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Peace? Defeat?
What Did the Vietnam War Protesters Want?
May/June 1997
by James Webb, American
Enterprise Institute
It is difficult to explain to my children that in my teens and
early twenties the most frequently heard voices of my peers were trying to
destroy the foundations of American society, so that it might be rebuilt
according to their own narcissistic notions. In retrospect it’s hard even for
some of us who went through those times to understand how highly educated
people—most of them spawned from the comforts of the upper-middle
class—could have seriously advanced the destructive ideas that were in the air
during the late ’60s and early ’70s. Even Congress was influenced by the
virus.
After President Nixon resigned in August of 1974, that fall’s
congressional elections brought 76 new Democrats to the House, and eight to the
Senate. A preponderance of these freshmen had run on McGovernesque platforms.
Many had been viewed as weak candidates before Nixon’s resignation, and some
were glaringly unqualified, such as then-26-year-old Tom Downey of New York, who
had never really held a job in his life and was still living at home with his
mother.
This so-called Watergate Congress rode into town with an
overriding mission that had become the rallying point of the American Left: to
end all American assistance in any form to the besieged government of South
Vietnam. Make no mistake—this was not the cry of a few years earlier to stop
young Americans from dying. It had been two years since the last American
soldiers left Vietnam and fully four years since the last serious American
casualty calls there.
For reasons that escape historical justification, even after
America’s military withdrawal the Left continued to try to bring down the
incipient South Vietnamese democracy. Future White House aide Harold Ickes and
others at “Project Pursestrings”—assisted at one point by an ambitious
young Bill Clinton—worked to cut off all congressional funding intended to
help the South Vietnamese defend themselves. The Indochina Peace Coalition, run
by David Dellinger and headlined by Jane Fonda and Tom Hayden, coordinated
closely with Hanoi throughout 1973 and 1974, and barnstormed across America’s
campuses, rallying students to the supposed evils of the South Vietnamese
government. Congressional allies repeatedly added amendments to spending bills
to end U.S. support of Vietnamese anti-Communists, precluding even air strikes
to help South Vietnamese soldiers under attack by North Vietnamese units that
were assisted by Soviet-bloc forces.
Then in early 1975 the Watergate Congress dealt non-Communist
Indochina the final blow. The new Congress icily resisted President Gerald
Ford’s January request for additional military aid to South Vietnam and
Cambodia. This appropriation would have provided the beleaguered Cambodian and
South Vietnamese militaries with ammunition, spare parts, and tactical weapons
needed to continue their own defense. Despite the fact that the 1973 Paris Peace
Accords called specifically for “unlimited military replacement aid” for
South Vietnam, by March the House Democratic Caucus voted overwhelmingly,
189-49, against any additional military assistance to Vietnam or Cambodia.
The rhetoric of the antiwar Left during these debates was filled
with condemnation of America’s war-torn allies, and promises of a better life
for them under the Communism that was sure to follow. Then-Congressman
Christopher Dodd typified the hopeless naiveté of his peers when he intoned
that “calling the Lon Nol regime an ally is to debase the word…. The
greatest gift our country can give to the Cambodian people is peace, not guns.
And the best way to accomplish that goal is by ending military aid now.” Tom
Downey, having become a foreign policy expert in the two months since being
freed from his mother’s apron strings, pooh-poohed the coming Cambodian
holocaust that would kill more than one-third of the country’s population,
saying, “The administration has warned that if we leave there will be a
bloodbath. But to warn of a new bloodbath is no justification for extending the
current bloodbath.”
On the battlefields of Vietnam the elimination of all U.S.
logistical support was stunning and unanticipated news. South Vietnamese
commanders had been assured of material support as the American military
withdrew—the same sort of aid the U.S. routinely provided allies from South
Korea to West Germany—and of renewed U.S. air strikes if the North attacked
the South in violation of the 1973 Paris Peace Accords. Now they were staring at
a terrifyingly uncertain future, even as the Soviets continued to assist the
Communist North.
As the shocked and demoralized South Vietnamese military sought
to readjust its forces to cope with serious shortages, the newly refurbished
North Vietnamese immediately launched a major offensive. Catching many units out
of position, the North rolled down the countryside over a 55-day period. In the
ensuing years I have interviewed South Vietnamese survivors of these battles,
many of whom spent ten years and more in Communist concentration camps after the
war. The litany is continuous: “I had no ammunition.” “I was down to three
artillery rounds per tube per day.” “I had nothing to give my soldiers.”
“I had to turn off my radio because I could no longer bear to hear their calls
for help.”
The reaction in the United States to this debacle defines two
distinct camps that continue to be identifiable in many of the issues we face
today. For most of those who fought in Vietnam, and for their families, friends,
and political compatriots, this was a dark and deeply depressing month. The
faces we saw running in terror from the North Vietnamese assault were real and
familiar, not simply video images. The bodies that fell like spinning snowflakes
toward cruel deaths after having clung hopelessly to the outer parts of
departing helicopters and aircraft may have been people we knew or tried to
help. Even for those who had lost their faith in America’s ability to defeat
the Communists, this was not the way it was supposed to end.
For those who had evaded the war and come of age believing our
country was somehow evil, even as they romanticized the intentions of the
Communists, these few weeks brought denials of their own responsibility in the
debacle, armchair criticisms of the South Vietnamese military, or open
celebrations. At the Georgetown University Law Center where I was a student, the
North’s blatant discarding of the promises of peace and elections contained in
the 1973 Paris Accords, followed by the rumbling of North Vietnamese tanks
through the streets of Saigon, was treated by many as a cause for actual
rejoicing.
Denial is rampant in 1997, but the truth is this end result was
the very goal of the antiwar movement’s continuing efforts in the years after
American withdrawal. George McGovern, more forthcoming than most, bluntly stated
as much to this writer during a break in taping a 1995 edition of CNN’s
“Crossfire.” After I had argued that the war was clearly winnable even
toward the end if we had changed our strategy, the 1972 presidential candidate
who had offered to go to Hanoi on his knees commented, “What you don’t
understand is that I didn’t want us to win that war.” Mr. McGovern was not
alone. He was part of a small but extremely influential minority who eventually
had their way.
There is perhaps no greater testimony to the celebratory
atmosphere that surrounded the Communist victory in Vietnam than the 1975
Academy Awards, which took place on April 8, just three weeks before the
South’s final surrender. The award for Best Feature Documentary went to the
film Hearts and Minds, a vicious piece of propaganda that assailed American
cultural values as well as our effort to assist South Vietnam’s struggle for
democracy. The producers, Peter Davis and Bert Schneider jointly accepted the
Oscar. Schneider was frank in his support of the Communists. As he stepped to
the mike he commented that “It is ironic that we are here at a time just
before Vietnam is about to be liberated.” Then came one of the most
stunning—if intentionally forgotten—moments in Hollywood history. As a
struggling country many Americans had paid blood and tears to try to preserve
was disappearing beneath a tank onslaught, Schneider pulled out a telegram from
our enemy, the Vietnamese Communist delegation in Paris, and read aloud its
congratulations to his film. Without hesitating, Hollywood’s most powerful
people rewarded Schneider’s reading of the telegram with a standing ovation.
Those of us who either fought in Vietnam or supported our efforts
there look at this 1975 “movie moment” with unforgetting and unmitigated
amazement. Who were these people who so energetically poisoned the rest of the
world’s view of us? How had they turned so virulently against their own
countrymen? How could they stand and applaud the victory of a Communist enemy
who had taken 58,000 American lives and crushed a struggling, pro-democratic
ally? Could they and the rest of us be said to be living in the same country
anymore?
Not a peep was heard then, or since, from Hollywood regarding the
people who disappeared behind Vietnam’s bamboo curtain. No one has ever
mentioned the concentration camps into which a million South Vietnamese soldiers
were sent; 56,000 to die, 250,000 to stay for more than six years, and some for
as long as 18. No one criticized the forced relocations, the corruption, or the
continuing police state. More to the point, with the exception of the
well-intentioned but artistically weak Hamburger Hill, one searches in vain for
a single major film since that time that has portrayed American soldiers in
Vietnam with dignity and in a true context.
Why? Because the film community, as with other elites, never
liked, respected, or even understood those who answered the call and served. And
at a time when a quiet but relentless battle is taking place over how history
will remember our country’s involvement in Vietnam, those who ridiculed
government policy, avoided military service, and actively supported an enemy who
turned out to be vicious and corrupt do not want to be remembered as having been
so naive and so wrong.
Among everyday Americans, attitudes during this troubled time
were much healthier. Behind the media filtering and distortion on Vietnam, the
fact is that our citizenry agreed far more consistently with those of us who
fought than with those who undermined our fight. This was especially true,
interestingly, among the young Americans now portrayed as having rebelled
against the war.
As reported in Public Opinion, Gallup surveys from 1966 to the
end of U.S. involvement show that younger Americans actually supported the
Vietnam War longer than any other age group. Even by January of 1973, when 68
percent of Americans over the age of 50 believed it had been a mistake to send
troops to Vietnam, only 49 percent of those between 25 and 29 agreed. These
findings that the youth cohort as a whole was distinctly un-radical were
buttressed by 1972 election results—where 18- to 29-year-olds preferred
Richard Nixon to George McGovern by 52 to 46 percent.
Similarly, despite persistent allegations to the contrary by
former protesters who now dominate media and academia, the 1970 invasion of
Cambodia—which caused widespread campus demonstrations, including a riot that
led to four deaths at Kent State University—was strongly supported by the
public. According to Harris surveys, nearly 6 in 10 Americans believed the
Cambodian invasion was justified. A majority in that same May 1970 survey
supported an immediate resumption of bombings in North Vietnam, a complete
repudiation of the antiwar movement.
Vietnam veterans, though persistently maligned in film, news
reports, and classrooms as unwilling, unsuccessful soldiers, have been well
thought of by average Americans. In the most comprehensive study ever done on
Vietnam vets (Harris Survey, 1980, commissioned by the Veterans Administration),
73 percent of the general public and 89 percent of Vietnam veterans agreed with
the statement that “The trouble in Vietnam was that our troops were asked to
fight in a war which our political leaders in Washington would not let them
win.” Seventy percent of those who fought in Vietnam disagreed with the
statement “It is shameful what my country did to the Vietnamese people.”
Fully 91 percent of those who served in Vietnam combat stated that they were
glad they had served their country, and 74 percent said they had enjoyed their
time in the military. Moreover, 71 percent of those who expressed an opinion
indicated that they would go to Vietnam again, even knowing the end result and
the ridicule that would be heaped on them when they returned.
This same survey contained what was called a “feelings
thermometer,” measuring the public’s attitudes toward various groups on a
scale of 1 to 10. Veterans who served in Vietnam rated a 9.8 on this scale.
Doctors scored a 7.9, TV reporters a 6.1, politicians a 5.2, antiwar
demonstrators a 5.0, and draft evaders who went to Canada came in at 3.3.
Contrary to persistent mythology, two-thirds of those who served
during Vietnam were volunteers rather than draftees, and 77 percent of those who
died were volunteers. Of those who died, 86 percent were Caucasian, 12.5 percent
were African-American, and 1.2 percent were from other races. The common claim
that it was minorities and the poor who were left to do the dirty work of
military service in Vietnam is false. The main imbalance in the war was simply
that the privileged avoided their obligations, and have persisted since that
time in demeaning the experience in order to protect themselves from the
judgment of history.
And what of these elites who misread not only a war but also
their own countrymen? Where are they now, other than in the White House? On this
vital historical issue that defined our generation, they now keep a low profile,
and well they should.
What an eerie feeling it must have been for those who staked the
journey of their youth on the idea that their own country was an evil force, to
have watched their naiveté unravel in the years following 1975. How sobering it
must have been for those who allowed themselves to move beyond their natural
denial, to observe the spectacle of hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese
fleeing the “pure flame of the revolution” on rickety boats that gave them a
50 percent chance of death at sea, or to see television pictures of thousands of
Cambodian skulls lying in open fields, part of the millions killed by Communist
“liberators.” How hollow the memories of drug-drenched and sex-enshrined
antiwar rallies must be; how false the music that beatified their supposedly
noble dissent.
Indeed, let’s be frank. How secretly humiliating to stare into
the face of a disabled veteran, or to watch the valedictory speech of the latest
Vietnamese-American kid whose late father fought alongside the Americans in a
cause they openly mocked, derided, and despised. And what a shame that the
system of government that allowed that student to be so quickly successful here
is not in place in the country of her origin.