Operations in Southern Quang Nam, 1-13 April 1971

By the beginning of April, the war in I Corps was reverting to its pre-Lam Son 719 pattern. Allied forces in Quang Tri and Thua Thien had resumed saturation patrolling of the populated lowlands. The allies also mounted occasional large-scale sweeps of enemy base areas, notably Operation Lam Son 720, a combined offensive in the A Shau and Da Krong Valleys by the 101st Airborne and 1st ARVN Divisions. In Quang Nam, as the first phase of the Communists’ K-850 Campaign came to an end, the 51st ARVN Regiment and the South Vietnamese RFs and PFs began another in the Hoang Dieu series of operations. The new offensive, Operation Hoang Dieu 107, was aimed at destroying enemy local forces and protecting the rice harvest.

The 1st Marines, now the only active infantry unit of III MAF, kept up small-unit warfare within its TAOI. The regiment’s 3d Battalion maintained its defense of the Hai Van Pass and patrolled and ambushed in the northwestern quadrant of the Rocket Belt. This battalion had a forward command post and one platoon on Hill 510 in the Que Sons, securing an artillery firebase and a haven for reconnaissance elements in Operation Imperial Lake. Also participating in Imperial Lake, the 1st Battalion used a platoon to protect a reconnaissance patrol base on western Charlie Ridge, while continuing to defend its portion of the Rocket Belt. The 2d Battalion coordinated the defense of Division Ridge and kept Marines in the field in pursuit of the VCI in the hamlets south of Da Nang.

With the enemy regrouping after the initial surge of the K-850 offensive, the Marines had few contacts during the first two weeks of April, although boobytraps remained a threat. Marine artillery accounted for most of the casualties inflicted on the enemy. On 10 April, for example, Marines manning the Integrated Observation Device on Hill 65 spotted a substantial group of VC and NVA with packs and rifles in the Arizona Territory south of the Vu Gia River and called for a fire mission by howitzers of Battery A, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. RFs and PFs from Dai Loc District, sweeping the area after the artillery bombardment, reported finding 30 dead Viet Cong.

In these final days before it redeployed, the 1st Marine Division made one last drive into Base Area 112 west of An Hoa. The division conducted this operation at the direction of MACV, which had received information indicating that U.S. and allied prisoners were being held in a camp hidden in the hills of western Quang Nam. III MAF intelligence officers doubted the accuracy of these reports, but the plight of American POWs had become a major political and diplomatic issue and the authorities in Saigon wanted to exploit even the slimmest chance of a spectacular rescue.*

Accordingly, III MAF on 7 April issued orders for the attack, codenamed Operation Scott Orchard. Under the plan, a provisional composite battery of 105mm and 155mm howitzers from the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines was to reopen FSB Dagger, used the previous autumn for Operation Catawba Falls. Then the 1st Marines, employing a reinforced infantry battalion, was to make a helicopter assault on the hills west of Dagger, where the POW camp was supposed to be located. The infantry were to search the area and, if they found an enemy prison compound, try to free the inmates. III MAF alerted Company A, 1st Medical Battalion to receive and care for diseased, dehydrated, and debilitated former prisoners and ordered that the attacking infantry be equipped with bolt cutters. Advance information about the operation was to be closely restricted and aerial reconnaissance of Dagger

*Since the beginning of major American involvement in the war, the Communists had refused to follow the Geneva Convention provisions governing accounting for and communicating with prisoners of war. By mid-1970, under increasing pressure from families of captured servicemen, the Nixon administration had begun making a public issue of the problem, using the Paris peace talks and other diplomatic channels to press the Communists for information about prisoners. The administration also tried forceable rescue. In late November 1970, a force of Army Rangers and Special Forces troops made a heliborne raid on Son Tay POW camp about 20 miles from the center of Hanoi. The raiders got in and out without casualties, but found the camp empty. For a discussion of the Son Tay raid and the POW issue in general, see Time, 7Dec70, pp. 15-21.
and the objective area kept to a minimum to avoid warning the enemy.

Despite the restriction on conducting an extensive reconnaissance of the target area, Lieutenant Colonel Roy E. Moss, then battalion commander of 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, recalled that he got permission from Colonel Kelley to make a quick aerial reconnaissance:

> Major Connie Silard and Major Jim Clark, the pilots of the helicopter, and my S-3, Major Tom Campbell, departed the afternoon of the 6th in a UH-1E to have a look at the area. We knew we would have the opportunity to make only one pass over the objective area, locate the LZs, and plot them on our maps. The area near Fire Support Base Dagger was extremely dense and suitable LZs were extremely difficult to spot, even from the air. We quickly pinpointed six suitable landing zones and then exited the area quickly in order not to give away our future intentions.

Following an intensive A-4 preparation of LZ Dagger, the operation began at 1045 on 7 April, when helicopters from MAG-16 inserted five teams from Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, a total of 14 Marines and two Navy corpsmen, on FSB Dagger. The teams searched the firebase for boobytraps and found two old ones. They had a brief firefight with three to five enemy, who quickly fled. A provisional platoon from Headquarters and Service Company of the 1st Battalion landed in trace of the reconnaissance units. At 1100, helicopters began bringing in two 105mm and four 155mm howitzers, with their crews and an infantry platoon. The infantry relieved the reconnaissance Marines in defense of the firebase. One of the reconnaissance teams was then lifted by helicopter to Hill 37, while the other remained at Dagger. By 1800, the artillery pieces were in position and ready to fire.

On the 8th, MAG-16 helicopters inserted five infantry companies (three from the 2d Battalion and one each from the 1st and 3d Battalions) under the operational control of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines into six landing zones. The helicopters also brought in four more reconnaissance teams. This complicated lift into six widely separated landing zones, which involved 24 CH-46s, 4 CH-53s, and extensive fixed-wing and gunship support, went so smoothly that the 1st MAW command history called it “a culmination of six years’ improvement on techniques and procedures developed prior to the Vietnam War.”

As III MAF had expected, Scott Orchard turned out to be a blow at empty air. From the 8th until the 11th, the rifle companies and reconnaissance teams maneuvered through the rugged country west of FSB Dagger. They found a scattering of small abandoned camps and caches and a number of old trails, but no prison compounds. Except for a few patrols and stragglers, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong had left long before the Marines arrived. The Marines did catch a few enemy. On 9 April, for example, a patrol from Company F encountered a lone Viet Cong in an open field and killed him. The following day, Marines from Company K spotted 15-30 North Vietnamese regulars wearing new-looking green utilities. In the ensuing exchange of fire, neither side suffered any casualties, and the NVA quickly withdrew. The artillery on FSB Dagger fired 235 missions during the operation, only two of them against observed enemy troops. On 11 April, helicopters lifted the infantry companies back to their battalion TA01 and extracted the reconnaissance teams. The artillery evacuated FSB Dagger the next day. In this, their last search and destroy operation of the war, the Marines suffered no casualties. They killed four enemy, three of them by artillery; took one prisoner; and captured 12 weapons and miscellaneous ammunition, food, clothing, and equipment. While establishing that Base Area 112 was still a very active line of communication, the Marines found no evidence of a prison camp.

East of the area of Operation Scott Orchard, elements of the 196th Brigade began moving into the Que Sons as the last Marine units cleared out of the mountains. On 6 April, part of Company B, 3d Battalion, 21st U.S. Infantry arrived by helicopter on Hill 510. The next day, Company C from the same battalion occupied Hill 65 to protect the Army artillery already stationed there. On 7 and 8 April, the forward command post, an infantry platoon from the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, and a 105mm howitzer detachment from Battery C, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines left Hill 510, the infantry elements returning to their battalion TA01 and the artillery going to the Northern Artillery Cantonment (NAC). On the 11th, the Marine mortar detachment displaced from Hill 425 to NAC. This movement, and the evacuation of FSB Dagger the following day, completed the removal of Marines from the area of Quang Nam south of the Vu Gia and Thu Bon.

At 2400 on 13 April, as planned earlier, the 1st Marine Division formally transferred responsibility for this portion of its TA01 to the Americal Division. By that time, all four companies of the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry were operating around Hill 510. Company, D of the 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry had taken over the
VIETNAMIZATION AND REDEPLOYMENT

Department of the Defense Photo (USMC) A702695

Photo of MajGen Alan J. Armstrong, Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and Commanding General, 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade.

defense of Hill 65. Elements of the 11th Combat Aviation Group, which would furnish helicopter support for the 196th Brigade, were moving in as tenants of MAG-16 at Marble Mountain.

Activation and Operations of the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade

With all Marines out of southern Quang Nam and the units scheduled for Keystone Robin Charlie either embarked or completing preparations for embarkation, the time had come to activate the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade. The organization, composition, and mission of the brigade had been laboriously worked out during the previous year. Planning and preparation for the activation of the brigade headquarters had begun in early February 1971, because

the process would be complicated and had to be conducted without interrupting control of operations and redeployments.

On 5 February, Lieutenant General William K. Jones, CG FMFPac, sent Lieutenant General Robertson a plan and schedule for command restructuring in the Western Pacific, which established the framework for activating the MAB. Under this plan, III MAF Headquarters would relocate to Okinawa on 14 April, and assume command of the 3d Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and 3d Force Service Regiment (FSR). The same day, the Commanding General, 1st MAW, Major General Alan J. Armstrong, was to activate and take command of the 3d MAB at Da Nang, while the bulk of the wing headquarters redeployed to Iwakuni, Japan to join the 1st MAW (Rear). The former rear headquarters then would become the new 1st MAW Headquarters and control all Marine air units in the Western Pacific outside Vietnam. Brigadier General Robert F. Conley, who commanded 1st MAW (Rear), was to become the new 1st MAW commander. Also on 14 April, Major General Widdecke and the 1st Marine Division Headquarters were to move to Camp Pendleton and assume command of all division units already there.

Shortly before General Jones set the schedule for the changes of command, on 3 February, the 1st Marine Division and 1st MAW staffs began informal discussion of the problems to be expected in organizing the brigade headquarters and transferring control of operations to it. Following these discussions, on 24 February, Brigadier General Simmons, the ADC, proposed that a small staff be organized on 1 March to devote full time to MAB activation planning. This staff, Simmons said, should be headed by the brigade chief of staff-designate, Colonel Boris J. Frankovic, and should include "one well qualified planner, preferably of field-grade," each from III MAF, the division, the wing, and Force Logistic Command. Other officers designated for assignment to the MAB staff could participate in the planning as required. Simmons proposed that the tasks of the staff include preparation of MAB operational and administrative plans, review of the brigade's communications requirements, preliminary planning for the Increment VII redeployments, and preparation for activation of the MAB Headquarters and Headquarters Company and for the physical establishment of the MAB command post.

III MAF accepted Brigadier General Simmons' proposal and on 27 February ordered activation of a

*The 3d MAB had been previously activated on 7 May 1965 when it was landed at Chu Lai with a mission of occupying the terrain necessary to construct an expeditionary airfield. Commanded by Brigadier General Marion E. Carl, it consisted of RLT 4 (Colonel Edward P. Dupras, Jr.), the advance elements of MAG-12 (Colonel John D. Noble), and Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 10 (Commander John M. Bannister, CEC, USN).
3d MAB planning staff on 1 March. The planning staff immediately began work, its deliberations supplemented by occasional conferences to coordinate the interests of the major commands. By 10 March, the schedule for forming the brigade headquarters had taken shape. Officers of the MAF, division, and wing assigned to the brigade were to be available for part-time work on MAB matters between 10 March and 13 April. Between 3 and 13 April, the 3d MAB staff would begin moving into the 1st Marine Division CP, which had been established as the site for the brigade CP. The MAF, division, and wing headquarters were to continue their normal operations until activation of the brigade on 14 April, but beginning around 7 April, the MAF and wing would relocate key staff functions and personnel to the division CP.11

On 15 March Lieutenant General Jones, confirming what he had indicated in his 5 February message to Robertson, appointed Major General Alan J. Armstrong to command the brigade. Armstrong, a native of Nebraska, had been a Marine aviator since 1941. A World War II veteran, Armstrong had come to Vietnam in June 1970 to command the 1st MAW, after completing a tour as Director of the Marine Corps Development Center at Quantico. In selecting Armstrong to command the brigade, HQMC and FMFPac set aside Brigadier General Simmons, who had been the initial designee for the assignment. This decision resulted from continuing concern that a one-star general might be at a disadvantage in dealing with the other Services and other Service commands, especially the Seventh Air Force. Also, the Marines expected air operations to continue longer than ground operations under brigade control. They also thought aviation redeployment problems would be a principal concern of the MAB commander. Hence Armstrong was selected as brigade commander, with Brigadier General Simmons reassigned as his deputy.12

The brigade staff now took final shape. As early as July of the previous year, Marine planners had developed a list of MAB Headquarters billets and had decided which of them should be filled from the MAF, division, wing, and FLC staffs. Assignment of particular officers to jobs had begun late in 1970 and was largely completed by mid-March. In making these assignments, the planners emphasized continuity in key positions. According to General Simmons, "The function performed by the Headquarters, III Marine Amphibious Force, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and 1st Marine Division were all telescoped together, reduced in scale, and in most cases continued to be performed by the same persons who had had the job all along." For example, four officers from the division FSCC remained in the MAB FSCC. The organizers of the MAB staff often disregarded the usual practice of automatically redeploying Marines with the least time remaining in their Southeast Asia tours. Major General Armstrong declared:

... This business of continuity—that's the reason it worked. We got some criticism... because they didn't put the right [Rotation T]our [D]ates in the billets that would make the MAB come out even and the people all go home. ... That's again the numbers business waggin' the operational dog. We put... the people... in there because they were people that were considered essential for the jobs, and that's why it went so well... 13

The 3d MAB planning staff, in conjunction with representatives of the MAF, division, wing, and FLC, revised and refined the schedules previously drawn up for redeployment of the brigade. By 22 March, carrying out General Abram's 17 February directive to prepare for another withdrawal between 1 May and 30 June, the Marines had drafted a timetable under which the infantry and artillery units of the MAB would stand down between mid-April and mid-May. The aviation and support elements were to cease operations during late May and early June.14

Establishment of the 3d MAB Headquarters went forward on schedule. By 24 March, the Marines who were to operate the brigade communications center were in position at the division CP. Most of the equipment, facilities, and personnel to operate the MAB communications center came from Communication Support Company, 7th Communication Battalion. Early in April, the officers and enlisted men assigned to the various MAB staff sections began moving into the offices of their counterpart division staff sections. Many entire headquarters elements became part of the MAB staff. The III MAF G-4 section, for example, transferred its real estate management, equipment redistribution, ordnance, and embarkation offices intact to 3d MAB Headquarters. On 8 April, the brigade staff took charge of conducting the daily operations briefing for General Robertson; on the same day, the 1st MAW began directing tactical air operations from the division command post.15

As the MAB Headquarters was taking shape, President Nixon on 7 April announced the long-expected new troop withdrawal which was to end the brigade's short operational life. Declaring to the American peo-
ple that "The American involvement in Vietnam is coming to an end," Nixon directed the removal of another 100,000 U.S. military personnel from Vietnam by 1 December 1971, an action which would reduce the total number of Americans in the country to 184,000. Under JCS instructions, MACV promptly issued orders to execute the first increment of the new withdrawal, codenamed Keystone Oriole Alpha. As previously planned, Keystone Oriole Alpha was to involve 29,000 men, including all of the 3d MAB.

III MAF began implementing the MAB redeployment plan developed during March, actually initiating the Keystone Oriole Alpha withdrawal before all the units in Keystone Robin Charlie had left Vietnam. On 13 April the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines ceased combat operations and moved to Hill 34 to prepare for embarkation. The same day, Battery A, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines stood down at Hill 65 and displaced to the Northern Artillery Cantonment, while the 2d CAG deactivated CACOs 2-1 and 2-2, with a total of 10 CAPs. The CAG now had only three CACOs still in operation.\(^1\)

On the 12th and 13th, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines redistributed its forces to fill in for the 1st Battalion. Company E of the 2d Battalion occupied Hill 10, just northeast of the foot of Charlie Ridge. A platoon of Company F, heavily reinforced with machine gun and mortar detachments and accompanied by an artillery forward observer and a forward air controller, took position on Hill 785, about five miles northeast of Thuong Duc. This platoon was to protect a patrol base for reconnaissance teams involved in Operation Imperial Lake. Company G sent a platoon to hold Hill 270, an artillery position in the foothills west of Hill 10. The rest of the 2d Battalion, which was scheduled to be the last operational Marine infantry battalion in Vietnam, continued operations south of Da Nang and on Division Ridge.\(^1\)

On 14 April, with all sections of the brigade staff in position and functioning, Lieutenant General Robertson officially activated the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade during a ceremony at Camp Jay K. Books, the Force Logistic Command compound northwest of Da Nang. At the same time, Major General Armstrong assumed command of the MAB, to which Robertson assigned all III MAF units remaining in Vietnam. The ceremony, attended by over 100 high-ranking U.S. and South Vietnamese guests, included a parade by units representing the MAF, division, wing, and FLC and a fly-over by 16 1st MAW aircraft. In his brief remarks before the troops passed in review, Robertson paid tribute to the Marines of III MAF. "Results of our combined efforts," he said, "surround us in the security in the hillsides, construction of buildings and prosperity of the people. . . . I am proud to have been a partner in that effort."\(^1\)

Following the ceremony, Robertson, with his staff and the III MAF flag, boarded a plane for Okinawa, where he was to reestablish force headquarters. Major General Widdecke left for Camp Pendleton the same day, stopping en route for a debrief at FMFPac in Camp Smith, Hawaii. General Widdecke's arrival in Camp Pendleton was preceded by his chief of staff, Colonel Don B. Blanchard, who traveled on a separate aircraft with the division colors. Colonel Blanchard had also served with the 1st Marine Division at Guadalcanal as a corporal and in Korea as a captain.\(^1\) The 1st MAW staff took the wing colors to Iwakuni, where the 1st MAW (Rear), the nucleus of the new wing headquarters, was located.\(^1\) For each command, the removal of its colors from Vietnam signalled the formal end of its war service.

With the departure of the colors on 14 April, almost six years of war ended for the III Marine Amphibious Force. Activated at Da Nang on 7 May 1965 to command the 3d Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, the force had grown with the expanding American involvement in the war until it reached a 1968 peak strength of over 150,000 Marine, Army, and Navy personnel, in two reinforced Marine divisions, a Marine aircraft wing, and two Army divisions. III MAF had been one of the largest Marine combat commands ever established and had directed most of the American war effort in northern South Vietnam. Now it would revert to the MAF role of directing the Marine ready forces in the Western Pacific.

The 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade began its brief existence with a total strength of 1,322 Marine and 124 Navy officers and 13,359 Marine and 711 Navy enlisted men. Its infantry element consisted of Colonel Kelley's 1st Marines, the 1st Battalion of which already had stood down. The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines and the 3d 8-inch Howitzer Battery constituted the brigade artillery. Company A (Rein), 1st Reconnaissance Battalion furnished long-range patrol capability. The 1st

- Although 1st MAW elements served in Vietnam since 1962, the wing headquarters did not move to Da Nang until 1965. The 1st MAW then evolved into the largest wing in Marine history, including fixed-wing and helicopter squadrons, and air control assets for air defense and air-ground coordination.
Military Police Battalion remained to protect the Da Nang Vital Area, and the 2d CAG continued its hamlet security efforts. Supporting units of the brigade included a Communication Support Company from the 7th Communication Battalion and one reinforced company each from the 1st Medical Battalion, 1st Motor Transport Battalion, 1st Shore Party Battalion, and the 1st and 7th Engineer Battalions. In Brigadier General James R. Jones's Force Logistic Command, the flag of the 1st Force Service Regiment had been moved to Camp Pendleton in Keystone Robin Charlie. FLC now had separate headquarters, supply, and maintenance battalions under its command.

The brigade aviation element, the organization of which had been the subject of so much debate during the long planning process, consisted of two aircraft groups. MAG-11, under Colonel Albert C. Pommerenck, included VMA-311, VMA(AW)-225, and a detachment of OV-10s under H&MS-11. Colonel Lewis C. Street III's MAG-16 consisted of HMH-463, HMLs -167 and -367, and HMMs -262 and -263. This disproportionately large helicopter complement resulted from the redeployment postponements caused by Lam Son 719. Air operations were now controlled by the aviation section of the MAB staff, with tactical air support directed by a direct air support center (DASC)* located at the brigade CP.20

Brigade operations began with additional reductions and stand-downs. On 15 April, the last four CUPP squads of the 1st Marines, which had been protecting hamlets just north of Hill 55, was deactivated, concluding the Combined Unit Pacification Program. Between 20 April and the end of the month, VMA(AW)-225, one of MAG-11's two fixed-wing squadrons, ceased combat operations and redeployed to MCAS El Toro.21

The remaining two active infantry battalions of the

*This DASC also discharged the functions of the Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC). See Chapter 15.
1st Marines continued saturation patrolling within their TAOIs. The 2d Battalion, besides operating south of Da Nang and around Hill 10, kept platoons on Hills 785 and 270 and coordinated the defense of Division (now Brigade) Ridge by the units stationed there. The 3d Battalion used one of its companies in rotation as regimental reserve and quick reaction force and kept the other three in the field north and northwest of Da Nang. Marines of both battalions had few contacts with the enemy. Those that did occur, following the by now usual pattern, were brief exchanges of fire with small Communist groups that showed no disposition to stand and fight. Reconnaissance teams scouted Charlie Ridge and Elephant Valley, sighting a few enemy but experiencing no combat. The 2d CAG, with its remaining three CACOs operating in Dien Ban, Hieu Nhon, and Hoa Vang Districts close in around Da Nang, also reported only light contact.22

The brigade artillery unit, the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, had only two 105mm batteries, Battery B on Hill 55 and Battery C at the Northern Artillery Cantonment (NAC). Battery C also maintained a two-howitzer detachment on Hill 270. Each 105mm howitzer battery had an attached platoon of two 155mm howitzers. The 107mm mortar battery was located at the Northern Artillery Cantonment, and the 3d 8-inch Howitzer Battery had two platoons deployed at the NAC and a third on Hill 55. Battery D, 1st Battalion, 82d U.S. Artillery on Hill 65 remained under operational control of the Marine artillery battalion until 16 April, when it passed to XXIV Corps Artillery control.

Between 14 and 30 April, these artillery units fired 1,229 missions in the 3d MAB TAOI, expending 3,869 rounds. Many of these missions were fired at a suspected enemy rocket storage site near La Bong village, about five miles southwest of Da Nang. This village lay in a swampy area along the banks of the Yen River, a small river often used by the Communists to move rockets into firing range of the city and airbase. On 22 and 23 April again and on the 25th and the 26th, Company H, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines directed fire into the La Bong area, causing 42 major and 139 minor secondary explosions.23

During the MAB's first two weeks of operation, the ARVN and the U.S. Army took over the defense of most of Quang Nam. All four of the 51st ARVN Regiment's battalions were in the field southwest of the Marines, sweeping enemy-infested areas around Hill 55, An Hoa, and in the Arizona Territory. Regional and Popular Forces assumed a steadily increasing share of responsibility for patrolling the pacified and semi-pacified portions of the province. The South Vietnamese, both regulars, RFs and PFs, encountered substantial action, reporting 435 enemy killed, 200 VC suspects seized, and 152 weapons captured during March and April.24

The U.S. Army presence in Quang Nam expanded rapidly. By 14 April, Battery D, 1st Battalion, 82d U.S. Artillery had relieved the 1st Marines as the command responsible for defense of Hill 65. In preparation for the 1 May Army takeover of most of Quang Nam, the 3d MAB and the 196th Brigade agreed on 21 April that the Army brigade would begin operations on Charlie Ridge immediately and that on the 27th, an Army battalion would deploy in a two-and-one-half-square-mile area around Hill 350 in the northwestern part of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines TAOI.

Carrying out this agreement, on 21-22 April, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines removed its platoons from Hills 785 and 270, and the howitzer detachment displaced from Hill 270 to NAC. Elements of the 1st Battalion, 46th U.S. Infantry immediately occupied Hill 270. On the 27th, the 4th Battalion, 31st U.S. Infantry began moving onto Hill 350. Two days later, the 196th Brigade assumed responsibility for all of Quang Nam Province north of the Vu Gia and Thu Bon Rivers and west of a north-south line about 10 miles west of Da Nang.25

While the combat units of the 196th Brigade deployed in the field, the rear elements of the infantry battalions and the artillery, headquarters, and support units began moving into Marine cantonments on Brigade Ridge. Between 21 and 30 April, the Army took possession of the camps of the 1st Medical Battalion and the 11th Motor Transport Battalion, the former 11th Marines CP, the old 1st Reconnaissance Battalion base at Camp Reasoner, and the 1st Marines headquarters compound at Camp Perdue. Marines continued to occupy portions of these installations, but now as tenants in Army-controlled facilities. All formerly Marine-established and occupied facilities for which no tenant, U.S. Army or RVNAF, was available or which were of no lasting "military or economic value" were dismantled to avoid the requirement to garrison them with security forces.26

As the allies carried out these troop redeployments, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong opened Phase Two of their K-850 offensive on 26 April, with another surge of rocket, mortar, and small ground attacks.
throughout Quang Nam. In spite of the Marines' preemptive shelling of the La Bong storage area, the Communists fired nine rockets at Da Nang Air Base and Marble Mountain in the small hours of the 26th, wounding seven soldiers. At the same time, the NVA and VC hit Dien Ban District Headquarters with a 60-round mortar barrage which killed one civilian, wounded another, and destroyed a number of homes. At 0210 on the 27th, the enemy fired four more 122mm rockets at Da Nang airfield. These rockets ignited two fuel storage tanks, and over 500,000 gallons of jet fuel and aviation gasoline went up in flames. With the exception of the rocket attacks, the Communists continued to direct most of their attention to South Vietnamese units and installations while avoiding American positions. According to the 3d MAB intelligence staff, the second surge of the K-850 offensive "did not reach the levels planned due to coordination and logistic problems, resulting in a low level of activity throughout the province."27

The Communists had more success with terrorism and political agitation, which they intensified in connection with the offensive. On 25 April, for instance, 15 Viet Cong entered Kim Lien, a valley in the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines TAOI where the battalion had conducted intensive pacification operations. The guerrillas killed the hamlet chief and five people's self defense force members and wounded three other PSDF troops before withdrawing. On the night of 26-27 April, about 60 NVA and VC invaded two hamlets of Hoa Vinh Village, just south of the Cau Do River, collected rice and money, and held propaganda meetings. The enemy attempted the same kind of incursion at Hoa Thanh, another village in the 3d Battalion's TAOI, but there Popular Force troops repelled the intruders.28

Unaffected by the Communist offensive, the 196th Brigade continued its movement into Quang Nam and by 30 April had deployed three of its four infantry battalions in the province. All four companies of the 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry were patrolling around Hill 350. The 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry had established its command post on Hill 270 and was maneuvering its companies on western Charlie Ridge. The 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry continued to sweep the Que Sons from its base on Hill 510. The brigade's remaining infantry battalion, the 2d of the 1st U.S. Infantry occupied Hill 65 with one company. Another company was in the field northeast of An Hoa, while the rest of the battalion completed preparations to leave its former TAOI in Quang Tin. As planned, all of the

196th Brigade was moving into the mountains west and southwest of Da Nang, leaving protection of the lowlands to the ARVN, the RFs and PFs, and the remaining Marines.29

With Army troops moving into position on the edges of the 3d MAB TAOI and the enemy avoiding Marine units, 3d MAB operations resulted in few casualties on either side. Between 14 and 30 April, the brigade killed only 22 Viet Cong and captured 10 individual weapons. With Marine units of 3d MAB moving progressively into a stand-down posture during April, patrol activities numbered just over 2,000 where as in February, with more ground combat units available and patrolling more intensely, more than 6,000 were recorded.30 Reflecting the decline in activity, Marine casualties in the same period amounted to two dead and 45 wounded.

The two aircraft groups of the MAB kept up the tempo of operations. Even with VMA(AW)-225 standing down on the 20th, jets of MAG-11 flew 436 sorties in the last two weeks of April. They conducted 44 of these in support of Imperial Lake and most of the rest for other Marine operations in Quang Nam and U.S. Army and ARVN offensives elsewhere in Military Region 1. MAG-16's helicopters completed 10,473 sorties in the same period, carrying 1,064 tons of cargo and 12,154 passengers.31

The End of Keystone Robin Charlie

During the last days of April, the remaining Marines scheduled for Keystone Robin Charlie embarked. Between 14 and 25 April, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines; the 1st Medical Battalion (-); the 11th Motor Transport Battalion; and the Headquarters Battalion (-), 1st Marine Division left Da Nang by ship and plane. The surface embarkation, coordinated by the Army Port Authority, proceeded well enough but not without a problem or two. The staging areas for unit equipment to be reloaded were selected to conform with the anticipated piers where ships for dedicated units were supposed to tie up. When the ships arrived, however, recalled Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Wehrle, commanding officer of Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division:

It appeared almost as if it was a random selection by the pilot as to which pier he put the ship on. There was no match up between the staging area at the head of the pier and the ship that was on the pier. As a consequence, we had a tremendous cross traffic of material handling equipment at-
declared. In his remarks to the division, Nixo n
Vietnam service, the eighth PUC to be received by the
vision with its second Presidential Unit Citation fo r
John W. Warner; Admiral John S. McCain, CinCPac;
no (LST 1182), and USS
occasion, the President presented the 1st Marine Di -
families, and local school children bused in for th e
rines, and the 5th Marines' ceremonial unit wa s
from each regiment and battalion, including those still
commander, staff, colors, and a ceremonial platoo n
Corps. Major General Widdecke, his staff, and th e
review. The Commandant, General Leonard F. Chap -
Pacific Fleet (ComPacFlt), were present at this special
and Admiral Bernard A. Clarey, Commander-in-Chief
the 1st Marine Division home during an elaborat e
Robin Charlie, on 30 April President Nixon welcomed
bic feet of cargo had been moved out of Vietnam
*For details on embarkation see Chapter 19.
**USS Cleveland (LPD 7), USS Anchorage (LSD 36), USS Fre s-
Bronco, 1st U.S. Cavalry began operations in the
brigade's attached armored cavalry squadron, the 1st
was deactivated CACOs 2-4 and 2-7, with 10 combine d
stand-down date of 7 May. On
but was to remain active until its previously scheduled
sance Battalion ended tactical operations on the 1st ,
drew its platoon from Hill 55 to Camp Faulkner nea r
The 3d 8-inch Howitzer Battery stood down and with-
continued to conduct fire missions for another week .
was left in the field. MAG-16's HMM-263 stood down
action platoons; only CACO 2-3, with six CAPs, now
ended operations at the Northern Artillery Canton-
the Mortar Battery of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines
ers of the 2d Battalion. Also on 1 May, Battery C and
its remaining infantry in the field to the headquart-
transferring direction of air and artillery support fo r
rines Headquarters ceased operations that same day ,
Brigade Ridge to prepare for embarkation. The 1st Ma-
moved with three of its companies to Camp 14 on
3d Battalion, 1st Marines stood down on the 1st an d
and turnover of Quang Nam to the 196th Brigade. The
3d Battalion, 1st Marines stood down on the 1st and moved with three of its companies to Camp 14 on
Brigade Ridge to prepare for embarkation. The 1st Ma-
ines Headquarters ceased operations that same day, transferring direction of air and artillery support for its remaining infantry in the field to the headquart-
ers of the 2d Battalion. Also on 1 May, Battery C and
the Mortar Battery of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines
ended operations at the Northern Artillery Canton-
ment, although two 155mm howitzers of Battery C continued to conduct fire missions for another week.
The 3d 8-inch Howitzer Battery stood down and with-
drew its platoon from Hill 55 to Camp Faulkner near Marble Mountain. Company A (Rein), 1st Reconnais-
sance Battalion ended tactical operations on the 1st, but was to remain active until its previously scheduled stand-down date of 7 May. On 1 May, the 2d CAG deactivated CACOs 2-4 and 2-7, with 10 combined action platoons; only CACO 2-3, with six CAPs, now was left in the field. MAG-16's HMM-263 stood down and began preparing its CH-46s and equipment for embarkation.

As these units ceased operations, the 196th Brigade extended its TAOI to cover all of Quang Nam outside the boundaries of Hoa Vang District. The Army brigade's attached armored cavalry squadron, the 1st Squadron, 1st U.S. Cavalry began operations in the
province on the 1st. Its CP was at Camp Faulkner and two troops, A and B, were in the field near the Thu Bon River.37

Within Hoa Vang District, Lieutenant Colonel Roy E. Moss’s 2d Battalion, 1st Marines reshuffled its companies to protect Brigade Ridge and continue saturation patrolling of the small portion of the Rocket Belt left to the Marines. The battalion had six rifle companies under its control, its own four organic companies, a provisional Brigade Ridge defense company drawn from its headquarters and rear elements, and Company K of the 3d Battalion. The 1st Military Police Battalion continued to protect Da Nang airfield. Outside the 3d MAB TAOR, the six CAPs of CACO 2-3 guarded hamlets in Dien Ban District; and Battery B, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines stayed in position on Hill 55. This battery, reinforced by the 155mm howitzer platoon of Battery C at NAC, now provided all of the MAB’s artillery support.

The last week of ground operations went quietly for the Marines. The 2d Battalion and the 1st MP Battalion conducted 117 small-unit patrols and 129 squad ambushes between 1 and 7 May, with no enemy contact and no encounters with boobytraps. CACO 2-3 also had a relatively uneventful week, reporting a few minor enemy attacks by fire. MAG-11, with only VMA-311 still operational, flew 80 sorties and dropped 128.7 tons of ordnance during the week, while helicopters of MAG-16 flew 3,691 sorties and carried 5,691 tons of cargo and 6,563 passengers.38

During the first days of May, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong continued Phase Two of their K-850 Campaign. Their pressure on South Vietnamese forces reached a climax on the 2d and 3d, when at least 200 men, later identified as members of the 38th NVA Regiment and the Q-83d Viet Cong Battalion, launched a series of mortar and ground attacks on RF and PF positions in Dai Loc District, southwest of Da Nang. In the heaviest of these assaults, at 0245 on the 2d, a reinforced company of VC infantry and sappers stormed Dai Loc District Headquarters near Hill 37 behind a mortar and rocket barrage. The Communists managed to blow up a bridge and an ammunition dump, but were driven off by Regional Force troops. In the fight at the district headquarters and in other small engagements, the Dai Loc Regional and Popular Forces, almost all of whom had been trained by Marine combined action units, gave a good account of themselves. Fighting largely without U.S. air support, which was hampered by cloudy weather, the RFs and PFs in two days killed 95 Communists and captured 43 individual and crew-served weapons, at a cost of 15 dead and 43 wounded. This success, and other minor RF and PF victories throughout the province during the spring, appeared to vindicate the Marines’ long, patient effort to improve the once-neglected local forces.39

Occasional rocket attacks reminded 3d MAB Marines of the continuing Communist offensive. On 3 May, eight rockets landed on Hill 55, destroying an ARVN bunker and killing one South Vietnamese soldier and wounding five others and one U.S. Marine. The enemy fired two rocket salvos at Da Nang Airbase on the 5th, three missiles at 0400 and six more at 2300. Most of the rockets overshot the airfield and exploded in Da Nang City, where they killed six Vietnamese civilians and injured six others and three ARVN soldiers.40 The overall impact of enemy attacks was negligible and seemed to demonstrate the VC/NVA reluctance to do more than harass the withdrawing Marines, knowing that with the Marine removal from the Da Nang TAOR remaining allied targets would be potentially more lucrative.

During the first week of May, the last week of combat operations, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Raymond G. Davis, who was visiting Vietnam, accepted an invitation from Lieutenant Colonel Roy E. Moss, commander of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, to stop for lunch with Company F which was to be the last combat unit of the battalion withdrawn from operations. Moss recalled:

General Davis accepted this offer and arrived at the 2d Battalion command post about 1130 and we then flew to Foxtrots’s company position a few miles south of Hill 34. Capt Mark [T.] Hehnen, the Foxtrots Company commander, had been alerted to these plans and had a lunch of “C” rations and hamburger patties waiting upon our arrival. Of course, Captain Hehnen had ensured tight security around the area and, for about one-half hour, General Davis, Lieutenant Colonel C. [Clyde] D. Dean and myself, and a few members of the company had lunch and an interesting conversation with the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. Needless to say, we didn’t carry on too long and, after we finished chatting, boarded helicopters back to the 2d Battalion CP where I departed and General Davis continued on his planned itinerary.41

On 7 May, all units of the 3d MAB ceased combat operations. The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines turned defense of Brigade Ridge over to two companies from the 196th Brigade and withdrew to Hill 34 to stand down. At noon of the previous day, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce F. Ogden, commander of the 1st Battalion, 11th
Marines fired the last Marine artillery round of the war from one of the 155mm howitzers of Battery C at the NAC. On the 7th, Battery B, and the 1st Battalion Headquarters Battery stood down; and Battery B displaced from Hill 55 to Camp Books to prepare for embarkation and the transfer of its weapons to the Vietnamese Marine Corps. That same day, the 2d Combined Action Group deactivated its last CACO, 2-3. The 1st Military Police Battalion turned over defense of Da Nang Airbase to the 104th Regional Force Battalion and the 796th RF Company, but, unlike most of the 3d MAB units ceasing operations on 7 May, the MP battalion remained active. It deployed companies to protect the Force Logistic Command installations where the other Marine organizations were standing down.42

At 1200 on the 7th, the 3d MAB terminated Operation Imperial Lake. This operation, which had begun in the Que Sons on 1 September of the previous year, eventually had involved elements of all three regiments of the 1st Marine Division. In the final days of operations in Quang Nam, it had been extended to cover all patrol and ambush activity. In almost nine months, Marines in Imperial Lake had killed 126 North Vietnamese and 179 Viet Cong and captured 215 individual and 16 crew-served weapons, while losing 24 Marines and two Navy corpsmen killed and 170 Marines and three corpsmen wounded. The conclusion of this long running search and destroy operation graphically demonstrated that, for Marines, the ground war in Vietnam was over.43

Marine fixed-wing aviation operations also ended on 7 May. After flying a final 14 sorties over Laos in support of the Seventh Air Force, VMA-311 stood down, as did H&MS-11’s detachment of OV-10As. HMM-262 stood down on the 7th, but the other helicopter squadrons of MAG-16 remained operational for noncombat missions.44

With Marine combat operations at an end, on the 7th the 196th Brigade enlarged its TA0I again to include Hoa Vang District and Da Nang Airbase and city. The Army brigade also took possession of the former 1st Marine Division command post, with 3d MAB Headquarters sharing the facility. The remaining infantry battalion of the 196th Brigade, the 2d Battalion, 1st U.S. Infantry completed its displacement northward from Quang Tin. By 8 May, this battalion had set up its CP on Hill 151, named LZ Chloe by the Army, about four miles east of An Hoa in the northern foothills of the Que Sons. One company of the 2d Battalion continued to garrison Hill 65, another was located at Da Nang, and the remaining two were in the field near Hill 151.45

The 1st Marines was the last of eight Marine infantry regiments to leave Vietnam. The last detachment of the regiment’s 1st Battalion, which had stood down on 13 April, left Da Nang on 3 May. By the 13th, the regimental headquarters company and the 3d Battalion were on their way to the United States. The regiment had entered Vietnam in 1965 and 1966, with one battalion landing at each of the then three major Marine enclaves: Chu Lai, Hue/Phu Bai, and Da Nang. In the next six years, the 1st Marines had taken part in over 50 operations, including the battle of Hue during the 1968 Communist Tet offensive. Late that same year, the regiment had moved to Quang Nam, participating in Operation Meade River, one of the largest Marine helicopter assaults of the war, in which over 1,000 VC/NVA were killed and 299 captured. The regiment spent the next two and one-half years before its withdrawal rooting the enemy out of Quang Nam Province.46

The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines also quickly redeployed. Battery A of the battalion had embarked for Camp Pendleton on 1 May. On the 10th, Headquarters Battery, Battery C, and the Mortar Battery moved to Camp Books from the Northern Artillery Cantonment, which was then transferred to the ARVN. Three days later, the battalion command group and the colors boarded a plane for the United States, while other personnel and equipment of Headquarters Battery, Battery C, and the Mortar Battery left Da Nang on board the USS Ogden (LPD 5).47

Still other ground and air units of the MAB left Vietnam in the week after the termination of offensive operations. Between 10 and 13 May, Company A (Reinforced), 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, redeployed to Camp Pendleton. VMA-311 flew its planes to Iwakuni on the 12th, and the following day HMMs-262 and -263 completed embarkation, respectively for Hawaii and Quantico. These early departures were in accord with Lieutenant General Robertson’s view that “when the time comes to withdraw from an area like that, keep active up to the last minute, then roll up and get the devil out.”48

By 14 May, the units of 3d MAB still in Vietnam were all in the positions they would occupy until they redeployed. The two aircraft groups remained at the airfields from which they had operated, MAG-11 at Da Nang Airbase and MAG-16 at Marble Mountain.
On Hill 34, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines and the 3d 8-inch Howitzer Battery, which had moved from Camp Faulkner, were completing embarkation preparations. Battery B, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines and the engineer, shore party, and motor transport companies of the 3d MAB all were at Camp Books. Company A, 1st Medical Battalion remained at the battalion's former cantonment on Brigade Ridge. The 1st MP Battalion Headquarters was at Camp Stokes near Da Nang airfield. The Force Logistic Command continued to operate embarkation facilities at Camp Haskins on Red Beach. All of these organizations, aided by the MPs, provided protection for their camps, but beyond their perimeters the ground was controlled by the Quang Nam Regional and Popular Forces, the ARVN, and the 196th Brigade.49

As unit after unit stood down and redeployed, Marine civic action came to an end. Most organizations continued their efforts in this field until late in the process of preparing to redeploy, concentrating on providing material for village self-help projects and conducting frequent MedCaps. They tried to finish long-term construction and other projects before they departed. After its activation, the 3d MAB continued spending public and private civic action funds that the MAF, division, and wing had left behind. The brigade used a large portion of this money to buy building, plumbing, and electrical supplies for the Quang Tri Child Care Center, the former 3d Marine Division Memorial Children's Hospital, which was now nearing completion.

Two ceremonies in mid-May signalled the end of the long, often frustrating, and occasionally rewarding Marine pacification and civic action campaign. On 11 May, the 2d Combined Action Group Headquarters departed its compound near Hoi An, after a farewell parade and a speech of gratitude and good wishes from Colonel Le Tri Tin, the Quang Nam Province Chief. Three days later, at Quang Tri, Major General Armstrong participated in the dedication of the Child Care Center, a combined orphanage, maternity clinic, and secondary school dormitory. By the end of May, the brigade could report, "3d MAB civic action program terminated."50

During the final weeks of May, the two Marine aircraft groups ceased operations and turned their facilities over to the U.S. Air Force and the Army. Both of the MAG-11 jet squadrons had redeployed during the first part of the month. On 19 May, the ground elements of the group, H&MS-11 and MABS-11, ceased operations. Two days later, Colonel Pommerenk transferred control of the MAG-11 area on the west side of Da Nang airfield to the Air Force, although units of MAG-11 remained until early June completing embarkation preparations.

At Marble Mountain, HMH-463 stood down on 18 May. Eight days later, HMLs -167 and -367 ended operations, as did H&MS-16 and MABS-16. Two Hueys of HML-167 remained operational until 15 June to support the MAB headquarters, but the rest of the helicopter group concentrated on readying equipment and aircraft for embarkation. On 1 June, Colonel Street turned possession of Marble Mountain Air Facility over to the Army's 11th Combat Aviation Group.51

While the aircraft groups completed their stand-down procedures, most of the remaining infantry and artillery of the 3d MAB left Vietnam. On 19 May, Lieutenant Colonel Moss, the command group, and the colors of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines boarded a plane for Camp Pendleton. The rest of the battalion followed in several detachments. On 1 June, the last 186 officers and men of the last Marine infantry battalion in Vietnam left Da Nang on board the USS Denver (LPD 9). The 3d 8-inch Howitzer Battery had embarked on 24 May, and Battery B, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines also went out on the Denver on 1 June.52

With its ground combat and combat support units gone, the 3d MAB rapidly wound up its activities. On 4 June, as General Armstrong put it, the Marine Corps "went out of the real estate business" in Vietnam with the turnover of the last 3d MAB cantonment, Camp Books, to the Army. Force Logistic Command continued using Camp Books and the Retrograde Facility at Red Beach, turned over earlier to the ARVN 1st Area Logistic Command, to prepare material for embarkation. With no more Marine controlled installations to protect, the 1st Military Police Battalion stood down on 7 June. The MPs and the remaining aviation, engineer, and medical units redeployed during the next three weeks. FLC, which assisted these last departing organizations, finished loading Marine supplies and equipment. The FLC redeployed in several detachments.53

Occasional enemy rocket attacks continued during the final weeks of logistic activity. According to Armstrong, an afternoon salvo on 5 June:

... jolted everyone. We had convinced ourselves they only did that at night. We were fortunate... MAG-11 lost a utility shed about 100 feet from Colonel Al Pommerenk's quarters. He had a good scare and shakeup. With three
days to go [before redeployment] he is at the nervous stage anyhow.  

On 25 June, the concluding seaborne embarkation unit of Keystone Oriole Alpha sailed from Da Nang on the USS *Saint Louis* (LKA 116). Two days later, Force Logistic Command Headquarters was deactivated, completing a redeployment which had involved 13,497 Marine officers and men, most of whom were moved by air; 489,927 cubic feet of cargo; and 408,295 square feet of deck space of vehicles.  

Under plans completed late in May, the last 3d MAB Marines to leave Da Nang were to be Major General Armstrong and 10-12 members of the brigade staff. They were to fly to FMFPac Headquarters at Camp Smith, Hawaii, on 26 and 27 June. The MAB would be deactivated as this final staff element left Vietnam, but the remainder of the staff were to spend a few more days together at Camp Smith to finish last-minute MAB business.  

Armstrong and his staff left Da Nang on schedule, after a hectic, uncomfortable month of coping with the myriad final details of redeployment while their facilities were being dismantled around them. According to Armstrong:  

> It got damn miserable towards the end. [During] the last couple of weeks, after . . . we pulled our telephones out of places like . . . FLC, we lost all telephone communications. We couldn’t even talk between the old division CP area and FLC. If we . . . had to get a message over, we had to send a vehicle, back and forth. We couldn’t talk to Marble Mountain; we couldn’t talk to the Deep Water Pier. Local communications [were] just awful . . . especially after you put most of your vehicles on the boat . . . .  

Other systems also deteriorated toward the end, including the water supply. Armstrong noted that “not having water for indoor plumbing is not necessarily a hardship, but it sure as hell is if you don’t have any outdoor heads.”  

On 25 June, two days before their scheduled departure, the 3d MAB staff received “a great big sheaf of messages, dating all the way back to the 1st of June,” from the communications station at Korat, Thailand. An equipment failure at the station had prevented prompt transmission of these messages, most of which dealt with personnel matters and disposition of Marines’ personal effects. General Armstrong recalled:  

> We just never got the messages, so there [was] a lot of undone business floating around. We got copies of all those, and on the . . . morning of the day we left, we got a “We’re so sorry” from the station over at Korat, that they were putting all these messages out, hoping that they’d be duplicates. Well, we found that most of ’em weren’t duplicates; we’d just never gotten the traffic . . . .  

The MAB staff had to take the messages with them to Hawaii, where they would deal with them along with the other remaining MAB business.  

In spite of these last-minute difficulties, 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade Headquarters closed down on 26 June. That day, Major General Armstrong, with 10 members of his staff, 53 other MAB Marines, and about 2,000 pounds of records and files, including the messages from Korat, boarded a Marine KC-130F tanker for the flight to Okinawa, the first leg of their trip to Hawaii. The following day, 3d MAB was formally deactivated. As planned, Armstrong and his staff cleared up final details of brigade affairs at Camp Smith. By early July, all had scattered to new assignments, Armstrong himself going to HQMC as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.  

One of the last elements of the MAB to depart was a detachment of Communication Support Company, 7th Communication Battalion (CSC-7), which left two days after General Armstrong and his staff, thus affording 3d MAB the means to communicate until the very last moment. Major Robert T. Himmerich, commander of the company, later explained how his command was incrementally reduced so that General Armstrong could communicate until he boarded his airplane on 26 June:  

> In reality the company did not stand down, but rather displaced from Vietnam to MCAS, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. As operational missions, except for the Communication Center, were transferred to XXIV Corps signal units, personnel released became involved in preparing equipment for transportation in USS *Saint Louis* (LKA 116) on 25 June. The AN/TNC-5 was the last major piece of equipment to be processed, and when it was taken off line, communication guard was shifted to the Air Force Communication Squadron at Da Nang Air Base. Message traffic was picked up and processed every two hours until Captain Fishero (Comm Center Officer) filed the Brigade Headquarters and CSC-7 movement reports on 26 June. The final message pickup was made when the movement reports were filed and carried to General Armstrong’s waiting aircraft. Because the Brigade was deactivated, CSC-7 brought the final MAB/MAB guidon out of Vietnam in 1971.  

---

After the departure of the last elements of the 3d MAB, only 542 Marine officers and men remained in Vietnam. Most were members of Sub-Unit 1, 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO); others comprised the Marine Advisory Unit (MAU), serving with the Vietnamese Marine Corps, and the U.S. Embassy security guard detachment at Saigon. A few served on the MACV staff.

**Quang Nam after the Marines Left**

As the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade completed redeployment during May and June, the 196th Light Infantry Brigade began Operation Caroline Hill, the codename for its search and destroy activities in the mountains and lowlands west and south of Da Nang. The Army brigade, under Colonel William S. Hathaway, USA, who was replaced by Colonel Rutland B. Beard, Jr., USA on 6 June, had four infantry battalions and an attached armored cavalry squadron for maneuver elements. Two artillery battalions, the 3d of the 16th U.S. Artillery and the 3d of the 82d U.S. Artillery, provided fire support.* The 11th Combat Aviation Group, based at Marble Mountain, furnished helicopters.

The mission of the brigade in Quang Nam was to conduct “combat operations in assigned areas of operations within the Brigade Tactical Area of Interest to find, fix and destroy enemy forces, lines of communication and cache sites,” to “deny the enemy use of the terrain for movement or the conduct of combat operations,” to assist the Quang Nam Province pacification effort, and to provide “standoff security for designated pacified areas.” With the exception of one infantry company and one cavalry troop stationed at Da Nang as reaction forces, two infantry companies guarding Brigade Ridge, and another garrisoning Hill 65, the infantry battalions and armored cavalry squadron conducted continuous operations in the AO's in which they initially had deployed. The 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry patrolled west of Da Nang, with firebases on Hills 270 and 350. The 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry and the cavalry squadron swept the flat land around An Hoa, at times working westward into the Arizona Territory. The 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry searched the Que Sons south of Hill 510 and conducted sweeps in Antenna Valley.

The Army troops, like the Marines before them, had only brief firefights with small enemy detachments, and suffered most of their casualties from boobytraps. In the largest contact of the brigade's first two months in Quang Nam, on 27 May, Troop B of the cavalry squadron, on a combined sweep with the 3d Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment, engaged about 50 VC. The Army cavalrymen and ARVN infantry killed 14 of the enemy and captured five, and five weapons. Between 29 April and 1 July, the 196th Brigade lost 15 dead and 125 wounded in Quang Nam, while killing 162 VC/NVA, taking 11 prisoners, and recovering 78 individual and three crew-served weapons.

The pattern of enemy operations continued unchanged in May and June. Guerrillas and local force units kept up a steady campaign of terrorism and small attacks by fire on South Vietnamese positions. The main forces continued the K-850 offensive. On 29-30 May, another wave of ground and rocket attacks signalled the start of the third and final phase of this campaign. This time, the largest assault came in central Dai Xuyen District, south of Da Nang, where over 80,000 South Vietnamese civilians, including high government officials, had gathered for a religious ceremony. In spite of security precautions by the 196th Brigade, the Korean Marines, and the 51st Regiment, three enemy battalions, including elements of the 38th Regiment and 91st Sapper Battalion, attacked the ceremony site on the 30th. The battle raged throughout the day and into the following night before the Communists fell back, leaving behind over 200 dead. The allies, who had lost five killed and 35 wounded, claimed a military victory, but 20 civilians had died in the fighting and homes in the area had suffered extensive damage.

The 575th Rocket Artillery Battalion, operating from its refuge on Charlie Ridge, continued to bombard Da Nang with its erratic, but occasionally deadly, missiles. At 0330 on 30 May, for example, the enemy fired 11 122mm rockets at Da Nang Airbase. The six rockets that fell on the airstrip caused no casualties or damage, but the other five landed in downtown Da Nang, where they killed 12 civilians.
wounded 11, and damaged six houses. Three more rocket attacks occurred during the first week of June, including the one on the 5th that narrowly missed Colonel Pommerenk’s quarters at the airbase. This persistent harassing fire concerned Lieutenant General Lam, who ordered the Quang Nam Province Chief to increase night patrols in the Rocket Belt and conduct more combined antirocket search and destroy operations with allied forces.83

By mid-summer, both MACV and XXIV Corps were convinced that Quang Nam was becoming militarily less secure. Lieutenant General Sutherland, the XXIV Corps commander, observed in August:

Quang Nam Province has a serious security problem. Present force levels in the province are inadequate to maintain the security level we had prior to U.S. Marine redeployments, since we have only the 196th Brigade and the 11th CAG replacing the 1st Marine Division and . . . [1st MAW]. Coordination between Vietnamese agencies has [also] been a problem in the province . . . .84

At about the same time, General Abrams reported to CinCPac that “a continuing pattern of regression” in security had become evident since November 1970 in Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai in southern MR 1 and in Binh Dinh in northern MR 2. Abrams called these provinces, which comprised the enemy’s Military Region 5, “one of the most troubled areas on the map of South Vietnam.” The security rating of these provinces under the Hamlet Evaluation System all had fallen 10-15 percent since the previous November, and other indices of progress, such as the number of Chieu Hoi, also had declined. The enemy appeared to have regained “significant . . . influence” over a substantial minority of the population of each province. In Quang Nam, the worst of the four, the Communists now controlled about 17 percent of the people. Abrams attributed this regression primarily to the reduction in U.S. forces in the area, especially the removal of the Marines from Quang Nam. He also cited poor coordination between the ARVN and local forces, a lack of mobile Regional Forces in many districts, and the devise effects of the GVN elections as causes of the deterioration in security.

Abrams concluded:

The overall impact of these combined factors has been a growing uncertainty and a lessening of self-confidence among local officials, local forces, and the general populace. The enemy in turn is taking advantage of this situation by directing the preponderance of his activities towards terrorism, to the general exclusion of large scale military actions. He has established psychological dominance over much of the populace and local friendly forces . . . .

On an optimistic note, Abrams ended his report by declaring, “This dominance is essentially a state of mind which can be changed.”85

In spite of these pessimistic assessments, the situation in Quang Nam appeared to improve during the last half of 1971. After the end of the third phase of the K-850 Campaign, the 38th Regiment and other enemy main force units withdrew from the lowlands into Base Area 112 and did not again emerge. Harassing attacks by guerrillas and local forces decreased in frequency and did less damage. Between January and June, according to a XXIV Corps analysis, the enemy made 424 attacks by fire and 97 ground attacks against secure areas and consolidation zones in Quang Nam. These attacks resulted in 294 South Vietnamese and allied dead and 1,021 wounded. Between July and December, the Communists made only 303 fire attacks and 25 ground assaults, killing 74 South Vietnamese and allied personnel and wounding 211. Rocket attacks on Da Nang stopped after the national elections in October, and by the end of the year the city had enjoyed three consecutive bombardment-free months. The cessation resulted partly from the 1st Task Force’s Operation Da Nang 101, during which ARVN and RFs and PFs continually patrolled the Rocket Belt.86

Except for the decline in security noted by Sutherland and Abrams which was partially remedied by the end of the year, no major alteration occurred in the military situation in Quang Nam after the Marines’ departure. The enemy made no significant noticeable gains, but neither did the allies. The ARVN and local forces seemed to be holding their own, which could be interpreted as a success for Vietnamization. The question remained whether the South Vietnamese forces were sufficient in number and quality to hold the province when the remaining allied units withdrew.
CHAPTER 14

Continuing Operational Problems, 1970-1971

Protecting the Da Nang Vital Area—Base Defense—Intelligence: Collection and Use—The Boobytrap War

Protecting the Da Nang Vital Area

Marines had first landed in Vietnam in 1965 to protect the Da Nang airfield. Defense of the airfield, and also of the city of Da Nang and the teeming military and civilian complex surrounding it, continued to be a III MAF responsibility during the last year and a half of combat. The Da Nang Vital Area (DVA), as it was called, in early 1970 encompassed about 45 square miles of territory, was bordered on the south by the Cau Do River and on the east by the South China Sea and extended westward to include the airbase. An estimated 600,000 Vietnamese civilians lived in the DVA, their villages and hamlets crowding close to 65 South Vietnamese and 45 United States military installations. These installations included ARVN I Corps Headquarters, the III MAF and later XXIV Corps Headquarters at Camp Horn, the 1st MAW and MAG-11 cantonments at Da Nang, and MAG-16’s field at Marble Mountain, as well as a variety of combat support and service support commands.

Most of the civilians in the DVA lived in Da Nang, South Vietnam’s second largest city. Called Tourane by the French, Da Nang had grown explosively as a result of the war, its population increasing from 110,000 in 1961 to 400,000 10 years later. Government and public services had not kept pace with growth. In 1969, the city had only six postmen and 380 telephones. It possessed neither a sewage system nor a newspaper. Only 10 percent of the population was served by the municipal electric system and seven percent by the water system. A U.S. Government report described Da Nang as “a miserable collection of unserviced huts, infused with temporary military infrastructure, surrounding a heavily overused and outdated city core.” The congested downtown area and the outlying hamlets were a refuge for U.S. and ARVN deserters and AWOLs, prostitutes, and drug peddlers. Viet Cong agents and terrorists mingled with the city’s rootless, often unemployed lower class.

South Vietnamese political and military authority within the DVA was divided. The area around Marble Mountain Air Facility and a strip of land between the south end of the airfield and the Cau Do River were part of Hoa Vang District, with defense and civil government conducted by the district under the supervision of Quang Nam Province. The rest of the DVA, including the city and the airfield, constituted the municipality of Da Nang, controlled both militarily and politically by a mayor appointed from Saigon. The mayor was independent of and often hostile to the province chief. ARVN Colonel Nguyen Noc Khoi, Mayor of Da Nang during 1970, also acted as Commander, Da Nang Special Sector (DSS), and as Deputy for Garrison Affairs to the I Corps commander, Lieutenant General Lam. As Mayor, Khoi supervised the activities of the 1,376 national policemen and three companies of the National Police Field Force stationed in Da Nang. As Commander, Da Nang Special Sector, he controlled 3 Regional Force companies, 19 Popular Force platoons, and 16,000 armed PSDF members. As Deputy for Garrison Affairs, Khoi was responsible for maintaining order among all RVNAF military personnel in Da Nang City and directed the Vietnamese Armed Forces Police there.

III MAF, in cooperation with Da Nang Special Sector and Hoa Vang District, coordinated the defense of the U.S. military installations in and around Da Nang and assisted in the general protection of the city. Under III MAF supervision, the 1st Military Police Battalion, which had arrived at Da Nang in 1966 to relieve Marine infantry guarding the vital airfield, performed the defense function. At the beginning of 1970, the battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Speros D. Thomaidis, was assigned the mission of planning and directing the integrated defense of the DVA. This was to be accomplished in cooperation with the Commander, Da Nang Special Sector, by coordinating the activities of tenant units to assign and secure sectors of responsibility, establish and maintain lines of communication, and constitute reserve contingency forces.

In essence, the battalion supervised the close-in defense activities of the commands within the DVA and ensured that these commands were ready to furnish company and platoon reaction forces, as required, for operations in the area. The MP battalion itself manned the fortifications surrounding Da Nang Airbase. It conducted antiinfiltration patrols and ambush-
bushes and maintained observation posts outside the boundaries of the various installations, and it assisted South Vietnamese security forces guarding strategic bridges.  

Also located in the DVA, the 3d Military Police Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Charles Fimian, assisted the 1st Battalion in security efforts. The 3d Battalion, in addition to furnishing war dogs for the 1st Marine Division, provided guards for the III MAF Correctional Facility, staffed the III MAF Criminal Investigation Department (CID), and contributed a 50-man MP contingent to the U.S. Armed Forces Police (AFP) in Da Nang. Marines from this AFP detachment protected the U.S. Consulate in Da Nang and helped guard the POW ward at the U.S. Army 95th Evacuation Hospital.

On 10 August, as the 3d MP Battalion prepared for redeployment in Keystone Robin Alpha, the 1st MP Battalion assumed control of the Marine war dog teams and also took over the 3d Battalion's security responsibilities in the DVA. The 1st Battalion, now under Lieutenant Colonel Newell T. Donahoo, who had relieved Lieutenant Colonel Thomaidis on 2 June, furnished guards for the former III MAF brig, which passed under Army control on 10 August. Company A of the 1st MP Battalion provided the AFP detachments, administered the dog force, and manned the III MAF CID. The 1st MP Battalion initially was scheduled for redeployment in late 1970, and by mid-August III MAF had completed plans to replace it with a provisional defense battalion consisting of one MP company and a rifle company from the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. With the delay of Marine redeployments, III MAF scrapped this plan and retained the entire 1st MP Battalion, which in fact became one of the last Marine ground units to stand down.

Throughout 1970 and early 1971, 1st MP Battalion Marines, who were not detailed to the Armed Forces Police or other special assignments, put in an average of 21 hours per week on day watch and 24 on night watch. They spent another eight hours on patrols and ambushes and manned portions of the Da Nang perimeter for another 48 hours. In July 1970, a typical month, the battalion carried out 280 fire team and 30 squad daytime patrols and 300 fire team and 133 squad night ambushes, made 31 river patrols, and manned 62 squad combat outposts. The battalion also conducted one multi-company operation. Of the total of 836 small-unit activities, the battalion conducted 627 with South Vietnamese forces. None of these operations produced significant enemy contact. The few actions that did occur were confined to brief exchanges of fire or an occasional grenade thrown at a passing Marine patrol.

Each month elements of the battalion took part in sweeps and cordon and search operations in cooperation with Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces, national police, and with reaction forces from other U.S. commands in the DVA. These operations rarely flushed out any NVA or VC, but they produced a steady haul of suspected VCI. RVNAF deserters and American military personnel who were off limits or absent without leave were also frequently taken into custody. During August, for example, companies of the 1st MP Battalion participated in 10 searches, apprehending 16 VCI, 35 ARVN deserters, 2 U.S. Army soldiers, a Marine, and a U.S. Navy sailor.

Working with troops and police from Da Nang Special Sector, the Marine MPs cracked down on the drug peddlers and prostitutes that infested the city. On 12, 13, and 14 October, elements of Company B joined Vietnamese authorities in a series of raids on hideouts in downtown Da Nang. The MPs and police seized caches of drugs, and arrested 21 Marines and five U.S. Army soldiers, all of whom were turned over to the Armed Forces Police and charged with being in unauthorized areas. They also apprehended 27 prostitutes and two VC suspects.

The enemy in the DVA consisted mostly of Viet Cong terrorists, sappers, and political agitators who usually operated in groups of three to five. By effective security measures, III MAF prevented sapper attacks on the airfields during 1970 and early 1971, but terrorism still took a steady toll of American and South Vietnamese lives and property. During July 1970, for example, three civilians were killed and 2 U.S. Marines, 11 ARVN soldiers, 6 national policemen, and 14 civilians were injured in 10 separate terrorist incidents. In October, Navy intelligence reported that enemy sappers were planning to attack the U.S. Consulate in
Marine Cpl Gavin R. Lebus, left, holds the leash on his sentry dog “Max” taut while Sgt Ted J. Ryan, Jr., muzzles his dog “Caesar” before boarding a Marine CH-53 helicopter. The men and dogs are from the Sentry Dog Platoon, 3d Military Police Battalion.

CONTINUING OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS

Da Nang. The 1st MP Battalion temporarily doubled its guard force at the consulate, but no attack took place. Communist harassment of the DVA declined in the last months of 1970, partly as a result of severe floods, but gradually increased again in early 1971.

Viet Cong terrorism sometimes took unusual forms. During March 1971, for instance, the MP battalion received reports of “female VC operating in Da Nang in the role of prostitutes with the intention of spreading VD to American and Korean officials. These VC were also reported to have been carrying small weapons with the intention of assassinating clients.” These ladies of the evening, if in fact they existed, claimed no known victims, but other young female Viet Cong were active in Da Nang. The MPs helped to break up a cell of 15- to 18-year-old VC girls who had been blowing up allied military vehicles with bombs made from soda cans filled with plastic explosive.7

Rockets attacks were the greatest Communist threat to the DVA, but their effect during 1970 and 1971 was more political and psychological than military. The III MAF Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Leo J. Dulacki, observed:

They sure didn’t inflict much damage on us . . . . I think they were pretty damn poor when you consider what they could have done. Imagine the number of ammunition dumps, the number of fuel depots and what-have-you we had scattered all over . . . . If you had given me a couple of Marine squads I could have raised holy hell . . . . by just planting a rocket or a mortar in the right place at the right time . . . .8

Looking back at the effects of enemy rocket attacks, Dulacki conceded that while of negligible importance militarily in most instances, rocket attacks on Da Nang
served the enemy in other ways: “Unfortunately, these attacks did achieve one success—the stateside media blew such incidents completely out of proportion and drew erroneous conclusions as to their meaning and effect.”

The Marine MPs had to contend with internal South Vietnamese domestic terrorism, as well as the more familiar enemy violence. ARVN soldiers occasionally threw grenades at national policemen and Popular Forces fired small arms to break up fights between rival non-Communist political groups. During October, the battalion conducted a series of psychological operations in the supposedly pacified hamlets on the north and west borders of the Da Nang Airbase, “in an effort to gain popular support to stem the indiscriminate firing of small arms . . . directed towards the perimeter bunkers and aircraft.” In spite of this effort, aircraft landing and taking off continued to be subjected to sporadic fire, some of which appeared to be from Popular Forces compounds.

During the first months of 1971, as III MAF was replaced by 3d MAB, the 1st Military Police Battalion, now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Colia, who had replaced Lieutenant Colonel Donahoo the previous November, continued to protect the Da Nang Vital Area. On 7 May, with the cessation of all Marine combat, the battalion ended small-unit operations and turned defense of the airfield over to the 104th Regional Force Battalion and the 796th Regional Force Company. The MP battalion retained its AFP and brig duties throughout the rest of May, as well as the guard of the remaining 3d MAB cantonments. On 1 June, a detachment of Marines from the U.S. Embassy Security Guard in Saigon relieved the MPs protecting the Da Nang consulate, and five days later the battalion was released from all Armed Forces Police tasks. The battalion stood down on 7 June. By the 24th, all elements had departed for Camp Pendleton, where the battalion was deactivated.

Base Defense

Throughout Quang Nam, major Marine bases were potentially lucrative targets for ground patrols and attacks by fire. Sprawling complexes such as LZ Baldy, FSB Ross, Hill 55, and An Hoa Combat Base contained headquarters, supply dumps, artillery batteries, and communications and support units of many kinds. Some bases housed ARVN and U.S. Army as well as Marine commands. By 1970-1971, the Marines had perfected their system for defending these bases, primarily using manpower from tenant units, while tying down a minimum of infantry units to static defensive missions.

Typical of the Marine base defense system in its most highly developed form was the 5th Marines’ plan for protecting An Hoa Combat Base. Until American withdrawal from An Hoa in midsummer 1970, this complex contained the 5th Marines’ regimental command post and the rear elements of the regiment’s 2d and 3d Battalions. The roughly triangular-shaped installation, just across the Thu Bon River from the Arizona Territory and within easy reach of enemy infantry and rocket attacks, also contained Headquarters Battery, Battery E, and the Mortar Battery of the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines; Battery M, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines; the 3d 175mm Gun Battery; a platoon of the 1st 8-inch Howitzer Battery; a tank platoon; engineer and motor transport companies; and detachments from Force Logistic Command and MAG-16. The base included a small airfield, and two helicopter landing zones. A continuous belt of barbed wire surrounded An Hoa, backed by fortified two- or three-man fighting positions, and several firing positions for tanks; five watchtowers overlooked the surrounding terrain.

During spring and early summer 1970, the 5th Marines commander, Colonel Ralph F. Estey, as installation coordinator, was in charge of the defense of An Hoa. Estey exercised this authority through his executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel William R. Kephart, who performed the additional duty of base defense commander (BDC). The base was divided into six sectors, lettered A through F, each encompassing a section of the perimeter and the units within it. The 5th Marines designated a commander for each sector, normally the commander or executive officer of one of the tenant units,* who was responsible for manning and maintaining the perimeter defenses and watch-

---

*In April 1970, the sector commanders were: Sector A—Executive Officer, 3/5 (Rear); Sector B—CO, Headquarters Company, 5th Marines; Sector C, Executive Officer, 2/11; Sector D—CO, Base Augmentation Company; Sector E—CO, 3d 175mm Gun Battery; Sector F—Executive Officer, 2/5 (Rear).
tower of his sector and for daily patrolling of the defensive wire. Each sector had its own combat operations center (COC), linked to its fighting positions by sound powered telephone and to the regimental COC by both telephone and radio. Sector commanders and duty officers met with the BDC each afternoon to receive the latest intelligence of enemy activities and coordinate night defensive operations.

To meet the threat of infantry and sapper assaults, the base maintained reaction forces. Each sector was required to have 10-20 Marines available for deployment to the 5th Marines COC or any prescribed assembly point. In addition, the Headquarters Commandant of the 5th Marines organized a provisional rifle company, which mustered daily at the regimental COC. This unit could be committed anywhere within the combat base. Finally, the 5th Marines rotated one rifle company in from the field to act as base defense augmentation company. Under operational control of the base defense commander, this company defended Sector D and furnished Marines for patrols and road sweeps outside the perimeter and for working parties within the base. During a major ground attack, any or all of these units could deploy to reinforce a section of the perimeter, contain a breakthrough, or counterattack.

To help repel assaults and to counter rocket and mortar bombardment, the 5th Marines had elaborate artillery fire plans. The regiment divided the entire area around An Hoa, including previously used or suspected enemy rocket and mortar positions, into targets identified by map grid locations and assigned each target to a specific battery, usually of the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines. A section of two 81mm mortars, controlled by the 5th Marines S-3, had the sole task of firing illumination missions as requested by the sectors. Each day, the 5th Marines tried to obtain advance political and military clearance for artillery fire on designated targets, especially the rocket and mortar positions. During enemy attacks by fire, Marines in the watchtowers would attempt to spot the enemy locations and phone them in to the 5th Marines COC over a special countermortar/rocket communications line. The regiment could then request fire missions on the precleared targets.

Colonel Estey could place An Hoa in any of four alert conditions. Condition I meant that the installation was under ground or fire attack; Condition II denoted "imminent" attack; Condition III indicated that an attack was expected within 12 hours; Condition IV, in effect most of the time, required only normal security precautions and implied no immediate threat of a major assault. The base was also subject to three readiness conditions. These ranged from Condition C, the usual daytime defense posture, in which each sector manned its watchtower and two or three perimeter fighting positions, through Condition B, in which reaction forces were to be available for muster within 15 minutes, to Condition A, under which all fighting positions were fully manned, command and control facilities activated, reaction forces assembled and standing by, and the base blacked out.

In October, after the 5th Marines shifted its base to LZ Baldy, it put a similar defense plan into effect. Again, the regimental executive officer acted as base defense commander, this time with four sector commands under him. Each sector maintained its own squad-size reaction force and furnished a platoon for a mobile base defense reaction company. The artillery defensive fire plan again featured preassigned and precleared targets covering the area around the base.13

Defense of the numerous allied headquarters and installations behind Division Ridge, immediately west of the Da Nang Vital Area, followed similar principles. In this roughly triangular eight-by-five-mile area, which stretched from the Cau Do River north almost to the Cu De River, were concentrated III MAF Headquarters at Camp Haskins, the 1st Marine Division CP, the Force Logistic Command Headquarters at Camp Books, the 1st and 11th Marines CPs, the III MAF Transit Facility, and the Freedom Hill Recreation Center. Two U.S. Navy construction battalions, Army MP and helicopter units, an Army replacement battalion and R and R Center, and ground elements of the Air Force 366th Tactical Fighter Wing also had cantonments behind Division Ridge. South Vietnamese commands there included the 1st Mobile Brigade Task Force Headquarters, the Hoa Cam RF/PF Training Center, and artillery and engineer units.*

*Reading roughly from north to south, the tenant units were: III MAF Headquarters (Camp Haskins); Force Logistic Command (Camp Books); NCBS 5 and 62 (USN); 58th Transportation Battalion (USA); 11th Marines; 1st Marines; 1st Motor Transport Battalion Headquarters; 1st Marine Division; 1st Medical Battalion; 11th Motor Transport Battalion; 1st Reconnaissance Battalion; 15th Light Engineer Company (ARVN); 8th Engineer Company (ARVN); 16th Bridge Company (ARVN); Freedom Hill Recreation Center (III MAF); 522d Replacement Battalion (USA); 478th Aviation Company (USA); III MAF Transit Facility; 1st Battalion, 5th Marines; 504th MP Battalion (USA); 366th Tactical Fighter Group (USAF); Ammunition Company, 1st FSR (ASP-1); MASS-3; 1st Mobile Brigade Task Force (ARVN); 44th Artillery (ARVN); Hoa Cam RF/PF Training Center.
After 10 August 1970, when III MAF discontinued the Northern and Southern Sector Defense Commands, this entire headquarters and support complex was included in the TAOR/TAOI of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. This battalion, which was the division reserve, acted as defense coordinator for both American and South Vietnamese tenant units. By early 1971, the battalion had divided the area into three sectors, designated from north to south A, B, and C. The battalion commander was in charge of the defense of Sector C, which included the battalion headquarters cantonment on Hill 34. Under 1st Battalion supervision, the commander of the 1st Marine Division Headquarters Battalion coordinated the defense of Sector B. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines directed the protection of the northernmost area, Sector A, through a small satellite COC established at Camp Books. Each tenant unit conducted its own perimeter defense and maintained internal security against sabotage and infiltration. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines kept two rifle companies on Division Ridge. These two companies occupied observation posts, manned fortified positions, and patrolled areas outside the cantonment boundaries.

Late in March 1971, when the 1st Battalion stood down for redeployment in Keystone Robin Charlie, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines took over its TAOI and defense coordination mission. The 2d Battalion divided the area into two defense sectors, instead of three, but otherwise continued the security system established by its predecessor. On 7 May, as Marines ended ground operations, the 2d Battalion was relieved by elements of the 196th Brigade, which in turn assumed the coordination task.

With the exception of a 6 January 1970 sapper attack on FSB Ross, the Communists did not seriously test the Marines' base defenses during 1970 and 1971. They confined their harassment of Marine bases to a steadily diminishing volume of rocket and mortar fire. How much of the base defense success resulted from American preemptive operations and the formidable nature of the defenses, and how much from a deliberate Communist decision to go after the South Vietnamese instead, is impossible to determine with finality. Nevertheless, it appeared that III MAF had succeeded in protecting its rear in a war without fronts.

**Intelligence: Collection and Use**

Timely, accurate information about the enemy is a prerequisite for military success. The guerrilla charac-
ter of much of the struggle in Vietnam made timely intelligence even more vital, and at the same time more difficult to collect and evaluate. Lieutenant General Leo J. Dulacki, who had been III MAF G-2 in late 1965, pointed out that in a conventional war, collecting information about the other side “is not . . . that difficult from the standpoint of the intelligence people. The enemy has tanks. It’s easy to pick up tanks with reconnaissance aircraft and the like. The enemy has organized units. It’s easy to pick up the location, movements and the like of organized units.”

Dulacki observed in retrospect, however, that the Marines learned in Vietnam that the conventional intelligence indicators were seldom to be found. “The guerilla not only did not possess conventional equipment, he didn’t even wear a uniform and was hidden among the populace. An alien language and culture further exacerbated the problems.” Intelligence was not accorded its rightful importance in the early period of III MAF involvement. In 1965 the III MAF intelligence section was a handful of officers and men who were according to Dulacki:

... struggling to perform a Herculean task. The development and growth of the assets required to perform the crucial intelligence tasks was long and slow, too long and too slow, but it eventually materialized. It had to. And the intelligence personnel acquitted themselves with distinction.19

By early 1970, the Marines’ intelligence effort had evolved into a many-faceted, highly sophisticated system that combined traditional methods with new technology. Brigadier General Simmons, the ADC of the 1st Marine Division, recalled that during his first Vietnam tour in 1965-1966, “we were half-blind and nearly deaf.” When Simmons returned in mid-1970, “I was not prepared for the tremendous advances in Marine combat intelligence which I found . . . .”19

III MAF and its subordinate units obtained much information from established methods of air and ground reconnaissance. VMO-2’s OV-10As served as the airborne eyes of the 1st Marine Division, flying hundreds of visual reconnaissance missions each month. The versatile OV-10A, which also could perform tactical air control and attack functions, proved, in General Simmons’ words, to be a “superb platform” for aerial reconnaissance.*20

Until VM CJ-1 redeployed in July 1970, its RF-4Bs flew conventional and infrared photographic and ground radar survey missions for III MAF. Although hampered by frequent equipment breakdowns, the squadron, which had its own film processing facility, produced finished pictures within two hours of an emergency mission request. Frequently, response took longer, because III MAF, as a subordinate under the MACV system of single management of aviation, had to pass many of its photographic mission requests through the Seventh Air Force, rather than directly to the 1st MA W. After VM CJ-1 left Vietnam, III MAF depended on the U.S. Air Force for most of its aerial photography and on the XXIV Corps G-2 (Air) staff for film processing.*

Rapid, expert interpretation of aerial photographs was essential. Colonel Edward W. Dzialo, the III MAF G-2, a former photo interpreter, emphasized that “it isn’t the picture that you want, but the information that’s on the picture.” Dzialo declared that the old adage, “One picture is worth 1,000 words,” had ceased to be valid. “In today’s modern photography . . . a thousand words [from expert analysts] are better than the picture.” Until late February 1970, III MAF had concentrated all photographic interpretation in the Photo Imagery Interpretation Center (PIIC) of its G-2 section, to which most of the 1st MA W’s photo interpreters were attached. Between 17 and 23 February, as part of the general reduction of its authority, III MAF returned the interpretation mission and the photo interpreters to the 1st MA W PIIC, which performed this function until the wing redeployed.21

Ground patrolling and reconnaissance was another basic information source. The 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, reinforced until July 1970 by the 3d Force Reconnaissance Company and from August 1970 through early 1971 by a subunit of the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, screened the western approaches to the populated area of Quang Nam. Reconnaissance patrols penetrated deep into mountain base areas to locate enemy troops and camps and direct air strikes and artillery against them.** Closer to the hamlets and villages, a myriad of infantry small-unit activities continually generated information which was passed to the regiments and the division.22

The Marines’ artillery observation and target acquisition system also produced intelligence.*** Through-

---

*For details of the other functions of VMO-2, see Chapter 15.

**For additional detail on artillery targeting and operations, see Chapter 17.
out Quang Nam, numerous observation posts not only directed artillery fire but also permitted general surveillance of enemy movements. Many of these observation posts were equipped with the Integrated Observation Device (IOD). According to Colonel Dzailo, the IOD, designed to spot targets for artillery attack, "helps us . . . in intelligence because of the readout capability that we have from it . . . . We can always follow them [the enemy] to a certain extent, where they originated and where they're going. . . ."23 In the same way, the 11th Marines' computerized Fire Support Information System (FSIS), a continuously maintained data file of enemy sightings and action taken against them, assisted intelligence analysis, as well as fire direction. According to Colonel Edward A. Timmes, 1st Marine Division Assistant G-2 during 1970:

It [FSIS] provides, really, more than . . . the program intended . . . . It . . . gives a historical base to your intelligence shop . . . . It provides the best briefing to the unit going into that particular area, of everything that has ever been seen, ever been attacked, and such . . . . It allows you to provide an analysis in two ways. First, your own intelligence analysis of how well have you done in this particular area, as far as cleaning up the enemy . . . . It also allows the operations people to take a look at it . . . . so you now have an operational trace that you can order . . . . 24

Prisoners and captured enemy documents yielded much information. Major John S. Grinalds, the 1st Marines' S-2, considered these two sources, and intercepted enemy radio signals, "the three most valuable sources of information that we had in our TAOR . . . ." The most important document discovery of the last year of the war came in November 1970, during Operation Imperial Lake, when Marines found the complete files of the enemy's Quang Nam security section. Among other things, this huge mass of material contained the names, and in some cases photographs, of many key members of the Viet Cong infrastructure.25

To extract information from POWs and documents, the 1st Marine Division relied heavily on the specially trained Marines of its interrogation-translation teams (ITTs), interpreter teams (ITs), and counterterrorism teams (CITs).* These teams worked under the division G-2 section. In mid-1970, the division had four ITTs under its control, three of them attached to the infantry regiments and the fourth located in the POW ward of the 95th Army Evacuation Hospital in Da Nang. These teams, as their name implied, interrogated NVA and VC prisoners and civilian detainees and reviewed captured documents. Of the two Interpreter Teams, one constituted the Division Interrogation Center and the other the Document Translation Center. In July 1970, a typical month, the Document Translation Center screened 58 batches of papers, totalling 1,117 items, and translated 58 of the documents. The team also translated four ARVN interrogation reports, 19 ARVN messages, and the monthly report of the Quang Nam Pacification and Development Committee. The three CITs, in addition to performing their usual security and counterintelligence tasks, participated extensively in the effort to neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure. Team members accompanied Marine units in the field, checking the identities of detained civilians against blacklists of known VC leaders. The teams also employed Vietnamese agents to ferret out information on VCI membership and activities and on the enemy military order of battle. Both ITTs and CITs questioned prisoners, but with different objectives. The interrogation teams engaged in lengthy questioning following a set procedure, while the counterintelligence teams tried to obtain information which could be used immediately in continuing operations.26

These Vietnamese language trained Marines were useful in intelligence gathering but their ability to extract data from POWs and informants was limited. The Vietnamese language is so complex and subtle that even the most fluent American had difficulty conducting a meaningful conversation, not to mention an effective interrogation. Major Grinalds, himself a graduate of military Vietnamese language schools, observed:

I could ask: "Where's the head?"; "I'd like a cup of coffee"; "How are your children?" Things like that. But to actually get in and interrogate a . . . captured NVA or VC—unless he were really willing and trying to give me information—was a very difficult thing. The same thing is true of every other American interpreter or linguist that I saw . . . . 27

The Marines employed many Vietnamese interpreters and agents, relying heavily on the Kit Carson Scouts with their proven loyalty and knowledge of the people and terrain. Some Marine units also worked extensively with the South Vietnamese Government's Armed Propaganda Teams (APTs). As the name implied, the primary mission of these teams was politi-

---

*In July 1970, the division's attached teams were the 3d, 9th, 13th, and 15th ITTs 1st and 7th ITs; and 1st, 3d, and 7th CITs. 1st MarDiv ComdC, July 70, pp. 12-16.
A view of Fire Support Base Ross as the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines prepares to leave by truck for Hill 34 and turn over the firebase to the South Vietnamese. Note the sandbags on the roofs to protect from typhoons, the lookout towers, and the extensive barbed wire.

To enlist the help of Quang Nam’s civilians in their intelligence effort, the Marines had developed the Voluntary Informant Program (VIP). Under this program, administered by the division G-2 staff, each subordinate command down to the battalion level was provided with its own fund which it could use to buy information. Individual commands were granted wide discretion in spending this money, including the power to negotiate the amount of any payment less than 5,000 piasters. Rules for administering the program included provisions for careful accounting of money expended and for protecting the anonymity of informants, including relocating them and their families when necessary. Marine units spent much of their VIP money rewarding Vietnamese who brought in grenades, dud rounds, and other potential boobytrap material which littered the countryside, but occasionally they purchased information about the enemy which was of varying reliability. During July 1970, for example, 1st Marine Division units spent a total of 278,890 piasters (about $1,000 U.S.)* in 359 separate payments for turn-in of ordnance and made six payments for information.29

Reports from part-time agents recruited by the Voluntary Informant Program and from regular informants enlisted by the CITs, while large in volume, required careful evaluation. Vietnamese agents frequently told Americans what they thought the Americans wanted to hear. As Lieutenant General Nickerson put it, “You can buy the intelligence you want to hear . . . . As long as they know you are buying rocket intelligence, that you are going to get plenty of.” Nevertheless, informants were indispensable sources of intelligence, especially about local Viet Cong members and their activities.30

The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, like the Americans, relied heavily on radio for command and control. If the Americans could read enemy messages or just determine the locations of their transmitters, the Communists would lose much of their advantage

---

*At this time, the official GVN exchange rate was 275 piasters to $1 U.S.
of concealment. During 1970-1971, the 1st Radio Battalion provided III MAF with this capability. At the beginning of 1970, the battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Delos M. Hopkins, was headquartered at Camp Horn, with its Headquarters and Service Company nearby at Camp Hoa Long and an Operations Company at Dong Ha in northern I Corps. Of the battalion's six radio platoons, three operated monitoring sites in Quang Nam and three were deployed along the Demilitarized Zone. During February and March, the battalion withdrew its elements in northern I Corps and transferred the signal intelligence mission there to the U.S. Army 407th Radio Research Detachment.* From then until it redeployed in April 1971, the battalion was concentrated in Quang Nam, with the exception of a platoon temporarily stationed at Chu Lai. The number of active platoons in the battalion gradually declined as Marine units redeployed, from six at the beginning of 1970 to four, all in Quang Nam, at the end of the year. In October and November 1970, the battalion, now under Lieutenant Colonel Edward D. Resnik,** moved its headquarters from Camp Horn and Camp Hoa Long to Camp Books, close to III MAF Headquarters at Camp Haskins.

Under III MAF operational control, the radio battalion deployed its men and equipment to monitoring sites at observation posts and firebases throughout Quang Nam. During large operations, such as Pickens Forest, Catawba Falls, and Imperial Lake, direct support units from the battalion accompanied the command groups to furnish information for immediate, rapid exploitation. Recalling the important role of 1st Radio Battalion Marines during Imperial Lake, Colonel Robert H. Piehl, commander of the 7th Marines, said the regiment "found this information very useful in planning our day-to-day operations...and frequently took advantage of it without waiting for it to be processed into intelligence by the Division G-2."32

Using both ground installations and airborne equipment, the Marine radio technicians listened to enemy messages and tried to fix the location of transmitter sites. They made an average of 2,000 to 3,000 radio direction fixes each month, many of which were then either attacked by air or artillery or became the objectives of ground operations. During early 1970 the 1st Marines launched most of its successful heliborne Kingfisher patrols on the basis of radio battalion intelligence reports. On other occasions, the battalion gave Marine units advance warning of enemy attacks, permitting the Marines to conduct preemptive attacks. Earlier in the war, extreme security precautions had prevented rapid transmission of signal intelligence to field units; however, by 1970 the Marines had largely overcome this problem. As a result, according to Colonel John W. Haggett, the Deputy G-3 of III MAF, by late 1970 the 1st Radio Battalion was furnishing "probably the best intelligence that the Marine Corps has ever had...We always knew what the enemy was going to do and could always prepare for it."33

Highly developed radio intelligence was an improvement over previous methods and techniques. Electronic sensors, which III MAF was using extensively by 1970, were devices never previously employed on the battlefield. As a means of gathering information about the enemy and locating potential artillery and air targets, sensors showed great promise, but they also had significant limitations.

The sensors in use in 1970 were the products of a development effort begun five years earlier in connection with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's abortive Demilitarized Zone barrier project.* The sensor barrier, codenamed Duel Blade, had not been completed, but during 1968, MACV introduced a new program, Duffel Bag, to employ the sensors intended for the barrier in tactical operations elsewhere in South Vietnam. Marines had been involved in the early development of sensors and had used the devices extensively and effectively at Khe Sanh in early 1968.** By 1970, the 1st Marine Division had integrated sensors into its intelligence and artillery-targeting system.34

Most of the sensors employed by Marines were of the radio-frequency (RF) type, the designation refer-

---

*In anticipation of withdrawal from northern ICTZ, the 1st Radio Battalion, in cooperation with Army signal intelligence agencies, established a Joint Tactical Processing Center at Dong Ha in October 1969, and the Army personnel were gradually prepared to take over the radio monitoring mission along the DMZ. 1st Radio Bn ComdC, Oct 69, pts. II and III.

**Lieutenant Colonel Hopkins was relieved on 30 June 1970 by Major Donald J. Hatch, who in turn was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Resnik on 31 July 1970.


**Marines had used seismic intrusion devices at Da Nang as early as 1965.
ring to the method by which they transmitted information to monitoring stations. Small, battery powered, and usually camouflageed, sensors of this type were easy to conceal and could be dropped from aircraft or implanted by hand. Most were designed to self-destruct when tampered with or when their batteries were exhausted. Once in position, RF sensors reacted to minute physical activity in their immediate surroundings at ranges from five to 200 yards, depending on the device. Seismic sensors, known as Seismic Intrusion Devices (SIDs), the most common, responded to small ground vibrations, such as human footsteps. Magnetic sensors, or Magnetic Intrusion Devices (MAGIDs), detected moving metallic objects. Infrared sensors (PIRIDs) picked up heat radiations from bodies, vehicle engines, or campfires. Acoustic sensors detected audible noises. Seismic, magnetic, and infrared sensors, when activated, sent a signal to a receiver, known as a Portatale, from which the operators could determine the location and probable nature of whatever activated the sensor. Acoustic sensors transmitted the sounds they picked up. For the Da Nang Anti-Infiltration System (DAIS), the 1st Marine Division employed seismic and infrared line sensors, which were connected by wire to a readout device. After dismantling the DAIS in mid-1970, the division relied almost exclusively on RF sensors.

During March 1970, the 1st Marine Division centralized the planting, maintenance, and monitoring of its sensors, tasks previously divided among the division and its regiments, in a Sensor Control and Management Platoon (SCAMP), part of the G-2 staff section.* When formed, the SCAMP had a strength of three officers and 82 enlisted Marines. It included a headquarters section, an operations section responsible for communications with tactical units, an installation section which planted and maintained sensors, a surveillance section which manned monitoring stations, and an instruction section to train other Marines in the use of sensors.

The 1st Marine Division requested sensor equipment and radio frequency assignments through XXIV Corps from the J-3 section of MACV, which controlled Project Duffel Bag. The Marines had no difficulty obtaining sensors, but often could not secure enough frequencies. Colonel James R. Weaver, the 1st MAW G-2, explained: “These are all line-of-sight transmissions . . . so your frequency control is pretty critical. You can’t just set these things anywhere because you wipe out somebody else’s.”

By mid-1970, the 1st Marine Division had over 250 radio frequency sensors in operation in Quang Nam, which it used to target artillery and monitor enemy movement. Most of the sensors were clustered along the main infiltration routes from the mountains into the lowlands. They were monitored by SCAMP Marines at 12 readout stations positioned from Dong Den Mountain in the north to FSB Ryder in the southwest.

The division’s sensors were usually planted in groups called “strings.” In August 1970, the division had 80 active strings. A typical string, designed to detect movement along a trail, consisted of one magnetic and three seismic sensors. As the suspected enemy walked along the trail, the SIDs picked up the sound of their footsteps in succession and signalled a readout station. Simultaneous activation of the SIDs indicated vibrations from artillery fire, low-flying aircraft, or some other nonhuman source. If the suspected enemy carried weapons or ordnance, they would activate the MAGID. When a sensor string showed probable enemy presence, its monitoring station operator, usually located at an artillery observation post, could request a fire mission, alert nearby allied ground units, or simply record the time, direction of movement, and other details for intelligence analysis.

During August, Marines of the division SCAMP tried submerging modified MAGIDs in the rivers near Da Nang to detect rockets hidden under water, without significant results. SCAMP Marines, employing 1st MAW aircraft, also experimented with air-dropped acoustic sensors in remote enemy base camps. Other acoustic sensors, placed in known Communist

---

*III MAF allowed the division to communicate directly with the Army on sensor equipment matters. The MAF received information copies of all messages. Mosher Debrief.

*Early in 1968, the Marine Corps Development and Education Center at Quantico established a tentative doctrine for Marine Corps use of sensors, which included a requirement for a specialized organization to manage them. The Marine Corps tested the SCAMP concept in Exercise Exotic Dancer II at Vieques in spring 1968. In May 1968, the 3d Marine Division established a Ground Surveillance Section (GSS), similar in functions to the SCAMP. The 1st Marine Division late the same year created a much smaller GSS, which merely advised the infantry regiments on location of sensors, tasks previously divided among the division and its regiments. In October 1969, when the 3d Marine Division redeployed, its GSS, now renamed SCAMP, remained with III MAF to help U.S. Army and ARVN units take over the Marines’ sensor system along the DMZ. This unit was deactivated on 31 December 1969. In March 1970, the 1st Marine Division formed its own full-fledged SCAMP with men drawn from other units of the division. Darron Intvw, pp. 92-93, 98-99; FMFPac, MarOps, Aug 70, p. 15.
hideouts in the populated areas, at times picked up the voices of suspected enemy, although they more often transmitted the chattering of monkeys or the squeak of tree branches rubbing together.38

The division used both troops and aircraft toemplace sensors. For example, infantry units conducted periodic operations in Antenna Valley, west of FSB Ryder, to cover the replacement or addition of sensor strings. As redeployments reduced Marine ground strength, the division, in cooperation with the wing, tried to develop methods for inserting and monitoring sensors from aircraft. CH-46s, OV-10As, and UH-1Es made sensor drops, while Douglas C-117Ds and Grumman US-2Bs of H&MS-17 attempted airborne monitoring. Aircraft shortages and inability to obtain required radio frequencies prevented continuous and effective aircraft monitoring, but the OV-10A proved well-adapted for sensor dropping and, carrying a Portatale, could accomplish limited readouts.39

The number of sensors in use by the 1st Marine Division declined during 1970. The decline resulted, in part, from troop redeployments, which included the reduction of the SCAMP from 85 Marines to 28, and from a MACV decision to reduce the Marines' allotted radio frequencies from 10 to four. In anticipation of autumn redeployment of the 5th Marines, SCAMP Marines removed or deactivated most of its sensor strings in southern and western Quang Nam during the summer and closed all of its readout stations, except those on Hill 190, OP Reno, and Hill 65. When redeployment of the 5th Marines was postponed, in late August the SCAMP set up additional monitoring stations in the Que Son Mountains and Valley, manned by troops of the 5th Marines specially trained by the SCAMP, and also began implanting new sensor strings in southern Quang Nam. Nevertheless, by November, the number of operating sensors in the division TAOR had fallen to 76.

Sensor usage increased again during early 1971. As additional redeployments further thinned the ranks of Marine ground units, the division and then the 3d MAB installed more sensors, many of them air-dropped, to cover areas Marines no longer could patrol on foot. During March the Marines activated 22 new sensor strings, nine of them on the approaches to the Rocket Belt. By 30 April, 120 active sensors in 29 strings were deployed in Quang Nam.40

While most Marine commands found sensors useful, the new devices were not a substitute for other methods of gathering information. Sensor effectiveness was reduced by the shortage of trained Marine operators and by an absence of well thought-out tactical plans for exploiting sensor activations. Even with sound plans, however, it was questionable that, as redeployment continued, either the 1st Marine Division or 3d MAB had the men and means to execute them. The ability to respond quickly to sensor activations was also hindered because sensor readout and reporting functions concentrated in the division-controlled SCAMP. Infantry units often were unaware of activations within their TAORs until it was too late to respond. Major Grinalds complained: "The battalion commander would often find out . . . that he had movement in his TAOR from the division FSCC calling down for a clearance for an artillery mission . . . ." Except in remote, unpopulated areas, sensors inevitably picked up civilian movement and friendly troop activity, and as a result, according to General Simmons, "any sensing had to be regarded as highly tentative, subject to confirmation as to identity, friend or foe." Nevertheless, in spite of their deficiencies, sensors clearly represented a major addition to intelligence gathering technology, and one likely to be of increasing importance in the future.41

By whatever means it was collected, information had to be quickly correlated and transmitted as intelligence to staffs and units in the field. To speed up and improve this process, III MAF established a Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SRC) at Da Nang in November 1969, under the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Colonel John S. Canton. The center received a continuous flow of information from signal intelligence sources, sensor readouts, aerial reconnaissance and photography, POW interrogations, and captured documents and plotted it on a single map. On the basis of this data, the SRC planned the activities of the attached 1st and 3d Force Reconnaissance Com-

---

*The Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center in the wing G-2 supervised airborne planting and monitoring of sensors for the 1st Marine Division. The wing also flew sensor missions for U.S. Army units and dropped sensors of its own on enemy truck routes near the Laotian border. See for example 1st MAW G-2 ComdC, Mar 70, pp. 2-3. To compliment 1st Marine Division efforts in the fall of 1969, General Thrash directed his wing G-2 to "develop and implement an internal wing capability for reconnaissance and targeting" in western Quang Nam. Col James R. Weaver, Comments on draft ms, 18 Apr 83 (Vietnam Comment Files).
BGen Edwin H. Simmons, Assistant Division Commander of the 1st Marine Division, talks to Marines on the defensive position south of Da Nang. The Marines have cut down the trees to clear fields of fire. Note the commanding view of the river valley below.
panies; provided III MAF operations planners with comprehensive current intelligence; and furnished target information to the 1st MAW.

The Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center never had time to demonstrate its full potential. In March 1970, when III MAF relinquished control in I Corps to XXIV Corps the SRC staff was deactivated. III MAF, with its much reduced headquarters complement and TAOR, could no longer maintain the SRC, nor was there a need for it. XXIV Corps decided not to reconstitute the SRC. From the deactivation of the SRC until redeployment, the division and wing G-2 staffs coordinated the collection of intelligence. The remaining reconnaissance units, for example, came under operational control of the division.42

Establishing a timely exchange of information with both the South Vietnamese and Korean Marine forces in Quang Nam was a continuing and frustrating problem, especially for the 1st Marine Division. The Vietnamese, who often refused to pass information between their own commands, were slow in transmitting potentially valuable data to the Marines. The communication that did exist was usually based on acquaintances and friendships between CIT and ITT Marines and their Vietnamese and Korean counterparts, rather than on formal arrangements. In December 1970, to improve intelligence coordination, the 1st Marine Division, Quang Da Special Zone, Quang Nam Province, and the 2d ROKMC Brigade established a Combined Intelligence Conference, but to the end of the Marines’ stay in Quang Nam, the inter-allied information exchange was, at best, sporadic.43

The January-June 1971 redeployments dissolved the Marines intelligence system. When the 3d MAB was activated, its G-2 section assumed control of the SCAMP, the ITs, ITTs, and CITs, and the wing’s aerial reconnaissance and photography activities, while the remaining company of the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion was attached to the 1st Marines. The 1st Radio Battalion began deactivation and redeployment early in March, and the battalion’s command group and colors left Vietnam on 15 April. A radio detachment of six Marine officers and 79 enlisted Marines was attached to 3d MAB’s H&S Company. On 1 May, the SCAMP turned all of its remaining sensor strings and readout sites over to the 196th Brigade. Six days later, all Marine intelligence collection activities came to an end.44

The Boobytrap War

As the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong increasingly avoided combat during 1970-1971, they relied on boobytraps, officially grouped under the comprehensive title Surprise Firing Devices (SFDs), to inflict American casualties. Boobytraps, especially in the heavily populated, strongly pro-Communist countryside south of Da Nang, had been killing and maiming Marines with grim regularity since 1965. During the Marines’ last year and a half of ground warfare, SFDs inflicted about half of the 1st Marine Division’s casualties. The Marines had developed well thought-out countermeasures against these devices. Nevertheless, as they left Vietnam, they had to acknowledge that their efforts had reduced rather than solved the boobytrap problem.

For the most part, the hamlet guerrillas who planted boobytraps turned the Marines’ own ordnance against them. Foraging parties of guerrillas and villagers diligently retrieved the dud bombs and rounds left by lavish allied use of their supporting arms. They also picked up grenades which had fallen off allied soldiers’ web belts in the thick brush or which had been carelessly left behind at previously occupied positions, and they retrieved mottled rounds and other ordnance which had been dropped from broken helicopter slings. The VC used their gleanings to manufacture boobytraps in small, well-hidden, easily moved hamlet workshops. While capable of improvising SFDs from almost any piece of allied ordnance, they especially favored the American M26 fragmentation grenade. Over 75 percent of the boobytraps encountered in the 1st Marine Division TAOR/TAOI were made from grenades, most of them M26s. The enemy also employed homemade devices, such as tin cans packed with plastic explosive and with pieces of wire, gravel, glass, or other sharp objects to serve as shrapnel. These, according to an officer in the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, “are probably as dangerous, if not more dangerous, than the ordnance that we have… and they will cause extensive [injury].”45

The Viet Cong commonly buried their explosive devices or attached them to tree trunks or low-hanging branches anywhere patrolling Marines were likely to go. The VC especially favored trails, dikes between flooded paddies, and other places where terrain channelled movement, or sites suitable for defensive positions, landing zones, and observation posts. Frequently, the enemy boobytrapped objects Marines would be apt to pick up as intelligence finds or souvenirs. On one occasion, the VC mined an infant’s
CONTINUING OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS

corpse. The Viet Cong most often relied on trip wires hidden in grass and brush to cause the detonation, and they also used pressure-release devices, activated by a Marine stepping onto and then off of a buried trigger. To emplace their boobytraps, the Viet Cong routinely conscripted local civilians, including young children, who could move about freely and watch American operations near their hamlets. Many of these civilian boobytrappers, according to Major Dale D. Dorman, S-3 of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, which had perhaps the most heavily mined AO in Quang Nam, were "in effect between a dog and a fire plug . . . . It's a case of, either they do this or they are . . . killed or mutilated by the VC."48

The Viet Cong set boobytraps in large numbers with a systematic tactical purpose. For the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, it was "not uncommon for one of our patrols to go out [and] in the space of four hours find as many as five or six boobytraps . . . . We have found as many as 15 boobytraps in . . . 45 minutes." The enemy moved their boobytraps in response to the movement of Marine sweeps and patrols. According to Colonel Floyd H. Waldrop, the 1st Marine Division G-3, "the enemy has a habit of planting boobytraps, using them tactically, putting them out in just a matter of minutes." When a Marine patrol left its base, VC or peasants would hurry ahead of it and set traps in its path, or move in behind the Marines and mine their return route. Occasionally, VC being chased by Marines stopped long enough to emplace boobytraps for their pursuers, or deliberately lead Marines into previously boobytrapped areas. Often, the enemy used boobytraps to hamper Marine activities, then picked them up to facilitate their own movement or permit peasants to reach their fields. A 2d Battalion, 1st Marines squad leader recalled that the Viet Cong were:

. . . never predictable. They usually have an area booby-trapped for a while, and then just leave the area alone, 'if all the boobytraps are found. And they won't touch this area again, possibly for about a month or two months, until everyone gets lax . . . and then all of a sudden they'll put 'em back out to catch people off guard . . . ."47

The enemy also used concentrations of SFDs "in a pattern . . . suspiciously like a defensive mine field," to protect major caches, headquarters, and hideouts. Marines could penetrate these mined areas at will, but they had to move slowly and carefully, which allowed the enemy to escape with key items of equipment. Marines, preoccupied with the search for boobytraps, often overlooked cleverly concealed caches. Nevertheless, according to Major Dorman, "In going in there and in cleaning these [mined areas] out, we have found some . . . quite important finds in the way of radio gear, documents, officers, and such . . . ."48

To protect their own troops and civilians, the Viet Cong frequently posted boobytrap warnings. They occasionally used small paper signs written in French or Vietnamese or merely a crude drawing depicting an explosion. More frequently, they arranged combinations of sticks, stones, or other common objects to mark the location or direction of boobytraps. When Viet Cong main force or North Vietnamese units, unfamiliar with a locality, moved in to conduct an attack, the local guerrillas removed most of their SFDs to give the unit safe passage. Knowledgeable Marines used this habit as a clue to detect enemy movements and intentions. According to Major Grinalds, the 1st Marines S-2, "You can always tell when a main force unit has moved into some place like the Arizona or Dodge City, which is notoriously bad for boobytraps, because all the boobytraps disappear for about three days:"49

For the enemy, boobytraps were a cheap and profitable method for maintaining pressure on the Americans. The experience of the 1st Platoon, Company H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines on a particularly bad day in the Arizona Territory graphically demonstrated what a few Viet Cong with explosives could accomplish.50 Early in the morning of 22 April 1970, the platoon began a patrol of the hamlets and rice paddies several miles northwest of An Hoa. At 0845, as the Marines were resting on dry ground after wading through waist-deep, flooded paddies, a machine gunner sat down on a large pressure-detonated boobytrap, later determined to have been a 105mm shell or a box mine. Staff Sergeant Thomas G. Ringer, the platoon sergeant, reported, "all portions of [the machine gunner's] body from the middle of his stomach on down, were completely blown off and he was killed instantly." Three other Marines suffered multiple fragmentation wounds and concussions.

After a Marine helicopter evacuated the dead and wounded, the platoon continued its patrol. At 0950, a Marine hit a trip wire, setting off two boobytraps together; one was a 60mm mortar shell, the other a
M26 grenade.* These blasts wounded three more Marines; one lost a leg. The platoon called for another medical evacuation helicopter. After it took off with the wounded, the patrol moved out again. It had gone barely 15 meters when a Marine, who made the mistake of not following in the footsteps of the men ahead of him, set off another pressure-detonated land mine. This SFD wounded only the Marine who tripped it, blowing off part of his leg, and once again the platoon went through the routine of evacuating wounded, and then marched on. It finished the patrol without further incident, but without seeing or engaging the enemy.

Suffering heavy, often gruesome casualties from boobytraps as the Company H patrol did, necessitating the suspension of operations to evacuate the dead and wounded, was frequent experience for units operating in the Da Nang TAOR's lowlands. In the latter stages of 1970 as redeployment proceeded and face-to-face contacts with the enemy lessened, these casualties became even more demoralizing. The casualties involved, Major General Widdecke pointed out, "are particularly profitless in that, unlike a firefight, no cost or penalty is inflicted on the enemy."

Cumulatively, the enemy's boobytrap war caused significant operational limitations. The danger of hitting SFDs slowed infantry maneuver and often effectively restricted Marine patrolling. Constant danger undermined morale and further reduced combat effectiveness. A sergeant in the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines found that many of his men had a "psychological block" about boobytraps. "Whenever they took a step outside of their perimeter," he reported, "the only thing they could think of was boobytraps . . . . And it really puts them in a bind as far as getting the job done."52

By early 1970, the 1st Marine Division, after almost five years of bitter experience, had developed counter-boobytrap tactics. The Marine effort began with measures to hinder Viet Cong manufacture and emplacement of SFDs. In frequent hamlet cordon and search operations, infantry units concentrated on finding and destroying enemy boobytrap workshops. To deprive the workshops of raw material, the Marines expended most of their VIP funds by paying civilians to bring in dud or discarded ordnance. Vietnamese children, especially

*Multiple groupings of SFDs, known as "Daisy Chains," were a favorite VC boobytrapping strategem.
cater a buried pressure-release trigger in soft dirt or sand. A few fortunate units acquired electric ordnance detectors and used them for the same purpose as the probe stick. Small-unit leaders carefully selected and trained their point men. Many tried to relieve the point man every 15 to 30 minutes in the field, before weariness dulled the keen edge produced by mental fatigue and anxiety.

During 1970, specially trained mine and boobytrap detecting dogs began accompanying Marine units on operations. These animals had been taught to find hidden SFDs by the odor of the explosives in them or by the scent of the VC who had planted them. Their keen hearing often could pick up the vibrations of a trip wire in the wind; and they could feel a wire touching the fur on their chests before running into it. Fourteen dogs and 18 Marine handlers arrived at Da Nang on 7 March and were attached to the 3d MP Battalion, which then controlled all III MAF war dogs. The first dogs went into the field on 18 March. By late August the number of mine and boobytrap dogs had grown to 23. When the 3d MP Battalion redeployed, these animals, with the scout and sentry dogs, were assigned to the 1st MP Battalion.

Marines in the field found the dogs useful but not infallible. The intense heat of Vietnam often caused the dogs to become fatigued and less alert. Occasionally, the dogs tripped boobytraps, and their handlers sometimes misunderstood or ignored the animals' signals. Also, as a platoon commander in the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines observed; "After several days of following a dog, you become overconfident in the dog and you stay less alert." In spite of their limitations, the dogs did provide another set of senses, in some respects sharper than those of men, for patrols working their way through dangerous terrain.

When a patrolling unit found or detonated a boobytrap, an established emergency procedure was put into effect. Every Marine froze in position. If the boobytrap had not gone off, a designated Marine, following a search for other nearby SFDs, carefully probed his way to the detected device, attached plastic explosive to it, and "blew it in place." The division repeatedly enjoined Marines not to tamper with or try to disarm boobytraps, a task reserved for trained engineers and ordnance disposal teams, but periodically Marines disregarded these injunctions and paid with life or limb.

If a boobytrap was triggered, especially the grenade type, Marines were taught to use the four second delay unless the fuse had been shortened by the VC, between the tug of the trip wire and the explosion to drop to the ground, giving themselves a chance to escape some of the blast and shrapnel. In Company G, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, which often ran into boobytrapped M26s in tall grass, Sergeant Thomas F. Massey told his Marines:

... when they think they've tripped a boobytrap in tall grass to turn around and jump, back in the direction they came from. This has been very effective in quite a few cases, where guys knew they'd tripped the boobytrap, turned and jumped, and they just caught two or three pieces of shrapnel in their lower legs, where it could have been emergency medevacs or even worse.

After a boobytrap detonation, the surviving Marines remained in position. An officer explained, "We found initially that when boobytraps were detonated, his buddies wanted to go and assist [the casualty] and by doing so they would detonate [another] boobytrap, causing three or four [more] casualties." The senior Marine, with the unit corpsman following in his footsteps, probed his way to the injured man or men and administered first aid. Other members of the unit, continually probing for more boobytraps, secured a landing zone for the medical evacuation helicopter. Within 48 hours of hitting a boobytrap, the parent unit commander was required to send a report to the division, which included a brief narrative of the incident, a description of the preventive tactics used by the patrol, planned countermeasures to prevent further incidents, and recommendations and lessons learned.

Marine units in heavily boobytrapped TAORs/TAOIs tried to vary their methods of operation to reduce exposure to SFDs while still accomplishing their missions. For some units, limitation of daytime movement and patrolling proved effective for this purpose. In June 1970 the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, at the instruction of its new commander, Lieutenant Col William G. Leftwich, did most of its patrolling and ambushing at night, watching its AO
by day from static observation posts. Major Grinalds, then the battalion S-3, explained:

The VCI would put out boobytraps in the day, ahead of us, and we hit them, and they'd bring them in at night so that their people could get out and roam at large. So we took advantage of their concept by moving at night with them and avoiding the boobytraps. Then we'd stop during the day and stay out. The kids and the VCI would watch us, and we just wouldn't move into a position where they could lay some boobytraps either in front of us or behind us . . . .

During May, Marines of the 2d Battalion found 22 boobytraps and unintentionally set off 30. In July, with the new concept of operations fully implemented, they found 20 and detonated 9; and in August they discovered 18 and detonated 14. At the same time, according to Grinalds, “we also maintained the same level of contact . . . and . . . kept the rockets from being fired.”

Reducing the patrolling during the daytime led to fewer boobytrap casualties in many units, but there were tradeoffs accepted. In the heavily populated lowlands surrounding Da Nang, where VC/NVA agents continually operated, other commanders argued that failing to patrol during daylight afforded the enemy greater opportunity to conduct his business and maintain influence over the Vietnamese populace. Lieutenant Colonel William V. H. White, who commanded the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines through the spring of 1970, was convinced that “the size and nature of the terrain” in the 1st Marines AO necessitated extensive daytime patrolling, even if done with great caution because of the boobytrap threat: “. . . there were thousands of persons in the area, civilians, VC, RFs, PFs, ARVN, and others wandering around by day,” he recalled, “it was necessary to get out among them to know what was going on.” White also said that his experience with VC boobytrapping practices suggested that “only those types of boobytraps which interfered with normal daytime commerce were usually removed once placed.” Most important, he contended, like many commanders, that units could not afford to “stay with one pattern too long” whether or not that included daytime patrolling. In short individual commanders were required to devise tactics which balanced the threat of boobytrap casualties with their ability to accomplish their mission of eliminating the enemy in assigned areas of operation.

Other units devised their own expedients to control their AOs while minimizing boobytrap casualties. The 5th Marines simply stopped ordinary small-unit patrolling in known, thickly-mined areas, entering them only during large-scale, carefully prepared operations. In the Que Son Valley, in mid-1970, the 7th Marines began cordoning off VC-dominated hamlets during the day and then patrolling actively at night. According to Colonel Derning, the regimental commander, this procedure more effectively restrained enemy activity while at the same time reducing physical exhaustion and boobytrap casualties among the Marines.

The 1st Marine Division made extensive efforts to pass on its hard-won antiboobytrap experience to newly assigned Marines. During late 1969, Major Wallace M. Greene III, of the G-3 staff drew up a comprehensive division standing operating procedure (SOP) for countermine warfare. Greene based his SOP on “correlation of various references; seminars with regimental and battalion commanders and their S-3s; conversations with platoon commanders, platoon sergeants, and pointmen; and attendance at the . . . Mine Warfare and Boobytrap School conducted by the 1st Engineer Battalion.” The SOP covered every aspect of the problem, from enemy methods and doctrine to post-detonation procedures. In addition to promulgating this basic guide, the division issued periodic bulletins to its subordinate units, informing them often of new VC techniques and devices and ways of countering them. Major General Widdecke continually stressed to his commanders the importance of “detailed indoctrination and frequent reindoctrination” of all Marines in antiboobytrap methods.

The division required every infantry battalion to conduct continuous anti-SFD training, including exercises on a boobytrap lane. Normally located near the battalion's headquarters, the boobytrap lane was a piece of typical terrain saturated with dummy versions of the most common SFDs. The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines set up its lane in “quite a bushy area” near the combat operations center. "And there are located there every conceivable type of boobytrap that we have run into . . . . These range from pitfalls . . . the ones ly
CONTINUING OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS

ing on the deck, . . . the ones in the trees, and covers all types of ordnance."88

Supplementing and reinforcing unit training efforts, the 1st Engineer Battalion operated a Land Mine Warfare School at Camp Faulkner, its base southwest of Da Nang. Each month during 1970, 300-400 Marines representing most units of the division, took the school's intensive three-day course. These Marines studied boobytraps and countermeasures in detail and practiced on a complete and up-to-date boobytrap lane which accurately incorporated dummy replicas of the most commonly encountered SFD. The eight NCO instructors at the school continually monitored field reports of new devices and added either disarmed and captured specimens or their own duplicates to the boobytrap lane. "More often than not," an instructor reported, "our first eyewitness account of Charlie's newest gimmick is from one of our students." The engineers developed a wary respect for VC ingenuity, pointing out that "Charlie will mine everything and usually does." To their own students, they emphasized, "While in the field, there's no substitute for alertness, caution and a suspicious attitude."

To extend its reach to Marines who could not attend the three-day course, the mine warfare school regularly sent two-man contact teams out to 1st Marine Division units. These teams presented a two-hour course tailored to the needs of the organization, concentrating, for example, on road mines for a motor transport battalion and boobytraps for an infantry unit. By the end of 1970, the teams had instructed a total of 5,912 Marines.87

On 1 August 1970, as part of the preparations for Keystone Robin Alpha, the division closed the mine warfare school to everyone but members of the 1st Engineer Battalion, although the contact teams continued to visit all units. With the slowdown of redeployments, the division reopened the school to all personnel in October, offering a five-day course for classes of 50 students at a time. Between 12 and 26 February 1971, as the 1st Engineer Battalion prepared to stand down, the school moved from Camp Faulkner to the division headquarters cantonment. The engineer battalion redeployed during March, but its Company A, left behind for inclusion in the 3d MAB, continued to conduct the school and dispatch contact teams until 30 April, when it turned the facility over to the 196th Brigade.88

All of the training and command attention apparently produced results. In 1969, the ratio of boobytraps found and destroyed to boobytraps inadvertently detonated, the division's principal measure of success on this problem, was 1.83 to 1. The year's average for 1970 increased to 1.96 to 1. For the first three months of 1971, the overall average rose to 2.77 to 1.89

Contributing to these encouraging ratios were innumerable instances of Marine coolheadedness and courage. On 22 October 1970, the 3d Platoon, Company H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines was moving through the Que Sons during Operation Imperial Lake.70 The platoon halted for a rest along a trail. Its Navy corpsman, Hospitalman Second Class Randall L. Hackett, sat down beside a tree, relaxed, and looked around. To his horror, he discovered that "two feet off the ground attached to a tree I was leaning against was a canister full of Composition B [explosive] with its detonator under my foot." Hackett kept his head. Remaining absolutely motionless, he whispered to the Marine next to him that he was sitting on a boobytrap and to quietly tell the company commander, Captain John W. Moffett, who was accompanying the platoon on the operation.

Captain Moffett carefully made his way to Hackett, looking him and the trap over. Since Hackett's foot was pressing on the detonator and the device had not exploded, Moffett and the corpsman decided it must have a pressure-release trigger. After placing flak jackets around the mine to absorb some of the blast if it went off, Moffett gingerly put his hand on the detonator and applied pressure. Hackett then took his foot off, rolled away, and scurried to cover. Moffett put a rock on the detonator and in turn jumped back. The device did not explode, and the Marines were able to destroy it.

Other Marines were not as skillful or fortunate. Too often, men forgot their training or neglected basic precautions. These lapses, according to Lieutenant General Nickerson, were almost inevitable under combat conditions. "You can only go so far, so many days," he observed, "before you get careless, you get tired.
... If you’ve been a grunt you know you get to the point where you just don’t give a damn. When you get to that point you are starting to make mistakes.”

During 1970, in spite of improving discovery-to-detonation ratios, the 1st Marine Division lost 1,868 Marines killed or severely wounded by boobytraps. The toll continued into 1971. On 10 January 1971 a CUPP unit from Company G, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines and a QRF platoon from Company E of the same battalion were sweeping a hamlet just south of the Ba Ren Bridge. A Marine detonated a boobytrap made from a 60mm mortar shell; the blast wounded two Marines. The QRF command helicopter, carrying the battalion executive officer, Major Cornelius H. Ram, and the commanders of Companies E and G, landed to pick up the injured men. Major Ram and Captain Douglas O. Ford of Company E left the aircraft to help load the wounded. As they did so, they set off a second 60mm mortar round SFD, which immediately killed Captain Ford and mortally wounded Major Ram.

With such incidents fresh in their memories, Marines left Quang Nam with the frustrating knowledge that they had contained, rather than defeated, the enemy in the boobytrap war. Brigadier General Simmons, the assistant division commander, concluded: “The 1st Marine Division’s strenuous efforts—including troop indoctrination, land mine warfare school, contact teams, and mine and boobytrap dogs—did not solve the problem. The best we can conclude,” he said, “is that these efforts greatly reduced what might have been the casualty figures if they had not been vigorously pursued.”
PART V
SUPPORTING THE TROOPS
CHAPTER 15

Fixed-Wing Air Operations, 1970-1971

1st MAW Organization, Strength, and Deployment—Coming to Terms with Single Management
Attacking the Ho Chi Minh Trail—Air Support Trends in Military Region 1—Controlling Air Support

1st MAW Organization, Strength, and Deployment

At the beginning of 1970, MACV had about 2,500 American fixed-wing aircraft and 3,600 helicopters of various types at its disposal. Of these, 261 fixed-wing aircraft and 241 helicopters belonged to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.¹

The fixed-wing aircraft of the 1st MAW, with the exception of one squadron, were concentrated at two bases in I Corps. At Da Nang, where the wing headquarters and air control groups were also located, Colonel Neal E. Heffernan's Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 11 included four jet squadrons: Marine All-Weather Attack Squadrons (VMA(AW)s) 225 and 242, Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron (VMFA) 542, and Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron (VMCJ) 1. Two other fixed-wing groups flew from Chu Lai. MAG-12, first under Colonel Paul B. Henley, then commanded by Colonel James R. Weaver, consisted of Marine Attack Squadrons (VMAs) 211, 223, and 311. MAG-13, commanded by Colonel Thomas E. Murphree, included VMFAs -115, -112, and -314. The fighter/attack squadrons were all equipped with the McDonnell-Douglas F-4B Phantom II; the attack squadrons flew the versatile McDonnell-Douglas A-4E Skyhawk; while the all-weather attack squadrons used Grumman A-6A Intruders. VMCJ-1 had a mixed complement of RF-4B Phantom IIs, modified for aerial reconnaissance and photography, and EA-6A Intruders with sophisticated electronic warfare devices.

The helicopters of the 1st MAW were also divided between two airfields at the beginning of 1970, but all belonged to a single aircraft group, Colonel James P. Bruce's MAG-16, which had its headquarters at Marble Mountain Air Facility. Both Marine light helicopter squadrons (HMLs) of the group, HML-167 with Bell UH-1E Hueys and HML-367 with Bell AH-1G Cobras, were based at Marble Mountain. Two medium helicopter squadrons, HMMs -263 and -364, also flew from Marble Mountain, as did the two heavy helicopter squadrons, HMHs -361 and -463, and Marine Observation Squadron (VMO) 2, the one MAG-16 fixed-wing squadron with its North American OV-10A Broncos. At Phu Bai, HMMs -161 and -262 remained after the recent dissolution of MAG-36. All the medium helicopter squadrons were now equipped with Boeing CH-46D twin-rotor Sea Knights, while the heavy squadrons had replaced most of their Sikorsky CH-53A Sea Stallions with more powerful CH-53Ds.

A number of other aircraft, not in the regular operating squadrons, were attached to the 1st MAW. Five aging Douglas C-117Ds were employed by headquarters and maintenance squadrons for a variety of missions. H&MS-11 operated 12 TA-4Fs, two-seat trainer versions of the A-4 Skyhawk, for reconnaissance and forward air control missions. Under H&MS-17, three Grumman US-2Bs were used for aerial monitoring of sensors. A detachment of four Lockheed KC-130F Hercules refueler-transports, from Marine Aerial Refueler/Transport Squadron (VMGR) 152 on Okinawa, flew aerial refueling, troop and cargo transport, and flare-drop missions from Da Nang Airbase.*

Major General William G. Thrash, commander of the wing at the beginning of 1970, had flown with the 1st MAW in two previous wars. A native Georgian who earned his naval aviator's wings in early 1942, Thrash won a Distinguished Flying Cross and five Air Medals with the wing in the Pacific during World War II. In Korea, Thrash, then a lieutenant colonel with MAG-12, received the Silver Star for gallantry in action before being shot down, captured, and held prisoner for two years by the Chinese Communists. Thrash was promoted to major general in January 1967. After a tour as Commanding General, MCAS El Toro/Commander, Marine Corps Air Bases, Western Area, he took command of the 1st MAW in July 1969, relieving Major General Charles S. Quilter.

Thrash had taken over when the wing was still adjusting to MACV's imposition of single management of fixed-wing aircraft while at the same time the wing's system for controlling helicopters was under sharp criticism from many Marine ground commanders. Described by a subordinate as "a charmer" and "ex-

*Also based at Da Nang were over 200 U.S. Air Force aircraft of the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing and the 41st Wing, 1st Vietnamese Air Force Air Division. The latter unit included two fighter, two helicopter, and one liaison/observation squadrons, with 122 aircraft.
 Extremely intelligent he devoted much of his first six months in command to improving the working relationship between the wing and the Marine divisions. Brigadier General Dulacki, then III MAF Chief of Staff, recalled:

'I've never seen a commander operate the way he does, from the standpoint of getting the aviation message across. General Thrash made it a point to visit all the battalions, all the regiments. If they have a problem, he'll go out and talk to them. . . . He has visited the Army units; his group commanders have; his squadron commanders have. And . . . they have just knocked themselves out to support the ground forces in every way they can. . . . This attitude has permeated his entire command. . . .

By the end of 1969, Thrash's campaign to improve air-ground teamwork appeared to be succeeding. Major General George S. Bowman, Jr., a Marine then serving as Deputy Commanding General, XXIV Corps, informed General McCutcheon late in December:

Here in III MAF we have a very fine relationship between our Ground and Air. . . . [Thrash] spends a good deal of time to make it so. He is bending every effort to use more of the air capability in support of the ground effort. And I mean this from a planning point of view, and not just having it available should someone call up. . . .

General Thrash also oversaw a steady diminution of 1st MAW strength. During January and February 1970, HMH-361, VMFA-542, and VMFA-223 were transferred from Vietnam to MCAS, Santa Ana and MCAS, El Toro, MAG-12, commanded by Colonel James R. Weaver, with its headquarters and support squadrons and VMA-211, was transferred to MCAS, Iwakuni. These changes were accomplished as part of Keystone Bluejay. The withdrawals permitted the transfer of VMO-2 from Marble Mountain to Da Nang, a field more suitable for its operations, and once there the observation squadron became part of Keystone Bluejay. The withdrawals permitted the transfer of VMO-2 from Marble Mountain to Da Nang, a field more suitable for its operations, and once there the observation squadron became part of Keystone Bluejay. The withdrawal of HMM-161 and HMM-262 from Da Nang and the redeployment of HMH-361 made room at Marble Mountain for HMMs -161 and -262, which now moved there from Phu Bai, completing the concentration of all the wing's helicopters at one base. At Chu Lai, VMA-311, the last Marine A-4E squadron in Vietnam, was transferred from MAG-12 to MAG-13. By the end of March, the 1st MAW had been reduced to two fixed-wing and one helicopter group, a total of 174 planes and 212 helicopters.

The wing, more than other III MAF elements, felt the disruptive impact of repeated changes in plans for the Keystone Robin Alpha redeployment. Initially, the Marines planned to remove six squadrons in this withdrawal: VMCJ-1, VMA(AW)-242, VMFA-122 and -314, and HMMs -161 and -262. They also intended to redeploy MAG-13, with its headquarters and support elements, and close Chu Lai Airbase.

These plans were quickly changed. MACV and XXIV Corps forced retention of VMFA-314 and HMM-262 to assure adequate jet and helicopter support for I Corps; they also objected to the proposed withdrawal of VMCJ-1. III MAF particularly wanted to remove the latter squadron. Large in manpower, VMCJ-1 had continual difficulty keeping its complicated equipment in working order. It flew most of its photographic reconnaissance and electronic countermeasures missions in support of Seventh Air Force and Seventh Fleet operations over Laos and North Vietnam rather than Marine forces in South Vietnam. Emphasizing the logistic costs of keeping the squadron in South Vietnam, III MAF finally persuaded MACV to let VMCJ-1 leave.

All these changes in plan occurred in mid-June. In August, with the Keystone Robin Alpha redeployment already under way, including extensive transfer of men and equipment between squadrons, MACV and III MAF decided to put VMFA-314 back in the withdrawal. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had restricted the number of monthly fighter-attack sorties, so the additional Marine jets were no longer needed in Vietnam. This meant that personnel and material had to be shifted again.

Eventually, VMCJ-1, VMFA-122 and -314, VMA(AW)-242, HMM-161, and MAG-13 with its headquarters and support squadrons left Vietnam in Keystone Robin Alpha. VMFA-115 and VMA-311 moved to Da Nang and joined MAG-11. In October, the last Marine aviation elements left Chu Lai, and control of that airfield passed to the U.S. Army. By 1 November, all of the remaining wing units, with the exception of two air support radar teams (ASRTs) deployed in northern I Corps, had been drawn into the Da Nang area. The wing, now under Major General Alan J. Armstrong, who had relieved Thrash on 2 July, consisted of two aircraft groups: MAG-11 under Colonel Albert C. Pommerenk, and MAG-16 commanded by Colonel Lewis C. Street III. Pommerenk's

*For a full account of the planning for this and other redeployment phases and for the formation of the 3d MAB, see Chapter 3.
group included the remaining 81 fixed-wing aircraft; MAG-16 controlled the 149 remaining helicopters.*

Between January and mid-April 1971, the 1st MAW headquarters group, Marine Wing Headquarters Group (MWHG) 1, and the bulk of the wing's air control group, Marine Air Control Group (MACG) 18, redeployed to Iwakuni in Keystone Robin Charlie. In the same redeployment, VMFA-115 went to Iwakuni, and HMM-364 and VMO-2 left Vietnam for the United States. On 14 April, the headquarters of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was formally transferred to Iwakuni, where Brigadier General Robert F. Conley, who had commanded 1st MAW (Rear), assumed command of the wing, replacing Armstrong who remained at Da Nang with the 3d MAB.

MAG-11, with VMA-311, VMA(AW)-225 and H&MS-11, which now had four OV-10As**, as well as its TA-4Fs, constituted the fixed-wing air element of the 3d MAB. MAG-16, the brigade helicopter group, consisted of HMLs -167 and -367, HMMS -262 and -263, and HMH-463. Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS) 3, formerly part of MACG-18, remained at Da Nang as part of MAG-11, to operate the brigade direct air support center (DASC) and furnish three ASRTs. A detachment of 20 Marines from Marine Air Control Squadron (MACS) 4, which had redeployed in February, stayed on Monkey Mountain to man the Marine Tactical Data Communications Center (TDCC), an automated facility which linked the Air Force and Navy aircraft tracking systems and antiair warfare direction. Air combat operations under the 3d MAB ended on 7 May. By 22 June, all Marine aviation units had left Vietnam. Only the TDCC detachment continued operating on Monkey Mountain. It would stay until Marine squadrons returned to Vietnam to help stem the North Vietnamese invasion in 1972.

Coming to Terms with Single Management

Since March 1968, the Commanding General, Seventh Air Force, in his capacity as Deputy ComUSMACV for Air Operations, had exercised "mission direction" of all 1st MAW fixed-wing strike and reconnaissance aircraft. The Air Force commander performed the daily function of "fragging" these Marine airplanes, that is assigning them to specific missions in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, or Laos.*

From its inception in a letter from General William C. Westmoreland, then ComUSMACV, to the Commanding General, III MAF, on 7 March 1968, this system, usually called "single management," had met continuing Marine Corps opposition and criticism. Westmoreland had justified its imposition as necessary to assure adequate air support for the Army divisions reinforcing the Marines in I Corps during the Communist Tet Offensive and siege of Khe Sanh, and as a means for improving the general efficiency of United States tactical airpower. In his 7 March instructions, he assured III MAF that "consistent with the tactical situation," Marine aircraft normally would continue to be assigned to support Marine ground units. In spite of these rationalizations and reassurances, most Marines interpreted the establishment of single management as a thinly veiled Air Force bid for operational control of their fixed-wing aviation. They bitterly recalled their frustrations in the Korean conflict, when the Marine air-ground team had been broken up, with the 1st MAW under Fifth Air Force control and the 1st Marine Division under the Eighth Army.

During 1968, Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., the III MAF commander, waged a persistent campaign to reverse Westmoreland's directive. He had the full support of the Commandant, General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., who appealed the issue to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Marine Corps leaders declared that the imposition of single management had reduced the responsiveness and effectiveness of tactical air power in 1 Corps. They insisted that single management represented a de facto transfer of operational control of Marine fixed-wing air units to the Air Force, destroying the integrity of the Marine Corps' air-ground team and violating both the law establishing Marine Corps organization and the Inter-Service agreements on the conduct of joint operations. Repeatedly, the

*Both MAGs had changed commanders previously during the year. In MAG-11, Colonel Robert N. Heffernan had been replaced by Colonel Grover S. Stewart, Jr. on 19 February 1970. Colonel Stewart in turn had been relieved by Colonel Pommerenek on 19 June. In MAG-16, Colonel Hayden R. Smith had taken over from Colonel Bruce on 7 March and was in turn replaced by Colonel Street on 4 October.

**These aircraft had been transferred from the departing VMO-2, H&MS-11 ComdC, Mar71.

*The daily orders assigning aircraft to fly particular missions are known as fragmentary orders, hence the slang verb "frag" as applied to air operations. Until March 1968, the 1st MAW had "fragged" all of its own aircraft and had reported to the Seventh Air Force each day the number of fixed-wing sorties not needed to support Marine operations. The Seventh Air Force could then use these extra sorties for its own purposes. Under the new system, the wing reported all of its daily fixed-wing sorties, except those of light observation craft, for Seventh Air Force assignment.
Marine Corps proposed changes in the MACV system which in effect would return control of Marine fixed-wing aircraft to III MAF. General Westmoreland and his successor, General Abrams, stood firm in their defense of single management, and a majority of the Joint Chiefs supported them. Emotion ran high on both sides, to the point where Westmoreland later declared that single management was "the one issue . . . during my service in Vietnam that prompted me to consider resigning. I was unable to accept that parochial consideration might take precedence over my command responsibilities and prudent use of assigned resources."8

Although Marine frontal attacks on single management proved fruitless, partly because the Army strongly favored the system, which provided more and better Air Force support for its divisions in Vietnam, III MAF and the 1st MAW were able gradually to modify the system through informal working arrangements with the Seventh Air Force. Lieutenant General Nickerson,
who took command of III MAF early in 1969, and Major General Thrash, who assumed command of the wing a few months later, both took the position that single management was a fact of life and that the Marines should try to recover as much control of their aircraft as was possible under the system. General George Brown, USAF, who commanded the Seventh Air Force throughout 1969 and most of 1970, responded favorably to this pragmatic, conciliatory Marine approach.9

By mid-1970, III MAF and the 1st MAW had recovered, in fact if not in principle, much of their ability to assign missions to Marine strike and reconnaissance aircraft. Colonel Stanley G. Dunwiddie, Jr., commander of Marine Air Control Group (MACG) 18 reported:

> Over the past year, although it was not officially recognized and not done in an overt fashion, the wing gradually began to frag more and more of its own aircraft again . . . although the fabric of single management still exists . . . “10

The 1st MAW, for example, had gained the right to deduct the sorties required for landing zone preparation and other special missions in support of Marine forces from the number reported available to the Seventh Air Force. Further, the number of Marine sorties turned over to the Air Force was calculated on a rate of one sortie per day for each aircraft, but Marine squadrons normally flew at a rate of more than one sortie per plane per day. By agreement with the Seventh Air Force, III MAF could “frag” these additional sorties in support of its own operations.

The wing also exerted some supervision over the sorties that it surrendered to Air Force “mission direction.” Customarily, the Seventh Air Force assigned all Marine aircraft used within South Vietnam to missions in I Corps/MR 1. The 1st MAW, through its liaison officer at Seventh Air Force Headquarters in Saigon, could recommend which Marine aircraft groups or squadrons should be employed on particular tasks. In fact, during late 1969 and the first part of 1970, the chief of the Strike Plans Branch of Seventh Air Force Headquarters, in charge of all aircraft task assignments, was a Marine lieutenant colonel. Marines declared jokingly: “Single management works great as long as the Marine Corps runs it.”11

As a result of these developments, according to General McCutcheon:

> . . . The modus operandi . . . relative to fragging of Marine aircraft is about as follows. With three F-4 squadrons, two A-6 squadrons and one A-4 squadron we had a total of 89 aircraft assigned. This would provide 89 sorties per day at a 1.0 sorties rate. From this 89 it was agreed that we could withhold 16 special sorties for radar beacon and LZ prep hops. This left 73 which we identified or made available to 7th Air Force. By agreement with them, they would frag 13 out of country, 36 for preplans and 24 for the alert pad which could be scrambled by Horn DASC. The net result of this was that in effect the Wing really controlled the 16 specials and 24 alert pad sorties, plus any add-ons that were generated. These usually amounted to nine to 27 per day depending on whether the sorties rate was 1.1 or 1.312

While the Marines had thus been able to modify single management in practice and keep their air-ground team substantially intact, these arrangements had no formal, written basis in either MACV directives or Inter-Service doctrines for joint operations. MACV Directive Number 95.4, prescribing rules for all aspects of air operations, had been issued in 1965 and never fundamentally modified. In December 1968, MACV had proposed a revision incorporating the basic principles of single management and including a new term, “operational direction,” to describe the Seventh Air Force’s relationship to Marine fixed-wing aircraft. III MAF, in a sharply worded response, refused to concur in the draft, and MACV had abandoned the revision attempt. The only official description of single management in paper was General Westmoreland’s letter of 7 March 1968 to General Cushman, prescribing a system which by 1970 had been altered extensively. Both to protect the Marines’ position in Vietnam and to establish a favorable precedent for application in future joint operations, III MAF during 1970 sought an opportunity to incorporate a description of single management as it was actually working into a revision of MACV Directive 95.4.13

The III MAF commander, Lieutenant General McCutcheon, was uniquely suited to this task. During 1965, as J-3, CinCPac, he had helped develop the initial MACV Directive 95.4 and then had implemented it as 1st MAW commander. He had been Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) at HQMC throughout the post-1968 single management dispute. McCutcheon had decided that, because both MACV and the Army were benefiting from single management in Vietnam, the Marine Corps could not hope to obtain formal abolition of the system. Instead, he declared with characteristic bluntness, “I am working . . . on the philosophy that single management is here, and the

---

*Horn Direct Air Support Center was a combined USAF/USMC/VNAF facility located at Camp Horn. It was created in 1968 and was the senior tactical air control agency for I Corps/MR1.
way to beat it is to join it and outmanage them." In practical terms, this meant trying to retain as much Marine control of fixed-wing aircraft as possible within the rules. It also meant restating at every opportunity the principle that operational control of all 1st MAW elements remained with the commander of III MAF. MACV, in its statements on single management, had always acknowledged III MAF's command and control over Marine air, as well as other Marine forces in Vietnam. McCutcheon simply took MACV at its word on this point. He continually emphasized that the commander of the Seventh Air Force exercised limited tasking authority over 1st MAW aircraft in his capacity as ComUSMACV's deputy for air, not as an Air Force commander.

McCutcheon closed on his goal when MACV revised its Directive Number 10.11, governing general command relations in Vietnam, after XXIV Corps became the senior U.S. headquarters in MR 1. McCutcheon and his staff proposed for inclusion in the document, a statement that the commander of III MAF would "exercise operational control of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing." He would make available "to Deputy Commander, USMACV for Air Operations, strike and reconnaissance air assets and tactical air control system for mission direction." MACV and Seventh Air Force accepted this proposal. McCutcheon declared: "My worst fears on this subject have been taken care of by the rewrite of 10.11. That shows I still have OpCon."

In early July 1970, the MACV staff again began revising Directive 95.4, and General Abrams ordered III MAF to submit proposed changes. The III MAF submission, sent to MACV on 6 July, reaffirmed that the Commanding General, III MAF "will exercise operational control of U.S. Marine Corps aviation resources and will conduct offensive and defensive air operations" while making strike and reconnaissance aircraft available to the Commanding General, Seventh Air Force, as Deputy ComUSMACV for Air, for "mission direction." Giving formal sanction to the practical arrangement already in effect, the Marines' draft permitted III MAF to withhold from Seventh Air Force direction "those assets necessary to support Marine Corps peculiar operations, e.g., . . . helo escort and landing zone preparation fire."

Reflecting McCutcheon's strategy for "outmanaging" single management, the most important proposed III MAF changes centered on an attempt to both clarify and restrict the authority of the Seventh Air Force under the system. The Marines did this by providing a definition of the terms "mission direction" and "operational direction," both of which MACV had used in relation to single management. Neither of these terms had an established definition in the United States military lexicon. III MAF proposed that "Mission/Operation Direction" be defined as "the authority delegated to ComUSMACV's Deputy Commander for Air Operations (CG 7th AF) to assign specific fixed-wing air tasks to the Commanding General, III Ma-

A North American OV-10A Bronco is seen in flight. The Broncos were introduced into Vietnam in 1968 for forward observation and to control close air support. The OV-10A Broncos could stay on station for three to four hours at altitudes of over 7,500 feet.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A568683
rine Amphibious Force, on a periodic basis as implementation of a basic mission assigned by ComUSMACV.  

McCutcheon explained the significance of this language in limiting Air Force authority and protecting Marine interests:

Operational control comprises four essential elements: composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. By our definition mission direction is restricted to one element only, namely, the assignment of tasks. CG III MAF therefore retains the other elements of operational control. A basic mission or task assigned by ComUSMACV to CG III MAF is to conduct offensive and defensive tactical air operations. Directive 95.4 now delegates to Deputy Commander MACV for Air, i.e., Commander 7th Air Force, responsibility to assign specific fixed-wing air tasks to CG III MAF on a periodic basis, that is in the weekly and daily frags, as an extension of the basic mission of offensive tactical air support assigned directly by MACV . . . .

The Seventh Air Force and MACV both accepted the Marine draft. Colonel Richard H. Rainforth, the 1st MAW liaison officer at Seventh Air Force Headquarters, declared that the revised Directive 95.4 “was written completely by Marine Corps input. We wrote it the way we wanted it, and the Air Force bought it.” Issued by MACV on 15 August, the new directive reiterated that III MAF retained operational control of all Marine aircraft and included the provision for withholding specialized Marine support sorties from the Seventh Air Force. It incorporated almost word for word the Marines’ definition of “Mission/Operational Direction.”

McCutcheon’s proposals and the revised Directive 95.4 met initial criticism at HQMC as a formal surrender to single management, but most Marines quickly realized that they had gained more than they had given up. Looking to protect the Marine Corps’ future, General McCutcheon concluded that 95.4, as published in 1970, “will stand us in good stead later as the JCS or unified commands research the subject and look for some way of explaining command relationships with air.”

Sortie allocations followed the practices developed during the previous year and the MACV Directive 95.4. Each evening, General Clay and his staff, including Colonel Stephen G. Warren,* who had relieved Colonel Rainforth as 1st MAW liaison officer, would “sit down and plan our sorties for next day.” According to General Clay, “Every night the Marines would say, ‘We are going to . . . give you X, Y, or Z sorties today. We’re going to retain A, B, and C for some . . . .

We have set a precedent whereby the Air Force had agreed in writing, to the Wing Commander retaining operational control of Marine aircraft . . . . We have inserted the MAF Commander in the chain which will prevent what the 7th Air Force was trying to do with the 1st MAW upon the advent of single management . . . . We may not always agree with the allocation of Marine forces under mission direction, but we sure as hell have a strong Marine voice that can go straight to the boss and not fiddle around with the Air Force.

Throughout the rest of 1970 and until the last Marine squadrons redeployed in 1971, III MAF and the 1st MAW worked harmoniously with the Seventh Air Force. General Lucius D. Clay, Jr., USAF, who replaced General Brown as Seventh Air Force commander in September 1970, was acquainted with both Lieutenant General McCutcheon and Major General Armstrong from previous joint assignments. “I could go talk to them as a person,” Clay recalled, and “just say, ‘Hey, fellows, we’ve got a problem . . . . Let’s work it [out]!’” The Marines, in turn, found Clay, in General Robertson’s words, “very fine” to work with. “I think he had great respect for Marine aviators and Marines themselves,” Robertson declared, “and the relationship we had, and the wing had with Seventh Air Force during my time . . . . couldn’t have been finer.” Marine and Air Force commanders alike approached single management from a practical, rather than a doctrinal standpoint. Their concern, as General Clay put it, was to make “a very honest effort . . . to put the . . . ordnance where the people wanted it.”

Sortie allocations followed the practices developed during the previous year and the MACV Directive 95.4. Each evening, General Clay and his staff, including Colonel Stephen G. Warren,* who had relieved Colonel Rainforth as 1st MAW liaison officer, would “sit down and plan our sorties for next day.” According to General Clay, “Every night the Marines would say, ‘We are going to . . . give you X, Y, or Z sorties today. We’re going to retain A, B, and C for some . . . .

*Colonel Warren, who had served five previous exchange tours or duty assignments with the Air Force beginning with the Korean War, was instructed by General McCutcheon to “act as a catalyst to ameliorate the enmity between Marine aviation and Seventh Air Force.” Warren later observed: “If we Marines did ‘outmanage’ single management it was only with full awareness of General Lucius Clay and Major General Ernest Hardin . . . . My daily association with them was most pleasurable and rewarding and they quickly came to understand the entire problem of the Marine Air/Ground concept when involved in combined and joint operations.” Col Stephen G. Warren, Comments on draft MS, 11 Apr 83 (Vietnam Comment File).
proved a unit award” Department of the Navy, for which the Navy Department is considering or has already ap-
currence “is necessary to preclude dual recognition of those unit s
Army or Air Force may be accepted by Navy or Marine units, bu t
unit award for the same action or service. Unit awards from the U.S.
field, the doctrinal issue was far from settled. Gener-
awarded.”*25
it go at that . . . . Then it turned out it was neve r
a proposed citation that is being submitted’ and le t
Al Armstrong and read the citation, saying, ‘This i s
tach the streamer to its colors . Nevertheless, at th e
considered. This meant that the wing could not at-
lar Navy unit citation for which the wing was bein g
Navy Department had not approved acceptance of the
award on the grounds that it might duplicate a simi-
278
*Under Navy regulations, no unit may receive more than one
unit award for the same action or service. Unit awards from the U.S.
Army or Air Force may be accepted by Navy or Marine units, but
only with the concurrence of the Secretary of the Navy. This con-
currence “is necessary to preclude dual recognition of those units
for which the Navy Department is considering or has already ap-
proved a unit award.” Department of the Navy, United States Navy
and Marine Corps Awards Manual, SecNavinst 1650.1D, CH-3, dtd
19Aug71, Paragraphs 314.3 and 316.1. The current 1st Marine Air-
craft Wing list of streamer entitlements include no unit award for the
period September 1970 - April 1971, although the wing holds a
Presidential Unit Citation for Vietnam service 11May65-15Sep67
and a Vietnam Service Streamer with two Silver and two Bronze
Stars for service between 11May65 and 14Apr71.

By the time 1st MAW Headquarters redeployed in
April 1971, Seventh Air Force/1st MAW relations had
reached such a peak of amicability that General Clay
nominated the wing for an Air Force Outstanding Unit
Award with Combat “V.” “They had done a hell of a job,” he said later, “and I thought . . . they deserved
some form of recognition.” Through direct telephone
calls to the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Air
Force, Clay obtained permission to make the award.
He brought the streamer with him to the 1st MAW
departure ceremony at Da Nang on 14 April. There,
Major General Armstrong informed Clay that the
Navy Department had not approved acceptance of the
award on the grounds that it might duplicate a simi-
ilar Navy unit citation for which the wing was being
considered. This meant that the wing could not at-
tach the streamer to its colors. Nevertheless, at the
departure parade, General Clay “gave the streamer to
Al Armstrong and read the citation, saying, ‘This is
a proposed citation that is being submitted’ and let
it go at that . . . . Then it turned out it was never
awarded.”*25

While harmony and cooperation prevailed in the
field, the doctrinal issue was far from settled. Gener-
al Chapman emphasized this fact on 14 October, in
a letter to the commanders of the two FMFs and to
the Marine Corps Development and Education Com-
mand. Evaluating the revised MACV Directive 95.4,
Chapman declared that the directive, while it “clear-
ly and decisively protects some of the Marine Corps
principles with minimal derogation of policy,”
represented only “a special accommodation to a
peculiar command relationship.” In principle, Marines
must continue to insist on “Marine aviation assets be-
ing tasked in support of Marine ground requirements
prior to commitment of air assets to other missions,”
and that only “air assets in excess of requirements for
Marine ground support” be committed “in general
support of a joint force.”*26

In Vietnam, the Marines had come to terms with
single management and had modified it to assure con-
tinued support of their ground forces by Marine avia-
tion, yet this favorable outcome had resulted in large
part from circumstances, and from the ability and will-
ingness of Marine and Air Force commanders on the
scene to accommodate each other's interests through
informal working relationships. In the end, General
Armstrong suggested, doctrines and regulations always
would give way to tactical necessity as perceived by the
joint commander:

When we really come down to it . . . when you get in
a tough situation where decisions have to be made, they're
going to be made on merit. And I don't give a damn what's
in writing. You could never hold COMUSMACV, for exam-
ple, to any agreement. If he's got a tactical situation that
dictates that he does something or he had to do something,
on its merit he's going to do it. And you can't take that away
from a commander by writing in a bunch of ironclad rules.*27

The debate on whether or not the Marine Corps’
long-term interests in maintaining the integrity of the
air-ground team was damaged in Vietnam will, doubt-
less, continue for years. The assessment of senior com-
manders in Vietnam in 1970-1971, however, was that
the single management controversy had little effect on
Marine air’s ability to support the troops on the
ground: “There certainly was no degradation of either
our capabilities or our ability to do anything we wanted
to do," said General Armstrong. "If our ground guys wanted to do something, we told Seventh Air Force we'd like to have a light schedule of commitments and excess sorties to do something on our own within III MAF, and never, on any occasion, were we refused."28

Attacking the Ho Chi Minh Trail

After the United States stopped bombing North Vietnam in 1968, the American effort to hinder the movement of men and supplies into South Vietnam was concentrated on the southern panhandle of Laos, codenamed the Steel Tiger area. Here, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a complicated network of trails and roads, crossed the western border of North Vietnam through four passes in the Annamite Mountains and then turned south, its innumerable branches leading to Communist base areas in South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese constantly repaired and extended these routes, in spite of American bombing. Over the elaborate trail and road network, enemy troops, fuel, and munitions flowed southward. Carried most of the way in a series of short hauls, with repeated changes of vehicles, each truck, or group of them, continually shuttled different loads over the same short stretch of road, almost always traveling by night. At various key points, troops could rest in hidden camps and supplies could be stored in carefully camouflaged depots.

The flow of enemy material through this system, and the American air effort to restrict it, was tied to the annual cycle of weather. Between October and February, the northeast monsoon brought relatively cool, foggy, rainy weather to coastal North Vietnam and northern South Vietnam. At the same time, the interior of Laos west of the Annamite Mountains experienced clear, dry days and nights. The North Vietnamese regularly took advantage of this period to move large amounts of supplies through the passes into Laos. Most of the material sent south during a year entered the northern end of the Ho Chi Minh Trail at this time. The allies adjusted their air interdiction effort to the same schedule. During the winter northeast monsoon, when bad weather reduced flying and ground activity in South Vietnam, MACV allocated the majority of its tactical air and B-52 sorties to the Steel Tiger area. Then, as the summer southwest monsoon brought rain to Laos, and northern
South Vietnam entered its dry season, the air effort was gradually shifted back to support operations in South Vietnam.

Conforming to the seasonal ebb and flow of activity, MACV and the Seventh Air Force in October 1969 launched Operation Commando Hunt III, the second in a series of campaigns to disrupt the Laotian portion of the enemy supply line. United States Air Force, Navy, and Marine tactical aircraft and Air Force B-52s made intensive day and night attacks on vehicle parks, transfer and storage areas, fords, and passes. By January 1970, MACV was allotting 55 percent of all preplanned tactical air sorties and 65 percent of all ARC Light missions to Commando Hunt III.29

In addition to the attacks on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, American aircraft flew other missions over Laos and, to a limited extent, North Vietnam. Over northern Laos, American aircraft conducted Operation Barrel Roll, providing tactical air support to anti-Communist Laotian forces. This operation involved primarily Air Force and Navy planes. American aircraft also continued reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam. Early in 1970, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized short incursions into North Vietnamese airspace by aircraft conducting Commando Hunt III missions and permitted attacks on North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites threatening B-52s flying into Laos.

At the beginning of 1970, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was providing 25-35 sorties per day in support of Commando Hunt III and other operations outside South Vietnam. While F-4Bs and A-4Es were conducting conventional bombing and strafing attacks in South Vietnam, most 1st MAW activity over Laos and North Vietnam was designed to exploit unique capabilities of Marine aircraft.30

The most distinctive Marine contribution to the Laos interdiction effort was Operation Commando Bolt, which exploited the all-weather capabilities of A-6A Intruders in night armed reconnaissance flights over the Ho Chi Minh Trail. These long-range twin-engine jets could carry as many as 22 500-pound bombs. Described by General McCutcheon as "the finest all-weather bombing aircraft in the world,"31 they had elaborate radar and computer navigation and bombing systems. These systems could locate and attack small moving targets, making the A-6A ideal for nighttime truck-hunting. The EA-6As also provided exceptional electronic jamming for strike missions into areas in Laos and North Vietnam which were heavily defended by antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles.

By early 1970, the A-6As were flying most of their missions under the guidance of the Air Force sensor readout station, which monitored seismic and acoustic sensors airdropped along the many branches of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.32 An A-6A assigned to Commando Bolt would take off from Da Nang and fly to a prearranged point where it would orbit, awaiting a target assignment. As trucks, known as "movers," activated the sensors, the readout station would notify the Marine aircraft of the target location. The Marine aircrew would then feed this data into the A-6A’s computer system and go in for a low-level attack. The A-6A proved effective as a truck destroyer. In the course of Commando Hunt III, MACV credited the Intruders with 977 trucks demolished or damaged in 1,486 sorties, an average of .66 trucks hit per sortie. Of the aircraft types used against the Ho Chi Minh Trail, only the Air Force AC-119, AC-123, and AC-130 gunships had a higher kills-to-sorties ratio.*

Marine Intruders making night bombing runs along the Ho Chi Minh Trail during late 1969 and early 1970 drew increasingly heavy antiaircraft fire. North Vietnamese gunners simply blazed away either at the sound of the aircraft or at the general area above where bombs were exploding. As a Marine pilot described it, the Communist strategy was to throw up "a tremendous volume of fire without stoppage from any gun that was able to deliver . . . fire in the immediate area . . . which was causing the A-6 some difficulties."33

To suppress this inaccurate but potentially dangerous flak, 1st MAW began sending an F-4B, codenamed appropriately Commando Bolt Assassin, to escort some of the patrolling A-6As. The crew of an F-4B, assigned the Assassin role, received the same briefing as the crew of the A-6A with which they were paired, then flew independently to orbit point, where the F-4B joined the A-6A and waited for a target. When the Intruder started its bombing run, the Phantom II followed in radar trail, armed with Zuni rockets and Rockeye II cluster bomb units (CBUs). The fighter-bomber crew watched for enemy gun flashes and attacked any Communist positions which opened fire. If the Intruder encountered no antiaircraft fire, which was infrequent, the F-4B expended its ordnance on the A-6A’s target.

*U.S. aircraft were credited with destroying or damaging 9,839 Communist trucks on 15,777 sorties during Commando Hunt III. MACV ComdHist, 70, 1, ch. VI, pp. 95-96.
Initially, Da Nang-based VMFA-542 carried out this mission. After this squadron redeployed in March, VMFAs -115, -122, and -314 at Chu Lai took over.

For the Phantom II pilots, accompanying an A-6A night bombing run was no easy task. Captain Lawrence G. Karch, of VMFA-542, pointed out that “the A-6 had a terrain-following radar and . . . all the goodies to do all-weather night interdiction missions . . . . We don’t . . . . Following this dude around right on the ground and then going in for a visual attack on a gun at night . . . it’s really quite challenging.”34 Some Phantom crews complained that the Rockeye II was ineffective in night attacks because the bright flash when its casing opened warned enemy gunners to take cover; nevertheless, the F-4B escorts achieved their goal of flak suppression. After the assassin flights began, A-6A and F-4B pilots flying over Laos reported that NVA gunners either were not shooting at the Intruders or were firing only brief bursts.

Under the codename Playboy, Marines of H&MS-11, flying McDonnell-Douglas TA-4Fs, conducted daily low-level, high-speed, visual reconnaissance of sections of the Ho Chi Minh Trail where NVA antiaircraft fire forced slower observation craft to remain at high altitudes.35 The TA-4F proved ideally suited to this dangerous mission. Its speed, small size, and maneuverability made it difficult for antiaircraft gunners to hit, and its two-place cockpit could accommodate an aerial observer. On a typical Playboy mission, a TA-4F would remain on station for about 40 minutes. It would fly along its assigned network of trails at altitudes of 200 to 2,000 feet at airspeeds between 450 and 550 miles per hour, constantly maneuvering up and down and from side to side to dodge hostile fire. After covering 10 or 15 miles of one route, the TA-4F would shift laterally to a different trail branch and follow it for a while. This tactic prevented the North Vietnamese from alerting batteries ahead of the TA-4F on its original flight path. The TA-4Fs were fired at on most of their missions and frequently were hit, but only one aircraft from H&MS-11 was shot down during 1970, and it was lost in South Vietnam. Occasionally, the Playboys, like Commando Bolt A-6As, flew with F-4B escorts for flak suppression.

While Air Force OV-10As, which remained on station for three or four hours at a time at altitudes above 7,500 feet, located large truck parks and storage areas and monitored the overall pattern of enemy activity, the TA-4Fs concentrated on smaller, hidden targets. Their crews regularly flew over the same portions of the trail system and developed the ability to spot subtle changes in foliage and topography, indicating enemy activity. They could locate individual, camouflaged trucks, bulldozers, and small supply dumps. While singly of minor importance, such sightings could form significant cumulative patterns. As a TA-4F pilot put it, “when you get into a particular area, [and] you’ll find a truck or two trucks, or storage, or a few oil drums, . . . every day for a two-week period you know . . . that they’ve got a lot of stuff in there, and it’s become a lucrative area to hit.”36

The TA-4Fs could also call for and control air strikes, but, because of their relatively short time on station, normally preplanned air support was not assigned to them. Often the TA-4Fs worked in cooperation with the OV-10As, which usually had flights standing by. The Marine jets would make low-level turns to investigate areas the high-altitude observers thought might contain potential targets; then the OV-10As could direct follow-up strikes.

VMCJ-1 supported operations over Laos and North Vietnam with both intelligence and electronic countermeasure flights. The RF-4Bs of the squadron, supplementing the much larger Air Force reconnaissance effort, collected target information and photographed strike results. The Marine jets on the average flew two of the approximately 40 photographic missions conducted in Laos and North Vietnam each day by the Seventh Air Force. More important were the Marine EA-6As. With the Navy EA-6s based offshore on carriers, these were the only electronic warfare planes in Southeast Asia fast and maneuverable enough to accompany strike aircraft to a target. They flew day and night radar detection and jamming missions in support of Air Force and Navy as well as Marine air raids.37

While the allies possessed total command of the air during 1970-1971, North Vietnamese MIG fighters posed a continuing threat to aircraft operating over Laos, especially the B-52s. To deter MIG attacks, the Americans kept fighters on airborne alert over Laos (MIGCAP) and over the Navy carrier task force in the Tonkin Gulf (BARCAP). The F-4B squadrons of the 1st MAW drew their share of both MIGCAP and BARCAP assignments. Normally, a squadron committed most of its strength to this mission on a particular day or days during the month, keeping two aircraft orbiting on the patrol station over Laos or the carriers, with others ready on the airstrip to relieve or support them. The mission also required a KC-130F tanker to refuel
the fighters when they reached their patrol area, extending both the range and the time on station.

While these missions at times strained the 1st MAW's diminishing fighter-bomber capabilities, General Thrash considered BARCAP, in particular, to have compensating advantages. Thrash declared that participation in BARCAP "maintains our air-to-air proficiency as well as coordination with carrier task force operations," and "has the side benefit of maintaining cordial relations with the fleet."38

During the first half of 1970, 1st MAW operations over Laos and North Vietnam kept pace with the intensity of the air campaign. Aircraft of the wing flew an average of 785 Commando Hunt related sorties each month. These included 250 A-6A Commando Bolt sorties, 75 F-4B bombing missions, and 15 Playboy TA-4F flights. VMCJ-1 conducted an average of 40-50 photographic reconnaissance and 150 electronic warfare missions per month. The wing's monthly BARCAP contribution averaged 48 sorties, and some months the F-4Bs flew another 50 or 60 bomber escort and Commando Bolt Assassin missions.

During May and June, Marine air operations expanded into Cambodia, as American and South Vietnamese troops swept the enemy's border base areas. On 5 and 6 May, Phantom IIs of VMFAs-115 and -314 flew eight missions in support of Operation Binh Tay I, a large-scale incursion by the U.S. 4th Division and the 22d ARVN Division into a Communist base area 40 miles west of Pleiku. The Marine jets dropped 1,000-pound bombs to clear landing zones for allied heliborne assaults. Later in the month, supporting the same operation, MAG-13 Phantoms completed 26 direct and close air support sorties, attacking NVA and VC positions with napalm and 500-pound bombs. Marine air operations over Cambodia concluded in June with four flights by VMFA-314 to drop 500-pound delayed action bombs on a key ford.39

In mid-1970 the usual seasonal decline in American sorties against the Ho Chi Minh Trail began, the number falling from 10,966 in April to 6,242 in July and only 4,943 in August. Conforming to the pattern, the 1st MAW, with the concurrence of the Seventh Air Force, reallocated most of its fixed-wing sorties to support the I Corps/ MR 1 summer offensive and participate in such large-scale 1st Marine Division operations as Pickens Forest and Imperial Lake. Redeployment of key Marine air units involved in the interdiction campaign further diminished 1st MAW operations outside South Vietnam.

The gradual removal of 1st MAW aircraft from Commando Hunt and related operations began in mid-June. On the 16th, as MAG-13 and two of the Marines' remaining three F-4B squadrons prepared to stand down, the Phantom IIs ceased flying bombing missions over the Steel Tiger area. Aircraft of non-redeploying VMFA-115 continued BARCAP and MIG-CAP flights. The withdrawal of VMCJ-1 in July ended

A Marine Grumman EA-6A Intruder is shown on the runway at the Da Nang Airbase. The EA-6A was the electronic countermeasures version of the A6A. EA-6As were used to detect and jam enemy radars in the air war over Laos and participated in Lam Son 719.

Marine Corps Historical Collection
the Marines' photographic reconnaissance and electronic warfare contributions to the interdiction campaign. A-6A Commando Bolt sorties also declined, from 212 flown in June to 60 in July and 87 in August. On 19 August, the 1st MAW temporarily halted Commando Bolt flights. This action resulted also from increased need for the all-weather bombers within South Vietnam and in part from severe maintenance problems which plagued the A-6A throughout the summer.* TA-4F Playboy missions ended on 14 September, again because of redeployment of some of the aircraft and the need for the others within South Vietnam. By October, only the F-4Bs of VMFA-115 still were flying Steel Tiger missions. They completed 33 B-52 escort missions during the month, as well as 32 BARCAP sorties.40

In November, the air war against the Ho Chi Minh Trail resumed with increased fury. MACV and the Seventh Air Force launched Commando Hunt V, another monsoon-season attempt to halt the flow of Communist troops and supplies into South Vietnam. General Abrams allotted 70 percent of all United States tactical sorties in Southeast Asia and the entire Arc Light effort to this campaign. At Abrams' direction, the Seventh Air Force concentrated most of this airpower on four "interdiction boxes," each a rectangle three-quarters of a mile by one and one-half miles in size covering the routes leading from one of the major passes. B-52s and tactical aircraft blasted these boxes in round-the-clock raids aimed at destroying trucks and supplies and obliterating the roads and trails. At the same time, tactical aircraft resumed antitrick patrols of the routes outside the interdiction boxes.41

As a result of troop redeployments and the declining level of ground action, the 1st MAW, even with its own strength much reduced, could now fly many more sorties than were needed to support Marine and allied forces in South Vietnam. The wing devoted most of the surplus to Commando Hunt V. On 8 November, the A-6As of VM(AW)-225 resumed Commando Bolt missions, flying a steady seven sorties a day over the Laotian roads. At the same time, the F-4Bs of VMFA-115 and the A-4Es of VMA-311 went north in daylight raids on the interdiction boxes. Aircraft of these two squadrons soon were flying 14 Commando Hunt sorties a day. The F-4Bs also increased escort activities; to protect the B-52s over Laos, the Phantoms conducted 66 MIGCAP missions in November and they completed 87 BARCAP sorties. 1st MAW Commando Hunt operations continued at a level of 700-800 sorties per month through the end of 1970 and the first four months of 1971. During March and April 1971, the Marines' interdiction effort in effect became part of the close air support for Lam Son 719.*42

To support the renewed Laotian offensive, EA-6As of VMCF-1 reentered South Vietnam. In October, MACV and the Seventh Air Force asked the Marine Corps to return at least the electronic warfare elements of the squadron to help ward off SAM attacks on B-52s over Laos. Initially, the Marines were reluctant to comply; they were concerned about the political repercussions of sending even part of a withdrawn unit back to the war. Further, the Marines' worldwide level of maintenance and support personnel, parts, and equipment for the EA-6A was limited, and a recommitment of the aircraft to Southeast Asia would force curtailment of EA-6A activities elsewhere. At the urging of General McCutcheon, who stressed the indispensability of the EA-6A in Southeast Asian operations, the Marines finally agreed to deploy detachments from VMCF-1 to Da Nang while the parent squadron stayed at Iwakuni. The aircraft at Da Nang were to be under the operational control of the Seventh Fleet, rather than III MAF.43

Two temporary deployments of four-plane EA-6A detachments took place during March 1971, one from the 9th through the 19th and another on the 22d. The aircraft flew 17 electronic warfare sorties during both deployments. On 5-6 April, another detachment of four EA-6As moved to Da Nang, this time "on a long-term basis." The aircraft and their crews were accompanied by 100 VMCF-1 ground personnel and seven vans of electronic warfare support equipment. Sup-

*In June, after a Navy A-6A suffered a wing failure, the Marines began inspecting each of their Intruders for wing cracks, using both ultrasonic and x-ray equipment. The Intruders Intruders were found to be structurally sound, but, under a Navy Department program, each had to be taken out of service temporarily for modifications to avoid potential maintenance problems which plagued the A-6A throughout the summer.* TA-4F Playboy missions ended on 14 September, again because of redeployment of some of the aircraft and the need for the others within South Vietnam. By October, only the F-4Bs of VMFA-115 still were flying Steel Tiger missions. They completed 33 B-52 escort missions during the month, as well as 32 BARCAP sorties.40

In November, the air war against the Ho Chi Minh Trail resumed with increased fury. MACV and the Seventh Air Force launched Commando Hunt V, another monsoon-season attempt to halt the flow of Communist troops and supplies into South Vietnam. General Abrams allotted 70 percent of all United States tactical sorties in Southeast Asia and the entire Arc Light effort to this campaign. At Abrams' direction, the Seventh Air Force concentrated most of this airpower on four "interdiction boxes," each a rectangle three-quarters of a mile by one and one-half miles in size covering the routes leading from one of the major passes. B-52s and tactical aircraft blasted these boxes in round-the-clock raids aimed at destroying trucks and supplies and obliterating the roads and trails. At the same time, tactical aircraft resumed antitrick patrols of the routes outside the interdiction boxes.41

As a result of troop redeployments and the declining level of ground action, the 1st MAW, even with its own strength much reduced, could now fly many more sorties than were needed to support Marine and allied forces in South Vietnam. The wing devoted most of the surplus to Commando Hunt V. On 8 November, the A-6As of VM(AW)-225 resumed Commando Bolt missions, flying a steady seven sorties a day over the Laotian roads. At the same time, the F-4Bs of VMFA-115 and the A-4Es of VMA-311 went north in daylight raids on the interdiction boxes. Aircraft of these two squadrons soon were flying 14 Commando Hunt sorties a day. The F-4Bs also increased escort activities; to protect the B-52s over Laos, the Phantoms conducted 66 MIGCAP missions in November and they completed 87 BARCAP sorties. 1st MAW Commando Hunt operations continued at a level of 700-800 sorties per month through the end of 1970 and the first four months of 1971. During March and April 1971, the Marines' interdiction effort in effect became part of the close air support for Lam Son 719.*42

To support the renewed Laotian offensive, EA-6As of VMCF-1 reentered South Vietnam. In October, MACV and the Seventh Air Force asked the Marine Corps to return at least the electronic warfare elements of the squadron to help ward off SAM attacks on B-52s over Laos. Initially, the Marines were reluctant to comply; they were concerned about the political repercussions of sending even part of a withdrawn unit back to the war. Further, the Marines' worldwide level of maintenance and support personnel, parts, and equipment for the EA-6A was limited, and a recommitment of the aircraft to Southeast Asia would force curtailment of EA-6A activities elsewhere. At the urging of General McCutcheon, who stressed the indispensability of the EA-6A in Southeast Asian operations, the Marines finally agreed to deploy detachments from VMCF-1 to Da Nang while the parent squadron stayed at Iwakuni. The aircraft at Da Nang were to be under the operational control of the Seventh Fleet, rather than III MAF.43

Two temporary deployments of four-plane EA-6A detachments took place during March 1971, one from the 9th through the 19th and another on the 22d. The aircraft flew 17 electronic warfare sorties during both deployments. On 5-6 April, another detachment of four EA-6As moved to Da Nang, this time "on a long-term basis." The aircraft and their crews were accompanied by 100 VMCF-1 ground personnel and seven vans of electronic warfare support equipment. Sup-

*For details of the Marine air role in Lam Son 719, see Chapter 11.
plementing the equipment brought from Iwakuni, the detachment received assistance from MAG-11 and from VMA(AW)-225. Between 15 April and 7 May, the EA-6As completed 116 combat sorties, fragged by the Seventh Air Force and CTF 77, then returned to Iwakuni as Marine ground and air operations ceased.44

Between 8 November 1970 and 30 April 1971, when Commando Hunt V ended, Marine A-6As flew a total of 1,011 Commando Bolt sorties. They claimed 251 trucks destroyed and reported 771 secondary explosions and 241 secondary fires. In the same period, Marine F-4Bs and A-4Es completed 2,498 sorties, in which they claimed 36 trucks, 2 bulldozers, 4 tanks, and 14 crew-served weapons, caused 900 secondary explosions, and made 396 road cuts. Air operations over Laos continued after the end of Commando Hunt V. VMA-311, the last operational fixed-wing squadron of 3d MAB, flew missions over Laos until all Marine combat ended on 7 May.45

Air Support Trends in Military Region 1

I Corps/Military Region 1 consistently received more fixed-wing air support than any other allied corps area. By late 1970, the region was absorbing between 65 and 100 percent per month of the B-52 sorties flown within South Vietnam and up to 30 percent of all tactical air sorties. Much of this airpower, substituting for withdrawing American ground forces, was used to break up enemy troop concentrations and destroy supplies in the large Communist base areas in western Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.46

Until late 1970, Marine aircraft daily flew about 65 percent of the tactical air-strikes conducted in MR 1,47 but, inexorably, as 1st MAW strength declined, so did Marine air activity. During January 1970, Marine aircraft completed 3,036 attack missions in MR 1 and 735 “combat support” sorties, a category that included reconnaissance, artillery and air-strike control, and flare drops. By June, the number of attack sorties had fallen to 2,497, although combat support missions had increased to 1,046.48

Reflecting the shifting balance of allied forces, Marine aircraft flew more than half of their close and direct support missions for U.S. Army, South Korean, and ARVN units. Of 29,998 A-4E, A-6A, and F-4B sorties flown in 1970, for instance, 11,348 supported Marines and 12,116 were called for by Army forces. The attack aircraft completed another 1,814 missions for the South Vietnamese and 290 for the Korean Marines. Attacks on targets outside South Vietnam accounted for the remaining sorties. By contrast, the OV-10As of VMO-2 flew all but a handful of their 7,018 sorties in support of the 1st Marine Division. The TA-4Fs split their 2,009 missions about evenly between the division and Seventh Air Force operations in Laos.49

Marines in turn occasionally received close support from the U.S. Air Force. An officer at the 1st MAW tactical air direction center remarked:

> Once on the target, the Air Force air is every bit as good as Marine air, not better in any way, but comparable in getting the ordnance on the target. There is a bit of a slowdown... as a result of the fact that Air Force air is not as familiar with the terrain features... in I Corps... but you can get them on target almost as quickly and once there they do a fine job... 50

During the last months of 1970 and early 1971, strike aircraft of all the Services operated under strict sortie limits. The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 August, as an economy measure, compelled by budget cuts, restricted the number of tactical air attack sorties which could be flown in southeast Asia to 14,000 per month. Of these, the JCS allotted 10,000 to the Air Force, 2,700 to the Navy, and 1,300 to the Marine Corps. Earlier, for similar reasons, the Joint Chiefs had limited B-52 sorties to 1,000 per month. MACV could exceed these ceilings only with special JCS permission.51

Under the JCS order, the 1st MAW could launch a maximum of 42 or 43 attack sorties per day; combat support missions did not count toward the limit. Since most of the daily attack sorties would be subject to Seventh Air Force assignment under single management, and the wing no longer could increase its sortie rate at will, the restriction initially revived III MAF fears that its ground forces would be denied adequate Marine air support, but, these concerns proved unfounded. The Seventh Air Force continued to be accommodating in mission assignments, and MACV permitted 1st MAW to reduce sorties below the maximum on some days of a month in order to exceed the maximum on other days when extra air support was required. According to Colonel Frank A. Shook, Jr., the 1st Marine Division Air Officer, “It’s 1,300 sorties in any one month, but you can run 10 sorties one day and then maybe 50 the next, but you’ve got to bank them to do it.” By this means, the wing met the 1st Marine Division requirements for support of major operations and covered the troop redeployments during August and September. In October, November, and December, as monsoon-season storms restricted both flying and ground action, the wing easily remained within the sortie limit, even with renewed
operations in Laos. In December, for example, 1st MAW aircraft flew only 539 in-country attack missions\(^5\) which did, nevertheless, include close air support for units in the Da Nang TAOR, combat air patrols for strikes in Laos, and interdiction and armed reconnaissance missions to curtail traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

During the remaining months of combat in 1971, the 1st MAW kept its attack missions within or exactly at the 1,300 ceiling, except when the JCS temporarily removed the limit during Lam Son 719. Marine aircraft, until the final redeployments, flew 500-600 in-country strike sorties each month and the same number of combat support sorties. The rest of the available attack missions were normally used in Commando Hunt V\(^5\^3\).

**Controlling Air Support**

Under single management, requesting and controlling fixed-wing air support was a complex but increasingly efficient process. For all missions but those employing sorties withheld for landing zone preparation and other special purposes, or the extra sorties above the one-per-day allocation to Seventh Air Force, control centered in Horn DASC.\(^5\) This combined U.S. Air Force/U.S. Marine/Vietnamese Air Force direct air support control center had been established at Camp Horn, then III MAF Headquarters, in 1968 as the senior tactical air control agency for I Corps. Horn DASC could divert any fixed-wing mission assigned to I Corps/MR 1, and it could launch aircraft held on alert for tactical emergencies. The 1st MAW air control system, consisting of a Tactical Air Direction Center at Da Nang Airbase, a Tactical Air Operations Center on Monkey Mountain, and a Direct Air Support Control Center at 1st Marine Division Headquarters, worked in close cooperation with Horn DASC.*

Until March 1970, DASC Victor at Phu Bai, subordinate to Horn DASC, controlled air support assigned to XXIV Corps units.

*In the Marine air control system, the TADC was the senior facility, responsible for command and control of all 1st MAW aircraft, and for use on assigned missions. The TAOC was to conduct air surveillance and direct antiair warfare operations; in Vietnam, it assisted in controlling fixed-wing aircraft. The DASC, a wing agency usually located at the headquarters of the supported unit, controlled all fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft assigned to missions in support of the 1st Marine Division.

Army divisions had the equivalent of a DASC, and the Air Force had its own air control system for its aircraft, with a Combat Reporting Center (CRC) on Monkey Mountain as senior control agency.

Marine ground units submitted requests for preplanning air support 24 hours in advance to the 1st Marine Division Air Officer. The consolidated requests from the division then went to III MAF, which combined them with air support requests from other MR 1 forces and transmitted them to the MACV Tactical Air Support Element (TASE) and the Seventh Air Force Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC) at Saigon. After the change of command in MR 1 on 9 March 1970, XXIV Corps, now at Camp Horn, took over the transmitting function and DASC Victor was dissolved. Under MACV supervision and general direction, Seventh Air Force apportioned available sorties among the corps areas, normally assigning 1st MAW to missions in I Corps. These assignments came to the wing in the form of a daily "frag" order, to which the wing could add the special mission and surplus sorties that it still directly controlled. For 1st Marine Division support missions, the 1st MAW TADC informed the DASC of the schedule of flights ordered and the number, type, ordnance loads, radio call signs, and time of arrival on station of the aircraft assigned. The DASC had responsibility for establishing communication with the aircraft as they came into division airspace and for turning them over to ground forward air controllers (FACs) or airborne forward air controllers (FAC[A}s) who directed the actual strikes.

If fixed-wing airpower were needed to meet a sudden tactical emergency, the DASC would receive the request from the ground unit or forward air controller. On its own authority, the DASC could divert preplanned flights already assigned to the division. If no such flights were in the area, the DASC would ask the TADC for additional strikes. The TADC then could "scramble" any available Marine aircraft or pass the request on to either Horn DASC or Saigon. With the slowing tempo of ground combat during 1970-1971, the Marines found it possible to rely more on preplanned missions and less on emergency scrambles. An officer of the wing TADC reported: "We have . . . gone much more in-country to pre-fragged missions and reduced our scramble rate."\(^5\)

While complicated, the system by 1970 usually delivered air support when and where Marine ground troops needed it. According to a FAC(A) with VMO-2, "You can expect [emergency] fixed-wing support on station within 30 minutes, in almost all cases, unless the weather or some emergency situation should arise, or the aircraft should go down [suffer mechanical
failure) on the ground . . . . Thirty minutes is generally soon enough to do the job.  

All aircraft furnishing direct support to Marine ground forces had to be controlled by a ground or airborne forward air controller, or by an air support radar team. Marine battalions each had a tactical air control party to transmit air support requests and control strikes, but ground FACs had proved to be of only limited usefulness in the obstructed terrain and scattered small-unit actions characteristic of the war in Quang Nam. Airborne FACs, usually flying in OV-10As in the air over the division TAOR, conducted visual and photographic reconnaissance, or spotted for artillery when not controlling strikes. In emergencies, one of these OV-10As, diverted by the division DASC, was the first aircraft on the scene. The forward air controller, riding in the back seat of the OV-10, established contact with the ground unit, determined what type and amount of air support was required, requested it through the DASC, and then controlled the responding aircraft.

To support ground forces and conduct bombing missions at night and in bad weather, the Marines developed two sophisticated and effective electronic air strike control systems. In 1968, they brought the Radar Beacon Forward Air Control (RABFAC), commonly known as the "Beacon," to Vietnam for use with the A-6A. The heart of this system was a six-pound, battery-powered radar transponder, or beacon, carried by a ground forward air control party. The beacon emitted a distinctive signal which the Intruder's radar picked up as the aircraft came within range of the unit to be supported. By radio, the ground FAC informed the pilot of his location and that of the friendly troops, provided the bearing of the target in relation to the beacon, and stated the target type and desired direction of the bombing run. Once fed this data, the A-6A's attack-navigation system could guide the plane to the objective and automatically release its ordnance. Since the FAC rarely could determine the bearing between himself and the target with complete accuracy, beacon strikes usually had to be adjusted like artillery fire, with the A-6 dropping one or two bombs on each pass and the FAC sending course corrections, but normally the plane would be on target by the third run.

During 1970-1971, Marine A-6A squadrons regularly flew as many as a dozen beacon sorties per day on missions fragged directly by 1st MAW. Units of the American and the 101st Airborne Divisions; the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized); and the 5th Special Forces Group, as well as the 1st Marine Division, were equipped with beacons. According to Colonel Walter E. Sparling, the 1st MAW G-3, the Army units "like [the beacon] even better, they say, than an Arc Light. They know there's complete secrecy in a beacon [and] greater accuracy . . . ."

In November 1970, to increase exploitation of the beacon and furnish more close air support during the monsoon season, the 1st MAW introduced "Buddy Bombing." It began sending A-4s, F-4s, or A-6s with nonfunctioning electronic systems to accompany each Intruder on a beacon flight. The "Buddy" aircraft would follow the beacon guided plane on its run, releasing its ordnance at the command of the lead pilot.

While useful, the beacon system had its limitations. Ground units in heavily populated areas rarely could employ it for lack of political clearance for strikes. Radio equipment failures often prevented the infantry from contacting the supporting aircraft, and the elaborate electronic systems of the Intruder were also difficult to keep in working order. General Armstrong summed up: "There's too damn many things to go wrong . . . in the beacon. The airplane system goes down, beacon doesn't work properly, or you don't have reliable air-ground communications. Our mission completion rate was only about 50 percent . . . in a long period of months."

Much more reliable than the RABFACs were the Marine AN/TPQ-10 radar course directing centrals, operated by the air support radar teams (ASRT) of MASS-3. These devices, each a combination of radars and computers, located at strategic points throughout Military Region 1, could track aircraft at ranges of up to 50 miles and direct them to targets. An ASRT normally received target assignments from the DASC it was supporting and was subordinate to the DASC. When a strike aircraft came into range, the ASRT took over as final controller of the attack. The ASRT would determine the aircraft's position in relation to that of the TPQ-10. With this information, and with the position of the target already known, the team then worked out a course and bomb release time for the aircraft and directed it to the objective by radio. Using the AN/TPQ-10, the air support radar teams could deliver ordnance accurately under the worst weather conditions, day or night.

ASRTs during 1970 controlled 5,421 Marines, Air Force, Army, and Navy missions. They also positioned aircraft for flare and supply drops, photographic reconnaissance runs, and medical evacuations. In early 1971, the Da Nang ASRT and HMM-262 successfully used
the system, combined with a beacon, to guide helicopters to preselected landing zones in the field. The application of air support radar devices to helicopter operations enhanced the wing’s ability to resupply ground units and move them when rain and fog had previously made helicopter support operations prohibitive. With the ASRT, the Marine Corps made a unique contribution to the air war; no other Service had facilities comparable in both accuracy and displacement ability.

At the beginning of 1970, MASS-3 had five ASRTs deployed, at Quang Tri, FSB Birmingham near Phu Bai, Da Nang, An Hoa, and Chu Lai. As part of the Keystone Robin Alpha redeployment in mid-1970, III MAF prepared plans to withdraw most of the personnel of MASS-3 and all of its ASRTs except the one at Da Nang. This plan met strong objection from XXIV Corps, which relied heavily on the Quang Tri ASRT to support the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) and Birmingham ASRT to control air strikes for the 101st Airborne Division in northern MR 1. The Army so valued the AN/TPQ-10 that, according to General Armstrong, “If the Army commanders had had their way, our AN/TPQ-10 would have been out there until they left.” After extensive discussions, the Marines agreed to remove MASS-3 from the Keystone Robin Alpha troop list and keep three ASRTs at Quang Tri, Birmingham, and Da Nang. These ASRTs continued in operation until the final Marine redeployment in May 1971.*

*For the role of the Quang Tri ASRT in Operation Lam Son 719, see Chapter 11.
CHAPTER 16

Improving Helicopter Support of the 1st Marine Division—Helicopter Operations
New Ordnance and Aircraft—Aviation Achievements and Costs

Improving Helicopter Support of the 1st Marine Division

During the last year and a half of combat, Generals Thrash and Armstrong devoted much time and effort to improving helicopter support of ground operations. The wing commanders acted against a background of mutual recrimination between aviation and ground Marines. This quarrel had reached a climax in 1969, when the wing, with not enough helicopters, was trying to support two reinforced Marine divisions. Ground commanders complained that Marine helicopters were unresponsive to their requirements, and many looked with increasing favor to the Army system of attaching helicopters directly to individual divisions and brigades. Lieutenant Colonel James W. Rider, who flew AH-1G Cobra gunships with VMO-2 and HML-367 in 1969-1970, was sympathetic in recalling criticism from the infantry: “The Marine command and control system required that all helicopters be requested at least one day in advance with exception of emergency missions. This did not afford Marine ground commanders the flexibility that their Army ground colleagues had.” Other Marine aviators declared that their ground counterparts made unrealistic demands and refused to appreciate the limitations and difficulties of rotary-wing operations. These arguments spread from Vietnam throughout the Marine Corps, raising doubts about the validity of the Marine system of helicopter command and control and, indeed, about the solidarity of the air-ground team as a whole. General Chapman, in a Green Letter to all general officers issued on 4 November 1969, acknowledged that “unfortunately, air-ground relationships are not all they could and must be.”²

Even as Chapman wrote, efforts to remedy the situation were under way. During 1969, two separate Marine study groups investigated helicopter usage, and command and control. In Vietnam, Lieutenant General Nickerson convened a board of III MAF officers, headed by Major General Carl A. Youngdale, the MAF deputy commanding general, which thoroughly reviewed the conduct of 1st MAW helicopter operations. At Quantico, a study group at the Marine Corps Development Center, then commanded by Major General Armstrong, who shortly afterward took over the 1st MAW, examined air-ground relations in general. This group also concentrated on helicopter problems as the major area of friction.

Both investigations reached similar conclusions. The boards reaffirmed the validity of basic Marine Corps principles of air and ground organization and helicopter command and control. Both declared that most of the air-ground difficulties in Vietnam had resulted from a shortage of helicopters and from the fact that one wing had had to work with two widely separated divisions. The investigative boards, nevertheless, also uncovered remediable failings in the application of Marine Corps doctrine. They emphasized training deficiencies, which had left many air and ground commanders ignorant of the fundamentals of each other’s specialties. While they rejected the Army system of permanently attaching helicopters to ground units, both study groups recommended strengthening the authority of the DASCs, located with the divisions and which controlled both helicopter and fixed-wing support, to speed the exchange of information between the divisions and the wing, and to permit more rapid reassignment of helicopters in response to tactical emergencies. To improve support of the 3d Marine Division, the Youngdale Board advocated establishment of a 1st MAW auxiliary wing headquarters, which would be commanded by a brigadier general assistant wing commander and located at 3d Division Headquarters in Quang Tri. Lieutenant General Nickerson promptly implemented this recommendation with beneficial results.³

The withdrawal of the 3d Marine Division from Vietnam during the second half of 1969 reduced III MAF to a single Marine division paired with a single wing, both located in the Da Nang area. To support the 1st Marine Division, at the beginning of 1970 the 1st MAW had available 52 UH-1Es, about half of them armed, 28 AH-1Gs, 117 CH-46Ds, and 20 CH-53Ds. This represented an abundance of helicopters never

*Earlier, Provisional MAG-39 had been set up at Quang Tri in an effort to coordinate helicopter support of the 3d Marine Division.
attained or even expected by the division.* The favorable ratio of air support to ground troops continued throughout the 1970-1971 redeployments, as III MAF kept infantry and helicopter withdrawals in close balance.

Major General Thrash took full advantage of the new sufficiency of helicopters. He announced as his policy that “any [helicopter] mission requested by the division that is within our capability will be launched.”* Following many of the recommendations of the Youngdale Board, Thrash tried to improve the coordination of helicopter and ground operations and to increase mutual understanding by air and ground Marines of each other's techniques and problems. Also, within the limits of existing aviation organization and doctrine, he began experimenting with the delegation of helicopter mission assignments, and, in some cases, command and control, to ground unit headquarters.

During 1970-1971, the 1st MAW assistant wing commander routinely attended the 1st Marine Division commanders’ briefing four days a week to note and report to the wing any ground complaints about air operations and any division plans which would affect air activities. To improve day-to-day coordination of helicopter and infantry operations, the wing stationed a colonel/assistant G-3 at the DASC located with the 1st Division. This officer, in consultation with the division air officer, had the authority to divert or assign secondary missions to any helicopters flying in support of the division; if necessary he could request additional helicopters directly from the wing TADC. All 1st MAW helicopters on missions for the division on a particular day were treated as a single “division block,” which the DASC could employ. In contrast to the previous practice of having only junior aviation officers regularly in the DASC, placing a colonel there expedited air-ground consultation on problems as they arose. In the words of Major General Armstrong, “You get a colonel up . . . at the division, and you can talk to people.”**

To enhance understanding by air and ground Marines of each other’s methods and problems, wing and division units began orientation visits. Lieutenants from the division periodically spent days with the CH-46 squadrons of MAG-16. According to Colonel Haywood R. Smith, who commanded the helicopter group from March to October 1970, the infantry officers “would fly with us, see . . . their area from the air. See what we did and how we did it and why we did it. And it helped.”* Both fixed-wing and helicopter aviators, in turn, visited infantry regiments and battalions. They toured positions, attended briefings on operations, and watched artillerymen and infantrymen employ their weapons. The jet pilots, particularly, found this experience “highly interesting to most of the officers, who had not been to Basic School and had a chance to fire . . . these . . . weapons.”*** Many pilots also had lengthy, informal, and frank discussions with ground commanders about air support problems. Among the problems discussed was medical evacuation after dark. “Support at night was difficult to obtain, except for emergencies,” recalled Lieutenant Colonel James W. Rider who flew Cobras for HML-367, “This was true even on nights with good visibility and bright illumination. I called in a priority medevac about 1800 one evening, before sunset, and was told that the night crews had assumed

---

*Helicopter missions were divided into preplanned and on-call categories. Ground units requested preplanned helicopter support a day in advance through the 1st Marine Division Air Officer, who, in turn, submitted requests to 1st MAW G-3. The wing then consolidated requests from the division and other XXIV Corps units and prepared a daily fragmentary order, a copy of which went to the DASC. The DASC then monitored the missions, controlling the helicopters as they entered division airspace and passing them on to the terminal controllers with the ground units. On any given day, more preplanned missions were ordered than there were helicopters to carry them out. As a helicopter finished its first assigned mission, if another mission remained uncovered and the helicopter had not exceeded its flight hours for the day, the DASC could give it a second mission. On-call missions, not listed on the frag, came from the regiments and the division air office to the DASC, which then could divert already assigned helicopters, assign the additional mission as a secondary mission, or call on the TADC to launch additional aircraft. Helicopters fragged to the division for preplanned or on-call additional missions all became part of the “division block,” when so assigned. McNamara Intvw.

**Due to a shortage of pilots, most junior Marine aviators at this time did not attend the Basic School, but instead went directly from the officer candidate programs to flight instruction.
Three Sikorsky CH-46 Sea Knights return to Marble Mountain Airbase east of Da Nang after an operation in July 1970. The Sea Knights were introduced into Vietnam in 1966 and by 1970 the versatile aircraft were the mainstay of Marine troop airlifts.

the duty at Marble Mountain and only flew emergency missions.”

Aviators assigned as air liaison officers (ALOs) with regiments and battalions often found themselves involved in a process of mutual education. First Lieutenant George S. Bennett of VMA-311, assigned to the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines as a FAC/ALO, discovered little need for his services as a forward air controller, but he reported: “the infantry does have a need for an ALO on many occasions, mainly because they’re not trained in aviation . . . . They just didn’t know certain things, and the ALO . . . became quite involved in planning for operations.” Sometimes, Bennett recalled, “you would just have to corner the colonel or a major and say, ‘Well, Sir, you just can’t do that . . . . You just don’t understand, Sir, you’re not a pilot.’”

Whether as a result of ALOs cornering colonels, or of orientation visits, or of more frequent experience in working together, ground units and helicopter squadrons during 1970 became increasingly adaptable in adjusting tactics for particular missions. To assist the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines in its successful August surprise raid on a Viet Cong district headquarters, MAG-16 waived its standard requirement for prior air and artillery preparation of the helicopter landing zone. Major Grinalds, the 2d Battalion S-3, declared:

The planning started from the initial stages. As soon as the information came in . . . the ALOs got together with the MAG, and the ground scheme of maneuver came forward immediately, and the question of the prep was discussed right away . . . and the decision [was] made that we could go without the prep.

One aviator years later gave a blunt rationale for eliminating the prep: “This policy was frequently waived, when it bordered on the ridiculous. In late 1969, a staff study floated around the 1st Marine Division criticizing the stereotyped, long drawn out preps. They frequently sacrificed surprise and shock.”

During 1970-1971, the wing made increasing use of helicopter “package,” assortments of command aircraft, gunships, and transports organized for particular missions and usually placed on alert each day, ready for emergencies or tactical opportunities. A quick reaction package, for example, Mission 80, consisting of four CH-46s, a Huey, and two gunships, stood by at Marble Mountain for use by the 1st Marine Division Pacifier unit and for reconnaissance team extractions. Daily, the wing furnished two medical evacuation packages, each of two AH-1Gs or armed UH-1Es and two CH-46Ds. In April 1970, the wing instituted the Night Hawk package, later renamed Black Hammer, a Huey with special observation equipment escorted
by two gunships, for night armed reconnaissance and support of troops in contact.*

Helicopter packages, as such, were not new, but during 1970-1971 the wing departed from past practice by placing particular packages under the operational control of infantry regimental commanders. General Thrash introduced this innovation early in 1970. Carrying out a proposal of the Youngdale Board, he assigned a command and control package, usually two CH-46Ds, to each infantry regiment of the 1st Marine Division. Each day, the wing placed these helicopters at the disposal of the regimental commander, to be used as he wished for reconnaissance, resupply, and administrative movement of personnel. Thrash explained: “They can use it any way they want to, except for tactical use to put troops in the field, because then we have to tie it back to gunbirds and other things.”

Major General Armstrong, after replacing Thrash as 1st MAW commander, went even further in turning helicopters over to the regiments. In October 1970, Armstrong established Mission 86, a package of six CH-46Ds, four AH-1Gs, a UH-1E command and control aircraft, and sometimes a CH-53D, daily stationed at LZ Baldy to support the 5th Marines. Colonel Clark V. Judge, the 5th Marines commander, had full control of these helicopters. In consultation with a helicopter commander (airborne) (HC[A]) provided by the wing, Judge could employ the package even for heliborne combat assaults. Colonel Judge had originally proposed the creation of this package to give his regiment more flexible and responsive helicopter support. The wing, according to Armstrong:

... took a look at it. My helicopter people were not for it, but I said, “Look, that’s part of the system. If a quick reaction force down there will do the tactical job, then we’ll try it . . . .”

And we were ready to do it before the division was ready to turn responsibility for the conduct of operations over to the regimental commander, and decentralize their authority in execution and decision-making . . . . We were willing to do it, and did it. But we were ready before they sold it up the infantry side of the chain.**

The 5th Marines’ package proved to be a complete success, and the wing later created a similar, smaller package for the 1st Marines.** General Armstrong acknowledged that: “The type of operation we had there was possible only because . . . . relative to the number of ground forces that were there, we had probably the most favorable ratio of helicopters” in the whole Vietnam war. Armstrong encountered “a great reluctance on the part of some of my good aviator friends” to exploit this favorable ratio by creating regimental packages. “They had husbanded their limited resources for so long that they didn’t think this would work . . . . In fact, it was very effective—and they admitted so, afterwards.”

By the time the last helicopter and ground units withdrew from Vietnam, the 1st MAW apparently had vindicated the Marine system for command and control of helicopters. With only one division to support, and with a sufficient number of helicopters available, the wing had been able to furnish rapid, flexible, and innovative assistance to ground operations. All the steps taken by the wing during this period, General Armstrong pointed out, including the creation of regimental-controlled packages, existed in established Marine Corps helicopter doctrine. He summed up: “We used the doctrine . . . . We knew what it was. We took advantage of it . . . .”

**Helicopter Operations**

The declining intensity of combat brought no reduction of the demands on the MAG-16 helicopters and crews. In fact, Colonel Robert W. Teller, the 1st MAW Chief of Staff, observed: “I don’t understand it, but if the helicopter availability goes up, flight hours go up, and we got just as good a war going on as we ever had.”

During January 1970, Marine helicopters flew 30,942 sorties. They carried 71,978 troops and passengers, hauled 5,549 tons of cargo, and completed 6,873 gunship and 3,057 command and control missions. The monthly helicopter sortie rate remained at or above 30,000 until July 1970, when it rose to 38,109. Consistently, Marine helicopters flew about 70 percent of these missions in support of the 1st Marine Division, and most of the remainder for the ARVN and the Korean Marines.

Under the standards set by the Navy Department, the 1st MAW was oversusing its helicopters. The Chief of Naval Operations prescribed a maximum number of flight hours per month for each helicopter type in the Marine Corps inventory, ranging from 31.5 hours for the CH-53 to 60.6 for the UH-1E. On this standard, called the utilization factor, the Navy planned its purchase of fuel and spare parts and maintained...
its “pipeline” of these items for the squadrons in Vietnam. By early 1970, III MAF helicopters regularly were flying at a rate of 125 to 150 percent of the CNO utilization factor. This high rate of use in turn created a shortage of spare parts, causing helicopters to be grounded for lack of parts,* and increasing the already high utilization rate of the remaining aircraft. The vicious cycle continued until, by mid-1970, utilization rates for some helicopter types had reached 170 percent of the factor. At the same time, reductions in spare part shipments and a shortage of maintenance personnel, which resulted from disrupting the replacement system due to uncertainty in Keystone Robin Alpha plans, compounded repair and supply problems. Colonel Teller bluntly summed up: “You can’t keep this going forever.”**

In late August, accordingly, Major General Armstrong limited flight hours for all helicopter types to a maximum of 120 percent of the CNO utilization factor. With the number of helicopters then in its possession, under this restriction the wing could furnish an average of 315 helicopter flight hours per day, about 220 of which were normally available to support the 1st Marine Division. The division often used up to 150 helicopter hours in a single major troop lift, but it managed to operate within the limit by reducing command and control packages and cancelling resupply runs when necessary to support a large operation. Colonel Walter E. Sparling, the wing G-3, reported: “It took a little while for people to get used to this, but we’ve been able to juggle our frags and stay with it and . . . keep utilization down.”18 In spite of the limitation, in October the wing was able to establish the regimental packages for the 1st and 5th Marines.

Partly as a result of the flight hour reduction, and partly as a consequence of redeployments and monsoon weather, monthly helicopter sorties fell to a little over 30,000 in September, and during the last three months of 1970 dropped to below 25,000. Helicopters in this period flew about 7,000 hours a month. During the first part of 1971, the rate of helicopter activity declined in pace with Marine redeployment and TAOI reductions. Even with the assignment of heavy lift helicopters and gunship support for Lam Son 719 from January to March, however, the missions flown by CH-53Ds and CH-46Ds had decreased markedly.

After four years of war, the missions of each type of Marine helicopter had been established and the tactics for those missions worked out and refined. For most helicopters, missions and tactics changed little during 1970-1971. The CH-46D medium transports continued to perform the bulk of combat and non-combat trooplifts and resupply missions; and they carried out the important and hazardous medical evacuation and reconnaissance team insertion and extraction flights. CH-46s regularly flew about half of the 1st MAW helicopter sorties each month.

The AH-1G Cobra gunship played a crucial role in most helicopter combat operations, and Cobras were included in every mission package. The first of these aircraft had arrived in Vietnam in April 1969. Initially, III MAF had assigned them to the VMO-2, but in December 1969 III MAF moved the Cobras to HML-367 to assure better maintenance support and improve operating efficiency. HML-367 remained an all Cobra squadron until it redeployed in June 1971.

Helicopter gunships, both Cobras and armed Hueys, had escort of transports as their primary task. On flights likely to meet opposition in the landing zone, the pilot of the lead gunship often located and scouted the zone and directed the troop carriers into it. If enemy gunners opened fire, the Cobras, circling at altitudes of 500-800 feet, immediately closed in on the source of the fire and replied with machine guns, miniguns, grenade launchers, and rockets. The gunships could attack targets within 15 to 20 yards of friendly positions. Their fire was intended less to kill the enemy than to stop the Communists from shooting at the transports. As Colonel Smith, the MAG-16 commander, put it, “I’m not saying that . . . we’re killing someone every time that we put the fire down . . . . What it does, it keeps the people’s head down and they quit firing at the airplane.”19

The AH-1Gs were plagued by repeated engine failures, which eventually were ended in late 1970 by replacement of the power plants in most Cobras with a much improved T53 engine. Retrofitting the AH-1Gs enabled the squadron to resume full operational capability. HML-367 also had difficulty obtaining satisfactory ammunition belts for its 40mm automatic grenade launchers and, according to Colonel Smith, had to “steal a lot . . . . from the Army” to keep its
Two Marine Sikorsky CH-53D Sea Stallions are seen lifting off after landing troops of the South Vietnamese Regional Forces in a landing zone during July 1970. These heavy helicopters could carry as many as 60 Marines, almost double the capacity of the CH-46.

weapons firing. In spite of these difficulties, the Cobra squadron kept up a gruelling flight schedule. Its monthly sortie rate rose from 4,556 in January 1970 to 5,720 in June and then gradually declined during the rest of the year, partly as a result of the reduction of III MAF forces and operations and partly as a consequence of stricter 1st MAW enforcement of the CNO helicopter flight hour limitations. By early 1971, the Cobras were flying an average of about 1,600 hours per month in 4,400 sorties. First Lieutenant Herbert P. Silva, a gunship pilot, reported, "We've got a tremendous [aircraft] availability from our maintenance [and] we use our people as much as we can. It's not unusual for a pilot to be ready to fly, in the ready room, or out on a mission for 12 to . . . 15 hours a day."²⁰

The UH-1Es of HML-167 were continually in demand for a variety of tasks. Command and control missions for III MAF units and for the 2d ROKMC Brigade daily required about half of the squadron's 12-15 available unarmed Huey "Slicks." Two were constantly in use by III MAF Headquarters, two more were regularly assigned to the 1st Marine Division, and one each to the 1st MAW, Force Logistic Command, and the Korean Marine Brigade. The rest often transported the endless stream of visitors to III MAF Headquarters, including commanders from other Services and allied nations and travelling U.S. Congressmen and government officials. These requirements decreased after III MAF ceased to be the senior American command in I Corps/MR 1, but "VIP" missions remained a drain on the wing's helicopter availability until the last Marines redeployed.²¹

The unarmed Hueys also flew reconnaissance missions. Carrying the XM-3 Airborne Personnel Detector (APD),²² they attempted to locate hidden enemy troops. Hueys fitted with xenon searchlights and night observation devices were the eyes of the effective Night Hawk/Black Hammer patrols. The squadron's gunships, reinforcing the HML-367 Cobras, escorted trans-

²⁰Major General George S. Bowman years later noted the mobility the helicopter brought, for better or worse, in some cases, to the war. Considering the mobility afforded the "commanders, their staffs and the visitors, including the press," he said, "even the squad leader was not exempt from a surprise visit from the top brass in Washington down to his own unit commander, and sometimes they had a politician in tow . . . . I'm still impressed by the mobility the helicopter gave to this conflict." MajGen George S. Bowman, Comments on draft MS, 27Jun83 (Vietnam Comment File).

²²The APD, or "People-sniffer," located the enemy by sensing the chemicals in the air given off by human activity, including sweat, campfire smoke, and engine exhaust. FMFPac, MarOps, Dec70, pp. 49-50.
participated in the APD and Black Hammer flights.

In January 1970, Hueys of HML-167 flew over 2,460 hours; the gunships accounted for about 1,450 of these and the "Slicks" for 1,010. By June, activity had increased to 2,480 flight hours, about evenly divided between gunship, transport, and command and control missions, in 7,028 sorties. The squadron in this month of peak activity carried 3,846 passengers, and its gunships fired 191,500 rounds of machine gun ammunition and 2,020 2.75-inch rockets. During the remainder of 1970 and early 1971, demands on the Hueys gradually declined with the reduction in Marine strength and activity, but HML-167 continued flying reconnaissance and transport missions until the last units of the 3d MAB redeployed. Even after the squadron stood down on 26 May, two of its Hueys remained in operation until 15 June to support 3d MAB Headquarters, allowing HML-167 to claim the title of "the last operating Marine helicopter squadron in Vietnam."  

Unlike the other Marine helicopters, the CH-53 enlarged its combat role and took on major new missions during 1970-1971. The first of these heavy helicopters had arrived in Vietnam in January 1967. Two squadrons of them, HMHs -361 and 463, were in the country at the end of 1969. Much to the frustration of their crews, the Sea Stallions had largely been restricted to noncombat troop transport and supply missions and to recovering downed aircraft. Marine commanders hesitated to risk such an expensive helicopter under hostile fire. Furthermore, a shortage of spare parts and inexperience in maintaining the CH-53 reduced the number of aircraft available for service at any one time to no more than 25 percent of the nominal strength of the squadron.

Withdrawal of HMH-361 early in 1970, roughly halving the total number of CH-53s in Vietnam, alleviated the shortage of parts and qualified ground crewmen. As a result, HMH-463 was continually able to keep 14 to 16 of its 20 aircraft in flying condition. By March 1970, all of the "A" model CH-53s had been removed from Vietnam, and HMH-463 had a full complement of improved CH-53Ds. According to Colonel Sparling, the CH-53D was "the first airplane I know of that we've got that is over-powered, that has more power than is really required." HMH-463 at the same time removed a major inhibition on exposing the CH-53 to enemy fire by developing a method for recovering downed CH-53s from the field. In the light of these changes, Lieutenant Colonel Charles A. Block, the HMH-463 commander, began pressing the wing to give his aircraft a more active role in the war.

During March, the 1st MAW began using CH-53Ds, as well as CH-46s, to carry Marines and also Vietnamese and Korean troops in heliborne assaults. The ability of the Sea Stallion to move as many as 60 Marines in one aircraft and the large helicopter's speed, which reduced the duration of exposure to hostile fire when approaching a defended landing zone, quickly won the favor of troop commanders. With its great power, the CH-53D could lift men and equipment into high-altitude landing zones which CH-46s could not reach. By mid-August, CH-53Ds were participating in three or four assault missions a week, as well as continuing their logistic and aircraft recovery activities.

Despite the "rapid troop buildup" capacity of the aircraft, commanders continued to worry about the high casualties that would occur if a fully loaded CH-53D were shot down or crashed during an assault. The decision whether to put many men in a single large helicopter or to use more smaller helicopters involved a complex balance of risks. Major General Armstrong later summed up the problem:

If you have ... a defended zone, are you better off to put twice as many people in a single helicopter and take advantage of either surprise or your suppressive capabilities, getting in quickly, unload it and get it out? Or should you put half as many people in the first one; and because of the lack of the element of surprise—and that pertains to not only the fact that you're making the operation but the direction of approach and everything which is given away by the first troop-lift helicopter—and do you thereby so affect the vulnerability factors that you greatly decrease the survival [chances] of the second helicopter? ... This is a very controversial thing, and one [that] would really have to be calculated very carefully.

Eventually, late in 1970, Armstrong, Lieutenant

*In December 1966, Lieutenant General Victor A. Krulak, then CGFMFPac, had defined the role of the CH-53 as "primarily for transport of supplies and equipment... They are not regarded as primarily and the like, reconnaissance, evacuation, or observation aircraft..." CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 3Dec66, quoted in LtCol William R. Fails, USMC, Marines and Helicopters, 1962-1973 (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1978), p. 116.

*Under the squadron plan, the rotor heads, and transmission would be removed from the downed aircraft. Then three Sea Stallions would lift out the hulk and the other components as separate loads. Hayes intvw.
General McCutcheon, and Major General Widdecke together agreed that no more than 33 Marines were to be carried in any one helicopter in normal operations, although up to 45 South Koreans or South Vietnamese and “just any numbers of irregular, CIDGs,” could be lifted. Nevertheless, Armstrong recalled, “We did leave the door open for discussion and running operations on a basis of their own, but the planning figure thereafter was 33.”

During May and June 1970, the wing began using CH-53s to conduct large-scale napalm attacks on enemy troops and base areas. The concept for these operations originated with the 2d ROKMC Brigade. The South Korean Marines had discovered that the 55-gallon fuel drums filled with napalm, when dropped from an Army CH-47 Chinook, would smash their way to the ground through the thickest jungle and burst upon impact, spattering their inflammable contents in all directions. Ignited by strafing, napalm so delivered would spread fire over the ground more effectively than would napalm bombs from fixed-wing aircraft and served admirably to clear an area of boobytraps. At the request of the South Koreans, late in May, XXIV Corps ordered 1st MAW to prepare to carry out such operations. The Marines quickly realized that this technique would allow effective air attacks on enemy positions, for instance under thick jungle canopy, which could not be seriously damaged by conventional bombing. On 31 May and 3 June, CH-53Ds of HMH-463 made two small napalm drops southwest of Da Nang to support the Korean Marines. Under the codename Operation Thrashlight, the wing staff began planning larger drops, using napalm-carrying CH-53s in combination with bombing and strafing by jets and helicopter gunships.

On 7 June, the wing launched its first full-scale Thrashlight. The target, an area of deep ravines and canyons roofed with triple-canopy jungle about 35 miles southwest of Da Nang, was believed to contain the hideout of Front 4 Headquarters. Starting at 0600 on the 7th, CH-53Ds struck the target in 12-plane flights, each flight composed of waves of three helicopters. Each Sea Stallion carried 8,000 pounds of napalm in 20 55-gallon drums slung in cargo nets, the rigging of which was provided by Marines of Company C, 1st Shore Party Battalion. The pilots released the drums at an altitude of 1,500 to 2,000 feet. OV-10As and AH-1Gs, escorting the CH-53s, set fire to the napalm with tracers and rockets. Between helicopter flights, F-4Bs and A-6As pounded the target with heavy delayed-action bombs. During the day, the CH-53s flew 99 attack sorties, the F-4Bs completed 20 sorties, and the A-6As, 14. The results were anticlimactic. Aerial photographs taken after the raid showed caved-in bunkers and denuded trails in the burned-over area, but the fate of Front 4 Headquarters if it had been there at all, could not be determined.

Th rashlight, nevertheless, possessed promise as a means of spreading fire and destruction over a wide area. As an HMH-463 pilot put it, “Besides having a tremendous psychological impact on the enemy, it burns the heck out of him.” The Marines now had their own small-scale version of the carpet bombing carried on by Air Force B-52s. Indeed, Marine pilots, according to General McCutcheon, began calling the CH-53 the “B-53”.

Marines conducted two more large Thrashlight operations, as well as a number of smaller napalm drops, during 1970. One of the major attacks took place on 14 June, in support of a 51st ARVN Regiment drive against enemy-held ridges overlooking Thuong Duc. The second, on 4 September, prepared the ground for a two-company sweep by the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines in the Arizona Territory. Logistic limitations, including difficulty in obtaining enough 55-gallon drums, and the impossibility of using the technique near populated areas, prevented more frequent Thrashlights.

At the same time as the wing was developing Thrashlight, HMH-463 was preparing for still another new mission. In May 1970, Marine CH-53Ds began carrying MACV Studies and Observation Group (SOG) teams of United States Army Special Forces soldiers and South Vietnamese mercenaries on intelligence-gathering and sabotage raids against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. These teams, which often went into landing zones as high as 7,000 feet above sea level, had special need for a helicopter with the speed and power of the CH-53D. The Marines installed reconnaissance team insertion and retrieval equipment on their Sea Stallions for this mission and fitted some of their aircraft with an armament package which the Air Force had developed for its “Jolly Green Giant” search-and-rescue version of the CH-53.

Each month, from May through November, Marine helicopters took part in SOG lifts, described in HMH-463 reports as “a tri-Service mission in a denied access area.” These activities reached their climax in Operation Tailwind. During this operation, between
7 and 14 September, HMH-463 daily committed five or six CH-53Ds, eventually supported by four Marine AH-1Gs, five Army AH1Gs or UH-1Es, two Marine and one Air Force OV-10As, and numerous flights of jets. In the face of heavy antiaircraft fire, the Marine-led flights inserted a company-size SOG force near a North Vietnamese regiment and then, after the SOG troops had accomplished their mission, extracted them. The operation cost HMH-463 two CH-53s shot down and six crewmen wounded, all of whom were rescued.31

Although Operation Tailwind resulted in an estimated 430 NVA casualties and in the capture of documents of great intelligence value, it evoked sharp protests to MACV from Generals McCutcheon and Armstrong. The Marine commanders complained that SOG operations were diverting too many of III MAF's dwindling number of helicopters from operations in Quang Nam and that the helicopters assigned to support the SOG spent most of their time sitting on the ground on alert. Further, especially in the case of Tailwind, the Marines criticized SOG planners for underestimating the amount of enemy opposition and initially failing to provide adequate fixed-wing and gunship protection for the transports. Armstrong recalled that he and Colonel Smith, the MAG-16 commander:

... virtually put ourselves on the line and provided our own Huey Cobras for escort, etc., and we ran a fixed-wing flight down in one case. It was called for by a Cobra with no authorization... and [we] could have gotten into an awful lot of trouble sending airplanes into Laos to support our own helicopters without proper clearance... We did it because the situation was hot and we weren't about to let our own people go unsupported... These things were made necessary because the people who were involved didn't know what they were doing and what the fire support requirements really were.32

Marine helicopter participation in SOG operations dropped off sharply after Tailwind. CH-53Ds made a few more "tri-Service mission" flights in October and November, but then out-of-country helicopter operations ended until the Sea Stallions and Cobras went back to Laos in late January 1971 for Operation Lam Son 719.

The newly designed prototype of the Bell AH-1J Sea Cobra is shown here. The AH-1J Sea Cobras had twice the fire power of the AH-1G Huey Cobras which they replaced. A small detachment of AH-1J aircraft and pilots arrived in Vietnam in February 1971.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A419809
New Ordnance and Aircraft

During late 1970 and early 1971, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing tested two new types of ordnance and two new aircraft. While most of this equipment represented improvement or refinements of aircraft and weapons already familiar to Marines, at least one item foreshadowed a new era in nonnuclear warfare.

On 18 November 1970, the wing received 80 CBU-55 Low-Speed Fuel-Air Explosive Munitions for tactical use and evaluation. Designed to be carried by OV-10s and helicopters, each CBU-55 weighed about 500 pounds and consisted of a canister containing three smaller bombs. When released from an aircraft, the canister opened and the three bomblets drifted to earth by parachute. Each bomblet was filled with a flammable gas. On impact, the bomb released the gas creating and then detonating an explosive mixture. The resulting blast had a force comparable to that of a conventional 2,000-pound bomb. The Marines intended to use this weapon, which could be dropped when weather prevented jet operations, for clearing landing zones and boobytrapped areas.

During November and December, OV-10As employed 68 CBU-55s in tactical operations, and UH-1Es dropped eight more. The Marines found that, as expected, a single CBU-55 could clear a landing zone in elephant grass in thick brush large enough for a CH-53D, although it could "not consistently remove trees." They also discovered that the CBU-55 could crush bunkers, cave in tunnels, and clear away foliage.

In December 1970, the wing began testing a laser target spotting and bomb guidance system. This system was composed of two devices, the Laser Target Designation System (LTDS) and the Laser Guided Bomb (LGB), popularly known as the "Smart Bomb." The LTDS, a portable battery-powered laser beam generator, could be carried by a ground forward air control party or installed in an aircraft. Its narrow, invisible beam, when aimed at a target, created a reflection which an airplane equipped with a suitable detection device could sense and use as an aiming point. The LGB, a 500-pound or 2,000-pound bomb, had a detector which could guide its fall toward a laser-illuminated target, provided the pilot released his ordnance within a certain range and direction. The bomb, in effect, could aim itself.

On 12 December, four A-4Es of VMA-311, fitted with laser beam detectors, began flying LTDS-guided combat missions first with conventional ordnance and later with 500-pound "Smart Bombs." The system quickly proved effective. In good weather, a ground FAC could illuminate targets as far as 4,000 yards from his position, and the Skyhawks could pick up the reflections at distances as great as 10 miles. During January, Marine Skyhawks and A-6As carrying LGBs began flying Steel Tiger missions, in cooperation with LTDS-equipped F-4Bs of the Air Force's 244th Tactical Fighter Squadron. The Air Force jet, controlling the strike, would light up the target with its laser beam, which the Marine aircraft would use to guide their "Smart Bombs." With this system, the jets could release bombs accurately at altitudes of up to 12,000 feet, out of range of most enemy antiaircraft and automatic weapons fire. The 1st MAW also tried to combine the LTDS and LGBs with the beacon, but this experiment proved unsuccessful. In weather poor enough to require use of the beacon, the ground FAC usually could not locate the target well enough to illuminate it with his laser. Nevertheless, when the tests of laser-guided ordnance ended on 31 January, the 1st MAW recommended that the LTDS be made an "integral part" of the A-4 weapons system and that laser guided bombs "be incorporated into the Marine Corps' inventory of weapons."34 Used on only a limited scale in this period of the war, "smart" ordnance and its associated target-seeking systems would lend precision and weight to the renewed bombing of North Vietnam in 1972-1973 and held out both the promise and the threat of an era of unprecedented accuracy in both air and ground firepower.

Of the two new aircraft tested, one was an improved version of the Cobra AH-1G helicopter gunship. The AH-1G, originally designed for the Army, had electronic systems not compatible with those of the Navy and lacked features, such as rotor brakes, required for shipboard operation. By early 1971, accordingly, the Navy Department and the Bell Helicopter Company had developed the AH-J Sea Cobra, designed specifically for the Marines' amphibious mission. The AH-J had improved armament, including a 20mm automatic three-barrelled cannon in a revolving chin turret. Twin jet engines gave it greater power and reliability, important in overwater flight, and it had rotor brakes and a Navy avionics system.

On 16 and 17 February 1971, a detachment of eight Marine officers and 23 enlisted men, commanded by Colonel Paul W. Niesen, arrived at Da Nang with four AH-1Js. Colonel Niesen, who had received the 1969 Alfred A. Cunningham Trophy for his work as commander of a transport helicopter squadron in Vietnam,
and his team were to test their Sea Cobras in combat attached to HML-367. The detachment spent the rest of February preparing the Sea Cobras, which had been brought from the United States in a C-130, for action while training the HML-367 pilots in their operation. On 2 March, the Cobras began flying combat missions. From then until the detachment redeployed to Okinawa in May, the AH-1Js, flown by members of HML-367 as well as Niesen’s detachment, participated in every type of gunship operation. The aircraft especially distinguished itself in Lam Son 719 and in repelling the enemy night attack on the South Vietnamese garrison of Duc Duc. Beginning with its first combat missions in 1971, the AH-1J Sea Cobra demonstrated a vastly improved performance over its predecessor, afforded by twin engine reliability, the increased firepower of the 20mm cannon, and a greater diversity of weapon systems, including the ability to carry CBU-55s.*

On 26 May 1971, as 3d MAB was standing down, two YOV-10Ds arrived at Da Nang for combat evaluation. These aircraft, an improved version of the Bronco, were equipped with a Night Observation Gunship System (NOGS) and a 20mm turret cannon coupled to an infrared target locating device. The system was supposed to be able to detect enemy troops on the ground at night, even in light jungle foliage. Since all 1st MAW units had ended combat operations, the wing arranged for a detachment of 21 Marine pilots and ground crewmen to operate the YOV-10Ds, as part of the Navy’s Light Attack Squadron (VAL) 4, in southern South Vietnam.** On missions in MRs 3 and 4, the modified OV-10s performed satisfactorily. They were credited with killing 43 enemy in their first week of operation, causing three secondary explosions, and destroying a storage area, four sampans, and three bunkers. The detachment flew with the Navy squadrons until late August, when it returned to the United States to continue tests of the NOGS.

Aviation Achievements and Costs

In its final year and a half of combat, the efforts of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing diminished in quantity as units redeployed, but not in diversity. The wing furnished the full range of fixed-wing and helicopter support to the 1st Marine Division and to other United States, South Vietnamese, and Korean forces in Military Region 1, and it contributed significantly to the interdiction campaign in Laos. Marine aviators continually improved and refined the tactics and techniques for carrying out their many missions.

These efforts and achievements had their price in men and equipment. Between January 1970 and 14 April 1971, the wing lost 40 Marines killed in action or dead of wounds, 193 wounded, and 9 missing in action. In the same period, 17 Marine fixed-wing aircraft and 31 helicopters were destroyed in combat.*

Shortly before Marine aviators left Vietnam, for what most believed was the last time,** one of them, Lieutenant General McCutcheon, summed up the record:

Marine Corps aviation... performed its mission for nearly six years and carried out every function in the tactical air book. The innovations and developments it had worked on over the years were proven in combat. The new environment created new challenges for men in Marine aviation, and these were met head-on and solved. The war was the longest, and in many ways the most difficult one in which Marines have had to participate. The restraints and constraints placed upon the use of air power, and the demanding management reports of all aspects of aviation required by higher authority, imposed additional requirements on staffs with no increase in resources, in most cases, to perform the tasks. In spite of these difficulties,.... no one outflew the United States Marines.37

*For details of these actions, see Chapter 11 and Chapter 12.

**In early 1970, the Marine Corps and Navy had considered deployment of ordinary Marine OV-10As to support VAL-4, but the Marine Corps had opposed any diversion of its limited Bronco strength. Admin FMFPac msg to CGFMFPac, dt d 23 Apr 70, FMFPac Message Files.

*These losses should be placed in context. During 1970, the U.S. Air Force reported 173 aircraft lost in combat; another 81 were destroyed in 1971. The U.S. Army lost 347 helicopters in 1971. MACV ComdHist, 71, 1, ch. 6, p. 20.

**Marine aviation would return to Vietnam in 1972 to help contain the Communist “Easter Offensive.”
Artillery and Reconnaissance


At the beginning of 1970, all Marine artillery units in Vietnam, with the exception of one 175mm gun battery, were under the control of the 11th Marines, the artillery regiment of the 1st Marine Division. The regiment, commanded by Colonel Don D. Ezell, consisted of its four organic battalions and the attached 1st Battalion, 13th Marines; 1st and 3d 8-inch Howitzer Batteries (SP); 1st and 3d 175mm Gun Batteries (SP); Battery K, 4th Battalion, 13th Marines; and Battery G (-), 29th Artillery, USA.

Each of the four 105mm howitzer battalions was in direct support of a Marine infantry regiment. The 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, with its CP at the Northern Artillery Cantonment (NAC) and batteries at NAC, Hill 10, and FSB Los Banos north of the Hai Van Pass, fired missions for the 26th Marines. This battalion had operational control of the Mortar Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, positioned at Hill 270 and Hai Van Pass. The rest of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines supported the 1st Marines, with its CP and one 105mm battery on Hill 55 and the other two batteries deployed at small firebases in the flatlands south of Da Nang. From positions at An Hoa and Hill 65, the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines supported the 5th Marines, while the 3d Battalion, deployed at Combat Base Baldy and FSBs Ross and Ryder, provided fire for the 7th Marines. The 4th Battalion, with its CP on Hill 34 and batteries at NAC, Hill 55, An Hoa, and FSB Ross, was in general support of the 1st Marine Division, reinforcing the 105mm batteries as required. This battalion also had operational and administrative control of Battery K, 4th Battalion, 13th Marines, stationed at FSB Ross.1

Of the four 105mm howitzer battalions temporarily under the 11th Marines, the 1st 175mm Gun Battery (SP) was split between NAC and Hill 34, and the 3d 175mm Gun Battery (SP) was posted at An Hoa. The 1st 8-inch Howitzer Battery (SP) had platoons at Baldy, An Hoa, and Ross; the 3d was similarly divided, with platoons at NAC, Hill 65, and Hill 55. All of these units provided long-range, heavy artillery support throughout the division TAOR.2

The single Marine artillery unit not under 11th Marines control, the 5th 175mm Gun Battery (SP) (Rein), operated in northern I Corps. Its command post was at Dong Ha Combat Base, while its 175mm guns were at Camp Carroll and a reinforcing platoon of 8-inch self-propelled howitzers was located at FSB A-2. This battery, under the operational control of the 108th Artillery Group, USA, fired long-range missions in support of the 101st Airborne Division; the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized); and the 1st ARVN Division. It also attacked targets in enemy base areas along the Laotian border. The battery's tracked 175s periodically moved west along Route 9 to participate in Army artillery raids on enemy bases not in range from American positions.3

These Marine artillery units possessed a total of 156 guns, howitzers, and mortars. Three firing batteries in each direct support battalion were armed with the tried and proven M101A1 105mm towed howitzer, which had a maximum range of 11,300 meters and could be air-transported by a CH-46; the fourth firing battery had six 4.2-inch mortars with a maximum range of 5,600 meters. The 4th Battalion, 11th Marines was equipped with M109A self-propelled 155mm howitzers, capable of hitting targets at ranges up to 14,600 meters. Eight towed 155mm howitzers also remained in the 11th Marines' inventory. These had been replaced in the general support battalion by the self-propelled version but were retained in Vietnam as a helicopter-transportable heavy weapon for reinforcement of 105s at temporary firebases.4 Each of the regiment's direct support battalions had been issued a few of these howitzers. The battalions normally attached them to individual 105mm batteries or to their mortar batteries. The 8-inch howitzer and 175mm gun batteries, respectively, were equipped with the M110

*Activated in August 1966 as a 155mm gun battery, this unit had been in Vietnam since July 1967, initially near Chu Lai and Da Nang and in Northern ICTZ since the beginning of 1968. In March 1969, it had received its 175mm guns, and in October of the same year, as the 3d Marine Division redeployed, it came under operational control of XXIV Corps, attached to the 108th Artillery Group. 5th 175mm Gun Battery. Battery Order 5060.1, dtd 27Feb70, in 5th 175mm Gun Battery (SP) ComdC, Feb70.
8-inch howitzer, maximum range 16,800 meters, and the M107 175mm gun, maximum range 32,000 meters. Each of these self-propelled weapons had the same type of tracked, motorized carriage, which simplified maintenance and supply for the Force Artillery batteries.5

In early 1970, Keystone Bluejay brought artillery redeployments and relocations. The 1st Battalion, 13th Marines left Vietnam during March 1970, following its supported infantry regiment, the 26th Marines. Battery K, 4th Battalion, 13th Marines and the 5th 175mm Gun Battery also departed. To fill in for the redeploying 13th Marines battalion, the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines moved its command post to the Northern Artillery Cantonnement, reassumed control of its own Mortar Battery, and moved 105mm batteries to NAC and Hill 10. Battery F, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines displaced from An Hoa to Hill 55 to reinforce the 1st Battalion.

The basic 1st Marine Division operation order assigned the 11th Marines the mission of providing "defensive and offensive fires in support of operations within and beyond the TAOR, AO, and Reconnaissance Zone" for Marines, other American Services, the South Vietnamese, and the South Koreans.6 In performance of this task, the regiment's batteries responded to calls for fire from units in contact. They attacked actual or suspected enemy rocket and mortar positions. The Marine batteries expended much ammunition on "preemptive" and "intelligence" missions, formerly called "Harassing and Interdiction and "Unobserved" fires." These were bombardments of known or suspected Communist base camps, infiltration trails, assembly points, and supply caches. Many of these missions were carried out according to special fire plans to thwart periodic North Vietnamese and Viet Cong offensive "high points." As the tempo of ground combat declined, missions fired in support of engaged troops diminished to a small proportion of the total amount of artillery fire. By August 1970, only about one percent of the 11th Marines' fire missions were contact missions.7

In spite of the decline in contact missions, the 11th Marines continued to conduct a large volume of observed fire, mostly directed by the regiment's own observation posts as part of a program to use artillery to supplement, and in some cases replace infantry patrols blocking enemy infiltration of the populated areas of Quang Nam. Colonel Ezell, who had instituted this effort after taking command of the 11th Marines late in 1969, declared:

"It appeared to me that when we first went in, the infrastructure and the organized units were lying together in the coastal plains, and that the Marines, through offensive operations, had disengaged the organized units from the infrastructure, knocking them back to the west and to the hills . . . . Now the infrastructure had to remain . . . to control the population. But they also had a great deal of dealing with the organized units . . . . It would appear if there was a disengagement that there must be . . . a lot of travel back and forth across the battlefield by both the infrastructure and the organized units to perform their missions. My artillery was not in position to control this. My [Forward] Observers were with the rifle companies, and they were certainly forward but they weren't observers in six feet of elephant grass."

In an effort "to destroy the enemy as far away as possible, to diminish his capabilities across the battlefield to perform his mission," Ezell stated, "took 100 people out of my hide and we started a regimental OP system." These hilltop observation posts (OPs), each manned by a team of artillerymen and protected by reconnaissance or infantry elements, afforded a commanding view of the principal infiltration routes between the mountains and the populated area around Da Nang. An OP at FSB Ryder covered Antenna Valley and portions of the Que Son Valley. OPs on Hill 425 in the northern Que Sons and on Hill 119 overlooked Go Noi Island and the An Hoa basin, while others on Hills 200 and 250 in the northwestern Arizona Territory and on Hill 55 dominated the Thuong Duc corridor. Farther north, Hills 190 and 270, respectively, commanded Elephant Valley and the routes leading down from Charlie Ridge. Artillery observers in these positions searched the countryside for enemy movement and called fire missions on promising targets, passing their requests through the appropriate fire support coordination centers (FSCCs).8

Six of these observation posts** were equipped with the Integrated Observation Device (IOD). Introduced in late 1969, this Marine Corps-developed 400-pound instrument consisted of high-powered ships' binocu-

---


**In April 1970, the six IOD positions were: Hill 270, Hill 200, Hill 65. Hill 119, Hill 425, and FSB Ryder. FMFPac, MarOps, Apr70, p. 4.
Two Marine enlisted men from Battery K, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines clean their 105mm howitzer. The battery position is located on Combat Base Baldy in March 1970. The sign above the ammunition bunker door reads “No Smoking Within 50 Yards.”

The IOD, he continued, “with its ability to give us the first round hit . . . was just what we needed.”

To operate the IODs, the 11th Marines selected its best forward observers, gave them special training with the S-2 section in use and maintenance of the instrument, and kept them at the same OPs for periods of up to five months. Constantly scanning the same countryside, observers learned every twist and turn of the enemy trail networks and spotted every tree line and bunker where the enemy customarily ran for cover from artillery fire. The more proficient observers could call in fire so as to “lead” a moving enemy column.

The IOD observation posts were credited with causing impressive North Vietnamese and Viet Cong casualties. On 2 January 1970, the IOD on Ryder spotted 25 NVA in Antenna Valley; answering the call for fire, Battery I, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines killed an estimated 20. Eight days later, Battery G of the same battalion claimed 11 enemy killed of 50 sighted by the Hill 425 IOD. On 31 January, the Ryder IOD called for fire on 40 more NVA, and Battery I responded, claiming 21 killed. During 1970, IOD-directed fire ac-
counted for at least 40 percent of the enemy killed by artillery in the 1st Marine Division TAOR. In a typical week 25–31 January 1970 for example, the IODs, positioned on Hills 65, 250, 119, and on FSB Ryder, fired 92 missions, claiming 91 kills.\textsuperscript{12}

The IODs had other uses. During March 1970, the division employed their spotting reports in planning helicopterborne Kingfisher missions. Infantry units maneuvering in areas being observed by the IODs occasionally asked the observers to give them an accurate ground fix. Colonel Ezell reported: "Sometimes they ask if we will locate them. At night they can shoot a flare or fire some tracers, or in the day use a smoke grenade, which you lose on . . . and tell them exactly where they are."\textsuperscript{13} Colonel Edwin M. Rudzis, who assumed command of the 11th Marines in the end of August, later observed that the IOD had other valuable uses: "For the artillery, it provided high burst registrations, center of impact registrations, and target area surveys." The IOD was also used to conduct six naval gunfire calibration firings and to calibrate TPQ-10 air drops of aviation ordnance. Friendly surveillance on request was another capability.\textsuperscript{14}

An incident in early 1970, further demonstrated the influence of the IOD. On 29 January, the Ryder IOD team sighted what appeared to be an American prisoner guarded by four VC/NVA entering a hut below them in the valley. Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Dunbaugh, a CH-46 pilot, recalled that CH-46s, Cobras, and fixed-wing aircraft had been diverted from various missions, and he then assumed "the role of helicopter commander airborne and quickly briefed the [newly] constituted flight . . . ." With an aerial observer controlling, a "Battery One" was fired to prep the zone just before landing. Fixed-wing aircraft arrived on station but couldn't support the mission because of a low cloud ceiling. Following a brief firefight in which five VC/NVA were killed and five Marines wounded, the Marines swept the area, finding no evidence of whether or not the enemy had an American prisoner.\textsuperscript{15}

Some Marine commanders voiced skepticism at the large casualty totals regularly claimed for IOD missions. Colonel Edward A. Wilcox, commander of the 1st Marines during the early part of 1970, commented: "I was personally of the opinion that there was an overclaim on these things. As an infantry commander, we didn't report kills unless we had them . . . on the ground and could see them; but the IOD was claiming kills from vast ranges."\textsuperscript{16} Colonel Ezell, on the other hand, insisted that, if anything, the number of enemy dead from IOD missions was being understated. "Sometimes," he declared, "we fired on as many as 100 [troops] and we hit right on top of them maybe with 750 rounds, enough to wipe them out, and we couldn't see but two or three enemy dead." Ezell also observed:

> When you see 25 or 30 people on that battlefield, it may be 125 or 130. This has been experienced several times when we had the opportunity to find out, by our own troops. One night, we had a rifle company, . . . 129 men, and we picked them up with the IOD, and we called in to check on them, and it happened to be a friendly unit, but we had estimated them at 30 people in the elephant grass.\textsuperscript{17}

Whatever the actual casualties inflicted, enemy reaction appeared to confirm that the accurate, sudden artillery bombardments were disrupting Communist operations. The NVA and VC launched numerous harassing attacks against IOD sites. In the most serious of these, on 9 August, an estimated 25 enemy troops, supported by mortar and RPG fire, rushed the wire surrounding the Hill 119 OP. The 20-man security unit from the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion repulsed the assault, killing eight enemy while suffering no Marine losses. Other OPs underwent occasional attacks with grenades, RPGs, or small arms, none of which inflicted significant casualties or damage.\textsuperscript{18}

The enemy reacted by reducing daytime movement, traveling in smaller groups, and changing infiltration routes to bypass the IOD sites.\textsuperscript{4} In May 1970, the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines reported: "The enemy appears to be using the traditional resupply trails in Antenna and Phu Loc Valleys less and less. However, sightings by the other OPs . . . and by units in the field showed greatly increased movement to the south and east of the Que Sons . . . possibly to avoid the IOD."\textsuperscript{19} The 11th Marines countered this enemy tactic by periodically moving its IODs to new positions. In October, the Ryder IOD shifted to FSB Roundup, overlooking the southern Que Son Valley. This displacement resulted in an increased number of sightings and fire missions. Similarly, in November, the Marines redeployed the IOD on Hill 270 to Dong Den, a peak in the mountains above Elephant Valley often used by recon-

\textsuperscript{*Lieutenant Colonel Pieter L. Hogaboom, operations officer of the 26th Marines, years later said the regiment "was mildly surprised that most of the kills we got from surprise fire called by the IOD teams were gotten during broad daylight, and not as we anticipated at night or in reduced visibility." LtCol Pieter L. Hogaboom, Comments on draft ms. 10Jun83 (Vietnam Comment File).
naissance teams, but the move produced only meager results. Partly as a consequence of the general decline in enemy activity and partly due to the Communists' evasive tactics, IOD fire missions during October, November, and December accounted for only 62 enemy dead, in contrast to 1,153 claimed in the first three months of 1970. 20 Despite this decline, in the estimation of artillery commanders, IOD employment had increased the effectiveness of the artillery. "It was the best investment of artillery assets," recalled Colonel Rudzis. "The IOD personnel represented approximately four percent of the artillery population, but even if it had required 20 percent, it would be well worth it for the functions that they performed." Rudzis added that "they were not only the 'eyes' of the artillery on a 24 hour per day basis," but they also provided timely intelligence to infantry units, from companies right up to the division. 21

In addition to observation posts, the 11th Marines relied heavily on aerial reconnaissance to locate targets, especially in the Rocket Belt around Da Nang. The regiment had its own aerial observation section, employing Huey gunships and light observation helicopters (UH-6s) of the Americal Division's 123d and 282d Aviation Battalions. According to Colonel Rudzis, the 11th Marines had, in effect, their own aviation unit from July 1970 forward, with the OH-6 being the primary aircraft. The crew of the OH-6 consisted of a warrant officer pilot and a sergeant machine gunner. Adding a Marine aerial observer, the 11th Marines patrolled the Division AO daily in this highly maneuverable and versatile aircraft. "The helicopter was used not only on a routine patrol of the Danang Rocket Belt but also on intelligence missions to provide up to the minute information on unusual activities reported by other sources," said Rudzis. He added that the cooperation showed by Army aviation units was outstanding, saying that if a helicopter "was disabled or shot down, a replacement was provided from Chu Lai on the same day or the next one, so that the AO missions could be carried out on a daily basis. 22

In addition to the light observation helicopters, the Army OH-1G Bird Dog observation planes of the 21st Reconnaissance Aircraft Company were used, as well as MAG-16 helicopters, for low-altitude visual reconnaissance missions. Batteries also frequently fired missions at sensor activations, and the artillery OPs were sited to cover many of the 1st Marine Division sensor fields. Radio interceptions provided by 1st Radio Battalion also were a source of targets. 23

The 11th Marines planned much of its "preemptive and intelligence" fire with information from the 1st Marine Division Fire Support Information System (FSIS), renamed early in 1971, as the Tactical Information Deposit Retrieval System (TINDER). This system, inaugurated in 1968, was located in the Target Information Section of the Division FSCC. The section received reports of enemy movement, caches, rocket firings, and other sightings and activities from 25 sources, including OPs, sensors, reconnaissance patrols, prisoners, and agents. This information went to Force Logistic Command, where Data Processing Platoon 16 coded it and stored it on computer tape. Using a specially prepared program, the Force Logistic Command computer, at the request of unit commanders, could produce prompt reports, accompanied by map overlays, on all enemy sightings and contacts in a given area. The 11th Marines used this system to plot recurring patterns of enemy movement and directed unobserved fire against the most heavily traveled routes. 24

According to Colonel Ezell, this sophisticated target analysis system had made "preemptive and intelligence" missions into an accurate, effective weapon. Other commanders disagreed. Lieutenant General McCutcheon, for one, remained unconvinced of the
value of unobserved artillery fire. At his insistence, the 11th Marines in late September drastically reduced preemptive and intelligence missions.25

During 1970-1971, the 11th Marines made much use of temporary fire support bases (FSBs) established and supplied entirely by helicopter and often located deep in enemy base areas. The 1st Marine Division and the 1st MAW had perfected their techniques for landing reconnaissance and security elements, engineers, construction equipment, guns, crews, and ammunition on remote peaks and could have batteries emplaced and firing within a few hours. By 1970, the 11th Marines had used a total of 65 firebase sites throughout Quang Nam. Most commanding hilltops in the province were cleared of large trees and pocked with gun pits, further simplifying the preparation of temporary FSBs. The direct support battalions routinely displaced 105mm howitzers, towed 155mm howitzers, and 4.2-inch mortars to provide fire support for infantry sweeps in the mountains. They developed weapon and equipment lists and organized mobile fire direction centers for helicopter-transportable provisional batteries. Periodically, the regiment conducted larger artillery deployments to support major operations, such as Pickens Forest or Imperial Lake.26

In a variation on the temporary firebase technique the 11th Marines conducted a number of “artillery raids,” rapid heliborne deployments of batteries to advanced positions for attacks on reconnaissance and intelligence targets which were beyond the range of the more permanent firebases or protected by terrain. During May and June 1970, the regiment conducted a series of raids west of Thong Duc. This CIDG camp, 30 miles southwest of Da Nang, had come under per-

Marine artillerymen from the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines on Fire Support Base Ryder make last-minute adjustments after receiving new direction coordinates before preparing to fire their weapon. The 2d Battalion relieved the 3d Battalion on Ryder in late 1970.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A373811
sistent mortar and rocket fire from Communist positions in Base Area 112, beyond the range of the Marines’ nearest 175mm guns. To bring the Communists’ positions under fire, Colonel Ernest R. Reid, Jr., commander of the 11th Marines, decided to move light artillery forward into the Thuong Duc area. He selected Hill 510, a peak five miles west-southwest of the CIDG camp, to be the firing position. This hill overlooks the confluence of the Cai River and Boun River Valleys, much-travelled enemy supply and infiltration routes. Marine reconnaissance teams frequently used it as an OP and radio relay site.*

The raids began at first light on 30 May. Partially protected by heavy ground fog, a reconnaissance team and four mortar crews from the Mortar Battery, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines landed on Hill 510. By 0655, the mortars were ready to fire, but the mist delayed the first mission until 1000. During the day, the mortars fired 530 rounds at 26 targets, including suspected enemy troop and rocket positions, bunkers, a base camp, and a group of enemy spotted by the reconnaissance team. At 1120, three rockets, launched from a position southwest of Hill 510, flew directly over the Mortar Battery toward ARVN positions to the north. The Marines, who could see the rocket firing site, replied with 140 mortar rounds and the rocket fire stopped. At 1620, helicopters extracted the battery, which had suffered no losses in men or equipment, and returned it to An Hoa.7

On 2 June, the 11th Marines conducted a second raid, this time using three 105mm howitzers from Battery E, 2d Battalion to gain greater range. The battery remained on Hill 510 throughout the day and fired a total of 564 rounds. Targets taken under fire included a suspected ammunition cache, enemy troops sighted by a reconnaissance team, and rocket positions located by radio interceptions. The battery returned to An Hoa by helicopter at 1740. The 11th Marines repeated this operation on 17, 20, 22, and 29 June, each time with weapons and crews from the 2d Battalion. In all but the last raid, the regiment employed provisional composite batteries of two 105mm howitzers and two 4.2-inch mortars. The final raid, on 29 June, involved three 105s. The raids met no significant enemy opposition and resulted in no losses of men or equipment. Damage to the enemy was impossible to determine, but the raids apparently disrupted Communist operations against Thuong Duc. Various size artillery raids continued until the final redeployments and reduction of the Marine TAOR; the largest raid, Operation Catawba Falls in September 1970, covered the 5th Marines’ movement from An Hoa to the Que Son Valley.28

Target clearance continued to be a complicated, often frustrating process for Marine artillerymen. “Frustration on the artillery side was principally due to not being able to provide the rapid, responsive fire support units would expect to receive,” recalled Colonel John D. Shoup, who was assistant division fire support coordinator in early 1970.29 Except in “Specified Strike Zones,”* where artillery and other supporting arms could fire without restriction, a call for fire had to be checked (“cleared”) with the appropriate U.S., ARVN, or South Korean Marine commands and with South Vietnamese political authorities before the mission could be executed. Under thoroughly planned procedures, the 1st Marine Division FSCC** coordinated all air and artillery supporting fires within the division TAOR. Each regiment, through its own FSCC, coordinated fire within its TAOR, as did each infantry battalion. The regiments and battalions were primarily responsible for maintaining contact with allied military and civil headquarters within their areas of operation and for obtaining fire clearances from them. The 1st Division FSCC, in close coordination with the DASC, operated the Sav-A-Plane*** system to prevent aircraft from flying into the artillery’s line of fire.30

Tactical innovation, such as Kingfisher patrols often aggravated the already complex system of controlling

---

*For details of reconnaissance activities in this area, see the “Reconnaissance Operations” section in this chapter.
supporting fires. "They were initially planned with due regard for artillery support but in operation found that support nonexistent due to lack of timely clearance in other 'free-fire' zones," said Colonel Shoup. "Preclearance of fire zones would have been tantamount, in my view, to advertising that Kingfisher was on the way, although efforts were made to do this without much success."31 Initially, calls for fire from IOD observation posts also created special clearance and coordination difficulties for the artillery and infantry. The OPs, controlled by the 11th Marines, directed many missions within the infantry regimental TAORs. While the artillery observers cleared all fires through the FSCCs of the concerned infantry units, both fire support requests and reports of enemy activity remained within the artillery communication network and were not transmitted immediately to battalion and regimental commanders. Colonel Wilcox of the 1st Marines "found that if we didn't watch it . . . the IOD was reporting targets directly back through FSCC channels to the 11th Marines, and they were reporting enemy running around in my TAOR and having them shot at." Wilcox made sure that his "battalion commanders, through their fire support coordinators, had an absolute obligation to pass that word on, and the IOD operators had an absolute obligation to talk to my infantry command[s] . . . so that the information flowed back through the infantry channels."32 Aside from this problem, and from the perpetual difficulty in coordinating artillery clearances and Sav-A-Plane information with the South Vietnamese, by late 1970, the 11th Marines had what Colonel Reid called, "probably the optimum fire support coordination system, balanced . . . on the one hand on the side of safety, and on the other, responsiveness."33

In accord with III MAF's emphasis on Vietnamization, the 11th Marines assisted ARVN operations and helped to train and improve the Quang Da Special Zone artillery. The Marine artillery battalions regularly fired missions in support of 51st ARVN Regiment, Regional and Popular Force units, and CIDGs and often assigned forward observers to Vietnamese commands. At Hai Van Pass, the Mortar Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines; the 1/25 Regional Force Group; and an element of the 101st Airborne Division established a combined combat operations and fire support coordination center at the 1/25 Group CP to ensure rapid Marine response to RF calls for fire. This system short-cut the political clearance requirement by allowing the RF group to give clearance for its own area of operations. If a mission required more than mortar fire, the request went from the joint FSCC to the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, which in turn cleared it with the 1st Marines fire support coordination center.34

The 11th Marines helped Quang Da Special Zone to organize its own fire support coordination center and conducted training programs for ARVN artillerymen in surveying, heavy gun motor transport, and 4.2-inch mortar employment. In April 1970, the regiment formed two Firing Battery Instructional Training Teams, each made up of two Marine artillerymen and an ARVN officer and NCO. These teams spent week-long periods with the batteries of the two QDSZ artillery battalions, the 44th and 64th, teaching gunnery and firing procedures.

The Marine artillery battalions also provided training assistance. The Mortar Battery of the 2d Battalion conducted forward observer schools for RFs and PFs working with CAPs. These efforts brought noticeable improvements in the South Vietnamese artillery units but could not remedy its greatest deficiency: a shortage of crews and artillery pieces to cover Quang Nam Province after the Marines left. "I don't believe that they have enough artillery to do the job, if we are displaced," Colonel Ezell concluded. "They only have two small-size battalions . . . . This would certainly be insufficient."35

Marine artillery strength declined rapidly during late 1970 and early 1971. In Keystone Robin Alpha, during August, September, and October, the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines redeployed with the 7th Marines. Paralleling the shift of the 5th Marines to replace the 7th, the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines moved south to Ross, Ryder, and Baldy. Headquarters Battery and Battery M, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines also withdrew in Keystone Robin Alpha, leaving behind two self-propelled 155mm batteries, one of which was attached to each remaining direct support battalion. From the heavy artillery, the 1st and 3d 175mm Gun and 1st 8-inch Howitzer Batteries redeployed. By the end of 1970, only 74 Marine artillery pieces remained in Vietnam.

When the 5th Marines redeployed in Keystone Robin Charlie, during February-March 1971, it was accompanied by the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines and Battery L, 4th Battalion. On 28 March, as part of Keystone Robin Charlie, Headquarters Battery and the regiment—

*The establishment of separate Regional and Popular Force artillery platoons partially alleviated this shortage. See Chapter 10.
tal colors of the 11th Marines embarked for the United States. The artillery regiment’s 1st Battalion, reinforced by Battery K, 4th Battalion and the 3d 8-inch Howitzer Battery, remained behind as the artillery element of the 3d MAB, redeploying with the brigade in May and June.

Throughout 1970-1971, the volume of Marine artillery fire diminished. In January 1970, the 11th Marines fired 178,062 rounds during 19,250 missions. By December, the amount of fire had fallen to 26,999 rounds for 2,902 missions. The volume rose again, to 35,408 rounds during 3,044 missions in January 1971. It remained at about that level during February, then fell precipitously with the final redeployments and contractions of the Marine TAOR/TAOI. Naval gunfire employment followed a similar pattern, dropping from 5,541 rounds from six ships during January 1970 to 217 rounds from one ship in December, then increasing to 370 rounds from a single ship in January 1971 before beginning a final decline.

This reduction in artillery fire resulted in part from the diminishing number of weapons, but it also reflected lessened usage, the consequence of both fewer enemy sightings and contacts and also of the cutback in preemptive and intelligence missions. In January 1970, the 11th Marines had fired an average of 1,141 rounds from each of its 156 tubes. In December 1970, with 74 tubes, the regiment fired only 365 rounds per tube. Between 15 and 17 January 1971, General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., the Commandant, paid a last visit to III MAF in Vietnam. When Chapman returned to Washington, General McCutcheon recalled, he told McCutcheon “that the whole three days he was in Da Nang, he didn’t hear one artillery round. He was pretty conscious of that, being an artilleryman.”

Reconnaissance Operations, 1970-1971

At the beginning of 1970, III MAF reconnaissance forces consisted of the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion and the 1st and 3d Force Reconnaissance Companies. The two Force Reconnaissance companies were controlled by III MAF, while the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion was under its parent 1st Marine Division.*

The 1st and 3d Force Reconnaissance Companies, directed by the III MAF Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center,* conducted patrols deep in enemy base areas, usually beyond the 1st Marine Division TAOR. Based at Phu Bai, the 3d Force Reconnaissance Company concentrated its efforts on the A Shau Valley, a major Communist infiltration route and assembly area in western Thua Thien. Patrols from this company, usually inserted and extracted by helicopters from the U.S. Army’s 2d Squadron, 17th U.S. Cavalry, ventured far into the mountains to locate enemy units, camps, and storage sites. They spotted targets for artillery fire and B-52 strikes and occasionally fought small Communist units. During January 1970, the company observed or encountered 159 enemy and killed 26 in eight separate engagements with losses of only one Marine killed and 14 wounded. The company also directed 38 artillery fire missions.

The 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, working from Da Nang, conducted long-range patrols in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces. During January, this company saw much less action than the 3d. The company completed 13 patrols, sighted 12 enemy, and killed one, with no casualties.

During February and March 1970, the Keystone Bluejay redeployment reduced force reconnaissance strength, and the III MAF-XXIV Corps exchange of roles ended separate Force Reconnaissance operations. The 3d Force Reconnaissance Company ceased combat activities in February, although the unit, almost at zero strength, remained in Vietnam until July. With the breakup of the III MAF Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center, both the cadred 3d and the still active 1st Force Reconnaissance Companies were placed under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division. The 1st Force Company, attached to Lieutenant Colonel William C. Drumright’s 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, continued operations as a division reconnaissance unit.

At the beginning of 1970, the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion was over strength; it had five letter companies instead of the usual four. Company A, 5th Reconnaissance Battalion was also attached, but it redeployed during Keystone Bluejay. The battalion performed a variety of missions. It furnished teams to support in-

---

*Force reconnaissance companies usually operate under a landing force commander, providing him with preassault reconnaissance and long-range reconnaissance after the landing. The division reconnaissance battalion, under operational control of the division, supports division operations.

*The Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center integrated all forms of information—signal, sensor, ground/aerial surveillance, POW and documentary—for use in III MAF planning from November 1969 to March 1970. For details on its organization and operations, see Chapter 14.
fantry search and destroy operations, secure firebases, and locate targets for artillery raids. Scuba* divers from the battalion checked bridges in the 1st Marine Division TAOR for underwater demolitions and searched streams for submerged cave entrances and weapon caches. Detachments from the battalion also protected four of the IOD observation posts.

Patrolling the western fringes of the division TAOR was the reconnaissance battalion's principal function. In these generally mountainous areas, the enemy could move less cautiously because of the cover provided by the jungle canopy. Operating in six-man teams, reconnaissance units monitored movement over the network of trails which linked the rugged base areas to the fertile lowlands surrounding Da Nang. Each team included an officer or NCO patrol leader, a radioman, three specially trained riflemen, and a Navy corpsman. During most of 1970, the battalion had 48 such teams available for duty. Normally, about half the teams were in the field, scattered from Elephant Valley to the far reaches of Base Area 112. Teams not patrolling or on other assignments protected the battalion cantonment near Division Ridge, underwent refresher training, and prepared for their next mission.

Reconnaissance patrolling had become a well-developed skill. Each team member backpacked 65-70 pounds of food, ammunition, and equipment to sustain him for as many as six days in the field. Helicopters lifted the teams to their assigned operating areas. After insertion, teams worked their way along streambeds, followed enemy trails, or "broke brush" across country, carefully noting and reporting details of terrain and enemy activity. Some teams tried to take

*S烟囱叔在 Underwater Breathing Apparatus.
prisoners or, using the Stingray* concept of operations, concealed themselves where they could direct artillery and air strikes on enemy troops and base camps. At the end of their assigned five- or six-day missions, or when they were discovered and attacked by the enemy, helicopters extracted the teams.

Patrolling resulted in a steady stream of small contacts. During June 1970, for example, the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion conducted 130 patrols, sighting 834 Communists, and directed 120 artillery fire missions and 25 air strikes. Reconnaissance battalion Marines were credited with 198 enemy killed and the capture of three individual weapons, at a cost of 2 Marines dead, 15 wounded, and 9 nonbattle casualties.43

For the individual reconnaissance Marine, this level of activity entailed a grueling routine. Lieutenant Colonel Drumright, the battalion commander, reported:

These kids . . . work very hard. You put them in the field five days; they're out of the field three. Their first day back is cleaning gear. Their second day, they train . . . They go through throwing hand grenades again, scouting and patrolling, immediate action drill, which is being able to get that first shot off the fastest, and . . . we do night work with them. So they never really have a day off.42

The primary purpose of reconnaissance patrols was to obtain information, usually through surveillance of enemy movement. Frequently reconnaissance teams directed artillery and air strikes on VC/NVA units while avoiding contact with them, but teams often found themselves involved in close combat. Some fights erupted from ambushes set by teams or from efforts to take prisoners; others were meeting engagements with small NVA or VC elements.43

In the first months of 1970, many contacts resulted from an aggressive counter-reconnaissance effort begun at the orders of General Binh, the Front 4 commander. At Binh's direction, North Vietnamese regulars and main force Viet Cong formed 15 to 25-man teams to protect their base areas. Some of these teams carried captured M16s and wore American clothing and camouflage paint to confuse the Marines during firefights. The counter-reconnaissance units watched for helicopters inserting Marine teams and signaled the Marines' arrival with rifle shots, then tried to close in and attack the Marines before they could leave the landing zone.

The Marines responded to these enemy tactics by making false insertions, often complete with helicopter gunship and fixed-wing landing zone preparations, before actually putting in a team. To avoid forewarning the enemy, some insertions were made without LZ preparation fires. As a result of these varied measures, most reconnaissance teams were able to move out of their landing zones before the enemy arrived. The Communists then tried to track the Marines across country. These deadly games of hide-and-seek frequently culminated in firefights and emergency extractions. Due to Marine small arms proficiency and the availability of lavish air and artillery support for teams in contact, the enemy invariably suffered many more casualties in these engagements than they inflicted.44

On 14 June 1970, a team from Company E, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion fought the battalion's most severe patrol action of the year.48 The team, identified by its radio call sign “Flakey Snow,” consisted of five enlisted Marines, a corpsman, and two South Korean Marines assigned to the patrol as members of a combined allied reconnaissance training program. Helicopters inserted the patrol at 1122 on the 14th in the southwestern Que Sons about five miles west of FSB Ryder. Although deep in the mountains, “Flakey Snow’s” first area of operations was a level region with no jungle canopy, but a secondary growth of small trees, bushes, bamboo, and sharp-edged elephant grass. The team's arrival was unopposed, and it moved northward from its landing zone along a wide trail that showed signs of recent, heavy use. After about an hour of uneventful walking, the Marines crossed a small stream and turned eastward on an intersecting trail. This trail, also obviously well traveled, ran toward a hill where the patrol leader, Sergeant Frank E. Diaz, planned to spend the night.

Clouds closed in and heavy rain was falling. About 1220, Diaz called a halt along the trail to wait until the rain stopped. There the Marines heard heavy machine gun and automatic weapons fire. Although no bullets seemed to be coming toward them, the members of “Flakey Snow” formed a defensive perimeter with only the elephant grass for cover, and quietly readied their weapons. As they did, two Viet Cong, both armed with AK-47s, came walking up the trail, “right into us,” Diaz recalled. The Marines shot and killed both of them, but the firing gave away their position. Diaz at once reported by radio that his team was in contact.

Contact quickly became heavy. From positions north, east, and west of the Marines, an enemy unit, later estimated to have been at least 50 men, opened fire with 12.7mm machine guns and automatic weapons. The Marines, with their backs to the stream they had just crossed, hugged the ground and returned fire with M16s and their one M79 grenade launcher. Whether the enemy was a counter-reconnaissance unit or simply a large force encountered by chance was never established, but it was obvious that they were determined to overwhelm "Flakey Snow." "They really wanted to get us," Diaz reported later, "for whatever reason they had in mind." The enemy began rushing the Marine position in groups of three and four, firing and throwing grenades. Some closed to within 30 feet of the Marines before being cut down. Bodies piled up in front of the patrol. Diaz had his men pull two or three of the closest into a barricade. One American Marine was mortally wounded and another was hit in the shoulder by grenade fragments. A Korean received a severe leg wound. "All this time," Diaz recalled, "we could hear people moaning and groaning on both sides . . . . The enemy just kept coming, and we just kept shooting and shooting."

Diaz had called for an aerial observer, and an OV-10 arrived over the patrol at 1245. The aircraft at once began strafing the enemy positions, causing some secondary explosions and more "loud crying and moaning." At 1300, Cobra gunships arrived on station and added their machine guns and rockets to Marine firepower. The closeness of the enemy to "Flakey Snow" prevented use of artillery, but according to Diaz the gunships were "really accurate and a great help in getting us all out of there." In spite of this punishment, the determined enemy hung on. Their fire slackened from the shoulder by grenade fragments. A Korean received a severe leg wound. "All this time," Diaz recalled, "we could hear people moaning and groaning on both sides . . . . The enemy just kept coming, and we just kept shooting and shooting."

At 1353, the helicopter lifted off with all members of "Flakey Snow." Diaz and his men had only a magazine of ammunition left between them and a single M79 round; the helicopter crew had expended all the ammunition from their two .50-caliber machine guns. At the price of one American Marine dead of wounds, another slightly wounded, and a South Korean Marine severely injured, "Flakey Snow" had killed at least 18 enemy in front of the patrol's position. An unknown number of enemy had been killed or wounded farther away, either by small arms and grenades, or by OV-10 and helicopter guns and rockets. Sergeant Diaz reported that "the firefight was so intense, and the fire was coming from so many directions, that the enemy themselves had killed their own people, trying to get to us."*

While no other fight during 1970-1971 equaled "Flakey Snow's" in severity, reconnaissance teams continued to meet aggressive enemy counteraction, either from chance contacts with regular units or special counter-reconnaissance teams. On 3 September, a six-man patrol from Company C, inserted in the mountains just south of Elephant Valley, came into immediate contact with at least 15-20 enemy who tried to surround the team. After a firefight in which the Marines killed three enemy and suffered one man wounded, the team was extracted after only 14 minutes on the ground. As soon as the extraction helicopters departed, the 11th Marines fired 225 105mm rounds into the landing zone, and fixed-wing jets also struck the area.47

Artillery bombardment and air strikes were a standard 1st Reconnaissance Battalion tactic after an extraction under fire. According to Lieutenant Colonel Drumright, a reconnaissance team, under these cir-

*For his part in this action, Sergeant Diaz was awarded the Silver Star. Another member of the patrol received the Bronze Star with Combat "V".
ARTILLERY AND RECONNAISSANCE

cumstances, acted on the enemy as "a little bucket of honey" acted on bees. He explained:

The bees, they'd swarm all around. And then you'd pull the bucket of honey out and you'd work it over, and then you get all the bees that don't run off . . . . You get them out of their caves. They have to come out of their caves to fight.48

By late 1970, the enemy had become more cautious about attacking reconnaissance teams. Instead, their counter-reconnaissance forces began shadowing Marine patrols, following them and signalling their location with rifle shots. The NVA and VC would engage a patrol only if it approached an important base camp or cache. The enemy occasionally used dogs to track the Marines. Reconnaissance teams sought to evade the enemy by night movement; they would establish a night position about sunset, then quietly shift position after dark. To temporarily kill the enemy dogs' sense of smell, the Marines often scattered CS crystals on trails and around night positions.49

Combat frequently erupted when reconnaissance patrols unexpectedly burst into occupied camps. To protect their hideouts from air strikes, artillery bombardments, and infantry sweeps, the enemy began locating them in the dense vegetation below the crests on the reverse slopes of ridges. They rarely left discernable trails into these positions. To increase their chances of finding camps, reconnaissance teams often hacked their way through the vegetation on the slopes rather than following the easier natural routes along crests or streambeds. "Breaking brush" in this way, teams occasionally walked into camps while enemy troops were still in them. When this happened, a team would attack immediately, moving quickly through the camp, shooting at any enemy they saw and throwing grenades into huts, bunkers, and caches. According to Lieutenant Colonel Drumright:

Our guys could outshoot theirs. They could throw a hand grenade further. They could think a little faster. They used a . . . technique of just going right through the camp throwing hand grenades into every hole and bunker you could find, usually about two or three going through the camp, and the other two or three covering . . . . Then they'd move back out of the area and try to saturate the thing with artillery and air.50

Patrolling deep in the mountains had its hazards even when no enemy were encountered. In May, a tiger attacked a 1st Force Reconnaissance Company patrol leader while the patrol was in its night position, dragged him off into the brush, and killed him. In September, a 1st Reconnaissance Battalion patrol lost two men killed and two others seriously injured in an accident during an unopposed extraction. The battalion suffered its most severe noncombat loss on 18 November, when its commander, Lieutenant Colonel William C. Leftwich, and nine other reconnaissance Marines died in a helicopter crash in the Que Sons.51

With five years of experience behind them, the division and wing had developed well tested techniques and equipment for inserting, supporting, and extracting reconnaissance teams. To assure prompt artillery response to calls for fire and at the same time prevent accidental shelling of friendly units, the division established a special reconnaissance zone for each deployed patrol in which only that patrol could direct fire missions. The 11th Marines usually designated a battery or platoon to support each patrol and stationed a liaison officer at the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion CP to assist in fire planning and coordination.

The 1st MAW's quick-reaction helicopter package, Mission 80, could be used for emergency extractions of teams, among other tasks. Reconnaissance units had developed standard procedures for teams involved in a contact from which they could not extricate themselves. Normally the first step would be to call in the nearest OV-10 to locate the unit and provide initial suppressive fires. The wing would then dispatch two Cobra gunships and two CH-46s to lift the Marines out. While the Cobras worked the enemy over, to within 25 yards of the reconnaissance team if necessary, a CH-46 maneuvered to an LZ or lowered a special extraction device. Final authority to pull out a team in trouble rested with the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion commander. "When it happens out there, it

---

48Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, a former commander of the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, later commented on the impressive "choreographed" firepower including helicopter gunships, fixed-wing aircraft, and artillery available to Marine teams being extracted out of difficult situations: "By routinely devastating an area immediately upon a team emergency extraction, it was surmised that the VC/NVA would become conditioned to fear contact with a Recon team because it meant that the sky would fall upon them . . . . Whether this drill really did have the desired effect on the enemy, we'll never know. But there is no doubt that it had a terrific and positive effect on the psychological outlook of the Recon Marines." LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, Comments on draft MS, 13Jan86 (Vietnam Comment File).
happens very quickly,” Lieutenant Colonel Drumright reported.* “And the key . . . is to very quickly get the OV-10 and start the gunships out and make up your mind . . . whether to leave them in or take them out.”52** Some of the most skillful patrol leaders could maneuver their men out of a contact and continue their missions, but the battalion usually followed the more prudent course of immediately withdrawing an engaged team and reinserting it later.

A new piece of equipment, the Special Patrol Insertion/Extraction (SPIE) line, made it easier and safer for teams to get in and out of small mountain and jungle landing zones. To put teams in or take them out of sites where a helicopter could not land, the Marines had previously used a 120-foot ladder which was lowered from the tail ramp. Because of its weight, the ladder was hard to maneuver in narrow spaces, and in hot weather at high elevations helicopters often had difficulty lifting it with Marines hanging onto it. In these situations, the SPIE, a strong nylon line, proved a practicable alternative. Much lighter than the ladder and more compact when stowed in a helicopter, the line could be dropped quickly through small openings in the jungle. Reconnaissance team members, who wore a special harness, then hooked themselves onto the line, and the helicopter lifted them straight up and flew back to base trailing the Marines behind it. If necessary, Marines could fire their weapons while attached to the SPIE rig; many found it more comfortable to ride in flight than the ladder.95

To train reconnaissance Marines for their exacting job, the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion conducted periodic 11-day indoctrination courses for all newly arrived personnel. The course, supervised by the battalion S-3, included instruction and practice in the use of the PRC-25 radio, map reading, first aid, rappelling down cliffs and from helicopters, air and artillery forward observer procedures, and combat intelligence reporting. New reconnaissance Marines also practiced scuba diving and rubber boat handling. Weapons refresher training and physical conditioning received emphasis throughout the course. According to Lieutenant Colonel Drumright, “It was strictly scouting and patrolling, and learning to shoot . . . first and . . . shoot straight and . . . to throw a hand grenade. Learn to hide. Learn to move. Get him in physical condition so he can outwalk the enemy.” The course ended with the planning and execution of a practice patrol in a safe area.54*

Under an agreement between the 1st Marine Division, Quang Da Special Zone, and the 2d ROK Marine Corps Brigade, the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion conducted three-week training courses for ARVN and Korean troops. During 1970, the battalion instructed 230 members of the ARVN 1st Ranger Battalion, as well as the reconnaissance companies of the 51st Regiment and the Korean Marine brigade. Vietnamese and Korean graduates of the course then participated in Marine patrols, one or two men to a team. The South Korean Marines who took part in the “Flakey Snow” fight were trained under this program. Both Korean and South Vietnamese reconnaissance troops learned quickly and performed well with the Marines.96

The battalion also trained combat operations center and communications personnel for the allies, in the hope that the South Vietnamese, in particular, would eventually carry out their own independent reconnaissance effort. Repeatedly, the 1st Marine Division pressed Quang Da Special Zone to begin deploying all-Vietnamese patrols in a reconnaissance zone separate from that patrolled by the Marines. The South Vietnamese continually refused, pleading a lack of manpower, helicopters, and radios. They preferred to continue combined patrols with the Marines. The South Vietnamese did not have enough helicopters to support the kind of wide-ranging reconnaissance program the Marines carried on. For the reconnaissance missions they ran, they relied on foot patrols from

---

* Lieutenant Colonel Drumright had been relieved on 11 August 1970 by Lieutenant Colonel Edmund J. Regan, Jr. Lieutenant Colonel Leftwich in turn replaced Regan on 13 September. 1st Recon Bn Commds, Aug-Sept 70.

** Another former commander of the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, later commented: “...a team normally did not ask for an emergency extract unless they really had an emergency. ... In truth, however, I did have to veto a few emergency extract requests where in my judgment the situation was not sufficiently threatening to warrant the risky rescue procedure. It's times like that when the responsibility of command takes on real meaning.” LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, Comments on draft ms, 13Jan86. (Vietnam Comment File).

---

* Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, who commanded the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion in 1970-1971, also emphasized the importance of the initial training in his comments on the draft manuscript. He later wrote, “Even sleeping had its SOP—no lying—a team would 'harbor-up' in the concealment of the undergrowth; it would form a circle facing outboard back-to-back, shoulder-to-shoulder; all quadrants covered. Those not on watch slept sitting up with chins on chests. Not comfortable but doable. Contact and communication could thus be made by touch rather than by voice.” LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, Comments on draft ms, 13Jan86 (Vietnam Comment File).
fixed bases. Marine commanders recognized that the Vietnamese would be limited to such short range operations after the Americans withdrew.\(^5^6\)

The Keystone Robin Alpha redeployments drastically reduced Marine reconnaissance strength. During August, the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company stood down and left for the United States, leaving a subunit of two officers and 29 enlisted men attached to the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion. The reconnaissance battalion itself deactivated Company E in August, and in September Companies C and D left Vietnam. These withdrawals halved the number of available reconnaissance teams, from 48 to 24. The 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, then under Lieutenant Colonel Leftwich, turned over protection of three of the four IOD sites to the infantry regiments and reorganized its two remaining letter companies. Each company would consist of two three-team platoons and one four-team platoon. With these rearrangements, Leftwich planned to have all 24 teams available for operations, and an average of 12 in the field at a time.\(^5^7\)

With fewer teams available and with operations in the mountains restricted by the fall-winter monsoon, the reconnaissance battalion concentrated much of its patrolling in areas closer to the populated lowlands. As part of Operation Imperial Lake, beginning in early October, the battalion saturated the Que Son Mountains with patrols, keeping 8-10 teams continuously in the area. These teams worked closely with infantry quick reaction forces in an effort to deny more territory to the enemy while using fewer Marines. Smaller saturation operations covered Charlie Ridge and eastern Elephant Valley.

Instead of being inserted and extracted by helicopter, most of the teams participating in saturation patrolling worked from platoon patrol bases in the mountains. The 1st Reconnaissance Battalion set up the first of these on 5 October, on Hill 845 in the Que
Sons. Three teams used the hill as a CP, radio relay station, and resting place. Remaining for 13 days, they fanned out on foot on assigned patrol missions. One team usually rested at the patrol base, constituting a reaction force while the other two were deployed. From then on, the battalion maintained a patrol base continuously in the Que Sons and periodically established bases on Charlie Ridge and in Elephant Valley. When weather often restricted helicopter operations, teams working out of patrol bases, once inserted, could remain longer in the field and reinforce each other in the event of a major contact. The teams also gained an advantage of surprise, since no helicopter activities, except for those involved in setting up the patrol base, signalled the reconnaissance Marines' entry into their operating areas.

Under Lieutenant Colonel Trainor's guidance the battalion continued this pattern of operation later in 1970 and during the first months of 1971. Its patrol base on Charlie Ridge became part of Operation Upshur Stream late in January. On both Charlie Ridge and in the Que Sons, infantry platoons took over the protection of reconnaissance patrol bases, while reconnaissance teams did most of the patrolling during Upshur Stream and Imperial Lake. Lieutenant Colonel Trainor observed that his reconnaissance teams usually had the “advantage of the initiative.” He later wrote that during his command tenure “no team was ever ambushed; on the contrary, it was the teams that did the ambushing.”

During late 1970 and early 1971, reconnaissance sightings of enemy troops and reconnaissance-inflicted enemy casualties grew steadily fewer. This decline reflected both reduced Marine reconnaissance activity and the shift of most patrolling to areas closer to Da Nang. The low level of action also indicated an apparent decline in enemy strength and aggressiveness. In December 1970, the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion sighted only 162 NVA and VC during 56 patrols, called 10 artillery fire missions and three air strikes, killed 23 enemy, and captured nine weapons. In the same month, the battalion lost three Marines wounded in action and seven nonbattle casualties. Action continued at this rate during January and February 1971.

On 14 March 1971, the battalion began its Keystone Robin Charlie redeployment. On that day, the Headquarters and Service Company and Company B ceased operations. After a farewell ceremony on the 19th, these units left Da Nang on the 24th with the battalion colors, bound for Camp Pendleton. Company A of the battalion, the reconnaissance element of the 3d MAB, continued operations until 28 April, when it extracted its last two deployed teams from Sherwood Forest, west of Da Nang, and from Elephant Valley. On 1 May, the company stood down; by the 13th, the last reconnaissance Marines had left Vietnam.
Supplying III MAF

Throughout its last year and a half of operations in Vietnam, III MAF continued to rely for supply, maintenance, and service support on Force Logistic Command (FLC). At the beginning of 1970, Brigadier General Mauro J. Padalino commanded FLC. A New Jersey native and combat veteran of World War II and Korea, Padalino as a colonel in 1965 had headed FLC's predecessor, the Force Logistic Support Group. The following year, he helped plan the organization of Force Logistic Command. He subsequently spent two years at the Marine Corps Supply Center, Barstow, California, and in June 1968 took command of the 3d Force Service Regiment (FSR) on Okinawa. He received his star in September 1969 and returned to Force Logistic Command two months later.

General Padalino had under him 396 Marine and 18 Navy officers and 7,391 Marine and 145 Navy enlisted men, most of them concentrated at Camp Books, the large FLC cantonment northwest of Da Nang. FLC, under operational control of III MAF and administrative control of FMFPac, was organized around the Headquarters and Service, Supply, and Maintenance Battalions of the 1st Force Service Regiment and also included Force Logistic Support Group (FLSG) B, the 7th Motor Transport Battalion, and the 1st and 3d Military Police Battalions.*

The three 1st FSR battalions conducted most of the centralized logistic activities of FLC. Headquarters and Service Battalion provided administrative, communications, and motor transport assistance to other elements of Force Logistic Command and units of III MAF. It also operated the III MAF Transient Facility, through which passed all incoming and outgoing personnel, and the R&R Processing Center. Supply Battalion received, stored, and distributed all types of supplies. It also manned a central control point for stores accounting, operated ammunition supply points (ASPs), baked most of III MAF's breadstuffs, and packed and cleaned equipment for embarkation. Maintenance Battalion repaired all types of Marine ordnance and ground equipment, except for items requiring extensive overhaul or rebuilding, which were shipped to 3d FSR on Okinawa or to bases in Japan and the United States.*2 The 3d FSR also provided critical supply, maintenance, and service support, and dispatched contact teams as requested by Commanding General, FLC and approved by Commanding General, FMFPac.

Force Logistic Support Group B, also headquartered at Camp Books, directly supported the 1st Marine Division. Composed of the Headquarters and Service, Maintenance, Supply, and Truck companies of the 1st Service Battalion,** the FLSG maintained logistic support units (LSUs) at Hill 55, An Hoa, and LZ Baldy to serve respectively the 1st, 5th, and 7th Marines. Each LSU consisted of two officers and an average of 65 enlisted Marines. It drew rations, fuel, and ammunition from FLC for issue to the battalions of its supported regiment, repaired many equipment and ordnance items, and operated a laundry. At Chu Lai, Sub-Unit 1 of FLSG-B, redesignated LSU-4 in April, issued ammunition and provided maintenance and laundry service for the 9th Engineer Battalion, MAGs -12 and -13, and the 1st Combined Action Group.***

*Under Marine Corps doctrine, a force service regiment furnishes all types of logistic support to a division, a wing, and force troops when deployed, and when reinforced provides the nucleus for a MAF logistics group. The FSR requisitions, stores, and issues all classes of supplies to the ground forces and Marine airbases. When authorized, the FSR also coordinates with other Services and theater commands to obtain common item support. The division and wing, through their own organic logistic units, perform most of their own internal maintenance and supply distribution. A unique feature of the FLC, as organized in Vietnam, was the assimilation of the divisions' organic service battalions into the centralized FLC structure as the nucleus of the FLSG.

**This was the organic logistic support element of the 1st Marine Division but in Vietnam such battalions were merged into FLC, which meant, among other things that they ceased to maintain their own separate supply stocks and accounts.

***Until the 3d Marine Division redeployed in November 1969, FLC had controlled two FLSGs: FLSG-A/1st Service Battalion at Da Nang and FLSG-B/3d Service Battalion at Dong Ha and Quang Tri. In November 1969, the 3d Service Battalion redeployed to Okinawa. FLSG-A then was deactivated and FLSG-B moved to Da Nang, where it assumed control of the 1st Service Battalion. FMFPac MarOps, Overview, pp. 56-57; FLSG-B ComdC, 15Mar66-16Sep70, in FLC ComdC, Sep70.

*The MP units were under III MAF operational control. For details of their operations, see Chapter 14.
The entire complex III MAF logistic effort was built on the speed and accuracy of automated data processing. A computer arrived in Vietnam with the first logistic support elements. By early 1970, III MAF had consolidated control of the three data processing platoons (DPPs) now attached to FLC and a separate data processing section (DPS) with the 1st MAW under an Automated Services Center (ASC). The ASC used 500 separate computer programs to carry out over 300 record-keeping tasks. Computers produced financial reports, kept warehouse locator files and supply inventories up to date, did much of the requisitioning of supplies, and maintained unit pay records.4

The division and wing had their own logistic capabilities and responsibilities. Since the 1st Marine Division had given up its organic 1st Service Battalion to FLC and maintained no separate supply stock or account of its own, each of the division's battalions drew supplies and services from FLC, either directly or through a logistic support unit. Elements of a single battalion could draw from different elements of FLC. During March 1970, for example, the forward command post and Company L of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, located on Hill 65, received daily resupply directly from FLC by truck. Company I of the battalion, on Hill 37, was resupplied by truck from Hill 65. Company K, split between Hills 52 and 25, depended on helicopter lifts from the An Hoa LSU for its resupply. Company M, at An Hoa, drew directly from the LSU there5

Helicopter resupply of the division depended heavily on the activities of the 1st Shore Party Battalion.* This battalion, organic to the division, deployed a company with each infantry regiment. Shore party helicopter support teams (HSTs) at each LSU assembled and prepared supplies for helicopter pickup. Landing zone control teams with the rifle companies located and marked LZs, briefed the crews of incoming helicopters, and supervised unloading. Liaison teams at battalion CPs received control teams; battalion commanders or S-4s consolidated the requests and assigned delivery priorities.6

When 1st Shore Party Battalion was redeployed during Keystone Bluejay in March 1970, Company C of the battalion remained in Vietnam, fulfilling the vital HST role until final redeployment on 30 April 1971. The nucleus of an HST team usually included two or more MOS 1381 shore party men and one or more communicators. The actual composition depended on such factors as the size of the supported unit, the permanency of the LZ, and the helicopter activity anticipated. Major James G. Dixon, who commanded Company C from August to November 1970, recalled the performance of his HST Marines:

Corporals and sergeants and even lance corporals did yeoman work as “mini” air controllers at their respective LZs. They directed the movement of the helicopters; marshaled and positioned cargo; rigged assorted supplies and equipment; manifested and directed passengers; and effected the hookup of external slingloads. All these responsibilities combined to make the LZs hubs of activity and lifelines of the supported unit at remote fire support bases such as Ryder, Hill 510, and Dagger.*7

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing drew upon both Navy and Marine sources for logistic support. The wing received nonaviation Marine Corps supplies and ammunition through Force Logistic Command; for replacement aircraft, spare aviation parts, most vehicles, and aircraft maintenance support, however, it relied on a complex of Navy agencies. Commander Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet (ComNavAirPac), a subordinate of CinCPacFlt, was ultimately responsible for aviation logistic support of the 1st MAW, as well as of fleet carrier aircraft groups.** The wing requisitioned its Navy material from the Navy Supply Depots (NSDs) at Yokosuka, Japan, and Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines.*** Until September 1970, NSD Yokosuka, and after that date, NSD Subic, contracted for and oversaw major repair and rebuilding

*Assuming another role previously handled by the battalion, Company C also provided forklift support to division units.

**Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet, was a “type commander” under CinCPacFlt, responsible for Pacific Fleet aircraft, carrier aircraft, and other assigned aviation units and facilities, including those of the Marines. Responsibilities of a type command, which FMFPac also was, included primarily logistic readiness and training. ComNavAirPac, ComdHist, 1970, OAB, NHD.

***In May 1970, Pacific Fleet decided to shift all aviation logistic support for units in the Western Pacific from NSD Yokosuka to NSD Subic. This changeover began on 1 September 1970 and was completed by mid-January 1971. All requisitions for aviation supplies after 1 September 1970 went through Subic. Commander, Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Operations of Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, FY 71, pp. 4-7; U.S. Naval Supply Depot, Subic Bay, R.P., ComdHist, 1 Jan-31 Dec 70, pts. I and II; U.S. Naval Supply Depot, Yokosuka, ComdHist 1970 and ComdHist 1971; all in OAB, NHD.

---

*Shore party battalions were established originally to control movement of men and equipment across the beach. As helicopters became part of Marine amphibious operations, the battalions expanded their missions and training to include support of heliborne assaults.
of Marine and Navy aircraft at plants in Japan. On Marine logistic support questions, the wing usually dealt directly with FMFPac, and on Navy matters it communicated through FMFPac with ComNavAirPac and Naval Air Systems Command. Complicating the situation, Commander, Fleet Air, Western Pacific (ComFAirWestPac) occasionally gave instructions directly to the wing or its subordinate units regarding transfers of individual aircraft between Marine squadrons and fleet carriers. III MAF became involved in some wing logistic matters, but the scope of its responsibility was unclear. Colonel William C. McGraw, Jr., 1st MAW G-4, commented in mid-1970:

Sometimes you wonder who you're supposed to go ask something. We normally would come through [FMFPac]. A couple of times we got criticized for it because it should have gone to III MAF. I'm not real clear in my mind just what functions they get into . . . . They shouldn't be worried about aircraft assignments or aircraft maintenance or supply problems or anything like this.

Within the wing, each aircraft group stored and issued its own supplies and did routine maintenance and limited repair of its aircraft. Civilian teams from naval aircraft repair facilities, attached to the groups under the Special Techniques for Repair and Analysis of Aircraft Damage Program, augmented the groups' battle damage repair capabilities. The wing shipped aircraft to Japan for major rebuilding and periodic rehabilitation. Marine Wing Support Group 17 furnished Marine Corps supply, postal, disbursing, and post exchange service for all 1st MAW elements, maintained ground equipment and SATS launching and recovery systems, and conducted all shipment of aircraft into and out of Vietnam.* The wing operated the Semi-Automatic Checkout Equipment (SACE) complex at Da Nang, which diagnosed the ills of sophisticated avionics systems.

The III MAF logistic system, perfected during five years of warfare, in the main worked smoothly. Temporary shortages of 175mm ammunition, some artillery and vehicle spare parts, and radio batteries occurred; III MAF, however, quickly remedied them by borrowing from the Army or by securing emergency shipments from Marine supply facilities on Okinawa or in the United States. Many infantry battalions suffered from a chronic shortage of qualified supply officers and had difficulty obtaining prompt replacement of wornout clothing. Nevertheless, for the most part, unit commanders had few major supply worries. As Colonel Edmund G. Derning, Jr., the 7th Marines commander, put it: "The ammo flows in there . . . . You never have to think about it. POL flows in there; you never have to think about it." Indicative of the general abundance and quality of supply, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, while operating in the Arizona Territory in February 1970, received weekly helicopter lifts of "frozen steaks, containers of milk, bread and all the onions, catsup, salt, needed for a company-size cookout every Sunday."10

**FLC Phases Down**

As III MAF combat forces diminished during the various redeployments, so did Force Logistic Command and the support elements associated with it. The 1st Shore Party Battalion redeployed during February 1970, in Keystone Bluejay. It left its Company C, attached to the 1st Engineer Battalion, to continue supporting the 1st Marine Division. During February, also, the FLC deactivated its 7th Separate Bulk Fuel Company and transferred its personnel to the new Bulk Fuel Company in the Supply Battalion. In March, FLC closed the logistic support unit on Hill 55. The 1st Marines, which had moved its CP and the bulk of its forces northward to relieve the 26th Marines, now drew its supplies and maintenance support directly from FLC. Through redeployment and ordinary rotation, FLC reduced its total strength by about 2,000 Marines during Keystone Bluejay.11

Force Logistic Command underwent another major reduction in Keystone Robin Alpha, including redeployment of the 1st Service Battalion and deactivation of FLSG-B. In mid-May, while planning for the new redeployment was still going on, the FLSG deactivated its Supply and Maintenance companies. It transferred Marines from these companies stationed at the LSUs to the Supply and Maintenance Battalion of FLC. During July, FLC completed plans for deactivating FLSG-B and transferring control of the LSUs to Supply Battalion. FLSG-B's Truck Company ceased operations on 15 August. On 1 September, Supply Battalion assumed operational and administrative control over the logistic support units. By 15 September, all 1st Service Battalion companies had been reduced to zero strength, and on that date the battalion colors left Vietnam for Camp Pendleton.

As FLSG-B prepared for deactivation, LSU-1 at An Hoa and LSU-4 at Chu Lai gradually reduced activity.

---

*MWSG-17 redeployed to Iwakuni in July-August 1970, leaving in Vietnam its structural Fire Department, Postal, Disbursing, EOD, and Data Processing sections, among others. MWSG-17 ComdGs, Jul-Aug70.
and transferred surplus supply stocks to Da Nang. On 2 August, anticipating the evacuation of An Hoa, FLC established a new battalion-size LSU-5 on Hill 37, initially to support 5th Marines units relocating there and later to serve the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. The An Hoa LSU closed on 21 September. On 15 October, as the last Marines pulled out of Chu Lai, LSU-4 turned its ammunition supply point over to the U.S. Army and disbanded.¹²

During Keystone Robin Alpha, two of FLC's data processing platoons redeployed. They left behind DPP-16, with its IBM Model 360/50 computer, at FLC, and Data Processing Section 28, equipped with an older IBM 1401, at 1st MAW. These two data processing units, which combined under one roof at FLC in March 1971, continued supporting III MAF and then the 3d MAB until redeployment of the last Marine forces.¹³

Initial Keystone Robin plans had called for Force Logistic Command to reduce the strength of 1st FSR to 2,856 Marines by 15 October. FLC itself was to be deactivated by mid-December and replaced by a 2,000-man Provisional Service Battalion, Da Nang. This plan was based on the assumption that another regiment would redeploy in Keystone Robin Bravo between 15 October and 31 December, coincident with withdrawal of III MAF, 1st Division, and 1st MAW Headquarters and activation of 3d MAB. In August, after MACV exempted the Marines from Keystone Robin Bravo, III MAF revised its plans, so as to retain FLC through the remaining redeployments, with 2,800 men in the FSR plus the 1st MP Battalion and a reinforced company of force engineers—a total strength of around 3,800.

To lessen administrative manpower requirements and keep as many of its remaining Marines as possible "down at the bottom ... kicking boxes," FLC reduced the number of companies in its Headquarters and Support, Supply, and Maintenance Battalions. Maintenance Battalion had deactivated one company in July due to a shortage of replacements. In mid-October, Headquarters and Service Battalion eliminated its Communications Company, replacing it with a platoon attached to its Support Company. Supply Battalion at the same time reduced its Bulk Fuel, Ammunition, and Ration companies each to a platoon under its Supply Company.¹⁴

At the conclusion of these reductions, on 23 October, Brigadier General James R. Jones replaced Brigadier General Padalino as FLC commander. Jones, a Texan and veteran of Guam and Iwo Jima, like Padalino was no stranger to III MAF logistics. During 1967-1968, Jones had commanded successively FLSG-A and FLSG-B and served as G-3 of Force Logistic Command. In September 1969, he had followed Padalino to command 3d FSR. Promoted to brigadier general on 15 August 1970, Jones again followed Padalino to FLC two months later.

FLC phased down slowly during Keystone Robin Charlie and Oriole Alpha. On 4 March 1971, as the 5th Marines redeployed, LSU-3 at LZ Baldy closed operations. The following month, Maintenance Battalion reduced three of its companies to platoons. On 23 April, the flag of the 1st Force Service Regiment was transferred to Camp Pendleton, but the regiment's three battalions stayed at Da Nang to finish the massive job of shipping out five years of accumulated Marine Corps material.* During May and June, the FSR battalions and Company C, 1st Shore Party Battalion gradually reduced their troop strength while continuing to support the 3d MAB. The last element of the shore party company redeployed on 22 June. By the 26th, Headquarters and Service, Supply, and Maintenance Battalions, their tasks completed, had been reduced to zero strength and deactivated.

**The End of Naval Support Activity Da Nang**

Force Logistic Command was only one component of the United States military logistic system in I Corps. For most supplies and for a wide variety of services, III MAF depended on Naval Support Activity (NSA) Da Nang.

At the end of 1969, NSA Da Nang, commanded by Rear Admiral Robert E. Adamson, Jr., consisted of over 10,000 United States Navy personnel and employed a civilian work force of 69 Americans and over 5,800 Vietnamese. Another 123 Americans and over 4,800 Vietnamese and other Asians worked for NSA's private contractors. Originally established in 1963 to support III MAF, NSA Da Nang was under the operational control of the Commander, United States Naval Forces, Vietnam (ComNavForV). Administratively, and for budgetary purposes, it was under Commander, Service Force, Pacific Fleet.

NSA Da Nang operated the port of Da Nang, which it had substantially enlarged and improved, as well as satellite ports at Cua Viet and Tan My in northern I Corps and Sa Huynh and Chu Lai in the southern

---

*With the return of the 1st FSR colors to Camp Pendleton, the 5th FSR, located there, was redesignated the 1st FSR.
provinces. With a fleet of over 250 lighters and other small craft and vast warehouses, storage lots, and tank farms around Da Nang, NSA handled all incoming and outgoing military cargo. It stored and issued the rations, fuel, and other supplies used in common by United States forces. NSA’s Navy Public Works Branch furnished electricity and water to American cantonments and operated the Da Nang military telephone exchange. Its civilian contractors maintained camp generators, air conditioners, and perimeter lights. NSA managed Navy and Marine real estate holdings. Its large naval hospital at Da Nang was a major component of III MAF’s medical support.18

When United States Army forces moved into I Corps in 1967-1968, they also received logistic support from NSA Da Nang. The Army early in 1968 established U.S. Army Support Command (USASuppCom) Da Nang, to perform for its units functions roughly equivalent to those of Force Logistic Command. This organization, under the operational control of the Commander, 1st Logistical Command, U.S. Army, by late 1969 had grown to a strength of about 7,500 supply and transportation troops. It included a field depot at Da Nang and two general support groups, the 26th and the 89th, which supported Army units respectively in northern and southern I Corps.18

As the I Corps logistics system had evolved up to this point, the Navy through NSA Da Nang, acted as wholesale provider of commonly used supplies and service support. The Marines and Army, through FLC and USASuppCom Da Nang, distributed supplies drawn from the NSA to their own forces and procured and issued their own ammunition and those stores and equipment unique to their particular Services. FLC in addition supported the 2d ROKMC Brigade, while USASuppCom Da Nang established petroleum pipelines for use of all Services, as well as providing unerserviceable property disposal and mortuary assistance. After redeployment of the 3d Marine Division and relocation of FLSG-B to Da Nang, the Army support command furnished common supply and port facilities for the Marine elements remaining in northern I Corps.*

In May 1969, as redeployment planning began, Vice Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, proposed that the missions of NSA Da Nang be assumed by the Army, which already furnished common service support for United States forces everywhere but in I Corps.* Zumwalt secured approval in principle of his plan from the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CinCPacFlt), with the proviso that the end of Navy common service support would occur only in conjunction with redeployment of Marine combat forces. General Abrams, ComUSMACV, also endorsed Zumwalt’s proposal and in late May ordered USARV to make a preliminary study of the costs and manpower requirements of an Army logistics takeover in I Corps. USARV initially responded cautiously, noting the uncertainty of redeployment plans and recommending that for the time being the Navy continue its support mission.17

Lieutenant General Nickerson, the III MAF commander, when informed early in June of these preliminary steps, vehemently protested. He expressed complete satisfaction with his Navy support and urged that logistics arrangements in I Corps not be disrupted at a time when the enemy threat remained significant and major redeployments and realignments of allied combat forces were in prospect. Emotion played a large part in the initial Marine reaction. Colonel Wilbur F. Simlik, III MAF G-4, recalled: “We seemed to have a great fear of losing Navy support. NSA had done such a marvellous job for a number of years . . . . With NSA leaving, we had a great sinking feeling of despair.”18 Colonel Miller M. Blue, who became G-4 in February 1971, said years later that it was a mistake to close down NSA so early:

This error caused a multitude of problems, especially in public works support; specifically electrical power requirements. I personally made many late night trips to the

*Since 1966, the U.S. Army’s 1st Logistical Command, a subordinate command of USARV, had furnished port and transportation facilities and common item supply support for all United States forces in Vietnam outside I Corps. In I Corps, the Navy, by direction of CinCPac, had been given responsibility for both tactical and logistic operations. Under 1st Logistical Command were two major base depots at Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay and five support commands responsible for different areas, including USASuppCom Da Nang. If reinforced, a support command, such as that at Da Nang, could perform most functions of NSA Da Nang. In addition, Army engineer support could be furnished by another USARV element, U.S. Army Engineer Command, Vietnam. LtGen Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., USA, Logistic Support, Department of the Army Vietnam Studies (Washington; Department of the Army, 1974), pp. 9-11.
old NSA compound to find someone in the Army to get
the generators running again so we could have power in,
among other places, COCs and communication centers
sometimes unsuccessfully.*

III MAF Marines had become accustomed to working
with NSA, and many relationships were rooted as much in tradition as formal Inter-Service agreement:
According to Colonel Simlik:

There were . . . many areas that were covered by the old
Gunnery Sergeant to Chief routine, where a number of years
ago a Gunnery Sergeant had gotten a Chief to take care of
a certain function and a certain area of support, small that
it may be, by seeing that he got a couple of bottles of booze
or a case of beer . . . . And all of this was unwritten, of
course, and passed on from Gunnery Sergeant to Gunnery
Sergeant and Chief to Chief. We knew that there were great
areas that we could never find out and get written down in
a contract, and we had a . . . fear that the Army would not
respond.**

In spite of III MAF reluctance, planning for the
Army takeover of NSA Da Nang's functions went in-
exorably forward.*** Marines still viewed the loss of ser-
vice of NSA with resignation: "The termination of the
logistics support role of the U.S. Navy was precipi-
tous," recalled Colonel James A. Sloan, who served
as III MAF plans officer in later 1969 and early 1970,
"and was so as the result of the determination of Vice
Admiral Zumwalt. The feeling I had was that the Navy
was deploying on a schedule, that 'Vietnamization' was
reality and those forces remaining had best be
prepared to fill the vacuum."**

In September 1969, at Zumwalt's suggestion, MACV
established a joint Army-Navy planning group, located
at Da Nang, to work out the practical details of gradu-
ally shifting common service support over to the Army
as the Marines pulled out. The group, chaired by the
Army, included representatives of MACV, USARV,
NavForV, III MAF, 1st Logistical Command, NSA Da
Nang, Army Support Command Da Nang, and Force
Logistic Command. Divided into subcommittees on
specific logistic functions,* the group worked through
October determining requirements for personnel,
equipment, and funds, defining problems, and
proposing solutions.

On 15 November, with both joint studies and Ma-
rine redeployments well under way, General Abrams

*The subcommittees were: Facilities Engineering, Construction,
Communications, Medical, Ammunition, Inter-Service Support
Agreements, Transportation, Petroleum, Contracts, Class I, Property
Disposal, Civilian Personnel, Security, Finance, Supply, Maintenance,
and Aviation.

instructed the Service components to develop a sup-
port turnover schedule for presentation to MACV by
1 January 1970. Abrams directed that the final Army
assumption of common support would follow the
redeployment of Marine combat units, but that par-
ticular functions not required for sustenance of III
MAF should be transferred earlier whenever possible,
subject to the concurrence of III MAF.

Another month and a half of planning and inter-
Service negotiation followed Abram's order. NavForV
pressed for early Army takeover of ports and activities
no longer needed by the Marines in northern I Corps.
NavForV also indicated that after the Army assump-
tion of common support, it would disestablish NSA
Da Nang and replace it with a smaller Naval Support
Facility primarily concerned with small-craft main-
tenance and assisting the South Vietnamese Navy. III
MAF emphasized the need to move slowly and care-
fully in transferring any functions to the Army and
reiterated that most Navy common support should
continue until all Marine combat forces had left Viet-
nam. USARV sought the loan or transfer of Navy fa-
cilities and equipment to supplement Army logistic
resources in I Corps. The Army and Navy also tried
to work out terms for renegotiating and, if necessary,
prorating payment for the various civilian support con-
tracts. Each Service anticipated a reduced budget in
the new fiscal year, and each was trying to minimize
the cost to itself of supporting the forces in I Corps.
How large those forces would be remained an unan-
swered question throughout most of the planning. The
logisticians did not have access to the highly classi-
fied projections of future troop redeployments.

Discussions dragged on past the MACV 1 January
deadline. On 21 January, General Abrams instructed
the Services to submit a plan by 5 February, based on
guidelines laid down by him. Abrams set 1 July 1970
as the date for final turnover of common service sup-
port in I Corps to the Army. This was the beginning
of the new fiscal year, and change at that point would
simply fund and the negotiation of new support con-
tracts. The changeover was to occur on 1 July even
if Marine combat forces remained. USARV in that case
would furnish whatever common support the Marines
required. The Army was to take over as many I Corps
common support functions as possible before the
deadline, while the Navy was to transfer or loan to
USARV any equipment the Army needed to assume
the support mission. In response to this directive, the
component commands quickly completed a timeta-
ble calling for a gradual transfer of functions, to begin in northern I Corps during February. Both NSA Da Nang and US Army Support Command Da Nang now developed detailed plans for their own roles in the changeover.

Preliminary turnovers of equipment and a few facilities in northern I Corps had begun in November and December 1969. On 15 February 1970, Naval Support Activity Da Nang disbanded its detachments at Sa Huynh and Cua Viet; elements of USASuppCom Da Nang took over operation of both ports. A month later, the NSA detachment at Tân My, near Hue, ceased operations. Its function, as well as other supply and support activities at Hue and Phu Bai, were assumed by the Army support command. At Da Nang during March, NSA’s public works division turned over operation of the telephone system, as well as some cargo handling functions. The NSA hospital began reducing nonessential activities in preparation for deactivation. On 26 March, the Army took over all fuel storage and issue operations at Da Nang and Chu Lai. During April, NSA Da Nang transferred its public works maintenance shops at Phu Bai and Tân My to the Army’s facilities maintenance contractor.

In early May, III MAF asked MACV to halt further scheduled turnover actions until the entire timetable could be reviewed in the light of changed redeployment plans. Common service support turnover planning had been predicated on another redeployment closely following Keystone Bluejay and on both these redeployments being “Marine-heavy,” but Marine participation in Bluejay had been reduced and the subsequent withdrawal now would not begin until mid-summer. This meant that larger Marine combat forces would be left after 1 July than originally expected. III MAF questioned whether USARV, with its own resources diminished by redeployment, could support adequately this larger Marine force and suggested that the Navy slow down the transfer of logistic responsibilities until more Marines had left.

MACV in response called a common service support conference, which met at Saigon from 15 to 17 May. At the conference, NavForV insisted that facilities transfers, contract negotiations, and budget planning had gone too far to permit any postponement of the turnover beyond 1 July. USARV declared that it could furnish the Marines all the support they now received from NSA, but it became apparent in the discussions that the Army authorities did not yet comprehend the extent and variety of those services. MACV directed that the 1 July turnover deadline be met and instructed the Services to finish working out methods. During May and June, representatives of III MAF, USA Support Command Da Nang, and Force Logistic Command met frequently to coordinate a smooth transfer and draw up interservice support agreements detailing exactly what supplies and services the Army would furnish to III MAF. By 28 June, III MAF and USARV had approved these agreements.

Meanwhile, the turnover continued. The NSA Da Nang Hospital closed on 15 May, and step by step the Navy handed over its Da Nang public works functions and port facilities to the Army Support Command. USARV reinforced the Da Nang support command with 2,000 additional officers and men, drawn from elsewhere in Vietnam. The reinforcements included the 1,000-man 5th Transportation Command, which moved to Da Nang from Qui Nhon in late May and early June and occupied the former NSA Hospital complex. On 1 June, NSA disestablished its detachment at Chu Lai. By the 30th, it had transferred or

*This command consisted of terminal service, POL barge, tug, and small boat companies and detachments. The unit took over many of NSA Da Nang’s harbor craft.
terminated all its remaining functions and activities at Da Nang. NSA Da Nang was deactivated on the 30th; the following day, its successor organization, Naval Support Facility Da Nang, was commissioned, with headquarters at Camp Tien Sha in East Da Nang. That same day, 1 July, the Army-Marine interservice support agreements went into effect. In a separate action on the 1st, III MAF turned its Transient Facility and R&R Processing Center over to Army management.25

As the USASuppCom Da Nang assumed most of NSA Da Nang’s support functions, III MAF and USARV worked out plans for the Army to furnish ammunition to Marine ground units. Negotiations on this subject began early in 1970, but the Marine Corps decided to delay the ammunition turnover past 1 July, until nearer the time of the final Marine withdrawals. Under the plan, Force Logistic Command eventually was to hand over its three ammunition supply points (ASPs) and most of their stocks to the Army, which would issue ammunition to Marine units as required. On 12 October, III MAF transferred control of its ASP-3 at Chu Lai to the Army. During December, III MAF and USARV established 15 March 1971 as the date when the Army would assume complete responsibility for issuing ammunition to Marine ground forces, under an interservice support agreement. Gradually, III MAF shipped excess stocks of Marine-peculiar ammunition out of Vietnam and transferred the rest to the U.S. Army and ARVN. The Marines shifted aviation munitions from the ASPs to the MAG-11 and MAG-16 bomb dumps. On 15 March 1971, control of ASP-2, the principal ground ammunition storage facility near Da Nang, passed to U.S. Army Support Command Da Nang, as did custody of 6,800 tons of munitions. Two months later, the Marines handed ASP-1, their remaining Da Nang area ammunition facility, over to the South Vietnamese, who had been using a portion of it for storage of their own ammunition since early 1970.26

The shift of common service support of III MAF from NSA Da Nang to the U.S. Army Support Command Da Nang was attended by a variety of problems. At the outset, the Army was short of small-boat pilots and crewmen for port operations; the Da Nang support command had to borrow Navy personnel and hire civilian workers for this purpose. Marines found Navy logistical organization fragmented and confusing. XXIV Corps had little role in logistic matters, forcing III MAF to deal with USASuppCom Da Nang, 1st Logistical Command, and separate engineer and other technical commands. Disagreements arose over interpretation of the interservice agreements, many resulting from belated discovery of informal arrangements that had not been covered. Most important, U.S. Army Support Command Da Nang, like other Army elements, labored under a sharply reduced FY 1971 budget and simply could not afford the quantity and variety of supplies to which the Marines had been accustomed.27

The turnover of logistic support to the Army had especially disruptive effects on the maintenance of III MAF camps and facilities. Developed piecemeal over the years from what were initially expected to be temporary installations, these facilities required continuous and extensive repair and rebuilding. Navy-installed generators, air conditioners, water and sewage pumps, and other pieces of equipment by mid-1970 were old and nearly worn out. The Army support command did not stock spare parts for many of these items. NSA Da Nang had turned over its own spares, but these stocks had run low as NSA closed down. Inevitably, equipment breakdowns and long delays in repairs plagued the Marines. To make matters worse, USASuppCom Da Nang and the Army Engineers were short of technicians and equipment for repair of such vital items as perimeter lights. The international work force of Philco-Ford the Army’s civilian facilities maintenance contractor, further complicated operations. Lieutenant Colonel William R. Fails, S-4 of MAG-16 and facilities manager for Marble Mountain Air Facility, recalled: "There was an American company using Taiwanese supervisors for Korean assistant supervisors, to work with the Vietnamese . . . . [All these nationalities] . . . working with Vietnamese under an Army command, supporting a U.S. Marine Corps unit that normally gets its support from the Navy, just became a nightmare . . . ."28

All the commands concerned labored diligently to solve or at least alleviate facilities problems. USASuppCom Da Nang, Philco-Ford, and the Army Engineers furnished all the assistance they could. Marine commands supplemented these efforts by self-help, occasionally resorting to unorthodox methods to obtain needed material. When the Navy public works warehouse at Da Nang closed down, Lieutenant Colonel Fails “found out that some of the equipment they had . . . would be available to any U.S. military unit that wanted it and would sign for it.” Fails and the MAG-16 staff acted quickly:
The next morning, with the concurrence . . . of the group commander, . . . we launched out every flat-bed . . . we could lay our hands on, with some of the Marine Corps' finest scavengers. We flew over an advance party by helicopter and made literally a pre-dawn assault on the warehouses . . . . We had clerks with us . . . We needed everything . . . . We started a shifting, rotating convoy, and I think we got 40-some truckloads . . . of stuff out of there . . . . We were able to take that material and upgrade our facilities considerably.  

In spite of many difficulties, the Army support command succeeded in sustaining III MAF during a period of diminishing Marine strength and low-intensity combat. III MAF developed a generally harmonious working relationship with the Army command. According to Colonel Simlik, the III MAF G-4, the "people in the Army who were involved in the transfer were people we knew personally and had the greatest confidence in." Brigadier General Leo J. Dulacki, III MAF Chief of Staff, summed up the predominant Marine evaluation of Army support: "The Army logistical command performed well and did not leave III MAF wanting."  

Engineer Support

At the beginning of 1970, three Marine engineer battalions were deployed in I Corps. The 1st Engineer Battalion, organic engineer unit of the 1st Marine Division,* reinforced by Company A (-), 5th Engineer Battalion, performed light construction throughout the division TAOR, maintained water points, swept sections of highway for mines, and conducted the 1st Marine Division Land Mine Warfare School.** Of III MAF's two force engineer battalions, the 7th, with the 1st Bridge Company attached, did heavy construction in the Da Nang area, maintained and improved highways, and made clearing mine sweeps. The 9th Engineer Battalion, with its CP and three companies at Chu Lai and part of the fourth company at Tam Ky, concentrated most of its efforts on clearing mines from Route 1 between Chu Lai and the Ba Ren River and preparing the roadbed for paving. This battalion also included a provisional land clearing company and provided construction and other support to the American Division.*

In addition to these Marine engineer units, the four-battalion 45th U.S. Army Engineer Group and four U.S. Navy Mobile Construction (Seabee) Battalions were operating in I Corps at the beginning of 1970. Until 9 March, III MAF, as senior United States command in the corps area, supervised the entire engineering effort. After that date, XXIV Corps assumed this responsibility. III MAF retained operational control of its two force engineer battalions, which were under administrative control of the 1st Marine Division. The division had both operational and administrative control of the 1st Engineer Battalion. With Marine, Army, and Navy elements all involved in large projects, engineer coordination in I Corps was a complex task. Colonel Nicholas A. Canzona, the 1st Marine Division G-4, commented: "I never saw so many engineers in all my life working in a given area, and . . . I don't think I've ever seen so much attention and confusion as to who is supposed to do what and why."  

During 1970, redeployments drastically reduced Marine engineer strength. Company A (-), 5th Engineer Battalion and Company A, 9th Engineer Battalion left Vietnam in Keystone Bluejay. In late March 1970, the 9th Engineer Battalion moved its CP to the Da Nang area and located its three remaining engineer companies at Tam Ky, Hill 34, and LZ Baldy. The battalion relinquished its minesweeping and construction mission on Route 1 south of Tam Ky while continuing to work on and sweep the highway from Tam Ky north to Baldy. On 19 July, as part of Keystone Robin Alpha, the 7th Engineer Battalion, with the exception of its Company A, and the 9th Engineer Battalion stood down. Even during their stand-down period, the engineers were kept busy: "As combat engineer platoons were freed from their supporting role when their infantry battalions stood down, they immediately went to work on dismantling pre-engineered buildings in the FLC compound for shipment to Okinawa," recalled Major James G. Dixon, who commanded Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion from February to June 1971. He noted, "A late engineer project for one combat engineer platoon newly out of the field was installation of a security fence around the USAID com-

---

* A division engineer battalion normally consists of 769 officers and men in a headquarters company, an engineer support company, and three engineer companies. Its primary mission is close combat engineer support of the division, and it is organized to provide one company in direct support of each infantry regiment, hence the battalion is equipped for light, temporary construction.

**For details of operations of the Land Mine Warfare School, see Chapter 14.

---

* A force engineer battalion, of 1,115 officers and men in a headquarters company, a service company, and four engineer companies, is equipped for larger and more permanent construction tasks than is the division engineer battalion.
 pound in downtown Da Nang, a drastic change of environment for these versatile engineers.  

The 7th and 9th Engineer Battalions embarked for the United States in September. Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion, which had been reinforced to almost 300 officers and men, was placed under administrative control of FLC and attached to Maintenance Battalion. Under III MAF operational control, the company assumed on a reduced scale the missions of its parent battalion. During February and March 1971, the 1st Engineer Battalion redeployed in Keystone Robin Charlie, leaving its Company A, with Company A, 7th Engineers, as engineer element of the 3d MAB. Major Dixon, who redeployed with the last engineer companies in June 1971, later observed that during the final stages of redeployment: "the demand for engineer support was overwhelming . . . and continued to exceed resources through the last engineer unit's departure . . ."  

As long as they remained in Vietnam, all three Marine engineer battalions expended much effort and material in roadbuilding and repair. Their activities were part of a general allied program to create a passable road net throughout I Corps, both to promote economic development and to facilitate ARVN maneuver, especially after the Americans and their helicopters had departed. The Marines concentrated on Route 4, running east to west from Hoi An to Thuong Duc, and the unpaved stretch of Route 1 between the Ba Ren River and Baldy. During April 1970, elements of the 1st Engineer Battalion widened Route 4 between Hill 52 and Thuong Duc into a two-lane fair-weather road. Between 26 April and 24 July, the 7th Engineer Battalion improved a six-mile segment of the same route cast of Hill 37 into an all-weather, though unpaved, highway. Working on this heavily-mined stretch, the Marine engineers lost two men killed, 29 wounded, and had eight pieces of machinery destroyed. Elements of the battalion labored past their 19 July stand-down date to finish the job. By early 1971, the 1st Engineer Battalion, in cooperation with the Seabees, had paved the 12 miles of Route 4 between Route 1 and Dai Loc. On Route 1 itself, Marine engineers hauled rock and dirt and helped with grading in preparation for paving of the road by the Seabees. The Quang Nam floods of October-November 1970, which submerged most roads and bridges under five feet or more of water, proved the worth of the engineers' efforts. Most bridges and surfaced highways in the province emerged with only minor damage, and Marines and Seabees soon had the major routes open again for traffic.  

All three engineer battalions regularly swept assigned segments of highway for buried mines. Sweep teams employed electric mine detectors and also bought large amounts of ordnance from Vietnamese civilians under the Voluntary Informant Program.* During July 1970, for example, 17 teams from the 1st Engineer Battalion swept over 1,550 miles of road. They detected and destroyed 10 buried mines and purchased 78 ordnance items, ranging from American and Communist grenades to 105mm artillery rounds.  

In accord with allied Vietnamization policy, Marine engineers during March 1970 began training minesweep teams for Quang Nam Province and Quang Da Special Zone. The 1st Engineer Battalion mine warfare school established a special two-day course for ARVN and Regional Force soldiers and dispatched a contact team to various Vietnamese commands. By the end of May, 176 Vietnamese had graduated from the course and 316 had received instruction from the mobile team. During June, the 1st Marine Division, Quang Nam Province, and QDSZ agreed on a timetable for Vietnamese takeover of particular highway segments. Actual turnover of responsibility fell behind schedule due to shortages of equipment and Vietnamese procrastination, but gradually, as Marine engineers redeployed, the South Vietnamese began sweeping longer and longer stretches of road. They continued to rely heavily on the Americans for advice and equipment maintenance.  

Throughout the war, the enemy had benefited from a network of caves, tunnels, and fortifications, borrowed out during many years, that honeycombed Viet Cong strongholds such as the area south of Da Nang. To destroy these fighting positions and escape routes, as well as remove concealing foliage, Marine engineers engaged in "land-clearing," systematically bulldozing bare selected portions of countryside. For this purpose, III MAF and XXIV Corps had organized the 2d Provisional Clearing Company. The company consisted of a command group from the 9th Engineer Battalion with men and equipment from both force engineer battalions and from the 26th and 39th U.S. Army Engineer Battalions.  

Land-clearing operations followed an established pattern. GVN authorities designed the target areas, and the military unit in the TAOR of which the oper-

---

*For details on this program, see Chapter 14.
Marine PFC Kyle E. Pruitt mans his .50-caliber machine gun during a Marine “Rough Rider” supply convoy. The Marines placed armored plates and mounted machine guns on trucks to protect the convoy from enemy ambushes. Note the improvised seat.

Marine PFC Kyle E. Pruitt mans his .50-caliber machine gun during a Marine “Rough Rider” supply convoy. The Marines placed armored plates and mounted machine guns on trucks to protect the convoy from enemy ambushes. Note the improvised seat.

Marine PFC Kyle E. Pruitt mans his .50-caliber machine gun during a Marine “Rough Rider” supply convoy. The Marines placed armored plates and mounted machine guns on trucks to protect the convoy from enemy ambushes. Note the improvised seat.

Marine PFC Kyle E. Pruitt mans his .50-caliber machine gun during a Marine “Rough Rider” supply convoy. The Marines placed armored plates and mounted machine guns on trucks to protect the convoy from enemy ambushes. Note the improvised seat.

Marine PFC Kyle E. Pruitt mans his .50-caliber machine gun during a Marine “Rough Rider” supply convoy. The Marines placed armored plates and mounted machine guns on trucks to protect the convoy from enemy ambushes. Note the improvised seat.

Marine PFC Kyle E. Pruitt mans his .50-caliber machine gun during a Marine “Rough Rider” supply convoy. The Marines placed armored plates and mounted machine guns on trucks to protect the convoy from enemy ambushes. Note the improvised seat.
steel and concrete "Wonderarch"* shelters at Da Nang Airbase and Marble Mountain, to protect aircraft against rocket and mortar fire. In the field, engineers, lifted into positions by helicopter with minidozers and other equipment, constructed fire support bases for both ARVN and Marine operations.41

As Marines withdrew from Vietnam, the engineers demolished the installations they had built earlier. During September and October 1970, elements of the 1st Engineer Battalion, assisted by heavy equipment operators from Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion, leveled much of An Hoa Combat Base. Using an average of 127 men and 20 pieces of earthmoving equipment per day, the engineers dismantled or demolished 340 buildings and flattened fortifications, leaving intact only the airfield, the industrial complex, and the small portion of the facility to be occupied by the ARVN.42

Base demolition accelerated during early 1971. During February, engineers from Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion, with helilifted bulldozers, destroyed OP Roundup and FSB Ryder in the Que Sons. Ironically, the 1st Engineer Battalion had finished rehabilitating huts and fortifications at Ryder only the previous September. In March and April, following the sequence of Marine relinquishment of territory, the engineers leveled camps, firebases, and OPs nearer Da Nang. For each position to be demolished, Lieutenant Colonel Daryl E. Benstead, 1st Engineer Battalion commander, or a member of his staff, first reconnoitered the site with representatives of the occupying unit and prepared a destruction schedule and plan. After division review and approval of the plan, engineers, usually brought in with their equipment by helicopter, would strip the position of all useable material and then bulldoze the fortifications.43 Major Dixon later described this process, known then as "de-militarization."

De-militarization became a well used term at those bases not retained by either U.S. Army or Vietnamese forces, and where total destruction exceeded resources. The engineers would destroy command and perimeter bunkers and any other facility that could be used as a shelter for incoming fire, thus preventing their use by the VC.44

The local Vietnamese would then pick the cantonment clean, usually leaving nothing but a bare hilltop.

The engineers were hard pressed during the final months of redeployment to accomplish all the tasks necessary before the MAB departed Vietnam. They operated water points and leveled numerous camps, firebases, OPs, and IOD sites near Da Nang, as well as on remote hilltops. In addition, they provided combat engineer support to the 1st Marines, the last infantry regiment in Vietnam. The support given by Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion and by its sister unit, Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion, which was commanded during the period by Major Gilbert R. Meibaum, "was substantial, mission essential for the Brigade and closely and harmoniously coordinated by the Brigade Engineer Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Benstead."45

Motor Transport

At the beginning of 1970, III MAF included four motor transport units. The 1st Motor Transport Battalion, reinforced by Company A, 5th Motor Transport Battalion, was under operational control of the 1st Marine Division, as was the 11th Motor Transport Battalion, a force troops unit.* These battalions furnished tactical and logistical transportation for the division. Force Logistic Command had operational control of the large Truck Company of the Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st FSR, and the 7th Motor Transport Battalion, another force troops unit newly

*The 1st Motor Transport Battalion was an organic element of the 1st Marine Division and consisted of a headquarters and service company and three truck companies. Each truck company was normally equipped with 30 2½-ton cargo trucks and with 1½-ton cargo trailers for use by supported units. Each truck company was also equipped with maintenance, recovery, and fueling vehicles. The 7th and 11th Motor Transport Battalions were elements of Force Troops and were assigned the mission of reinforcing the land transport of MAF elements for tactical, logistic, and administrative movement of troops, supplies, and equipment. Each of the force motor transport battalions consisted of a headquarters and service company, three truck companies and a transportation company. The truck companies were equipped with 31 5-ton cargo trucks, and the transportation company had 30 tractor prime movers, 45 high bed trailers, and 2 25-ton, low bed trailers. LtCol Morris S. Shimanoff, Comments on draft ms, 9May83 Vietnam Comment File.

*Introduced late in 1969, "Wonderarches" were constructed of bolted steel sections covered with 12 inches of high-strength concrete. Each semi-cylindrical structure was 48 feet wide by 70 feet long and housed one aircraft. Besides protecting the planes from high-trajectory fire, the shelters were designed to reduce the danger of a fire and explosion in one aircraft spreading to others. FMFPac, MarOps, Dec69, p. 80.
moved to Da Nang from Quang Tri. Both of these organizations supported FLC, as well as other III MAF elements. Truck Company, which had a variety of specialized vehicles as well as a fleet of 2.5- and 5-ton trucks, coordinated the “Rough Rider” convoys to bases in southern Quang Nam, such as Baldy, and furnished gun trucks* for escort.


In spite of the extensive tactical and logistic use of helicopters, III MAF still relied heavily on trucks for cargo movement. The logistic support units and major bases received most of their stocks by road convoy. During 1970, accordingly, the Marine motor transport battalions drove over 3,000,000 miles, hauling 566,646 tons of freight and 1,297,533 passengers. Over improved and increasingly secure highways, trucks now could reach most Marine positions in Quang Nam. Daily resupply convoys ran to Hill 37, An Hoa, Baldy, and other bases, although for safety from mines, most troops bound for outlying areas still went by helicopter.46

Viet Cong mines remained a significant threat to Marine truckers, in spite of generally improved security and constant minesweeping. The stretch of Route 4 east of Hill 37, part of the land supply line to that position, was especially dangerous. In an effort to reduce personnel casualties from detonations, the Marines since early in the war had attached sandbags and pieces of boiler plate to cabs and other vital areas of their vehicles; but this improvised armor could not stop most of the fragments that caused the severest injuries and its weight reduced truck efficiency and carrying capacity.

During 1968, at III MAF request, the Marine Corps had begun developing light, easily attached and removed armor kits for 2.5- and 5-ton trucks. By mid-1970, these kits had been designed, tested, and manufactured. Separate cab and bed components could be installed in a few hours without special tools or modification of the vehicle. Made of 5/8-inch wrought armor steel, the plates weighed about half as much per square foot as sandbags and could stop fragments of the most powerful mines. During September, delivery of the kits began to the 1st and 11th Motor Transport Battalions. By the end of the year, the 1st Battalion had installed 62 cabs and 19 bed kits in its 2.5-ton trucks and cab kits in two wreckers and two tankers. The 11th Battalion had armored the cabs of 82 of its 5-ton trucks and the beds of eight.47

The kits quickly proved their worth. On 4 November 1970, a 1st Motor Transport Battalion truck, serving as command vehicle of a convoy with both cab and bed kits installed, hit a 30-pound mine on Route 4 about a mile east of Hill 37. The explosion tore the truck in half, but all four Marines on board survived. Although all were injured by being hurled from the vehicle, none of the Marines suffered fragment wounds or loss of limb. The armor kits were recovered with only minor damage and later installed in other trucks.48 In similar incidents during the following weeks, truck armor repeatedly saved Marine lives. Force Logistic Command, which initially had not ordered armor for its trucks, made haste to do so. By early 1971, Truck Company was installing kits in its vehicles.48

Medical Services

At the beginning of 1970, III MAF included the 1st Medical Battalion, reinforced by Company A, 5th Medical Battalion, which maintained a 300-bed 1st Marine Division hospital. The 1st Hospital Company, a force troops unit, which had operated a 100-bed treatment facility, was preparing to stand down for redeployment. About 100 Navy medical officers, 2,300 medical service corpsmen, and 1,781 hospital corpsmen were attached to division, wing, FLC, and Combined Action Force units. Two Navy hospital ships, the USS Repose (AH 16) and the USS Sanctuary (AH 17), each with a capacity of about 800 patients, were on station off I Corps to treat the more seriously wounded and sick. At Da Nang, the 600-bed Naval Support Activity Hospital afforded most of the services of a

---

*Gun trucks were the standard 2½-ton or 5-ton trucks with the cargo beds armored on the sides with steel plate and the floors covered with sandbags. Each truck mounted a .50-caliber machine gun and was equipped with a radio for convoy control, adjustment of supporting arms, and calls for medical evacuation. These trucks also carried tools and vehicle spare parts.
While the Naval Support Activity Hospital afforded MAF units basic medical care, the 1st and 11th Dental Companies provided a broad range of dental services to units of III MAF from 1970-1971. The 1st Company, which numbered 26 Naval officers and 40 enlisted men in March 1970, operated 15 dental facilities for the 1st Marine Division in the Da Nang TAOR, including permanent clinics at the 1st Division command post at Da Nang, 5th Marines Headquarters at An Hoa, 7th Marines Headquarters at LZ Baldy, and 3d Battalion, 5th Marines Headquarters at Hill 65, as well as operating mobile surgical vans capable of supporting units along the major roads throughout the TAOR. The 11th Dental Company, slightly smaller than the 1st, serviced the wing, FLC, and III MAF Headquarters until September 1970, when 1st Dental Company redeployed, and then provided support for all Marine units remaining until 28 May 1971, when the final detachment of the 11th Company redeployed. Captain Meredith H. Mead, DC, USN, who assumed command of the 1st Dental Company in March 1970, recalled the support which the dental companies provided:

All these clinics had from one or more dentists and dental techs depending on the number of personnel to be served. . . . All had high speed handpieces powered by a gasoline air compressor. This was the latest in field dental equipment. Many of the dental chairs were not field type but were old chairs sent from the States. The 1st Dental Company had a trailer fitted out as a mobile dental office to rotate among those people in more remote locations . . . . [The 11th Dental Company] had a very good modern prosthetic laboratory for fabrication of dentures. It included an automatic casting machine that was used to make partial dentures from [a] chromium cobalt alloy. It was better than many laboratories in the States.51

During 1969, III MAF and XXIV Corps had established a joint medical regulating center by placing a Navy-Marine regulating section with its Army counterpart at the 95th Evacuation Hospital. As helicopters picked up casualties throughout I Corps, the pilots would contact the regulating center on a dedicated radio frequency and report the number of patients and the type and severity of the wounds or illness. The regulator then checked a status board showing the facilities, specialists, and space available at each hospital, directed the helicopter to the appropriate destination, and notified the hospital that casualties were on the way. On 10 April 1970, after XXIV Corps became the senior U.S. command in I Corps, the Marines and Navy deactivated their portion of the joint regulating unit. The U.S. Army 67th Medical Group then took over medical regulation for all of I Corps, including III MAF52.

Admissions to the hospitals serving III MAF reflected the declining level of combat. Of 16,821 patients treated during 1970, 21 percent were battle casualties. By comparison, in 1969, out of 22,003 hospital patients, 26 per cent had been wounded in combat; and in 1967, a year of heavy fighting, combat wounded had accounted for 39 per cent of 23,091 admissions53.

During 1970, redeployments and deactivations rapidly reduced III MAF's medical support facilities. The 1st Hospital Company left Vietnam on 27 February in Keystone Bluejay, followed on 12 March by Company A, 5th Medical Battalion. On 13 March, the Repose, which had been on duty in Vietnamese waters since February 1966, sailed for the United States and deactivation.54

For Marines, the most dramatic medical support reduction was the closing on 15 May of the NSA Da Nang Hospital. More than any other aspect of the NSA phasedown, this action aroused concern among III MAF commanders that the Marines would be left without adequate facilities, especially if the intensity of combat should increase during the summer. In the face of III MAF requests for postponement of the closing, ComNavForV remained adamant while at the same time assuring the Marines that the Navy in emergencies would furnish all necessary support. Through FMFPac, III MAF appealed to CinCPacFlt and CinCPac, again to no avail. III MAF finally approached ComUSMACV. General Abrams upheld the Navy's decision on the closing date, but, as General Dulacki recalled, "he gave his full and personal assurances that in the event the situation required, the Marines would be provided full medical support even if it meant moving an Army hospital into ICTZ."55

The NSA Hospital closed on schedule, leaving III MAF with the facilities of the 1st Medical Battalion and the USS Sanctuary, backed by the Army 95th Evacuation Hospital. As battlefield action remained limited in scale and intensity, this medical support proved more than adequate. During September, in Keystone Robin Alpha, Company C, 1st Medical Bat-
talion redeployed. The rest of the battalion, except for Company A, redeployed in April 1971 in Keystone Robin Charlie. Company A remained the principal medical element of 3d MAB. The Sanctuary left for the United States on 1 May. Company A stood down on 2 June and redeployed on the 25th.\textsuperscript{58}
The 'Mixmaster' of Personnel

The most complex logistic problem facing III MAF throughout 1970-1971 was the redeployment of men and equipment. Redeployment was not simply a matter of the whole force ceasing operations, packing up, and leaving Vietnam. Instead, in each withdrawal, selected units or parts of units had to be extricated from continuing active operations. The departing units had to exchange most of their personnel and much of their equipment with other organizations still in combat before embarking by sea and air for destinations in the Pacific or the United States. Colonel Hershel L. Johnson, Jr., who assumed command of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines in August 1970, later explained: "... the many problems of accountability and the necessary preparation for turnover of equipment to other units was a task which would have been difficult under the best of circumstances. The requirement to transfer critical personnel, many of whom could assist in accountability problems, was understandable, but served to aggravate the situations."

At the same time, portions of Force Logistic Command's large reserve material stocks had to be disposed of either by shipment out of Vietnam or by transfer to other United States or Vietnamese Armed Services. The traffic was not all one way. Normal rotations of personnel and resupply and replacement of equipment had to continue, but the flow through the manpower and materiel "pipelines" had to be regulated so as to leave III MAF at the prescribed reduced strength at the end of each redeployment increment. Due to the length of time involved in moving men and supplies through the pipeline, achievement of the proper level at any point required almost impossibly precise calculation and operational coordination.

For each redeployment, the White House and Defense Department, in consultation with MACV, determined the number of troops to be withdrawn and the beginning and concluding dates of the withdrawal. MACV, in turn, apportioned the troops to be removed among the Services and received from the component commanders a list of specific units to be redeployed. CinCPac and the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed and approved the troop list and determined the destinations of the units leaving Vietnam. The particular Services established personnel policies for each withdrawal and developed their own plans and transportation requirements for movement of men and supplies. Finally, CinCPac, on the basis of information provided by the Services, would prepare a tentative schedule for sea and air movements. At a final CinCPac movement conference, representatives of all concerned commands would apportion aircraft and shipping and establish a definite timetable for the withdrawal.

FMFPac, headquartered at Camp Smith, Hawaii, was the central Marine Corps coordinator of redeployment planning and execution. FMFPac, at the direction of HQMC, represented the Marine Corps in consultations with other Pacific commands. In conjunction with III MAF, it suggested Marine units for redeployment. It transmitted manpower and logistic guidance to III MAF and coordinated movement of men and equipment from South Vietnam to other Marine bases in the Pacific and the continental United States. Until July 1970, Lieutenant General Henry W. Buse, Jr., a Naval Academy graduate and winner of the Silver Star in World War II, commanded FMFPac. Buse’s replacement, Lieutenant General William K. Jones, also a World War II veteran who had earned a Silver Star Medal at Tarawa and a Navy Cross at Saipan, had had first-hand experience with redeployment. As commander of the 3d Marine Division during 1969, Jones had conducted its relocation from northern I Corps to Okinawa.

According to Colonel Simlik, the III MAF G-4, the relationship between FMFPac and III MAF on redeployment matters was “constant and close and personal.” Both Buse and Jones made frequent trips to Da Nang for observation and consultation. At the same time, both FMFPac commanders maintained a close and friendly working relationship with Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., CinCPac. General Jones recalled that McCain:

... thought highly of my predecessor, General Buse, whom he used as a close friend and confidant and he complimented me by taking me in under the same ground rules.
We had a special phone that was a dedicated phone from him to CGFMFPac and that phone rang quite regularly. . . . He included CGFMFPac in everything and treated him as a component commander, although of course he wasn't. . . . The relationship between CinCPac and CGFMFPac and CinCPac staff and CGFM FPac staff was very, very cordial.9

Besides maintaining contact with higher headquarters through FMFPac, III MAF regularly sent representatives to the CinCPac movement planning conferences and other meetings concerned with redeployment. III MAF passed redeployment directives to subordinate commands; coordinated plans for unit reliefs, stand downs, and embarkations; and dealt with MACV, the other Services within Vietnam, and the South Vietnamese on such matters as equipment turnovers and real estate transfers. The 1st Marine Division, 1st MAW, and FLC had primary responsibility for preparing men and equipment for embarkation and moving them to piers and airports on schedule. For this purpose, the 1st Marine Division in January 1970 activated a Logistic Operations Center under the G-4. The Division Embarkation Officer and his staff continually inspected redeploying units and assisted subordinate units in making inventories and other preparations.8

The plans for redeployment increments were drafted in terms of units to be redeployed or deactivated and total numbers of troops to be deducted from the authorized strength of each Service in Vietnam. To carry out the Marine Corps portion of each plan, HQMC and FMFPac had to determine which individual Marines to redeploy to bring III MAF down to the required size and assign the men thus selected to departing units. In deciding who should redeploy and who should stay, the Marine commanders had to strike a balance between contradictory military requirements. Lieutenant General Jones explained:

It was necessary to consider a whole host of complex problems such as the retention of needed skills in WestPac, readiness of remaining as well as redeploying units, the need for key personnel in each redeploying unit, tour equity for the individual Marine. Many of these considerations are counterproductive and finding the right combination has been a real experience in every sense of the word.7

In practice, tour equity overshadowed all other considerations. Those Marines with the fewest months remaining in their current 12-month tours normally were selected for each redeployment. In Keystone Bluejay, men who had served nine months or more of their tours were considered eligible; in Keystones Robin Alpha and Robin Charlie, Marines whose tours were scheduled to end on or before a particular month were earmarked for redeployment. Eligible Marines with skills urgently needed by remaining III MAF units were kept in Vietnam in each redeployment, while a few noneligibles needed to guard and maintain equipment in transit were sent home early. This was not always the benefit it seemed to be, as such assignments frequently entailed long, dull voyages on amphibious ships packed with miscellaneous vehicles and stores.

Since III MAF units always included Marines with a mixture of end-of-tour dates, no redeploying unit could simply leave with its existing personnel. Instead, in a process nicknamed the "mixmaster," each unit selected for redeployment to Hawaii or the continental United States transferred its noneligible Marines to organizations staying in Vietnam and at the same time filled its ranks with eligible Marines from other commands. As a result, few units returned to the United States composed of Marines who had served with the unit in Vietnam. Units bound for Okinawa and Japan underwent much less "mixmastering." In order to maintain combat readiness, these commands embarked with their existing personnel, including Marines otherwise eligible for redeployment, who simply completed their Western Pacific tours at their new stations.8

To implement these complex manpower reshuffles, HQMC delegated broad transfer and reassignment authority to FMFPac. The FMFPac staff broke down each redeployment into numbers of Marines of each rank, grade, and skill who were to be redeployed from the 1st MAW, 1st Marine Division, and Force Logistic Command, either by transfer to redeploying organizations or by normal rotation. A liaison team from FMFPac, located at III MAF Headquarters, briefed the commands on these strength reduction requirements and where necessary assisted in their implementation. Each of the major III MAF subordinate commands, through its G-1 section, then screened its own personnel for Marines eligible for redeployment, arranged for the necessary transfers between units, and prepared and issued the thousands of individual orders and transportation requests required. FMFPac, besides overseeing this "mixmaster," periodically halted or reduced the flow of replacements to III MAF to assure compliance with post-redeployment manpower ceilings. FMFPac also directed special transfers of III MAF personnel to units on Okinawa and in Japan, both to reduce numbers in Vietnam and to rebuild other Western Pacific commands.9
This complicated process did not always go smoothly. Late notification of the highly classified redeployment plans often forced the division, wing, and FL C to do their own planning and implementation on extremely short notice. Compounding this problem, the exact strength and composition of Marine units varied almost from day to day, due to casualties, rotations, and replacements.* With the aid of computers, the various staffs could make the necessary calculations in time for the results to still be valid; but the different headquarters often worked from different data bases. Inevitably, mistakes occurred. Personnel redeployments were attended by much organizational disruption and individual frustrations.

Marine commanders almost universally deplored the impact of the “mixmaster” on unit effectiveness and on the well-being of the individual Marine. For both redeploying and nonredeploying units, mass personnel transfers resulted in the loss of key Marines and undermined morale and efficiency. In Keystone Robin Alpha, VMFA-314 was “mixmastered” three times in as many months because of changes in redeployment plans; finally officers from squadrons staying in Vietnam had to be assigned to temporary duty with VMFA-314 to fly out the squadron’s aircraft. Unavoidably, with such personnel turbulence, “the man didn’t know who he worked for; the supervisor didn’t know who was working for him.”

As one redeployment increment followed another, a Marine with most of his Vietnam tour yet to serve

* A HQMC handbook for manpower planners, issued in 1969, likened the Marine Corps manpower system to a bath tub with a faucet at one end and a drain at the other. Water constantly flows in from the faucet and runs out the drain. The objective of the “plumber/manpower planner is to adjust this flow so as to keep a given number of gallons (Marines) in the tub at any one time and to assure that each gallon spends a fixed length of time (tour of duty) in the tub. The basic rate of flow could be calculated with this equation: rate of flow (manpower input) equals the number of gallons in tub (strength) divided by the time in tub (tour length). By this formula, to keep III MAF at a strength of 24,000 Marines, each serving a 12-month tour, required a monthly replacement rate of 2,000 men (24,000 divided by 12 months). This was an oversimplification, since casualties in Vietnam and attrition from various causes elsewhere in the system would force adjustments in the replacement flow to compensate. To plan a redeployment, one had to calculate normal inflow and outflow, allow for attrition, and then determine how much additional water had to be bailed out to bring the water level down to a set point by a given time. Add to this the further complication that the “water” in fact was not uniform, but was a mixture of different temperatures (ranks and skills) which had to be kept in a prescribed balance. G-1 Division, HQMC, “The Plumber’s Helper: for Manpower Planners” (Washington: HQMC, 1969).

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A355179

BGen Ross T. Dwyer, Jr., in khaki and facing the formation, greets returning Marines from Vietnam on board the USS Mobile (AKC 115) at San Diego.

might be shunted from organization to organization, sometimes too rapidly for his own mail to follow him. According to General Armstrong:

As units folded up and left Vietnam, a young fellow would go from the 7th Marines . . . to the 5th Marines; then, as one of their outfits would leave, they’d shift him to a different outfit and finally [he] ended up in the 1st Marines. And then if he still had the most time to do, why he’d end up in the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines because that was the unit that was going to go home last . . . . In a period of six months, he might have been in seven organizations.11

In each redeployment, security requirements prevented commanders from informing their troops concerning who was going home and when. The resulting spate of rumors and contradictory information adversely affected morale. Delayed instructions or last-minute changes in instructions kept commanders themselves uncertain who could redeploy almost to the moment that troop movements were ordered. As Colonel Robert W. Teller, the 1st MAW Chief of Staff put it, “you’re a day before the boats are sailing and you still don’t know who’s leaving town.”

The repeated alterations of plans for Keystone Robin Alpha forced HQMC to revise the individual redeployment criteria after embarkations actually had begun,
rendering ineligible Marines who had already received aircraft or shipping assignments. Out of 1,400 1st Marine Division troops in one Keystone Robin Alpha embarkation unit, 512 had to be told they were not redeploying. Other Marines, as a result of staff work incomplete for lack of time, found themselves leaving Vietnam without permanent new station assignments. These unfortunates included General Armstrong. The 3d MAB commander recalled:

CG, FMFPac had to send me temporary duty orders so I could leave the country [with 3d MAB]. I did not have the advantage of a permanent change of station (PCS) assignment . . . . I went back to Hawaii and stayed there on temporary duty assignment for three weeks before my assignment came through.

Another who was affected was Colonel Don H. Blanchard, the chief of staff of the 1st Division, who was held at Camp Pendleton for more than a month awaiting orders.13

Manpower shortages, both in overall strength and in particular ranks and specialties, plagued III MAF during and between redeployment. Anticipating an early redeployment following Keystone Bluejay, HQMC and FMFPac reduced replacements to III MAF. This action resulted in severe personnel shortages when Keystone Robin Alpha was delayed until July 1970. By that month, the division and wing each were about 1,000 Marines below their manning levels,* with deficiencies in aviation specialists and field grade officers among the shortages.14 Throughout late 1970 and early 1971, the flow of replacements was uneven and unpredictable. In the 1st Marine Division, according to Colonel Hugh S. Aitken, the G-1, "The input flow . . . varied so considerably that we were either faced with . . . a significant excess of personnel or a significant shortage . . . . Very seldom did the division stabilize at its authorized strength ceiling." Repeatedly, the division found itself with surpluses of some specialists and shortages of others. Advance information on the composition of new replacement drafts often proved inaccurate. Aitken reported: "We . . . try to plan for 350 O3s [riflemen] coming in in a given month, and we end up with 50 of those and maybe 200 communicators . . . . The entire personnel plan for that

*The number of Marines of particular ranks, grades, and MOSs in a particular type of unit is established by its table of organization (T/O). The Marine Corps, in Vietnam and elsewhere, was forced by overall manpower shortages to keep most organizations at less than T/O strength. This reduced strength was called the "manning level," normally established as a percentage of T/O strength.

month and succeeding months is useless at that point." Aitken attributed these deficiencies to the difficulty of maintaining uniform, up-to-date strength information at all the headquarters involved in manpower movement and assignment.*15

Redeploying units began embarkation preparations two or more months before their scheduled date of departure. While still conducting combat operations, they began taking inventory of their equipment and packing or disposing of everything not immediately required for their missions. They cancelled requisitions and began sending nonessential vehicles and material to staging areas near Da Nang. The 5th Marines, which embarked in March 1971, established an Embarkation Readiness Center at Hill 34, the CP of its 1st Battalion, in December 1970, to process and store its equipment. By the beginning of March, when it stood down from operations, the regiment already had packed and prepared 85 percent of the material with which it would embark.16

Units normally stood down two or three weeks before embarkation and moved to secure cantonments near Da Nang. There, they "mixmastered" their personnel and finished packing and turning in supplies and equipment, often drawing transportation, messing, and other support from nonredeploying commands. During March 1971, Major Francis M. Kauffman, Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, described to his men what they could expect during stand-down:

This will be a fast moving, stressful period while we transfer personnel to other in-country units, to Okinawa, or to ConUS. At the same time, all equipment must be cleaned, checked by technicians, packaged for shipment and staged for embarkation. The next few weeks require cooperation all around. You can expect hard work, crowded living conditions at first, many inspections and formations . . . . Many of you will not be on the lines again.17

Few redeploying organizations left Vietnam en masse. Instead, during stand-down, units gradually lost strength from transfers and individual redeployments by air or ship. The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, which stood down in February 1971, dropped during the month from 33 Marine officers and 1,066 enlisted men to 22 officers and 230 men. It sent 441 Ma-

*The automated Marine Corps Manpower Management System (MMS) was designed to permit accurate measurement of strength at any time, but due to a shortage of trained personnel to operate it, the system in Vietnam was undermined by errors. The 1st Marine Division had a MMS error rate of 15-17 percent until early 1971. Aitken Debrief.
rines to the United States and transferred 395 to the 1st Marines and Force Logistic Command. At the appointed embarkation date, after a farewell parade, at least a token command group with the unit colors would emplane for their new station. Other contingents would board ships to accompany their unit's heavy equipment.

'Mixmastering' of Equipment and Real Estate

At the beginning of each redeployment, FMFPac instructed units concerning which categories of equipment and supplies to take with them and which items of equipment to turn in to FLC for redistribution to the Marine Corps or other United States and allied forces. Until Keystone Robin Alpha, units left Vietnam with their standard allowances of clothing, weapons, and vehicles and with some medical supplies, packaged fuel and lubricants, and spare parts. They divested themselves of all rations, ammunition, bulk POL, and extra or special southeast Asia allowance equipment. Units being deactivated left most of their material in Vietnam. III MAF "mixmastered" equipment, as well as Marines, so that the newest items and those items in the best condition remained with the organizations still committed to combat. Aircraft squadrons, for example, exchanged airplanes to keep in Vietnam those most recently returned from progressive aircraft rework (PAR).* Redeploying units as a result often embarked with unserviceable equipment; of 90 MAG-16 vehicles loaded on one LST, only one was driven on under its own power. To alleviate this difficulty MAG-16 early in 1971 stationed a group staff officer familiar with redeployment plans at Futema to inform the MAG-16 elements there what material to expect in shipments from Vietnam and to help material repair and rehabilitation. As redeployment progressed, however, the loads of gear that were retrograded were organized more carefully and were in better shape.¹⁰

The intricacies of reshuffling personnel and equipment affected some units more adversely than others. Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Wehrle, who was the executive officer and then commanding officer of Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division from September 1970 to May 1971, recalled that his battalion became heavily reinforced with both people and equipment. The vehicles, alone, that Headquarters Battalion acquired through this process created a great burden because they had to be cleaned, painted, and restenciled before they were loaded on the ships. The battalion became responsible for the condition of the vehicles, many of which were marginally serviceable, and had to meet the "Department of Agriculture requirement that these vehicles be showroom clean before they could be returned to the continental U.S." This requirement was made more difficult because the one steam jenny in the motor transport platoon in Service Company was of little value when it was working well and at the time it was barely working. "Even if it had been in top working order," said Wehrle, "we had another problem and that was the limited amount of water that we had because of the repeated breaking of the line coming from the airfield over to the division." Lastly, the motor transport platoon's size had been depleted by redeployment of personnel.

In an effort to meet the deadline, Wehrle hired Vietnamese and placed them on a round-the-clock work schedule. Vehicles were rolled on their sides and Marine supervisors "literally put Vietnamese on them like ants with knives, what have you, scraping to get the grease, mud, and everything off of them." According to Wehrle, just a few days before redeployment, the Army provided Headquarters Battalion with efficient steam jennies:

> . . . they would set up almost like a conveyor belt line, . . . and I'd bring a convoy of vehicles through and they would turn their steam jennies loose on them and clean up the last amount of dirt that was on them. But this was touch and go and, as I recall, we finished up the last vehicles, I believe, the day before we were to move them to Da Nang and stage them.

Finally, before the vehicles were actually staged to be reloaded, they were repainted and stenciled and displayed for the Vietnamese to pick what they wanted. "This went to them as military assistance," said Wehrle, and what remained "was embarked and returned to Camp Pendleton."²⁰

The experience of Communication Support Company (CSC) of 7th Communication Battalion, which in September 1970 assumed responsibilities of the deactivated 5th Communication Battalion, was as frustrating as Headquarters Battalion after inheriting the 5th's equipment including 137 vehicles. For the next 10 months, CSC labored to clean, paint and, in general, rehabilitate the equipment to a degree acceptable for retrograde from Vietnam. Although CSC finally succeeded in cleaning and retrograding all salvagea-

---

*Under the PAR system, at specified intervals, each Marine aircraft in Vietnam was shipped to aircraft plants in Japan for complete disassembly and rehabilitation. PAR intervals ranged from 18 months for A-4s to 25 months for UH-1Es. FMFPac MarOps, Dec 66, pp. 77-78.
ble gear which had been transferred to its accounts, thousands of man-hours were spent preparing unwanted acquisitions and their organic gear which included over 100 vehicles, prime movers and towed loads, 25 CONEX boxes of miscellaneous equipment, as well as maintenance, radio and microwave equipment shelters. And all this was accomplished while CSC provided the preponderance of equipment, facilities, and personnel for the brigade communications center. Major Robert T. Himmerich, who commanded CSC prior to redeployment, observed years later: “Units and organizations that made up III MAF and then 3d MAB should have displaced from Vietnam to wherever ordered and taken their equipment and supplies with them. Deactivation should have been effected only after all accounts were settled.”

III MAF redistributed excess equipment turned in by departing units, and in some instances also regular allowance equipment,* under priorities and programs established by FMFPac and MACV. Generally, Marine units still in Vietnam had first claim, followed by the Vietnamese Marine Corps and the 2d ROKMC Brigade. On 1 August 1970, MACV initiated Project 805, a program under which all equipment of departing units, both standard allowance and excess, was screened for items needed by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. Later in 1970, MACV established a similar program to meet the needs of United States Services in Vietnam. Any excess Marine unit equipment not selected for either of these programs went to FMFPac organizations outside Vietnam or to rebuild mountout and mountout augmentation (MO/ MOA)** stocks throughout the Pacific.

To supervise and coordinate implementation of these programs, III MAF established a Redistribution Center under its G-4. This staff unit supervised equipment transfers between Marine organizations and to the South Vietnamese and other United States and allied forces. Colonel Allan T. Wood, III MAF G-4, observed: “You won’t find this organization on a T/O, for it was never provided for, and it’s an exceptional requirement existing only in . . . redeployment.”

III MAF took special care in selecting and preparing equipment for MACV’s Project 805. Thirty to 35 days before a Marine unit was to redeploy, III MAF compared the unit’s list of equipment, both standard allowance and excess on hand for United States and Hawaii-bound units and excess on hand only for organizations going to Okinawa or Japan, against a MACV list of RVNAF needs. III MAF then nominated the appropriate items to HQMC for turnover. After HQMC arranged for one-for-one reimbursement in kind by the Army and approved the transaction, Marine technicians carefully inspected each item as the owning unit stood down. Equipment offered to the

CH-46 Sea Knight aircraft from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 161 are lined up at the Tien Sha Deep Water Pier near Da Nang for redeployment.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A422854

---

*This was known as Table of Equipment (T/E) allowance and included the unit’s weapons and vehicles.

**As forces in readiness, Marine Corps units maintained special stocks of reserve supplies to support them during initial deployment. These stocks were divided into two 30-day blocks. The first, designated the Mountout block, was supposed to be held by the unit and move with it. The second, or Mountout Augmentation block, was carried by the service support unit (FSR or service battalion) responsible for support of the combat unit for which the block was intended. During 1965-1966, Marine units had brought both these blocks into Vietnam and used them up. The blocks had not been reconstituted during the war. In December 1968, FMFPac began planning to rebuild them, using excess material resulting from anticipated redeployments. The effort got under way in July 1969, with redeployment of the 3d Marine Division, based mainly on use of excess equipment from units; but it did not achieve great momentum until FLC and the 3d FSR on Okinawa were able to release their excess supplies during late 1970 and early 1971. Soper, “Logistics,” pp. 210-211; FMFPac, MarOps, Jun70, pp. 40-41, Dec70, p. 69.
South Vietnamese had to meet exacting standards set by III MAF. Trucks, for instance, could have surface scratches and mildewed seat cushions; but engines, transmissions, brakes, instruments, horns, lights, and windshield wipers had to work; the battery had to have at least nine months of life left; and a vehicle could not have over 17,000 miles on its speedometer. After the Marines weeded out substandard pieces, representatives from the ARVN 1st Area Logistic Command inspected the equipment again and selected what they wanted.

Between the start of Project 805 in August 1970 and the end of Marine participation in it in May of the following year, III MAF/3d MAB offered 11,480 separate items to the South Vietnamese. These items included radios, mine detectors, grenade launchers, machine guns, rifles, pistols, trucks, night vision sights, 105mm howitzers, and even war dogs. The Vietnamese accepted 10,733 of these offerings, an acceptance rate for Marine equipment of 94 percent. By contrast, of the much larger amounts of material offered by the U.S. Army, the Vietnamese took only about 15 percent. Marines attributed this difference to their own stringent prettransfer inspections and more careful preparation.* Colonel Kenneth McLennan later noted that while Project 805 served the Army and the RVNAF, it was not "simply an altruistic effort on the part of the Corps." The Marine Corps "received either dollar credit or replacement in kind in CONUS for every item turned over."25

By the time the last 3d MAB units left Vietnam, the Marines had redistributed 328,000 pieces of unit equipment valued at $50,409,000. Of the dollar value, 86.7 percent remained within the Marine Corps, most of it in Western Pacific commands. Another 8.7 percent by value went to the RVNAF and 3 percent to the South Korean Marines. The MACV interservice transfer program in Vietnam, which had gotten off to a late start, accounted for only 1.6 percent.26

As units redeployed, Force Logistic Command grappled with the problem of disposing of five years of accumulated supplies and equipment. At the beginning of 1970, FLC estimated that it had over 170,000 tons of material to be redeployed in its operating stocks and maintenance "float,"* plus another 3,800 tons of property organic to its own units and 259,156 square feet of vehicles. During the year, turned-in equipment from departing organizations and the arrival of requisitioned supplies, no longer needed, enlarged the mass of material for which FLC was directly responsible. Since FLC had to maintain reserve stocks in proportion to III MAF strength, it defined its equipment redeployment problem and measured success in terms of disposing of "excesses." Excesses were a matter of accounting definition. Colonel Robert W. Calvert, G-3 of FLC, explained:

The ... stock account is constantly changing . . . from receipts, turn-ins, inventory gains and losses, recomputation of requisitioning objectives, and then one of the major factors that affects the excesses is the reduction in forces. You get a reduction in force and your excesses go way sky high.27

Disposition of FLC excesses, like that of unit equipment, followed policies and priorities established by the Department of Defense and Headquarters Marine Corps. Fundamental was General Chapman's often-repeated injunction to pull out of Vietnam every usable piece of Marine Corps material worth more than five dollars. FLC did its best to comply with the spirit, if not the letter, of this policy. In redistributing excess supplies and equipment not part of the regular allowance of units ("non-table of equipment," or non-T/E equipment), reconstitution of Western Pacific MO/OA stocks received first priority, followed by replenishment of Western Pacific operating stocks. The Marine Corps offered material not required for these purposes to the Pacific Command Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA), an organization established by the Department of Defense to shift supplies among American military and civilian agencies in the Pacific. FLC stock excesses not picked up by PURA flowed back into the Marine Corps supply system for use within the United States and elsewhere.28

During January 1970, Force Logistic Command opened a Retrograde Facility for repair, salvage, packing, and storage of FLC material and that turned in by units to be prepared for shipment. Built by Marine engineers about a mile from FLC Headquarters at Camp Books, the Retrograde Facility consisted of workshops; loading ramps; hardstands; vehicle wash racks; 10,300 square feet of maintenance area; 244,000

*Unlike Marine units, Army organizations normally did not redeploy with their equipment. Instead, they left it in depots for later disposition or transfer. Marine units, by contrast, prepared their own equipment for RVNAF or other transfer and turned it over right at their stand-down cantonments. Wood Debrief.

*The maintenance float was a reserve of large pieces of equipment which could be issued temporarily to units to replace items turned in for repair.
square feet of paved, open storage; and 4,200 square feet of covered storage. The facility's staff of 50 Marines could prepare for embarkation any item of equipment from an M16 rifle to a 60-ton tank. During peak activity, Marines of the facility processed an average of 1,000 ordnance items, 500-800 pieces of communication equipment, and 400-500 vehicles per month. Marines of the facility also salvaged and shipped out brass cartridge cases and reconditioned and reissued jungle camouflage uniforms, and collected damaged body armor and sent it to the 3d FSR on Okinawa for repair and reuse.29

FLC began preliminary steps in early 1970 to consolidate, control, and use up its supply stocks. During January, FLSG-B set up its own Disposal/Redistribution Collection Point for handling its excesses as they developed. FLC in March established procedures for cancelling units' equipment requisitions and meeting their requirements instead with items left by redeploying organizations. In May, FLC launched a "Care and Store" program. Under the program, work crews pulled particular categories of supplies out of storage, opened the packages, discarded deteriorated items, repacked the rest, and where possible placed the repacked material in warehouses rather than open lots. FLC also tried to collect each supply item at one storage location. In January, FLC had 190,000 separate entries in its storage locator file; by October FLC had reduced the number of entries to 80,000, partly by issue and shipment and partly by rearrangement of the stock. Marines of the Supply Battalion recovered barbed wire and stakes from vacated American fortifications, cleaned them, and packed them for shipment to the 3d FSR.30

In November 1970, Force Logistic Command undertook a final sustained effort to identify and dispose of its excesses. Marines of Supply Battalion, assisted by Marines of Maintenance Battalion, made a detailed inventory and inspection of FLC's operating stocks, to determine how much material listed in the accounts actually was on hand and in what condition. Maintenance Battalion at the same time reviewed the equipment "float" in the light of reduced III MAF strength to determine how much of the float was now in excess. By 12 November, FLC had computed the value of excesses at $15,000,000. Brigadier General James R. Jones, CGFLC, years later stated: "Excess material then had to be screened against established priorities, packed and embarked for various destinations. At the same time, requisitions had to be cancelled for items no longer needed and an effort made to halt or divert to new destinations items already shipped before they reached Vietnam and added to the existing surplus."31

For the next six months, all elements of FLC labored to find and eliminate excesses. In the process, the command had to overcome a number of problems. Much material in warehouses and storage lots turned out to have been misidentified or mislocated, often as a result of mistakes by Vietnamese civilian employees unfamiliar with the English language. Other equipment had deteriorated in outside storage in the heat and humidity. Supply Battalion's Preservation, Packing, and Packaging (PP&P) Facility, its work load vastly increased, ran short of packaging material and manpower. FLC shifted Marines from other elements into the packaging shop and eventually reorganized the PP&P facility into three separate production lines, so that Marines not trained in packaging and preservation could work on the least complicated items.

Paperwork procedures had to be revised to move the required volume of supplies in the limited time available. FLC and the Marine Corps Supply Activity (MCSA) in Philadelphia developed shortcuts to speed disposition of various items. In January 1971, HQMC authorized FLC to declare certain types of equipment unserviceable or obsolete on its own authority, whereas previously FLC had to submit a Recoverable Item Report (RIR) to Philadelphia on each piece. These actions reduced message traffic and saved the Marine Corps both time and money. Bottlenecks developed in the PURA system. Excesses offered through PURA had to remain available for 75 days, during which period FLC could not ship or otherwise dispose of them. Any increase item resulted in a new PURA offering for that item, entailing further delay of its disposition. Brigadier General Jones recalled that "FLC broke this logjam by monitoring the items which had been offered to PURA and subsequently at selected intervals force releasing selected quantities of these PURA-reported excess items to the Marine Corps supply system."32

Force Logistic Command mounted a major effort to halt shipment of supplies requisitioned but no longer needed. Material requisitioned from the Marine supply system in the United States could take up to 160 days to reach Vietnam; as redeployments proceeded much of it became excess en route due to withdrawal of the ordering unit or reduction of the required FLC operating reserves. By November 1970, this material, known as "excess due-ins" had a total
value of $8,100,000. To remove these excesses from itsooks, FLC had to trace the requisitions through the
system and cancel them, as well as stop or divert the
actual goods in transit. FLC finally resorted to block
cancellation of all requisitions for III MAF units ex-
cept those specifically identified as still necessary, and
FLC arranged for stoppage of the material wherever
it was then in the “pipeline.” As a result of close
cooperation between FLC, the 3d FSR, and MCSA
Philadelphia, this procedure proved effective, and “by
the end of May 1971, the value of excess due-ins had
been reduced to $2,400.”

In March 1971, FLC began shipping out its remain-
ing supply stocks. By the end of the following month,
the command had emptied most of its warehouses and
storage lots. The Marines also carried away many of
the warehouses themselves. To meet a need for storage
at Marine bases in Okinawa and Japan, III MAF early
in 1971 obtained permission from MACV to dismantle
and remove 55 prefabricated steel Butler buildings
from its installations. Company A, 7th Engineer Bat-
talion took the structures apart and by early May FLC
had packed the components and sent most of them
out of Vietnam.

Between 12 November 1970 and 26 April 1971,
Force Logistic Command disposed of $23,000,000
worth of excess supplies and equipment, including the
$15,000,000 initially identified and material subse-
quently turned in by units or arriving from the Unit-
ed States. In the same period, FLC reduced its
occupied storage space from 800,000 cubic feet to
501,000. Of the material thus redistributed, 3 percent
by value was used to reconstitute Pacific mountout and
mountout augmentation stocks; 25 percent went into

A self-propelled 155mm howitzer backs onto the ramp of the Landing Ship Tank Pitkin Count (LST 1082) at Da Nang as the Marines in 1971 continue their redeployment from Vietnam. Note the head of the driver can be seen under the barrel of the gun.
Pacific operating supplies; 7 percent was taken up through PURA; 53 percent returned to the Marine Corps supply system; and 12 percent was disposed of as unserviceable.\textsuperscript{35}

FLC's large-scale effort to recover all possible equipment and supplies loaded Marine bases on Okinawa and in Japan with much unusable material. Some officers said that the receiving commands were not warned of the poor condition of the material that was arriving. Brigadier General James R. Jones, later viewed the retrograde of material differently, challenging the suggestion that commands in Okinawa and Japan became respositories for unusuable gear:

There was never a directive or policy to retrograde unusable/unserviceable supplies (expendable items). Units did acquire unserviceable (but repairable) equipment through the various exchange programs but not in excess of authorized equipment allowances. Unserviceable equipment retrograded by FLC to the 3d PSR on Okinawa was within the commands' authorized allowances and ability to repair.\textsuperscript{36}

"While the massive retrograde of III MAF material and equipment did cause storage difficulties and equipment repair backlogs at bases on Okinawa and in Japan," the recovery effort nevertheless contributed to rebuilding Marine Corps logistic readiness in the Pacific. In July 1971, Lieutenant General Jones, CGFMFPac, could report that Western Pacific mount-out and mountout augmentation stocks had been fully reestablished.\textsuperscript{37}

All equipment and supplies being shipped back to the United States, whether by redeploying units or by FLC, had to meet exacting standards of cleanliness set by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Public Health Service to prevent the introduction of Asian insect pests and contagious diseases into the United States. USDA and Public Health Service inspectors closely examined each shipload of vehicles and cargo; nothing could go on board without their approval. Packing boxes had to be of termite-free, unrotted wood. All containers, closed vehicle bodies, and shipborne aircraft had to be sealed and treated with specified amounts and types of insecticides and rat poisons. Vehicles used for years in Vietnam's mud and dust had to be treated with a mixture of fuel oil and kerosene, scraped with wire brushes to remove caked soil and vegetation, and then hosed down with water under high pressure. Having cleaned the vehicle, Marines had to sand and spot paint all areas requiring it, coat unpainted metal surfaces with protective oil, and carefully pack all tools and accessories. After the unusual dusty and muddy drive to the dock, they had to wash the vehicle once again before it could be embarked. Helicopters, which also picked up much Vietnamese dust and dirt, were if anything more difficult to decontaminate. Lieutenant Colonel William R. Fails, MAG-16 S-4, estimated that clearing a single CH-46 required up to 100 man-hours of labor, "if the bird was in reasonable shape" to begin with.\textsuperscript{38}

Owning units were responsible for cleaning and preparing the equipment they were taking with them, while FLC packaged and decontaminated its own equipment, as well as excess items turned in by redeploying organizations. Both FLC and the 1st Engineer Battalion assisted redeploying units in preparing their equipment. Force Logistic Command, besides furnishing packing and cleaning materials, provided washdown ramps at its Retrograde Facility for use of other organizations. The 1st Engineer Battalion set up a vehicle washing facility at its cantonment and maintained last-minute washing points at the Da Nang Deep Water Piers and at two of the LST ramps.\textsuperscript{39}

While most redeploying fixed-wing squadrons could fly their aircraft to their new stations,\textsuperscript{*} helicopters posed a special embarkation problem. Some redeploying helicopter squadrons simply flew on board LPHs, but as MAG-16 prepared for its final redeployments in early 1971, it was apparent that many aircraft would have to be loaded on other types of amphibious and cargo vessels at the Deep Water Piers. Since the wharves lacked space for landing and decontaminating an entire squadron at one time, the helicopters would have to be cleaned and protected at Marble Mountain for the voyage and then towed the 12 miles to the docks through a heavily populated area vulner-

\textsuperscript{*Fixed-wing squadrons displacing to the United States and Hawaii conducted trans-Pacific flights (TransPacs), involving planned stops in the Philippines and on Guam, Wake, and Midway or Johnston Island, with aerial refuelling at the midpoint of each leg of the trip. Besides refuelling the planes in the air, KC-130Fs of VMGRs -152 and -352 transported squadron maintenance and control personnel and equipment to meet the aircraft at each stopover. The Marine Corps had used this system since the early 1960s to move squadrons between the United States and the Western Pacific. It saved expense and helped maintain squadron integrity. By the time the last TransPac out of Vietnam, VMA(AW)-225 to MCAS El Toro, was completed on 10 May 1971, 590 Marine aircraft had made the crossing, either eastbound or westbound. Only three aircraft had been lost due to equipment failure, and no crewmen had been killed or injured. FMFPac MarOps, May-Jun71, pp. 19-22, recapitulates TransPac operations, listing each separate redeployment.
able to enemy infiltration. MAG-16 had previously moved individual aircraft to the Deep Water Piers without harassment, but the 23 or 24 helicopters of an entire squadron constituted a target worth the risk to the enemy of setting up a large ambush.

Beginning with the redeployment of HMM-364 in March 1971, MAG-16 conducted a series of convoys in which helicopters were towed from Marble Mountain to the deep water piers. Each convoy required elaborate planning, rehearsals, and security measures. Movement began around midnight; and no one, except the group commander and key staff officers, was told the convoy date until two hours before departure. A truck carrying several armed Marines towed each helicopter, and the column included fire engines, bulldozers, and cranes. Army MPs blocked all side roads intersecting the convoy route, holding people and vehicles beyond grenade range. Marine drivers and guards had instructions that “if an aircraft is attacked or somebody throws a grenade in it, push it in the ditch and keep the other[s] . . . moving.” As a result of these precautions, all convoys completed the two- and one-half hour trip without incident. In the largest movement, on 18-19 May, MAG-16 transported 47 aircraft to the piers in a single night—37 CH-46Ds, 3 CH-53Ds, and 7 UH-1Es.40

Of the total number of Marines redeploying during 1969-1971, about 30 percent left Vietnam by ship. The rest departed on commercial aircraft chartered by the Military Airlift Command and allocated by MACV. In contrast, 90 percent of tonnage of all Marine equipment and cargo went by sea. Most of this cargo, as well as most surface-transported Marines, traveled in Navy amphibious vessels furnished by CinCPacFlt. Each Keystone redeployment required most of the amphibious shipping in the Western Pacific, from LPHs to LSTs. During each redeployment, one of the two Seventh Fleet Special Landing Forces stood down temporarily to permit the vessels of its amphibious ready group to join in the sealift. Pacific Fleet when necessary diverted additional ships from the Eastern Pacific. LSTs shuttled troops and cargo to Japan and Okinawa. To move freight, especially FLC’s excess stock, the Marines took advantage of every available amphibious ship, including LSTs returning to the United States to be broken up for scrap. FMFPac Headquarters closely watched ship movements and informed FLC whenever a ship was due to arrive at Da Nang with empty cargo space. FLC then quickly diverted Marines from other jobs to prepare cargo already designated for embarkation and to haul it to the piers. During Keystone Bluejay alone, FLC squeezed 94,000 square feet of vehicles and 486,000 cubic feet of freight onto eastbound amphibious ships. Between 1969 and 1971, reliance on Navy ships saved the Marine Corps about $18,000,000 in commerical freight costs, as well as affording useful embarkation training to both Marines and ships’ crews.41

As Marines left Vietnam with their supplies and equipment, III MAF and later 3d MAB had to dispose of an increasing number of empty bases and camps. III MAF possessed exclusive authority to transfer or demolish OPs, most firebases, and other combat positions; but later installations, such as An Hoa, Baldy, and the Division Ridge complex, had to be first offered to the other United States Services and the South Vietnamese under procedures established and supervised by MACV. During most of 1970, the Navy Civil Engineering/Real Property Office at Da Nang maintained the records on Marine as well as Navy installations and performed most of the staff work on base transfer. On 1 October, as a result of continued Navy reductions in force, III MAF had to take over management of its own real estate. III MAF then established a Real Estate/Base Development Officer under its G-4 staff section. The office consisted of a Marine major assisted by a Navy engineer lieutenant, two draftsmen, and a clerk-typist. This office, which continued in operation under the 3d MAB, notified MACV when Marine camps became vacant, and prepared the documents for offering and transferring the installations.42

Real estate transfers, especially to the South Vietnamese, were a complex, often frustrating task. Property turnovers included elaborate paperwork. Colonel Wood, III MAF G-4, reported: “It takes a minimum of four separate, detailed reports to transfer a piece of property . . . . We finally end up . . . with a heavily detailed report and a legal agreement which must be bilingual . . . and signed by the respective commanders for both governments.”43 The secrecy of redeployment planning prevented III MAF and other U.S. commands from opening base turnover discussions with the Vietnamese until late in each withdrawal. The Vietnamese, who were poorly organized and equipped to manage their own facilities, made decisions slowly and only after much haggling and American pressure. Most important, as American strength diminished, more camps were available than the remaining allied forces needed or could protect.
Colonel John W. Haggerty III, the MAF G-3, pointed out in late 1970:

One of the problems . . . all over is going to be getting rid of real estate . . . We don't want [the ARVN] to end up doing nothing but guarding property . . . But we've got so darn much . . . real estate in Vietnam, not just the Marine Corps but everybody, that it takes twice the ARVN forces just to guard it all. . . .

In spite of these difficulties, III MAF gradually rid itself of its surplus real estate. III MAF turned over 26 camps and bases in Keystone Robin Charlie and Oriole Alpha. The Marines tried to leave each installation immaculate and in good repair. Major General Widdecke, the 1st Marine Division Commander, according to his G-4, "was very interested in the Marine Corps image in turning over this property" and insisted that electric fixtures and toilets must work and that screens and doors on huts be correctly installed. At combat positions, under division orders, "all waste will be buried [and] bunkers, trenches and fighting holes will be left in place." 45

III MAF also tried to clean up its battlefield. In April 1970, Lieutenant General McCutcheon instituted a program to find and retrieve wrecked Marine tanks, amphibian tractors, aircraft, trucks, and other large pieces of equipment that littered the Quang Nam countryside after five years of war. Marines from FLC's Maintenance Battalion assisted by division and force engineer elements, located 144 hulks. Using cranes, bulldozers, and recovery vehicles, work crews extricated the wrecks and dragged them to the U.S. Army Property Disposal salvage yard. On one occasion, Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion dug up and turned in seven amphibian tractors buried near the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines CP at Camp Lauer. This particular recovery required 714 man-hours of work and the employment of 13 cranes, tractors, and other pieces of earthmoving and salvage equipment. Helicopter support team Marines of Company C, 1st Shore Party Battalion, also played a large role in retrieval of abandoned gear. For HST Marines this salvage mission usually required "an early morning home LZ helicopter pickup and insertion at a remote site to effect helicopter retrieval of downed aircraft and destroyed equipment." The mission often demanded ingenuity of HST Marines "to gain access and rig the lifts." Of the 144 wrecks located, Marines had removed 125 by April 1971. The Marines could have retrieved the remaining 19 hulks only at excessive risk to men and equipment and hence left them where they were.46

The immense logistic effort accomplished its intended purpose. When the last ship of Keystone Oriole Alpha, the USS Saint Louis (LKA 116), sailed from Da Nang on 25 June 1971, the only major pieces of Marine Corps material left behind were several Butler buildings packed on trailers and awaiting pickup by a commercial roll-on-roll-off cargo vessel. General Armstrong reported: "As far as I know, that's the only usable property that belonged to us that was still there." 47
PART VI

THE CLOSE OF AN ERA
CHAPTER 20
Morale and Discipline

A Time of Troubles—Atrocities, Rules of Engagement, and Personal Response—"Friendly on Friendly"
The Challenge to Authority: Race, Drugs, Indiscipline—"Fragging" and Operation Freeze
Training and Morale-Building—Cohesion or Disintegration?

A Time of Troubles

For III MAF, the last year and a half of ground operations in Vietnam was a time of troubles. The decline in combat, combined with increasingly critical public and mass media scrutiny of the military actions of all Services, brought into prominence two long-standing and distressing problems: the protection of noncombatants in a battle fought among and for control of the people, and the prevention of accidental killing and wounding of Marines by their own fire. These problems lent themselves to the traditional military solutions of intensified training and rigorous enforcement of operating procedures, rules of engagement, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

More complex and difficult to deal with were the manifestations among Marines of the racial upheaval, antiwar dissent, and generational conflict plaguing American society in the early 1970s. These manifestations added up to a many-faceted challenge to command authority. Black militancy, expressed in forms ranging from haircuts and hand signs to mass confrontations and assaults, set Marine against Marine. The youth drug culture, imported from the United States, found fertile soil in Vietnam, where cheap narcotics abounded. Political dissent, encouraged and sometimes organized by a militant segment of the antiwar movement, raised the threat of mass disobedience of orders. All these forms of discontent merged into a general attitude of resentment and suspicion toward authority among many enlisted Marines, an attitude that occasionally erupted in deliberate attempts to murder officers and NCOs, the heinous crime known by the slang term, "fragging." Of this turbulent period, Sergeant Major Edgar R. Huff, Sergeant Major of III MAF, later observed: "If I were asked to sum up the 'Marine Experience' in Vietnam, I would say that the Corps grew far too fast and that this growth had a devastating impact on our leadership training and combat effectiveness.*1

III MAF, following general Marine Corps policy, adopted two main lines of approach to its disciplinary problems. On one hand, III MAF reemphasized traditional Marine values of pride in country and Corps, discipline, and loyalty to unit and comrades, while displaying the determination to punish gross violations of orders and regulations. The Marine Corps used existing legal and administrative procedures to purge its ranks of the most persistent offenders. On the other hand, III MAF tried to understand and make allowances for the pride and resentment of young Black Marines, sought ways to prevent drug abuse by education, and sponsored efforts to find common ground between a tradition-minded leadership and an often antitraditional rank and file. Although most Marines recognized that unrest was largely confined to the rear areas, where leadership is often put to its severest test, they also found that the problems were widespread and not amenable to simple or fast solutions. The balance between established, still valid standards of military discipline and professional conduct and accommodation to irreversible social and cultural change was not easy to find. That search was still under way as the last Marines of the 3d MAB left Vietnam.

Atrocities, Rules of Engagement, and Personal Response

On the evening of 19 February 1970, Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, operating in the Viet Cong-dominated countryside south of FSB Ross, sent out a five-man roving patrol. Called a "killer team," the patrol had the mission of setting ambushes near the many pro-VC hamlets in the Que Son Valley to catch enemy troops or underground members moving in and out. Of the members of the team, Lance Corporal Randell D. Herrod, the leader, had been in Vietnam for seven months; PFC Thomas R. Boyd, Jr., had spent six months in the war, and Private Michael A. Schwartz, three months. The remaining two patrol members, PFCs Samuel G. Green and Michael S. Major, III MAF. In 1970-71, he was again Sergeant Major, III MAF and took part in the headquarters withdrawal from Vietnam. Henry I. Shaw, Jr. and Ralph W. Donnelly, Blacks in the Marine Corps (Washington: MCHC, 1979), pp. 79-80.

* Sergeant Major Huff had the unique experience of twice having been the senior enlisted man in III MAF. Towards the end of his first tour in Vietnam (1967-1968) during which he was awarded the Bronze Star and Purple Heart Medals, he served as Sergeant Major, III MAF. In 1970-71, he was again Sergeant Major, III MAF and took part in the headquarters withdrawal from Vietnam. Henry I. Shaw, Jr. and Ralph W. Donnelly, Blacks in the Marine Corps (Washington: MCHC, 1979), pp. 79-80.
Krichten, had been in Vietnam only a month. None of these Marines, except Herrod, was considered proficient in night patrolling, although all had volunteered for the mission. Herrod, recently transferred from the 3d Marine Division, was awaiting court-martial for unauthorized absence. He was acting as team leader on this occasion because better qualified men were fatigued by days of continual combat.

January and February 1970 had been difficult months for Company B. The company had helped defend FSB Ross against the 6 January sapper attack. On 12 February, Company B had nine Marines killed in a well-executed enemy ambush. Weeks of day and night operations had brought the men close to exhaustion, and boobytrap casualties had compounded anger and frustration at the 12 February losses. The company commander, First Lieutenant Louis R. Ambort, a 23-year-old from Little Rock, Arkansas, reflected the tension in the unit in his instructions to Herrod's patrol. Ambort, according to subsequent accounts, exhorted his men to "get some damned gooks tonight" and avenge the company's casualties. He gave the impression that age, sex, and military status were not to be taken into account, although the platoon sergeant made a point of warning Herrod before the patrol went out that the lieutenant really meant only enemy soldiers.

In the field, the "killer team" moved to the small hamlet of Son Thang (4),* about two miles southwest of Ross, inhabited by a group of known Viet Cong families. The people in Son Thang had refused both American and GVN offers of relocation to a safer area, preferring to stay near where their men were fighting. Under the rules of engagement for this area, night patrols could enter such hamlets to search for VC; this night, Herrod's team entered Son Thang (4). The Marines went to a hut and called out the occupants, all women and children. One woman broke for a nearby treeline. The Marines shot her and then, allegedly at Herrod's command, gunned down the others. They went on to two more huts, ordered the inhabitants of each to come outside, and cut them down with small arms fire. In all, 16 Vietnamese—five women and 11 children—died that night in Son Thang (4).

Returning to the company position, the patrol reported a fight with 15-20 armed Viet Cong and claimed to have killed six. Lieutenant Ambort passed the report on to battalion and regiment. The next morning, another 1st Battalion patrol, acting on a report from Vietnamese civilians, found the bodies in Son Thang (4). When battalion headquarters challenged Ambort's initial report, the lieutenant at first stuck by it and produced an SKS, actually taken some time before, as a weapon captured in the nonexistent fight. Later, he admitted that he had made a false action report. Information on the incident moved rapidly up the division chain of command. On 20 February, Major General Wheeler, the 1st Marine Division commander, reported to III MAF that a "possible serious incident" had occurred, involving elements of Company B and the civilians of Son Thang (4).*

The Son Thang (4) incident was not the first of its kind in the Vietnam conflict. In fact, in most earlier counterguerrilla campaigns, conducted by the United States and other western and nonwestern nations, the butchery at the small hamlet would not have been viewed as unique. Even in the conventional and relatively gentlemanly American Civil War, Union commanders summarily shot and hanged rebel bushwackers, burned towns and farms, and threatened retaliation against civilians for irregular acts of resistance. During his 1864 march through Georgia, General William T. Sherman ordered Confederate prisoners driven ahead of one of his columns to find or detonate enemy road mines. In the Philippines in 1901, Marine Lieutenant Colonel Littleton W. T. Waller was court-martialed for directing the execution of 11 treacherous native guides.* Brutality charges, some of them valid, marred the pre-World War II Marine occupation of Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.* In Vietnam, such cruelties were no part of American policy. Nevertheless, the fear, rage, and frustration of battle against an evasive enemy, compounded often by deficient unit training and leadership, by individual personality defects, and by racial and cultural prejudice, led to isolated incidents of murder or abuse of prisoners and civilians and mutilation of enemy dead.

*On American maps, this hamlet was named Thang Tay (1) and this name appeared in initial dispatches. Later everyone substituted Son Thang (4), which was the hamlet name used by Que Son District authorities.

*Waller was acquitted. The entire court-martial, convened by the Army, later was ruled invalid, as Waller's Marines had not been formally assigned to Army command when the incident occurred.
Battlefield abuses and "war crimes"* had become a major public issue in the United States by the time Herrod's patrol entered Son Thang (4). The furor stemmed from revelation of the My Lai incident of 16 March 1968, in which Americal Division soldiers had shot several hundred unsuspecting Vietnamese noncombatants in Quang Ngai Province. Evidence that Americal Division commanders and staffs had falsified reports and suppressed investigation of this crime further disturbed political leaders and ordinary citizens alike. By early 1970, 16 Army officers—including First Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr., whose platoon was involved in the My Lai shooting—and nine enlisted men were awaiting court-martial on charges related to the massacre. A special Army investigating team headed by Lieutenant General William R. Peers, USA, was examining the allegations of a coverup and soon would confirm its occurrence. Peers' findings would ruin the careers of 14 senior officers, including Major General Samuel W. Koster, former Americal Division commander. Congress had begun its own My Lai investigation.

Since mid-1965, when Marine riflemen first moved out into the countryside around Da Nang, III MAF commanders had attempted to enforce discrimination in the use of firepower and ensure firm but compassionate treatment of Vietnamese civilians. Television coverage of Company D, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines' assault on the village of Cam Ne, a VC stronghold, in which civilians' huts were allegedly burned indiscriminately in August 1965 dramatized both the military and the public relations importance of this problem.** In combat amid heavily populated hamlets, against an enemy who used the people to conceal and shield him, commanders often found it difficult to distinguish between a deliberate atrocity and the accidental result of misjudgement by troops under fire. Nevertheless, when clearcut battlefield crimes occurred, III MAF charged and court-martialed the offenders and reported the facts to superior headquarters. To the extent appropriate, the command informed the press about pending cases and their disposition. From 1965 to 1971, 27 Marines who served in Vietnam were convicted of the offense of murder in cases in which the victim was Vietnamese.*

III MAF's response to the Son Thang (4) incident followed this established pattern. Brigadier General Leo J. Dulacki, then III MAF Chief of Staff, recalled that Son Thang, while not on the scale of My Lai, "was still a despicable atrocity, and there was concern that it would be blown up to the proportions of My Lai regardless of how III MAF handled the incident." Dulacki said, "disappointedly," that at the lower levels in the early stages of the investigation there were signs that the atrocity should be "hushed up." Nevertheless, the command "handled the case according to law and out in the open."*

III MAF passed the earlier 1st Marine Division serious incident report through III MAF on to Headquarters Marines in Vietnam. The Commandant, General Chapman, closely followed the case. He instructed the 1st Marine Division which had responsibility for investigating and if necessary courtmartialing offenders, to report developments to Headquarters daily through FMFPac.** These daily reports continued until 6 March. Eventually, to facilitate the conduct of trials, the division, with FMFPac concurrence, declassified all its messages concerning the investigation. Throughout, III MAF kept the news media fully informed. Reviewing the incident years later, General Dulacki said that in the early stages of the legal process the press showed little interest, "in fact, one of the earliest press reports emanating from Vietnam complimented the Marine Corps for the forthright and candid manner" in which "it handled the case, making favorable comparisons with My Lai. It wasn't until much later, as a result of the political maneuvering*

*War crimes are defined by a number of international agreements, including the Hague and Geneva conventions and the precedents developed in the post-World War II Nuremberg and Tokyo trials of Axis leaders. Most provisions of these codes affecting the actions of individual soldiers on the battlefield are embodied in the manuals and rules of engagement of the United Armed Services and in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and battlefield offenses are charged as violations of the UCMJ in accordance with policy which preceded the Vietnam war. U.S. Army Field Manual FM 27-40, The Law of Land Warfare (1956), para 507b. Sydney D. Bailey, Prohibitions and Restraints in War (New York: Oxford United Press, 1972).


**Moreover, 16 Marines were convicted of rape, while 15 were convicted of manslaughter. Few of these offenses were committed in the heat of battle. For example, in U.S. v Stamats, NMC 70-3765, and U.S. v Sikorski, NMC 70-3578, the victim of manslaughter was a South Vietnamese soldier who was a drug pusher. Maj W. Hayes Parks, Head, Law of War Branch, International Law Division, Intr to Col John E. Greenwood, dtd 30May79.

**Marine Corps Order 5830.4, dtd 30Apr70, established this as standard reporting procedure for commands investigating misconduct by their personnel which led to damage to lives and property of foreign nationals.
on behalf of certain parties to the case, that it became somewhat of a cause celebre."

After an informal investigation, Lieutenant Colonel Charles G. Cooper, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines commander, on 23 February removed Lieutenant Ambort from command of Company B. The following day, the battalion convened a formal pretrial investigation under Article 32 of the UCMJ,* and charged the five members of the patrol with murder. At the same time, the office of the Division Staff Judge Advocate appointed an investigating officer and furnished military lawyers as counsel for both the government and the defendants.9

Reports of the charges in the American press provoked letters of protest to Marine Corps Headquarters. Most of the letter writers questioned the justice of prosecuting young men for doing the killing they had been trained and sent to do. The protestors also stressed the emotional pressures of counterguerrilla operations as mitigating circumstances for the Marines’ offense. Replying to these letters, Headquarters spokesmen carefully avoided comment on the facts of the Son Thang case, but they declared as a general principle:

There is no denying that the ordeal of combat puts extreme pressures on the Marines fighting in Vietnam. However, the Marine Corps is fighting in Vietnam in the name of a nation which requires certain standards of civilized conduct to be maintained even under the trying circumstances of combat. Those standards do not permit the intentional killing of persons, such as civilians or prisoners of war, who are not actually participating in combat. When there is an allegation that such an event has occurred appropriate action must be taken in accordance with the law.10

The Article 32 investigation began on 12 March and continued until the 23d. As a result of it, Major General Widdecke, who had replaced the injured Wheeler as 1st Marine Division commander, on 15 May referred four of the patrol members to trial by general court-martial, Lance Corporal Herrod and Private Schwartz on charges of premeditated murder and PFCs Green and Boyd on charges of unpremeditated murder. The division dropped charges against Kritchen, who had agreed to testify for the prosecution. After a separate investigation, General Widdecke imposed nonjudicial punishment on Lieutenant Ambort for making a false official report. Punishment consisted of a letter of reprimand and the forfeiture of $250 pay for each of two months.

Trials of the four murder defendants began in June with that of Schwartz, and ended on 30 August with the verdict on Herrod. Herrod and Boyd retained civilian attorneys, while Schwartz and Green were represented by military defense counsel. Legal maneuvers by the defense in the Federal courts, inquiries by the defendants’ Congressmen, and charges of brig brutality toward Green—the only black among the accused—complicated the proceedings. The results of the trials were mixed. Military courts found Schwartz guilty on 12 of 16 counts of premeditated murder and Green guilty on 15 of 16 counts of unpremeditated murder. Schwartz and Green received sentences respectively of life and five years at hard labor;* in addition, both were sentenced to forfeiture of all pay and allowances and dishonorable discharge. Boyd was tried, at his own request, before a military judge sitting alone and won acquittal on all charges. In the final Son Thang (4) trial, a full military court acquitted Herrod after a vigorous defense conducted by two state senators from Oklahoma, Herrod’s home state. On 15 December 1970, Major General Widdecke reduced the prison terms of Schwartz and Green, both of whom had been moved from Da Nang to the Camp Pendleton brig, to one year each but let stand the rest of their sentences. The varied results of the trials brought some press and Congressional protest and even ridicule, but the Marine Corps had allowed the legal system to work without manipulation; and it had been willing to acknowledge and attempt to punish wrongdoing by its own men.11

Most civilian casualties resulted from errors of judgement in combat or misdirected fire, not deliberate murderous intent. In the short, sharp firefights in or

*Such an investigation is required whenever preliminary evaluation of facts pertaining to a crime or charge indicates that a general court-martial may be recommended. During the pretrial investigation, the accused may be represented by counsel and may present witnesses or cross-examine those called by the convening authority. The hearings are transcribed, and the investigating officer makes recommendations to the convening commander as to disposition of the case, in this instance to the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. If a general court-martial is recommended, the findings go for review and approval to the higher commander with general court-martial convening authority, in this case to the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division. 1st MarDivO P5800.1B, dtd 5Feb70, Tab B-6, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb70, prescribes in detail procedures for the Article 32 investigation, as well as other aspects of division legal procedures.

*The maximum penalty for premeditated murder under UCMJ was death, but General Widdecke had directed that the case be tried as noncapital, which made the maximum punishment life imprisonment.
near hamlets that characterized the war in Quang Nam, it was all too easy for women, children, or old people to be hit by stray bullets and grenades. Keyed up Marines in night ambushes found the impulse to fire at any moving figure difficult to resist, even though the moving figure could be a child violating curfew rather than an attacking Viet Cong. Employment of air strikes and artillery fire, necessary to hold down Marine casualties, could also kill and maim large numbers of noncombatants. On 15 April 1970, for instance, Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines engaged enemy troops near Le Bac (2), about five miles northeast of An Hoa. The company called in jets and Cobra gunships; a dozen enemy troops died in the action, but so did about 30 people in the nearby hamlet.*

In an effort to avoid such tragedies, MACV and its subordinate commands, including III MAF, early in the war had issued elaborate rules of engagement (ROE), prescribing procedures for employing all types of weapons and for humane treatment of prisoners and noncombatants. All commands were supposed to train and retrain their troops in these procedures and principles. The 1st Marine Division, in an order issued in March 1968 and still in effect in 1970, required its subordinate units to include ROE instruction in the initial orientation of newly arriving troops and to provide refresher training in this subject to each Marine every two months during his Vietnam tour. The division syllabus, based on the MACV ROE, emphasized employment in all situations of the minimum force required for self-protection or mission accomplishment and enjoined “patient and compassionate” treatment of Vietnamese civilians.13

The public uproar in the United States over My Lai led to new command interest in enforcing the ROE and the laws of war, especially after the Army investigation of the massacre cited lax or nonexistent instruction in these subjects as a contributing cause.** In the 1st Marine Division, according to Major General Widdecke, concern over the legal, moral, and tactical implications of My Lai created “an atmosphere of uncertainty” among newly arrived lieutenants. “This uncertainty,” Widdecke reported on 28 April to General McCutcheon, “is illustrated by a question often asked during advanced indoctrination training, ‘What is an atrocity?’” An increased division concern over civilian casualties, Widdecke continued, “impacts directly both on planning and on clearances for fire missions; and may result in targets not attacked for lack of positive identification on the remote possibility of injury to noncombatants.”14

On 13 May 1970, Lieutenant General McCutcheon, responding to the Son Thang (4) and other incidents, sent a message to all III MAF unit commanders. In it, he emphasized that “It is imperative that measures to preserve the lives and property of noncombatants receive constant command attention.” McCutcheon directed all commanders to review the rules of engagement and “ensure strict compliance with their provisions.” He concluded by repeating: “Continuing command attention is mandatory.”

Whatever the degree of command effort and effectiveness in carrying out these instructions, it was difficult to translate the principles of the ROE into terms meaningful to the individual Marine on patrol or in ambush. The 4th Combined Action Group, located in Quang Tri Province, made a determined attempt to do this. On 16 May 1970, the group instituted a new ROE instruction program for all its Marines and corpsmen. Instruction was based on 19 specific tactical questions and answers, most of which emphasized the need to identify targets before opening fire. The tactical catechism, which was to be considered “directive in nature,” included such questions as:

Q. While in ambush position, you see a human figure at 200 meters moving toward you. The figure appears to be armed, but cannot be further identified. Should you shoot?

A. No. Wait for the target to get closer, and make use of the starlight scope to identify the target. Only when you are reasonably sure the target is enemy may you shoot. If need be, when the target is at its closest point, use a challenge or illumination in an effort to identify the target.

Q. While in an ambush position, an unarmed person wearing civilian clothes walks into the killing zone. Should you shoot him?

A. No. This is probably just a curfew violator. Curfew violators do not rate being shot. Curfew violators should be halted by a challenge and apprehended, preferably by a PF.
Q. Two armed enemy soldiers are spotted talking to some civilians next to some inhabited hooches. The range is 150 meters. Should you shoot?

A. You may not shoot until the enemy move so that the civilians are out of the line of fire. If you are lucky, this will happen and you will get your kill. In terms of winning the war in your area, it is better to let some VC get away than it is to kill some civilians along with them.

On the more aggressive side, the questionnaire pointed out that, if troops came under fire from huts, or from an enemy force with huts in the line of fire, the Marines could shoot back. "Use proper care, but if you happen to hit some civilians you will not be held at fault."16

Efforts to limit civilian casualties continued until the end of Marine ground combat. The reduction in intelligence and preemptive artillery fire missions during September-October 1970 had this as one of its objectives. Early in 1971, the 1st Marine Division began attaching liaison officers from the appropriate districts to the Marine headquarters controlling major operations in populated areas. The Vietnamese officers, presumably familiar with their areas of responsibility, were at once to expedite political clearance of supporting fire and to keep such fire away from places inhabited by noncombatants. The division directive announcing this program again exhorted regimental and battalion commanders to "continue to emphasize the importance of minimizing noncombatant casualties," and instructed them to "exercise caution in employing supporting arms near areas where noncombatants are located."17

Besides trying to enforce the rules of engagement, III MAF attempted to improve the individual Marine's attitude toward the South Vietnamese people. Marine commanders had realized early in the war that ignorance, fear, prejudice, and hatred contributed not only to major battlefield crimes but also to innumerable minor insults and violations of personal rights which could turn potential Vietnamese friends into enemies. To instill favorable attitudes in Marines toward their allies, III MAF during 1966 had instituted the Personal Response Program. Administered by the G-5 and S-5 staff sections in close cooperation with command and unit chaplains, the program was designed to enhance the individual Marine's understanding and appreciation of Vietnamese culture, traditions, religions, and customs. A Marine so trained, it was hoped, would recognize that a Vietnamese, while different from himself in many ways, was nevertheless a fellow human being whose behavior made sense in terms of his own values and whose rights deserved respect.

Throughout 1970-1971, personal response activity continued at all command levels. The III MAF personal response officer, a member of the G-5 section, presented monthly briefings at the Combined Action Force School and at other Da Nang area Marine, Army, and Air Force commands. The MAF personal response staff also prepared instructional materials on special topics, for instance Tet holiday traditions. At the request of units, the section conducted attitude surveys of Vietnamese residents and employees, to determine their response to American actions and identify points of conflict. Guides from the section took Marines on tours of religious shrines and museums in Da Nang.18

The 1st Marine Division G-5 Personal Response Section carried on what it described as "a multifaceted effort aimed at improving the attitude of the individual Marine toward the Vietnamese people." A division personal response contact team traveled from unit to unit, to present classes in "Attitude Improvement," Vietnamese history and culture, and the Vietnamese language. The division, like III MAF, sponsored cultural guided tours of Da Nang. Each regiment and separate battalion was required to conduct its own personal response program, centered on an "Attitude Improvement" orientation lecture by the chaplain for all newly-arrived Marines. Units supplemented this initial training with whatever other activities the commanding officers deemed appropriate, using their own resources and the division contact team. Unit commanders had to report quarterly to the Division G-5 on subjects covered, hours of instruction, and total numbers of Marines involved. In addition, some units established personal response councils, to determine troop reaction to the program and report to the commander on particular problems in dealing with the local people.19

Marine commands at times went to great lengths to placate offended Vietnamese. On 24 April 1970, elements of Headquarters Company, 1st Marines made a search of Khanh Son hamlet, a more or less friendly

---

*During most of this period, Da Nang City, and most other Vietnamese civilian communities, were 'off-limits' to Marines at all times, unless on particular military missions.

*Navy chaplains attached to III MAF had done much to originate and develop the Personal Response Program, but by 1970 disagreement existed among chaplains as to whether involvement with what was in many respects a military program compromised their religious mission. For details of the controversy, see Cdr Herbert J. Bergsma, CHC, USN, Chaplains with Marines in Vietnam, 1962-1971 (Washington: MCHC, 1983), pp. 183-85, hereafter Bergsma, Chaplains with Marines in Vietnam.
community close to the division CP. The Marines, assisted by a counterintelligence team, officers of the Vietnamese national police Special Branch, and two ARVN interpreters, acted on a report that a VC reconnaissance squad was in the hamlet, which was also a suspected center of drug traffic, black marketeering, and prostitution. In the course of an otherwise uneventful and unproductive operation, medical corpsmen with the Marines drew blood samples from 13 women and gave them penicillin shots on suspicion that they were diseased prostitutes.

The hamlet residents and their chief viewed this action as an insult and protested to the Hoa Vang District Chief. Rumors spread that the Americans were taking Vietnamese blood for transfusions for Americans casualties. The district chief transmitted the protest to Colonel Edward A. Wilcox, the 1st Marines commander on 12 May. Three days later, Colonel Wilcox, the district chief, and other officials met with the protestors at the Khanh Son hamlet council station. Colonel Wilcox expressed “official regrets” and “apologized” for the forced medical treatment and assured the people that it would not be repeated. His remarks satisfied the villagers concerning the Marines’ part in the incident, but the Vietnamese still demanded a separate apology from the ARVN interpreters. The 1st Marine Division then made its own investigation of the affair. In August, on the basis of the findings, Major General Widdecke sent letters of caution to the previous division G-2 and the 1st Marines regimental surgeon, and a formal letter of admonition to the assistant S-2 of the 1st Marines, for failing to follow prescribed procedures in planning and conducting the search.

The effectiveness of these measures in improving the attitudes of Marines and Vietnamese toward each other is impossible to measure. To the end, probably, dislike or distrust, tempered by wary tolerance dictated by self-interest, were the dominant sentiments on both sides. Tension was constant and violence never far below the surface as the Marines redeployed, but III MAF never gave up the effort to maintain a measure of humanity and compassion in the conduct of an often savage war. How much worse the situation might have been had the command not made the effort, the tragedy at Son Thang (4) clearly indicated.

'Friendly on Friendly'

As enemy contact diminished during 1970-1971, the Marine casualty rate from what was graphically labelled “friendly on friendly” fire incidents took a heavy toll of Marines. In a single bad month, August 1970, the 1st Marine Division lost nine men killed and 37 wounded by their own fire, as opposed to 18 killed and 140 wounded by the enemy. Throughout 1970, misdirected supporting arms, mostly artillery accounted for 10 Marines dead and 157 injured, the equivalent of a rifle company put out of action. “Intramural fire fights” between small infantry units resulted in 20 Marines killed and 89 wounded. Firearms and ordnance accidents took another 32 lives and injured 298 Marines, enough men for two more rifle companies.

In a particularly serious incident on 17 August 1970, Company M, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines shelled itself with its own 60mm mortars, losing four Marines and a Viet Cong woman prisoner killed and 28 Marines wounded. During a counterrocket artillery fire mission on 12 October, a 100 mil error in elevation brought 34 rounds from a Marine battery down on Hieu Duc District Headquartes west of Da Nang. The accidental shelling killed a U.S. Army major and a Popular Force soldier and wounded five American soldiers and a PF. Missaimed rounds from this mission hit Hill 10, injuring three Marines. Early in November, a reconnaissence team in the mountains northwest of Da Nang called a fire mission on moving troops they thought were enemy. Three men from Company I, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines died in the ensuing barrage and four were wounded. The patrol’s route into the reconnaissance team’s AO had not been plotted at the FSCC.

“Friendly on friendlies” had a number of causes. The small-unit saturation patrolling fundamental to pacification and counterrocket tactics entailed a high but necessary risk of accidents. Major John S. Grinalds, 1st Marines S-2, explained:

The dilemma we had was, do we drive the squads and ambushed close enough to each other so that the VC are denied the time and the distance to move in their rockets and set them up and fire them and also run the risk of “friendly on friendlies”? Or do we hang back and reduce the risk of “friendly on friendlies” and let . . . chance take its course so far as firing the rockets?

We elected to drive the squads and patrols close to each other and it just took pretty tight coordination to try and prevent any incidents. In the main we were successful . . .

The strain of continued enemy contact was also conducive to accidental shootings. According to Colonel Theodore E. Metzger, commander of the Combined Action Force, most “friendly on friendlies” among his troops “happened in CAPs where they’ve been in contact . . . for about two months, steady contact, heavy
contact . . . . You get jumpy, as you well know, and I think this is a good part [of the problem]."26

While tactics and the combat situations were contributory causes, the overwhelming majority of incidents resulted from carelessness and from what Major General Widdecke called "an ignorance or lack of application of basic military fundamentals." Small infantry units often collided inadvertently because of map-reading and land navigation errors. Forward observers and fire support coordination center personnel transmitted incorrect map coordinates, and FSCCs sometimes did not follow prescribed fire mission clearance procedures. Gun crews set fuses improperly, selected wrong powder charges, or misaimed their guns. Carelessness was almost the sole cause of the large number of firearms and ordnance accidents in rear areas. In the 1st Marine Division, the .45 caliber pistol, the M16 rifle, and the various grenade types were major casualty-producers in the hands of Marines disregarding established safety procedures or "skylarking with the weapon." Brigadier General Simmons, 1st Marine Division ADC, declared: "Forty percent of these cases were caused by .45 caliber pistols, failure to inspect, and a round in the chamber when it wasn't authorized."27

Marine commanders relied primarily on continuous and intensive training to reduce "friendly on friendlies." The infantry regiments regularly included such subjects as forward observer procedures, map reading, and land navigation in their troop orientation and refresher training. They also conducted firearms and ordnance safety programs, supervised by the division inspector. Beginning in mid-1969, the 11th Marines cooperated closely with the infantry regiments to improve artillery fire control. The artillery regiment tried to ensure precision in its own operations at every stage, from the fire direction center to the gun crew, by emphasizing exact adherence to procedures and thorough mastery of necessary skills. On 22 May 1970, the division convened the first in a series of quarterly friendly fire incident seminars. Chaired by the commander of the 11th Marines and with representation from all units using supporting arms, the seminars facilitated the exchange of information on accidents and methods of prevention.28

On 24 August 1970, in response to a series of friendly fire incidents, Major General Widdecke directed all 1st Marine Division regiments and separate battalions to instruct their men "repetitively" in map reading, land navigation "to include thorough orientation on immediate local terrain and emphasis on use of the compass," identification and challenge procedures, fire discipline, and the use and coordination of both organic and external supporting arms. He ordered regimental and battalion commanders to report to him by 1 September on their actions and plans for carrying out this training. He warned in conclusion: "I will hold every officer and Marine personally responsible for insuring the professional use of arms against the enemy rather than their destructive and counterproductive employment against our own Marines." Each friendly fire incident, Widdecke promised, "will be rigorously investigated to determine command responsibility and possible dereliction." This order produced no radically new unit safety programs, but regiments and battalions continued to include the subjects Widdecke specified in their regular training schedule.29

To reduce accidental shootings and explosions in rear areas, III MAF enforced a number of safety procedures. These included prohibition of borrowing or lending weapons and of chambering rounds unless "required by the tactical situation and so directed by competent authority or the individual is under enemy attack or attack is imminent." No Marine was to discharge a weapon unless cleared to do so by "competent authority" or "unless necessary for the protection of human life." Unless specifically directed to the contrary, Marines were not to enter cantonments, compounds, or buildings with rounds in the chamber of their weapons. Regulations forbade "horseplay or unauthorized handling" of arms and prohibited possession of weapons or ordnance not issued by proper authorities. All shoulder weapons were to be carried at sling arms "except in tactical situations at the option of the tactical commander."30

On 21 October 1970, in a strongly worded message, Lieutenant General McCutcheon enjoined strict enforcement of these regulations by all commands. He threatened criminal prosecution of violators and concluded:

The basic job of a Marine is to bear and properly use his assigned weapon. Any violation of these procedures for weapons control by a Marine and/or his supervisors casts serious doubt as to the stability, maturity, dependability and responsibility of those involved and the right to bear the name Marine and any rank above private.21

Responding to McCutcheon's directive, the 1st Marine Division on 8 November promulgated a strict weapons-safety SOP. It provided for frequent inspec-
Vietnamization and redeployment

tion of weapons in the hands of troops, tight control of the issue of grenades and other ordnance, frequent inspection of working and living areas for contraband arms and explosives, and, where possible, supervised cleaning of all weapons. Commanders in secure rear areas could withhold even the issue of small arms ammunition, unless needed for guard or other duty. On 6 January 1971, the division restricted issue of the .45 caliber pistol, a major instrument of accidents, to men whose jobs actually required it. The division authorized commanders to withdraw .45s from men who did not need them even if they were entitled to pistols under the table of equipment. Commanders were to rearm such individuals with M16s and make sure they received thorough safety instruction on that weapon. As a result of these command efforts, and of slackening combat and Marine redeployments, the total number of "friendly on friendly" casualties declined during 1970, and the incidence of some categories of accidents in relation to troop strength diminished. In 1969, the 1st Marine Division suffered an average of 34.9 friendly fire casualties per month; in 1970 it suffered 23 per month, and in the first months of 1971, 1.7. During 1969, the division had 0.5 supporting arms accidents per 1,000 men; it had 0.2 such incidents per thousand during 1970. The rate of individual weapon friendly fire mishaps, on the other hand, remained at a constant 0.4 per thousand in both 1969 and 1970. Grenade and other explosions increased in frequency, from 0.5 per thousand in 1969 to 0.7 per thousand in 1970. Accidental discharges declined from 0.7 incidents per thousand men to 0.5 per thousand. Clearly, the fatal combination of young men and deadly devices was far from neutralized.

The Challenge to Authority: Race, Drugs, Indiscipline

By 1970, all the Armed Services were confronting, to varying degrees, a deterioration of discipline. Riots and acts of sabotage occurred at Army bases and on Navy ships; a few small units in Vietnam refused en masse to advance into combat. In some strife-torn units in Vietnam officers faced the daily threat of assassination ("fragging") by their own men. Military personnel in the United States and overseas joined radical groups dedicated to ending the war and revolutionizing the Services. Drug abuse and minor defiance of regulations were widespread. Malignant blacks set themselves apart by the use of "Black Power" symbols and rituals; they engaged in demonstrations and confrontations over alleged discrimination and occasionally attacked white officers and enlisted men. This unrest in the military reflected the divisions within American society over Vietnam, race, and the conflict of generations, but it also showed the effects on the Services of the long war. Rapid manpower turnover, a decline in training standards and personnel quality, and boredom and restlessness as combat action diminished all undermined discipline and morale. In addition, "the quality of some of our enlisted Marines was deficient in terms of education," said Sergeant Major Huff of III MAF. "They lacked seasoning and there was no time to train them properly. Black and white Marines who had these deficiencies were shoved into the front line units and this was the group that suffered the high casualty rates . . . ." As Huff, a black Marine, and others have noted, combat units in the field experienced far fewer difficulties:

The fact that our line units performed with little of the racial problems seen in rear areas is a tribute to the officers and staff noncommissioned officers (NCOs) of those units. It is interesting to note that most of the black officers and NCOs were in line units. In my opinion, their presence there and the common bond they shared with their white counterparts helped sustain the combat effectiveness of those commands.

In the six years of large-scale Marine Corps participation in the war, 730,000 men passed through the ranks of a Corps that had a peak strength of 317,000.* This meant, according to Major General Edwin B. Wheeler, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 at HQMC, that "We have turned over an average of half the Marine Corps each year for the past six years." Only 46,500 officers and enlisted men remained on duty continuously during that period. Compounding the problem, 50 to 60 percent of the one-term Marines had enlisted for only two years. Their Marine experience consisted of initial training, a Vietnam tour, and return to the United States for a short time before discharge.

*In contrast, during World War II, the Marine Corps, with a maximum strength of 485,000, passed 600,000 men through its ranks.
Inevitably, these Marines lacked the seasoning and Marine Corps indoctrination afforded by longer service. Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, ADC of the 1st Marine Division, pointed out that the Marine arriving in Vietnam in 1971 "was probably only 13, 14, or 16 years old when this thing... began..." So he grew up in a different high school environment than his predecessor did, five or six years ago, and he brought many of the attitudes of that environment into the Marine Corps with him." Those attitudes included acceptance of drugs and, for many blacks, racial militancy. For III MAF Marines, circumstances in Vietnam compounded tensions and conflicts imported from the United States. As the Marines' part in the war diminished, more and more men, especially in support units, operating in the secure rear areas, found extra time on their hands and few places except overcrowded clubs in which to spend it. Boredom led to excessive drinking, drug use, and fights, often fights between blacks and whites. In combat, continuous small-unit activities were at once dangerous and seemingly devoid of measurable success. General Dulacki, then Chief of Staff, III MAF later observed:

The complex nature of the war and the tediousness of the day-to-day job of some Marines in Vietnam created frustrations. It was frustrating to the commanders who sought and expected to achieve readily and visibly successful results from their multifaceted operational efforts. It was so different from other wars. And it took time for each new arrival to learn that it was different. At times it appeared to sap the souls and the spirit of the men.

In many III MAF cantonments, poor living conditions contributed to troop discontent. Housing, improvised at best, had deteriorated; with redeployment in prospect, few resources were available for rehabilitation. Lieutenant Colonel William R. Fails, MAG-16 S-4, described the living areas at Marble Mountain as "squalid." "The density," he recalled:

was almost intolerable... The enlisted men's area... had been strong-backed tents and now [they] had tin roofs on them. They were probably three or four feet apart, with 15 or 20 men living in each little hut... There were literally acres of them... As a unit withdrew, if we had the opportunity, and we found many opportunities, we would simply knock those sheds down to give them some daylight, air to breathe.

Above all, the prospect of redeployment itself undermined morale and discipline. Men found it difficult to maintain a sense of purpose in a war that was ending without decisive results. In MAG-16, according to Fails, "the typical reaction could go one of two ways. Either, 'I've only got a few more months or weeks to earn all my medals, so I can be a hero,' or the opposite: 'I'm not going to be the last one shot down.'"

Of all the manifestations of the breakdown of military cohesion, black militancy was potentially the most disruptive and, for many white Marines, the most difficult to understand. In 1969, a sociologist concluded in a study of Army enlisted men: "military life is characterized by an interracial egalitarianism of a quantity and of a kind that is seldom found in the other major institutions of American society." This statement appeared to apply as well to the Marine Corps. During the late 1960s, blacks made up about 10 percent of Marine strength. Black and white Marines worked and lived together in integrated units; all military specialties were open to Marines of every race; formal discrimination in promotions, assignments, and military justice was forbidden; black officers and NCOs led white troops; on-base housing and recreation facilities were completely desegregated. In Vietnam, black Marines participated in all aspects of the war effort. Five earned the Medal of Honor; countless others won Navy Crosses, Silver Stars, and lesser decorations. To the senior black Marines, who recalled the segregated World War II Corps, it seemed that blacks had become fullfledged members of the Marine "family."

Nevertheless, racial tension and potential conflict existed within the integrated Marine Corps as in all
the Services. While blacks and whites mingled on the job, they usually resegregated themselves off duty. Many liberty areas near Marine bases had de facto white and black sections, which members of the wrong race entered at their own peril. In spite of the abolition of formal discrimination in duty assignments, relatively few black recruits possessed the educational and social advantages to qualify for the more highly technical military specialties; hence, the number of black Marines in combat units and unskilled billets was out of proportion to their percentage of Marine strength. Among Marine officers, blacks were conspicuously underrepresented. In the 1st Marine Division, blacks made up 13 percent of total strength during 1970 but accounted for only 1.2 percent of officer strength.*43 The Marine Corps still contained prejudiced whites, even after years of integration; their persecution of black Marines ranged from verbal insult to punitive abuse of the disciplinary and military justice systems. Blacks continued to encounter discrimination in off-base private housing and other facilities. They complained that military clubs and post exchanges rarely catered to their taste in music, food, and personal items.

Young blacks entering the Marine Corps in the late 1960s and early 1970s were not predisposed to accept these remaining real and imagined slights calmly. Years of civil rights agitation and progress had instilled in them a strong racial pride and an intolerance of even the appearance of second-class treatment. Many, especially those from lower-class urban backgrounds, had grown up distrusting all authority. Confronted with a largely white chain of command, they readily interpreted even legitimate decisions unfavorable to themselves as discriminatory. While most black Marines loyally did their duty and asked only for fair play, most also, to one degree or another, felt the new racial pride and expressed it with “Afro” haircuts, “Black Power” symbols and salutes, and requests for “soul” food in the messhalls and “soul” music in the clubs. They often congregated by race in living areas and on liberty. A minority of militants, loosely organized around a few aggressive, sometimes criminal, individuals, actively sought trouble. They carried the use of “Black Power” symbols to extremes and attempted to create or intensify racial grievances. The militants tried to form an alternative power structure to the chain of command and to this end used violence against nonconforming blacks as well as whites. Depending on the issue and the circumstances, the militants secured varying degrees of moderate black support.44

Black militancy and racial grievances proved an explosive mixture. Beginning in 1968, outbreaks of racial violence occurred at Marine bases around the world. Typically, trouble began with quarrels in enlisted men’s clubs and recreational facilities and culminated in gangs of blacks roaming the base attacking white Marines. Less frequently, white gangs retaliated with assaults on blacks, or groups of up to 50 whites and blacks confronted each other. In the first eight months of 1969, Camp Lejeune reported 160 assaults, muggings, and robberies with racial overtones. The camp’s troubles reached a climax on the night of 20 July 1969, when groups of blacks assaulted 15 white Marines, one of whom died. Similar racial flareups took place in Hawaii, Japan, and Okinawa. After a two-week tour of Marine commands in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, General Chapman declared: “There is no question about it . . . . We’ve got a problem.”45

On 2 September 1969, General Chapman issued ALMAR 65, a directive to all Marines on “Race Relations and Instances of Racial Violence within the Marine Corps.”46 The Commandant began by declaring that acts of violence between Marines cannot be tolerated and must stop,” and that:

> It is now and has long been our policy in the Marine Corps that discrimination in any form is not tolerated. It had similarly been our policy that a fighting organization such as ours must have a solid foundation of firm, impartial discipline. It is in the context of these two basic policies that we must take measures to dispel the racial problems that currently exist.

Chapman instructed all Marine commanders to make “positive and overt efforts to eradicate every trace of discrimination, whether intentional or not, especially in promotions.” He directed them to maintain full, frank, and open communication with all their troops on racial matters, so as to refute disruptive false rumors and prevent misinformation. Chapman urged all officers and NCOs to follow the established principles of Marine Corps leadership in combating racial strife, calling attention to the commander’s role as teacher and guide to his men. In the most controversial portion of his directives, Chapman instructed commanders to permit wearing of the "Afro/Natural

---

*On the other hand, 12.2 percent of staff NCOs and 7.3 percent of NCOs in the division were black. In 1967, the black-white officer ratio in the Marine Corps was 1-150, as compared to 1-30 in the Army, 1-60 in the Air Force, and 1-300 in the Navy. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today’s Military (New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), ch. 5.
provided it conforms with current Marine Corps regulations.” He forbade the making of “Black Power” salutes and the wearing of “Black Power” symbols at regular formations and in rendering military courtesy to the flag, the national anthem, and individual Marines but declared: “Individual signs between groups and individuals will be accepted for what they are—gestures of recognition and unity.” While such actions should be “discouraged,” they “are nevertheless expressions of individual belief and are not, in themselves, prohibited. . . . They are grounds for disciplinary action if executed during official ceremonies or in a manner suggesting direct defiance of duly constituted authority.”

Chapman’s conditional permission of “Afro” haircuts and “Black Power” signs drew criticism from many Marines, who argued that it constituted special privilege for a minority and was inherently divisive. Others contended that ALMAR 65 simply recognized a division that already existed and offered a valid approach to overcoming it within Marine traditions and discipline. Lieutenant General William K. Jones, CGFMFPac, for example, defended the Commandant’s action on haircuts, pointing out that “All he did was to restate what our regulations were all along. I have always been against the Marine officer or NCO who, because of his own personal values, would insist that a white sidewall is the only acceptable haircut.”

Besides issuing ALMAR 65, Headquarters Marine Corps during 1969 established an Equal Opportunities Branch and started a drive to recruit more black Marine officers. Progress in resolving racial conflict, however, was slow. In mid-1970, officers of a Reserve public affairs unit, in a study of Marine Corps race relations, concluded: “Compliance with ALMAR 65 varies greatly among . . . commands.” The officers reported that the apparent softening toward black militancy had created a “backlash” among many white Marines and that other Marines—both black and white—refused to admit that a racial problem existed. Nevertheless, ALMAR 65 had set the course along which III MAF tried to move in dealing with its own racial tensions.

During 1970, III MAF felt the effects of the gener-
al racial unrest. The 1st Marine Division alone reported 32 racial incidents* between January and October 1970: "5 group confrontations with authority, 3 organized petitions, 19 assaults, 2 intragroup dissent, and 3 fraggings." The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and Force Logistic Command also suffered outbreaks of violence, including a grenade attack on the FLC Maintenance Battalion enlisted men's club that killed one Marine and injured 62. Most incidents took the form of fights between small groups of Marines after an altercation in a club, or several-to-one assaults on individuals, with the attackers most often blacks. Whites occasionally attacked blacks, such as the FLC Marine who went after two black Marines and a black corpsman because, according to the incident report, he was "fed up with their racially oriented activities." On occasion, blacks fought other blacks, evidently in an effort to coerce or intimidate nonmilitants. Black Marines came forward to identify the black perpetrators of several attacks on whites. Almost all incidents occurred in cantonments and rear areas. Marines searching for the VC/NVA while on patrol in the rice paddies or mountains of the Da Nang TAOR, in contrast, were drawn together by the threat common to all which the enemy presented, and only rarely were disciplinary problems of any magnitude encountered.50

III MAF commanders attributed their racial troubles primarily to the general causes: black distrust of a white command; resentment of alleged inequities in promotion, assignments, and military justice; and the presence of black militants and white racists. Yet the Vietnam situation had its own effects on Marine racial tension. Especially at Chu Lai, where the American Division surrounded MAGs -12 and -13, Marine black militants drew reinforcements from the much larger Army black population. Lieutenant General McCutcheon recalled: "Some of the race ... problems that we had, mainly crowd gathering, deliberations on the part of the black brothers in defense of themselves ... nearly always could be traced to the fact that some Army blacks had infiltrated the area and sought out our militant blacks ..." McCutcheon added, however, that racial problems of the period reached far beyond the military domain: "They were not only big problems within the military in Vietnam, they were big problems, and in my opinion even bigger, within the civilian community back here in the United States."51

Enlisted clubs were a center of conflict, as military activity diminished and off-duty Marines crowded inadequate facilities. In MAG-13, according to Colonel Laurence J. Stien, the group commander, reductions in the fixed-wing sortie rate resulted in 2,000 men trying to use clubs built to accommodate 450. "If you dump these kids loose on a hot day," he reported, "they end up in the club system. And the clubs ... are not made for things like this." If a traveling floor show were scheduled for an evening, men would go to the club early to secure seats and spend several hours drinking beer. Stien described the results:

They won't ever get up and go over and get a hamburger and get food in their stomach to absorb the alcohol they're consuming. They will not go to the mess hall because they want that seat. So by the time the show starts, you run up with a delicate situation. A lot of the young people, who cannot hold the alcohol they consume, ... end up tipsy. And let somebody ... black or white, walk on somebody else's foot ... and the first thing you know you've built into an incident.52

Lack of information or misinformation contributed to racial tension, especially if it concerned a matter as vital to the individual Marine as redeployment eligibility. Colonel Robert L. Parnell, Jr., III MAF G-1, pointed out: "[If] you let 10 white engineer troops go home three months before five black engineer troops who came in at the same time ... we ought to, for fundamental reasons as well as for racial relations, tell the troops why those 10 are going home earlier than those five."53

III MAF and its subordinate commands attacked the racial problem on the principles of ALMAR 65. Commanding officers emphasized fair treatment of all Marines and made efforts to root out remnants of discrimination, at the same time taking strong action against violent militants. In October 1970, Lieutenant General McCutcheon, drawing an analogy to his personal fight against cancer, set the tone of III MAF's approach:

Like human cancer this problem of racial minorities can have two outcomes. It can kill us if we don't operate soon enough. It can make us even stronger as a Corps and a nation if we face facts now and solve it. Let's continue to move out toward that end, but do so as mature, reasonable men in a sane, peaceful, nonviolent manner.54

The 1st Marine Division relied heavily on platoon-level leaders—officers and NCOs—to head off racial
trouble. During 1970, the division issued to each small unit leader a pamphlet on “The Racial Situation, Equality of Treatment and Opportunity.” Designed to guide junior officers and NCOs in carrying out the division “policy of equal treatment and opportunity,” the pamphlet, distributed as a division order, called for “non-preferential” policies toward all Marines. It placed reponsibility for ensuring this on the platoon leader and warned that prejudice, often covert, did exist and that the leader must be alert to spot it. “The platoon leader must make it his business to find out whether all of his Marines do, in fact, enjoy equality of treatment. The only way this can be done is by self-education and by talking with his Marines individually and collectively.” The pamphlet enjoined candid discussion of the racial problem within small units and called attention to opportunities for promotion and officer candidacy open to black Marines. Following ALMAR 65, the pamphlet declared the Afro haircut permissible within regulations; it urged leaders to avoid arbitrary appearance standards that went beyond regulations, as blacks viewed these as directed against "equality of treatment and opportunity." The pamphlet enjoined candidacy open to black Marines. Following ALMAR 65, the pamphlet declared the Afro haircut permissible within regulations; it urged leaders to avoid arbitrary appearance standards that went beyond regulations, as blacks viewed these as directed against them. Officers were to treat “Black Power” greetings and symbols as legitimate expressions of racial unity and pride, but the use by any Marine of “any signs, symbols, or gestures for the purpose of inciting or antagonizing or when they convey disrespect for authority is prohibited and . . . cause for disciplinary action.” The pamphlet summed up:

The platoon leader must express a positive attitude concerning the racial situation in the 1st Marine Division. He must be willing to discuss all aspects of the issues and seek to create understanding among his troops. The challenge is presented. Fundamentally, it is no different from others faced as a leader. To avoid it, or neglect it, is to fail. Meet the challenge with mental awareness and tenacity. Your success will make you “stand tall” among your fellow Marines!

By the beginning of 1970, all Marine, Army, Navy, and Air Force commands in I Corps Tactical Zone had formed “Leadership Councils” to supplement the regular chain of command in coping with racial tension. After the change of command in March 1970, a XXIV Corps Leadership Council, with representation from all major subordinate elements, capped this structure. In the 1st Marine Division, the division G-1, with the executive officers of regiments and separate battalions, and the division sergeant major, composed the Division Leadership Council. Each regiment and battalion had its own council, with membership “to be determined by the Commanding Officer.” The councils had as their mission “monitoring and recommend-
taught by the command chaplain, for leadership council members from its subordinate units. Later, on 21 March, FLC instituted a required Race Relations course for all personnel. Each unit was to provide its own instructors; the FLC G-1 section would furnish lesson plans and teaching materials. The prescribed syllabus called for four hours of instruction divided into five periods dealing respectively with “Individual and Group Communications, Promotion System, Opportunities through Education, Rights and Responsibilities, and Cultural Influences on the Contemporary American Scene.”

Marine Wing Support Group 17 tried a less formal and more intensive program. Group Chaplain Lieutenant Commander James G. Goode established a human relations seminar. Each class of both black and white Marines met four hours a day, one day a week, for three weeks, for general discussion of racial attitudes and conflicts. The seminar included from 12 to 16 sergeants and below who were selected or had volunteered to participate. Following conclusion of discussions, group and squadron commanders and the sergeant major were informed of the thoughts expressed. Copies of a report which summarized discussions and tapes of some discussions were provided to commanders. While race relations were often the focus, subjects covered included officer and enlisted relations, drug abuse, and the relationship of the individual Marine to the command and to the Marine Corps at large. Throughout, Chaplain Goode tried to make the men “walk around in each other’s shoes” so as to reach a “broader understanding of each other as human beings, and not as a particular racial or ethnic individual.”

Whatever formal programs were instituted, the burden of keeping racial peace fell on regimental, group, battalion, and squadron commanders and their junior officers and NCOs. Success required a careful day-to-day mixture of repression and conciliation. Some commands imposed evening curfews in their cantonments to reduce assaults and prevent militant gatherings. In MAG-13, Colonel Stien posted sentries to keep Army blacks out of his camp after 1800 each night and had his squadron commanders and executive officers attend floor shows at the enlisted clubs to keep order. Commanders made special efforts to identify and get rid of black militant leaders. When possible, they used disciplinary action or administrative discharges; if militants failed to give solid grounds for such action, many commanders resorted to transfer. In the 1st MAW, group commanders, by informal agreement, frequently moved known militants from unit to unit. Colonel Neal E. Hefferman, commander of MAG-11, explained: “It didn’t matter where you sent him; just break it up and transfer him . . . . Even though he was still being transferred within the wing . . . this leader, malcontent, had to start all over, establish his reputation, reform his gang . . . .” Such efforts could backfire, however, as they intensified the fears of more moderate blacks that the “white” command had singled out all of their race for persecution.

Unit experience with racial strife and response to it varied. The Combined Action Force was one of the few commands to have relatively little racial unrest. The CAF commander, Colonel Theodore E. Metzger, later explained:

> While the CAF had the undoubted advantage of exercising real selectivity in accepting new CAP Marines, it also offered each Marine an assignment of obviously great significance to the people of Vietnam. There weren’t many CAF Marines who didn’t quickly grasp this fact. The average Marine who fought with a CAP platoon was in my opinion, representative of the best qualities of America.*

Most commanders balanced repression with conciliation. They tried to find and correct genuine abuses, so as to deny the extremists valid issues. Colonel Haywood R. Smith, MAG-16 commander, used leadership council meetings to collect specific complaints. “I found,” he reported, “that . . . . if I showed them in the next hour, or the next day, that something was being done about the things that they had a justified [complaint] on, then I didn’t have any problem, because the hard core . . . are very hard pressed to get any followers when they don’t have any bitches . . . .” Colonel Wilcox of the 1st Marines followed a similar policy. “We kept the channels of communication open pretty well with all Marines, black and white,” he reported. “We had a viable request mast* procedure and we let these guys talk and get it out of their system. And that often solved the problem. As long as they could talk to somebody . . . it solved the problem.” When a racially sensitive film came to the MAG-13 club system, Colonel Stien, warned of

---

*These programs were forerunners of a Marine Corps-wide program of Human Relations Seminars, established in mid-1972. Shaw and Donnelly, *Blacks in the Marine Corps*, pp. 76-77.

*Request mast is a procedure under which a Marine is given an opportunity to present a problem or grievance to any officer in his chain of command.
potential violence by his white and black NCOs, initially prevented its showing. He allowed it to be screened later, after preparatory discussions with his troops, and no incidents resulted.66

Controlling prejudiced white NCOs could be a delicate problem. In the Communication Company, Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division, according to one officer, he perceived that some of the "most capable staff NCOs" were unfairly treating blacks in the unit. They were making formal charges that could lead to court martial and administrative discharge.

... it became obvious to the blacks that they were being identified ... as targets ... they became very nervous ... We were dealing with some very capable and one-of-a-kind staff NCOs, technicians who were the only ones in Vietnam who knew how to repair certain kinds of equipment, so we couldn't sacrifice the troop [nor] sacrifice the staff NCO ... . What the junior officers would do is we would appear in office hours with these troops and very politely destroy the case, if in fact it was a case that should be destroyed, without irritating the staff or the senior officers to the point at which they turned on us ... 87

Black NCOs were of varying effectiveness in mediating between commands and the young black Marine. III MAF had many strong black noncommissioned leaders, including Sergeant Major Huff, who served from October 1970 to the redeployment of III MAF Headquarters in April 1971. General McCutcheon remembered Huff, who had been a Marine since 1942, as "a pretty effective sergeant major," but he noted that many senior black NCOs had little in common with militants of the new generation. The latter often referred to the older blacks as "'Oreos,' black on the outside and white on the inside."88 On the other hand, the 1st MAW, according to Major General Armstrong benefited from the presence on the wing inspector's staff of a "high quality" black staff sergeant "who is independent enough not to have been labeled as an Uncle Tom by most blacks."89 Recalling III MAF's struggle to deal with race relations, Sergeant Major Huff offered another reason why black Marine leaders were only marginally effective:

Two things stand out in my mind ... Senior black SNCOs felt left out when the Corps implemented its human relations program; no one consulted them to determine how best to cope with the young black Marine who he had to supervise daily ... . Both black and white SNCOs felt that the human relations program was forced down their throats.

Huff also believed that the problems the staff NCOs had dealing with the many leadership challenges in Vietnam resulted from two temporary officer programs—in which NCOs were commissioned to fill the void in the junior officer ranks—that diluted the quality of Marine noncommissioned officers: "These two programs tore the heart out of the very group the Corps had traditionally relied upon to be the bedrock of its stability."70

In some units white junior officers, often working informally with black NCOs, also played a mediating role. A white Marine captain recalled: "Largely the ones that were able to do the talking were the younger officers who had grown up and were impressed as youth, or were impressionable during their youth, when the whole change in the racial feeling in this country was coming about, so they could relate somewhat to the other side of the fence."71

Through formal programs and informal day-to-day adjustments, III MAF avoided major racial outbreaks during 1970-1971. In some commands, the situation appeared to improve. The 1st Marine Division, for example, reported 29 racial incidents during the first six months of 1970, an average of 0.2 incidents per 1,000 of strength per month. In the last six months of the year, only eight incidents occurred, a rate of 0.1 incident per 1,000 men per month.72 In spite of such encouraging indications, commanders realized that only time, effort, and constant vigilance could overcome the racial polarization afflicting the Corps. Sergeant Major Huff later offered his perspective of the racial unrest of the period and the Marine Corps' handling of it:

Indeed Black militancy existed, but unit response to this problem was far from being effective. Many commands reacted to the surface problem with little in-depth information. Black militancy was never the awesome threat it has been given credit for being and if this idea is given credence in the hearts and minds of future officers and SNCOs then I fear the Corps could again find itself on the horns of a dilemma.73

Next to racial tension, the growing incidence of drug abuse was the most troubling personnel problem facing Marine commanders. Even more than racial conflict, drug abuse achieved crisis proportions comparatively suddenly. Major General Alan J. Armstrong, 1st MAW commander, told a briefing at FMFPac Headquarters in mid-1971: "Those of you that think you know a lot about the drug problem, if you were not out there in the last year, you need to re-estimate your thoughts."74

The group chaplain of MWSG-17, Commander James G. Goode, USN, conducted a "Social Interest Survey," in 1970 to determine the extent of drug use
and to try to identify when, where, and why it started. His survey illustrated the size of the problem in III MAF. Administered to 1,241 Marines of MACG-28 and MWSG-17, whose responses remained anonymous, the survey indicated widespread use of drugs, predominantly marijuana, throughout the command. The findings of the survey were so sensitive at the time that the command did not want it released. As Chaplain Goode recalled:

An attitude of total disbelief of the findings was expressed at the wing headquarters level. It appeared as though commands did not want to believe the immense drug involvement of the Marines. The ostrich syndrome was in effect: "If we don’t know about it, it will go away." Or "Tell me what I want to hear."76

In the 1st Marine Division, the total number of drug-related administrative and judicial disciplinary actions increased from 417 in 1969 to 831 in 1970; these figures reflected intensified command concern, as well as expanded usage. The 1st Medical Battalion Neuropsychiatric Clinic diagnosed 3 drug abuse cases in 1968, 62 in 1969, and 143 in 1970. Unit commanders estimated during 1970 that 30-50 percent of their men had some involvement with drugs. Among III MAF Marines, marijuana was the most prevalent narcotic, followed by various locally produced stimulants and barbiturates. Heroin use remained rare until late 1970, when cheap and plentiful supplies of this dangerous drug, which earlier had appeared among U.S. Army units farther south, finally reached I Corps. Black and white Marines, from all social, economic, and educational levels used drugs in about equal proportion. Recognizing the obvious danger of drug use in a combat environment, troops in the field commonly avoided narcotics. Tolerance of drug use, even among drug users, while pursuing the enemy was very limited, but in rear areas and support units drug use at times reached epidemic proportions.76

The effects of widespread drug abuse on military operations were difficult to determine. Brigadier General Simmons declared it was "impossible to quantify just how debilitating drug use may have been to the 1st Marine Division." "In general," he explained, "poor performance attracts attention which leads to revelation of drug use. But this does not ‘prove’ that drug use caused the poor performance nor does it give any indication of how many ‘good’ performers use drugs." Major General Armstrong, on the other hand, reported that at least one 1st MAW unit "had a heroin problem that I viewed as an operational problem, no longer an administrative problem."77

Like racial conflict, the rising incidence of drug abuse came into III MAF from American society. In Vietnam, the abundance of cheap, relatively pure quality drugs, coupled with lax GVN enforcement of its own narcotics control laws, made it easy for Marines who arrived with the habit to continue it and facilitated experimentation by the uninstructed. Colonel Robert W. Teller, 1st MAW Chief of Staff, declared: "It’s something in the climate that you’re in out there. You can walk out on the road anywhere and for a dollar get a package of ‘weeds.’" At Camp Books, the FLC pamphlet, according to the Security Company commander, "the kids would come up and toss the marijuana over the wire to sentries, day and night."78

As both civilian and military drug abuse became a public issue in the United States, III MAF, like other Vietnam commands, had to receive and brief a steady stream of delegations concerned with the problem. During August and September 1970, a Deputy Assistant to the President, a Department of Defense Drug Abuse Control Committee, and a group of staff members from the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee visited III MAF and other Marine commands at different times for briefings and investigations. In January 1971, members of the House Armed Services Committee made the same tour and received the same information.79

The visitors learned that III MAF relied heavily on troop education to prevent drug abuse. Commands employed all available media to impress upon the individual Marine the moral evils, legal consequences, and physical hazards of drugs. To help small-unit leaders educate their men, and to help them spot the presence and effects of drugs, the 1st Marine Division issued a platoon leaders’ pamphlet similar to the one it distributed on the racial situation. The pamphlet included an extensive glossary of drug slang. To supplement unit efforts, III MAF, the division, and the wing organized special drug education teams to give detailed and, it was hoped, hard-hitting antidrug presentations. Commanders found that young, articulate, informed enlisted men and NCOs were their most effective teachers. III MAF during late 1970 used as its principal drug lecturer a former Milwaukee city probation officer, attached as a PFC to the G-1 section. This Marine had extensive experience in counseling drug-addicted civilian offenders.80

By early 1971, most major commands had created drug abuse councils, similar in function to leadership councils and composed of G-1, medical, legal, and
MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

During late 1970, this policy became a subject for debate within and outside the Marine Corps. Some officers at the working level viewed strict enforcement of punishment and discharge as a waste of trained men. A communications officer in charge of Marines specially cleared to work with classified messages pointed out: “If a guy was caught with drugs he’d lose his clearance and then that was one less worker... so it was very painful to us to have a highly skilled kid busted.” Increasingly, commanders and medical officers came to view drug abuse as a medical and social problem rather than a crime and suggested that users who voluntarily asked for help be exempted from punishment and offered rehabilitation assistance. Such a policy could rescue valuable military manpower and prevent the dumping back into society of servicemen handicapped by drug dependence and unfavorable discharges. By mid-1970, a number of Army commands in the United States and at least one division, the 4th, in Vietnam, had instituted amnesty and treatment programs for users who turned themselves in. In August 1970, a DOD military/civilian task force on combating drug abuse included amnesty in its list of recommendations.

Until well after the redeployment of the 3d MAB, the Marine Corps took an adamant stand against amnesty. On 10 October 1970, General Chapman stated this position in a strongly worded message to all commands: “The Marine Corps cannot tolerate drug use within its ranks. Those who experiment with drugs can expect to be punished. Those who become addicted will be separated... Both types of user introduce unnecessary operational risk, as well as an unwholesome environment.” Concerning rehabilitation Chapman added:

The Marine Corps is neither funded nor equipped to carry the burden of noneffective members for the inordinate length of time that civilian institutions are finding necessary to achieve the rehabilitation of addicts. Even then the reversion rate is discouragingly high. In any case our medical resources are sufficiently taxed by duty-connected physical problems without intentionally taking on clinical or rehabilitative responsibilities... As Marine Corps strength reduces to a post-Vietnam commitment level, the premium on professionalism goes even higher. We will only enlist or retain those who will conscientiously meet and maintain high standards. Drug users do not fit into that category.

Within III MAF, General Chapman’s policy statement created much confusion and disagreement, especially over what degree of drug abuse should be considered sufficient to dictate expulsion from the Ma-
Marine Corps Historical Collection

LtGen Henry W. Buse, Jr., and his successor as commanding general, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, LtGen William K. Jones, a former 3d Division commander, salute the colors during the change of command ceremony at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii in June 1970.

Marine Corps. Lieutenant General McCutcheon interpreted the policy as "a restatement of what we are doing," which meant that "the first minor offender, one time experimenter or possessor of inconsequential amounts," at the unit commander's discretion, could be given a second chance. "If he does straighten up, he stays and if not, then he goes out."86 Other commanders nevertheless, felt themselves constrained by Chapman's directive to adopt a very harsh policy in spite of dislike for its implications. Colonel Hugh S. Aitken, 1st Marine Division G-1, summed up the problem in March 1971:

Is the one-time experimenter a kid that smokes a marijuana cigarette; or is the one-time experimenter a kid that does it for a weekend; or is the one-time experimenter the kid that goes on a week-long jag on marijuana and never touches it again . . . ? And what is the user . . . ? We are putting a lot of youngsters out of the Corps with undesirable . . . type discharges, without, I believe, a clear understanding of the policy at all levels. And the policy . . . is being interpreted in the extreme . . . 87

Even more serious, according to Major General Armstrong, the Commandant's policy, by eliminating any incentive for users to surrender voluntarily, hindered the discovery and removal of drug addicts from units. Late in 1970, Armstrong deliberately went against CMC policy to deal with an immediate crisis. A "rash" of drug-related incidents in MAG-16, in Armstrong's opinion, had "reached the stage . . . of creating a possible danger to flight operations." The group executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Guay, with the consent of the group commander and the assistance of the chaplain and medical and legal officers, proposed a temporary amnesty as a "short-range solution" to reducing drug use. Armstrong authorized implementation of the plan, under which Marines who came forward of their own free will were kept out of the disciplinary system and received aid from a group drug action team. At the end of February 1971, the MAG-16 chaplain, Lieutenant John B. Fitzgerald, reported: "The . . . program combating drug abuse is showing its effectiveness. Both chaplains, legal [officers], flight-surgeons, and Squadrons are working together." Marines who asked for help took
part in counseling sessions and also in civic action projects. After a few months of operation, Armstrong ended the program, on the grounds that it had achieved the objective of alleviating the MAG-16 drug problem. He recalled later that he “caught a good bit of static” for introducing it; but he insisted: “I felt that we had an operational problem; I took an operational solution at the time. It worked . . . . If I’m ever faced with the same situation again, I’ll do as I did then.”

Compared to race and drugs, political dissent and refusal to engage in combat were minor problems for III MAF. Antiwar and radical groups, such as the American Servicemen’s Union and the Movement for a Democratic Military, won adherents and established coffee houses and underground newspapers at Marine bases in the United States, Okinawa, and Japan, but few agitators appeared in III MAF units. Those who did found themselves under close command surveillance and lacking outside civilian support, accomplished little. III MAF reported no collective refusals of Marines who were unwilling to go to the field to fight with their units although some individual Marines refused, but these were generally individual cases of combat fatigue or disobedience and the commanders treated them as such. In many units, disregard for Marine Corps standards of appearance and military courtesy was common; especially to veteran NCOs, the general attitude of junior enlisted Marines seemed defiant and hostile. On their side, enlisted men expressed anger at an impersonal “Green Machine.” These tensions never reached massive proportions, although they contributed to occasional acts of violence against officers and NCOs.

To rid itself of problem Marines of all sorts, during 1970 III MAF relied increasingly on administrative discharges. Early in the year, General Chapman anticipating post-Vietnam manpower reductions, ordered all commanders to “clean house” by administratively separating men who did not meet Marine Corps performance and disciplinary standards. The commands in Vietnam took full advantage of this policy. In October 1970, for instance, the 1st Marine Division directed that “Individual Marines whose service is characterized by a record of substandard performance of duty, numerous minor disciplinary infractions, or diagnosed character behavior disorders” be processed for administrative discharge. Many division Marines fitted into those categories. During 1969, the division issued 121 administrative discharges; in 1970, it issued 809.

From the commander’s point of view, administrative discharge had the great virtue of ridding the unit of troublemakers comparatively quickly, by relatively simple procedures. The Military Justice Act of 1968, which went into effect on 1 July 1969, had lengthened and complicated the military judicial process; but an administrative separation could be accom-

*The Marine Corps today (early 1986) has a general drug exemption program under policies and procedures prescribed by DOD and the Secretary of the Navy. The program is “a legal guarantee of exemption from adverse disciplinary and/or administrative consequences which may result from the disclosure . . . of personal drug abuse for the purpose of facilitating treatment or rehabilitation.” It is now “the policy of the Marine Corps to prevent and eliminate drug abuse within the Marine Corps and to restore to full duty those Marines who have abused drugs and who have potential for continued useful service.” The exemption privilege can be exercised only through voluntary disclosure and only once by any individual. Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5300.12, dtd 25Jun84.

**Administrative discharges could be honorable, general, or undesirable; the two most unfavorable types of separation—Bad Conduct Discharges and Dishonorable Discharges—could be issued only by sentence of courtmartial. Administrative discharges could be given on a number of grounds. The most common grounds were Convenience of the Government, Unsuitability, and Undesirability. Discharges on the first two of these grounds had to be honorable or general; discharge for unfitness had to be undesirable unless circumstances in a particular case warranted an honorable or general discharge. On most grounds, either the CMC or the individual’s superior in the chain of command having general courtmartial convening authority could issue an administrative discharge, but certain cases—such as unsuitability by reason of sexual deviance and unfitness due to active sexual perversion—had to be referred to the CMC, as did drug cases until early 1970. A Marine proposed by his commander for undesirable discharge was entitled to a hearing before a board of officers convened by the appropriate commander with general courtmartial authority. The defendant automatically received military counsel and could retain a civilian lawyer at his own expense; he could present witnesses on his behalf and question the command’s witnesses. The board then would recommend either retention or discharge, subject to review by the commander convening the board, who could accept the decision, modify it in favor of the defendant, or set it aside and convene a new board. Marine Corps Separation and Retirement Manual (MCO P1900.16), paras. 6002, 6005, 6009-6021, 6024.

***Under the Military Justice Act of 1968, both special and general courts-martial, had to be tried with the full panoply of a certified military judge and judge-advocate prosecution and defense counsel. Further, most offenders of any type could have their cases tried by courtmartial. This created an immediate strain on the limited number of military lawyers with the commands. The 1st Marine Division, to alleviate this problem, created a “County Courthouse” of continuously sitting military courts at division headquarters to try all special courts-martial from the various battalions. See 1st MarDiv O P5800.1B, dtd 5Feb70, in 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb70.
plished in about 30 days. Commanders, therefore, often preferred the administrative procedure to court-martial, even for offenders they believed merited the more severe penalties a court could impose. Administrative discharge, according to a judge advocate with Force Logistic Command, "cut out [in] the least expensive way those persons who are not going to succeed, those persons who are nonrehabilitable, and those persons who just can't hack it."91

"Fragging" and Operation Freeze

The slang term "fragging," which in aviation referred to the issuing of fragmentary mission orders, acquired a more sinister connotation during the last years of ground combat in Vietnam. The 1st Marine Division concisely defined the new meaning of the term: "a deliberate, covert assault, by throwing or setting off a grenade or other explosive device, or the preparation and emplacement of such a device as a boobytrap, with the intention of harming or intimidating another."92 More specifically, "fragging" usually denoted the attempted murder of an officer or NCO by an enlisted man, often by means of an M26 fragmentation grenade.

American commanders had been attacked by their own men in earlier wars, but in Vietnam the frequency of such incidents increased dramatically and they received extensive and—in some radical groups—sympathetic publicity. III MAF, like other component commands in Vietnam, had to meet this new threat from within its ranks. During 1970, in the 1st Marine Division, one Marine died and 41 others were injured in 47 fraggings. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and Force Logistic Command also had their share of these crimes. FLC suffered the most costly single fragging of the year on the night of 5 February, when a Marine tossed a grenade into the crowded patio of the Maintenance Battalion enlisted men's club. The resulting explosion killed one Marine and wounded 62. Marine commanders reviewing the record of these outrages found little consolation in the knowledge that the U.S. Army problems were even more severe. During 1970, the 1st Marine Division, with its 47 fraggings, had an incident rate of 0.2 per thousand.94

Fraggings in III MAF plagued both secure rear areas and forward positions. In the 1st Marine Division, 62 percent of the assaults during 1970 took place in cantonments near Da Nang; 38 percent occurred at combat and fire support bases, observation posts, and battalion CPs. Clubs and living areas were favorite targets, with grenades typically rolled through a hut or bunker entrance or exploded against a wall. Lower-ranking enlisted men committed most fraggings, commonly against NCOs and junior officers.95 The motives for fragging were as varied as the tensions afflicting III MAF. A few fraggings, including the one in Maintenance Battalion, appeared to have been racially motivated. Others reflected anger and resentment at a particular small-unit leader or were efforts to get rid of an incompetent or particularly aggressive commander. Many fraggings were committed under the influence of alcohol or drugs or for drug-related reasons, for example pusher-buyer disputes or intimidation of informers. Probably the majority of fraggings resulted from individual personality disturbances. Brigadier General Simmons observed:

In a surprising number of cases after it happens . . . we learn things like, "Oh, yeah, we were worried about Bill. He'd been acting funny." Or so-and-so said he was going to frag the gunny. . . . Or they say, "We were watching him."96

The perpetrators of fraggings were difficult to find, and if found they were even harder to convict. As was true in narcotics cases, enlisted Marines hesitated to turn in their peers. According to Lieutenant General Jones, "We were faced with the typical teen-age squeal syndrome." Fear of being fragged themselves if they came forward also helped silence potential witnesses. For the authorities, frustration often resulted. In the Maintenance Battalion fragging, the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) eventually arrested four enlisted Marines, but Marine courts-martial acquitted all the defendants.97

In mid-1970, III MAF instituted Operation Freeze, designed to make escape more difficult for fraggers and conviction more certain. Lieutenant General Jones had developed the program during 1969 while commanding the 3d Marine Division. As Commanding General, FMFPac, Jones passed the concept on to Lieutenant General McCutcheon. Jones recalled:

They were having another rash of fragging in III MAF . . . and I went out on a visit there and had a big session with all the division commanders and I told Keith about my division order. And I said, "Keith, you've got to stop this." He agreed . . . of course. So I sent my order to him and he took it, and he wrote a III MAF order based on that order.98

By the end of 1970, most III MAF commands had put Operation Freeze into effect. Under the system, each unit reacted to a fragging or other violent act ac-
cording to prearranged and previously rehearsed procedures. Military police or an infantry reaction force immediately closed all entrances and exits of the cantonment and cordoned the area of the incident. Company and platoon commanders assembled their men and called roll; they took into custody any Marines from other units found in their areas. All NCOs and other enlisted Marines then went to their living quarters and stayed there until they received further orders, while specially assigned teams searched the incident site and each hut or barracks. Meanwhile, the unit legal officer, assisted by NIS and Criminal Investigation Division personnel, set up an interrogation point, where each Marine, brought from his quarters, underwent private questioning about the incident. The interrogators, as General Jones put it, would “call in each Marine and point out to him his responsibilities as a man, as a Marine, as a Christian.” This process continued until suspects had been identified and arrested. During it, the unit cancelled all leaves and suspended personnel rotations.

As an auxiliary to Operation Freeze, FMFPac and III MAF issued a steady stream of orders and messages designed to impress upon the individual Marine the “cowardly context” of fraggings and other acts of violence and to convince him that “identification of criminals is the responsibility of every citizen” and “is not playing the role normally attributed to being an informer.” Of more practical value, the commands promised protection, if necessary by transfer out of Vietnam, to any Marine who volunteered information. The 1st Marine Division in addition imposed strict control of grenades and other explosive devices and conducted frequent inspections of troop quarters for potentially dangerous materials. The division also emphasized preventive action. A division order in mid-December 1970 directed small-unit leaders to “be alert as to behavior or symptoms which may signal the possibility of a violent act” and where appropriate to arrange for the immediate medical treatment, transfer, or administrative separation of potentially dangerous men. Commanders were to keep close watch on such possible fraggers and withhold weapons from them “except in the extreme case where their lives might be endangered by enemy action.”

By the end of 1970, Operation Freeze and its associated measures appeared to be producing results. In the first half of the year, the 1st Marine Division solved only 10 of 26 fraggings. During July, August, and September, division units made arrests in five of 10 cases, and in the last three months of the year the division solved seven out of 11 fraggings. In two cases during December, individual Marines, responding to the offer of protection, furnished information that led to arrests, confessions, and convictions. Only two fraggings, neither of which caused any casualties, occurred between January and April 1971. The division G-1 staff attributed this encouraging trend to the effectiveness of Operation Freeze and to the fact that “few, if any, such incidents . . . occur in . . . units standing down.”

Training and Morale-Building

Besides trying to remedy specific disciplinary problems, III MAF carried on a broad training and morale-building effort. The necessity for training increased as combat diminished and an often false sense of security led to slackness in the field. Repeatedly, regimental and battalion commanders had to remind their small-unit leaders to follow correct tactical procedures. In May 1970, for example, Lieutenant Colonel Johan S. Gestson, commanding the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, declared: “Ambushes are often compromised by Marines smoking, coughing, or talking and fire power is not effective frequently.” He directed his company and platoon commanders to “take immediate corrective action to upgrade marksmanship and discipline in ambushes.” At the end of his tour as commander of the 1st Marines, Colonel Wilcox observed: “The best training the Division could get is to get out of Vietnam and . . . get people teaching . . . fire support, fire discipline, fire control, sensors, and a lot of other things that . . . we’re awful shaky on.”

While unable to follow Wilcox’ advice about getting out of Vietnam, the 1st Marine Division did the next best thing. It conducted continuous training aimed at preparing Marines to “fight aggressively and intelligently in a counterinsurgency environment” and to “maintain the individual Marine’s readiness to
redeploy to other combat/combat ready zones.” Following division guidelines, each battalion regularly put its men through refresher weapons and tactics instruction. Colonel James E. Harrell, commander of the 26th Marines in 1970, said that Lieutenant Colonel William C. Drumright designed a retraining program for the 2d Battalion to counter the bad habits that were often developed:

He took in one platoon for 10 days and conducted fire team and squad training. He went back to basics, even marksmanship and grenade throwing. It was . . . a most successful program since it was a unit program. By the little statistics we were able to gather in the remaining time we had in country, it appeared that casualties went down in retrained platoons especially during night patrols and ambushes.108

The retraining touched other areas also: rules of engagement, Vietnamese customs, and race relations. The cycle was concluded with a steak and egg breakfast, followed by an inspection, usually by Lieutenant Colonel Drumright or his executive officer. Other units developed similar programs. The division operated formal schools for officer and NCO leadership, scout-sniper instruction, and mine and boobytrap countermeasures, with monthly student quotas allotted to each regiment. Each month, division Marines, with others from the wing and FLC, attended the III MAF Vietnamese Language and Combined Action Force schools or went to Okinawa for specialized technical courses.108

Each battalion managed a complex variety of training activities. During April 1970, the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines held staff officers’ and NCOs’ schools. Each rifle company conducted training in employment of supporting arms, ambush tactics, leadership, racial problems, and the rules of engagement; all incoming Marines received combat firing instruction on the battalion rifle range. Seventy-five percent of battalion Marines attended drug abuse classes taught by the division drug contact team. Twenty-seven men went to a division class in operation and maintenance of the experimental XM-191 Multi-Shot Portable Flame Weapon. The battalion sent 40 men to the division mine and boobytrap school, 2 officers to officers’ leadership school, and 10 NCOs to staff NCO and NCO leadership schools. Two Marines attended division 16mm projectionist school, and eight took a course on multi-channel radio equipment.107

Other III MAF elements conducted similarly extensive training. In Force Logistic Command, for instance, the Supply Battalion, 1st FSR regularly instructed its Marines in marksmanship, weapon and motor vehicle safety, first aid, and defense against nuclear, biological, and chemical attack. The battalion held seminars on drugs and personal response and classes on proper treatment of civilians. Battalion Marines took courses each month in one or more supply specialties, and the battalion’s Ration Company trained bakers from FLC, the division, and the wing.108

All Marine commands provided extensive troop recreation facilities and personnel services. At the beginning of 1970, the III MAF G-1 staff, in addition to its prescribed functions, operated a Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Center at China Beach in East Da Nang and the Freedom Hill Day Recreation Center just west of Da Nang Airbase. III MAF coordinated R&R assignments and travel for all United States personnel in I Corps. It sponsored and scheduled USO and other professional entertainment groups, and it had charge of Armed Forces motion picture distribution. As part of its exchange of roles with XXIV Corps, III MAF, in late February 1970, turned its entertainment scheduling and film distribution responsibilities over to the U.S. Army 80th Special Services Group.109

The Freedom Hill Recreation Center, one of III MAF’s largest entertainment facilities, served 6,000-7,000 off-duty Marines, soldiers, sailors, and airmen each day; it was open most days of every month. The center included an indoor 35mm motion picture theater and fully equipped bowling lanes. Due to its location, Freedom Hill catered largely to rear-area troops rather than frontline riflemen. Colonel Wilcox, the 1st Marines commander, commented: “Every time I drove past Freedom Hill, it bothered me. It seems to me that’s an investment in manpower and facilities for the wrong people.” III MAF retained control over Freedom Hill until 28 February 1971, when the center came under Army management during the final Marine redeployments.110

The division, wing, and FLC maintained their own recreational facilities. Early in 1970, the division had 12 officers’ clubs, 21 staff NCO and NCO clubs, and 26 enlisted men’s clubs in operation, as well as 16 post exchange stores and 1 main and 11 unit post offices. Besides a comparably complete club system, the 1st MAW boasted a hobby shop complete with a model car racing track and a golf pro shop with a driving cage. Force Logistic Command units enjoyed equally elaborate facilities, including post exchanges with civilian gift shops and concessions.111
Individual regiments and battalions developed their own off-duty amenities, some of which, even in deployed infantry units, were extensive. The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, south of Da Nang, described its troop services in language reminiscent of a resort advertisement:

The Enlisted Club has a large outdoor theater which features nightly movies and weekly floor shows. An outstanding beach on the South China Sea with facilities for parties is very popular. A lifeguard is on duty and swimming is permitted at noon and late afternoon on a daily basis. In addition to nightly movies, Special Services provides a weight room, a well stocked reading room and a wide assortment of athletic equipment. Commercial services in the cantonment include a Marine Corps Exchange, laundry, photo shop, and gift shop. Camp Lauer, the battalion headquarters cantonment, has an efficient mess hall which provides three hot meals to approximately 600 men on a daily basis.113

Ground combat units, however, found very little time or opportunity to cycle units to the rear for recreation even as redeployment approached. "During my stay (at Camp Lauer), we were far too busy to utilize much recreation," recalled Lieutenant Colonel William V. H. White, commander of 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, "but during low threat periods we did bring individual platoons from the rifle companies to get a little rest and time on the beach."114

The clubs and other recreational facilities, extensive as they were, only partially alleviated the discomfort and boredom of life in often crowded cantonments in a tropical climate. For units in remote or outlying Marine positions, for example at Chu Lai, the amenities were much less elaborate. In many commands, reductions in military activity increased the burden on spare-time amusement facilities to, and in some cases beyond, capacity.

To meet the troops' religious needs, each III MAF battalion or larger organization had one or more Navy chaplains. These hard-working men, besides holding regular worship services in the cantonments, used every opportunity to carry religious support to Marines in the field. In the 7th Marines, according to Colonel Edmund G. Derning, Jr., "on Sunday afternoon, my whole command and control helicopter package went to the chaplains, and I wanted to see the plan where they made every effort to get out to every . . . . unit and hold something . . . . It's just symbolic. It's what you stand for." Chaplains conducted Bible classes, religious retreats, and discussion groups. They counseled troubled Marines and visited the wounded and sick in the hospitals and prisoners in the brig. They played a major part in the civic action and personal response programs, as well as assuming much of the burden of teaching race relations seminars and drug abuse classes.*114

Each Marine had the chance to take at least one week of 'Rest and Recreation' (R&R) outside the country during his Vietnam tour. Under a program administered by MACV, regularly scheduled military flights left Da Nang each month for Hong Kong, Bangkok, Okinawa, Manila, Tokyo, Taipei, Sydney, and Honolulu. The division, wing, and FLC received monthly allocations of seats on these flights. Through the Special Services officers of their G-1 staffs, the major commands apportioned seats among their subordinate units in proportion to their manpower strength. Individual Marines could apply to their unit commanders for particular R&R cities and dates. The units distributed the available leave on the basis of their own internal policies, usually giving Marines longest in Vietnam preference among dates and places. Commands occasionally used extra R&R as a performance award. During early 1971, for example, the 1st Marine Division offered a "mini-R&R" to Hong Kong or Bangkok to any man who uncovered a Communist rocket.115

Marines bound for or returning from R&R passed through the III MAF R&R Processing Center, part of the larger III MAF Transient Facility. Operated by the Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st FSR, the Transient Facility was located near Freedom Hill. Navy Seabees had completed its construction early in 1969. The facility included two terminal buildings, a mess hall, and Southeast Asia huts and barracks for temporary housing of Marines awaiting transportation to R&R, as well as those joining or leaving III MAF. Each month, the R&R portion of the transient facility accommodated over 10,000 men from all American commands in I Corps. III MAF operated the facility until 1 July 1970, when USARV took it over as part of the Army assumption of common service support.116

III MAF and the 1st Marine Division provided additional R&R opportunities within Vietnam. All officers and men were eligible for three-day rest periods at the III MAF China Beach R&R Center. Each quarter, organizations received quotas for China Beach, as they did for overseas R&R, and distributed them according to unit internal policies. A Marine using China Beach retained his right to a trip outside Vietnam. The China Beach facility, located in East Da

*For a detailed account of Navy chaplains with III MAF, see Bergsma, Chaplains with Marines in Vietnam.
Nang just north of Marble Mountain Air Facility, contained an exchange, a USO center, and a cafeteria and snack bar. Marines could attend films, go swimming in the South China Sea, work out in a gymnasium, or avail themselves of the tennis courts, softball field, shuffleboard and volleyball courts, and archery range. The entire complex had as its objective "to provide . . . billeting, messing, and recreational facilities in a relaxed atmosphere." To give infantry companies temporary relief from the strain of constant operations, the 1st Marine Division during 1969 established a "Stack Arms" center at Camp Lauer, what was then the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion's and then in mid-1970 the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines' cantonment south of Marble Mountain. Infantry companies, in rotation, spent 48-hour stand-down periods at this camp, in effect a simpler and smaller version of China Beach. Here, relieved of all regular duties, the riflemen could enjoy beer, steaks, sports, swimming, and leisure. Regimental commanders regarded "Stack Arms" as an excellent morale-builder, but limited facilities allowed each company to take advantage of the program only twice a year.

During 1970, Colonel Edmund G. Derning, Jr., instituted a similar program within the 7th Marines. On a monthly basis each rifle company in the regiment went back to a 7th Marines base for 72 hours of rest and rehabilitation. According to Derning, "only the most distressing of operational requirements, actual contact or commitment with the enemy" could force a company to skip its scheduled rest period. The program was designed to give the men a little rest, update administrative records, repair weapons and individual equipment, and return to the field three days later refreshed. Derning recalled:

This was not a rest break, . . . as they marched in, they were relieved of their weapons by armorers. Weapons were tagged, any deficiencies noted, and they were turned over to the armorers for repair. The troops continued to march, were stripped down, and were examined by corpsmen and medical officers for health problems and so on. After this examination and the notes and comments were taken for care . . . the troops continued on for a complete washdown and usually that afternoon a steak dinner, a little kind of beer-bust or something in a safe, secure area.

On the second day weapons were prepared, personnel records were updated—birth recorded, promotions rendered—and in the afternoon when the weapons were returned, weapons were fanfired and zeroed. Supplies, rations, and ammunition were issued on day three, and the men were mustered outside the billets where a battalion or regimental inspection was conducted. When the inspection was complete, the Marines shouldered their packs and weapons, the chaplain offered a blessing and a moment of prayer, and the company, which was not permitted to return to their billeting area, marched back out into their area of operations.

Military recreation facilities were much needed during III MAF's last year of combat, because Marines, like other American personnel, were effectively forbidden access to the Vietnamese civilian economy. XXIV Corps and III MAF during 1970 kept the city of Da Nang, and all other Vietnamese towns, villages, and hamlets, off-limits to troops unless they were on official business with written authorization from unit commanders or staff section heads. The commands also placed a 2000-0600 nightly curfew on movement outside United States bases and effectively closed all Vietnamese businesses and places of entertainment, as well as private homes, to American military personnel. Only advisors and other Americans who had to attend social engagements with counterparts were exempt from this ban. By these stringent regulations, the commands hoped to improve military security, reduce prostitution and the drug traffic, and prevent confrontations between American troops and the increasingly hostile civilian population.

On 25 April 1971, XXIV Corps partially relaxed these restrictions; it opened Da Nang City to off-duty personnel between 0600 and 2300 each day. 3d MAB followed the new policy, but it required all Marines going into Da Nang to travel in vehicles provided by their units and with an on-duty armed driver and guard in each. The first open week in Da Nang passed without major incident, although the CORDS city advisor considered it a poor test, since it was the week before a payday. Still, he reported, "bars, restaurants, souvenir stores, cycle and Honda drivers have enjoyed a bonanza," and Vietnamese national police at the air base had intercepted many incoming prostitutes on civilian flights from Saigon. Da Nang remained open throughout the 3d MAB's remaining time in Vietnam.

Besides furnishing recreation and services for their troops, III MAF commanders by late 1970 were devoting much thought and effort to solving what they called the "communication" problem. Lieutenant General Jones summed up the widespread concern: "Simply stated," he declared, "we aren't getting the word out. We aren't spending enough time making Marines understand what we're trying to achieve and why." In the same vein, General Chapman exhorted commanders to "establish communications through
the chain of command . . . from the very top to the very bottom, and back up again.”

Efforts to reopen communication took many forms. Force Logistic Command set up a special information telephone, manned 24 hours a day by members of the G-1 staff, to answer Marines’ questions about administrative and personnel matters. Individual officers had their own approaches to communicating with troops. Lieutenant General Robertson, when visiting a unit, preferred to talk with enlisted Marines:

... individually or in twos or threes—needle them a little and get a feel for them. I learned long ago if you’ve got your own antennas up and you’re really listening, a young Marine doesn’t have to complain in a loud, direct manner for you to realize there may be a problem he’s trying to tell you about.

Whatever their personal approaches, Marine commanders had had the realization forced upon them that, as Major General Armstrong put it, “We’ve got a . . . lot of people in this younger generation it’s going to take a little extra to get through to.” As with so many other problems of the war, this one had to be placed in the category of “Unfinished Business” as the last Marines left Da Nang.

Cohesion or Disintegration?

It is impossible to measure with any precision how severely the deterioration of morale and discipline affected III MAF’s military performance. Commanders almost unanimously denied that trouble in the ranks had any adverse influence on operations. Typically, Lieutenant General McCutcheon declared that, in his estimation, III MAF never approached a critical loss of cohesion and that Marine disciplinary problems were “nowhere near the extent that the Army . . . experienced.” Colonel Stien, who had faced significant racial disorder in MAG-13, cautiously echoed McCutcheon’s assessment. “I felt,” Stien said, “as though I was capable of taking care of the problem but I didn’t like what I might have to do.” In spite of racial tension, drug abuse, occasional fraggings, and general dissension, III MAF until the final redeployments continued to carry out daily operations requiring a high degree of skill and coordination, while at the same time managing a series of complicated redeployments. Nevertheless, the fact that the question of troop reliability even arose demonstrated the severity of the internal problem, as did the amount of command attention devoted to race relations, drug education, and other personnel matters unrelated to the combat mission.

A glass is either half-full or half-empty depending on the viewpoint of the observer. Against the statistics on racial incidents, drug use, fraggings, accidents, and atrocities must be set the fact that thousands of Marines continued to do their duty to the end. Many daily risked death and mutilation for a cause that perhaps a majority of their civilian contemporaries, as well as substantial numbers of their country’s most eminent leaders, denounced as immoral or dismissed as no longer important to national security. Sergeant Major Huff later observed that despite all of the unrest in III MAF during the latter stages of the war “the majority of the Marines I met in Vietnam met the challenge presented to them in stride; no one knows this better than General Giap of the NVA.” At the end of his tour in command of the 1st Marines, Colonel Wilcox paid tribute to this military “silent majority:"

I saw daily . . . examples of raw courage, selflessness, and dedication that made me both proud and humble . . . to have been serving with those men . . . . They really put it on the line, day in and day out . . . . I just really am tremendously proud to have been a part of them.
U.S. Marine Advisors and the Vietnamese Marine Corps

U.S. Marine Advisors supported the Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) from its activation in October 1954. Originally a part of the Naval Advisory Group (NAG), which was responsible to ComUSMACV, the Marine Advisory Unit (MAU) was the link between the VNMC and the American command. At the beginning of 1970, the MAU was commanded by the Senior Marine Advisor (SMA), Colonel William M. Van Zuyen, and had a Marine strength* of 39 officers and five enlisted men. In addition, the staff usually had one Navy doctor as medical advisor and two corpsmen. American Marines from all general occupational fields—combat, combat support, and combat service support—rounded out the MAU staff. Marines advised most VNMC staff sections, and since VNMC battalions tended to maneuver tactically in two large elements, common MAU practice was to have two Marine advisors with each battalion, one with each element, and three advisors with each brigade.¹

Activated in 1954, the VNMC was formed from old French-organized commando and riverine units. The VNMC was originally assigned to conduct amphibious and riverine operations as part of the Vietnamese Navy (VNN). From 1954 to 1971 the VNMC expanded from a strength of 1,150 officers and men to 13,500² growing from a brigade- to a division-size organization, while gaining separate service status. From its very beginning the VNMC was an important combat element of the RVNAF. As part of the General Reserve, it fought in all four Corps areas, and during the 1968 Tet Offensive helped retake the Citadel in Hue City.

Relying on U.S. Marine Corps advisors from the start, the VNMC, unsurprisingly, reflected this influence in its recruiting, organization, and training. Like its American counterpart, the VNMC recruited volunteers and did not draft. Its recruiting program stressed patriotism and challenged “young men to prove themselves equal to rigorous, disciplined life.” This proved to be as effective in Vietnam as it was in the United States. Thirteen enlisted recruiting teams were located throughout the country. By mid-1971, 610 men were being enlisted monthly, which was enough to replace “normal attrition” and keep up with authorized strength increases. Officers were appointed from varied sources: the National Military Academy, the two-year infantry school for reserve officers, and the 12-week officer course for meritorious NCOs³

The MAU emphasized the importance of training. By 1971 the VNMC Training Command, located northwest of Thu Duc in Military Region III near Saigon, could accommodate 2,000 students and provide basic recruit and advanced individual infantry training, as well as officer, NCO, and sniper courses.

Since 1956 some 200 VNMC officers and a number of enlisted men had attended courses in the United States and Okinawa. Included were 14 lieutenants and two captains who had attended either the U.S. Marine Corps Basic School or Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico during 1957 and 1958 and now held key positions, including Commandant, in the VNMC. One-fourth of the training command instructors had been through U.S. Marine recruit training, the Drill Instructor School at San Diego, and had completed the U.S. Marine Corps Marksmanship Instructor Course. Offshore training gave the VNMC vital knowledge and skills, and also created “a basis for common understanding between MAU personnel and the Vietnamese—a factor essential to the successful advisory effort.”⁴

The mission of the MAU was to “foster a VNMC capable of conducting amphibious, riverine, helicopter, and ground operations, and to assist in establishing a sound, enduring logistical and administrative procedure within the VNMC.”⁵ The MAU also closely monitored the Military Assistance Service Fund (MASP) program that supported the Vietnamese Marines.

The VNMC requisitioned most of its supplies and equipment through the RVNAF supply system until

---

*The task organization of the MAU was increased in the spring of 1970 to include 56 officers and 22 enlisted Marines. Col Richard F. Armstrong, Comments on draft ms. n.d. (Vietnam Comment File). Armstrong's comments include a memo depicting the changed T/O. See also monthly historical summaries for personnel breakdowns.
1966, the year MASF was established. Under MASF the American Marine advisors furnished the VNMC material not commonly used by other RVNAF Services or needed to equip new units. Responsibility fell on the MAU to verify VNMC requirements and determine which must be met by MASF. The MAU also conducted periodic inventories of U.S. equipment held by the Vietnamese Marines and made recommendations to upgrade their equipment.

In 1971 the MAU had set these goals: increase VNMC strength to 13,462 by the end of the year; provide full and continuing MASF support, including training the VNMC in the proper use and maintenance of equipment; improve individual and unit training; and improve living conditions for Vietnamese Marines and their families. While advisory efforts in the past had concentrated on improvement of combat skills, the MAU now emphasized logistics. American Marine advisors worked vigorously to develop a “definitive supply management system within the VNMC.” In short, the Marine Advisory Unit readjusted “the nature of its support” as the VNMC demonstrated self-sufficiency in specific areas.

To improve VNMC morale and esprit de corps, as well as battlefield effectiveness, and to strengthen allegiance to the Government of South Vietnam, the MAU and VNMC worked to improve the health and well-being of the Vietnamese Marines’ families. American Marine advisors put many man-hours into civic action projects to better the lot of the Vietnamese Marines and their dependents. Projects included operating a pig farm for low-cost meat and a commissary with foods at reduced rates; building dependent housing; upgrading base camps; and constructing a new hospital. In 1971 the SMA reported that “more must be and is being done, primarily by the Vietnamese themselves, but with extensive MAU assistance.”

With its American Marine advisors, the VNMC conducted primarily battalion-size operations in 1970. The year began slowly with the Vietnamese Marines searching for an elusive enemy. In late January, however, while operating in Chuong Thien and Kien Giang Provinces, southwest of Saigon in IV Corps as part of Amphibious Task Force 211, a battalion of Brigade A made heavy contact. In the early morning hours of the 22d, the K-2 and K-6 Battalions of the

The relative simplicity of a South Vietnamese Marine Corps battalion command post during the fall of 1970 is depicted below. Capt Peter C. Anderson, Assistant Advisor to the 6th VNMC Battalion, left, is shown with Maj Tung, center, and his staff.

Courtesy of Col John G. Miller, USMC
A South Vietnamese Marine “Cowboy” holds his transistor radio while perched on a field hammock. The so-called “Cowboys” were South Vietnamese Marine enlisted men assigned to the advisors to assist the Americans with minor chores in the field.

T-18 Regiment, a VC main force unit, launched a coordinated ground attack at 0340 against a rifle company and elements of the Headquarters and Service Company of the 1st VNMC Battalion. The brigade command post and Battery B, which was in direct support of the company in contact, were simultaneously attacked by mortars.

The VC conducted a diversionary attack from the south while at the same time concentrating the main attack from the east. Following a 100-round 82mm and 60mm mortar preparation, the enemy assaulted under the cover of .50 caliber machine gun and 75mm recoilless rifle fire. The VC could not penetrate the Marine perimeter. In a “fiercely contested hand-to-hand encounter” the Marines halted the VC advance and forced the enemy to fall back. The 1st Battalion commander then maneuvered two companies to reinforce the contact, and block the enemy’s withdrawal. The reinforcing companies immediately discovered and attacked the VC medical evacuation unit responsible for the removal of enemy casualties from the battlefield, killing another 16 and forcing the unit into “full disorganized retreat.” Meanwhile, the rifle company which was initially hit conducted an aggressive counterattack, pursuing the VC battalion relentlessly. Two platoons of Marines maintained contact with the fleeing enemy. As the VC battalion retreated to the east, the 2d VNMC Battalion conducted a heliborne assault, reestablishing contact with the enemy in mid-afternoon. The action continued until 2300, when the VC broke contact. Total enemy losses were 95 killed and four captured, against 24 Marines killed.

Brigade B, consisting of the 1st, 4th, and 5th VNMC Infantry Battalions and a battery of the 2d VNMC Artillery Battalion, accompanied by their American Marine advisors, participated in Operation Tran Hung Dao IX, the GVN incursion into Cambodia. The Marines joined the operation on 9 May 1970 when Amphibious Task Force 211, including Brigade B, moved up the Mekong River toward Phnom Penh. The 1st VNMC Infantry Battalion landed at 0950 south of
Neak Luong where intelligence reports indicated the enemy MR 2 Headquarters was located. Contact was immediately made and 23 VC/NVA were killed. Amphibious Task Force 211 continued north to the Neak Luong ferry site and the bulk of the brigade, was put ashore at 1400. The brigade established defensive positions on both sides of the ferry site while relieving the 14th ARVN Regiment. In a battalion-size contact on the 11th, the 4th Battalion killed 38 more enemy and captured numerous weapons and equipment, as well as four tons of small arms ammunition.

Elements of the 5th Battalion made contact with an estimated NVA battalion and regimental headquarters entrenched on Hill 147 in the vicinity of the village of Chaeu Kach on 14 May. The fight began when the pilots of the light observation helicopters of a U.S. Army air cavalry unit supporting the 5th Battalion saw a SKS rifle leaning against the wall of a building near the village. When the helicopters were fired upon, two platoons along with the battalion executive officer and the assistant battalion advisor were inserted about 500 meters south of Chaeu Kach.

Heavy fighting developed around 1650 with automatic weapons, recoilless rifle, and B-40 rocket fire concentrated against the platoons, while the command and control helicopter was taken under machine gun fire. The battle lasted through the night. Eight “Black Pony” (OV-10s) and 16 “Sea Wolf” (helicopter gunships) air strikes were flown by U.S. Navy units, enabling the Marines to consolidate their positions and continue to attack the hill. Fire support was also provided by the VNMC artillery battery supporting the 5th Battalion and by a Vietnamese C-47 equipped with Gatling guns. By 0830 on the 15th, despite heavy resistance, the objective was taken by the 5th Battalion. The enemy losses were 49 killed and one heavy machine gun, one B-40 rocket launcher, and numerous small arms, grenades, ammunition, and equipment captured. Vietnamese Marine losses were five killed and 10 wounded.

On 28 May Brigade A, consisting of the 2d, 6th, 7th, and 8th VNMC Infantry Battalions and the 2d VNMC Artillery Battalion (-) (Rein), replaced Brigade B in the Neak Luong area of operation. From then until 4 June the Vietnamese Marines engaged the enemy in their most intense combat in Cambodia. The 2d Battalion conducted an assault on the 28th into Pre Veng, a provincial town just north of Neak Luong. During the ensuing six-day engagement, in which the 2d Battalion was reinforced by the 4th Battalion on the 29th, 295 NVA were killed and seven crew-served and numerous individual weapons were captured, while the VNMC suffered seven killed. In heavy house-to-house fighting, the VNMC employed supporting arms extensively with devastating effect. The heaviest contact in Pre Veng occurred between 0700 and 2000 on the 30th when the 2d Battalion killed 137 NVA. During this same period the 4th Battalion killed 32 more and captured nearly 1,700 rifles. Captain Edward O. Bierman, an American advisor, later recalled the importance of the operation to the VNMC:
A U.S. base area near the Cambodian border is shown after all U.S. forces including Marine advisors have been ordered back to South Vietnam. The pig in the foreground, oblivious to less important matters, has found a comfortable mud hole in which to wallow.

Marine advisors, still assigned to Brigade B, were not allowed to accompany the VNMC during the battle because Pre Veng was just over the 25-mile limit.* The battle, however, served as a major test of the ability of the VNMC to operate independent of their advisors.10

After a relative lull in the fighting in the Neak Luong-Pre Veng area of operations in Cambodia, combat intensified from 14-16 June. The 2d Battalion was again drawn into action first. At 0145 on the 14th, 2d Battalion positions in the Pre Veng area were hit with about 100 82mm mortar rounds followed by an NVA ground assault. By daylight 43 NVA were dead, as were six Marines. The 7th Battalion was lifted by helicopter into blocking positions to the east and northeast of Pre Veng while the 2d Battalion was counteraattacking on the morning of the 14th. Meanwhile, the 6th Battalion and artillery units began moving by road from Neak Luong to Pre Veng. The 6th Battalion arrived on the 15th. In position as the blocking force as the 2d Battalion pushed the retreating NVA towards them, the 7th Battalion killed another 63 enemy and captured 10 AK-47s, 1 Browning automatic rifle, a .50 caliber antiaircraft machine gun, and much ammunition. Contact ended on the morning of the 16th. In all 112 NVA were killed while the VNMC had 21 killed.11

In late June the VNMC changed the designation of its brigades which, under the revised system, were numbered according to the infantry battalions they included. Brigade B in July, for example, became Brigade 256, consisting of the 2d, 5th, and 6th Infantry Battalions.

In a staff change on 2 July, Colonel Francis W. Tief relieved Colonel Van Zuyen, assuming command of the MAU. His Assistant Senior Marine Advisor was Lieutenant Colonel Alexander P. McMillan, who had joined the MAU on 1 April 1970 when he relieved Lieutenant Colonel Tom D. Parsons. MAU strength was then 51 Marine officers, 7 NCOs, 1 PFC, and 2 Navy corpsmen.

*When allied forces entered Cambodia in the spring of 1970, American units and advisors were not permitted to penetrate the border more than 25 miles.
During July 1970 the VNMC participated in Operation Vu Ninh 12. Conducted in MR 1 under operational control of Quang Da Special Zone, Brigade 256 and its American Marine advisors began the operation on 14 July with the establishment of two fire support bases in the mountains 24 kilometers southwest of An Hoa Combat Base in Quang Nam Province. Called Base Area (BA) 112, this mountainous region, often covered by double and triple canopy, concealed a complex trail network along which the enemy operated one of "the most active logistical distribution points" in South Vietnam. BA 112 was a natural marshaling area and afforded the VC/NVA operating in the region a sanctuary, as well as lines of approach from which to launch rocket and ground attacks against allied units and installations in Da Nang and the populated lowlands of Quang Nam.

Intelligence reports preceding the operation suggested that large caches of supplies and equipment were located in BA 112. While numerous base camps of platoon and company size were destroyed, only light and sporadic contacts with the enemy were made, and the caches of arms, ammunition, and other supplies discovered were of moderate size. In addition, the 6th Battalion found an abandoned VC hospital containing small quantities of medical supplies.

The VC/NVA reacted with rocket and mortar attacks to the establishment of two more fire support bases in late July and early August as Vu Ninh 12 continued. In the only sizeable contact of the operation, the 6th VNMC Battalion repelled a VC ground attack, killing 26 and capturing five individual weapons and a 75mm recoilless rifle. A total of 59 enemy had been killed during the operation by the time Brigade 256 was relieved of its brigades numerically: Brigade A became 147, B became 258, and C became 369. These designations were permanent.

The VNMC relocated to the vicinity of Khe Sanh in northern I Corps in February 1971. Maneuvering as a division for the first time,* the VNMC was one of three RVNAF divisions and other assorted units slated to participate in Operation Lam Son 719, the GVN raid into Laos. This was the most significant operation during 1971, and perhaps the whole war to that date. Lam Son 719 would test the RVNAF’s ability to coordinate and control corps-size forces in an area reputed to be an enemy stronghold. The results of Lam Son 719 would be mixed. In addition to encountering sizeable and fierce enemy opposition, which caused heavy casualties, the RVNAF would suffer from hesitant leadership and inexperienced staffs which proved unable to direct an operation of such magnitude and complexity. The RVNAF would also be handicapped by its inability adequately to coordinate supporting arms, particularly since U.S. advisors and liaison personnel were forbidden from accompanying the ARVN and VNMC into Laos. Overhead heliborne fire support coordinators (U.S. Marine advisors) were provided to the VNMC, but their presence was sporadic because of weather and helicopter availability. Consequently, fire support was inadequate during the most crucial phases of the operation.13

The Vietnamese Marine Corps in Lam Son 719

A South Vietnamese operation in Laos was conceived in late 1970 after intelligence reports indicated that NVA forces were preparing a big offensive in northern I Corps. Aerial reconnaissance missions reported an increase in troop and vehicular movement down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Agents and POW interrogations pointed toward a large-scale attack sometime between the first of the year and mid-summer.

In December 1970, ComUSMACV, General Creighton W. Abrams, divulged his plan for an incursion into Laos to cut the enemy’s lines of communication where the vast network of trails and roads comprising the Ho Chi Minh Trail passed through the city of Tchepone. In severing these lines, Lam Son 719 was intended temporarily to distract the enemy and delay any buildup of men and material for an anticipated offensive, thereby also facilitating the redeployment of American combat units during 1971.14

The GVN offensive into Cambodia, which began in April 1970, had established the precedent for cross-border operations, and Washington had agreed to a limited thrust into Laos. In January 1971 General Abrams approved a plan developed by a combined I Corps and XXIV Corps planning group. III MAF was not involved. The plan called for a four-phased operation in which the VNMC Division would be committed during Phase II.

---

*"This was the first time the VNMC was committed as a Division," observed Brigadier General Tief years later. "The ACMC (Assistant Commandant, Marine Corps) VNMC, Colonel Bui The Lan, was designated as the division commander. The MAU placed officers in key staff advisory positions. Overall the division staff functioned well. Strong rapport between MAU advisors and the VNMC was the key." BGen Francis W. Tief, Comments on draft ms, 13Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Tief Comments.
Following Phase I of Lam Son 719, during which Route 9 was reopened from FSB Vandegrift, east of Khe Sanh, to the Laotian border, the 7th Battalion and a command group of Brigade 147 were inserted on 1 March by helicopter into the Marine AO in Laos, about 15 miles southwest of where Route 9 intersects with the Laotian border. Brigade 258, consisting of the 1st, 3d, and 8th Infantry Battalions and the 3rd Artillery Battalion, crossed the border on the 4th and 5th of March and began operations northeast of Brigade 147, just south of Route 9 along the plateau near the border of Laos and RVN. Although the VNMC was not accompanied by its American Marine advisors on the ground in Laos, advisors were frequently airborne in command and control Hueys in the vicinity of VNMC units. Captain Marshall N. Carter recalled:

The MAU immediately established an advisor with an experienced VNMC officer as airborne coordinator (in an Army UH-1 command and control bird) during daylight hours. In the VNMC division combat operations center, we had another advisor constantly on the net assisting in coordinating artillery, helicopter support, airstrikes, etc. This worked very effectively during the entire operation.

Operating out of FSB Delta, Brigade 147, which now included the 2d, 4th, and 7th Infantry Battalions, and 2d Artillery Battalion, encountered determined enemy resistance almost immediately. On 5 March the NVA attacked the 4th Battalion with mortars followed by a ground assault. Fighting throughout the day, the 4th Battalion killed 130 NVA (30 by air) and captured 20 weapons while suffering six Marines killed. The battalion killed 18 more on 6 March and discovered 100 enemy bodies in the area of a B-52 strike conducted the day before. The 4th Battalion killed another 38 in moderate to heavy contacts on the 8th and uncovered two mass graves containing 55 more NVA, including a company commander.

The 2d Battalion of Brigade 147, patrolling southwest of FSB Delta, also made heavy contact on 7 March. Engaging an estimated two NVA companies at 1430, the battalion killed 145, including 47 killed by helicopter gunships. The 2d Battalion also captured large quantities of supplies and equipment while sustaining 14 killed and 91 wounded. The following afternoon the 7th Battalion of Brigade 147 engaged an NVA platoon, killing 11 without incurring any casualties of its own.

Brigade 258, with its CP at FSB Hotel, four to five miles northeast of Brigade 147, experienced lighter enemy activity. In a series of small-scale contacts from 6 to 8 March, units of Brigade 258 killed 46 NVA while suffering one Marine killed and 19 wounded. During the same period Brigade 369, consisting of the 5th and 9th Infantry Battalions and the 1st Artillery Battalion, patrolled the area around the Division CP at Khe Sanh out to three to four miles from the base itself.

During a ceremony at the Vietnamese Marine Thu Duc Training Center, troops stand in formation to receive awards for their participation in the Cambodian incursion. The following spring during Lam Son 719 in Laos, the Marines encountered stiff opposition.

Courtesy of Col John G. Miller, USMC
experiencing only light and sporadic contacts with the enemy which resulted in 10 kills.

Enemy response against individual and often widely separated South Vietnamese units in Laos, such as Brigade 147, followed a pattern. RVNAF units initially met light to moderate resistance on patrols, and their fire support bases were subjected to sporadic indirect fire attacks. The enemy then began to progressively build up forces around fixed positions, increasing indirect fire attacks and antiaircraft fire. Beginning around 18 March, the NVA had started to concentrate forces, estimated at two regiments, around FSB Delta. This enemy buildup coincided with the start of Phase III of Lam Son 719, the phased extraction of units from Laos, which was complicated by increasing NVA pressure against widely dispersed and, therefore, vulnerable South Vietnamese units.

Brigade 147 initially had occupied FSB Delta with one battalion securing the base and two battalions operating to the south. After its arrival, the brigade worked hard to improve defensive positions. On the 13th the first salvos of 130mm artillery rained down on Delta, and by the 17th the NVA had occupied "defilade positions" on Delta's steep slopes which were secure from small arms and indirect fire from the base. From these positions antiaircraft gunners fired on resupply and evacuation helicopters. Tactical air and gunships struck 10 active enemy gun positions, but the gunners would relocate and continue to attack the daily stream of helicopters which supported FSB Delta.

On the 18th, outlying battalions began sweeping back toward Delta to clear enemy positions around the base. In one intense firefight that day, the 7th Battalion killed 95 NVA. The 4th and 7th Battalions, upon arrival at Delta, assumed essentially defensive positions because the NVA had so thoroughly invested the area. Compounding this dilemma the brigade commander consistently refused to clear artillery and air strikes within 1,000 meters of the base because of lack of confidence in the accuracy of his supporting arms.

NVA indirect fire attacks intensified progressively. Between 0700 and 1800 on the 19th, FSB Delta came under "heavy enemy fire" from 130mm artillery and 122mm mortars on six separate occasions, leaving six Marines dead and 39 wounded. By the 20th NVA soldiers were firing small arms at incoming helicopters from positions dug under the base's perimeter wire. Combining antiaircraft and indirect fire on Delta's landing zone, the NVA had virtually halted resupply and medical evacuation operations. Although Colonel Lan, the VNMC division commander directing operations from Khe Sanh, overrode the restrictions placed on the clearance of supporting fires by the commander of Brigade 147, the VNMC could not break the enemy siege.

At 0600 on the 21st, two NVA regiments, later identified by POWs as the 29th and 803d of the 324B Division, launched a heavy ground attack against Delta, preceded by mortar fire and what appeared to be 75mm direct fire from tank guns. Despite the intense combat, seven helicopters landed during the day with resupplies, but all were hit and one destroyed. The fight raged on through the night.

General Lam disapproved the Marines' request for evacuation of FSB Delta on the night of the 21st, but demanded the evacuation of artillery from the base, although helicopters had not been able to land. Lam also allocated 2,000 rounds of 8-inch and 5,000 rounds of 155mm artillery to support Brigade 147, but it was of no use. The assistant senior marine advisor, Lieutenant Colonel McMillan, later noted:

"At the point that General Lam finally committed long-range artillery support to assist in the extraction of the brigade from FSB Delta, . . . he was fully aware that all long-range artillery had already been withdrawn to a range that precluded their providing any support."19

Alluding to the friction between the I Corps commander and the Marine Division, Colonel Tief said that General Lam remarked, "Now the Marines will have to fight."*20

Years later McMillan recalled the troubled relationship between the I Corps commander and the Vietnamese Marines during this critical period:

From the very outset of the retrograde operation, it was apparent that General Lam, the corps commander, was bent on isolating Brigade 147 on the battlefield. Perhaps it would be too strong to state that it was a deliberate effort to bloody the Marines. However, the fact [was] that the airborne, the rangers, and the 1st ARVN had all suffered grievously during the operation, and the Marines were the only unit achieving local battle success and still tactically intact; and the conscious refusals at corps level to provide any long-range artillery support to the brigade certainly lends credence to the conclusion that more than the fortunes of war were involved.31

**"This remark was a reflection of General Lam's personal animosity toward CMC-VNMC," recalled Brigadier General Tief. "It was unwarranted since the RVN Marines were the only ones who fought and won during Lam Son 719." Tief Comments."
The attack continued on the 22nd, and at 2000, 10 enemy tanks, all equipped with flame throwers, joined the battle. The Marines destroyed three tanks within or near the perimeter — two by light antitank assault weapons, the other by an antitank mine. A fourth tank was destroyed south of the base by tactical air strikes.

The ability to resupply the Marines remained extremely tenuous and two helicopters were shot down attempting to “free drop and parachute supplies.”

Tactical air was employed in a desperate attempt to suppress enemy antiaircraft fire, and gunships fought to strip the sides of FSB Delta of the entrenched enemy. The NVA, nevertheless, penetrated the perimeter and consolidated positions in the center of the fire base.* The Marines were ordered to pull back from the center to either end of Delta and prepare to counterattack after a napalm strike. But the strike was diverted in favor of a higher priority mission and never arrived. At this time the brigade commander ordered his Marines to withdraw. “The order to withdraw was given by the division commander after consultation with CMC-VNMC and the SMA,” recalled Colonel Tief. Brigade 258 was to secure a landing zone and provide a secure area for evacuation of Brigade 147²³.

Brigade 147 then had to fight its way through two enemy base camps and nine NVA tanks in blocking positions while clashing repeatedly with NVA forces deployed in the streambeds leading to friendly lines. It was during this series of actions that 1 Corps and XXIV Corps refused to provide “8-inch or 155 support,” Colonel Tief said later. “Brigade 258 had occupied the key terrain in the west valley” which XXIV Corps said could not be held. Denied the heavy artillery support the MAU felt was needed, “MAU and VNMC officers worked out an artillery support plan using the VNMC artillery units exclusively. It worked; the position was held.”²⁴

When the SMA was informed by the Army artillery liaison officer that the VNMC could have the requested heavy artillery, the SMA informed him that it was no longer necessary because Brigade 258 had been moved to a position from which it could provide artillery support. On the morning of the 23rd, Brigade 147 broke through enemy lines and linked up with elements of Brigade 258 to the northeast. The 3rd Battalion of Brigade 258 secured a landing zone, and over the following 24 hours, Brigade 147 was lifted back to Khe Sanh.

The last elements of Brigade 258, which had encountered far less resistance during some 20 days in Laos, were withdrawn on 25 March. Small groups of Marines cut off in the withdrawal from Delta continued to filter out of Laos by foot. A group of 26 Marines fought their way out to rejoin the division at Khe Sanh on 27 March, leaving 37 missing of an original total of 134 when FSB Delta was evacuated.

During the siege and withdrawal from FSB Delta from 21-23 March, Marines estimated that 600 enemy were killed around the base by Brigade 147 and an estimated 400 were killed in a B-52 strike on the 21st. Some 200 individual weapons were captured and 100 destroyed as were 60 crew-served weapons. In addition to the missing, friendly casualties during the 21st and 22d of March were 60 Marines killed and 150 wounded. The close-in combat of the month had brutal effects on both sides. The Marine division as a whole from 1-27 March killed over 2,000 NVA and captured or destroyed over 800 weapons, while suffering 335 killed and 768 wounded.

Lam Son 719 had demonstrated the weaknesses of both the VNMC division and the ARVN assigned to General Lam's I Corps. At the command level, Colonel Lan, the VNMC division commander, was at first “reluctant to impose on the autonomy of the brigade commander,” a practice “which had been buttressed by years of custom within the VNMC. This resulted in an inability to maintain an accurate assessment of the tactical and logistical situation, which in turn led to an inability to generate a cohesive plan for the division as a whole.” The brigade commander's refusal to clear close supporting fires, bred by lack of confidence in the ability of VNMC artillery to compute and fire high-angle defensive fires, enabled the enemy to achieve fire superiority. “The brigade commander's inexplicable failure to launch aggressive ground action to clear the ground around FSB Delta” permitted the NVA to concentrate their antiaircraft fire to preclude aerial resupply, necessitating the withdrawal from Delta.²⁴

Assessing the performance of the ARVN I Corps staff, the senior Marine advisor levelled some equally

*Lieutenant Colonel Marshall N. Carter years later recalled a dangerous situation which occurred at Delta because of a scheduled Arclight attack: “At one point one of the VNMC brigades had been driven off the firebase ... at about midnight and into an area scheduled for a 2:00 AM arclight strike. It was with great difficulty that we were able to have the B-52s, only 30 minutes or so away from the target abort the mission. Had this not been done, the entire brigade would have been hit since they had moved into the 2-3 grid-square area of the arclight.” LtCol Marshall N. Carter, Comments on draft ms, 28Mar83 (Vietnam Comment File).
Col Francis W. Tief, who assumed command of the Marine Advisory Unit in June 1970, is shown with South Vietnamese officers at the U.S. Army 101st Airborne Division (Air-mobile) command post during Lam Son 719 asking for additional helicopter support.

stern criticism. Colonel Tief said that, while he understood the logic for the VNMC receiving a low priority for air support during the early stages of the operation, when the 1st ARVN and Airborne Divisions were heavily engaged, the low priority later came close to meaning "no priority." Tief added that only through his "direct appeals" did the situation improve, but even during the withdrawal phase of Lam Son 719, priority in assignment of tactical air went to the ARVN, "even though the resupply situation on FSB Delta was becoming critical." Corps artillery support was equally deficient because of a similar priority system. Tief concluded that the extreme conditions which demanded withdrawal might have been averted had Brigade 147 been given higher priority fire support before the enemy was preparing to breach the wire and had even occupied positions between FSB Delta and the withdrawal route to Brigade 258. In his after action report, Tief also suggested that RVNAF politics affected tactical operations: "The personal attitude of the CG, I Corps, toward the Marine division and the interplay between him and the Commandant of the VNMC were responsible for significant tactical considerations, without doubt. The extent to which political decisions overrode tactical ones is difficult to gauge."

Summarizing the operation, Colonel Tief lauded the Marines of the division:

The combat units of the Marine Division performed admirably in the face of the strongest enemy forces they have yet encountered. Brigade 147, the most severely tested, has taken great pride in the way it came out of Laos. Troops were improvising equipment items—packs [made] from sandbags and communications wire—in order to return to action immediately. Brigade 258 performed well under steady, if less spectacular pressure. Brigade 369 . . . was never committed . . . . It experienced . . . little contact in its AO west of Khe Sanh.

The SMA went on to say that "the brightest spots in the action at FSB Delta were the performances of
the individual Marines and their company and battalion level leadership." The three battalion commanders, though wounded, retained unit integrity while fighting their way to link-up with Brigade 258. "Within 24 hours after returning to Khe Sanh, the battalions of Brigade 147 were operational and redeployed in the hills southwest of the division CP—and in contact with the enemy."27

_The Marine Advisory Unit and Solid Anchor_

Ca Mau Peninsula, "unmatched in desolation," is on the southern tip of South Vietnam in An Xuyen Province. Essentially a mangrove swamp with trees rising to 60 feet and triple canopy covering a tidal floor, the peninsula remains inundated at high tide and during the rainy season. Overland transportation south of Ca Mau City is virtually impossible. Boats and aircraft are required for any degree of mobility. South of the Cua Lon River, the inhabitants are Viet Cong, their families, and refugees from Nam Can Village, which was destroyed in the wake of the 1968 Tet Offensive. Numerous defoliated strips of jungle south of the Cua Lon served to reinforce the impression of uninhabitability.

The Cua Lon and its tributaries, nevertheless, are rich in seafood, and growing throughout the region is an indigenous tree that produces the highest quality charcoal found in Vietnam, making the area lucrative for those who would work it. Because of the difficulty of ground operations south of the Cua Lon, the VC operating there were essentially unchallenged. As late as mid-1970 this portion of An Xuyen Province was exempt from the pacification goals assigned the commanding general of Military Region 4.

ComNavForV established an advanced tactical support base, called Sea Float, on the Cua Lon River near Nam Can in 1968. Sea Float consisted of several

_Several U.S. Marine Advisors pose at the Khe Sanh Combat Base in the spring of 1971 during Operation Lam Son 719. From left to right: Maj John G. Miller; Maj William C. Stroup; Maj Thomas G. Adams, partially hidden; and Maj Frederic L. Tolleson._

Courtesy of Col John G. Miller, USMC
AMMI* pontoon barges lashed together in a cluster in mid-stream. The base provided logistical support for U.S. Navy river patrol operations in An Xuyen Province. By early 1970, the base’s vulnerability had become a “matter of mounting concern.” Though the base had not been attacked, during a two-month period in the spring of 1970 eight VC swimmer-sappers were killed by concussion grenades, which had been thrown from the barges about every 15 minutes. A land base was designed to replace Sea Float to provide a more inhabitable and operable installation, as well as one that could be better defended.

The planned facility ashore would include a 250x600-meter cantonment. Built on “a 17 million dollar sand pile,” the new base was named Solid Anchor. The installation was almost complete in August 1970. By September all operations were moved ashore, and Sea Float was discontinued. In early 1971 construction of a 3,000-foot runway on Solid Anchor was finished, in addition to large storage areas, a pad for the helicopter detachment (Sea Wolves), and many boat mooring spaces. Ships as large as LSTs could easily come up river to Solid Anchor, and a U.S. Navy LST-type logistic support ship was maintained for many months there.

Since 1968 the Navy had conducted waterborne operations from Sea Float, employing river patrol craft to raid VC units. At no time were allied ground forces operating for prolonged periods in the Sea Float AO. While the 21st ARVN made occasional forays into the drier areas of the province, its units never stayed long because the tides made the terrain so marginally habitable. Not until the fall of 1970 did ComNavForV consider improving the offensive and defensive capability of what in 1970 had become known as Solid Anchor by basing an infantry battalion there. The 6th VNMC Battalion and an artillery battery arrived at Solid Anchor in early September and immediately moved into the AO and began operating against an enemy who tried to stand and fight rather than evade. Despite the 6th Battalion’s success in killing some 85 VC in the first two months of operations, however, Solid Anchor continued to be troubled by a host of operational and organizational difficulties.

A more incongruous and diverse grouping of units in a relatively small command could not have been found outside of Solid Anchor. In addition to the newly arrived VNMC units, the melange included Seabees, Sea Wolves, SEALS, Explosive Ordnance Disposa l (EOD) teams, and combat service support units. OV-10 “Black Ponies,” Sea Lords (riverine forces), and administrative and logistic helicopters were also based there.

The Solid Anchor cantonment was defended by about 70 Vietnamese irregular infantry and an equal number of CIDGs. Special Forces advisors and a handful of Kit Carson Scouts, who frequently accompanied the SEAL teams on patrol, further diversified the organization of the base. When in mid-summer 1970 ComNavForV, Vice Admiral Jerome H. King, decided the Solid Anchor population of 600-700 and the $78 million real estate investment warranted increased security, the MAU sent advisors to Solid Anchor to develop and implement a coordinated base defense plan and to instruct the Vietnamese in the use of the 81mm mortar. An additional advisor was assigned to the staff of Rear Admiral Herbert S. Matthews, Deputy, ComNavForV, who was also the advisor to the deputy CNO of the VNN. Although the MAU developed “an explicit detailed plan,” the Solid Anchor command struggled through most of the fall to coordinate tactical operations.

Solid Anchor had also been plagued with a series of personnel and logistic problems. These alone were sufficient to have “tried the patience of any responsible commander.” Because of the austerity of Solid Anchor existence, U.S. Navy personnel assigned there were assembled from other in-country units and ordered to Nam Can for 90 days temporary additional duty. Major John G. Miller, MAU G-3, observed that “this resulted, predictably, in a universal short timer’s attitude and all its associated evils.” Living conditions, which included electrical power and running water, were quite comfortable within the cantonment. But the isolation of the base and transitory nature of the personnel created an atmosphere of loneliness and martyrdom “thick enough to cut with a knife.” The G-3 Advisor noted further that the organization of Solid Anchor was, in effect, a coalition of allied military units operating semi-autonomously:

The SEALS and Sea Wolves in particular tended to operate with an unwarranted spirit of independence. The VNN was in a class by itself, exhibiting a blatant disregard for practically everything except personal comfort and safety. The VNN’s lack of discipline was manifested most frequently in failure to carry out operational orders and haphazard firing into friendly unit AOs.

---

*Named for its inventor, Dr. Amritkan. An improvement over the World War II pontoon barge, it was used lashed together in groups that became helipads, living facilities, and logistical bases.
Relations between the U.S. and Vietnamese Navies were tense, and because of weak leadership at all levels, "VNN forces never functioned effectively." In a message to the Commander of Solid Anchor, the commander of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 74 complained of the conduct of the irregular troops. Not only had they been caught stealing the Seabees clothes, breaking into their mess lines, and walking into the mechanic shops with armed hand grenades, the Vietnamese had beaten up three Seabees.

To begin to shore up the many problems at Solid Anchor, in October, Admiral King, "with the agreement of Rear Admiral Tran Van Chon, the VNN CNO, sent Captain Eugene I. Finke, USN, the Senior Naval Advisor to the VNN, on temporary duty to command CTG 116.1 at Solid Anchor." Captain Finke used his extensive experience in dealing with the Vietnamese to begin to restore order and discipline while increasing the scope of combat operations. In late November Captain Finke was recalled to Saigon to resume his primary duties as Senior Naval Advisor. Admiral King replaced Captain Finke with the SMA, Colonel Tief, "on the basis of his experience in ground and amphibious warfare, with the mission of intensifying offensive operations against the VC in the Solid Anchor AO."35

When Colonel Tief assumed command, he discovered that mending Solid Anchor's many problems would not be a simple task. "The area resembled a zoo," recalled Colonel Tief. "Nobody was truly in charge. Internal wrangling was rife." The 6th VNMC battalion commander, for example, encamped across the river from Solid Anchor, refusing to allow his troops onto the base or to allow Vietnamese from other units into his camp. Captain Marshall N. Carter, the MAU assistant G-3 Advisor, was also critical of the apparent lack of military discipline within TG 116.1:

The uniform of the day was anything the individual wanted to wear. The NCO watch standers appeared in sandals, peace symbols, headbands, and cutoff dungarees or civilian trousers. This atmosphere existed for several days and then ceased. The problem of low level leadership continued throughout the SMA's tour and without his very strong leadership at all levels the situation would have been tragic.

Aside from the personnel and morale problems which lingered, there were operational concerns which posed an even more direct threat to the security of the base. The infantry, artillery, naval, and air units operating in the Solid Anchor AO needed fire support coordination "of the most professional sort." The lowest level where this coordination could be provided was by the commander of Solid Anchor, CTG 116.1, but effective coordination had been hindered by lack of experienced people to organize and man a naval operations center (NOC), differences in operating procedures of units working in the AO, and by the "reluctance on the part of some units to have their activities coordinated." To begin correcting the deficiencies the SMA brought with him a captain from the MAU to be the ground operations officer and added another advisor to the 7th VNMC Battalion, which had replaced the 6th in November, because most of the ground operations were of company size.

*Vice Admiral Jerome H. King, Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam, later noted that "on 9 December, because of insubordinate conduct, the VNN EOD personnel departed Solid Anchor for Saigon on orders of the VNN Chief of Naval Operations to face disciplinary charges." King Comments.

*Colonel Tief observed later that the replacement of the 6th VNMC Battalion with the 7th was a good move because the "battalion commander was aggressive and experienced." Tief comments.
Recognizing the chaotic state of the Solid Anchor command, Colonel Tief reorganized the staff, setting up an N-1, N-2, N-3, N-4—personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics sections—and established a base defense officer and a base commander. The N-2, N-3, and base defense officers were Marines from NavForV. Under N-3, infantry patrols were now coordinated by a ground operations officer from the MAU and surface operations by a Navy officer. According to Captain Carter, who was made ground operations officer, “the main purpose of consolidation of the staff was to get people into responsible positions and knock off all the bullshit that had been going on for months where no one would accept responsibility for actions and operations poorly run and poorly coordinated.”

Under Colonel Tief, operational planning became “quite detailed” and coordination “quite complex.” The assets and capabilities of all the units, American and Vietnamese, were carefully integrated to make the Solid Anchor command more tactically effective. A typical battalion operation might employ Army and Navy aircraft, American and Vietnamese Navy river craft, naval gunfire ships, and aerial observers, as well as the 7th VNMC Battalion. “The operational level was purposely kept high to keep the enemy confused,” said Captain Carter. “Large troop movements were made into the Dam Sol Secret Zone,” which had not been entered previously by allied forces. Colonel Tief later recalled the efforts of the organizational and operational initiatives:

The U.S. advisors began to function in high gear, with MAU officers setting the example. The advisory team blossomed. The Sea Wolves detachment (U.S. Navy helicopters) was outstanding. They performed way beyond expectations, flying all missions and wreaking havoc with the VC throughout the AO . . . areas that had not been entered in years by RVN were attacked. The Nam Can area became a poor refuge for the VC. Nam Can village grew to 2 times its earlier size. Charcoal and shrimp, the major products of the area, began moving to the city market north of the AO . . . in short, the Solid Anchor situation got cleared up. The base finally began to serve the purpose for which it had been built.

When he took command of Solid Anchor in December, Colonel Tief requested an additional VNMC battalion* to allow operations by CTG 116.1 at some distance from Solid Anchor without weakening the base defense. The Vietnamese JGS denied his request and at the same time indicated “impatience” with Major General Nghi, commanding general of the 21st ARVN Division, for his “slowness in replacing the Marines with forces from his own assets—delaying the Marines’ return to the JGS reserve role.” By the end of January 1971, a 250-man ARVN battalion, “battle-wearied from fighting in the U Minh Forest,” was sent to Nam Can to replace the 7th VNMC Battalion.

Rear Admiral Matthews and Major General Nghi worked out “a curious command relationship agreement in which CTG 116.1 had operational control of the battalion, but Major General Nghi had ‘supervision.’ In other words, the battalion commander would have a clearly defined channel of appeal if he didn’t like the orders issued to him by CTG 116.1.” Although the ARVN battalion performed well in its first two operations under the SMA’s control,** Colonel Tief “felt this to be an untenable command situation, stating so verbally and by message to ComNavForV.” While the controversy boiled, the Chief of Staff, 21st ARVN Division, “logged a false accusation of disrespect against the SMA, which was passed” through DepComUSMACV to ComNavForV “along with a request for the SMA’s relief as CTG 116.1. ComNavForV acquiesced.”

Admiral King later said that his deputy, Rear Admiral Matthews, “attempted to resolve the personal and command relationship problems between the CG, 21st ARVN Division, and Colonel Tief, but both officers had taken positions from which they could not retreat.” Admiral King reasoned that “since the survival of Solid Anchor depended upon support from the 21st ARVN Division,” the “political” impasse had to be ended. Noting that Colonel Tief had “accomplished his basic mission of strengthening the defensive posture and intensifying offensive activities at Solid Anchor,” Admiral King relieved him with Cap-

---

*Command relations at Solid Anchor were complex and created continuous problems during Colonel Tief’s brief assignment as CTG 116.1. When Colonel Tief assumed command, there were at least two additional oddities: a Marine was in command of a naval base, and for the first time a VNMC unit was under operational control of a VNMC advisor.

**Colonel Tief reported that the “ARVN battalion commander and his U.S. Army advisor both acknowledged that there was no difficulty in their operating under CTG 116.1 operational control. The political problem was originated and fueled at the 21st ARVN Division CP.” Tief Comments.
A panoramic view of the Cau Mau Peninsula Solid Anchor Project. Solid Anchor was an Advanced Naval Tactical Base to support river patrol activities in An Xuyen Province in South Vietnam, with Col Francis W. Tief, the Senior Marine Advisor, in command.

Sub-Unit 1, 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company

When U.S. Army units followed the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade into Vietnam in 1965, a naval gunfire support requirement ensued.* In response, Sub-Unit One, 1st ANGLICO was activated in Hawaii on 20 May 1965 and flown to Saigon, reporting in-country on 29 May “with two shore fire control parties (each comprised of a liaison team and a spot team), an additional naval gunfire spot team, two radar beacon teams (shipping navigational aids), and ancillary support personnel.” Initially comprised of 12 officers and 98 enlisted Marines, Sub-Unit One reached an operational peak in 1968 when it had teams deployed at 27 locations in Vietnam, including a 118-man air/naval gunfire platoon supporting the ROK Brigade.45

In January 1970, the 21 Marine and 9 Navy officers, and the 192 enlisted Marines and 2 Navy enlisted men of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Simpson’s Sub-Unit One were deployed in 24 locations from northern I Corps to the Ca Mau peninsula. Among the units supported by naval gunfire liaison and spot teams were the 1st ARVN Division forward CP at Dong Ha; the 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division (Mech), U.S. Army, in Quang Tri; XXIV Corps in Phu Bai; the 2d ROKMC Brigade, in Hoi An; the Naval Advisory Group in the Rung Sat Special Zone; the 1st Australian Task Force in Nui Dat; and the 21st ARVN Division in Ca Mau.46

*The primary mission of ANGLICO is to support a U.S. Army or allied division, or elements thereof, by providing the control and liaison agencies associated with the ground elements of the landing force in the amphibious assault, or in other type operations where support is provided by naval gunfire and/or naval air. “... Control and liaison teams are further assigned to lower echelons... to provide the necessary personnel and communications... to request, direct, and control the support... The teams are qualified to enter combat by means of parachute.” FMF Manual 7-2.
Since most of the fighting in Vietnam was concentrated around the heavily populated coastal regions, naval gunfire had proven a ready and flexible means of support. Mobility and speed of naval ships allowed for rapid massing of fire at any point or area target, provided that sufficient naval gunfire ships were patrolling Vietnam's coastline. Naval gunfire was available around the clock and, unlike air support, was relatively unaffected by inclement weather. In addition, it offered a wide selection of firepower, from the 81mm mortars of river patrol boats to the 16-inch rifles of the USS New Jersey. The 5-inch multiple rocket launchers of inshore fire support ships were also used a great deal in Vietnam, particularly in MR 1 where a shallow beach gradient kept deeper draft ships out of bombardment range. The mainstay of naval gunfire support throughout the war, however, was the 5-inch gun of American destroyers, which alternated between fire support and carrier escort duty.

Seventh Fleet, which controlled the naval gunfire ships, was a separate command from MACV, hence, a "unique" procedure for fire support evolved. Within the Seventh Fleet's cruiser-destroyer group, a designated task unit provided MACV with fire support ships. Composition of the unit varied as ships came from and went to other operational or repair and replenishment commitments. But the command element—called gunline commander—remained relatively constant. This was usually a destroyer squadron or division commander.

Based on priorities set by MACV for each of the four military regions, the gunline commander published periodic ship availability messages. These messages reflected ship assignments or changes to the gunfire support unit, as well as when and where naval gunfire was to be employed. After receipt of the message, and at least 48 hours before the scheduled arrival of the support ship, the senior U.S. military commander, advised by the naval gunfire liaison officer in the MR being supported, assigned inbound ships to specific fire support areas and furnished spotter identification and radio frequencies.

The naval gunfire liaison officer/spotter supporting the designated ground combat unit briefed the ship as it reported on station. The report included friendly positions and scheme of maneuver, general enemy situation, anticipated gun employment, trajectory, and friendly aircraft coordination measures, rules of engagement, navigational aids, and communications. From then on a triangular relationship was maintained among the ship, spotter, and the liaison team coordinated with the supported unit's fire support coordination center.

To improve the quality of naval gunfire support provided through this complex arrangement, two successive gunline commanders came ashore in February 1970 for extensive briefings from Sub-Unit One representatives. In addition, the weapons officer from CTG 70.8, which was then providing naval gunfire, visited with the ANGLICO staff in Da Nang, and the TG's "representative in conventional ordnance fire control" traveled throughout "a good portion of Vietnam attempting to trouble-shoot for the ships on the gunline." Despite these liaison visits, however, effective fire support was not always provided. During March 1970, for example, Colonel Simpson reported that the problems were caused "as a result of frequent changes in gunline commanders, approximately every three weeks." Noting that the gunline commander has the prerogative to move ships into any position he chooses to provide support, Colonel Simpson observed that since the gunline commander is not familiar with the ground tactical situation, he should "logically rely upon the Corps NGLO's [naval gunfire liaison officer] request for support to base his decision." To correct the problem, Colonel Simpson recommended that the tours of gunline commanders at a station be increased to a minimum of three months.

Aside from coordination difficulties with the Navy and the in-bore explosion problems caused by some defective 5"/54 ammunition, Sub-Unit One—in conjunction with supporting ships—provided generally reliable support throughout the four corps areas from January 1970 to June 1971. In July, for example, ANGLICO naval gunfire spot teams controlled the firing of 19,102 rounds during 3,356 missions, accounting for 5 confirmed enemy dead, 23 estimated dead, and 70 secondary explosions. An average of four destroyers and one cruiser were on station most of the month. ANGLICO forward air controllers controlled 66 close air support missions, delivering 13,000 pounds of ordnance, which resulted in eight enemy confirmed dead, four estimated dead, and caused one secondary explosion.

Support provided by the air/naVAL gunfire platoon which was assigned to the ROKMC brigade in Hoi An included the full breadth of ANGLICO capabilities. Besides planning, coordinating, and controlling naval gunfire and close air support, the platoon coordinated all forms of helicoper support—medevac, assault lift, resupply, control of armed helicopters, and the complete range of helicopter support team operations.
Each battalion tactical air control party (TACP) maintained two-man landing zone control teams with each of the ROKMC rifle companies, affording them the only direct English-speaking link with American combat and combat service support. During July the TACP with the brigade controlled 59 medevacs and over 2,700 resupply missions, delivering over 3,000,000 pounds of supplies.

ANGLICO Marines earned the praise of the 2nd ROKMC Brigade in August 1970. During Operations Golden Dragon 6-2 and 6-3, which were initiated by the 2nd and 3rd ROKMC Battalions and accounted for 38 VC/NVA killed, Marine TACPs controlled heavy air support for Korean maneuver units. In addition, one ANGLICO Marine performed heroically when a Huey gunship providing suppressive fire was shot down during a medevac.

Lance Corporal K. K. Rabidou distinguished himself by sprinting to the downed aircraft through a heavily boobytrapped area while ignoring small arms fire. At the site of the crash he pulled three of the crewmen's bodies out of the burning helicopter in spite of rockets and ammunition being in danger of "cooking off." Unfortunately, the crewmen were dead." Rabidou received the Bronze Star Medal for his actions.

With the takeover of III MAF's command responsibilities in I Corps by XXIV Corps in March 1970, Sub-Unit One's NGLO, located with XXIV Corps in Phu Bai assumed responsibility for naval gunfire support for all of I Corps, which had previously been coordinated by the III MAF NGLO. The III MAF/1 Corps NGLO billet was then eliminated following the XXIV Corps-III MAF command shifts, and from then on Sub-Unit One controlled all naval gunfire support in Vietnam.

June 1971 saw the rotation of about a quarter of Sub-Unit One personnel. This necessitated an increase in training and, with the reduction of liaison teams supporting allied units throughout the four military regions, caused a temporary 10 percent shortage of enlisted personnel. Even with this limitation, Sub-Unit One was able to meet its requirements.

Throughout 1970, Sub-Unit One had coordinated missions for allied units which accounted for over 325 confirmed VC/NVA killed while estimating an additional 400 killed. As combat generally declined in 1971 with the gradual redeployment of American forces, so did the activity of ANGLICO units progressively decline. Air/naval gunfire missions fell in May to 577, accounting for 15 enemy killed, and in June to 576, resulting in only two enemy killed. Sub-Unit One deployed 20 Marine officers and 147 enlisted men, and 8 naval officers and 2 enlisted men at 14 locations in the four corps areas at the end of June. When Lieutenant Colonel D'Wayne Gray* relieved Lieutenant Colonel Eugene E. Shoults in July 1971, following the redeployment of 3d MAB, the last Fleet Marine Force element in South Vietnam was Sub-Unit One.

The Special Landing Force

The last Special Landing Force operation of the war was Defiant Stand, a combined 2d ROKMC Brigade and 26th Marines amphibious operation on Barrier Island, 20 miles south of Da Nang, from 7-19 September 1969. With the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division in the fall of 1969, areas of operation of remaining allied units in I Corps were adjusted, necessitating that all three battalions of the 26th Marines, which had formerly rotated SLF duties, operate ashore in the Da Nang TAOR until the regiment redeployed in Keystone Blue Jay. As a consequence the 3d Marine Division, now headquartered on Okinawa, provided the battalion landing teams for the SLF which had returned to the mission of Pacific Command reserve.

During 1970 and 1971 the 3d Marine Division provided two SLFs for the two amphibious ready groups (ARGs) which constituted the Pacific Command reserve. The 9th Marines rotated its battalions to SLF duty, from January 1970 to June 1971, with one BLT afloat at a time. Embarking from Okinawa and training ashore, primarily in the Philippines, the SLFs spent an average of two days a month off the coast of Vietnam, usually in the South China Sea or the Gulf of Tonkin. ARG/SLF readiness normally required the first BLT to be able to go ashore in Vietnam within 120 hours. The second BLT, which was usually not afloat, would take much longer. But even when ARG/SLF Bravo** stood down from January-May 1971 so that ARG Bravo shipping could be used to redeploy units in Vietnam, CinCPacFlt said that SLF Bravo "could be landed in Vietnam, by ARG Alfa, 168 hours after its own SLF was landed," should the need arise.

*Lieutenant General Gray in 1984 was Chief of Staff, Headquarters Marine Corps.

**The 4th Marines provided a second BLT during the last 18 months of large-scale operations in Vietnam. While 4th Marines BUs occasionally passed through Vietnam waters, they spent much time ashore in Okinawa and were never committed to support operations from January 1970 to June 1971.
The 9th Marines rotated different battalions to SLF duty about every three months in 1970-1971. Once deployed from Okinawa, the monthly cycle of the ARG/SLF usually included taking ready station in Vietnam’s coastal waters for two or more days, either preceded or followed by an amphibious landing or an administrative unloading in the Philippines and about a week of training ashore. On 5 August 1970, for example, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald H. Polakoff’s 2d Battalion, 9th Marines embarked from White Beach, Okinawa as the ground element of Colonel William F. Saunders, Jr.’s, ARG/SLF Alpha. Along with Lieutenant Colonel Robert G. Miller’s Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 164 (Rein) on board ARG shipping, the SLF took station off the coast of Vietnam from 10-11 August. The ARG then steamed to the Philippines where the 2d Battalion offloaded for training at the SLF Camp from mid- to late August, reembarking on 30 August. ARG/SLF monthly cycles were occasionally altered with visits to other ports.85

From January to March 1971, the SLF, which had been redesignated to the 31st Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) in late 1970, provided limited support for two operations in Vietnam, which differed from its normal monthly posting in Vietnam’s coastal waters. The flagship of ARG Alpha (TG 76.4) USS Iwo Jima (LPH 2) and the USS Cleveland (LPD 7) lent minor helicopter and communications assistance to the ARVN in Operation Cuu Long 44/02 in MR 4 during mid-January. Marine Helicopters of Lieutenant Colonel Herbert M. Herther’s HMM-165, operating from the Iwo Jima, flew a few logistical missions “between the Iwo Jima and the Cleveland, or between the ships and Phu Quoc Island,” which is in the Gulf of Thailand just off the coast of Cambodia. No SLF ground forces participated in the operation, and no Marine casualties were sustained.86

The 31st MAU also participated in Operation Lam Son 719* in February and March 1971, feinting an amphibious raid in the vicinity of the NVA airfield at Vinh, located along the coast of North Vietnam, in “order to influence a change in the disposition of enemy forces operating in Southern NVN [North Vietnam].” The 31st MAU was ordered to begin an emergency backload on 1 February on board ARG Alpha shipping, the full nature of the alert not yet having been received. Colonel Lawrence A. Marousek, the MAU commander, conferred with Rear Admiral Walter D. Gaddis, CTF-76, on board the USS Paul Revere (APA 248) on 6 February regarding the SLF’s role in Lam Son 719 and that same day published an operation order with the following mission statement:

- . . . conduct raid against air facilities at Vinh airfield
- . . . alternate mission is to conduct raid against Port of Quang Khe to destroy one or more of the following: ferry . . . SW Radar Site . . . Cuu Dinh POL storage and terminal facilities south . . . and to interdict lines of communication.

The concept of operations of the order specified that the “length of time ashore [would be] less than 24 hours” and restricted to daylight hours. Lieutenant Colonel Francis X. Frey, commanding the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, and Lieutenant Colonel Herther, not knowing until long after embarkation that the raid would be a feint, extended rotation tour dates* of their Marines until special operations in conjunction with Lam Son 719 were complete.87

Daily rehearsals were conducted from a holding area in the Gulf of Tonkin from 17 February to 6 March. The rehearsals included extensive communications exercises for the MAU and ARG staffs and mock assault lifts, without boarding helicopter teams, from the Iwo Jima and Cleveland. On 4 March, Admiral Bernard A. Clarey (CinCPacFlt), Vice Admiral Maurice F. Weisner (ComSeventhFlt) and Rear Admiral Gaddis (CTF-76) received a briefing and observed rehearsals and then, satisfied, departed. The ARG Alpha/31st MAU role in Lam Son 719 was terminated on 7 March when ARG Alpha steamed for Okinawa where 1st Battalion, 9th Marines would replace the 3d Battalion.88

Following the feint at Vinh during Lam Son 719, the 31st MAU returned to its usual monthly cycle from March through June when the 3d MAB finally redeployed. Only from mid- to late May was the cycle appreciably altered when at the request of CinCPacFlt the MAU was placed on 72-hour response time rather than 120. This temporary adjustment resulted from FMFPac’s desire to have the SLF “backstop” 3d MAB while it was standing down. As a prelude to CinCPacFlt’s decision, Major General Arthur H. Adams, Deputy Commanding General, FMFPac, advised Lieutenant General William K. Jones, Commanding General, FMFPac, on 23 April that 3d MAB was concerned about its increasing vulnerability to enemy attack from 8 May onward as principal MAB combat units (1st Marines, VMA-311, VMA(AW)-225) stood down for increment VII redeployment. Adams said

*For details on Lam Son 719 see Chapter 11.
that the MAB's ability to defend itself was much reduced during the final redeployment period. According to Lieutenant General Jones informed Lieutenant General Robertson, Commanding General, III MAF, that he was "concerned about the possibility of VC/NVA initiated actions directed at inflicting a significant loss upon 3d MAB during the critical embarkation period of Increment VII." Jones recommended that at the 26-30 April Seventh Fleet Conference, plans be made to ensure that American forces were in the "best possible posture" to respond quickly and effectively to needs in Vietnam.  

Admiral Clarey requested that ARG Alpha/31st MAU assume a 72-hour reaction time to MR 1 beginning 12 May, subject to continuing evaluation of risks in I Corps as 3d MAB redeployed and the Army's 196th Brigade assumed responsibility for security of the entire Da Nang TAOR. Operating under this new requirement, the 31st MAU commanded by Colonel Robert R. Dickey III, including the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Fitz W. M. Woodrow, Jr., and Lieutenant Colonel Alvah J. Kettering's HMM-164, reloaded on board ships of ARG Alpha on 19 May80 The 31st MAU took station in Vietnam's coastal waters on 21 May and then directed to conduct "a communications exercise, and flight operations using maximum helicopters available" to accentuate the MAU presence in Vietnam waters during what was considered a critical period. Concurrent with 31st MAU's operations off the coast, Colonel Dickey and Captain J. O'Neil, CTG 76.4, flew from the flagship, USS New Orleans (LPH 11), to make a liaison visit with Major General Armstrong, Commanding General, 3d MAB, in Da Nang. Following this visit and the completion of amphibious exercises at sea, the ARG steamed for Taiwan.81

From 1-30 June 1971, the 72-hour response time for the SLF was again extended to the normal 120 hours as the 3d MAB population ashore dwindled and the 196th Brigade became progressively more familiar with defense plans for the Da Nang TAOR.82 The SLF played an important role, particularly during March-June 1971, although it was never committed ashore. General Armstrong later noted:

... I must say this: It was always a comfort to Commandant, particularly during the withdrawal phase. I remember an awful lot of message traffic in which the commandant of MACV was reluctant to let the SLF get very far away when people were closing down along the beach. He wanted... the flexibility where he could run the SLF up and down the coast and quickly put it where it could be used. I think that's the best argument you could make for it.83

Marines on the MACV Staff

The Marine Corps was well represented among the principal staff positions in MACV during 1970-1971. Brigadier General William F. Dochler, Deputy J-3, MACV, headed the list of senior Marine officers in key staff billets in late 1970 and early 1971. Other officers among the 245 Marines in MACV* in January 1971 were Colonel Jack W. Dindinger, Director, Combined Intelligence Center, J-2; Colonel Robert R. Baker, Chief, Special Operations Division; Colonel David A. Clement, Chief, Research and Analysis Division; Colonel James P. Kelly, Chief Plans and Requirements Division, J-4; Colonel Joseph KoHer, Jr., Chief, U.S. and SEATO Division, J-4; Colonel Verle E. Ludwig, Deputy Information Officer; Colonel Anthony Walker, Chief of the Command Center; and Colonel Francis W. Tief, Senior Marine Advisor, Navy Advisory Group.84

The size of Marine representation, officers and enlisted men, on the MACV staff varied during the course of the war. In March 1966, a year after the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade landed at Da Nang, 41 officers and 45 enlisted Marines served on the staff. A year later the Marine Corps had 82 officers and 199 enlisted Marines assigned. In January 1969 total Marine strength on the MACV staff had fallen to 157, then jumped to 278 the next year. From that point forward, during the final 18 months of III MAF redeployment, Marine representation generally declined, leaving 186 Marine officers and enlisted men by 30 June 1971.85

Marine officers on the MACV staff characterized interservice relationships as very professional during this period and, generally, devoid of service parochialism for a number of reasons. "We all got along very well,"
recalled Colonel Ludwig, "General Abrams was outstanding at getting good cooperative work from everybody." In addition, the demanding roles of officers in principal staff positions lessened the tendency toward parochialism among Marine officers and the officers of the other Services. Colonel Ludwig said that staff officers "worked such long hours" that there was "little time for socializing." The fact that "Marines were parceled all over town" in and around Saigon also "controlled relationships." While many senior staff officers lived in a trailer camp near MACV Headquarters, Ludwig lived in a "villa area out in Saigon" so that the public information officer could hold once a month "off the record meetings in the villa" with the press.66

The work of Marine officers in MACV was, in some cases, distinctly different from previous staff experiences. Colonel Dindinger directed the Combined Intelligence Center (CICV) along with his Vietnamese counterpart, Lieutenant Colonel Le Nuyen Binh, from June 1970 to June 1971. Working under the Director of Intelligence Production, J-2, MACV, Colonel Charles E. Wilson, U.S. Army, Dindinger and Binh coordinated the efforts of a staff of 500, "of which 300 were U.S. and 200 ARVN at the start of the period, while as a function of Vietnamization this ratio was reversed by the end of the period." Dindinger described the function of CICV as the "provision of finished intelligence to ComUSMACV, the MACV staff and subordinate U.S., ROK, Australian and New Zealand field forces." Eight subordinate branches were tasked functionally to process information: Administration, Supply, Order of Battle, Area Analysis, Pattern Analysis, Imagery Interpretation, Captured Material Exploitation, and Intelligence Data Bank (IBM 360). Dindinger later explained the organization:

Each of these branches contained a U.S. and an ARVN component that physically worked side by side, and each had a U.S. and ARVN branch head. This arrangement which was in effect when I arrived, was continued during my tour, and tended to be synergistic as to results.

CICV products generally fell into two forms, "responses to specific requests or regular periodic reports." Pattern Analyses requested from commands in all four Corps areas were among the common specific requests, while enemy base area studies were representative of the regular periodic reports. Among the one-time CICV efforts during 1970-1971 were the temporary assignment of a lieutenant colonel of CICV to the military component of the U.S. delegation to the Paris Peace Talks "to provide intelligence input" and the exploitation of previously unexamined Chinese Communist "antiaircraft material from Cambodia after friendly access to that country had been gained."87

Colonel Richard H. Rainforth filled the unique billets of liaison officer to MACV and, separately, to Seventh Air Force through August 1970. As liaison for MACV, Rainforth and his successors—Colonel Lewis C. Street III until 4 October 1970, then Colonel Stephen G. Warren until III MAF redeployed in April 1971—provided personnel support for transient Marines passing through Saigon and protocol for all visitors with Marine Corps interest. Technical representatives from defense contractors and civilian attorneys representing Marines in Vietnam were among those in the latter category. Rainforth also provided Marine Corps representation on various boards, councils, and committees, whose interests ranged from matters dealing with the Vietnam regional exchange to auditing commercial entertainment to determine "suitability, classification, and how much they should be paid." As liaison to Seventh Air Force, Rainforth and his successors were III MAF and 1st MAW's point men on all aviation matters. They were, for example, the intermediaries on flight safety investigations of joint concern and on the crucial subject of "single management," they were readily available to present the Marine Corps view when issues arose.
Rainforth said that his job was simplified tremendously by the other Marine officers, especially the lieutenant colonels, on the MACV staff. “These people were terrific,” said Rainforth. “They would call me every time there was a ripple, trying to keep it from becoming a wave . . . and I’d journey up to Da Nang . . . to carry messages back and forth and see what the feeling was up there.” Colonel Rainforth also lauded the Marines in Saigon for the quality of their joint service, saying, “they’re never going to knock [the Marine Corp’s] joint representation.”

Senior Marine officers on the MACV staff echoed Rainforth’s view of the performance of Marines and the officers of other services with MACV. “The staff worked well,” recalled Ludwig. “I shared the general impression that General Abrams was an amazing and phenomenal individual, and relationships were all very professional.” Colonel Dindinger later voiced the same opinion:

My strongest remaining impression is that of the high degree of cooperation and harmony which was maintained. CICV had U.S. Marines, soldiers, sailors and airmen, as well as Vietnamese soldiers and civilians, working together on difficult problems with short deadlines, and the level of acrimony and friction was consistently minimal.

Embassy Marines

Company E, Marine Security Guard (MSG) Battalion, fielded an average of five officers and 145 enlisted Marines during the first half of 1970 to protect the American Embassy in Saigon. In contrast, Company C, which was headquartered in Manila, Republic of the Philippines, deployed about 120 Marines in 14 locations throughout Southeast Asia, including a detachment of five Marines in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Activated on 1 February 1969, Company E was commanded from January to November 1970 by Captain Herbert M. Steigelman, Jr.

Primary responsibilities of Company E were to safeguard classified material and protect American personnel and property at the Embassy. To accomplish this mission the company was organized into three elements: a headquarters section of two officers and 10 enlisted Marines; an interior guard force of two officers and 90 enlisted Marines; and an exterior guard force of one officer and 46 enlisted Marines.

Exterior security would normally be the responsibility of the host country. Company E was the first Marine Security Guard unit tasked to provide external security—essentially a tactical mission in Saigon—to an American Embassy. Partially as a result of the attack on the American Embassy during Tet 1968, a reinforced rifle platoon was formed to control access into the compound and provide a reaction force in the event of another attack. Unlike the exterior guard force, the two platoons assigned to interior guard duty were trained Marine security guards. In addition, a detachment of seven Marines was selected as the Ambassador’s Personal Security Unit (PSU). The PSU provided compound security and conducted route reconnaissance when the Ambassador left the compound. All posts, vehicles, and buildings in the compound were connected by a sophisticated communications system, known as the “Dragon Net,” which was manned by a five-man detachment.

Dignitaries and senior ranking officers were provided security by Company E Marines during official visits to the American Embassy. From 1-2 January 1970, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew met with Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and other officials during a brief stay in Vietnam. General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, Joseph W. Daily, toured Company E’s area on 9 January. In July, Secretary of State William Rogers stayed with the Ambassador for three days, and in August, Vice President Agnew returned again for another two days of meetings with Ambassador Bunker.

During 1971 the average monthly strength of Company E was five officers and 150 enlisted Marines, representing an increase of about 10 men from 1970. The personnel change was brought about by added security responsibilities. In May 1971 five Marines were sent to Da Nang on temporary additional duty to establish external security functions for the American consulate there. An additional five Marines reinforced the security element in June when the Marine Security Guard Detachment at the American consulate was formally activated. The Da Nang detachment was comprised of one NCO and nine watchstanders who were under the operational control of the consulate general and the administrative control of Company E.

Embassy Marines were involved in civic action programs, as virtually all other Marine units in Vietnam. Company E held a party on 24 December 1970 for the Vietnamese children of the Go Van Number II Orphanage. The children were fed at the Marshall Hall enlisted quarters and later at Marine House Number Two were presented with gifts by Santa Claus. The gifts were donated by personnel of USAID, the Embassy,
and JUSPAO. Four months later, Company E assumed sponsorship of My Hoa Orphanage. On Easter Sunday 1971, Embassy Marines visited the children of the orphanage, bringing gifts of food, clothing, and toys which had been shipped by the American Legion auxiliaries of Punta Gorda and Naples, Florida, and by the citizens and merchants of Immokalee, Florida through the efforts of the mother of Company E's Gunnery Sergeant Robert M. Jenkins.

Although Marines were screened closely for security guard duty, Company E, like all other sizeable Marine commands in Vietnam, had its share of discipline and drug problems. From January to June 1971, Captain William E. Keller, Jr., who took command in November 1970, conducted company-level nonjudicial punishment on 27 Marines, while two more Marines were dealt with at battalion level. Five of the Marines disciplined were ultimately removed from duty when found unsuitable for retention in the Marine Security Guard program. An additional five Marines during the same period were recommended for discharge by reason of unfitness for possession of dangerous drugs.*

On 29 April 1971 at the American Embassy Compound, the Chief of Missions, Saigon, Vietnam, the Honorable Ellsworth Bunker, presented the Meritorious Unit Commendation to Company E "for meritorious service as the immediate defense and security force for the U.S. Mission, Saigon, Republic of Vietnam, from 1 February 1969 to 31 December 1970." Two months after the Ambassador presented the award, Company E joined Sub-Unit One, 1st ANGLICO, and the Marine Advisory Unit as the only U.S. Marine commands remaining in Vietnam. The MSG detachment in Saigon, which would be transferred on 30 June 1974 to Company C, headquartered in Hong Kong, would ultimately be the last American unit evacuated from South Vietnam on 30 April 1975, nearly four years after the Marine Corps tactical role ended in that country.**

Conclusion

With President Nixon's commitment to the American public to reduce troop levels in Vietnam, the Marine presence decreased in strength from some 55,000 to a mere few hundred between January 1970 and June 1971.

Throughout the redeployment cycle, two significant fundamental features of the large-scale Marine presence in Vietnam remained constant: the essential air-ground character of Marine units and the focus on small-unit counter guerrilla tactics. A Marine air-ground team existed until the final redeployment of the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade in June 1971. Building on the tactical successes of 1968-1969, which had left the enemy battered and exhausted, III MAF, now concentrated in the Da Nang TAOR, stepped up its grassroots counter guerrilla campaign. The Marines expanded the Combined Action Platoon concept—incorporating Marine infantry companies—with the Combined Unit Pacification Program. To enhance mobility and to facilitate controlling areas of operation with fewer forces during the latter stages of redeployment, Marine infantry regiments requested and received helicopter detachments which were prepositioned with ground forces to expedite response time to enemy contacts or sightings.

The enemy was on the defensive during the last 18 months of Marine operations. Although the pacification goals established for 1970 by MACV were not entirely met, the steady decline in VC/NVA offensive activity from 1970-1971 and the return to terrorism and subversion, combined with the enemy's reliance on indirect fire and limited objective ground attacks, gave indication the enemy was either hurting or bidding his time as redeployment proceeded.

Vietnamization was given increased emphasis during this period. General Abrams' "One War" strategy of 1968-1969, which emphasized that the small-unit counter guerrilla war and the big-unit war were mutually supportive and interdependent, was continued in 1970-1971 with the RVNAF assuming proportionately greater responsibilities as American forces redeployed. To better pursue the goals of Vietnamization, the size of the RVNAF increased progressively. By June 1971 the ARVN, VNN, VNMC, RFs and PFs of the RVNAF numbered 1,058,237.

General Lam, who commanded Vietnamese forces operating in the five provinces of I Corps, maneuvered 36 ARVN infantry battalions, 5 ARVN cavalry battalions, and 5 VNMC infantry battalions during the final months of Marine redeployment in 1971. In addition to the U.S. Army forces remaining in I Corps following the departure of the Marines, the Vietnamese regulars were augmented by the RFs and PFs,
which Marine CAP and CUPP units had tried to develop into independent and self-sufficient units. While General Lam's forces were much improved, they were still relatively limited in number to control effectively a military region that was 220 miles long and from 30-75 miles wide. In spite of that, the ARVN seemed to be holding their own as Marine redeployment moved forward, and the RFs and PFs began to conduct more offensive operations. There were still ominous indicators that, while the enemy appeared to be in decline, the GVN had demonstrated only limited capability of winning the war with far less American assistance.

As measures of RVNAF progress, the allied offensives into enemy sanctuaries within the boundaries of border nations during 1970-1971 achieved some success but also demonstrated Vietnamese weakness and left lingering doubts whether the escalating pace of redeployment was compatible with the progress of Vietnamization. The invasion of base areas in Cambodia in 1970 cost the enemy dearly in men, arms, ammunition, and supplies and rendered him temporarily incapable of mounting an offensive. The South Vietnamese move into Laos in February and March 1971 was less successful, even though MACV estimated that the NVA lost some 13,000 killed to the RVNAF's reported 1,500.

Evaluating the VNMC performance in Laos during Operation Lam Son 719, American Marine advisors observed that the companies and battalions fought well, but the brigades and the division exhibited many of the deficiencies apparent in other Vietnamese forces. Relative to the progress of Vietnamization, therefore, Lam Son 719 showed clearly that body counts and other statistical measurements of battlefield performance could not necessarily be translated into conclusions concerning operational success or failure. In the broader analysis Lam Son 719 unveiled the grave weakness that Marines had observed in the RVNAF in large-scale operations: the inadequacies in high level staff work; the questionable ability to maneuver effectively units of greater than battalion size; the reluctance of commanders to delegate authority to staffs; the absence of long-range logistical planning; the disregard for the rudiments of supply discipline; and the inability to exercise communications security. Lam Son 719 also revealed the technological dependence—tactically and logistically—that the United States had bred into the RVNAF.

For the U.S. Marines this 18-month period was one of dramatic change, aside from the total draw-down of the remaining 55,000 Marines in III MAF. Lieutenant General John R. Chaisson, who was Chief of Staff, Headquarters Marine Corps in May 1971, remarked of this stage of the war, "We had adopted, from 1969 on, the idea that we were in the postwar period."

Following the redeployment of 1969, the focus in 1970-1971 for the Marine Corps, therefore, was finely balanced between maintaining tactical control of Marine areas of operation while encouraging Vietnamization, and conducting a systematic and orderly redeployment, a gargantuan task, especially for logisticians.

Acting on General Chapman's guidance to take every item worth five dollars or more with them, III MAF logistical planners meticulously inspected and inventoried material, dismantled installations, redistributed equipment, and transferred facilities and real estate from January 1970 to June 1971. The III MAF Redistribution Center, created in May 1970 to reduce excesses of equipment before the redeployment, coordinated the transfer of Marine Corps gear valued at $50,409,000 and numbering over 325,000 separate items. Most of these went from Vietnam to Marine commands, ranging from the Western Pacific to the west coast of the United States. The 3d MAB ended ground combat operations, other than local security around installations, on 7 May 1971. Within three weeks Marine combat air operations ceased and by 4 June all Marine real estate had been turned over to either the ARVN or the U.S. Army. The last units of the 3d MAB left Vietnam by sea and air on 25 and 26 June. Only Sub-Unit One, 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company; the Marine Advisory Unit; the Embassy Marines; a handful of technicians; and Marines on the MACV staff remained. For the Marine Corps, the war reverted to an advisory effort.
Notes

PART I
A Contracting War

CHAPTER 1
THE WAR IN I CORPS, EARLY 1970


III MAF in January 1970

1. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70, p. 32; FMFPac ComdC, Jan-Jun 70; III MAF 4th Quarterly Written Summary, Combined Campaign Plan 1969, dtd 17Jan70, Encl 8, 1st MarDiv Admin Files; hereafter 4th Quarterly Plan, 1969; Combined Action Force ComdC, Jan70.
5. MACV ComdHist 1969, I, ch. IV, pp. 1-5; FMFPac ComdC, Jan-Jun70.
6. Biographical Files (RefSec, MCHC); LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr., intvw, Jan73, (Oral HistColl, MCHC) hereafter Nickerson intvw.
10. Simpson Debrief.

Allied and Enemy Strategy, 1969-1970

11. A convenient statement of the Marine concept of the relationship between pacification and large-unit operations can be found in FMFPac, MarOpsV, pp. 4-5.

12. MajGen Lloyd B. Ramsey, USA, Comments on draft ms, 2Jun83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Ramsey Comments.
17. All of these plans are summarized in Ibid, I, ch. II, pp. 1-8, and II, ch. VII, 1-2.

The III MAF/ICTZ Combined Plan for 1970

All material in this section is drawn from the III MAF/ICTZ Combined Campaign Plan 1970, dtd 13Dec69, hereafter III MAF/ICTZ Combined Campaign Plan 1970. Footnote citations in this section refer to the plan and list only locations of the material within the plan.

Troop Redeployment—Keystone Bluejay

25. LtGen Leo J. Dulacki, comments on draft ms, 8Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Dulacki Comments.
26. LtGen Leo J. Dulacki, USMC (Ret), intvw 24Oct74, pp. 91-2, 97-8 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Dulacki intvw.
27. Col Floyd Waldrop, comments on draft ms, 16Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Waldrop Comments.
29. HQMC Messages; New York Times, 7Nov69, and 5 Dec69.
30. Dulacki intvw, pp. 96-98, HQMC Messages; Dulacki Comments.
32. HQMC Messages; LtGen William J. Van Ryzin, intvw, 20Apr71, p. 63 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
33. Dulacki Comments.

34. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, pp. 64-65. The 26th Marines was attached to the 1st Marine Division, but the tank, engineer, amphibian tractor, reconnaissance, and other elements which would be attached to it to form an RLT had been designated in advance so that they quickly could be detached from their parent formations to establish the RLT. Col Ralph A. Heywood, debriefing at
VIETNAMIZATION AND REDEPLOYMENT

FMFPac, dtd 15Dec69, Tape 4732 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Heywood Debrief.


36. III MAF OPlan 183-69, dtd 1Sept69; USMC Fact Sheet on Personnel Policy in Keystone Bluejay, dtd Jan70.


38. FMFPac, MarOpsV, pp. 27-28, 30; 1st MAW ComdC, Jan70, Feb70.

39. FMFPac ComdC, Jan-Jun70, pp. 43-44; FMFPac, MarOpsV, p. 29; CAF ComdC, Mar70.

The Change of Command in I Corps

Additional sources for this section are from III MAF AAR, Opn Cavalier Beach, dtd 18Apr70, hereafter Cavalier Beach AAR.


41. III MAF ComdC, Jan70, p. 7.

42. XXIV Corps Hist 68, pp. 5-11, 14-17, 20-24, 86-87.

43. ComUSMACV memo to CCHMAF and other commanders, Subj: Reduction in Force, dtd 3Aug69, III MAF Admin Files.

44. CCHMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 14Aug69; ComUSMACV msg to CCHMAF, dtd 23Aug69 in III MAF Admin Files.

45. CG III MAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 7Feb70, III MAF Admin Files.

46. Cavalier Beach AAR; Draft Terms of Reference for III MAF, dtd 7Feb70, III MAF Admin Files.

47. MACV, Draft of Proposed Changes to Directive 10-11, dtd 16Feb70, III MAF Admin Files.

48. Col George C. Fox, debriefing at FMFPac, 6May70, Tape 4807, (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Fox Debrief.

49. Dulacki intvw, pp. 105-107.

50. Dulacki Comments.

51. Cavalier Beach AAR.

52. CAF ComdC, Mar and Sept 70.

53. Asst C/S, G-3, III MAF memo to CGIIIMAF, dtd 16Feb70; Cavalier Beach AAR.

54. BGen Leo J. Dulacki, debriefing at FMFPac, Jun70, Tape 4853 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Dulacki Debrief and Dulacki Comments.

55. Ibid and Dulacki intvw, pp. 113-114.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. XXIV Corps OpO 2-C-70 (Cavalier Beach), dtd 1Feb70.

59. Col Herbert L. Wilkerson, debriefing at FMFPac, 13Jul70, Tape 4892, (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Wilkerson Debrief.

60. III MAF ComdC, Mar70, p. 8.


63. III MAF ComdC, Apr70, p. 16.

64. Dulacki Debrief; Cavalier Beach AAR.

65. Dulacki Comments.

66. Ibid.

67. Wilkerson Debrief; Dulacki Debrief.

68. Dulacki Debrief.

69. Ibid.

70. Dulacki Comments.

CHAPTER 2

THE WAR CONTINUES

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from:

III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Jun70; 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Jun70; MACV ComdHist, 1970; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Jun70; Simmons, "Marine Operations."

Overview and the Defense of Da Nang

Additional material to the above for this section includes: 1st Mar ComdCs, Jan-Jun70; 5th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Jun70; 7th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Jun70; 26th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Mar70; 11th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Jun70.


2. Ibid., III, pp. E10-E12; Fox Debrief.


4. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70, pp. 17-18, Feb70, pp. 16-19.

5. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb70, pp. 19-20.


7. General Officer Biographical File, (RefSec, MCHC), hereafter, General Officer Bio File.


10. 1stMarDiv OpO 301A-YR, dtd 16Dec70, Anx C.

11. Ibid.


14. 1st Mar Div G-2 Overview, 30Jun70 and 1st Mar Div G-2 Overview, 31Dec70, both in 1stMarDiv Documents; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Jun70.


17. RVN JGS Memo dtd 7Feb69, in 1stMarDiv Documents; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul70, p. 22; LtCol William Blakely, Jr., USA, Deputy Province Senior Advisor, memo to CCHMAF, dtd 24Apr70 (McCutcheon Papers); Col Noble L. Beck, debriefing at FMFPac, 16Jul70, Tape 4893 (OralHistColl, MCHC); Col Floyd H. Waldrop, Debriefing at FMFPac, 19Aug70, Tape 4926 (OralHistColl, MCHC), hereafter Waldrop Debrief.


The Inner Defenses: Northern Sector Defense Command and Southern Sector Defense Command

24. Col William C. Patton, comments on draft ms, 15 Apr 83 (Vietnam Comment File) and 11th Mar ComdC, Mar-Apr 70.
25. 11th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Jun 70.
26. 1st Tank Bn ComdCs, Jan-Feb 70; for the attack on Op Piranha, see 1st Tank Bn Jnl 4 Jan 70.
27. 1st Tank Bn ComdC, Mar 70; 1/5 ComdCs, Mar-Jun 70.

The 1st and 26th Marines: The Rocket Belt

Additional material in this section is drawn from: 1st Mar ComdCs, Jan-Jun 70 and 26th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Mar 70.

29. CO 26th Mar rpt to CG lstMarDiv, dtd 22 Jan 70; Col Ralph A. Heywood Debrief.
30. LtCol Pieter L. Hogaboom, comments on draft ms, 10 Jun 83 (Vietnam Comment File).
31. 26th Mar ComdC, Jan 70; 1/26, 2/26, 3/26 ComdCs, Jan-Feb 70; Heywood Debrief.
32. 1/26 ComdC, Jan 70, p. III-2.
33. 1/1, 2/1, 3/1 ComdCs, Jan-Feb 70; FMFPac, Mar Ops V, Jan 70, p. 3.
34. Wilkerson Debrief.
35. FMFPac, Mar Ops V, Jan 70, p. 3; 2/26 ComdC, Jan 70, pt. III; 3/26 ComdC, Feb 70, pt II; LtCol Godfrey S. Delcuze, intvw by 1st Mar Div Historical Team, 13 Feb 70, Tape 4768, and 1stLt William R. Purdy, intvw by 1st Mar Div Historical Team, 11 Feb 70, Tape 4768 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Delcuze intvw or Purdy intvw.
36. Wilkerson Debrief.
37. Purdy intvw; HMM-263 ComdC, Jan-Jul 70; pp. 2, 10. During January LtCol Warren G. Cretney's HML-367 (Cobras) also flew in support of Kingfisher patrols; see HML-367 ComdC, Jan-Jul 70, p. 4.
38. Purdy intvw.
40. Dalton intvw.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Purdy intvw; 1/1 ComdC, Jan-Jul 70, Spt Rpt No. 37.
44. Delcuze intvw; Purdy intvw.
45. Col William V. H. White, comments on draft ms, 6 Jul 83 (Vietnam Comment File).
46. 1st Mar ComdC, Mar 70; 26th Mar ComdC, Feb-Mar 70; 1/26 and 2/26 ComdCs, Feb-Mar 70.
47. 3/26 ComdC, Feb-Mar 70; 5/1 ComdC, Mar 70.
48. 26th Mar ComdC, Mar 70.
CHAPTER 3

THE CAMBODIA INVASION AND CONTINUED REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING, APRIL-JULY 1970

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is drawn from MACV ComdHist 70, I, III, and Supplement; and FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-July 70.

The War Spreads into Cambodia

2. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May70, pp. 33-34, Jun70, p. 36.
3. Col G. C. Fox, debriefing at FMFPac, 6May70, Tape 4806 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Fox Debrief.
5. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May70, pp. 10, 24-25; Jun70, p. 16.

Redeployment Planning Accelerates: Keystone Robin Alpha

7. HQMC Message Files.
8. MACV ComdHist 70, I, ch. 4, p. 11; Supplement, p. 9.
9. HQMC Message Files; Maj R. J. Johnson, memo for the record, Subj : Meeting with MACV J-3, dtd 29May70, and memo for the record, Subj: Telecon with LtCol Doublet, dtd 30May70, in III MAF G-3 Keystone Robin File, hereafter III MAF G-3 KSR.
11. III MAF, memo for the record, Subj: Redeployment/Reassignment of III MAF Elements, dtd 30May70, in III MAF G-3 KSR.
12. Dulacki Comments.
13. HQMC Message Files; III MAF, memo for the record, Subj: Redeployment Planning-Keystone Robin, dtd 16Jun70, in III MAF G-3 KSR.
14. ComUSMACV msg to III MAF and Other Commands, dtd 23Jun70, in III MAF G-3 KSR.
15. CinCPac msg to III MAF and Other Commands, dtd 19Jun70 and CinCPac msg to Pacific Commands, dtd 11Jul70, in III MAF G-3 KSR.
PART II
Summer and Fall-Winter Campaigns, 1970

Chapter 4
The Summer Campaign in Quang Nam, July-September 1970

New Campaign Plans

Unless otherwise noted, all material in this chapter is drawn from MACV ComdHist, 70, I, III, and Supplement; and FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jul 70.

1. MACV ComdHist, 70, I, ch. 2, pp. 9-11.
2. Ibid., II, ch. 7, pp. 16-20, ch. 14, pp. 1-4; Beck Debrief.
3. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul 70, p. 22; Beck Debrief; Waldrop Debrief; Dulacki Debrief.
5. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul 70, p. 2; HQMC Message Files.

Summer Offensive: The 7th Marines in Pickens Forest

Additional sources for this section are: 7th Marines ComdC, Jul-Sep 70; 7th Marines CAAR, Operation Pickens Forest, dtd 18 Sep 70, hereafter 7th Mar PF CAAR; Col E. G. Derning, Jr., debriefing at FMFPac, 10 Aug 70, Tape 4958 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Derning Debrief.

6. Derning Debrief.
7. 2/7 ComdC, Jul 70; Sgt T. R. Carl, intvw with 1st Mar Div Historical Team, 17 Jul 70, Tape 4901 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); Derning Debrief.
8. 1st Mar Div G-2, Briefing Notes, Subj: Enemy Logistics System in Quang Nam Prov, dtd 30 Jun 70, in 1st Mar Div Documents; Briefing Notes, Subj: Enemy BAs 112 and 127, dtd 30 Jul 70, 1st Mar Div Documents.
9. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul 70, pp. 3, 22-23; 5th Marines ComdC, Jul 70; Beck Debrief; Waldrop Debrief.
12. 7th Mar OpO 3-70, dtd 10 Jul 70, Anx C, in 7th Mar PF CAAR.
13. For details of the reconnaissance activities, see patrol reports Air Hose (15-16 Jul 70) and May Fly (15-16 Jul 70) in 1st Recon Bn, Patrol Reports, Jul 70.
15. 3/11 ComdC, Jul 70.
16. 2/7 CAAR, Opn Pickens Forest, dtd 31 Aug 70, hereafter 2/7 PF CAAR, in 7th Marines PF CAAR.
17. Derning Debrief.
18. Ibid.; 7th Marines PF CAAR.
20. 1/7 ComdC, Jul 70; 2/7 PF CAAR; 1/5 ComdC, Jul 70; 11th Mar ComdC, Jul 70; 3/11 ComdC, Jul 70.
21. 2/7 ComdC, Jul 70; Lt Col Omer L. Gibson, intvw by 1st MAW Historical Team, 3 Aug 70, Tape 4942 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) gives an AO's view of the action.
22. 1/5 ComdC and Staff Jnl, Jul 70.

NOTES
27. 2/7 Jnl, 21Aug70, in 2/7 ComdC, Aug70.
28. 2/7 PF CAAR.
29. 3/11 ComdC, Aug70; 2/7 PF CAAR, 7th Mar PF CAAR, pp. 5-7.
30. 7th Mar PF CAAR, pp. 14-16.
31. Ibid., pp. 1, 11, 14, 20.
32. Waldrop Debrief.
33. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul70, pp. 22-23, Aug70, pp. 7-8, 26; Waldrop Debrief.

The 1st and 5th Marines Continue the Small-Unit War

Additional materials for this section are: 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jul-Sep70; 1st Mar ComdC, Jul-Sep70; and 5th Mar ComdC, Jul-Sep70.

34. 1stMarDiv FragO 35-70, dtd 1Aug70, in 2/1 ComdC, Aug70.
35. 1stMarDiv, Division Sensor Briefing, dtd 12Dec70, 1stMarDiv Documents; LtCol C. M. Mosher, debriefing at FMFPac, dtd 17Sep70, Tape 4959 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
36. 1/1 ComdC, Jul-Sep70; 2/1 ComdC, Jul-Sep70; 3/1 ComdC, Jul-Sep70.
37. 2/1 ComdC, Sep70.
38. The account of this operation is based on: 2/1 CAAR, dtd 5Aug70, in 2/1 ComdC, Aug70; 2/1 ComdC, Jul70; 1st Mar ComdC, Aug70; Maj J. S. Grinalds, debriefing at FMFPac, 4May71, Tape 4967 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), Grinalds Debrief.
39. 2/1 CAAR, dtd 5Aug70, in 2/1 ComdC, Aug70.
40. 1st Mar ComdC, Sep70; 11th Marines ComdC, Sep70; 3/1 ComdC, Sep70.
41. 5th Mar ComdC, Jul and Aug70.
42. Waldrop Debrief.
43. LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, Comments on draft ms, 17Oct83 (Vietnam Comment File).
44. 1/5 ComdCs, Jul-Sep70.
45. 2/5 and 3/5 ComdCs, Jul-Sep70.
46. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jul70, pp. 21-22; 5th Mar ComdC, Jul70; 2/5 ComdC, Jul70.
47. 5th Mar FragO 24-70, dtd 26Jul70, in 5th Mar ComdC, Aug70, p. 23.

Combat Declines, But the Threat Continues

48. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 1-2, Sep70, p. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Sep70, p. 17.
49. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 1-2; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jul-Sep70; III MAF ComdC, Jul-Sep70.
51. Ibid., III, Anx G, pp. 4-9.
53. LtGen John R. Chaisson, Position Paper on Viet Nam, n.d. (ca late70-early71), Item 38, Chaisson Papers (General Officers Collection, MCHC).

Deployment Plans Change: More Marines Stay Longer

54. Van Ryzin Transcript, pp. 3-6.
55. MACV ComdHist, 70, Supplement, pp. 10-11; JCS msg to CINC Pac, dtd 1Aug70; JCS msg to CINC Pac, dtd 4Aug70, in III MAF G-3 KSR.
56. Fox Debrief.
57. Undated notes, Aug 70 in III MAF G-3 KSR; HQMC Message Files.
58. HQMC Message Files; CGIII MAF msg to 1st MAW and 1stMarDiv, dtd 12Sep70, III MAF G-3 KSR.
60. 3d MAB Fact Sheet, Subj: Keyzone Redeployment Update, dtd 1May71, in 1stMarDiv Documents.
61. CGIII MAF msg to CMC, dtd 25Sep70, III MAF G-3 KSR; MACV ComdHist, 70, I, ch. 4, pp. 24-26.
63. HQMC Message Files.

CHAPTER 5

OFFENSIVES AND REDEPLOYMENTS: IMPERIAL LAKE, CATAWBA FALLS, AND KEYSTONE ROBIN ALPHA, JULY-OCTOBER 1970

Unless otherwise noted, material for this chapter is derived from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug and Sep70; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Aug70; 7th Mar ComdC, Aug70; Derning Debrief; Col Ralph E. Estey, debriefing at FMFPac, dtd 14Dec70, Tape 4979 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Estey Debrief.

Preliminaries to Imperial Lake

1. Derning Debrief.
2. Estey Debrief.
3. Derning Debrief.
4. 3/7 FragO 3-70, dtd 20Jun70, in 3/7 ComdC, Jun70; Derning Debrief.
5. 3/7 ComdC, Jun70.
7. 7th Mar FragO 35-70, dtd 23Aug70, in 7th Mar ComdC, Aug70; 1/7 ComdC, Aug-Sep70; 2/7 ComdC, Aug-Sep70; 3/7 ComdC, Aug-Sep70.
9. 7th Mar, Opn Ripley Center CAAR, dtd 27Sep70, Box 12, 1stMarDiv Admin Files; 2/7 ComdC, Aug70; 2/7 Jnl, 30Aug70, in ibid.

Operation Imperial Lake

Additional materials for this section are: 1stMarDiv ComdC, Sep70; 7th Mar ComdC, Sep70.

10. CGIstMarDiv msg to 1stMarDiv, dtd 30Aug70, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Aug70; 7th Mar OP-4-70, dtd 30Aug70, 7th Mar ComdC, Aug70; 2/7, OpP-12-70, dtd 30Aug70, 2/7 ComdC, Aug70.
11. 11th Mar ComdC, Aug70; 3/11 ComdC, Aug70.
13. 2/7 ComdC, Sep70; 1st MAW ComdCs, Aug-Sep70.
14. 2/7 ComdC, Sep70; 2/7 Jnl, 5-12Sep70, in ibid.
15. Ibid.
NOTES

16. 2/7 ComdC, Sep70; for LtCol Albers's comments on the “duck hunter” scheme of maneuver, see 1stMarDiv, Press Release No. 1057-70, dtd 21Oct70, in 1stMarDiv Press Releases, Oct70; see also LtCol Vincent A. Albers, comments on draft ms, 16Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).

17. 3/11 ComdC, Sep70.

18. 3/7 CAAR Opn Nebraska Rapids, dtd 17 Sep70, in 3/7 ComdC, Sep70.

19. 7th Mar ComdC, Sep70; 3/7 ComdC, Sep70; 3/11 ComdC, Sep70.

20. 7th Mar ComdC, Sep70, p. 16; 2/7 ComdC, Sep70; 2/7 Jnl, 18Sep70, in Ibid.

21. 2/7 ComdC, Sep70.

22. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Sep70, pp. 22-23; for the 2d Battalion claims, see 2/7 ComdC, Sep70.

Keystone Robin Alpha Redeployments Begin

Additional materials for this section are: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul-Sep70; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jul-Sep70; 1st MAW ComdC, Jul-Sep70; Simmons, “Marine Operations.”

23. MAG-13 ComdC, Sep70.


25. LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon msg to LtGens Sutherland and Lam, dtd 5Sep70, HQMC Message Files.

26. 1stMarDiv, Warning Order, dtd 3Sep70, in 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 1-5Sep70.

27. 2/7 ComdC, Sep70.


29. Co G/2/5, Cupp Progress Rept for Sep70, dtd 4Oct70, in 2/5 ComdC, Sep70; 1/7 ComdC, Sep70.

Operation Catawba Falls

Additional material for this section is: 2/11 CAAR, Opn Catawba Falls, dtd 9Oct70, Box 12, 1stMarDiv Admin Files, hereafter 2/11 Catawba Falls CAAR.

30. 5th Mar ComdC, Aug70; 3/5 ComdC, Aug70.

31. 3/5 ComdC, Aug70.

32. 1stMarDiv FragO 52-70, dtd 16Sep70, in 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 15-19Sep70.

33. 2/11 Catawba Falls CAAR; 2/11 ComdC, Sep70.


35. 2/11 ComdC, Sep70; 2/11 Catawba Falls CAAR.

The Regiments Realign

36. 1st Mar ComdC, Sep70; 1/1 ComdC, Sep70; 2/1 ComdC, Sep70; 3/1 ComdC, Sep70.

37. 5th Mar ComdC, Sep70; 2/5 ComdC, Sep70; 3/5 ComdC, Sep70; 2/7 ComdC, Sep70.

38. 2/11 ComdC, Sep70; 3/11 ComdC, Sep70.

39. 1/5 ComdC, Sep and Oct70.

40. 7th Mar ComdC, Sep-Oct70; 1/7 ComdC, Sep-Dec70; 2/7 ComdC, Sep and 1-12Oct70; 3/7 ComdC, Sep-Oct70.


42. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct70, pp. 27-29; III MAF ComdC, Oct70, p. 20; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Sep-Oct70.


44. COlstMar msg to 1st Mar, dtd 15Oct70, in 1st Mar ComdC, Oct70; 5th Mar ComdC, Oct70; 2/5 ComdC, Oct70.

CHAPTER 6

THE FALL-WINTER CAMPAIGN IN QUANG NAM, OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1970

Unless otherwise noted, source material for this chapter is drawn from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct-Dec70; III MAF ComdC, Oct-Dec70; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Oct-Dec70; Estey Debrief.

New Campaign Plans and Changes in Tactics

1. XXIV Corps/MR1 Combined Fall-Winter Military Campaign Plan, 1971, dtd 8Sept70, Box 5, 1stMarDiv Admin Files.

2. MACV ComdHist, 70, I, ch. 2, pp. 11-17.

3. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct70, pp. 3-4, 13-14.

4. Estey Debrief.


6. BGen E. H. Simmons memo to CGFMFPac, dtd 24May71; 2/1 ComdC, Sep70.

7. CGlstMarDiv msg to COs, 1st, 5th, 11th Mar, dtd 19Oct70, in 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 20-31Oct70; Col P. X. Kelley hr to CGlstMarDiv, Subj: Restricted Fires on Intel and Preemptive Targets, dtd 20Oct70, Box 6, 1stMarDiv Admin Files; 11th Mar ComdC, Oct-Dec70.

8. LtGen K. B. McCutcheon msg to LtGen W. K. Jones, dtd 2Dec70, HQMC Message Files.


11. 1st Mar ComdC, Nov70.

12. 1st Recon Brn ComdC, Oct70, pt. 2; 1stMarDiv, G-3 Briefing Notes, dtd 5Dec70, in 1stMarDiv Documents.

13. 1stMarDiv FragO 61-70, dtd 18Oct70, in 1stMarDiv ComdC, Oct70; for an account of the 7th Marines' plan, see Derning Debrief.


The Course of the Fall-Winter Campaign

Additional sources for this section are: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct-Dec70; and 1stMarDiv ComdC, Oct-Dec70.
VIETNAMIZATION AND REDEPLOYMENT

18. Col Rex C. Denny, Jr., comments on draft ms, 6Jul83 (Vietnam Comment File); Gen Kenneth McLennan, comments on draft ms, 28Jun83 (Vietnam Comment File).
20. Col John W. Chism, USA, comments on draft ms, 19Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).
21. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct70, pp. 20-21; MAG-16 ComdC, Oct70, pt. II.
33. 1stMarDiv IMP LK Rept; 1/5 ComdC, Nov70, pts. 1 and 2; 2/5 ComdC, Nov70, pts. 2 and 3.
34. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Nov70, pt. 18; LtGen McCutcheon msg to LtGen Jones, dtd 10Nov70, HQMC Message Files; 1/5 ComdC, Nov70, pt. 2.
35. 2/5 ComdC, Nov70, pt. 3; 5th Mar ComdC, Nov70, pt. 2.
36. This quotation, and other biographical material on LtCol Leftwich, is from LtCol William G. Leftwich biographical file (RecSec, MCHC).
38. Col Franklin A. Hart, Jr., comments on draft ms, 5Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).
39. 1stMarDiv, IMP LK Rept; 1st Mar ComdC, Dec70; 2/1 ComdC, Dec70, pt. 3; 1/5 ComdC, Dec70; 2/5 ComdC, Dec70, pt. 2; 3/5 ComdC, pts. 2 and 3.
40. Estey Debrief.
41. 5th Mar ComdC, Dec70, pt. 3; 3/5 (Fwd), Imperial Lake Jnl, 24-25Dec70, in 3/5 ComdC, Dec70.
42. 1st AW ComdC, Oct70, p. 4, Nov70, p. 4, Dec70, p. 4; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov70, pp. 2-3; 3/5 ComdC, Dec70, pt. 3.
43. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Dec70, p. 20.
44. Estey Debrief.
45. 5th Marines in the Lowlands: Noble Canyon and Tulare Falls I and II
46. 2/5 ComdC, Oct-Dec70.
47. 3/5 ComdC, Oct-Dec70.
52. Estey Debrief; 1stMarDiv, G-3 Briefing Notes, dtd 5Dec70, 1stMarDiv Documents.
53. 3/5 Jnl, 3Dec70, in 3/5 ComdC, Dec70.
55. 1st Marines Operations, October-December 1970
56. Additional sources for this section are: 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Oct-Dec70; and 1st Mar ComdCs, Oct-Dec70.
58. 1/1 ComdC, Oct-Nov70.
60. 2/1 ComdC, Oct70; 2/1 FragO 39-70, dtd 10Nov70, tab 2-2 in ibid., Nov70.
61. 2/1 S-2 Jnl, 15-16Nov70, in 2/1 ComdC, Nov70.
62. 2/1 S-2 Jnl, 18Nov70, in 2/1 ComdC, Nov70; see also ibid., pts. 2 and 3; 1st Mar ComdC, Nov70; Grinalds Debrief.
63. 2/1 ComdC, Dec70, p. 3.
64. 3/1 ComdC, Oct-Dec70.
65. Ibid., Nov70, 1st Mar Sitrep, dtd 7Nov70, in 1st Mar ComdC, Nov70.
NOTES

66.  3/1 FragO 44-70, dtd 31Dec70, in 3/1 Command Center, Dec 70.
67.  1st Mar Command Center, Nov-Dec 70; 2/1 S-3 Journal, 28Nov70, in 2/1 Command Center, Nov 70; 1/1 Command Center, Dec 70, pt. 1.
68.  1st Mar Command Center, Oct-Dec 70; 1/1, 2/1, and 3/1 Command Centers, Oct-Dec 70.
69.  1st Mar msg to 2/1, dtd 16Dec70 (passing on message from 1stMarDiv of 13Dec70), tab 4-20, in 2/1 Command Center, Dec 70.
70.  Casualty and rocket statistics are compiled from 1st Mar Command Centers, Oct-Dec 70.

The War in Quang Nam at the End of the Year

71.  1st Mar Division, Command Information Summary, G-1 Section, dtd 31Dec70, 1stMarDiv Documents.
72.  1st Mar Division, G-2 Briefing Notes, dtd 1Dec70; 1stMarDiv Command Information Summary, G-2 Overview, dtd 31Dec70; both in 1stMarDiv Documents; III MAF Command Center, Oct-Dec 70.

PART III

Pacification

CHAPTER 7

PACIFICATION 1970: PLANS, ORGANIZATION, AND PROBLEMS

Unless otherwise noted, the information contained in this chapter is drawn from MACV Command History, 70; FMFPac, March Operations, Jan-Dec 70; and Chester L. Cooper, Judith E. Corson, Laurence J. Legere, David E. Lockwood, and Donald M. Weller, The American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam, 3 vols. (Arlington, Va.: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1972), hereafter IDA Pacification Study. Documents from the supporting material for the latter study will be cited as Pacification Study Docs. This chapter also draws much material from: Col W. W. Hixon, debriefing at FMFPac, 5Oct70, Tape No. 4698 (Oral History Collection, MCHC), hereafter Hixon Debrief; and Col C. J. Peabody, debriefing at FMFPac, 8Sep70, Tape No. 4956 (Oral History Collection, MCHC), hereafter Peabody Debrief.

Pacification: The Nationwide Perspective

4. Ibid., 2, pp. 268-271.

The 1970 GVN Pacification and Development Plan


6. IDA Pacification Study, 3, p. 313.
8. Ibid., pp. 5-12.
9. MACV Command History, 70, II, ch. 8, p. 36.

Pacification Plans and Organization in Military Region 1

All quotations from Colonel Hixson not otherwise footnoted are taken from the Hixson Debrief.

13. The following description of the CORDS organization in ICTZ is drawn from: FMFPac, March Operations, Summary and Overview, pp. 45, 47-48; Hixon Debrief; MACV Command History, 70, II, ch. 7, p. 66.
15. Ibid.
16. LtCol Warren E. Parker, USA, comments on draft ms, 11Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Parker Comments.

Pacification Situation in Quang Nam, Early 1970

An additional source for this section is: LtCol Warren E. Parker, USA (Ret.), PSA, Quang Nam, Completion of Tour Report, dtd 20Apr70, in the files of the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C. (CMH), hereafter Parker Report.

17. Fact Sheets on Quang Nam Province Government and American and Vietnamese Support, in QDSZ Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents.
18. Maj J. S. Grinalds interview, 8May71, pp. 7-9 (Oral History Collection, MCHC), hereafter Grinalds Transcript.
20. Col Ennis C. Whitehead, Jr., USA, Assistant CORDS (Military), memo, Subj: Relationships in Quang Da Special Zone, dtd 18Jul70, in QDSZ Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents.
21. Fact Sheets on Quang Nam Province Government and American and Vietnamese Support, in QDSZ Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents; monthly reports of PSA, Quang Nam, to MACCORDS, in files of the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., hereafter cited as CMH Files.
22. Parker Comments.
23. FMFPac, March Operations, Summary and Overview, p. 41; III MAF and 1stMarDiv Command Centers, Jan-Dec 70; Hixon Debrief; Peabody Debrief.
24. Simmons Debrief; the quotation is from an undated memo in 1stMarDiv Command Center, Aug 70, tab B-21; the same source contains memos for the record of the conferences; other records of the conferences are contained in QDSZ Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents.
25. Simmons Debrief.
27. Ibid.; FMFPac, March Operations, Apr 70, pp. 19-20; PSA, Quang Nam, Report to MACCORDS for Period 1-31May70, dtd 1Jun70, in CMH Files.
CHAPTER 8

THE STRUGGLE FOR SECURITY: COMBINED ACTION

Unless otherwise noted, the information contained in this chapter is drawn from MACV ComdHist, 70; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Dec 70; and IDA Pacification Study and Pacification Study Docs.

Combined Action Platoons

Additional sources for this section are: Combined Action Force Fact Sheet, dtd 31Mar70, in CAF History & SOP Folder, Box 2, Pacification Study Docs, hereafter CAF Fact Sheet; Col T. H. Metzger, debriefing at FMFPac, dtd 13 July 70, Tape 4899 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Metzger Debrief; Lt Col J. J. Tolnay, debriefing at FMFPac, dtd 19May71, Tape 5000 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Tolnay Debrief.

1. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70, pp. 19-20; CAF ComdC, Jan70; 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th CAG ComdCs, Jan70.
2. CAF ComdC, Jan-Feb70.
3. CGXXIV Corps LOI to COCAF, dtd 3May70, in CAF ComdC, May70; ibid., Jul70.
4. III MAF 0 3121.4B, Subj: SOP for the Combined Action Program, dtd 22Jun68, in CAF History and SOP Folder, Box 2, Pacification Study Docs; CGXXIV Corps, LOI to COCAF, dtd 3May70, in CAF ComdC, May70; CAF Fact Sheet; Tolnay Debrief; Tolnay Comments, comments on draft ms, 22Mar83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Tolnay Debrief.
5. Metzger Comments.
6. Consul F. T. McNamara, Political Advisor to CGXXIV Corps, ltr to LtGen Melvin Zais, dtd 14Mar70 and Col T. H. Metzger ltr to CGXXIV Corps via C/S XXIV Corps, Subj: Consulate-CORDS Survey of CAP villages, comments concerning, dtd 24Mar70, both in CAF History & SOP Folder, Box 2, Pacification Study Docs, hereafter Metzger Debrief.
7. Metzger Debrief; CAF Fact Sheet.
8. For curriculum of the school, see CAF ComdC, Feb70.
10. Metzger ltr Mar70; 3d CAG ComdC, Mar70, pt. II; 2d CAG ComdC, Oct70, pts. 1 and II.
11. CGXXIV Corps LOI to COCAF, dtd 3May70, in CAF ComdC, May70.
12. Metzger Debrief; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec69, p. 32; CAF Fact Sheet, see especially Encl 7, "A Discussion of the Mobile CAP Concept;" 4th CAG ComdC, May-Jun70. For the change in mission of the RF and PF, see MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 8, p. 31.
13. 2d CAG ComdC, Mar70, pt. II; for month-by-month CAG operations, see 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th CAG ComdCs, Jan70 through month of deactivation.
14. CAF Fact Sheet; Metzger Debrief.
15. CAF Fact Sheet.
16. 4th CAG ComdC, Jan-Feb70; 3d CAG ComdC, Jan and Mar70.
17. Tolnay Debrief.
18. Tolnay Debrief.
19. 3d CAG ComdC, May-Jun70.
22. Ibid.
23. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr70, p. 17.
24. For civic action details and statistics, see 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th CAG ComdCs, Jan through month of deactivation 70.
25. Metzger Comments.
26. Metzger Debrief; Metzger also believed that the CAGs needed full-time chaplains and more medical and dental services for their Marines.
27. Grinalds Transcript, pp. 92-93; the quotation is from Tolnay Debrief.
29. Tolnay Debrief.
30. Tom Harvey, comments on draft ms, 16Jan84 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Harvey Comments.
31. Metzger ltr Mar70; Seiler ltr; 1st CAG ComdC, Feb70, pt. II; 4th CAG ComdC, Jan-Jul70.
32. 4th CAG ComdC, Feb70, p. 11.
33. 4th CAG Spot Report, dtd 12Jan70, in 4th CAG ComdC, Jan70.
34. Grinalds Transcript, pp. 92-96; Metzger Debrief; for the ambush of the Binh Ky CAP, which occurred on 8Jul, see 2/1 S-2 Jnl, 8Jul70 and 5-3 Jnl 8Jul70, both in 2/1 ComdC, Jul70.
35. Harvey Comments.
36. Tolnay Debrief. The CORDS survey early in 1970 found village response to CAGs generally favorable; see Consul Francis T. McNamara, Political Advisor to CG XXIV Corps, ltr to LtGen Melvin Zais, dtd 14Mar70, in CAF SOP & History Folder, Box 2, Pacification Study Docs.
37. CAF Fact Sheet; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Summary and Overview, p. 39.

Reducing the Combined Action Force

39. LtGen H. Nickerson, Jr., debriefing at HQMC, 17May70, Tape 6000 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); BG Gen G. E. Dooley, debriefing at FMFPac, dtd 23Dec69, Tape 4733 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
40. Dulacki Debrief.
41. HQMC Message Files.
42. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb70, p. 15; May70, pp. 17-18; CAF ComdC, Apr70, pt. III; 2d CAG ComdC, Feb70, pt. II; May70, pt. II; 3d CAG ComdC, Apr70, pt. II; 4th CAG ComdC, Apr70, pt. II; Metzger ltr Mar70.
NOTES

43. CAF ComdC, May-Jun70.
44. Metzger Debrief; CAF ComdC, Jul70; 4th CAG ComdC, Jul70, pt. II.
45. CAF ComdC, Aug70, pts. II and III; Sep70; 1st CAG ComdC, 1-13 Sep70, pt. II; 2d CAG ComdC, Aug70, pts. II and III, Sep70, pts. I and II; 3d CAG ComdC, Jul70, pt. II; Aug70, pt. II, 1-7 Sep70, pt. II.
46. 4th CAG ComdC, Jul70, pt. II; 1st CAG ComdC, Jun-Aug70; 3d CAG ComdC, Aug70, pt. II.
47. CAF ComdC, Sep70; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Sep70, p. 12.
48. 2d CAG OpO, dtd 23 Dec70, in Miscellaneous Sheets/Documents Folder, Box 4, Pacification Study Docs.
49. Tolnay Debrief.
50. 2d CAG ComdC, Sep-Nov70.
51. Ibid., Sep-Dec70; Tolnay Debrief.
52. Col Don R. Christiansen, comments on draft ms, 12 Jul83 (Vietnam Comment File).
53. This quotation, and unless otherwise noted, the material in the rest of this section is drawn from Tolnay Debrief.

Building on Success: The Combined Unit Pacification Program

In this section, extensive use has been made of two sets of interviews: Capt. D. J. Robinson II, et. al., M/3/1 in the CUPP interviews by 1st Mar Div Historical Team, 18 Jan70, Tape 4735; and 1st Lt T. M. Calvert, et al., A/1/7 in the CUPP interviews by 1st Mar Div Historical Team, 25-27 May70, Tape 4848, both in Oral HistColl, MCHC. These tapes will be cited respectively hereafter as 1st Mar CUPP Team, 25-27 May70, Tape 4848, both in Oral HistColl, MCHC.

55. Dulacki interview, pp. 68-70.
56. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov69, pp. 17-18, Dec69, pp. 35-36.
58. Haggerty Debrief.
59. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70, pp. 21-22; 1st Mar ComdC, Jan70; 7th Mar CUPP Progress Report, dtd Jan70, in 7th Mar ComdC, Jan70; 3/26 ComdC, Jan70; 3/5 ComdC, Feb70.
60. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar70, p. 15, Apr70, p. 18; 1st Mar ComdC, Mar70; 3/5 ComdC, Mar70; 7th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Jan70, in 7th Mar ComdC, Jan70.
61. 1st Mar Div ComdC, Sep70; 5th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Sep70, in 2/5 ComdC, Sep70; 5th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Dec70, in 2/5 ComdC, Dec70; 2/1 ComdC, Sep70; 3/5 ComdC, Sep70.
62. 7th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Jan70, in 7th Mar ComdC, Jan70; for comparison, see Capt D. J. Robinson II, 1st Mar CUPP Intvs.
63. 3/5 Frag O 9-70, dtd 6 Feb70, in 3/5 ComdC, Feb70.
64. Sgt Danny H. Walker, 7th Mar CUPP Intvs; 1st Lt T. M. Calvert, 1st Mar CUPP Intvs; 3/5 ComdC, Jul70.
65. 7th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Apr70, in 7th Mar ComdC, Apr70.
66. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May70, p. 20; 7th Mar CUPP Progress Reports, Jan, Apr, Jun, and Jul70, in 7th Mar ComdCs, Jan Mar, Apr, Jun, and Jul70; 5th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Sep70, in 2/5 ComdC, Sep70; 3/5 ComdC, Apr-Jun70.
67. 5th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Nov-Dec70, in 2/5 ComdC, Nov-Dec70.
68. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov70, p. 12; 7th Mar CUPP Progress Reports, Jan-Sep70, in 7th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Sep70; 5th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Sep-Dec70, in 2/5 ComdCs, Sep-Dec70.
70. 2d Lt R. H. Mansfield III, 7th Mar CUPP Intvs.
71. 2d Lt G. T. Olshesky, 1st Mar CUPP Intvs.
72. 2d Lt J. D. Hopkins, 1st Mar CUPP Intvs; Sgt D. H. Walker, 7th Mar CUPP Intvs.
73. PFC D. A. Bronzy, 7th Mar CUPP Intvs; Capt D. J. Robinson II, 1st Mar CUPP Intvs.
74. 3/26 ComdC, Jan7, pt. III.
75. Sgt D. H. Walker, 7th Mar CUPP Intvs.
76. 7th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Jan70, in 7th Mar ComdC, Jan70; 2d Lt R. H. Mansfield III, 7th Mar CUPP Intvs.
77. Cpl M. Y. Jeffries, 7th Mar CUPP Intvs.
78. 2d Lt R. H. Mansfield III, ibid.
79. 7th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Jan70, in 7th Mar ComdC, Jan70, for additional impressions of village reaction to the CUPPs, consult 1st Mar and 7th Mar CUPP Intvs, passim.
80. Sgt W. J. Dignan, 1st Mar CUPP Intvs.
82. 7th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Mar70, in 7th Mar ComdC; CUPP actions and casualties can be followed month by month in the 7th Mar CUPP Progress Report, 7th Mar ComdC, Jan-Sep70; the 5th Mar CUPP Progress Report, in 2/5 ComdC, Sep-Dec70; and in FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Dec70, section on Pacification and Rural Development. Simmons Debrief gives a division-level evaluation of the CUPP program.
83. 7th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Jul70, in 7th Mar ComdC, Jul70; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov70, p. 12.
84. Denning Debrief.

CHAPTER 9
THE SPECTRUM OF PACIFICATION AND VIETNAMIZATION, 1970

Unless otherwise noted, the information contained in this chapter is drawn from MACV ComdHist, 70; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Dec70; and IDA Pacification Study and Pacification Study Docs.

Line Units in Pacification

1. For the plans for a typical large County Fair in 1970, see 2/1 OpOrder 001-70, dtd 22 May70, in 2/1 ComdC, May70; for results of this cordon and search, see 2/1 S-3 Jnl, 27 May70, in Ibid.
2. 3/5 ComdC, Oct, Nov, Dec70; Grinalds Debrief.
3. Grinalds Debrief. LtGen Zaiss, the XXIV Corps commander, favored shorter County Fairs to minimize civilian resentment; see LtGen M. Zaiss, USA, Opening Remarks at XXIV Corps Commanders' Conference, 22 Mar70, in Melvin Zaiss Papers, U.S. Army Military History Research Collection, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
4. 1st Mar Div Staff Memo, Subj: Summary of Discussion, QDS Z of this cordon and search, see 2/1 S-3 Jnl, 27 May70, in Ibid.
5. For the plans for a typical large County Fair in 1970, see 2/1 OpOrder 001-70, dtd 22 May70, in 2/1 ComdC, May70; for results of this cordon and search, see 2/1 S-3 Jnl, 27 May70, in Ibid.
8. 2/7 OpOrder 8-70, dtd 16Apr70, in 2/7 ComdC, Apr70.
9. Derning Debrief; 2/7 ComdC, Apr-May70.
10. Derning Comments.
11. 2/7 ComdC, Apr-Jun70; 1/7 ComdC, Apr-Jun70.
12. 2/1 ComdC, Sep, Nov70; Grinalds Debrief.

Kit Carson Scouts in 1970

Additional sources for this section are: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, pp. 15-16; 1stMarDiv, Kit Carson Scouts, Background Data, dtd 21Jun70, and 1stMarDiv, KCS Program Fact Sheet, ca. Aug70, both in Narrative Notes 1970 Notebooks, 1stMarDiv Documents.

13. For salaries see MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 8 p. 74; MACV on 31Mar71 raised all KCS salaries 2,500 piastres per year to keep their wages comparable to ARVN pay scales.

Targeting the VCI

17. 1stMarDiv, Briefing Notes, “Viet Cong Infrastructure in Quang Nam Province,” dtd Apr70, in Enemy OOB Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents; Grinalds Debrief; Maj J. S. Grinalds interview, 8May71, pp. 9-15 (Oral HistColl MCHC), hereafter Grinalds Transcript.
20. MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 8, pp. 40-41; IDA Pacificification Study, 2, pp. 91-95; GVN 1970 P&D Plan, Anx II.
22. Parker Report; PSA, Quang Nam, Report to MACCORDS for 1-30Jun70, dtd 1Jul70, CMH Files.
23. Capt Charles O. Pfugraith, USA, memo to PSA, Quang Nam, Subj: Status of PHX/PH in Quang Nam Prov, dtd 26Nov70, in Quang Nam Prov PHX/PH Briefing Folder, Box 1, Pacificification Study Docs, hereafter Pfugraith Memo.
24. Pfugraith Memo; Parker Report; Quang Nam PSA, Comments on Phung Hoang, Nov70, in Quang Nam Prov PHX/PH Briefing Folders, Box 1, Pacificification Study Docs; Grinalds Debrief; Grinalds Transcript, pp. 34, 86-87.
26. 2/1 CAAR, dtd 5Aug70, in 2/1 ComdC, Aug70; Grinals Debrief.
27. LtGen McCutcheon msg to LtGen Jones, dtd 10Nov70, HQMC Message Files; Grinalds Transcript, pp. 53-54; Acting PSA, Quang Nam Province, Report to ComUSMACV, for Period 1-31Dec70, dtd 3Jan71, in CMH Files; 1st MarDiv/2d ROKMC Brig/QDSZ Conference Agenda, dtd 4Dec70, in QDSZ Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents.

Communist Counter-Pacification Efforts

The continuing terrorist activity during the year can best be followed through the III MAF, 1stMarDiv, and 1st, 5th, and 7th Mar...
ComdCs and the ComdCs of the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th CAGs for 1970 which contain the Marines' count of incidents in their areas of operation.

54. 2d CAG ComdC, Mar70, pt. II.
55. 4th CAG ComdC, May70, pt. III; 2d CAG ComdC, Jun70, pts. II and III, see also ibid.; Jul-Dec70.
56. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May70, pp. 20-21.
58. PSA, Quang Nam, Report to ACCORDS for 1-31May70, dtd 1Jun70, CMH Files.
59. Grinalds Transcript, p. 56; Grinalds Debrief.
60. 3/5 Jnl, 21Mar70, in 3/5 ComdC, Mar70; this incident had a tragic aftermath when members of a CUPP unit grenaded a bunker into which they thought the VC had fled, killing two civilians, one a five-year-old boy, and wounding three others.
62. VC propaganda leaflet, n.d.
64. 2d CAG ComdC, Jan70, pt. III.
65. This account of the fight at Phu Thanh is drawn from the following sources: 1st Lt Thomas S. Miller, et. al., intvws by lstMarDiv Historical Team, dtd 15-16Jun70, Tape 4868 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Phu Thanh Interviews, preceded by name of interviewees; 7th Mar CUPP Report Progress, Jun70; in 7th Mar ComdC, Jun70; MajGen Wieddeke msg to LtGen McCutcheon, dtd 1Jun70, HQMC Message Files.
67. Ibid.
68. Cpl Robert M. Mutchler, 1stLt Thomas M. Miller, both in Phu Thanh Interviews.
69. 1stLt Thomas M. Miller, in ibid.
70. 5th Mar Jnl, 30Aug70, in 5th Mar ComdC, Aug70.

Vietnamization

73. MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 7, pp. 1-3, 15-16.
76. These negotiations can be traced through the record of the 1stMarDivQDSZ/2d ROKMC Conference, tab B-21, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Aug70; 1stMarDiv G-3, QDSZ Agenda Item, dtd 19Jun70, 1stMarDiv Agenda Item for QDSZ Conference of 28Aug70, Subj: Turnover of Mine Sweeps, dtd 25Aug70, both in QDSZ Notebook, lstMarDiv Documents.
78. 1stMarDiv Staff Memo, Subj: Summary of Discussion, QDSZ Conference, 27Mar70, dtd 28Mar70, in 1stMarDiv ComdC, Aug70, tab B-21; CGIIIMAF msg to GXXIV Corps, dtd 22Jul70, in XXIV Corps Message Files, CMH; MajGen Armstrong msg to LiGen Sutherland, dtd 3Aug70, in HQMC Message Files; Grinalds Transcript, pp. 7-9.
79. CGIIIMAF msg to GXXIV Corps, dtd 9Aug70, XXIV Corps Message Files, CMH; MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 7, p. 99; Acting PSA, Quang Nam Province, Report to ComUSMACV for period 1-31Dec70, dtd 3Jan71, in CMH Files; favorable Marine views of the South Vietnamese forces can be found in the following interviews, all in Oral HistColl, MCHC: Grinalds Debrief; Grinalds Transcript, pp. 121-22; LtGen H. Nickerson debriefing at HQMC, 17May70, Tape 6000, hereafter Nickerson Debrief (HQMC); Col R. A. Heywood, debriefing at FMFPac, 15Dec69, Tape 4732; Col G. C. Fox, debriefing at FMFPac, 6May70, Tape 4806; Dulacki Debrief; Hixson Debrief.
80. CGIIIMAF msg to GXXIV Corps, dtd 9Aug70, LiGen Sutherland msg to Gen Rosson, Dep ComUSMACV, dtd 16Aug70, in XXIV Corps Message Files, CMH.
81. CGIIIMAF msg to CG XXIV Corps, dtd 9Aug70, in ibid.
82. Nickerson Debrief (HQMC); Beck Debrief; IDA Pacification Study, 2, pp. 64-70.
83. Grinalds Debrief; PSA, Quang Nam, Report to ComUSMACV for period 1-30Nov70, dtd 1Dec70, in CMH files.

Results, 1970

84. MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 8, pp. 8-11, 89-90; FMFPac, MarOpsV, May70, p. 22, Nov70, pp. 9-11.
85. IDA Pacification Study, 3, p. 530; see also 3, pp. 229-30.
86. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, pp. 26-29; MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 8, p. 24; Acting PSA, Quang Nam Province, Report to ComUSMACV for period 1-31Dec70, dtd 3Jan71, CMH Files.
87. MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 8, pp. 48-49.
88. PSA, Quang Nam Province, Report to ComUSMACV for period 1-31Jul70, dtd 2Aug70, in CMH files.
89. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, pp. 29-30; for 1969 figure, see Dec69, p. 30; Hixson Debrief.
90. PSA, Quang Nam Province, Report to ComUSMACV for period 1-31Jul70, dtd 2Aug70, and for period 1-30Sep70, dtd 1Oct70, both in CMH Files; Hixson Debrief; Peabody Debrief; CGIIIMAF msg to GXXIV Corps, dtd 9Aug70, in XXIV Corps Message Files, CMH.
91. Nickerson Debrief.
93. CGIIIMAF msg to GXXIV Corps, dtd 9Aug70, in XXIV Corps Message Files, CMH.

PART IV

Winding Up and Winding Down

CHAPTER 10

ALLIED STRATEGIC AND REDEPLOYMENT PLANS FOR 1971

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is drawn from MACV ComdHist, 70 and ComdHist, 71; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct-Dec70; Jan-Feb71; III MAF ComdC, various dates.
Military and Pacification Plans for 1971

1. MACV, ComdHist, 71, ch. 1, pp. 7-8, ch. 4, pp. 5-8.
3. MR 1/XXIV Corps CCP71, Anx 1; LtGen James W. Sutherland, USA, Senior Officer Debrieving Report, period 18Jun70-9Jul71, dtd 31Aug71 (Copy in MCHC); XXIV Corps ORL, period ending 30Apr71, dtd 17May71 (Copy in MCHC); XXIV Corps LOI, CCP71, dtd 5Jan71, Box 9, RG 338 (71A7122), FRC, Suitland, Md.; LtGen Donn J. Robertson intvw, 24Apr73 and 24Aug76, pp. 71-72 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Robertson Transcript.

Final Plans for Redeployment and the MAB

Additional sources for this section are: 3d MAB Planning Notebook, 1st MarDivDocuments, hereafter 3d MAB Notebook; Message Files, LtGen James W. Sutherland, in U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., hereafter Sutherland Messages.

5. Robertson Transcript; Col F. A. Hart, Jr. memo to Asst CS S-3, 1st MarDiv, Subj: Artillery Mix for 3d MAB, dtd 4Nov70, 3d MAB Notebook; Col J. W. Haggerty, Debrieving at FMFPac, 15Oct70, Tape 4965 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); LtGen Jones msg to LtGen Van Ryzin, dtd 26Sept70, HQMC Msg Files.
6. CincPac's views are summarized in LtGen Jones msg to LtGen McCutcheon, dtd 4Nov70, HQMC Msg Files.
7. LtGen Sutherland msg to Gen Abrams, dtd 9Nov70, in Sutherland Messages.
8. Gen Abrams msg to LtGen Sutherland, USA, dtd 14Nov70, Sutherland Messages.
10. MBA Options and Trooplists for 3d MBA Options, dtd 31Oct70, 3d MBA Notebook.
11. MBA Conference Memo.
12. LtGen McCutcheon msg to LtGen Jones, dtd 5Nov70, HQMC Msg Files.
13. LtGen Jones msg to Gen Chapman, dtd 7Nov70, and Gen Chapman msg to LtGen Jones, dtd 7Nov70, HQMC Msg Files; Col F. A. Hart, Jr. memo to ADC, 1st MarDiv, Subj: MBA Structure Planning, dtd 8Nov70, 3d MBA Notebook.
15. Draft of msg from CGlstMarDiv to CGIII MAF, dtd 11Nov70, 3d MBA Notebook.
16. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, p. 32.
17. MajGen Widdecke msg to LtGen McCutcheon, dtd 14Nov70 and McCutcheon widdecke, dtd 28Nov70, HQMC Msg Files.
18. The details of schedule planning can be followed in 3d MBA Notebook, III MAF ComdC, Jan71, pp. 20-26; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Dec70, p. 22.
19. MajGen Armstrong msg to LtGen Jones, dtd 15Dec70, and LtGen Jones msg to Armstrong, dtd 22Dec70, HQMC Msg Files; Organization Chart, III MAF (Rear), dtd 1Jan71, 3d MAB Notebook.
20. Simmons, "Marine Operations", p. 142; III MAF ComdC, Jan71, p. 7; LtGen Jones msg to LtGen Robertson, dtd 5Feb71, HQMC Msg Files.

A New Commander for III MAF

21. CGIII MAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 20Oct70; LtGen Jones msg to LGareng McCutcheon, dtd 7Nov70, LtGen McCutcheon msg to Gen Abrams, dtd 12Nov70; USMACV msg to LtGens McCutcheon, Sutherland, and Jones, dtd 14Nov70; LtGen McCutcheon msg to LtGen Jones, dtd 15Nov70; LtGen Jones msg to Gen Chapman dtd 16Nov70; all in HQMC Msg Files.
22. Lt Gen Herman Nickerson, Jr. intvw, 10Jan73, pp. 115-17 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
23. LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon ltr to MajGen Louis Metzger, dtd 28Nov70, and ltr to MajGen George A. Bowman, dtd 11Dec70, Box 10, McCutcheon Papers; Simmons, "Marine Operations,"
24. Robertson Transcript, p. 56.

Military Situation in Quang Nam and Military Region 1, Early 1971

25. III MAF ComdC, Jan71, p. 6; FMFPac, ComdC, Jan-Jun71, pt. IV; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb71, p. 29.
27. XXIV Corps, 1st Semi-Annual Written Summary, CCP71, dtd 17July71, Box 9, RG 338 (72A7122) and BG Charles A. Jackson, USA, Dep Sr Advisor, I Corps, memo to LtGen Sutherland, Subj: Territorial Artillery for I Corps/MR 1, dtd 9Jan71, RG 319 (319-74-051), both in FRC, Suitland, Md.; Acting Prov Sr Advisor, Quang Nam, Report to MACV for Period 1-31Dec70, for period ending 31Jan71, dtd 2Feb71, and for period ending 28Feb71, dtd 3Mar71, all in CMH Files; CGXXIV Corps msg to PSAs of Quang Nam and Quang Ngai, dtd 4May71, Box 25, Folder 26, RG 319 (72A6443), FRC, Suitland, Md.
29. For an optimistic assessment of the enemy situation, see FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov70, p. 7, and Dec70, p. 12; Grinalds Debrieving.
30. LtGen James W. Sutherland, USA ltr to MajGen Thomas M. Tarpley, USA, dtd 1Feb71, Box 6, Folder 1, RG 319 (319-74-051), both in FRC, Suitland, Md.; Acting Prov Sr Advisor, Quang Nam, Report to MACV for Period 1-31Dec70, for period ending 31Jan71, dtd 2Feb71, and for period ending 28Feb71, dtd 3Mar71, all in CMH Files; CGXXIV Corps msg to PSAs of Quang Nam and Quang Ngai, dtd 4May71, Box 25, Folder 26, RG 319 (72A6443), FRC, Suitland, Md.

CHAPTER 11

MARINES IN OPERATION LAM SON 719

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is drawn from: MACV ComdHist, 70, and ComdHist, 71; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Apr71; and III MAF ComdC. Also extensively relied upon for events in Lam Son 719 is XXIV Corps, Operation Lam Son 719 AAR, dtd 14May71, MACV Microfilm Records, Reel 138, MCHC, hereafter XXIV Corps Lam Son 719 AAR. Much material on the role of Marine aviation in the offensive is taken from 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, "A History of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 1 November 1970 -14 April 1971," hereafter 1st MAW ComdHist70-71. The III MAF commander's view is in Robertson, Transcript.
The Preemptive Strike: Lam Son 719


2. Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA (Ret), A Soldier Reports (Garden City, N.Y., 1976), pp. 271-272.

3. This account of the plans for Lam Son 719 is based on MACV ComdHist, 71, II, Anx E, pp. 15-25, and XXIV Corps Lam Son 719 AAR.

4. Col Verle E. Ludwig, comments on draft ms, 14Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).

5. Robertson Transcript, p. 59; 1st MAW ComdHist70-71, p. B-8; III MAF ComdC, Feb71, pp. 19-20; CGIIIMAF msg to CGIstMarDiv, dtd 6Feb71, Box 25, RG 319 (72A6644), FRC, Suitland, Md. On 21Jan71, XXIV Corps issued a cover plan aimed at deceiving the enemy as to the purpose of the concentrations of troops for Lam Son 719; see CGIIIMACVS msg to Subordinate Units, dtd 21Jan71, in III MAF Jnl File, 13-21Jan71.

6. Robertson Transcript, p. 43.

7. The following account of the Laotian offensive is based on: MACV ComdHist, 71, Anx E, passim.; LtGen James W. Sutherland, Jr., USA, Senior Officer Debriefer Report, Period 18Jun70-9 Jun71, Copy in MCHC, pp. 29-30, hereafter Sutherland Debriefer; ComUSMACV, msg to CJCS, dtd 14Feb71; ComUSMACV mgs to CJCS and CincPac, dtd 16Feb71 and 1Mar71; Gen Weyand msg to Adm McCain, dtd 13Apr71, in all in MACV Documents, FRC, Suitland, Md., Copies in MCHC; XXIV Corps Lam Son 719 AAR.


10. LtGen Sutherland msg to Gen Abrams, dtd 18Mar71, MACV Documents, Ssuitland, Md., copy in MCHC is an example of the U.S. concern about the speed of the Vietnamese withdrawal.

11. The armored brigade losses are summarized in XXIV Corps Lam Son 719 AAR; for the artillery pieces abandoned, see MACV ComdHist, 71, II, Anx E, p. 43. See also Miller Comments.

Marine Fixed Wing Air Support and the ASRT


13. 1st MAW ComdHist70-71, pt. II, ch. 4, p. 6; 1st MAW ComdC, Feb71; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb71, p. 25. It should be noted that the sortie and bomb tonnage figures in the command chronology differ from those in the 1st MAW ComdHist, which are lower (for example 5508 sorties in the ComdHist to 534 in the ComdC). Throughout the accounts of Marine aviation in Lam Son 719, we have used the command history's figures where there is disagreement among the sources, as some apparently exclude missions in Laos that were not in support of the ARVN offensive.


18. XXIV Corps ORLL, period ending 30Apr71, dtd 17May71, copy in MCHC.

Marine Helicopters Over Laos

Additional sources for this section are: HMM-463 ComdC, Jan-Mar71; HMM-367 ComdC, Jan-Mar71; and MajGen Alan J. Armstrong, debriefing at FMFPac, 29June71, Tape 5010 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Armstrong Debrief.

19. Darron Transcript, pp. 64-65; MACV ComdHist, 71, II, Anx E, p. 44.

20. Robertson Transcript, pp. 64-65.


22. HMM-463 ComdC, Jan-Feb71; 1st MAW ComdHist70-71, pt. II, ch. 4, pp. 7-9, B-10-B-12.


25. XXIV Corps ORLL, period ending 30Apr71, dtd 17May71, p. 8, copy in MCHC.


27. Armstrong Debrief; see also Armstrong Transcript, pp. 21-23, and Darron Transcript, pp. 50-52.

28. FMFPac, Citation for Distinguished Flying Cross for Capt Robert F. Wemheuer, in Hist&MusDiv Citation Files, 1971; 1st MAW News Release No. 141-71, in 1st MAW ComdC, Mar71.

29. FMFPac, Citations for Navy Commendation Medals for Capt Henry J. Cipolla and GySgt Ronald S. Severson, in Hist&MusDiv Citation Files, 1971; Darron Transcript, pp. 65-67.

30. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb71, pp. 22-23, 28-29; 3d MAB News Release No. 39-71, dtd 13May71 (delayed) in 3d MAB Jnl File, May71, describes a typical day of Cobra operations; FMFPac, Citation for Air Medal for Maj Malcolm T. Bird, and Citation for Air Medal for 1stLt Michael L. Bartlett, both in Hist&MusDiv Citation Files, 1971.


34. HMM-463 ComdC, Mar71; XXIV Corps Lam Son 719 AAR, Anx N, App 1.

Marine Trucks on Route 9

Additional sources for this section are: Co C, 11th MT Bn CAAR, dtd 24Feb71, in 11th MT Bn ComdC, Feb71, hereafter Co C CAAR.

36. CGIIIMAF msg to CGs of 1st MAW and 1stMarDiv, dtd 6Feb71, Box 25, RG 319 (72A4643), FRC, Suitland, Md.
37. Robertson Transcript, pp. 59-60.
38. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb71, p. 37; IstMarDiv ComdC, Feb71, p. 27; Co C CAAR.
39. The following account of Co C’s operations is taken from Co C CAAR; and XXIV Corps Lam Son 719 AAR, Anx N, App 2.
40. Robertson Transcript, p. 43.
43. XXIV Corps Lam Son 719 AAR, Anx N.
44. Headquarters Bns, 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Feb-Mar71; Capt Ronald C. Hood III, intvw, tape 6345 (Oral HistColl, MCHC). See also Himmertech Comments.

Diversion Off Vinh

An additional source for this section is LtCol Jon R. Robson and Maj William J. Sambito, intvw, 28June76, Tape 6178 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Robson/Sambito Intvw.
45. CinCPac msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 31Dec70, in CinCPac Message Files, Navy History Division.
46. ComUSMACV msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 4Feb71, MACV Documents, FRC, Suitland, Md., copy in MCHC.
47. 31st MAU ComdC, Jan71, p. 2; BLT 3/9 ComdC, Feb71; Robson/Sambito Intvw.
48. 31st MAU ComdC, Feb71, p. 2.
50. 31st MAU ComdC, Feb71, pp. 3-4; CGXXIV Corps msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 7Feb71; CTG76.4/CTG 79.4 msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 7Feb71; CGIIIMAF msg to CG 1st MAW, dtd 7Feb71; all in III MAF Jnl File, 31Jan-8Feb71; Robson/Sambito Intvw.
52. The following account of the diversion is drawn from 31st MAU ComdC, Feb-Mar71; BLT 3/9 ComdC, Feb-Mar71; and Robson/Sambito Intvw. All quotations not otherwise cited are from the latter source.
53. Robson/Sambito Intvw.
54. Capt Tracy H. Wilder, Jr., USN, comments on draft ms, 14Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File)

Results of Lam Son 719
55. MACV ComdHist, 71, II, Anx E, p. 34; Gen Weyand msg to Adm McCain, dtd 13Apr71, MACV Documents, FRC, Suitland, Md., copy in MCHC.
56. MACV ComdHist, 71, II, Anx E, p. 45; see also pp. 33-35.
57. Sutherland Debrief, pp. 6-7.

CHAPTER 12

LAST OPERATIONS OF III MAF, JANUARY-MARCH 1971

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is drawn from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Mar71; MACV ComdHist, 71; III MAF and IstMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Mar71. Army documents cited from Records Groups 319 and 338 are located in the Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md. Extensive use has been made of the Robertson Transcript.

Plans for the Army Takeover of Quang Nam
2. Robertson Transcript, pp. 70-71.
4. For 196th Brigade operations in Antenna Valley, see CGXXIV Corps msg to III MAF, dtd 13Jan71, and CG23dInfDiv msg to XXIV Corps, dtd 14Jan71, both in III MAF Jnl File, 13-21Jan71.
5. Love Memo; Robertson Transcript, pp. 72-73.
6. CGIstMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 4Feb71, III MAF Jnl File, 3Jan-8Feb71; CGIstMarDiv msg to Units of IstMarDiv, dtd 8Feb71, 3d MAB Planning Notebook, IstMarDiv Documents
8. CG23dInfDiv msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 18Feb71, in 23d Div Msg File, Box 1/2, 72A811, RG 338; CG23dInfDiv msg to XXIV Corps, dtd 12Mar71, III MAF Jnl File, 1-2Mar71; 23dInfDiv FragO 14-71, dtd 21Mar71, III MAF Jnl File, 13-25Mar71; 196th Inf Bde, Admin/Logistics Plan 1-71 (Dominion Run), related to OPlan 5-71, dtd 21Mar71, Box 1/2, 72A811, RG 338.
10. CG23dInfDiv, LOI No. 12, Subj: Repositioning of the 196th Infantry Brigade, dtd 24Mar71, Box 9, 72A5711, RG 319; Robertson Transcript, pp. 70-71.

Operations in Quang Nam, January-February 1971

All award citations are from Microfilm Citation Files, RefSec, MCHC, hereafter Microfilm Citation Files.

11. III MAF ComdC, Jan71, pp. 16-17; Col E. A. Timmes, debriefing at FMFPac, 14Dec70, Tape 4980 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Timmes Debrief.
12. Timmes Debrief.
15. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb71, pp. 4-5, 13-14; Senior Advisor, 1st Task Force Operations Summary, dtd 3Feb71, III MAF Jnl File, 3Jan-8Feb71, gives ARVN disposition on a typical day.
16. MACV ComdHist71, 1, ch. 4, p. 21.
18. 1st Mar ComdC, Jan-Feb71; 1/1, 2/2, and 3/1 ComdCs, Jan-Feb71.

VIETNAMIZATION AND REDEPLOYMENT
tenants in 1stMarDiv, ca. early 71 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), p. 45; Sea Tiger, 13Jan71, p. 3; for typical traffic incidents, see 1st MP Bn ComdCs, 1970-1971; an unusually serious Marine-ARVN confrontation is reported in CGIII MAF msg to CMC, dtd 27Feb71, Folder 24, Box 25, RG 319 (71A6443). 67. CGIII MAF msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 6Mar71, Folder 24, Box 25, RG 319; Robertson Transcript, p. 61. 68. BGen Edwin H. Simmons memo to CG, FMFPac, Subj: Debriefing, Vietnam Service, 15Jun70-24May71, 1stMarDiv Documents. 69. Robertson Transcript, pp. 83-84.

The Enemy Grows Bolder

70. III MAF ComdC, Jan71, pp. 17-18, Feb71, pp. 14-15, Mar71, pp. 16-17; the disarming of the PSDF is in 3rd Mar ComdC, Jan71, p. 3.


72. 2/1 S-2 Jnl, 27Mar71, in 2/1 ComdC, Mar71; see also Ibid., sec III-A, p. 1; 2/1 Spot Report, dtd 4Mar71, III MAF Jnl File, 1-12Mar71.


75. Unless otherwise noted, the following account of the battle of Duc Duc and the role of Marine helicopters in it is based on: XXIV Corps ORLL, period ending 30Apr71, copy in MCHC; CG3dMAB msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 22Mar71, in Narrative Notes 1971 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Moss Comments.

76. CGIstMarDiv msg to CGIII MAF, dtd 10Apr71, and msg to lst Mar, dtd 14Apr71, in 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 1-14Apr71; 1st Mar ComdC, 1-14Apr71, pt. II, pp. 1-3; II/1 ComdC, 1-14Apr71, pt. II; CG23dInfDiv msg to Subordinate Commands dtd 10Apr71, Box 25, Folder 25, RG 319 (72A 6443); 196th Bde SitReps, 5-6Apr71, 11-12Apr71, 12-13Apr71; CGUSARY msg to II FForceV and CGXXIV Corps, dtd 30Mar71, Box 25, Folder 24, RG 319 (72A 6443).

Activation and Operations of the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade

This section draws heavily on: 3d MAB Planning Notebook in 1stMarDiv Documents, hereafter cited as 3d MAB Notebook; and Armstrong Debrief.

9. LtGen Jones, msg to LtGen Robertson, info MajGen Wilson, dtd 5Feb71, HQMC Message Files.

10. BGen Edwin H. Simmons memo to C/S III MAF, Subj: 3d MAB Planning Staff, dtd 24Feb71, 3d MAB Notebook; see also LtCol J. C. Love memo to G-3, 1stMarDiv, Subj: Activation of 3d MAB HG, dtd 3Feb71 3d MAB Notebook.

11. CGIII MAF msg, dtd 27Feb71, quoted in C/S, 3d MAB, Memo for the Record, Subj: Weekly Activities Summary, dtd 8Mar71; C/S 3d MAB, Memo for the Record, Subj: III MAF Coordinating Conference, dtd 6Mar71; C/S 3d MAB, Memo for the Record, Subj: 3d MAB Planning Staff Meeting of 10Mar71, dtd 11Mar71; C/S 3d MAB, Memo for the Record, Subj: Meeting with Headquarters Commandants of III MAF, 1stMarDiv, and 3d MAB, dtd 11Mar71; LtCol J. C. Love memo to G-3, 1stMarDiv, Subj: 1st MAB Integration into 3d MAB, dtd 5Feb71; all these documents are in 3d MAB Notebook.


13. The Simmons quotation is from BGen Edwin H. Simmons memo to CGFMFPac, Subj: Debriefing, Vietnam Service
The End of Keystone Robin Charlie

LeCol Robert E. Wehrle, comments on draft ms, 9May83 (Vietnam Comment File).

NOTES


37. 196th Bde SitRep, 30Apr-May71.


39. The fight at Dai Loc is described in 3d MAB Jnl File, May71, and in Quang Nam Prov Sr Advisor, Report for period ending 31May71, dtd 2Jun71, CMH Files; casualty statistics for the battles in Dai Loc District are in FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jun71, pp. 6-7; Grinalds Debrief and Tolnay Debrief contain optimistic assessments of RF/PF performance.

40. 3d MAB ComdC, May71, p. 12; 3d MAB Jnl File, May71.

41. Moss Comments.


43. 3d MAB HistSum, 7May71.

44. Ibid.

45. 196th Bde SitRep, 7-8May71; FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Apr71, p. 3.


47. 1/11 ComdC, 1-12May71, S-3 Journal, and 13May-30Jun71, pt. III.


50. The quotation is from 3d MAB ComdC, May71, p. 36; see also Ibid., 14-30Apr71, p. 24. The deactivation of 2d CAG is described in 2d CAG ComdC, 1-1May71, and Tolnay Debrief. For the ceremony at the Quang Binh Child Care Center, see 3d MAB ComdC, May71, p. 23, and 3d MAB Supplemental Data Sheet D, Subj: Child Care Center, ca. May71, Narrative Notes 1971 Notebook, 1stMarDivDocuments.


Keystone Oriole Alpha: The Final Stand-Down


32. LtCol Robert E. Wehrle, comments on draft ms, 9May83 (Vietnam Comment File).
CHAPTER 14
CONTINUING OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS,
1970-1971

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is drawn from FMFPac, MarkOpsV, Jan-Dec 70, Jan-Jun 71, and IstMarDiv Command C, Jan-Dec 70, Jan-Apr 71.

412

VIETNAMIZATION AND REDEPLOYMENT

Protecting the Da Nang Vital Area

Additional sources for this section are: 1st MP Bn Fact Sheet, Subj: Defense of the Da Nang Vital Area, dtd 12Aug 70, hereafter cited as 1st MP Bn Fact Sheet, and 3d MP Bn, Briefing for BG Gen Simmons, dtd 12Aug 70, hereafter cited as 3d MP Bn Briefing, both in Narrative Notes 1970 Notebook, IstMarDiv Documents. Unless otherwise noted, all material is drawn from 1st MP Bn Command C, Jan-Dec 70 and Jan-Jun 71 and 3d MP Bn Command C, Jan-Jun 70.


3. 1st MP Bn Fact Sheet, pp. 1-3, tab C-1; 1st MAW OPorder 303-7YR, dtd 1Jan70, Anx E (Ground Defense). For background on Marine base defense methods and the arrival of the 1st MP Bn, see FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb66, pp. 41-42, and Jun66, p. 33.

4. 3d MP Bn Command C, Jan 70; 3d MP Bn Briefing.

5. 3d MP Bn Command C, Jun70, p. 3, 23Aug-15Oct70; 1st MP Bn Command C, Aug70, p. 2; 3d MP Bn Briefing; 1st MP Bn Fact Sheet, pp. 3-4, tabs G and H.

6. 1st MP Bn Fact Sheet, tab F-1; see also tab D-1; 1st MP Bn Command C, Jul70, pp. 4-5.


9. Dulacki Comments.


11. BG Gen Stewart C. Meyer, USA, Acting C/S XXIV Corps, ltr to CO, 366th Tactical Fighter Wing, dtd 3Jul71 (319 74 O51), RG 319, 25th Inf Div Opplg 4-71, in 23d Div Opplg Files 71 (72A753), RG 338, both in FRC, Suitland, Md.

Base Defense

12. This description of the An Hoa defense system is taken from 5th Mar OP 1-70 (Defense of an An Hoa Combat Base), dtd 26 Apr 70, in 5th Mar Command C, Apr 70.


14. 1/5 OP 1-71, dtd 9Jan71; 1/5 FrG 1-71, dtd 4Jan71; 1/5 FrG 2-71, dtd 1Jan71; all in 1/5 Command C, Jan71.

15. For the Keystone Robin Charlie troop redeployments, see 2/1 FrG 4-71, dtd 21Mar71, in 2/1 Command C, Mar71.

16. For rocket and mortar fire statistics, see IstMarDiv Command Information Summary, Dec70, dtd 2Jan71, in Narrative Notes 70 Notebook, and IstMarDiv Command Information Summary, Apr71, dtd 31Apr71, in Command Information Notebook, Apr71, both in IstMarDiv Documents.

Intelligence: Collection and Use

Additional sources for this section are: III MAF Command C, Jan-Dec 70, Jan-Apr71; 1st MAW Command C, Jan-Dec70, Jan-Apr71, Defense
Communications Planning Group Liaison Office No. 1, Briefing, Subj: Duffel Bag in 10 Minutes, dt 11Feb69, in Narrative Notes 69 Notebook. 1stMarDiv Documents, hereafter cited as Duffel Bag Briefing; 1stMarDiv, Sensor Program Briefing, dt 12Dec70, in Narrative Notes 70 Notebook. 1stMarDiv Documents, hereafter cited as 1stMarDiv Sensor Briefing; and BG Edwin H. Simmons memo to CGFMFPac, Subj: Debriefing, Vietnam Service, 15Jun70-24May71, 1stMarDiv Documents, hereafter cited as Simmons Debrief. Extensive use has been made of the following tapes and transcripts, all in the Oral History Collection, History and Museums Division: Nickerson Transcript; Col Edward W. Dzialo, debriefing at FMFPac, 2July70, Tape 4888, hereafter Dzialo Debrief; Col John W. Canton, debriefing at FMFPac, 22Dec69, Tape 4737, hereafter Canton Debrief; Col John W. Haggerty III, debriefing at FMFPac, 15Oct70, Tape 4965, hereafter Haggerty Debrief; Col Edward A. Timmes, debriefing at FMFPac, 14Sep70, Tape 4980, hereafter Timmes Debrief; LtCol Charles M. Mosher, debriefing at FMFPac, 17Sep70, Tape 4959, hereafter Mosher Debrief; Grinalds Debrief, and Grinalds Transcript.

18. Dulacki Comments.
19. Simmons Debrief.
20. VMO-2 ComdC, Jan-Dec70; Simmons Debrief.
21. The quotations are from Dzialo Debrief. 1st MAW G-2 ComdC, Feb70, Sept70, VMCJ-1 ComdC, Jan-Jul70; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 3-4; 1st MarDiv, OpO 301A-YR, dt 10Dec69, Anx B (Intelligence); Dulacki intvw, p. 20; Canton Debrief.
22. 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Jan-Dec70, Jan-Mar71; Mosher Debrief; Haggerty Debrief; for infantry unit intelligence responsibilities, see 1stMarDiv OpO 301A-YR, dt 10Dec69, Anx B (Intelligence).
23. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr70, p. 3; Dzialo Debrief.
24. Timmes Debrief.
25. Quotation is from Grinalds Debrief; Timmes Debrief comments on importance of the capture of the Quang Nam Security Section documents.
26. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jul70, pp. 12-16; Timmes Debrief; Grinalds Debrief comments on different questioning priorities of ITTs and CITs, Capt B. D. Voronin, debriefing at Camp Butler, Okinawa, 1971, 5065 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
28. Grinalds Debrief; see also Grinalds Transcript, pp. 41-42.
29. SOP for the VIP is in 1stMarDiv Order 7000.4C, dt 17Jul70, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jul70, tab B-14; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jul70, p. 16.
30. Nickerson Transcript, pp. 38-39; Dulacki Transcript, pp. 11-13; also recounts the difficulty of working with local agents; Dzialo Debrief emphasizes the necessity for agent networks among the people in waging a counterguerrilla campaign.
31. This account of signal intelligence is drawn from 1st Radio Bn ComdC, Jan-Dec70, Jan-Apr71. Besides monitoring enemy communications, the battalion also listened to American transmissions, noting and reporting violations of communications security.
32. Col Robert H. Pielch, comments on draft ms, 28Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File) and Haggerty Debrief; see also Mosher Debrief.
33. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 13-14; for early Marine Corps involvement in sensor development and use, see LtCol Robert R. Darron intvw, 3Jun76, pp. 90-98, 105-08 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Darron Transcript.
34. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 14-15; Duffel Bag Briefing, pp. 4-11. By early 1970, the Marines were using the Phase III system of sensors, roughly the third generation of the devices, in terms of sophistication of both sensing and transmitting capabilities; for the points of distinction between various models, see Darron Transcript, p. 110.
35. 1stMarDiv Sensor Briefing; Mosher Debrief.
36. 1stMarDiv Sensor Briefing, p. 11; the quotation is from Col James R. Weaver, debriefing at FMFPac, 27Aug70, Tape 4981 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Weaver Debrief.
38. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 19-20; 1st MAW G-2 ComdC, Mar70, pp. 2-3; Weaver Debrief, Mosher Debrief.
40. Grinalds Transcript, pp. 127-132; Simmons Debrief. For other comments on sensors, pro and con, see Timmes, Dzialo, and Mosher Debriefs and FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 13-18.
42. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb70, p. 9, Dec70, pp. 18-19; Dulacki intvw, p. 22; Canton Debrief; Dzialo Debrief; Haggerty Debrief; for activities of the division and wing G-2 sections, see for example 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jul70, pp. 10-15, and 1st MAW G-2 ComdC, Jul70, pp. 3-5. The division G-2 contained 46 officers and 110-115 enlisted men in mid-1970, see Mosher Debrief.
43. Grinalds Debrief; Metzger Debrief; 1stMarDiv/2d ROKMC Bde/QDSZ Conference Agenda, dt 4Dec70, in QDSZ Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents; Timmes Debrief; Acting PSA, Quang Nam Province, Report to ComUSMACV for the period 1-31Dec70, dt 3Jan71, CMH Files.

The Boobytrap War

Additional sources for this section are: 1stMarDiv, Division Order 3820.2B, dt 9Dec69, Subj: Countermeasures against Mines and Boobytraps, in 1stMarDiv ComdC, Sep70, tab B-2, hereafter 1stMarDiv Mine/Boobytrap SOP; and the following 1st Marine Division historical interview tapes, all located in the Oral History Collection, History and Museums Division: Maj Dale D. Dotman, et. al. Boobytraps in the 2/1 TAOR, 3-4Feb70, Tape 4771, hereafter 2/1 Boobytrap intwvs; 1st Lt Jack W. Klimp, et. al., Enemy Boobytraps Encountered by H/2/1, 29-30Apr70, Tape 4836, hereafter H/2/1 Boobytrap intwvs; Enemy Boobytraps Encountered by F/2/1, 6-11May70, Tape 4847, hereafter F/2/1 Boobytrap intwvs; and 2Lt Herbert B. Stafford, et. al., Enemy Boobytraps, H/2/5, 10-11July70, Tape 4904, hereafter H/2/5 Boobytrap intwvs. Interviews from these tapes will be cited by name of interviewee followed by the short title of the tape.

45. Capt Dennis J. Anderson, 2/1 Boobytrap intwvs.
46. Maj Dale D. Dorman, Ibid. For an instance of Vietnamese children planting a boobytrap, with disastrous consequences to themselves when they accidently set it off, see 2/1 ComdC, Apr70, p. 6.
47. The first quotation is from Capt Dennis J. Anderson, 2/1 Boobytrap intvws; the second is from Col Floyd H. Waldrop, debriefing at FMFPac, 19Aug70, Tape 4926 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Waldrop Debrief; the third is from Cpl Ted L. LeMay, H&F/2/1 Boobytrap intwvs. 48. Maj Dale D. Dorman, 2/1 Boobytrap intwvs; consult also 1stLt Burton L. Cohen, G/2/1 Boobytrap intwvs. 49. Grinalds Debrief; consult also Sgt James G. Ingall, G/2/1 Boobytrap intwvs, and Maj Dale D. Dorman, 2/1 Boobytrap intwvs. 50. The following account of this incident is drawn from: Ssgt Thomas G. Ringer, H/2/5 Boobytrap intwvs, and 5th Mar Jnl, 22Apr70, in 5th Mar ComdC, Apr70. 51. CG1stMarDiv msg to DistrihList, dtd 20Aug70, in Leadership & Discipline Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents. 52. Sgt William Stanley, H&F/2/1 Boobytrap intwvs; other comments on morale and tactical effects are Grinalds Transcript, pp. 124-125, and Ssgt Thomas G. Ringer, H/2/5 Boobytrap intwvs. 53. Capt Dennis J. Anderson, 2/1 Boobytrap intwvs; 2/1 ComdC, Jun70, pts. II and III. See 1/7 Jnl, 28May70, 1/7 ComdC, May70, for indications of Marine suspicion about the origins of ordnance children were turning in. 54. Capt Dennis J. Anderson, 2/1 Boobytrap intwvs. 55. 1stMarDiv Mine/Boobytrap SOP; 3d MP Bn ComdC, Mar70, p. 4; 3d MP Bn Briefing; 1st MP Bn ComdC, Aug70, p. 5. 56. 2dLt James R. Lindholm, G/2/1 Boobytrap intwvs; for an instance of a dog tripping a booby trap, see 1st MP Bn ComdC, Mar71, p. 17. 57. CG1stMarDiv msg to 1stMarDiv, Subj: Boobytrap Incident, dtd 4Dec70, 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 1-11Dec70, is a typical injunction to Marines not to tamper with boobytraps or try to disarm them, including an account of the most recent example of a Marine ignoring this advice. 58. Sgt Thomas F. Massey, G/2/1 Boobytrap intwvs; 1stMarDiv Mine/Boobytrap SOP. 59. Capt Dennis J. Anderson, 2/1 Boobytrap intwvs. 60. Grinalds Transcript, pp. 123-124. 61. Grinalds Debrief; 2/1 ComdC, May, Jun, Jul, and Aug70. 62. Col William V. H. White, comments on draft ms, 6Jul83 (Vietnam Comment File). 63. Waldrop Debrief sums up the activities of the 5th and 7th Marines. 64. Maj Wallace M. Greene III, "Countermeasures against Mines and Booby Traps," Marine Corps Gazette, Dec69, pp. 31-32. 65. CG1stMarDiv msg to DistrihList, dtd 20Aug70, in Leadership & Discipline Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents. 66. Maj Dale D. Dorman, 2/1 Boobytrap intwvs. 1stMarDiv Mine/Boobytrap SOP sums up training duties of unit commanders. 67. This account of the school's activities, including the quotations, is based on 1stMarDiv Public Affairs Office, Release No. 1069-70, dtd 17Oct70; also FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, pp. 76-77; and 1stMarDiv Command Information Summary, Dec70, dtd 12Jan71, G-3 Overview, in Narrative Notes50 Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents; hereafter 1stMarDiv Command Summary, Dec70; and 1st Engineer Bn ComdC, Jan70 through Mar71. 68. 1st Engineer Bn ComdC, Aug70, p. 1, Oct70, pts. II and III, Feb71, pt. II, Mar71, pt. II; Co A, 1st Engineer Bn ComdC, 14-30Apr71. 69. 1stMarDiv Command Summary, Dec70; 1stMarDiv G-3 Overview, Mar71, dtd 31Mar71, in 1stMarDiv Command Information Notebook, Mar71, 1stMarDiv Documents. 70. The account of this incident is taken from 1stMarDiv Press Release No. 1132-70, dtd 22Nov70, and 2/5 Jnl, 20Jul70, in 2/5 ComdC, Oct70. 71. Nickerson Transcript, p. 53. For an example of continuing division exhortations to Marines to take basic precautions, see 1stMarDiv, DivO 10126.1D, Subj: The Wearing or Carrying of Individual Combat Equipment, dtd 25 Dec70, in 1stMarDiv ComdC, Dec70, tab B-21. 72. For the 1970 casualty figures, see 1stMarDiv Command Summary, Dec70; for the 10Jan71 incident, see III MAF ComdC, Jan71, p. 11; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan71, p. 18; and 2/5 Jnl, 10Jan71, in 2/5 ComdC, Jan71. 73. Simmons Debrief. 74. Simmons Debrief. 75. Simmons Debrief. 76. Simmons Debrief. 77. Simmons Debrief. 78. Simmons Debrief. 79. Simmons Debrief.
after Thrash, CMC Briefing; Col James R. Weaver, comments on draft ms, 18Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).
6. Thrash Debrief; Col Walter E. Spangling debriefing at FMF Pac, 9Nov70, Tape 4975 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Thrash Debrief; LaMar Debrief; Rainforth Debrief.

Coming to Terms with Single Management

This section is based on material from HQMC, Operational Control of III MAF Air Assets Reference File, Oct68-Oct70, in MCHC, hereafter cited as HQMC Air Control File. Extensive use also has been made of Gen Lucius D. Clay, Jr., USAF (Ret.), Intvw, 6Oct77 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter cited as Clay Intvw.


8. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp. 343-345. For Marine arguments against single management and proposals for overturning it, see HQMC Air Control File, passim.

9. LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr., Intvw, 10Jan73, pp. 88-90 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Nickerson Transcript; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon ltr to MajGen Norman J. Anderson, dtd 14Sep70, Box 10, McCutcheon Papers.


11. The quotation is from Rainforth Debrief. HQMC Point Paper, Subj: DC/S (Air) Comments on Proposed Reconnaissance Missions in RVN, dtd 14Nov70, HQMC Air Control File.

12. LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon ltr to MajGen Homer S. Hill, DC/S (Air), dtd 22Aug70, Box 10, McCutcheon Papers; see also Rainforth Debrief.

13. ComUSMACV memo to CGII MAF, Subj: Proposed MACV Directive 95-4, dtd 2Dec68 and CGII MAF memo to ComUSMACV, dtd 12Jan69, HQMC Air Control File; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon ltr to LtGen Frank C. Tharin, DC/S (Planes & Policies), dtd 30Mar70, and ltr to MajGen Norman J. Anderson, dtd 14Sep70, both in Box 10, McCutcheon Papers; Rainforth Debrief.

14. LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon ltr to MajGen Charles S. Quitter, CG 1st MAW, dtd 19Nov68, Box 12, McCutcheon Papers.


16. USMACV Directive No. 10-41, dtd 5Apr70, in G-3 III MAF Command Relations File, Nov68-27Dec70; LtGen McCutcheon ltr to LtGen Frank C. Tharin, dtd 23Apr70, Box 10, McCutcheon Papers.

17. CGII MAF memo to ComUSMACV, Subj: Proposed Revision to MACV Directive 95-4, submission of, dtd 6Jul70, in HQMC Air Control File. For background to this draft, see LtGen McCutcheon msg to LtGen Jones, info Gen Chapman, dtd 1Jul70, III MAF message files; LtGen McCutcheon ltr to BGen Homer S. Hill, 7Jul70, and ltr to LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., dtd 16Jul70, both in Box 10, McCutcheon Papers; also McCutcheon Transcript, p. 7.

18. McCutcheon ltr to Gen Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., dtd 16Aug70, in HQMC Air Control File.

19. USMACV Directive No. 95-4, dtd 15Aug70, HQMC Air Control File; Rainforth Debrief.


21. MajGen Homer S. Hill ltr to LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, dtd 31Aug70, Box 10, McCutcheon Papers; this box contains numerous other comments on Directive 95-4 and explanation of it by McCutcheon, as does HQMC Air Control File.

22. Clay Intvw; LtGen Donn J. Robertson Intvw, 24Apr73, pp. 66-67 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); McCutcheon Transcript, pp. 7-8.


24. Clay Intvw; Armstrong Debrief; see also Armstrong Transcript, pp. 10-11, 28-30.

25. 1st MAW, ComdHist, pt. III, p. 15; Clay Intvw.

26. CMC memo to CGs FMFLant, FMF Pac, and MCDEC, Subj: U.S. Air Operations in RVN, dtd 14Oct70, HQMC Air Control File.

27. Armstrong Transcript, pp. 50-52.

28. Ibid., pp. 28-29.

Attacking the Ho Chi Minh Trail


30. Thrash, CMC Briefing.


32. This account of Commando Bolt and Commando Bolt Assas- sin missions is based on: FMF Pac, MarOpsV, Jun70, p. 37, Dec70, p. 53; 1st MAW ComdHist, pt. II, ch. 1, p. 8; Col Neal E. Heffernan, debriefing at FMF Pac, 29Jun70, Tape 4890 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Heffernan Debrief; and the following interviews by the 1st MAW Historical Team, all located in the Oral HistColl, Hist&MusDiv: Capt Lawrence G. Karch, 9Jan70, Tape 4756; 1stLt Walter F. Siller, Jr., 9Jan70, Tape 4757; Maj Carl H. Dubock, 9Jan70, Tape 4759; Capt Terrill J. Richardson, 6Apr70, Tape 4826; Maj John H. Trotti, 10Mar70, Tape 4784; 1stLt Arthur A. Vreeland, 6Jul70, Tape 4936; hereafter cited by name of interviewee and tape number.

33. 1stLt Arthur A. Vreeland, Tape 4936.

34. Capt Lawrence G. Karch, Tape 4756.

35. This description of TA-4F operations is based on: H&M-11 ComdC, Jan-Sep70; FMF Pac, MarOpsV, Sep70, p. 23; Heffernan Debrief; LaMar Debrief; Capt Dallas J. Weber, intvw by 1st MAW Historical Team, 4May70, Tape 4938 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter cited by name of interviewee and tape number.

36. Weber Intvw.

37. VMQ-1 ComdC, Jan-Jul70; Rainforth Debrief.

38. Thrash, CMC Briefing; see also 1st MAW ComdHist, pt. II, ch. 1, p. 13; FMF Pac, MarOpsV, Oct70, pp. 23-24; and Thrash Debrief.

39. Marine Corps Command Center (MCCC), Items of Significa
tous other comments on Directive 95.4 and explanation of it b y McCutcheon, as does HQMC Air Control File.


41. MACV ComdHist70, pt. I, ch. VI, pp. 105-111, and ComdHist, 71, I, ch. VI, pp. 29-30; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon msg to LtGen William K. Jones, dtd 27Sep70 and 24Oct70, and LtGen
Sutherland msg to LtGen McCutcheon, MajGen Milloy, MajGen Hennessey, BGen Jackson, and BGen Hill, dd 9Oct70, in III MAF Message Files.
42. 1st MAW ComdHist, pt. II, ch. 1, pp. 5-8, 11-14, ch. 2, pp. 3-7; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov70, pp. 19-20, Dec70, pp. 53-55; VMA(AW)-225 ComdC, Nov70; VMA-311 ComdC, Nov70; VMA-115 ComdC, Dec70.
43. LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon msgs to LtGen William K. Jones, dd 24Oct70 and 9Nov70, and LtGen Jones msgs to McCutcheon, dd 14Nov70, all in III MAF message files.
44. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, pp. 29, 48; VMCJ-1 ComdC, 1Jan-14Apr71 and 15Apr-30Jun71; 3d MAB Fact Sheet, Subj: EA-6A Deployment to Da Nang, RVN, dd 1May71.
45. 1st MAW ComdHist, pt. III, pp. 6-7; VMA-311 ComdC, 1-7May71.

Air Support Trends in Military Region 1

46. MACV ComdHist, 70, I, ch. VI.
47. Thrash Debrief.
48. Monthly sortie totals for the entire year 1970 are given in FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, p. 47.
49. For a breakdown of air sorties by type of aircraft and forces supported, see Ibid, p. 44.
50. Capt Charles W. Fish, intvw by 1st MAW Historical Teams, 14Apr70, Tape 4834 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Fish intvw.
51. MACV ComdHist, 70, Supplement, pp. 1, 24-25; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, p. 41.
52. Col Frank A. Shook, Jr., debriefing at FMFPac, 5Oct70, Tape 4966 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Shook Debrief; Sparling Debrief; Rainforth Debrief.
53. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb71, pp. 20-21, Mar-Apr71, pp. 21-23.

Controlling Air Support

Additional source for this section is 1st MAW OpO 303-(YR), dd 1Jan70, hereafter OpO 303-(YR), 70.
54. This description of the system for calling for and controlling strikes is drawn from: OpO 303-(YR), 70, Anx C; Maj John J. McNamara intvw by 1st MAW Historical Team, 13Apr70, Tape 4833 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter McNamara intvw; Shook Debrief; LaMar Debrief; Fish intvw.
55. Fish intvw; consult also Rainforth Debrief.
56. 1stLt Dennis R. Darnell intvw by 1st MAW Historical Team, 4May70, 4839 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Darnell intvw.
57. OpO 303-(YR), Anx C; Shook Debrief; McNamara intvw; Capt Terrill J. Richardson intvw by 1st MAW Historical Team, 6Apr70, Tape 4826 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
58. Unless otherwise noted, all material on the Beacon system is from: 1st MAW ComdHist, pt. II, ch. 5, pp. 15-16, 54-55; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 30-32; Sparling Debrief.
59. Sparling Debrief.
60. Armstrong Debrief; the following two interviews by the 1st MAW Historical Team and in the Oral HistColl, MCHC, sum up operating problems with the Beacon: 1stLt James J. Ewing, 4May70, Tape 4860; and 1stLt Robert C. McIntyre, 3Aug70, Tape 4943.
61. 1st MAW ComdHist, pt. II, ch. 3, p. 12; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, pp. 57-58; McNamara intvw; Fish intvw.
62. The quotation is from Armstrong Transcript, pp. 13-14; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, pp. 29-30, and May-Jun71, p. 17-18; Sparling Debrief; LtGen McCutcheon msg to LtGen Sutherland, dtd 22Sep70, III MAF message files.

CHAPTER 16
HELIICOPTER OPERATIONS AND NEW TECHNOLOGY, 1970-1971

Unless otherwise noted, this chapter is based on the sources cited at the beginning of Chapter 15.

Improving Helicopter Support of the 1st Marine Division

Additional sources for this section are: III MAF, Board Report for Utilization, Command, and Control of III MAF Helo Assets, dtd 25Apr69, hereafter cited as Youngdale Report.

1. LtCol James W. Rider, comments on draft ms, n.d. (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Rider Comments.
4. Thrash, CMC Briefing; also Ltr to MajGen Alan J. Armstrong, dtd 19Jan70, in Armstrong Air/Ground File.
5. Armstrong Debrief; Thrash, CMC Briefing; Shook Debrief; Dunwiddie Debrief; McNamara intvw; Fish intvw.
7. 1stLt Michael D. Langston intvw by 1st MAW Historical Team, 4May70, Tape 4892 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
8. Rider Comments.
9. 1stLt George S. Bennett intvw by 1st MAW Historical Team, 3Aug70, Tape 4945 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Bennett Debrief; Grinalds Debrief.
10. Rider Comments.
11. Thrash Debrief; Shook Debrief; for the Youngdale Board recommendation, see Youngdale Report, p. 15.
13. Armstrong Transcript, p. 43.

Helicopter Operations

Helicopter sortie figures and other statistics are drawn from FMFPac, MarOpsV, for the appropriate months and from the year-end summary in the Dec70 volume, p. 41.

16. Tellor Debrief.
17. Ibid.; Youngdale Report, pp. 16-19; specifies the flight hours for each helicopter type; Shook Debrief.
19. Smith Debrief; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar70, pp. 26-27, summarizes development of the Cobra force; Cobra tactics are described
in 1stLt Herbert P. Silva intrvw by 1st MAW Historical Team, 15Jun70, Tape 4880 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Silva intrvw, and 1stLt Fulton H. Beville intrvw by 1st MAW Historical Team, 8Apr70, Tape 4827 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

20. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct70, p. 34, describes the Cobra engine replacement. For the ammunition problem, see Smith Debrief. The final quotation is from Silva intrvw.

21. Thrash Debrief; see also Thrash, CMC Briefing.

22. HML-167 ComdCs, Jan70-Jun71; the quotation is from ibid., June71.

23. Quotation is from Sparling Debrief; Thrash, CMC Briefing; Thrash Debrief; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar70, p. 28; Lamar Debrief; for accounts of the changing mission of the CH-53, consult the following 1st MAW Historical Team interviews, in Oral HistColl, MCHC: 1stLt James A. Motisi, 9Jul70, Tape 4939, hereafter Motisi intrvw; and 1stLt Michael P. Hayes, 10Aug70, Tape 4943, hereafter Hayes intrvw.

24. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun70, p. 32; Hayes intrvw; HMH-463 ComdC, Jan-Jun70.


26. Ibid.

27. Unless otherwise noted, this account of Thrashlight operations is drawn from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun70, pp. 33-36, Sep70, pp. 21-22; Thrash Debrief; Lamar Debrief; Hayes intrvw; and LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon ltr to MajGen Louis Metzger, dtd 28May70, and ltr to BGen Homer S. Hill, dtd 1Jun70; in both Box 10, McCutcheon Papers.


29. LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon ltr to BGen Homer S. Hill, dtd 17Jun70, Box 10, McCutcheon Papers.

30. Thrash Debrief, Motisi intrvw.

31. HML-463 ComdC, Jun70-May71; see Chronology for Sep70 for participation in Operation Tailwind. MAG-16 ComdC, Sep70, p. II-1, contains a description of the operation, although not mentioning Laos by name.

32. Armstrong Transcript, pp. 11-13; LtGen McCutcheon msgs to LtGen Jones, dtd 17Sep70 and 27Sep70, and msg to LtGen Sutherland, info Gen Abrams, dtd 17Sep70, III MAF Message Files.

New Ordnance and Aircraft

Additional sources for this section are: 1st MAW ComdHist, pt. II, ch. 2, pp. 16-17, ch. 4, pp. 3, 13-19; and FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov70, pp. 25-26, Jan-Feb71, pp. 39-41, Mar-Apr71, p. 26, and May-Jun71, pp. 18-19.


35. 1st MAB Fact Sheet, Sub: Cobra AH-1J Combat Evaluation, dtd 30Apr71; see also Fails, Marines and Helicopters, pp. 154-157; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, p. 26.

Aviation Achievements and Costs

36. Personnel losses are compiled from 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec70 and Jan to 1-14Apr71; aircraft losses are summarized in FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, p. 56, Jan-Feb71, pp. 28-29, and Mar-Apr71, p. 30.


CHAPTER 17

ARTILLERY AND RECONNAISSANCE

Artillery Operations, 1970-1971

Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is drawn from FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70-May-Jun71; 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan70-14Apr71; 11th Mar ComdCs, Jan70-Mar71; 1/11 ComdCs, Jan70-May71; 2/11 ComdCs, Jan70-Mar71; 3/11 ComdCs, Jan70-Sep70; 4/11 ComdCs, Jan70-Sep70; 1/13 ComdCs, Jan-Mar70; The following debriefings were drawn upon extensively; both are located in the Oral HistColl, MCHC: Col Don D. Ezell debriefing at FMFPac, 8Apr70, Tape 4837, hereafter Ezell Debrief; and Col Ernest J. Reid, Jr., debriefing at FMFPac, 2Sep70, Tape 4952, hereafter Reid Debrief. Unless otherwise noted, all oral history interviews and debriefings cited are in the Oral HistColl, MCHC.

1. 1st Mar msg to 11th Mar adcon/opcon, dtd 19Jan70; 1st Mar Div OpO 301A-YR, dtd 10Dec69, Anx F (Artillery) : for positions, see the ComdCs for Jan 70 referred to in the compendium footnotes.

2. 1st 175mm Gun Battery (SP) ComdC, Jan70; 3d 175mm Gun Battery (SP) ComdC, Jan70; 1st 8-Inch Howitzer Battery (SP) ComdC, Jan70; 3d 8-Inch Howitzer Battery (SP) ComdC, Jan70. 3d 175mm Gun Battery (SP) ComdC, Jan-Feb70.

3. For the role of the towed 155mm howitzer, see LtCol William Plaskett, Jr., “New Life for Towed 155 Howitzer,” Marine Corps Gazette, Feb69, p. 51. 2/11 ComdC, Aug70, pp. 6, 9, covers the battalion’s use of the 155s.

5. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun70, p. 45.


7. Reid Debrief; for an example of a special preemptive fire plan, in this case covering the June 1970 provincial elections, see 3/11 ComdC, Jun70, pt. II.

8. Ezell Debrief.


10. Ezell Debrief; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov69, p. 3, Apr70, pp. 3-4, Aug70, p. 7, Overview, p. 15; Reid Debrief. LtCol Peter L. Hogaboam, comments on draft ms, 10Jun83 (Vietnam Comment File); FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov69, p. 3.

11. 11th Marines ComdC, Aug70, p. 6, outlines the IOD team training program. Ezell Debrief details many FO “tricks of the trade.”

12. 3/11 ComdC, Jan70, pt. III; 11th Mar ComdC, Jan70, p. 5; Col Floyd H. Waldrop, comments on draft ms, 16Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).

13. The quotation is from Ezell Debrief; for the link to Kingfisher missions, see 3/11 S-3 Jnl, dtd 10Mar70, 3/11 ComdC, Mar70; for the supposed prisoner incident, see 3/11 S-3 Jnl, dtd 29Jan70, in 3/11 ComdC, Jan70; for previous incident also see 1/11 S-3 Jnl, dtd 29Jan70, 1/11 ComdC, Jan70.


15. LtCol Charles R. Dunbaugh, comments on draft ms, 10May83 (Vietnam Comment File).

16. Col Edward A. Wilcox debriefing at FMFPac, 4Jul70, Tape 4889, hereafter Wilcox Debrief.

17. Ezell Debrief. The IOD received high praise from most III MAF
and 1st Marine Division commanders and staff officers; for examples, consult Col John S. Canton (III MAF AC/S G-2) debriefing at FMFPac, 22Dec69, Tape 4737, hereafter Canton Debrief; Col Edward Dziolko (III MAF G-2) debriefing at FMFPac, 2Jul70, Tape 4888; and Col Ralph F. Estey (III MAF AC/S G-3) debriefing at FMFPac, 14Dec70, Tape 4979.


19. 3/11 ComdC, May70, pt. III: see also 1/11 ComdC, Aug70, p. 11; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, pp. 13-14; and Ezell Debrief.


21. Rudzis Comments.

22. Ibid.

23. Ezell Debrief, AO section activities are covered month by month in 11th Mar ComdCs, Jan70-Mar71; for an example of engagement of radio intercept targets, see 3/11 ComdC, Jul70, pt. III.

24. 1stMarDiv Order 1560.4, dtd 6Mar71, in 1stMarDiv ComdC, Mar71; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb70, pp. 16-18, May-Jun71, p. 57; Reid Debrief. The Tinker computer tapes, both data base and program, are now in the National Archives; duplicates of this material are in the MCHC.

25. Ezell Debrief, McCutcheon Transcript p. 33; for H&I fire reduction at the battalion level, see 1/11 ComdC, Sep70, p. 5.

26. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr70, pp. 2, 32-33; for an example of plans for a heliborne provisional battery and for firebase deployments, see 1/11 ComdC, Aug70, p. 12, and 2/11 ComdC, Oct70, p. 7.

27. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun70, pp. 2-3; Reid Debrief; Col Ernest R. Reid, Jr., memo to CGlstMarDiv, Subj: Artillery Raid of 30May70, summary of, dtd 1Jun70, Item 103 (1), 1stMarDiv Admin Files; 11th Mar ComdC, May70, p. 5; 2/11 ComdC, May70, p. 6.


29. Col John D. Shoup, Comments on draft ms, 15Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Shoup Comments.

30. 1stMarDiv OpO 301A-YR, dtd 10Dec69, Anx E (Fire Support Coordination); Ezell Debrief.

31. Shoup Comments.

32. Wilcox Debrief: Some of the IOD teams were under the operational and administrative control of various battalions of the 11th Marines; others were directly controlled and administered by the artillery regimental headquarters. 11th Mar ComdCs, Jul70, p. 6, Sep70, p. 6.

33. Reid Debrief; Ezell Debrief discusses coordination problems with ARVN.

34. For examples of Marine support for ARVN operations, see 2/11 ComdCs, Feb70, Mar70, Apr70, May and Jun70 and 4/11 ComdC, Jun70. The Hai Van FSCC is covered in 1/11 ComdCs, May70, pp. 9-10, Jul70, p. 10, Aug70, pp. 11-12.

35. Ezell Debrief, 11th Mar ComdCs, Apr70, pp. 4-5, May70, p. 5; 2/11 ComdC, Apr70, pp. 6.

36. 11th Mar ComdC, Jan70-Mar71; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70; pp. 10-11; 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan70-Mar71.

37. McCutcheon Transcript, p. 33.

Reconnaissance Operations, 1970-1971

Additional sources for this section are: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70-May/Jun71; 1st Recon Bn ComdCs, Jan70-Mar71; 1st Force Recon Co ComdCs, Jan-Aug70; 3d Force Recon Co ComdCs, Jan-Feb70. Extensive use has been made of Col William C. Drumright debriefing at FMFPac, 17Aug70, Tape 4928 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Drumright Debrief. All oral history interviews cited in this section are from OralHistColl, MCHC. Extensive use also has been made of Lieutenant Commander Ray W. Stubbe, CHC, USN, "Paddles, Parachutes, and Patrols: A History of Specialized Reconnaissance Activities of the United States Marine Corps" (ms, MCHC, 1978), hereafter Stubbe, PPP.

38. 3d Force Recon Co ComdC, Jan70; Stubbe PPP, pp. 539-542; Canton Debrief; BGen George E. Dooley, debriefing at FMFPac, 23Dec69, Tape 4733.

39. 1st Force Recon Co ComdCs, Jan-Feb70.


41. 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Jun70, p. 6; for the various types of patrol activities, see 1st Recon Bn Patrol Reports, Jan70-Mar71, filed with 1st Recon Bn ComdCs, Jan70-Mar71, and 1st Force Recon Co Patrol Reports, Jan-Aug70, in 1st Force Recon Co ComdCs, Jan-Aug70.

42. Drumright Debrief.

43. Col George C. Fox, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3 of III MAF during the first half of 1970, criticized the reconnaissance Marines for being too aggressive on patrol and compromising their main mission by initiating too many fights. Consult Fox's debriefing at FMFPac, 6May70, Tape 4807.

44. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 4-5; Drumright Debrief.

45. The following account of the 14 June 1970 action is based on: Co E, 1st Recon Bn Patrol Report "Flakey Snow," dtd 14Jun70, tab A-155, 1st Recon Bn Patrol Reports, Jun70; and Sgt Frank E. Diaz, intvw by 1stMarDiv Historical Team, 23Jun70, Tape 4866. Quotations are from the Diaz intvw.

46. 1stLt Peter F. Goetz, intvw by 1stMAW Historical Team, 10Aug70, Tape 4948. All quotations from Lt Goetz are from this tape.


48. Drumright Debrief.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, p. 4; for an example of a reconnaissance attack on a camp, see Co B, 1st Recon Bn Patrol Report, "Clay Pipe," dtd 8Aug70, tab A-38, 1st Recon Bn Patrol Reports, Aug70.


52. Drumright Debrief; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr70, p. 9, Aug70, p. 5.

53. Drumright Debrief; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon ltr to MajGen Rathvon McC Tompkins, dtd 14Jul70, Box 10, McCutcheon Papers.
CHAPTER 18
LOGISTICS, 1970-1971

Material for this chapter is drawn from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70-May/Jun71 and Overview; FMFPac, ComdCs, Jan70-Jun71; III MAF ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71; 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71; 3d MAB ComdCs, 13-Apr-Jun71; FLC ComdCs, Jan-Jun71. Much information is drawn from Col James D. Soper, “A View from FMFPac of Logistics in the Western Pacific, 1963-1971,” in The Marines in Vietnam: An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography (Washington: History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1974), pp. 200-217, hereafter Soper, “Logistics.” Extensive use has been made of BGen Mauro J. Padalino debriefing at FMFPac, 26-Oct70, Tape 4971, hereafter Padalino FMFPac Debrief, and debriefing at HQMC, 8-Jan71, Tape 6135, hereafter Padalino HQMC Debrief, both in Oral Hist Coll, MCHC. Unless otherwise noted, all oral history tapes and transcripts cited in this chapter are located in the Oral Hist Coll, MCHC.

Supplying III MAF

Additional sources for this section are: 1st FSR ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71; and FLSG ComdCs, Jan70-Sep70, in FLC ComdCs.

1. FLC ComdC, Jan70, p. 3, and tab K-2.
2. 1st FSR ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71, contain ComdCs of Headquarters and Service, Supply, and Maintenance Bns. For details of the III MAF equipment maintenance system, see FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun70, pp. 42-44, Dec70, pp. 73-74; and Soper, “Logistics,” pp. 206-207.

NOTES

54. The quotation is from ibid. For details and schedule of the indoctrination course, see 1st Recon Bn Order 3500.1, dt 16-Jan70, 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Jan70.
55. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 5-6; 1st Recon Bn Bulletin 3500, dt 10-Mar70, and Bulletin 1510, dt 7-May70, in 1st Recon Bn ComdCs, Mar70 and Jun70, describe the courses respectively for ARVN and Korean troops. Consult also Drumright Debrief.
56. 1st MarDiv staff memos, Subj: QDSZ Conferences, dt 2-Mar70, 26-Apr70, 10-May70, 16-May70, 24-May70, and 4-Jul70, tab B-21 in 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Mar, Apr, May, and Jul70. For comment on limited South Vietnamese reconnaissance capabilities, consult LtCol Charles M. Mosher, debriefing at FMFPac, 17-Sep70, Tape 4959.
57. 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Aug-Sep70; 1st Force Recon Co ComdC, Aug70; Stubbe, PPP, p. 347; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, p. 17; Col John W. Haggerty, III, debriefing at FMFPac, 15-Oct70, Tape 4965, hereafter Haggerty Debrief.
59. LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, comments on draft ms, 17-Jan83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Trainor Comments.
60. 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Dec70, tab G, and Feb71, tab D; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, p. 17.
61. 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Mar71; Co A (Rein), 1st Recon Bn ComdCs, 1-14-Apr71, 15-30-Apr71; 1-13-May71.

CHAPTER 18
LOGISTICS, 1970-1971

Material for this chapter is drawn from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70-May/Jun71 and Overview; FMFPac, ComdCs, Jan70-Jun71; III MAF ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71; 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71; 3d MAB ComdCs, 13-Apr-Jun71; FLC ComdCs, Jan-Jun71. Much information is drawn from Col James D. Soper, “A View from FMFPac of Logistics in the Western Pacific, 1963-1971,” in The Marines in Vietnam: An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography (Washington: History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1974), pp. 200-217, hereafter Soper, “Logistics.” Extensive use has been made of BGen Mauro J. Padalino debriefing at FMFPac, 26-Oct70, Tape 4971, hereafter Padalino FMFPac Debrief, and debriefing at HQMC, 8-Jan71, Tape 6135, hereafter Padalino HQMC Debrief, both in Oral Hist Coll, MCHC. Unless otherwise noted, all oral history tapes and transcripts cited in this chapter are located in the Oral Hist Coll, MCHC.

Supplying III MAF

Additional sources for this section are: 1st FSR ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71; and FLSG ComdCs, Jan70-Sep70, in FLC ComdCs.

1. FLC ComdC, Jan70, p. 3, and tab K-2.
2. 1st FSR ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71, contain ComdCs of Headquarters and Service, Supply, and Maintenance Bns. For details of the III MAF equipment maintenance system, see FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun70, pp. 42-44, Dec70, pp. 73-74; and Soper, “Logistics,” pp. 206-207.
3. FLSG-B ComdCs, Jan-Sep70.
5. 3/3 ComdC, Mar70, pt. III; 1stMarDiv Order P4400.7E, dt 15-Apr70, tab B-16, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Apr70; Col Miller M. Blue debriefing at FMFPac, 3-Feb70, 4987, hereafter Blue Debrief.
6. 1st Shore Party Bn ComdC, Jan70; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul70, pp. 40-43.
7. Colonel James G. Dixon, comments on draft ms, 11-May83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Dixon Comments.
9. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Overview, p. 53, Jan70, pp. 40-41, Aug70, p. 44, Dec70, pp. 86-87; MWSS-17 ComdCs, Jan-Aug70.
10. Col Edmund G. Deming, Jr., debriefing at FMFPac, 10-Aug70, Tape 4958; 1/5 ComdC, Feb70, p. 3-7. For various supply shortages, consult: Col Ernest R. Reid, debriefing at FMFPac, 25-Sep70, 4952; FLC ComdC, Jan70; FMFPac MarOpsV, Jun70, pp. 45, Aug70, p. 43; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan70, p. 26, Aug70, p. 30, Sep70, p. 30.

FLC Phases Down

12. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Sep70, pp. 27-29; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Sep70, p. 29; FLSG-B ComdCs, May-Sep70; FLC ComdC, Jul70; 1st FSR ComdCs, May70, Sep70, Oct70.
14. Col Robert W. Calvert, debriefing at FMFPac, 12-Oct70, Tape 4969, hereafter Calvert Debrief; 1st FSR ComdCs, Jun70, Jul70, Oct70; FLC ComdC, Dec70.

The End of Naval Support Activity Da Nang

16. Army CSS History, pp. 2-4; Maj Donald R. Davis, intvw by 15th
Military History Detachment, U.S. Army, dtd 26Jun70 (Folder 4, Box 7, 71A2312, FRC, Suitland, Md.), hereafter Davis intvw.

17. ComNavForV msg to CINCPAC, dtd 3Jun70, III MAF CSS File.

18. CINCPAC msg to ComNavForV, dtd 4Jun69, in ibid.; Simlik intvw.

19. Col Miller M. Blue, comments on draft ms, 5Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).

20. Simlik intvw.

21. This account of the NSA Da Nang phase-down planning is based on: III MAF CSS File; USNASD CommdHist 69, p. 137; Army CSS History, pp. 5-7; Davis intvw; III MAF CommdC, Jan70, p. 28.

22. Col James A. Sloan, comments on draft ms, 6Jul83 (Vietnam Comment File).


24. LtGen Leo J. Dulacki, USMC (Ret), intv to Oral History Unit, MCHC, dtd 8Nov77; III MAF CommdC, May70, pp. 22-23, Jun70, p. 24; FLC CommdC, May 70, p. 4, Jun70, p. 4; Admin III MAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 19May70, Admin FMFPac msg to CINCPAC, dtd 20May70, III MAF Message Files; BGen Dulacki msg to BGen Houghton, dtd 19May70, FMFPac Message Files.

25. III MAF CommdC, Jul70, p. 22; FLC CommdC, Jul70, p. 4; USNASD CommdHist 70, pp. 6-12; Army CSS History, pp. 16-17, tab 1.


27. III MAF CommdCs, Jul70, p. 21, Aug70, p. 20, Sep70, p. 21; Army CSS History, pp. 26-27; Padalino FMFPac Debrief; Calvert Debrief; Blue Debrief; Dulacki Debrief; Col Allan T. Wood, debriefing at FMFPac, 24Nov70, tape 4983, hereafter Wood Debrief.

28. LtCol William R. Fails intvw, 2Jan79, Tape 6365, hereafter Fails intvw; LtGen Keith Bling McCutcheon msg to LtGen William J. McCaffrey, USA, dtd 16Sep70, III MAF Message Files.

29. Fails intvw; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon msg to LtGen William J. McCaffrey, USA, dtd 20Sep70, III MAF Message Files, expresses McCutcheon's appreciation of prompt Army response to Marine requirements.

30. Simlik intvw; LtGen Leo J. Dulacki, USMC (Ret), intw to Oral History Unit, MCHC, dtd 8Nov77.

Engineer Support

Additional sources for this section are: 1st Engineer Bn CommdCs, Jan-Mar71; 7th Engineer Bn CommdCs, Jan-Aug70; and 9th Engineer Bn CommdCs, Jan-Aug70.


32. Dixon Comments.

33. FLC Order 5400.7, dtd 8Aug70, tab K, FLC CommdC, Aug70; FLC CommdC, Nov70, tab F-1; 1st FSR CommdC, Jul70; Co A, 7th Engineer Bn CommdCs, 19-31Jul70 and 1-10Jun71.

34. Dixon Comments.

35. LtGen Herman Nickerson debriefing at FMFPac, 10Mar70, Tape 4806, explains the strategic significance of road building; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr70, p. 32, Jun70, pp. 41-42, Nov70, pp. 22-23, Mar-Apr71, p. 47; III MAF CommdC, Jul70, p. 21; 1st Engineer Bn CommdC, Apr70; 7th Engineer Bn CommdC, Jul70.

36. 1st Engineer Bn CommdC, Jul70, pp. 1-4; 1stMarDiv Order P3820.2B, dtd 9Dec69, Subj: Countermeasures against Mines and Boobytraps. 1stMarDiv CommdC, Dec69, tab B-12, describes enemy road mining techniques and Marine countermeasures.


38. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May70, pp. 38-40; 9th Engineer Bn CommdC, Jan70, May70; 7th Engineer Bn CommdC, Apr70, p. 12, Jul70; 1st Engineer Bn CommdCs, Jan-Mar71.

39. Dixon Comments.

40. Col Edward A. Wilcox debriefing at FMFPac, 4Jul70, Tape 4889, hereafter Wilcox Debrief; 2/1 CommdC, Jun70, pt. II-B, gives an example of cleared areas being overgrown again.

41. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb70, p. 31, details construction of the Wonderditches; 1st Engineer Bn CommdC, Aug70, contains instances of Marine engineer aid in constructing ARVN firebases.

42. 1st Engineer Bn CommdCs, Sep-Oct70.

43. Ibid., Feb-Mar71; Co A, 1st Engineer Bn CommdCs, 1-13Apr71, 14-30Apr71.

44. Dixon Comments.

45. Ibid.

Motor Transport

Additional sources for this section are: 1st Motor Transport Bn CommdCs, Jan-30Mar71; 7th Motor Transport Bn CommdCs, Jan70 and 1Feb-13Mar70; 11th Motor Transport Bn CommdC, Jan70-Jun71; Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st FSR CommdCs, Jan70-Jun71, in the 1st FSR CommdCs, Jan70-Apr71; FLC CommdCs, Apr-Jul71.

46. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, pp. 82-83.


49. 11th Motor Transport Bn CommdC, Nov-Dec70; Blue Debrief; Wood Debrief; FMFPac CommdC, 1Jul-31Dec70, pp. 43-44; Headquarters and Service Bn, 1st FSR CommdC, Jan71; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, p. 84; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon to MajGen Louis Metzger, dtd 28Nov70, Box 10, McCutcheon Papers.

Medical Services

Additional sources for this section are: 1st Medical Bn CommdCs, Jan70-Apr71; and 1st Hospital Co CommdCs, Jan70 and 1-26Feb70.
CHAPTER 19

THE LOGISTICS OF REDEPLOYMENT

Unless otherwise noted, this chapter is based on: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70-May/Jul71; III MAF ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71; 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71; 3d MAW ComdCs, 15Apr-Jun71; FLC ComdCs, Jan70-Jun71; Soper, "Logistics;" Padaliano FMFPac Debrief and CGIIIMAF message files, dtd 13May70, and CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 13May70, III MAF Message Files.

FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, p. 80; 1st Medical Bn ComdCs, Sep70 and 14Apr71; 3d MAB ComdCs, May71, p. 21; Co A, 1st Medical Bn ComdC, 8-25Jun71.

The 'Mixmaster' of Person nel

1. Colonel Hetschel L. Johnson, Jr., comments on draft ms, 14Apr83 (Vietnam Comments File).
2. For a typical planning sequence, that for Keystone Robin Alpha, see CinCPac msg to III MAF, dtd 19Jun70, in G-3 III MAF Keystone Robin File. Soper, "Logistics," pp. 203, 209, describes earlier planning efforts for the redeployments as a whole.
3. FMFPac ComdCs, 1Jan-30Jun70, 1Jul-31Dec70, 1Jan-30Jun71.
4. Simlik intvw.
5. Jones Transcript, pp. 77-78.
6. III MAF ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71; Simlik intvw; III MAF OPlan 183-69, dtd 1Sep69, is the basic III MAF redeployment plan and outlines the division of responsibility among subordinate commands; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan70, p. 25; 1stMarDiv Order 4400.25A, dtd 2Dec70, tab B-6; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Dec70; FLC ComdCs, Jan70, p. 6, and tab K-4.
8. Redeployment criteria for Keystone Robin Alpha and Bluejay are published in III MAF Sea Tiger, 30Jan70, 6Feb70, 14Aug70, 21Aug70; those for Keystone Robin Charlie are in CG1stMarDiv msg to 1stMarDiv, dtd 19Jan71, 2/1 ComdC, Jan71.
9. Jones, 1971 Symposium Presentation; III MAF OPlan 183-69, dtd 1Sep69, Anx I (Personnel); FMFPac ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun70, pp. 13-14, 1Jul-31Dec70, p. 32; Sea Tiger, 13Nov70, describes the FLC personnel transfer system; BGEn Louis H. Wilson msg to BGEn Leo J. Dulacki, dtd 30Jan70, III MAF CSS File; CGFMFPac msg to CGS III MAF, 1stMarDiv, 1st MAW, FLC, 1MAF, 3dMarDiv, 1st MAW (Rear), MCB Camp Butler, CO 3d FSR, dtd 15Sep70, III MAF Message Files; CG1stMarDiv msg to 1stMarDiv, dtd 19Jan71, 2/1 ComdC, Jan71.
10. Col Walter E. Spratling, debriefing at FMFPac, 9Nov70, Tape 4975 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Spratling Debrief; McCutcheon Transcript, pp. 18-19; CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 23Mar70, FMFPac Message Files; Armstrong Debrief; McGraw Debrief. These are only a sampling of the debriefing and messages expressing concern at the efforts of the "mixmaster."
13. Armstrong Transcript, pp. 4-5; Admin FMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 13Aug70, and CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 15Aug70, III MAF Message Files, discuss the impact of the Keystone Robin Alpha changes. Consult also: Col Lawrence J. Stien, debriefing at FMFPac, 15Oct70, Tape 4973 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Stien Debrief; Col Robert L. Pearne, Jr., debriefing at FMFPac, 3Aug70, Tape 4925 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); Armstrong Debrief; Col Don H. Blanchard, Comments on draft ms, 2Jun83 (Vietnam Comments File).
14. FMFPac ComdC, 1Jul-31Dec70, pp. 6, 11; MajGen William G. Thras, debriefing at FMFPac, 2Jul70, Tape 4850 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); Col Paul B. Henley, debriefing at FMFPac, 13Jul70, Tape 4898; Wilcox Debrief.
15. Aitken Debrief.
16. III MAF OPlan 183-69, dtd 1Sep69, outlines the basic redeployment sequence, as does FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jun71, pp. 46-48.
17. "1/5 News about the Pros," dtd 24Mar71, in 1/5 ComdC, Mar71. III MAF used the 9th Engineer Battalion cantonment and later Hill 34 as stand-down areas; see Col John W. Haggerty III, debriefing at FMFPac, 15Oct70, Tape 4965, hereafter Haggerty Debrief; and 1/5 ComdC, Feb71, pt. II. For assistance to withdrawing units by a still-active unit, see 3d 8-Inch Howitzer Battery ComdC, 15-30Apr71, pt. III.
18. 3/5 ComdC, Feb71, pt. III.

'Mixmastering' of Equipment and Real Estate

19. III MAF OPlan 183-69, dtd 1Sep69, Anx E (Logistic), dtd 25Sep69; CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 19Dec69, CMC msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 31Dec69, III MAF Force Reduction Planning File, 17Dec69-7Jan70; CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 11Mar70, III MAF Message Files; FLC Order 4500.2, dtd 9Mar71, tab F, FLC ComdC, Mar71; Stien Debrief; Fails intvw; also LtCol William R. Fails, comments on draft ms, n.d. (Vietnam Comment File).
22. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 38-39, Dec70, pp. 68, 70-72,
CHAPTER 20

MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is drawn from FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70-May/Jun71; III MAF, 1st MAW, 1st MarDiv, and FLC ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71. Extensive use has been made of the Leadership and Discipline Notebook (1stMarDiv Documents, MCHC), hereafter cited as L & D Notebook. Frequent use has been made of the following interviews and briefings, all in the Oral HistColl, MCHC: McCutcheon intvw; Armstrong intvw; and Stieh Debrief.

Atrocities, Rules of Engagement, and Personal Response

Additional sources for this section are: HQMC Son Thang Incident Document File, hereafter cited as Son Thang File, with folder

2. Unless otherwise noted, this account of the Son Thang incident is based on: HQMC Point Paper, Subj: Incident of 19Feb70 at Song Thang (4) . . . , dtd 2Mar70; Son Thang File, folder 1; *Lewy, America in Vietnam*, pp. 327-328; CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 25Feb70, FMFPac Message File; CGlstMarDiv msgs to CGFMFPac, dtd 27Feb70 and 13Dec70, and CGlstMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 3Mar70, all in III MAF Message Files.

3. The initial false reports are in 1/7 Journal, 19Feb70, 1/7 ComdC, Feb70, and 7th Mar SitRep, dtd 19Feb70, 7th Mar ComdC, Feb70.

4. CGlstMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 20Feb70, III MAF Message Files.


6. *Lewy, America in Vietnam*, p. 456, reprints these statistics from the Judge Advocate General, Military Justice Division, U.S. Department of the Navy. For earlier atrocity incidents and their disposition, see Jack Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966, An Expanding War* (Washington: History and Museum Division, HQMC, ), pp. 244-246; Philip Caputo, *A Rumor of War* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982), ch. 17 recounts the legal proceedings against a Marine officer and several enlisted men charged with killing two Vietnamese civilians; in this case, the men were acquitted or charges were dropped.

7. Dulacal Comments.

8. Ibid. and Dulacal intvw, pp. 107-110; messages on the incident are in III MAF Outgoing Message Files, 14Jan-31Mar70, and Incoming Message Files, 13Feb-18Mar70; for declassification, see CGFMFPac msg to CG lstMarDiv, dtd 23Aug70 and CG lstMarDiv msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 24Aug70, III MAF Incoming Message Files 29Jul-15Sep70.

9. 1/7 ComdC, Feb70; HQMC Point Paper, Subj: Incident of 19Feb70 at Song Thang (4) . . . , dtd 2Mar70, Son Thang File, folder 1.

10. Col Max G. Halliday, Head Military Law Branch, JAG, int to Mrs. Kenneth D. Coffin, dtd 19Mar70, Son Thang File, folder 1; this folder contains numerous protest letters, with answers worded essentially as the one cited.

11. This summary of the trials is based on III MAF Incoming Message Files, 19Mar-11May70, and Son Thang File, folders 2, 3, and 4.

12. CGlstMarDiv msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 21May70; CGlstMarDiv msg to CMC, dtd 7Jun70, III MAF Incoming Message Files, 19Mar-29Jul70.


15. CGIIIMAF msg to II MAF, dtd 13May70, CGIIIMAF Personal/official Correspondence File, Feb-Nov70.

16. CO 4th CAG msg to 4th CAG, dtd 16May70, 4th CAG ComdC, May70; see also CO 4th CAG Circular, Subj: Fire Discipline, dtd 23Apr70 in Ibid; and CAF Order 3300.1, dtd 17May70, in CAG SOP and History folder, Box 2, Pacification Story Docs.

17. 1stMarDiv msg to All Units, dtd 4Jan71, 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 1-10Jan71.

18. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Summary and Overview, p. 45; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec70; *Sea Tiger*, 16Oct70, described the III MAF cultural tours.

19. 1stMarDiv Order 5710.8B, dtd 9Oct70, tab B-13, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Oct70; see also DivO 1050.4, dtd 3 Feb70, tab B-4, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Feb70. For an example of regimental Personal Response efforts, see 1st Mar ComdCs, Jan-Dec70; 3/5 ComdC, Apr70, p. 3-9, describes activities of a unit Personal Response Council.

20. CGlstMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 21Jul70, III MAF Incoming Message Files, 22May-29Jul70; CGIIIMAF ltr to CG MR 1, dtd 16Aug70, CG III MAF Personal/official Correspondence File, Feb-Nov70.

‘Friendly on Friendly’

Additional sources for this section are: Simmons Debrief and BGen Edwin H. Simmons, Orientation Talk to 1st Lieutenants, 1st Marine Division, n.d., ca. early 1971, hereafter Simmons Orientation Talk.

21. CGlstMarDiv msg to Distribution List, dtd 24Aug70, L&D Notebook; Simmons Orientation Talk, pp. 34, 38, 40, 43.

22. 3/7 ComdC, Aug70; CGlstMarDiv msgs to CGFMFPac, dtd 18Aug70, 21Aug70, 29Aug70, 16Sep70, III MAF Incoming Message Files, 29Jul-15Sep70, 16Sep-29Oct70.

23. 1st Mar ComdC, Oct70; 1st Mar SitRepRep, 12Oct70, in ibid., Simmons Orientation Talk, pp. 35-37; Col Lawrence R. Dorsa, comments on draft ms, 9Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).


25. Gtinalds intvw, pp. 119-120.

26. Col T. E. Metzger debriefing at FMFPac, 13Jul70, Tape 4899.

27. CGlstMarDiv msg to Distribution List, dtd 24Aug70, L&D Notebook; Simmons Orientation Talk, pp. 34-35, 40; Simmons Debrief; IstMarDiv Order 5100.9B, dtd 8Nov70, tab B-11, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Nov70; Col Don D. Ezell debriefing at FMFPac, 8Apr70, Tape 4837, hereafter Ezell Debrief.


30. CGIIIMAF msg to 1stMarDiv, 1st MAW, FLIC, 1st Radio Bn, 2d
CAG, Sub-Unit 1, 1st ANGLICO, dtd 21Oct70, L&D Notebook, summarizes the instructions previously in effect.
31. Ibid.
32. 1stMarDiv Order 5100.9B, dtd 8Nov70, tab B-11, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Nov70; CG1stMarDiv msg to Distribution List, dtd 6Jan71, L&D Notebook.

The Challenge to Authority: Race, Drugs, Indiscipline


34. Cortright, Soldier, passim., is a detailed overview of military unrest, from a radical perspective. Lewy, America in Vietnam, pp. 158-161, approaches the situation from a more pro-military viewpoint.
35. Huff Comments.
38. DuLac, Comments; DuLac intvw, p. 108.
40. Fails intvw; see also Supply BN, 1st FSR Scuttlebutt, 1Feb70, tab B, end i, 1st FSR ComdC, Jan70.
41. Fails intvw.
42. Moskos, Enlisted Man, p. 121.


45. Chapman is quoted in Shaw and Donnelly, Blacks in the Marine Corps, pp. 72-73.
46. CMC msg to ALMAR, dtd 2Sep69 (Negro Marines, ALMAR-65 Subject File, RefSec).
47. For examples of views critical of the permission of "Black Power" symbols, see Simmons Brief and GySgt Joe Lopez intvw, 21Feb70, Tape 4749, hereafter Lopez intvw.
48. Jones intvw, Apr 73, pp. 85-86.
50. 1stMarDiv Talking Paper, dtd 2Oct70, L&D Notebook, HQMC Summary of Significant Racial Incidents at Marine Corps Installations, Aug68-Nov71 (Negro Marines—Race Relations File, RefSec); CG1stMAW msg to CGIIIAMF, dtd 29Dec70, 3, 4, and 7Jan71 (III MAF Incoming Message Files, 7Dec70-14Jan71).
51. McCutcheon intvw, pp. 13, 14, 16; consult also Simmons Debrief and Stien Debrief.
52. Stien Debrief.
53. Col Robert L. Parnell, Jr., debriefing at FMFPac, 3Aug70, Tape 4925, hereafter Parnell Debrief.
54. Sea Tiger, 160Oct70; quoted in Shaw and Donnelly, Blacks in the Marine Corps, pp. 77-78. See also McCutcheon intvw, p. 15.
55. 1stMarDiv, The Racial Situation. See also Simmons Orientation Talk, pp. 11-13; and 1stMarDiv Talking Paper, dtd 2Oct70, L&D Notebook.
56. 1stMarDiv Order 5420.1A, dtd 14Dec69, tab B-18, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Dec69.
60. MLC Order 1500.6, dtd 13Mar70, tab N and MLC Order 5350.1, dtd 21Mar70, tab R, both in MLC ComdC, Mar70.
61. Lcdr James G. Goode, CHC, USN, intvw, 3Jul70, Tape 4935, hereafter Goode intvw; Cdr James G. Goode, CHC, USN, comments on draft ms, 28Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Goode Comments.
62. Hefferman Debrief; Smith Debrief; Stien Debrief; Teller Debrief; Hood intvw.
63. Col Theodore E. Metzger, comments on draft ms, 22Mar83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Metzger Comments.
64. Smith Debrief.
65. Col Edward A. Wilcox debriefing at FMFPac, 4Jul70, Tape 4889, hereafter Wilcox Debrief.
66. Stien Debrief.
67. Hood intvw.
68. McCutcheon intvw, p. 15. For background on SgtMaj Huff, see Shaw and Donnelly, Blacks in the Marine Corps, pp. 79-80.
69. CG1stMAW msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 30Aug70 (III MAF Incoming Message Files, Aug14Dec70).
70. Huff Comments.
71. Hood intvw.
72. 1stMarDiv/3d MAB CG's Information Notebook, Apr71, in 3d
NOTES

MAB ComdC, 14-30Apr71, p. G-1-5g; Simmons Debrief.
73. Huff Comments.
74. Armstrong Debrief.
75. Goode Comments.
77. Simmons Debrief; Armstrong Debrief.
78. Teller Debrief; Capt Jerry K. Taylor intvw, 29Mar71, Tape 4997.
79. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 31Aug70 and 11Sep70; CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 12Jan71 (III MAF Outgoing Message Files, 3Aug70-24Jan71); III MAF ComdC, Aug70, Sep70, Jan71.
81. Simmons Orientation Talk, p. 16.
82. CGFMFPac msg to FMFPac, dtd 27Aug70, L&D Notebook, describes basic drug policy. See also: Armstrong Debrief; Maj J. W. Neely intvw, 21Feb70, Tape 4748, hereafter Neely intvw, describes one unit's efforts to break up drug-using groups of Marines.
83. Hood intvw.
84. For the 4th Division amnesty, see Washington Post, 23Jul70, p. 1. The DOD drug task force recommendations are summarized in Sea Tiger, 2OCot70, and in U.S. News and World Report, 31Aug70, p. 26. Marines occasionally voluntarily turned themselves in for drug treatment; see Maintenance Bn ComdC, Apr70, in 1st FSR ComdC, Apr70.
85. This message is quoted in Simmons Orientation Talk, pp. 17-19.
86. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 19Oct70 (III MAF Outgoing Message Files, 16Sep-29Oct70); CGIIIMAF msg to CGIstMarDiv, dtd 22OCot70 (III MAF Outgoing Message Files, Aug-14Dec70); CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 11Nov70 (III MAF Outgoing Message Files, Aug-14Dec70).
87. Col Hugh S. Aikens debriefing at FMFPac, 4Mar71, Tape 5007, hereafter Aikens Debrief.
89. Stien Debrief describes handling of a radicalagitator in MAG-13. Wilcox Debrief deals with combat refusals in the 1st Marines. For general disciplinary problems, see: Goode intvw; Lopez intvw; Col Donald E. Morin intvw, 13Aug70, Tape 4909; Capt John S. Papa intvw, 24Feb70, Tape 4750, hereafter Papa intvw.
91. Papa intvw. See also Aikens Debrief; Simmons Debrief.

'Fragging' and Operation Freeze

93. Contright, Soldiers, pp. 46-47, for example, calls fragging an essential tool of soldier democracy.
94. Division statistics are in 1stMarDiv/3d MAB CG's Information Notebook, Apr71, p. G-1-5h, in 3d MAB ComdC, 14-30Apr71. For the Maintenance Battalion incident, see Maintenance Bn ComdC, Feb70, in 1st FSR ComdC, Feb70; and McCutcheon intvw. p. 1. USARV statistics are summarized in Lewy, America in Vietnam, p. 156.
96. SimmonsOrientation Talk, pp. 29-30, 33; Papa intvw, Jones intvw, pp. 44-47, 49-50. For an obviously drug-related attempted fragging, see 1st MP Bn ComdC, Jan71, p. 11. The intended victim in this case was the handler of a dog trained to sniff out marijuana.
99. For typical Operation Freeze order, see 2/5 Order 3120.1 dtd 8Sep70, in 2/5 ComdC, Sep70; Simmons Orientation Talk, p. 29.
100. CGFMFPac msg to FMFPac, dtd 13Nov70; CGIstMarDiv msg to IstMarDiv, dtd 15Nov70, L&D Notebook; 1stMarDiv Order 5830.2, dtd 19Dec70, tab B-17, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Dec70.
101. 1stMarDiv Order 5830.1, dtd 13Dec70, tab B-15; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Dec70; Simmons Debrief.

Training and Morale-Building

103. 3/1 Jnl, 2May70, in 3/5 ComdC, May70; in the same vein, see CO, 1st Mar msg to 1st Mar, dtd 25Dec70, tab 4-30, 2/1 ComdC, Dec70.
104. Wilcox Debrief. For similar views, see BGen Charles S. Robertson debriefing at FMFPac, 2Feb70, Tape 4797; and Col Herbert L. Wilkerson debriefing at FMFPac, 13Jul70, Tape 4892.
105. Col James E. Hatrell, comments on draft ms, 16Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).
106. 1stMarDiv Order P1500.31A, dtd 24Jan70, tab B-33, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan70, outlines the division training objectives and methods. For regimental training efforts see 1st, 3th, 7th, and 11th Mar ComdCs, for 1970 and 1971.
108. Supply Bn ComdC, Jan70, in 1st FSR ComdC, Jan70.
110. Wilcox Debrief; III MAF ComdCs, Jan70-Feb71.
111. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Feb70, p. 1st MAW ComdC, Jan70; 1st FSR ComdC, Jan70.
112. 2/1 ComdC, Sep70, pt. 2, sec A. For a description of similar facilities in FLSG-B, consult Neely intvw.
113. Col William V. Hare, comments on draft ms, 16Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).
114. 1stMarDiv, 1st MAW, and FLC ComdCs, 1970-1971; Col Edmund G. Derning Jr., debriefing at FMFPac, 10Aug70, Tape 4958, hereafter Derning Debrief.
CHAPTER 21

U.S. MARINE ADVISORS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES

U.S. Marine Advisors and the Vietnamese Marine Corps

Unless otherwise noted, material in this section is drawn from SMA Monthly Historical Summaries, hereafter SMA HistSum and date; FMFPac, MarOpsV, 1970-71; MACV ComdHist, 70 and 71.

1. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jun71, pp. 34-36; SMA HistSum Jan 1970; Col Richard F. Armstrong, comments on draft ms, n.d.; and LtCol Pieter L. Hogaboam, comments on draft ms, 10Jun83 (Vietnam Comment File); see also SMA, "VNMC/MAU Historical Summary, 1954-1973," a concise history of the VNMC and MAU.

2. MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 7, pp. 9-10.


4. Ibid., p. 40.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., pp. 42-43.

7. Ibid., p. 43.

8. SMA HistSum, Jan 70.


10. SMA HistSum, 29May and 5Jun70; Col Edward O. Bierman, comments on draft ms, 22Jul83 (Vietnam Comment File).

11. SMA HistSum, 19Jun70.

12. SMA HistSum, Jul and Aug70.

13. SMA Lam Son 719 CAAR, Mar 71, hereafter cited as Lam Son 719 CAAR.

The Vietnamese Marine Corps in Lam Son 719


15. LtCol Marshall N. Carter, comments on draft ms, 28Mar83 (Vietnam Comment File).

16. SMA HistSum, May 71.

17. SMA HistSum, May 71; Hinh, Lam Son 719, pp. 93-96.

18. Lam Son 719 CAAR; SMA HistSum, May 71.

19. BGen Alexander P. McMillan, comments on draft ms, 19Apr71 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter McMillan Comments; Lam Son 719 CAAR.

20. BGen Francis W. Tief, comments on draft ms, 13Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Tief Comments.


22. Tief Comments.

23. Lam Son 719 CAAR; Tief Comments.


25. Ibid.

26. Tief Comments.

27. Ibid.

28. SMA HistSum 19-25 Mar 1971; Hinh, Lam Son 719 CAAR.

29. LtCol Pieter L. Hogaboam, comments on draft ms, 10Jun83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Hogaboam Comments.


33. Ibid.


35. King Comments.

36. Tief Comments.


38. G-3 Advisor Report; Tief Comments; Carter Report.

39. Ibid.


41. Tief Comments.

42. G-3 Advisor Report.

43. G-3 Advisor Report; Tief Comments; Carter Report.

44. King Comments.


29. VAdm Jerome H. King, comments on draft ms, 10Jun83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter King Comments.


33. Ibid.


35. King Comments.

36. Tief Comments.


38. G-3 Advisor Report; Tief Comments; Carter Report.

39. Ibid.


41. Tief Comments.

42. G-3 Advisor Report.

43. G-3 Advisor Report; Tief Comments; Carter Report.

44. King Comments.

The Marine Advisory Unit and Solid Anchor

Additional sources for this section are FMFPac, MarOpsV, 1970-71, and Sub-Unit 1, 1st ANGLICO, ComdCs, 1970-71, hereafter SU-1 ComdC and date.
The Special Landing Force

54. 9th Mar Comd Cs, 70-71; 31st MAU Comd Cs, 70-71.
55. TG 79.4/SLF Alpha Comd C, Aug 70.
56. 31st MAU Comd C, Jan 71; Com USMACV msg to ComSeventhFlt, dtd 30 Jan 71 in 31st MAU Comd C, Jan 71.
57. CTG 79.4 msg to CTF 76, dtd 6 Feb 71 in 31st MAU Comd C, Feb 71.
58. 31st MAU Comd C, Feb-Mar 71.
60. Ibid.
61. CTG 79.4 msg to 1st Bn, 9th Mar, and HMM-164, dtd 20 May 71 and CTG 76.4 msg to AIG 461, dtd 24 May 71, in 31st MAU Comd C, May 71.
## Appendix A

### Marine Command and Staff List

**January 1970-June 1971**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>III MAF Headquarters, 1Jan70-14Apr71</th>
<th>MajGen Charles F. Widdecke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CG LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr.</td>
<td>27Apr70-14Apr71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LtGen Donn J. Robertson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DepCG MajGen George S. Bowman, Jr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DepCG (Ground) MajGen Edwin B. Wheeler</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajGen Charles F. Widdecke</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DepCG (Air) MajGen William G. Thrash</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajGen Alan J. Armstrong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/S BGen Leo J. Dulacki</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGen Thomas H. Miller, Jr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGen William J. Joslyn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DepC/S Col Sam A. Dressin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Robert W. Kersey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Eugene H. Haffey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DepC/S Plans Col James A. Sloan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col John R. Thurman, III, USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-1 Col Robert L. Parnell, Jr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Lavern J. Oltmer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-2 Col Edward W. Dziak</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Forest J. Hunt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-3 BGen Thomas H. Miller, Jr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Herbert L. Wilkerson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Charles H. Ludden</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-4 Col Wilbur F. Simlik</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Allan T. Wood</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Kenneth McLennan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Warren E. McCain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-5 Col Clifford J. Peabody</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj Donald E. Sudduth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col William L. McCulloch</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj Donald E. Sudduth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| MajGen William G. Thrash            |                             |
| MajGen Alan J. Armstrong            |                             |
| C/S BGen Leo J. Dulacki             |                             |
| BGen Thomas H. Miller, Jr.          |                             |
| BGen William J. Joslyn              |                             |
| DepC/S Col Sam A. Dressin           |                             |
| Col Robert W. Kersey                |                             |
| Col Eugene H. Haffey                |                             |
| DepC/S Plans Col James A. Sloan     |                             |
| Col John R. Thurman, III, USA       |                             |
| G-1 Col Robert L. Parnell, Jr.      |                             |
| Col Lavern J. Oltmer                |                             |
| G-2 Col Edward W. Dziak             |                             |
| Col Forest J. Hunt                  |                             |
| G-3 BGen Thomas H. Miller, Jr.      |                             |
| Col Herbert L. Wilkerson            |                             |
| Col Charles H. Ludden               |                             |
| G-4 Col Wilbur F. Simlik            |                             |
| Col Allan T. Wood                   |                             |
| Col Kenneth McLennan                |                             |
| Col Warren E. McCain                |                             |
| G-5 Col Clifford J. Peabody         |                             |
| Maj Donald E. Sudduth               |                             |
| Col William L. McCulloch            |                             |
| Maj Donald E. Sudduth               |                             |

### MajGen Charles F. Widdecke

| ADC BGen Charles S. Robertson       | 1-3Jan70                   |
| BGen William F. Doehrer             | 1Feb-15Jun70               |
| BGen Edwin H. Simmons               | 16Jun70-14Apr71            |
| C/S Col Charles E. Walker           | 1Feb-27Feb70               |
| Col Noble L. Beck                   | 28Feb-12Jul70              |
| Col Eugene H. Haffey                | 13Jul-26Sep70              |
| Col Don H. Blanchard                | 27Sep70-14Apr71            |
| DepC/S Col Hugh S. Aitken           | 4Feb-28Feb70               |
| G-1 Col Robert E. Barde             | 1Jan-31Aug70               |
| Col Hugh S. Aitken                  | 1Sep70-3Feb71              |
| Col William M. Herrin, Jr.          | 4Feb-14Apr71               |
| G-2 Col Edward A. Wilcox            | 1Jan-9Feb70                |
| LtCol Charles M. Mosher             | 10Feb-25Mar70              |
| Col Clarence W. Boyd, Jr.           | 26Mar-29Jul70              |
| Col Albert C. Smith, Jr.            | 30Jul70-14Apr71            |
| G-3 Col Floyd H. Waldrop            | 1Jan-18Aug70               |
| Col Don H. Blanchard                | 19Aug-26Sep70              |
| Col Ralph E. Estey                  | 27Sep-30Nov70              |
| Col Leon N. Utter                   | 1Dec70-14Apr71             |
| G-4 Col Nicholas A. Canzona         | 1Jan-27Feb70               |
| Col Miller M. Blue                  | 28Feb70-1Feb71             |
| Col William L. McCulloch            | 2Feb-14Apr71               |
| G-5 LtCol Vincent A. Albers, Jr.    | 1Jan-3Jan70                |
| Col Louis S. Hollier, Jr.           | 1Feb70-1Jan71              |
| Col Richard B. Bailey               | 2Jan-14Jan71               |

### Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division

| CO Col William C. Patton            | 1Jan-22Mar70               |
| Col John H. Keith, Jr.              | 23Mar-30Jun70              |
| Col Edwin M. Young                  | 1Jul-15Dec70               |
| Col William M. Herrin, Jr.          | 16Dec70-3Feb71             |
| Col George M. Bryant                | 4Feb-3Apr71                |
| LtCol Robert E. Wehrle              | 4-14Apr71                  |

### 1st Marine Division

| CO Col Herbert L. Wilkerson         | 1Jan-9Feb70                |
| Col Edward A. Wilcox                | 10Feb-28Jun70              |
| Col Paul X. Kelley                  | 29Jun70-9May71             |

### 1st Battalion, 1st Marines

| CO LtCol Godfrey S. Delcuze         | 1Jan-15Mar70               |
| LtCol Charles G. Little             | 16Mar-8Jul70               |
| LtCol Robert P. Rose                | 9Jul70-3May71              |

### Headquarters & Service Company

#### CO/III MAF Headquarters Commandant

| CO III MAF Headquarters Commandant |                             |
| Col Frank X. Hoff                  | 1Jan-15Jun70               |
| LtCol James C. Klinedinst          | 16Jun-1Nov70               |
| LtCol William J. Spiesl            | 12Nov70-14Apr71            |

### 1st Marine Division Headquarters, 1Jan70-14Apr71

| CG MajGen Edwin B. Wheeler         | 1Jan-26Apr70               |
COMMAND AND STAFF LIST

2d Battalion, 1st Marines
CO LtCol William V. H. White 1Jan-15May70
LtCol William G. Leftwich, Jr. 16May-12Sep70
LtCol Donald J. Nutris 13Sep70-13Mar71
LtCol Roy E. Moss 14Mar-19May71

3d Battalion, 1st Marines
CO LtCol Thomas P. Ganey 1-9Jan70
LtCol Frank M. Boyd 10Jan-18May70
Maj Pierre L. LeFevre 19-24May70
LtCol William M. Yeager 25May-17Sep70
LtCol Marc A. Moore 18Sep70-3May71

3d Battalion, 7th Marines
CO LtCol Ray G. Kummerow 1-30Jan70
LtCol Gerald C. Thomas, Jr. 31Jan-27Jun70
LtCol Kenneth L. Robinson, Jr. 28Jun-5Sep70
LtCol Franklin A. Hart, Jr. 6Sep-10Oct70
Maj Daniel J. O'Connor 11Oct-13Oct70

11th Marines
CO Col Don D. Ezell 1Jan-24Mar70
Col Ernest R. Reid, Jr. 25Mar-30Aug70
Col Edwin M. Rudzis 31Aug-28Mar71

5th Marines
CO Col Noble L. Beck 1Jan-10Feb70
Col Ralph F. Essey 11Feb-26Jun70
Col Clark V. Judge 27Jun70-25Mar71

1st Battalion, 5th Marines
CO LtCol Joseph K. Griffis, Jr. 1Jan-14Feb70
LtCol Cornelius F. Savage, Jr. 15Feb-28Aug70
LtCol Bernard E. Trainor 29Aug-19Nov70
LtCol Franklin A. Hart, Jr. 20Nov70-16Apr71

2d Battalion, 5th Marines
CO LtCol James T. Bowen 1-13Jan70
LtCol Frederick D. Leder 14Jan-25Jul70
LtCol Thomas M. Hamlin 26Jul70-22Mar71

3d Battalion, 5th Marines
CO LtCol Johan S. Gestson 1Jan-6Apr70
LtCol William R. Kepart 7-14Apr70 (Acting)
LtCol Johan S. Gestson 15Apr-17Aug70
LtCol Herschel L. Johnson, Jr. 18Aug70-14Mar71

4th Battalion, 11th Marines
CO LtCol John D. Shoup 1Jan-13Feb70
LtCol Lawrence R. Dorsa 14Feb-1Aug70
LtCol Gene H. Martin 12Aug-2Dec70
LtCol Bruce F. Ogden 3Dec70-13May71

3d Battalion, 11th Marines
CO LtCol Vonda Weaver 1Jan-23Mar70
LtCol Donald C. Stanton 24Mar-14Jul70
Maj George W. Ryhanych 15Jul-2Nov70
Maj Carlos K. McAfee 3Nov70-21Mar71

1st Battalion, 13th Marines
CO LtCol Donald H. Strain 1Jan-19Feb70
LtCol Harold Schofield 20Feb-19Mar70

7th Marines
CO Col Gildo S. Codispoti 1Jan-28Feb70
Col Edmund G. Derning, Jr. 1Mar-4Aug70
Col Robert H. Piehl 5Aug-10Oct70

1st Battalion, 13th Marines
CO LtCol Charles G. Cooper 1-15Jan70
LtCol Theophil P. Riegert 16Jan-23Jul70
Maj John J. Sheridan 16Jul-18Sep70
Maj Theophil P. Riegert 19-22Sep70

26th Marines
CO LtCol Frank A. Clark 1Jan-9Apr70
LtCol Arthur E. Folsom 10Apr-12Oct70

2d Battalion, 26th Marines
CO LtCol William C. Drumright 1-2Jan70
Maj Donald L. Humphrey 27Jan-19Mar70
### 3d Battalion, 26th Marines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>LtCol John J. Unterkofer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LtCol</td>
<td>Gayle F. Twyman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1st Reconnaissance Battalion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>LtCol John J. Grace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LtCol</td>
<td>William C. Drumright</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LtCol</td>
<td>Edmund J. Regan, Jr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LtCol</td>
<td>William G. Lefwich, Jr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LtCol</td>
<td>Bernard E. Trainor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1st Engineer Battalion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>LtCol Walter M. Winoski</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LtCol</td>
<td>Walter F. Glowicki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LtCol</td>
<td>Daryl E. Benstead</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**7th Engineer Battalion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>LtCol William G. Bates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Richard Gleeson</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**9th Engineer Battalion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>LtCol Edward K. Maxwell</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LtCol</td>
<td>John P. Kraynak</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1st Shore Party Battalion**

| CO             | LtCol Richard F. Armstrong |

**1st Motor Transport Battalion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>LtCol Morris S. Shimanoff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LtCol</td>
<td>Joseph J. Louder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LtCol</td>
<td>Charles A. Rosenfeld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LtCol</td>
<td>Robert E. Burgess</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LtCol</td>
<td>Richard B. Talbott</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Joseph A. Galizio</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**11th Motor Transport Battalion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>LtCol William R. Kephart</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LtCol</td>
<td>Richard L. Prather</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>William H. Walters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LtCol</td>
<td>Alan D. Albert, Jr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LtCol</td>
<td>Charles A. Rosenfeld</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1st Tank Battalion**

| CO             | Maj Joseph J. Louder    |

**1st Medical Battalion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>Capt James W. Lea, USN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>Thomas R. Turner, USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cdr</td>
<td>William A. Elliot, USN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1st Hospital Company

| CO             | Capt G. R. Hart, USN   |

### 1st Dental Company

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>Capt Perry C. Alexander, USN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>Merideth H. Mead, USN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion

| CO             | LtCol David G. Mehargue    |

### 1st Force Reconnaissance Company

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>Maj William H. Bond, Jr.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Dale D. Dorman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>Norman B. Centers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW)

**CG**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>MajGen William G. Thrash</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MajGen</td>
<td>Alan J. Armstrong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AWC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>BGGen Ralph H. Spanjer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BGGen</td>
<td>Robert F. Conley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGGen</td>
<td>William R. Quinn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**C/S**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>Col Robert W. Teller</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Jack R. Sloan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**G-1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>Col Grover S. Stewart, Jr.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Paul B. Henley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Donald Conroy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**G-2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>Col James R. Weaver</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Jerry J. Mitchell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Walter E. Sparling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Jerry J. Mitchell</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**G-3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>Col Robert L. LaMar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Walter E. Sparling</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**G-4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>Col William C. McGraw, Jr.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>John M. Dean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Boris J. Frankovic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Marine Wing Headquarters Group 1 (MWHG-1)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>Col Laurence J. Stien</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LtCol</td>
<td>William R. Smith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LtCol</td>
<td>Gordon H. Buckner II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LtCol</td>
<td>Paul S. Frappollo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 1 (H&HS-1)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>LtCol Henry F. Winter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>William S. Humbert III</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
COMMAND AND STAFF LIST

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (HMM-263)

CO LtCol Walter R. Ledbetter, Jr. 1Jan-19Feb70
LtCol Earnest G. Young 20Feb-25Jul70
LtCol Louis K. Keck 26Jul70-26Mar71
Maj Dennis N. Anderson 27Mar-15May71

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 (HMH-361)

CO LtCol Charles A. Block 1Jan-6Jan70
Maj Richard A. Gowen 7Jan-28Jan70

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 364 (HMH-364)

CO LtCol Charles R. Daniil 1Jan-24Feb70
LtCol Peter C. Scaglione, Jr. 25Feb-15Sep70
LtCol Henry W. Steadman 16Sep70-23Feb71
Maj Neil R. Vanleeuwen 24Feb-12Mar71

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 (HMH-463)

CO LtCol Raymond M. Ryan 1-7Jan70
LtCol Charles A. Block 8Jan-10Sep70
LtCol Robert R. Leisy 11Sep70-4Mar71
LtCol Thomas S. Reap 5Mar-18May71
Maj Myrddyn W. Edwards 9May-29May71

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 161 (HMM-161)

CO LtCol Bennie H. Mann, Jr. 1Jan-16Jul70
Maj Lewis J. Zilka 17Jul-15Aug70

Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 367 (HML-367)

CO LtCol Warren G. Cretney 1Jan-14Mar70
LtCol Harry E. Sexton 15Mar-21Oct70
LtCol Clifford E. Reese 22Oct70-31May71

Marine Observation Squadron 2 (VMO-2)

CO LtCol Stanley A. Chalkgren 1Jan-12Jan70
LtCol James M. Moriarity 13Jan-31Jan70

Marine Air Control Group 18 (MACG-18)

CO Col Stanley G. Dunwiddie, Jr. 1Jan-27Jun70
Col Charles T. Westcott 28Jun-14Sep70
LtCol Francis L. Delaney 15Sep70-14Apr71

Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 18 (H&HS-18)

CO Maj Herbert E. Hoppe, Jr. 1Jan-8Mar70
LtCol Robert W. Fischer 9Mar-30Jul70
Maj John P. Fox 3Jul-28Oct70

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 167 (HMM-167)

CO LtCol John E. Webber, Jr. 1Jan-8Apr70
LtCol Douglas A. McCaughey, Jr. 9Apr-4Dec70
LtCol Richard J. Blanc 5Dec70-10Jun71

Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 167 (HML-167)

CO LtCol John E. Wever, Jr. 1Jan-8Apr70
LtCol Douglas A. McCaughey, Jr. 9Apr-4Dec70
LtCol Richard J. Blanc 5Dec70-10Jun71
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Commanding Officer</th>
<th>Duty Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marine Air Support Squadron 3 (MASS-3)</td>
<td>LtCol John H. Dubois</td>
<td>Jan-21 Apr 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Pasquale J. Florio</td>
<td>22 Apr-10 Aug 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj George S. Prescott</td>
<td>11 Aug-5 Sep 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Victor J. Fulladossa</td>
<td>6 Sep-3 Oct 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LtCol William C. Simanikas</td>
<td>20 Oct-2 Jun 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Air Control Squadron 4 (MACS-4)</td>
<td>Maj Robert W. Molyneux</td>
<td>Jan-30 Apr 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Ronald G. Richardson</td>
<td>1 May-7 Jul 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Lionel M. Silva</td>
<td>8 Jul-2 Sep 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Theodore M. Quinlin</td>
<td>3 Oct-2 Oct 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LtCol Lyell H. Holmes</td>
<td>3 Oct-30 Jan 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj George S. Prescott</td>
<td>3 Jan-14 Apr 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Aircraft Group 11 (MAG-11)</td>
<td>Col Neal E. Heffernan</td>
<td>Jan-18 Feb 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Col Grover S. Stewart, Jr.</td>
<td>19 Feb-18 Jun 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Col Albert C. Pommeren</td>
<td>19 Jun-10 Jun 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 11 (H&amp;MS-11)</td>
<td>LtCol Richard F. Hebert</td>
<td>Jan-10 Apr 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LtCol Speed F. Shea</td>
<td>11 Apr-25 Sep 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LtCol Arthur R. Anderson, Jr.</td>
<td>26 Sep-70-1 Jun 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Air Base Squadron 11 (MABS-11)</td>
<td>LtCol Paul A. Manning</td>
<td>Jan-6 Apr 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Donald F. Crowe</td>
<td>7 Apr-18 Dec 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LtCol Clayton L. Comfort</td>
<td>19 Dec-70-10 Jun 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron 1 (VMCJ-1)</td>
<td>LtCol Bob W. Farley</td>
<td>Jan-14 Apr 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LtCol Paul A. Manning</td>
<td>15 Apr-14 Jul 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 542 (VMFA-542)</td>
<td>LtCol Keith A. Smith</td>
<td>Jan-31 Jan 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 242 (VMA [AW]-242)</td>
<td>LtCol Thomas L. Griffin, Jr.</td>
<td>Jan-2 Jan 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LtCol Stanley P. Lewis</td>
<td>3 Jan-19 Aug 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Patrick J. McCarthy</td>
<td>20 Aug-11 Sep 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 225 (VMA [AW]-225)</td>
<td>Maj Peter M. Busch</td>
<td>Jan-11 Jan 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LtCol John J. Metzko</td>
<td>12 Jan-6 Jun 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Patrick J. McCarthy</td>
<td>7 Jun-19 Aug 70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VIETNAMIZATION AND REDEPLOYMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Commanding Officer</th>
<th>Duty Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marine Observation Squadron 2 (VMO-2)</td>
<td>LtCol Stanley A. Challgren</td>
<td>Jan-11 Jan 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LtCol James M. Moriarty</td>
<td>12 Jan-17 Sep 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Carl B. Olsen, Jr.</td>
<td>18 Sep-26 Nov 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LtCol Edward P. Janz</td>
<td>27 Nov-31 Mar 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12)</td>
<td>Col Paul B. Henley</td>
<td>Jan-4 Feb 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Col James R. Weaver</td>
<td>5 Feb-25 Feb 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 12 (H&amp;MS-12)</td>
<td>LtCol Joseph J. Went</td>
<td>Jan-27 Jan 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Charles A. Dixon</td>
<td>28 Jan-25 Feb 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Air Base Squadron 12 (MABS-12)</td>
<td>LtCol George J. Ertlemeier</td>
<td>Jan-18 Feb 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LtCol Henry F. Witter</td>
<td>19 Feb-25 Feb 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMA-211)</td>
<td>LtCol Louis Gasparine, Jr.</td>
<td>Jan-25 Feb 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Attack Squadron 223 (VMA-223)</td>
<td>LtCol James W. Lazzo</td>
<td>Jan-28 Jan 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Attack Squadron 311 (VMA-311)</td>
<td>LtCol Arthur R. Hickie</td>
<td>Jan-12 Feb 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Aircraft Group 13 (MAG-13)</td>
<td>Col Thomas E. Murphee</td>
<td>Jan-17 May 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Col Lawrence J. Stien</td>
<td>18 May-15 Oct 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 13 (H&amp;MS-13)</td>
<td>Maj Frank J. Horak, Jr.</td>
<td>Jan-4 Feb 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Josephus L. Mavretic</td>
<td>5 Feb-14 Apr 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LtCol Robert W. Chapin</td>
<td>15 Apr-30 Sep 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Air Base Squadron 13 (MABS-13)</td>
<td>LtCol Richard D. Revie</td>
<td>Jan-12 Mar 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Daniel T. Benn</td>
<td>13 Mar-25 Apr 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LtCol Robert A. Christy</td>
<td>26 Apr-6 Jun 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Daniel T. Benn</td>
<td>7 Jun-2 Sep 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Michael J. Fibich, Jr.</td>
<td>3 Sep-15 Oct 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115 (VMFA-115)</td>
<td>LtCol Donald P. Bowen</td>
<td>Jan-2 Mar 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LtCol John V. Cox</td>
<td>3 Mar-22 Jul 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LtCol Michael Mura</td>
<td>23 Jul-28 Feb 71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 122 (VMFA-122)

- **CO**: LtCol John K. Cochran  
  - Jan-6Jan70
- **LtCol Robert E. Howard, Jr.**:  
  - 7Jan-12Jul70
- **Maj Ross C. Chaimson**:  
  - 13Jul-8Sep70

### Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314 (VMFA-314)

- **CO**: LtCol Thomas J. Kelly  
  - Jan-6Jun70
- **LtCol Robert A. Christy**:  
  - 7Jun-12Sep70

### Marine Attack Squadron 311 (VMA-311)

- **CO**: LtCol Arthur R. Hickle  
  - 1Jan-31May70
- **LtCol James M. Bannan**:  
  - 1Jun-10Oct70
- **LtCol Jerome T. Hagen**:  
  - 11Oct70-12May71

### Marine Wing Support Group 17 (MWSG-17)

- **CO**: LtCol Richard A. Savage  
  - 1Jan-8Feb70
- **Col Harvey L. Jensen**:  
  - 9Feb-6Aug70

### Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 17 (H&MS-17)

- **CO**: LtCol Dalvin Serrin  
  - 1Jan-6Aug70

### Wing Equipment and Repair Squadron 17 (WERS-17)

- **CO**: Maj William F. Farley  
  - 1Jan-20Feb70
- **LtCol George J. Ertmeier**:  
  - 21Feb-6Aug70

### 11th Dental Company

- **CO**: Capt Van L. Johnson, Jr., USN  
  - 1Jan-6May70
- **Capt Frank D. Grossman, USN**:  
  - 7May70-17Jan71
- **Cdr William P. Armstrong, USN**:  
  - 18Jan-14Apr71
- **Capt James J. Lyons, USN**:  
  - 15Apr-30Jun71

### Force Logistic Command/1st Force Service Regiment

- **CG**: BGen Mauro J. Padalino  
  - 1Jan-22Oct70
- **BGen James R. Jones**:  
  - 23Oct70-14Apr71
- **CO**: Col Harold W. Evans, Jr.  
  - 16-26Jun71
- **C/S**: Col John L. Tobin  
  - 1Jan-17Jun70
  - Col Robert W. Calvert  
  - 18Jun-2Jul70
  - Col Garth K. Sturdevan  
  - 3Jul70-8Jun71
  - Col Harold W. Evans, Jr.  
  - 9Jun-15Jun71
- **G-1**: LtCol John E. Redelfs  
  - 1Jan-31Jul70
  - LtCol Ralph D. First  
  - 1Aug70-10Jun71
  - Capt David R. Little  
  - 11Jun-26Jun71
- **G-2**: LtCol Robert L. Solze  
  - 1Jan-9Oct70
  - Maj Amilcar Vazquez  
  - 10Oct70-26Jun71
- **G-3**: Col William W. Storm III  
  - 1Jan-24Mar70
  - Col Robert W. Calvert  
  - 25Mar-10Oct70
  - Col Harold W. Evans, Jr.  
  - 11Oct70-8Jun71
  - Maj John R. Wahrlich  
  - 9Jun-26Jun71
- **G-4**: LtCol Maurice H. Ivins, Jr.  
  - 1Jan-15Sep70
  - LtCol Charles G. Boicey  
  - 14Sep-22Dec70
  - LtCol Charles R. Poppe, Jr.  
  - 23Dec70-26Jun71

### G-5

- **Maj Robert E. Johnson**:  
  - Jan-17Apr70
- **Maj Ronald E. Bane**:  
  - 18Apr-14Jun70
- **Maj Robert E. Johnson**:  
  - 15Jun-17Jun70

### Headquarters & Service Battalion, 1st Force Service Regiment

- **CO**: LtCol Lewis R. Webb  
  - 1Jan-16Oct70
- **LtCol Donald J. Burger**:  
  - 17Oct70-2Jun71
- **LtCol Edward E. Crews**:  
  - 3Jun71-26Jun71

### Supply Battalion, 1st Force Service Regiment

- **CO**: Col Robert W. Calvert  
  - 1Jan-24Mar70
- **Col Donald E. Morin**:  
  - 25Mar-14Aug70
- **Col Charles F. Langley**:  
  - 15Aug70-10May71
- **LtCol Eugene R. Puckett**:  
  - 11May-11Jun71
- **Maj Ronald L. Fraser**:  
  - 12Jun-26Jun71

### Maintenance Battalion, 1st Force Service Regiment

- **CO**: LtCol Edward C. Morris  
  - 1Jan-3Apr70
- **LtCol Don D. Beal**:  
  - 4Apr-21Sep70
- **LtCol William F. Sheehan**:  
  - 22Sep70-18Feb71
- **LtCol Edward E. Crews**:  
  - 19Feb-30May71
- **Capt William E. Phelps**:  
  - 31May-17Jun71

### Force Logistic Support Group Bravo, 1st Service Battalion (Rein)

- **CO**: Col Donald E. Morin  
  - 1Jan-12Mar70
- **Maj Norman L. Young**:  
  - 13Mar-30Jun70
- **LtCol Donald J. Burger**:  
  - 1Jul-15Sep70

### 1st Military Police Battalion

- **CO**: LtCol Speros D. Thomaidis  
  - 1Jan-1Jun70
- **LtCol Newell T. Donahoo**:  
  - 2Jun-17Nov70
- **LtCol John Colia**:  
  - 18Nov70-12Jun71

### 3d Military Police Battalion

- **CO**: LtCol Charles Fimian  
  - 1Jan-8Aug70

### 7th Motor Transport Battalion

- **CO**: LtCol Richard L. Prather  
  - 1Jan-13Feb70
- **Maj Lawrence E. Davies**:  
  - 14Feb-19Feb70

### 5th Communication Battalion

- **CO**: LtCol Dale E. Shatzer  
  - Aug70-17Sep70
- **Maj Gerald F. Baker**  
  - 18Sep-4Oct70

### Force Logistic Command Attached Units

#### 1st Radio Battalion

- **CO**: LtCol Delos M. Hopkins  
  - 1Jan-29Jun70
- **Maj Donald J. Hatch**:  
  - 30Jun-29Jul70
- **LtCol Edward D. Resnik**:  
  - 30Jul70-14Apr71
**VIETNAMIZATION AND REDEPLOYMENT**

Combined Action Force Headquarters 11 Jan-21 Jan 71

| Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion | CO Maj James G. Dixon | 14 Apr-23 Jun 71 |
| Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion | CO Maj Gilbert R. Meibaurm | 14 Apr-10 Jun 71 |
| Company C, 1st Shore Party Battalion | CO Maj Richard W. Sweet, Jr. | 14 Apr-21 Jun 71 |
| Company A, 1st Motor Transport Battalion | CO Capt Plin McCann | 14 Apr-15 Jun 71 |

1st Combined Action Group

| CO LtCol David F. Seiler | 1 Jan-30 Jun 70 |
| Maj George N. Robillard, Jr. | 1 Jul-13 Sep 70 |

*1st CAG was deactivated on 13 Sep 70.*

2d Combined Action Group

| CO LtCol Don R. Christensen | 1 Jan-21 Sep 70 |
| LtCol John J. Tolnay | 22 Sep 70-11 May 71 |

3d Combined Action Group

| CO Col John B. Michaud | 1 Jan-4 Feb 70 |
| LtCol Claude M. Daniels | 5 Feb-7 Sep 70 |

*3d CAG was deactivated on 7 Sep 70.*

4th Combined Action Group

| CO LtCol John J. Keenan | 1 Jan-17 Feb 70 |
| Maj Robert D. King | 18 Feb-26 Jun 70 |
| Maj Willis D. Ledeboer | 27 Jun-25 Jul 70 |

*4th CAG was deactivated on 25 Jul 70.*

3d Marine Amphibious Brigade Headquarters, 14 Apr-28 Jun 71

| CG MajGen Alan J. Armstrong | 14 Apr-28 Jun 71 |
| ABC BGen Edwin H. Simmons | 14 Apr-24 May 71 |
| BGen James R. Jones | 23 May-14 Jun 71 |
| C/S Col Boris J. Frankovic | 14 Apr-10 Jun 71 |
| G-1 Col Lavern J. Oltmer | 14 Apr-28 Jun 71 |
| G-2 Col Forest J. Hunt | 14 Apr-28 Jun 71 |
| G-3 Col Rex C. Denny, Jr. | 14 Apr-6 Jun 71 |
| G-4 Col William L. McCulloch | 14 Apr-28 Jun 71 |
| G-5 Maj Donald E. Sudduth | 14 Apr-28 Jun 71 |
| G-6 Col Urban A. Lees | 14 Apr-3 Jun 71 |

Headquarters Company

| CO LtCol Richard B. Talbott | 14 Apr-28 Jun 71 |

1st Marines

| CO Col Paul X. Kelley | 14 Apr-9 May 71 |

1st Battalion, 11th Marines

| CO LtCol Bruce F. Ogden | 14 Apr-13 May 71 |

3d 8-inch Howitzer Battery

| CO Maj William J. McCallum | 14 Apr-24 May 71 |

Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion

<p>| CO Maj Harlan C. Cooper, Jr. | 14 Apr-3 May 71 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Commanding Officer(s)</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 167 (HML-167)</td>
<td>LtCol Richard J. Blanc</td>
<td>15 Apr-10 Jun 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Logistic Command</td>
<td>BGen James R. Jones</td>
<td>14 Apr-14 Jun 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Col Harold W. Evans, Jr.</td>
<td>16-26 Jun 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Military Police Battalion</td>
<td>LtCol John Colia</td>
<td>14 Apr-12 Jun 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication Support Company, 7th Communication Battalion</td>
<td>Maj Robert T. Himmerich</td>
<td>14 Apr-22 Jun 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Combined Action Group</td>
<td>LtCol John J. Tolany</td>
<td>14 Apr-11 May 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262 (HMM-262)</td>
<td>LtCol Frank K. West, Jr.</td>
<td>15 Apr-7 May 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (HMM-263)</td>
<td>Maj Dennis N. Anderson</td>
<td>15 Apr-15 May 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 367 (HML-367)</td>
<td>LtCol Clifford E. Reese</td>
<td>15 Apr-31 May 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 (HMH-463)</td>
<td>LtCol Thomas S. Reap</td>
<td>15 Apr-18 May 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Myrddyn W. Edwards</td>
<td>19 May-29 May 71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B
Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A-1E—Douglas Skyraider, a propeller-driven, single-engine, attack aircraft.
A-4—Douglas Skyhawk, a single-seat, jet attack aircraft in service on board carriers of the U.S. Navy and with land-based Marine attack squadrons.
A-6A—Grumman Intruder, a twin-jet, twin-seat, attack aircraft specifically designed to deliver weapons on targets completely obscured by weather or darkness.

AAR—After Action Report.
ABCCC—Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center, a U.S. Air Force aircraft equipped with communications, data link, and display equipment; it may be employed as an airborne command post or a communications and intelligence relay facility.
AC-47—Douglas C-47 Skytrain, twin-engine, fixed-wing transport modified with 7.62mm miniguns and used as a gunship.
AC-119—Fairchild Hiller, C-119 military transport aircraft remodeled into a gunship with side-firing 7.62mm miniguns.

ADC—Assistant Division Commander.
AdminO—Administrative Officer.
Adv—Advanced.
AFP—Armed Forces Police.
AGC—Amphibious command ship. The current designation is LCC.
AH-1G/J—Bell Huey Cobra helicopter specifically designed for close air support.
AK-47—Russian-designed Kalashnikov gas-operated 7.62mm automatic rifle, with an effective range of 400 meters. It was the standard rifle of the North Vietnamese Army.

AKA—Attack cargo ship, a naval ship designed to transport combat-loaded cargo in an assault landing. LKA is the current designation.
ALMAR—All Marines, a Commandant of the Marine Corps communication directed to all Marines.
ALO—Air Liaison Officer, an officer (aviator/pilot) attached to a ground unit who functions as the primary advisor to the ground commander on air operation matters.
ANGLICO—Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, an organization composed of Marine and Navy personnel specially qualified for control of naval gunfire and close air support. ANGLICO personnel normally provided this service while attached to U.S. Army, Korean, and ARVN units.
AO—Air Observer, an individual whose primary mission is to observe or to take photographs from an aircraft in order to adjust artillery fire or obtain military information.
AOA—Amphibious Objective Area, a defined geographical area within which is located the area or areas to be captured by the amphibious task force.
APA—Attack transport ship, a naval ship, designed for combat loading elements of a battalion landing team. LPA is the current designation.

APT—Armed Propaganda Team, a South Vietnamese pacification cadre who carried weapons in self-defense as they attempted to convince South Vietnamese villagers to remain loyal to the government.
Arc Light—The codename for B-52 bombing missions in South Vietnam.
ARG—Amphibious Ready Group.
Art—Artillery.
ARN—Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).
ASP—Ammunition Supply Point.
ASRT—Air Support Radar Team, a subordinate operational component of a tactical air control system which provides ground controlled precision flight path guidance and weapons release for attack aircraft.

B-3—North Vietnamese military command established in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam to control military operations in Kontum, Dak Lak, and Pleiku Provinces.
B-40 rockets—Communist rocket-propelled grenade.

B—Base Area.
Barrel Roll—Codename for air operations over Laos.
BDC—Base Defense Commander.
BGen—Brigadier General.
BLT—Battalion Landing Team.
Bn—Battalion.
Brig—Brigade.

C-117D—Douglas Skytrain, a twin-engine transport aircraft. The C-117D was an improved version of the C-47, the military version of the DC-3.
C-130—Lockheed Hercules, a four-engine turboprop transport aircraft.
CAAR—Combat After Action Report.
CACO—Combined Action Company.
CAF—Combined Action Force.
CAG—Combined Action Group.
CAP—Combined Action Platoon.
Capt—Captain.
CAS—Close Air Support.
CBU—Cluster Bomb Unit.

CCC—Combined Campaign Plan.
Cdr—Commander.
CEC—Construction Engineer Corps.
CG—Commanding General.

CH-37—Sikorsky twin-engine, heavy transport helicopter which carries three crew members and 20 passengers.
CH-46—Boeing Vertol Sea Knight, a twin-engine, tandem-rotor transport helicopter designed to carry a four-man crew and 17 combat-loaded troops.

CH-53—Sikorsky Sea Stallion, a single-rotor, heavy transport helicopter powered by two shaft-turbine engines with an aver-
age payload of 12,800 pounds. Carries crew of three and 38 combat-loaded troops.

Chieu Hoi—The South Vietnamese amnesty program designed to attract Communist troops and cadre to defect to the government cause.

CICV—Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam.

CID—Criminal Investigative Division.

CIDG—Civilian Irregular Defense Group, South Vietnamese paramilitary force, composed largely of Montagnards, the nomadic tribesmen who populate the South Vietnamese highlands, and advised by the U.S. Army Special Forces.

CinCPac—Commander in Chief, Pacific.

CinCPacFlt—Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

CIT—Counter Intelligence Team.

Class (I-V)—Categories of military supplies, e.g., Class I, rations; Class II, POL; Class V, Ammunition.

Claymore—A U.S. directional antipersonnel mine.

CMC—Commandant of the Marine Corps.

CMH—Center of Military History, Department of the Army.

CNO—Chief of Naval Operations.

CO—Commanding Officer.

COC—Combat Operations Center.

Col—Colonel.

Combined Action Program—A Marine pacification program which integrated a Marine infantry squad with a South Vietnamese Popular Force platoon in a Vietnamese village.

CommdC—Command Chronology.

CommdHist—Command History.

ComNavForPac—Commander, Naval Forces, Pacific.

ComNavForV—Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam.


CORS—Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, the agency organized under MACV in May 1967 and charged with coordinating U.S.-Vietnamese pacification efforts.

COSVN—Central Office of South Vietnam, the nominal Communist military and political headquarters in South Vietnam.

County Fair—A sophisticated cordon and search operation in a particular hamlet or village by South Vietnamese troops, police, local officials, and U.S. Marines in an attempt to screen and register the local inhabitants.

CP—Command Post.

CPDC—Central Pacification and Development Council, the South Vietnamese government agency responsible for coordinating the pacification plan.

CRC—Control and Reporting Center, an element of the U.S. Air Force tactical air control system, subordinate to the Tactical Air Control Center, which conducted radar and warning operations.

CRIMP—Consolidated Republic of Vietnam Improvement and Modernization Plan.

CSC—Communications Service Company.

CTZ—Corps Tactical Zone.

CUPP—Combined Unit Pacification Program, a variation of the combined action concept and involving the integration of a Marine line company with a Popular Force or Regional force unit.

DAIS—Da Nang Antiinfiltration System.

DASC—Direct Air Support Center, a subordinate operational component of the Marine air control system designed for control of close air support and other direct air support operations.

D-Day—Day scheduled for the beginning of an operation.

DD—Navy destroyer.

DIOCC—District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center.

Div—Division.

DMZ—Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam.

DOD—Department of Defense.

DPP—Data Processing Platoon.

DPS—Data Processing Section.

DRV—Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).

DSA—District Senior Advisor.

DSS—Da Nang Special Sector.

Dtd—Dated.

Duster—The nickname for the U.S. Army's tracked vehicle, the M-42, which mounted dual 40mm automatic weapons.

DVA—Da Nang Vital Area.

EA-6A—The electronic-countermeasures version of the A-6A Intruder.

ECM—Electronic Countermeasures, a major subdivision of electronic warfare involving actions against enemy electronic equipment or to exploit the enemy's use of electromagnetic radiations from such equipment.

EF-10B—An ECM-modified version of the Navy F-3D Skyknight, a twin-engine jet night-fighter of Korean War vintage.

ELINT—Electronic Intelligence, the intelligence information gained by monitoring radiations from enemy electronic equipment.

Engr—Engineer.

EOD—Explosive Ordnance Device.

F-4B—McDonnell Phantom II, a twin-engined, two-seat, long-range, all-weather jet interceptor and attack bomber.

FAC(A)—Forward Air Controller (Airborne).

FDC—Fire Direction Center.


FLC—Force Logistic Command.


FLSU—Force Logistic Support Unit.

FMFPac—Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

FO—Forward Observer.

FRC—Federal Records Center.

Front 4—A Communist headquarters subordinate to MR 3 and responsible for Quang Nam Province.

FSB—Fire Support Base.

FSSC—Fire Service Coordination Center, a single location involved in the coordination of all forms of fire support.

FSR—Fire Service Regiment.

Fwd—Forward.

FWMF—Free World Military Force.

G—Refers to staff positions on a general staff, e.g., G-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel; G-2, intelligence; G-3, operations; G-4, logistics, and G-5, civil affairs.

Gen—General.

Golden Fleece—Marine rice harvest protection operation.

Grenade Launcher, M79—U.S.-built, single-shot, breech-loaded shoulder weapon which fires 40mm projectiles and weighs approximately 6.5 pounds when loaded; it has a sustained rate of aimed fire of five-seven rounds per minute and an effective range of 375 meters.

Gun, 175mm, M107—U.S.-built, self-propelled gun which weighs 62,000 pounds and fires a 147-pound projectile to a maximum
range of 32,800 meters. Maximum rate of fire is one round every two minutes.

GVN—Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam).

H&I fires—Harassing and Interdiction fires.

HRMS—Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron.

H&S Co—Headquarters and Service Company.

HAWK—A mobile, surface-to-air guided missile, designed to defend against low-flying enemy aircraft and short-range missiles.

HC(A)—Helicopter Commander (Airborne).

HE—High Explosive.

Hectare—A unit of land measure in the metric system and equal to 2.471 acres.

HESS—Hamlet Evaluation System, the computerized statistical data system used to measure pacification in the hamlets and villages of South Vietnam.

H-Hour—The specific hour an operation begins.

HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC—Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, the Vietnam-era predecessor of the History and Museums Division.

HLZ—Helicopter Landing Zone.

HMH—Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron.

HMM—Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron.

Howtar—A 4.2 (107mm) mortar tube mounted on a 75mm pak howitzer frame.

HST—Helicopter Support Team.

"Huey"—Popular name for UH-1 series of helicopters.

ICH—International Control Commission, established by the Geneva Accords of 1954 to supervise the truce ending the First Indochina War between the French and the Viet Minh and resulting in the partition of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel. The members of the Commission were from Canada, India, and Poland.

ICCC—I Corps Coordinating Council, consisting of U.S. and Vietnamese officials in I Corps who coordinated the civilian assistance program.

I Corps—The military and administrative subdivision which included the five northern provinces of South Vietnam.

IDA—Institute for Defense Analysis.

MAF—I Marine Amphibious Force.

MEF—I Marine Expeditionary Force.

Intel—Intelligence.

Interview—Interview.

IOD—Integrated Observation Device.

ITT—Interrogation/Translator Team.

J—The designation for members of a joint staff which includes members of several services comprising the command, e.g., J-1 would refer to the staff members responsible for personnel; J-2, intelligence; J-3, operations; J-4, logistics; and J-5, civil affairs.

JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.).

JGS—Joint General Staff (South Vietnamese).

JTD—Joint Table of Distribution.

JUSPAO—Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office.

KC-130—The in-flight refueling tanker configuration of the C-130 Lockheed Hercules.

KIA—Killed in Action.

Kingfisher operations—Heliborne combat patrols for quick reaction operations.

Kit Carson Scout—Viet Cong defectors recruited by Marines to serve as scouts, interpreters, and intelligence agents.

L-Hour—in planned helicopter operations, it is the specific hour the helicopters land in the landing zone.

LAAM Bn—Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion.

LCM—Landing Craft Mechanized, designed to land tanks, trucks, and trailers directly onto the beach.

LCVP—Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel, a small craft with a bow ramp used to transport assault troops and light vehicles to the beach.

LGB—Laser Guided Bomb, popularly known as the "smart bomb."

LKA—The current designation for an attack cargo ship. See AKA.

LOC—Lines of Communication.

LOI—Letter of Instruction.

LPD—Amphibious transport, dock, a ship designed to transport and land troops, equipment, and supplies by means of embarked landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and helicopters. It had both a submersible well deck and a helicopter landing deck.

LPH—Amphibious assault ship, a ship designed or modified to transport and land troops, equipment, and supplies by means of embarked helicopters.

LSA—Logistic Support Area.

LSD—Landing Ship, Dock, a landing ship designed to combat, load, transport, and launch amphibious crafts or vehicles together with crews and embarked personnel, and to provide limited docking and repair services to small ships and crafts. It lacks the helicopter landing deck of the LPD.

LST—Landing Ship, Tank, landing ship designed to transport heavy vehicles and to land them on a beach.

Lt—Lieutenant.

LtCol—Lieutenant Colonel.

LTDS—Laser Target Designation System.

LtGen—Lieutenant General.

Lt—Lieutenant.

LVTE—Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Engineer, a lightly armored amphibious vehicle designed for minefield and obstacle clearance.

LVTH—Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Howitzer, a lightly armored, self-propelled, amphibious 105mm howitzer. It resembles an LVTP with a turret for the howitzer.

LVTP—Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Personnel, an amphibious vehicle used to land and/or transport personnel.

LZ—Landing Zone.

MAB—Marine Amphibious Brigade.

MABS—Marine Air Base Squadron.

Machine gun, .50-caliber—U.S.-built, belt-fed, recoil-operated, air-
cooled automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 80 pounds without mount or ammunition; it has a sustained rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,450 meters.

Machine gun, M60—U.S.-built, belt-fed, gas-operated, air-cooled, 7.62mm automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 20 pounds without mount or ammunition; it has a sustained rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,000 meters.

Mortar, 81mm, M29—U.S.-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, 81mm mortar, single-shot, high angle of fire weapon which weighs approximately 123 pounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 25 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 3,040 meters.

Mortar, 82mm—Soviet-built, smooth-bore, mortar, single-shot, high angle of fire weapon which weighs approximately 600 pounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 15 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 5,700 meters.

Mortar, 120mm—Soviet- or Chinese Communist-built, smooth bore, drop or trigger fired, mortar which weighs approximately 600 pounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 15 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 5,700 meters.

MR—Military Region; corps tactical zones were redesignated military regions in 1970, e.g. I Corps Tactical Zone became Military Region 1 (MR 1).

MR 5—Military Region 5, a Communist political and military sector in northern South Vietnam, including all of I Corps. NVA units in MR 5 did not report to COSVN.

Ms—Manuscript.

MSG—Marine Security Group.

NAC—Northern Artillery Cantonment.

NAG—Naval Advisory Group.

NAS—Naval Air Station.

NCC—Naval Component Commander.

NCO—Noncommissioned Officer.

NCS—Naval Civil Support Squadron, provides and operates facilities for the control of support aircraft operating in direct support of ground forces.

MAU—Marine Advisory Unit, the Marine advisory unit under the Naval Advisory Group which administered the advisory effort to the South Vietnamese Marine Corps; not to be confused with a Marine Amphibious Unit.

MAW—Marine Aircraft Wing.

MCAF—Marine Corps Air Facility.

MCAS—Marine Corps Air Station.

MCCC—Marine Corps Command Center.

MCO—Marine Corps Order.

MCOAG—Marine Corps Operations Analysis Group.

MSCA—Marine Corps Supply Agency.

MEDC—Medical Civilian Assistance Program.

MEDVAC—Medical Evacuation.

MIA—Missing in Action.

MilHistBr—Military History Branch.

MO—Mount Out.

MOA—Mount Out Augmentation.

Mortar, 4.2-inch, M30—U.S.-built, rifled, muzzle-loaded, drop-fired weapon consisting of tube, base-plate and standard; weapon weighs 330 pounds and has maximum range of 4,020 meters.

Mortar, 60mm, M19—U.S.-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, weapon which weighs 45.2 pounds when assembled; it has a maximum rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and sustained rate of fire of 18 rounds per minute; the effective range is 2,000 meters.

Mortar, 81mm, M29—U.S.-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, which weighs approximately 115 pounds when assembled; it has a sustained rate of fire of two rounds per minute and an effective range of 2,300-3,650 meters, depending upon ammunition used.

Mortar, 82mm—Soviet-built, smooth-bore, mortar, single-shot, high angle of fire weapon which weighs approximately 123 pounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 25 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 3,040 meters.

Mortar, 120mm—Soviet- or Chinese Communist-built, smooth bore, drop or trigger fired, mortar which weighs approximately 600 pounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 15 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 5,700 meters.

M1A—Mount Out Augmentation.

Mortar, 81mm, M29—U.S.-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, weapon which weighs approximately 20 pounds without mount or ammunition; it has a sustained rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,000 meters.

MOA—Mount Out Augmentation.
PDC—Pacification and Development Councils.
PF—Popular Force, Vietnamese militia who were usually employed in the defense of their own communities.
Phoenix program—A covert U.S. and South Vietnamese program aimed at the eradication of the Viet Cong infrastructure in South Vietnam.
PIIC—Photo Imagery Interpretation Center.
POL—Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants.
Project Nine—The codename for the planning of the antinfiltration barrier across the DMZ.
PRC-25—Standard radio used by Marine ground units in Vietnam that allowed for voice communication for distances up to 25 miles.
Project Delta—A special South Vietnamese reconnaissance group consisting of South Vietnamese Special Forces troops and U.S. Army Special Forces advisors.
PRU—Provincial Reconnaissance Unit.
PSA—Province Senior Advisor.
PSDF—People's Self-Defense Force, a local self-defense force organized by the South Vietnamese Government after the enemy's Tet offensive in 1968.
QDSF—Quang Da Special Zone.
QRF—Quick Reaction Force.
R&R—Rest and Recreation.
Recoilless rifle, 106mm, M40A1—U.S. built, single-shot, recoilless, breech-loaded weapon which weighs 438 pounds when assembled and mounted for firing; it has a sustained rate of fire of six rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,365 meters.
Regt—Regiment.
Revolutionary Development—The South Vietnamese pacification program started in 1966.
Revolutionary Development Teams—Specially trained Vietnamese political cadre who were assigned to individual hamlets and villages and conducted various pacification and civilian assistance tasks on a local level.
RF-4B—Photo-reconnaissance model of the F4B Phantom II.
RF-8A—Reconnaissance version of the F8B Chance Vought Crusader.
RF—Regional Force, Vietnamese militia who were employed in a specific area.
Rifle, M14—Gas-operated, magazine-fed, semi-automatic, 7.62mm caliber shoulder weapon, which weighs 12 pounds with a full 20-round magazine; it has a sustained rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and an effective range of 460 meters.
Rifle, M16—Gas-operated, magazine-fed, air-cooled, automatic, 5.56mm caliber shoulder weapon, which weighs 3.1 pounds with a 20-round magazine; it has a sustained rate of fire of 12-15 rounds per minute and an effective range of 460 meters.
RRT—Regimental Landing Team.
ROK—Republic of Korea.
Rolling Thunder—Codename for U.S. air operations over North Vietnam.
Rough Rider—Organized vehicle convoys, often escorted by helicopters and armored vehicles, using Vietnam's roads to supply Marine bases.
Route Package—Codename used with a number to designate areas of North Vietnam for the American bombing campaign. Route Package I was the area immediately north of DMZ.
ROE—Rules of Engagement.
RPG—Rocket-Propelled Grenade.
RRU—Radio Research Unit.
Rural Reconstruction—The predecessor campaign to Revolutionary Development.
RVN—Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). 
RVNAF—Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. 
RZ—Reconnaissance Zone.
S—Refers to staff positions on regimental and battalion levels. S-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel; S-2, intelligence; S-3, operations; S-4, logistics; and S-5, civil affairs.
SAM—Surface to Air Missile.
SAR—Search and Rescue.
SATS—Short Airfield for Tactical Support, an expeditionary airfield used by Marine Corps aviation that included a portable runway surface, aircraft launching and recovery devices, and other essential expeditionary airfield components.
SCAMP—Sensor Control and Maintenance Platoon.
SEATO—Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.
2d AD—2d Air Division, the major U.S. Air Force command in Vietnam prior to the establishment of the Seventh Air Force.
SecDef—Secretary of Defense.
SecState—Secretary of State.
Seventh AF—Seventh Air Force, the major U.S. Air Force command in Vietnam.
Seventh Fleet—The U.S. fleet assigned to the Pacific.
SF—Surprise Firing Device, a euphemism for a boobytrap.
SID—Seismic Intrusion Device, sensor used to monitor movement through ground vibrations.
SitRep—Situation Report.
SKS—Russian-designed Simonov gas-operated 7.62mm semiautomatic rifle.
SLF—Special Landing Force.
SMA—Senior Marine Advisor.
SOG—Studies and Operations Group, the cover name for the organization that carried out cross-border operations.
Song—Vietnamese for 'river.'
SOP—Standing Operating Procedure, set of instructions laying out standardized procedures.
SPIE—Special Patrol Insertion/Extraction line.
Spt Rept—Spot Report.
Sortie—An operational flight by one aircraft.
Sparrow Hawk—A small rapid-reaction force on standby, ready for insertion by helicopter for reinforcement of units in contact with the enemy.
SSDC—Southern Sector Defense Command.
Steel Tiger—The codename for the air campaign over Laos.
Stingray—Special Marine reconnaissance missions in which small Marine reconnaissance teams call artillery and air attacks on targets of opportunity.
Strike Company—An elite company in a South Vietnamese infantry division, directly under the control of the division commander.
TAC(A)—Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne), an officer in an airplane, who coordinates close air support.
TACC—Tactical Air Control Center, the principal air operations installation for controlling all aircraft and air-warning functions of tactical air operations.
GLOSSARY

TACP—Tactical Air Control Party, a subordinate operational component of a tactical air control system designed to provide air liaison to land forces and for the control of aircraft.

TADC—Tactical Air Direction Center, an air operations installation under the Tactical Air Control Center, which directs aircraft and aircraft warning functions of the tactical air center.

TAFDS—Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System, the expeditionary storage and dispensing system of aviation fuel at tactical airfields. It uses 10,000-gallon fabric tanks to store the fuel.

TAOC—Tactical Air Operations Center, a subordinate component of the air command and control system which controls all enroute air traffic and air defense operations.

Tank, M48—U.S.-built 50.7-ton tank with a crew of four; primary armament is turret-mounted 90mm gun with one .30-caliber and one .50-caliber machine gun; has maximum road speed of 32 miles per hour and an average range of 195 miles.

TAOC—Tactical Air Operations Center, a subordinate component of the air command and control system which controls all enroute air traffic and air defense operations.

TAOC—Tactical Area of Coordination.

TAOI—Tactical Area of Interest.

TAOR—Tactical Area of Responsibility, a defined area of land for which responsibility is specifically assigned to the commander of the area as a measure for control of assigned forces and coordination of support.

TE—Task Element.

TE—Table of Equipment.

TG—Task Group.

Tiger Hound—Airstrikes in Laos directed by U.S. Air Force small fixed-wing observation aircraft, flying up to 12 miles into southeastern Laos.

TO—Table of Organization.

Trung-ri—A South Vietnamese Popular Force sergeant.

TSF—Transitional Support Force.

TU—Task Unit.

UCMJ—Uniform Code of Military Justice

UH-1E—Bell “Huey”—A single-engine, light attack/observation helicopter noted for its maneuverability and firepower; carries a crew of three; it can be armed with air-to-ground rocket packs and fuselage-mounted, electrically-fired machine guns.

UH-34D—Sikorsky Sea Horse, a single-engine medium transport helicopter with a crew of three, carries eight to 12 combat soldiers, depending upon weather conditions.

USA—U.S. Army.


USAID—U.S. Agency for International Development.


USIA—U.S. Information Agency.

USMC—U.S. Marine Corps.

U.S. Mission Council—Council, chaired by the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam and including ComUSMACV, which developed and coordinated U.S. policy within South Vietnam.

USN—U.S. Navy.

VC—Viet Cong, a term used to refer to the Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam; a contraction of the Vietnamese phrase meaning “Vietnamese Communists.”

Viet Minh—The Vietnamese contraction for Viet Nam Doc Lap Nong Minh Hoi, a Communist-led coalition of nationalist groups, which actively opposed the Japanese in World War II and the French in the first Indochina War.

VCI—Viet Cong Infrastructure.

VIS—Vietnamese Information Service.

VMA—Marine attack squadron (in naval aviation, the “V” designates “heavier than air” as opposed to craft that are “lighter than air”).

VMR(AW)—Marine Fighter Squadron (All-Weather).

VMFA—Marine Fighter Attack Squadron.

VMCJ—Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron.

VMGR—Marine Refueller Transport Squadron.

VMO—Marine Observation Squadron.

VNAF—Vietnamese Air Force.

VNMB—Vietnamese Marine Brigade.

VNMC—Vietnamese Marine Corps.

VNN—Vietnamese Navy.

VT—Variable timed electronic fuze for an artillery shell which causes airburst over the target area.

WestPac—Western Pacific.

WIA—Wounded in Action.

WFRC—Washington Federal Records Center.
Appendix C

Chronology of Significant Events
January 1970-June 1971

1970

6 January An estimated force of 100 VC attacked Fire Support Base Ross, which was then occupied by Companies A and B of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, the battalion headquarters group, and two artillery batteries. Thirteen Marines were killed and 63 were wounded while the VC left 39 dead behind.

8 January Building on the combined action platoon concept, III MAF formally established the Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP). Under the CUPP, Marine rifle companies deployed their squads in hamlets to work with the RFs and PFs much like the CAPs did. The CUPP differed in that the rifle companies were given no special training, and the Marine units remained under operational control of parent regiments, generally operating within the regiment's AO.

11 January III MAF formally activated the Combined Action Force, incorporating the four combined action groups (CAGs) under its own headquarters rather than through an assistant chief of staff within III MAF. In January the CAF included 42 Marine officers and 2,050 enlisted men, along with 2 naval officers and 126 hospital corpsmen. The 20 combined action companies and 114 combined action platoons worked with about 3,000 RFs and PFs at the time.

18 January A North Vietnamese spokesman said that allowing POWs to send a postcard home once a month and to receive packages from home every other month was, in effect, a means of accounting for those captured.

26 January President Nguyen Van Thieu appealed to friendly nations for continued aid, saying he would go his own way if allied policies were not in accord with the South Vietnamese government's.

28 January Troop movement for Keystone Bluejay, the first redeployment of 1970, began and continued until 19 March. Among the ground and aviation units redeployed were 26th Marines, VMAs -223 and -211, VMFA-542, HMH-361, and MAG-12.

31 January Enemy traffic along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in January increased to 10 times what it was in September-October 1969.

31 January III MAF strength in Vietnam was 55,191.

5 February At the Paris peace talks, the enemy produced the first letter of a POW held in South Vietnam by the VC. This act took place in response to heavy pressure from the U.S. and South Vietnamese.

17 February President Nixon said the military aspects of Vietnamization were proceeding on schedule.
19 February Lieutenant General Nickerson and Lieutenant General Zais briefed General Abrams on the planned Army takeover of ICTZ on 9 March. Abrams sanctioned the arrangement proposed by Nickerson whereby III MAF, while becoming subordinate to XXIV Corps, still remained parent unit of 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, preserving the integrity of the Marine air-ground team concept in Vietnam.

5-9 March During Operation Cavalier Beach, III MAF relocated to Camp Haskins and XXIV Corps moved from its headquarters in Phu Bai to Camp Horn.

9 March Lieutenant General Herman Nickerson, Jr., passed operational command of I Corps to Lieutenant General Melvin Zais, USA, and simultaneously passed command of III MAF to Lieutenant General Keith B. McCutcheon.

9 March III MAF turned command of I Corps over to XXIV Corps. Major elements of III MAF at the time included the 1st Marine Division (Rein), 1st MAW, and FLC.

19 March The 26th Marines, which had received a Presidential Unit Citation for the defense of Khe Sanh, departed Vietnam. Following the regiment’s departure, the 1st Marines was left to control the Rocket Belt, an area of some 534 square kilometers.

19 March The U.S. said that its recognition of Cambodian sovereignty would continue following the seizure of power from Prince Norodom Sihanouk by General Lon Nol.

26 March The Combined Action Force was placed under the operational control of XXIV Corps while remaining under the administrative control of III MAF.

April During April the Marine Corps stopped taking draftees.

14 April Major General C. F. Widdecke relieved Major General Edwin B. Wheeler as Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, and as Deputy Commander, III MAF.

21 April President Thieu said that the Vietnamese could gradually assume greater responsibilities as the Americans withdrew from Vietnam but that the South Vietnamese would require more aid from allies.

23 April The 1st Force Service Support Regiment was closed down and transferred to Camp Pendleton.

27 April Following a helicopter crash on 18 April Major General Edwin B. Wheeler, who broke a leg on impact, was replaced by Major General Charles F. Widdecke.

30 April President Nixon announced that several thousand American troops supporting the RVNAF invasion entered Cambodia’s Fishhook area bordering South Vietnam to attack the supposed location of the headquarters of the Communist military operation in South Vietnam. American advisors, tactical air support, medical evacuation teams, and logistical support were also provided to the RVNAF. On 9 May Brigade B of the VNMC crossed the Cambodian border and at 0930 landed at Neck Luong to begin operations. Allied troops in Cambodia increased to 50,000 by 6 May. Withdrawal of American units from Cambodia was completed when the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) returned to South Vietnam on 29 June.
29 April  Beginning this date RVNAF and U.S. Army forces conducted search
and destroy operations in a dozen base areas in Cambodia adjoining
II, III, and IV Corps in South Vietnam. A U.S.-Vietnamese
naval task force also swept up the Mekong River to open a supply
line to Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital.

1-31 May  The VC progressively returned to guerrilla warfare and terrorism in
1970. During May the VC in Quang Nam killed 129 civilians,
wounded 247, and kidnapped 73. Most of the latter was interpret-
ed as being forcible recruitment of young males.

3 May  III MAF approved a 1st Division request to demolish the Da Nang
Antiinfiltration System (DAIS), the line of minefields, cleared land,
barbed wire fences, and electronic sensors which had been deve-
loped to stop enemy infiltration of the Rocket Belt. Never fully
constructed or manned, the DAIS was regarded as ineffective by
most Marines because farmers and water buffaloes could not be
distinguished from rocket-bearing enemy.

4 May  Four students at Kent State University in Ohio were killed by sol-
diers of the U.S. National Guard who had been called to halt riots
which were stimulated in part by the Cambodian invasion.

4 May  The Senate Foreign Relations Committee accused President Nixon
of usurping the war-making powers of Congress by allowing Ameri-
can troops to participate in the RVNAF's invasion of Cambodia. A
day later President Nixon responded, saying American troops
would penetrate no further than 19 miles and would be withdraw-
ned by 1 July 1970.

6 May  Que Son District Headquarters in Quang Nam Province received
some 200 rounds of mortar fire followed by a ground attack of an
enemy force estimated at greater than battalion strength. Marines
of Company H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, supported by artillery
aided the beseiged RF/PF units. Friendly losses were 11 killed, in-
cluding one American, and 41 wounded; 27 enemy were killed.

11 June  To terrorize the villagers of Phu Thanh—a village near the Ba Ren
Bridge where CUPP team Number 9 of 1st Platoon, Company A,
7th Marines operated—elements of the V-25th Main Force Battalion
and the T-89th Sapper Battalion (VC) attacked at 0200, killing 74
civilians, many of them women and children, wounding 60 seriously,
and destroying 156 houses.

11 June  Thanh My Hamlet eight kilometers southwest of Hoi An, was at-
tacked by the VC/NVA, resulting in 150 civilians killed and 60
wounded. In destroying the hamlet the enemy left behind 16 dead.

21 June  Da Nang was hit by nine 122mm rockets, killing seven civilians,
wounding 19, and destroying seven houses.

30 June  The Naval Support Activity Da Nang was deactivated and the fol-
lowing day Army-Marine service support agreements went into
effect.
1-2 July  Major General Alan J. Armstrong replaced Major General William G. Thrash as Commanding General, 1st MAW.

2 July  To unify command and strengthen the administration of the RVNAF President Nguyen Van Thieu incorporated the regional and popular forces into the Vietnamese Army and redesignated Corps Tactical Zones as Military Regions (MRs). Under the reorganization the corps deputy commander conducted major offensive operations in the MR while the MR deputy commander, in charge of territorial defense and pacification, commanded the RFs and PFs. Concurrently, MACV and the Vietnamese Joint General Staff completed plans to incorporate the Civilian Defense Groups into ARVN Border Defense Ranger Battalions.

3 July  The Hai Lang PF Platoon; RF group 1/11 and Companies 121 and 122; and CAPs 4-3-2 and 4-1-2, located nine kilometers southeast of Quang Tri City, were attacked by an enemy force of unknown size. Supported by gunships and artillery, the allies killed 135 enemy and captured 74 weapons while losing 16 killed and six missing in action.

6 July  A house fact-finding mission to South Vietnam filed a report expressing optimism about ending the war. The report also noted that South Vietnam's major problem was its economy.

15-16 July  Operation Barren Green was launched by elements of the 5th Marines in the northern Arizona Territory south of the Vu Gia River to prevent the VC/NVA from collecting the ripened corn of this fertile region. A second operation, Lyon Valley, was initiated by the 5th Marines on 16 August in the mountains bordering the Arizona Territory to further limit the movement of food to the 38th NVA Regiment, known to be staged in base camps there.

16 July  Marine units, primarily of the 7th Marines, began Operation Pickins Forest south of the An Hoa in the Song Thu Bon Valley.

16 August  Operation Lien Valley was begun by 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (-) about 11 kilometers southwest of An Hoa.

20 August  A DOD study indicated that about three of 10 servicemen interviewed had used marijuana or other drugs.

30 August  Thirty South Vietnamese senators were elected in voting marked by terrorist attacks and charges of fraud. Forty-two civilians were killed.

September  By the end of the month, the 1st and 5th Marines and 2d Battalion, 7th Marines were the only maneuver units remaining in the field.

September  TAORs were realigned as 7th Marines and some combat and service support units stood down.

1 September  With the deactivation of all CAPs outside Quang Nam, XXIV Corps returned operational control of the CAF to III MAF.

5 September  The 5th Marines began shifting elements of its infantry regiments to assume responsibility of the 7th Marines' area of operations in the Que Son area, as the 7th Marines began preparations to stand down from combat operations.

21 September  The Combined Action Force headquarters in Chu Lai was deactivated, leaving only the 2nd CAG operating in Quang Nam Province.
The approximately 600 Marines and Navy corpsmen integrated their operations with 31 PF and three RF platoons distributed throughout Quang Nam.

1 October
In a ceremony attended by Lieutenant General McCutcheon, CG, III MAF; Lieutenant General Sutherland of XXIV Corps; Lieutenant General Lam of I Corps; and Major General Widdecke, CG, 1st Marine Division, the regimental colors of the 7th Marines were trooped for the last time in Vietnam. That same day the regimental command group departed Vietnam for Camp Pendleton, California.

8 October
MACV completed plans to redeploy another 40,000 troops by the end of the year, which would leave some 344,000 in Vietnam.

14 October
At the request of Colonel Clark V. Judge, Commander of the 5th Marines, the 1st MAW decentralized helicopter support by dispatching six CH-46Ds, four AH-1G gunships, one UH-1E command and control aircraft, and usually a CH-53 to LZ Baldy on a daily basis. The helicopter package, operating under the control of Colonel Judge, was provided to improve the regiment's mobility and tactical flexibility.

15 October
The last Marines left An Hoa, turning the base over to the South Vietnamese.

22 October
Employing the 51st ARVN Regiment, the 1st Ranger Group, the 2d and 3d Troops of the 17th Armored Cavalry Squadron, over 300 RF and PF platoons, the People's Self-Defense Force, and the national police in a province-wide offensive against the VC, Lieutenant General Lam launched Operation Hoang Dien, the I Corps commander's most ambitious, essentially South Vietnamese pacification operation to that date.

31 October
MACV promulgated the Allied Combined Campaign Plan for 1971. Reflecting the changing emphasis of the war, the plan emphasized the RVNAF's increasing assumption of tasks previously assigned the redeploying Americans.

2 November
A large construction effort got underway to repair damage caused by monsoon flood waters.

21 November
TG 79.4 was redesignated 31st Marine Amphibious Unit (31st MAU), no longer SLF Alpha.

23 November
Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird reported that a joint American force conducted an unsuccessful helicopter raid on Son Toy prisoner of war camp 20 miles west of Hanoi on 19 November. The prisoners had been moved some weeks before.

December
The 1st Marine Division, which had a strength of over 28,000 the previous January, had shrunk to some 12,500.

1 December
The 1st LAAM Battalion was deactivated in Twentynine Palms, California. The battalion was one of the first units to arrive in Vietnam in 1965.

3 December
American strength in Vietnam was down to 349,700, the lowest since 29 October 1966.
9 December The Senior Marine Advisor, Colonel Francis W. Tief, relieved Captain Eugene I. Finke, USN, as commander of TG 116.1 at the Solid Anchor base in the Ca Mau peninsula.

10 December President Nixon warned that if North Vietnamese forces increased the level of fighting in South Vietnam as American forces were withdrawn, he would begin bombing targets in North Vietnam again.

24 December Lieutenant General Keith B. McCutcheon was relieved as Commanding General, III MAF by Lieutenant General Donn J. Robertson.

1971

1 January RVNAF allies ceased to have Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAORs). Instead, only the RVNAF had them, while allied units were assigned Tactical Areas of Interest (TAOI), which generally encompassed the same areas as their previous TAORs. From then forward the ARVN assigned areas of responsibility to allied commands.

1-31 January Enemy activity was in apparent decline. In January 1970, allied forces had sighted 4,425 enemy troops, but from September through December 1970 only 4,159 were spotted.

6 January Secretary of Defense Laird said that Vietnamization was running ahead of schedule and that the combat mission of American troops would end the following summer.

23 January CINCPac approved standing down ARG Bravo from 29 January-1 May 1971. ARG Alpha would remain on 120-hour reaction time during the period.

30 January Phase I of Operation Lam Son 719 began with elements of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech), USA, advancing from FSB Vandegrift toward Khe Sanh. On 8 February the ARVN entered Laos to begin Phase II. The RVNAF units swept areas of operation from 7 to 16 March during Phase III and began Phase IV, the withdrawal, on 17 March. The last South Vietnamese troops exited Laos on 6 April.

3 February-10 March During the RVNAF-coordinated Operation Hoang Dien 103, units of III MAF, 1st MAW, 2d ROKMC, 51st ARVN Regiment, 146th PF Platoon, 39th RF Company, and PSDF combed the Da Nang TAOR lowlands and lowland fringes, killing 330 VC/NVA, while the allies lost 46 killed, including two Americans.

8 February President Thieu announced that South Vietnamese troops entered Laos in operation Lam Son 719. No American ground troops or advisors crossed the border.

12 February Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) Alfa/31st Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) arrived off the coast of North Vietnam, 50 miles east of the City of Vinh. From then until 6 March the ARG/MAU con-
ducted daily amphibious and communications exercises in an effort to cause the North Vietnamese to divert forces to respond to a potential raid at Vinh while Lam Son 719 was ongoing.

17 February The MACV commander directed that from 1 May to 30 June during Keystone Robin Charlie the entire 3d MAB would be redeployed.

2 March Brigade 147, VNMC made a heliborne assault into Laos during Lam Son 719, at FSB Delta, and relieving ARVN forces operating there.

24 March DOD announced that the North Vietnamese had begun moving long-range artillery into the western end of the DMZ.

29 March An estimated two battalions of the 38th NVA Regiment reinforced by two Viet Cong battalions, attacked Duc Duc district headquarters just southwest of An Hoa, killing 103 civilians and kidnapping 37, while destroying 1,500 homes.

14 April III MAF relocated to Okinawa this date and 3d MAB was officially established in RVN.

15 April The strength of 3d MAB on its activation was 1,322 Marine and 124 Navy officers and 13,359 Marine and 711 Navy enlisted men. The ground combat element was the 1st Marines and the air element consisted of two aircraft groups, MAG-11 and MAG-16. The MAB also included numerous combat support and service support units.

15 April The last four CUPP squads of Company M, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines were deactivated, ending the CUPP program. In 18 months of existence, the CUPP program had accounted for 578 enemy killed while Marines lost 46 killed.

30 April President Nixon welcomed home the 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton.

30 April At the end of April, 3d MAB included the following units: HQ, 3d MAB; RLT-1; 1/1; 2/1; 3/1; 1/11; Sub-Unit 1, 1st Anglico; MAG-11; VMA-311; Det, VMO-6; MAG-16; HML-367; HML-167; HMM-263; HMM-463.

14 April Lieutenant General Robertson, Commanding General, III MAF, relocated to Camp Courtney, Okinawa. Major General Armstrong, CG, 1st MAW, assumed command of all units remaining in RVN, reporting to CG, XXIV Corps for operational control as CG, 3d MAB. Command of 1st MAW was passed to CG, 1st MAW (Rear) and Major General Widdecke, CG, 1st Marine Division relocated to MCB, Camp Pendleton, California, reporting to CG, FMFPac for operational control.

3-4 May Marines from Quantico and Camp Lejeune were deployed in Washington, D.C. to assist the police in controlling anti-war protesters.

7 May 3d MAB units ceased ground combat operations and fixed-wing aviation operations.

11 May The 2d Combined Action Group headquarters was deactivated, signalling the end of Marine Corps pacification and civic action campaigns in Vietnam.
12 May  Operation Imperial Lake ended in which 305 VC/NVA were killed while Marines had 24 killed.

4 June  The 3d MAB turned over its last piece of real estate in Vietnam, Camp Books, to the U.S. Army.

9 June  Lieutenant General W. G. Dolvin, USA, relieved Lieutenant General J. W. Sutherland, USA, as Commanding General, XXIV Corps.

21 June  American troop strength in RVN was down to 244,900.

26 June  The 3d MAB closed its headquarters.

27 June  The 3d MAB was deactivated.
Appendix D

Medal of Honor Citations
January 1970-June 1971

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS RAYMOND MICHAEL CLAUSEN
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving with Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263, Marine Aircraft Group 16, First Marine Aircraft Wing, during operations against enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam on 31 January 1970. Participating in a helicopter rescue mission to extract elements of a platoon which had inadvertently entered a minefield while attacking enemy positions, Private First Class Clausen skillfully guided the helicopter pilot to a landing in an area cleared by one of several mine explosions. With eleven Marines wounded, one dead, and the remaining eight Marines holding their positions for fear of detonating other mines, Private First Class Clausen quickly leaped from the helicopter and, in the face of enemy fire, moved across the extremely hazardous, mine-laden area to assist in carrying casualties to the waiting helicopter and in placing them aboard. Despite the ever-present threat of further mine explosions, he continued his valiant efforts, leaving the comparatively safe area of the helicopter on six separate occasions to carry out his rescue efforts. On one occasion while he was carrying one of the wounded, another mine detonated, killing a corpsman and wounding three other men. Only when he was certain that all Marines were safely aboard did he signal the pilot to lift the helicopter. By his courageous, determined and inspiring efforts in the face of the utmost danger, Private First Class Clausen upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and of the United States Naval Service.
The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL EMILIO ALBERT DE LA GARZA, JR.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a machine gunner with Company E, Second Battalion, First Marines, First Marine Division, in the Republic of Vietnam on April 11, 1970. Returning with his squad from a night ambush operation, Lance Corporal De La Garza joined his platoon commander and another Marine in searching for two enemy soldiers who had been observed fleeing for cover toward a small pond. Moments later, he located one of the enemy soldiers hiding among the reeds and brush. As the three Marines attempted to remove the resisting soldier from the pond, Lance Corporal De La Garza observed him pull the pin on a grenade. Shouting a warning, Lance Corporal De La Garza placed himself between the other two Marines and the ensuing blast from the grenade, thereby saving the lives of his comrades at the sacrifice of his own. By his prompt and decisive action, and his great personal valor in the face of almost certain death, Lance Corporal De La Garza upheld and further enhanced the finest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.
The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL JAMES DONNIE HOWE
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Rifleman with Company I, Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine Division during operations against enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam. In the early morning hours of May 6, 1970, Lance Corporal Howe and two other Marines were occupying a defensive position in a sandy beach area fronted by bamboo thickets. Enemy sappers suddenly launched a grenade attack against the position, utilizing the cover of darkness to carry out the assault. Following the initial explosions of the grenades, Lance Corporal Howe and his two comrades moved to a more advantageous position in order to return suppressive fire. When an enemy grenade landed in their midst, Lance Corporal Howe immediately shouted a warning and then threw himself upon the deadly missile, thereby protecting the lives of the fellow Marines. His heroic and selfless action was in keeping with the finest traditions of the Marine Corps and of the United States Naval Service. He valiantly gave his life in the service of his country.
The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL MIGUEL KEITH
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a machine gunner with Combined Action Platoon 1-2-3, III Marine Amphibious Force, operating in Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam. During the early morning of 8 May 1970, Lance Corporal Keith was seriously wounded when his platoon was subjected to a heavy ground attack by a greatly outnumbering enemy force. Despite his painful wounds, he ran across the fire-swept terrain to check the security of vital defense positions, and then, while completely exposed to view, proceeded to deliver a hail of devastating machine gun fire against the enemy. Determined to stop five of the enemy approaching the command post, he rushed forward, firing as he advanced. He succeeded in disposing of three of the attackers and in dispersing the remaining two. At this point, a grenade detonated near Lance Corporal Keith, knocking him to the ground and inflicting further severe wounds. Fighting pain and weakness from loss of blood, he again braved the concentrated hostile fire to charge an estimated twenty-five enemy soldiers who were massing to attack. The vigor of his assault and his well-placed fire eliminated four of the enemy while the remainder fled for cover. During this valiant effort, he was mortally wounded by an enemy soldier. By his courageous and inspiring performance in the face of almost overwhelming odds, Lance Corporal Keith contributed in large measure to the success of his platoon in routing a numerically superior enemy force, and upheld the finest traditions of the Marine Corps and of the United States Naval Service.
The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

STAFF SERGEANT ALLAN JAY KELLOGG, JR.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Platoon Sergeant with Company G, Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division, in connection with combat operations against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam on the night of March 11, 1970. Under the leadership of Gunnery Sergeant (then Staff Sergeant) Kellogg, a small unit from Company G was evacuating a fallen comrade when the unit came under a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire from a numerically superior enemy force occupying well-concealed emplacements in the surrounding jungle. During the ensuing fierce engagement, an enemy soldier managed to maneuver through the dense foliage to a position near the Marines, and hurled a hand grenade into their midst which glanced off the chest of Gunnery Sergeant Kellogg. Quick to act, he forced the grenade into the mud in which he was standing, threw himself over the lethal weapon, and absorbed the full effects of its detonation with his body, thereby preventing serious injury or possible death to several of his fellow Marines. Although suffering multiple injuries to his chest and his right shoulder and arm, Gunnery Sergeant Kellogg resolutely continued to direct the efforts of his men until all were able to maneuver to the relative safety of the company perimeter. By his heroic and decisive action in risking his own life to save the lives of his comrades, Gunnery Sergeant Kellogg reflected the highest credit upon himself and upheld the finest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.
Appendix E

List of Reviewers

Marines

Gen Kenneth McLennan, USMC (Ret)
LtGen Leo J. Dulacki, USMC (Ret)
LtGen William K. Jones, USMC (Ret)
LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr., USMC (Ret)
LtGen Donn J. Robertson, USMC (Ret)
LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret)

MajGen Alan J. Armstrong, USMC (Ret)
MajGen George S. Bowman, Jr., USMC (Ret)
MajGen James R. Jones, USMC (Ret)
MajGen Marc A. Moore, USMC (Ret)
MajGen Roy E. Moss, USMC (Ret)
MajGen Kenneth L. Robinson, Jr., USMC
MajGen Herbert L. Wilkerson, USMC (Ret)

BGen George L. Bartlett, USMC (Ret)
BGen Robert F. Conley, USMC (Ret)
BGen John S. Ginalds, USMC
BGen Donald L. Humphrey, USMC (Ret)
BGen Alexander P. McMillan, USMC (Ret)
BGen Thurman Owens, USMC (Ret)
BGen Albert C. Pommerenk, USMC (Ret)
BGen Charles S. Robertson, USMC (Ret)
BGen Francis W. Tief, USMC (Ret)

Col Vincent A. Albers, Jr., USMC (Ret)
Col Richard F. Armstrong, USMC (Ret)
Col Richard B. Baity, USMC (Ret)
Col Robert E. Barde, USMC (Ret)
Col Richard S. Barry, USMC (Ret)
Col Edward O. Bierman, USMC (Ret)
Col Don H. Blanchard, USMC (Ret)
Col Miller M. Blue, USMC (Ret)
Col Clarence W. Boyd, Jr., USMC (Ret)
Col George M. Bryant, USMC (Ret)
Col Robert R. Calvert, USMC (Ret)
Col Marshall N. Catter, USMCR
Col Alphonse V. Castellana, USMC (Ret)
Col Don R. Christensen, USMC (Ret)
Col David A. Clement, USMC (Ret)
Col Gildo S. Codispoti, USMC (Ret)
Col Barry S. Colassard, USMC (Ret)

Col Rex C. Denny, Jr., USMC (Ret)
Col Edmund G. Derning, Jr., USMC (Ret)
Col Jack W. Dindinger, USMC (Ret)
Col James G. Dixon, USMC (Ret)
Col Lawrence R. Dotsa, USMC (Ret)
Col Sam A. Dressin, USMC (Ret)
Col James E. Fegley, USMC (Ret)
Col Phillip J. Fehlen, USMC
Col George C. Fox, USMC (Ret)
Col Jesse L. Gibney, USMC (Ret)
Col Walter F. Glowiwicki, USMC (Ret)
Col Robert E. Gruenler, USMC (Ret)
Col Max G. Halliday, USMC (Ret)
Col James E. Harrell, USMC (Ret)
Col Franklin A. Hart, Jr., USMC (Ret)
Col Neal E. Heffernan, USMC (Ret)
Col Frank X. Hoff, USMC (Ret)
Col Louis S. Hollier, Jr., USMC (Ret)
Col Forest J. Hunt, USMC (Ret)
Col Sanford B. Hunt, Jr., USMC (Ret)
Col Herschel L. Johnson, Jr., USMC (Ret)
Col Clark V. Judge, USMC (Ret)
Col James P. Kelly, USMC (Ret)
Col Robert D. King, USMC (Ret)
Col Ray G. Kummerow, USMC (Ret)
Col Robert L. La Mar, USMC (Ret)
Col Willis D. Ledeboer, USMC (Ret)
Col Frederick D. Leder, USMC (Ret)
Col Pierre L. LeFevre, USMC
Col Charles G. Little, USMC (Ret)
Col Verle E. Ludwig, USMC (Ret)
Col Warren E. McCain, USMC (Ret)
Col Laurence A. Marousek, USMC (Ret)
Col Karl N. Mueller, USMCR (Ret)
Col Donald J. Norris, USMC (Ret)
Col W. Hays Parks, USMCR
Col Robert L. Parnell, Jr., USMC (Ret)
Col Tom D. Parsons, USMC (Ret)
Col William C. Patton, USMC (Ret)
Col Clifford J. Peabody, USMC (Ret)
Col Robert H. Piehl, USMC (Ret)
Col Lewis E. Poggemeyer, USMC (Ret)
Col Edward D. Resnik, USMC (Ret)
Col Raymond E. Roeder, Jr., USMC (Ret)
VIETNAMIZATION AND REDEPLOYMENT

Col Robert P. Rose, USMC (Ret)
Col Edwin M. Rudzis, USMC (Ret)
Col Dale E. Shatzer, USMC (Ret)
Col John D. Shoup, USMC (Ret)
Col James A. Sloan, USMC (Ret)
Col Albert C. Smith, Jr., USMC (Ret)
Col Lewis C. Street III, USMC (Ret)
Col William J. Tirschfield, USMC
Col John J. Unterkofler, USMC (Ret)
Col Leon N. Utter, USMC (Ret)
Col Floyd H. Waldrop, USMC (Ret)
Col Anthony Walker, USMC (Ret)
Col Stephen G. Warren, USMC (Ret)
Col James R. Weaver, USMC (Ret)
Col Vonda Weaver, USMC (Ret)
Col William V. H. White, USMC (Ret)
Col Robert L. Willis, USMC (Ret)
Col Walter M. Winoski, USMC (Ret)
Col William M. Yeager, USMC (Ret)
Col Edwin M. Young, USMC (Ret)

LtCol Alan D. Albert, USMC (Ret)
LtCol James W. Rider, USMC (Ret)
LtCol Charles A. Rosenfeld, USMC (Ret)
LtCol David F. Seiler, USMC (Ret)
LtCol John J. Sheridan, USMC (Ret)
LtCol Morris S. Shimanoff, USMC (Ret)
LtCol Thomas H. Simpson, USMC (Ret)
LtCol Robert E. Wehrle, USMC (Ret)
LtCol Kenneth C. Williams, USMC (Ret)

Maj Gerald F. Baker, USMC (Ret)
Maj Robert E. Burgess, USMC (Ret)
Maj Robert T. Himmerich, USMC (Ret)
Maj Edward J. Land, Jr., USMC (Ret)
Maj Dellas J. Weber, USMC (Ret)

LtCol James W. Rider, USMC (Ret)
LtCol Charles A. Rosenfeld, USMC (Ret)
LtCol David F. Seiler, USMC (Ret)
LtCol John J. Sheridan, USMC (Ret)
LtCol Morris S. Shimanoff, USMC (Ret)
LtCol Thomas H. Simpson, USMC (Ret)
LtCol Robert E. Wehrle, USMC (Ret)
LtCol Kenneth C. Williams, USMC (Ret)

Army

Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA (Ret)
LtGen John R. Thurman III, USA (Ret)
LtGen John M. Wright, Jr., USA (Ret)
MajGen Lloyd B. Ramsey, USA (Ret)
Col John W. Chism, USA (Ret)
LtCol Warren E. Parker, USA (Ret)
LtCol Robert R. Rafferty, USA (Ret)

Navy

Adm Maurice F. Weisner, USN (Ret)
VAdm Walter D. Gaddis, USN (Ret)
RAdm Herbert S. Matthews, Jr., USN (Ret)
Capt Perry C. Alexander, USN (Ret)
Capt James G. Goode, USN, CHC
Capt Merideth H. Mead, USN (Ret)
Capt Tracy H. Wilder, USN (Ret)
Cdr John B. Fitzgerald, USN, CHC

Others

Mr. Thomas Harvey
Appendix F

Distribution of Personnel
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

(Reproduction of Status of Forces, 30 January 1970)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>NOTE</th>
<th>ASIGNED</th>
<th>STR.RPT. STRK DAT</th>
<th>DANANG</th>
<th>CHU LAI</th>
<th>PHU BAI</th>
<th>HQ 1 CTD</th>
<th>OKINAWA</th>
<th>JAPAN</th>
<th>HAWAII</th>
<th>EASTPAC</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HEADQUARTERS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, FMF, PAC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, FMF, PAC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMF, PAC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQS BN, FMF, PAC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>MAY 69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASB, D. C. BUTLER</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>MAY 70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, MARINE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, FMF, PAC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, FORTRES, FMF PAC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, 1ST MAR BRIG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, I REFS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, II MAF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, III MAF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, 1ST MARS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFANTRY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST MARS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST BATTALION</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>266.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2ND BATTALION</td>
<td>1358</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1358.54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3RD BATTALION</td>
<td>1137</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1137.55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D MARES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ CO</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>331.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST BATTALION</td>
<td>1445</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1445.84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2ND BATTALION</td>
<td>1327</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1327.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3RD BATTALION</td>
<td>1308</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1308.55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4TH MARES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ CO</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>352.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST BATTALION</td>
<td>1122</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1122.57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2ND BATTALION</td>
<td>1110</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1110.58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3RD BATTALION</td>
<td>1106</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1106.56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7TH MARES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ CO</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>381.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST BATTALION</td>
<td>1138</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1138.57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2ND BATTALION</td>
<td>1136</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1136.56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3RD BATTALION</td>
<td>1026</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1026.46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8TH MARES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ CO</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>372.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST BATTALION</td>
<td>1470</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1470.76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2ND BATTALION</td>
<td>1060</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1060.80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3RD BATTALION</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>907.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26TH MARES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ CO</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>331.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST BATTALION</td>
<td>1138</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1138.57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2ND BATTALION</td>
<td>1128</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1128.53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3RD BATTALION</td>
<td>1128</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1128.55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARTILLERY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11TH MARES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ CO</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>475.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST BATTALION</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>621.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2ND BATTALION</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>605.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3RD BATTALION</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>605.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4TH BATTALION</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>605.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### VIETNAMIZATION AND REDEPLOYMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>NOTE</th>
<th>ASSIGNED STRENGTH</th>
<th>STR RPT DATE</th>
<th>DARIANG</th>
<th>CHU LAI</th>
<th>PHU BAI</th>
<th>NO I CTE</th>
<th>OKINAMA</th>
<th>JAPAN</th>
<th>HAWAII</th>
<th>EASTPAC</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12TH MARINES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ BTRY</td>
<td></td>
<td>273 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST BATTALION</td>
<td></td>
<td>161 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D BATTALION</td>
<td></td>
<td>152 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4TH BATTALION</td>
<td></td>
<td>152 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 1ST BN, 12TH MAR

| 1120 30        | 1179 30 |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |
| 273 9          |         |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |
| 152 2          |         |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |
| 152 7          |         |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |

#### RECONNAISSANCE

| 795 50         | 795 50  |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |
| 149 7          |         |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |
| 152 7          |         |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |

#### ANTI-TANK

| 105 4          |         |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |
| 105 4          |         |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |

#### TANK

| 843 23         |         |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |
| 735 19         |         |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |

#### AMTRAC

| 806 19         |         |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |
| 105 9          |         |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |

#### ENGINEER

| 940 10         |         |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |
| 940 10         |         |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |

#### MOTOR TRANSPORT

| 422 7          |         |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |
| 276 8          |         |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |

#### COMMUNICATION

| 522 9          |         |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |
| 522 9          |         |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |

### MILITARY POLICE

| 656 16         |         |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |
| 656 16         |         |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |

### SERVICE/SUPPORT

| 932 59         |         |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |
| 1610 40        |         |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |
| 147 10         |         |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |

| 1548 26        |         |                   |              |         |         |         |          |         |       |        |         |       |
### DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL, 1970

#### MEDICAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1ST MED BN</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5TH MED BN</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3RD MENT BN</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1ST MENT BN</td>
<td>18,919</td>
<td>39,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5TH MENT BN</td>
<td>1,569</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>987</td>
<td>17,061</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,764</td>
<td>12,297</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1ST MENT BN</td>
<td>18,919</td>
<td>39,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5TH MENT BN</td>
<td>1,569</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>987</td>
<td>17,061</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,764</td>
<td>12,297</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### AVIATION UNITS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1ST MAW</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>402</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>460</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### AVIATION UNITS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>NOTE</th>
<th>ASSIGNED STRENGTH</th>
<th>STRENGTH AS OF DATE</th>
<th>DANANG</th>
<th>CHU LAI</th>
<th>PHU BA1</th>
<th>NO I CTZ</th>
<th>OKINAWA</th>
<th>JAPAN</th>
<th>HAWAII</th>
<th>EASTPAC</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1ST MAW</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 1ST MAW (FRONT) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1ST MAW (REAR) | | | | | | | | | | | | |

| 1ST MAW (FRONT) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3D MAW | | | | | | | | | | | | |

| 3D MAW | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MAC-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1ST BMG | | | | | | | | | | | | |

| 1ST BMG | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MACS-24 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL, 1970

| UNIT     | NOTE | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH |
|----------|------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| H&MS-56  |      | 1        | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      |
| H&AS-56  |      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      |
| H&CP-100 |      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      |
| H&CP-285 |      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      |
| H&CP-265 |      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      |
| H&CP-163 |      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      |
| H&CP-75  |      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      | 461      |

AVIATION TOTAL

| NOTE | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH |
|------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| USMC | 29,091   | 7,363    | 3,374    | 638      | 0        | 1,907    | 2,864    | 1,533    | 11,034   | 378      |
| USN  | 461      | 124      | 72       | 3        | 0        | 23       | 38       | 26       | 167      | 9        |

RECAPITULATION OF FMFPAC PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION

| NOTE | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH | STRENGTH |
|------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| GROUND TOTAL | 78,919   | 39,465   | 1,569    | 365      | 987      | 17,061   | 295      | 3,764    | 11,892   | 3,521    |
| USMC | 3,476    | 1,730    | 21       | 0        | 19       | 980      | 0        | 165      | 405      | 156      |
| USN  | 29,091   | 7,363    | 3,374    | 638      | 0        | 1,907    | 2,864    | 1,533    | 11,034   | 370      | 8        |
| USMC | 461      | 124      | 72       | 3        | 0        | 23       | 38       | 26       | 167      | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| USN  | 108,013  | 46,828   | 4,843    | 1,003    | 987      | 18,968   | 3,159    | 5,297    | 22,926   | 3,099    | 3        | 4        | 4        | 4        | 4        | 4        | 4        | 4        |
| USMC | 3,937    | 1,854    | 93       | 3        | 0        | 19       | 243      | 0        | 191      | 572      | 144      | 144      | 144      | 144      | 144      | 144      | 144      | 144      |

NOTES:
1. FIGURES IN "OTHER" ASSIGNED TO SLF'S.
2. FIGURES IN "OTHER" ASSIGNED TO VARIOUS LOCATIONS IN RVN.
3. PERSONNEL IN "OTHER" ARE ASSIGNED TO IT, ITT, CSS, CI TEAMS, RED EYE AND NUCLEAR ORDNANCE PLATOONS.
4. STRENGTH INCLUDED IN 1ST AND 3RD TANK BATTALIONS.
5. THE 597 PERSONNEL LISTED IN "OTHER" ARE HOSPITALIZED AT LOCATIONS OTHER THAN OKINAWA, BUT ARE CARRIED ON THE ROLLS OF CASUAL COMPANY, MCB, CAMP BUTLER AT SUBIC.
6. UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, STRENGTHS AND LOCATION ARE THOSE REPORTED BY UNIT PERSONNEL STATUS REPORTS AND DO NOT REFLECT DAY-TO-DAY ADJUSTMENTS BETWEEN PERIODS.
7. UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, STRENGTH REPORT DATE IS 16 JAN 70.
Appendix G

Distribution of Personnel
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
(Reproduction of Status of Forces, 21 April 1971)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>NOTE</th>
<th>UNIT COMMANDER</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>MAJOR EQUIPMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FMFPAC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO FMFPAC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H&amp;SCO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST ANGLICO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU 2, 1ST ANGLICO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL NO FMFPAC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1566</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESTPAC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO 3D MAB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST RADIO BN (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>197</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMM SPT CO, 7TH COMM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D CAG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5TH CIT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL NO, 3D MAB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1341</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLT-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST IT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7TH IT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D CIT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13TH ITT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D SSCT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO A, 1ST ENGR BN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST MED BN (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11TH MT BN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO A, 1ST MT BN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DET, H&amp; BTRY, 11TH MAR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

462
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>NOTE</th>
<th>UNIT COMMANDER</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>STRENGTH USMC USN</th>
<th>MAJOR EQUIPMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CO C (REIN), 1ST SP BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR R. W. SWEET, JR</td>
<td></td>
<td>95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO A, 1ST RECON BN(REIN)</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR H. C. COOPFR, JR</td>
<td></td>
<td>218</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DET, 1ST FORCE RECON BN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST MARINES</td>
<td></td>
<td>COL P. X. KELLEY</td>
<td>DANANG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ CO</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT H. W. GARDNER</td>
<td>STANDING</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>2/105MM RR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>LCOL R. P. ROSS</td>
<td>STANDING</td>
<td>1029</td>
<td>9/105MM RR, 10/81 MORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>LCOL R. E. MOSS</td>
<td>DANANG</td>
<td>1137</td>
<td>9/105MM RR, 10/81 MORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>LCOL M. A. MOSS</td>
<td></td>
<td>1195</td>
<td>9/105MM RR, 8/81 MORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST BN, 11TH MAR</td>
<td></td>
<td>LCOL B. F. ODEN</td>
<td>DANANG</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>6/81 MORT, 18/105 HOW TD, 8/105 HOW TD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D 8&quot; BTRY</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR W. J. McCALLUM</td>
<td></td>
<td>243</td>
<td>5/MSN, 6/8&quot; HOW SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL BLT-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5635</td>
<td>527</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| FLC.                  |       | BGEN J. R. JONES     | DANANG    |                   | 14/105 HOW TD, 1/155 HOW SP, 1/155 HOW TD |
| HQ BN                 |       | LCOL D. J. BURGER    |           | 762               | 47              |
| MAINT BN              |       | LCOL W. F. SHEEHAN   |           | 497               | 13              |
| SUPPLY BN             |       | COL C. F. LANGLEY    |           | 310               | 32              |
| 1ST MP BN             |       | LCOL J. COLLIA       |           | 675               | 10              |
| CO A, 7TH ENGR BN     |       | MAJOR G. R. MEIBAUN  |           | 262               |                 |
| TOTAL FLC             |       |                      |           | 3006              | 102             |

| MAG-11/MAG-16         |       |                      |           |                   |                 |
| DET, HHC-1            |       | MAJOR L. F. GAGNON   | STANDING  | 116               |                 |
| DET, HHC-2            |       | MAJOR J. R. GRIFFIN  |           | 42                |                 |
| DET, HHC-3            |       | MAJOR R. S. KAYE     |           | 38                |                 |
| DET, 3D SACT         |       | CAPT D. R. PHELPS    |           | 1                 |                 |
| LET, 1ST FORCE DENTAL |       | CDR W.P. ARMSTRONG (USN) |         | 1                 | 60              |
| LET, HHC-18           |       | MAJOR L. E. OBENHAUS | STANDING  | 20                |                 |

<p>| MAG-11                |       | COL A. C. POMNERENK  | DANANG    |                   |                 |
| MAG-11                |       | LCOL A.R. ANDERSON, JR. |       | 603               | 2/C-117D, 3/1A-4F |
| MAG-11                |       | LCOL C. L. COMFORT   |           | 567               | 22              |
| VMA-311               |       | LCOL J. T. HAGEN     |           | 203               | 124/4/6F        |
| VMA (AM)-225          |       | LCOL J.A. MANGIONE, JR. |       | 289               | 12/4/6A         |
| DET, VMA-6            |       | LCOL E. P. JANS      | DANANG    | 53                | 4/36/10A        |
| MASS-3                |       | LCOL W. C. SIMANIKAS | DANANG    | 223               | 1               |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>NOTE</th>
<th>UNIT COMMANDER</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>MAJOR EQUIPMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAG-16</td>
<td></td>
<td>COL L. C. STREET III</td>
<td>MARBLE MOUNTAIN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG-16</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR C. D. SILLARD, JR.</td>
<td></td>
<td>490</td>
<td>5/CH-46D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG-16</td>
<td></td>
<td>LT COL J. M. DEAN</td>
<td></td>
<td>665</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHML-167</td>
<td></td>
<td>LT COL R. J. BLANC</td>
<td></td>
<td>207</td>
<td>22/ML-1E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHML-367</td>
<td></td>
<td>LT COL L. E. REESE</td>
<td></td>
<td>241</td>
<td>22/ML-10, 4/ML-1J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHML-262</td>
<td></td>
<td>LT COL F. X. WEST, JR.</td>
<td></td>
<td>248</td>
<td>22/CH-46D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHMH-263</td>
<td></td>
<td>LT COL L. K. KECK</td>
<td></td>
<td>197</td>
<td>20/CH-46D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHMH-463</td>
<td></td>
<td>LT COL T. S. REAP</td>
<td></td>
<td>229</td>
<td>1/18/CH-53D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATCU-68</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR B. D. COLLINS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL MAG-11/MAG-16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4501</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL I3D MAB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14,493</td>
<td>784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI MAF</td>
<td></td>
<td>LT GEN D. J. ROBERTSON</td>
<td>CAMP COURTNEY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL HQO HI MAF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>185</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D WAR DIV (-) (REIN)</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJ GEN L. NETSGER</td>
<td>CAMP COURTNEY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQBN</td>
<td></td>
<td>COL W. D. PONEMY</td>
<td></td>
<td>1419</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17TH ITT</td>
<td></td>
<td>1STLT G. H. JOHNSON, JR.</td>
<td>CAMP HANSEN</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST SSCT</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT T. L. STROHELLECKER</td>
<td>CAMP COURTNEY</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7TH ITT</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT A. R. ARBISI</td>
<td>CAMP HANSEN</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15TH ITT</td>
<td></td>
<td>1STLT, B. R. KRAMER</td>
<td>END CAMP HANSEN</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11TH ITT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4TH MARINES</td>
<td></td>
<td>COL R. T. HANFIN, JR.</td>
<td>CAMP HANSEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQCU</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR R. P. LUSK</td>
<td></td>
<td>211</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>LT COL P. M. JOHNSON</td>
<td></td>
<td>1088</td>
<td>32/105MM RR, 6/81 MORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>LT COL W. H. HUTLEY</td>
<td>BLT</td>
<td>1092</td>
<td>42/105MM RR, 6/81 MORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>LT COL A. J. CASTELLANA</td>
<td></td>
<td>1071</td>
<td>14/105MM RR, 6/81 MORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9TH MARINES</td>
<td></td>
<td>COL J. V. MCLELLAN</td>
<td>CAMP SCHAB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQCO</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT M. H. CRAFTON</td>
<td></td>
<td>202</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>LT COL P. W. WOODMAN, JR.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1047</td>
<td>17/105MM RR, 6/81 MORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>LT COL F. J. JOHNSON, JR.</td>
<td>CAMP SCHAB</td>
<td></td>
<td>1164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>LT COL B. S. SHELL</td>
<td></td>
<td>937</td>
<td>10/105MM RR, 6/81 MORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12TH MARINES</td>
<td></td>
<td>COL J. J. SNYDER</td>
<td>CAMP FUTI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ BTRY (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT D. J. LAROCIBBRE</td>
<td></td>
<td>186</td>
<td>6/155 HOW TD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D BN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>491</td>
<td>12/180 HOW TD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D BN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>471</td>
<td>11/180 HOW TD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4TH BN (-) (REIN)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LT COL K. G. PATTERSON</td>
<td></td>
<td>366</td>
<td>11/180 HOW TD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D PLAT, 1ST B HOW BTRY</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2/8 HOW TD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D MED BN (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LC DR K. W. GRAY (USN)</td>
<td>CAMP HANSEN</td>
<td></td>
<td>117/150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>UNIT COMMANDER</td>
<td>LOCATION</td>
<td>STRENGTH</td>
<td>MAJOR EQUIPMENT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D DENTAL CO</td>
<td>CAPT W. J. KENNEDY, JR.</td>
<td>CAMP COURTY</td>
<td>5 67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D SERV BN (-)</td>
<td>COL D. J. HUNTER</td>
<td>CAMP HANESER</td>
<td>719 17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D TANK BN (-)</td>
<td>LTCOL C. R. STIFFLER</td>
<td>CAMP SCHMAH</td>
<td>650 10</td>
<td>50/M48 TANKS, 8/M67 TANKS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D MT BN (-)</td>
<td>MAJOR J. F. SCHERRY, JR.</td>
<td>CAMP SCHMAH</td>
<td>185 6</td>
<td>4/M61 VTR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D RECON BN (-)</td>
<td>LTCOL T. R. STUART</td>
<td>CAMP SCHMAH</td>
<td>322 22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D ENGR BN (-) (REIN)</td>
<td>LTCOL R. D. CREWS, JR.</td>
<td>CAMP SCHMAH</td>
<td>750 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO D (REIN), 7TH ENGR</td>
<td>MAJOR D. R. CONNER</td>
<td>CAMP NAUKE</td>
<td>322 23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST ANTRAC BN (-)</td>
<td>LTCOL J. G. HUCKMAN</td>
<td>CAMP SCHMAH</td>
<td>580 11</td>
<td>99/LVT-5, 10/LVT-5 COMD 3/LVT6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7TH COMM BN (-)</td>
<td>LTCOL M. W. MCCOURTY</td>
<td>CAMP SCHMAH</td>
<td>451 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9TH MT BN (-)</td>
<td>MAJOR J. B. TRAYLOR</td>
<td>CAMP NAUKE</td>
<td>270 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST HOSPITAL CO (CADE)</td>
<td>LT H. D. CASH (USN)</td>
<td>CAMP NAUKE</td>
<td>28 13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 3D MAR DIV.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14,209 644</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D FSR</td>
<td>COL R. E. ROEDER, JR.</td>
<td>CAMP POSTER</td>
<td>814 20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HASBN</td>
<td>LTCOL J. B. HARRIS</td>
<td>CAMP SCHMAH</td>
<td>814 20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPLY BN</td>
<td>LTCOL J. W. FRIBERG</td>
<td>CAMP SCHMAH</td>
<td>1022 27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAINT BN</td>
<td>CAPT C. W. SHIVER</td>
<td>CAMP SCHMAH</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 3D FSR/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2723 55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST MAW/JAPAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARS-1 (-)</td>
<td>LTCOL G. H. BUCKNER II</td>
<td>CAMP NAUKE</td>
<td>791</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARS-1 (-)</td>
<td>LTCOL P. S. FRAPPOLLO</td>
<td>CAMP SCHMAH</td>
<td>821 31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARS-1 (-)</td>
<td>MAJOR J. R. GRIFFIN</td>
<td>CAMP SCHMAH</td>
<td>270 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARS-1 (-)</td>
<td>MAJOR R. S. KAYE</td>
<td>CAMP SCHMAH</td>
<td>205</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACO-18 (-)</td>
<td>COL C. T. WESTCOTT</td>
<td>CAMP NAUKE</td>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARS-18 (-)</td>
<td>CAPT F. A. TOVAL</td>
<td>CAMP SCHMAH</td>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11TH FORCE DENTAL CO (-)</td>
<td>LCDR G. W. OATS (USN)</td>
<td>CAMP SCHMAH</td>
<td>114</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D SERT (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>114</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG-15</td>
<td>COL R. J. R. MILLER</td>
<td>CAMP NAUKE</td>
<td>473 12</td>
<td>4/TA-4F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARS-15</td>
<td>MAJOR R. P. CAIN</td>
<td>CAMP NAUKE</td>
<td>473 12</td>
<td>4/TA-4F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARS-15</td>
<td>MAJOR L. K. ORLESTET</td>
<td>CAMP NAUKE</td>
<td>310 12</td>
<td>4/TA-4F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARS-15</td>
<td>MAJOR W. A. MCINTYRE</td>
<td>CAMP NAUKE</td>
<td>481 12</td>
<td>4/TA-4F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMFA-212</td>
<td>LTCOL J. S. ROSENTHAL</td>
<td>CAMP NAUKE</td>
<td>262 12</td>
<td>12/T-4F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMFA-115</td>
<td>LTCOL R. R. POowell</td>
<td>CAMP NAUKE</td>
<td>290 12</td>
<td>12/T-4F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATC-60</td>
<td>LCDR J. W. MEFFER</td>
<td>CAMP NAUKE</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7TH CIT</td>
<td>LT J. A. CANNAWICO</td>
<td>CAMP NAUKE</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG-12</td>
<td>COL R. L. MCINLROY</td>
<td>CAMP NAUKE</td>
<td>481 12</td>
<td>4/TA-4F, 2/A-4F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARS-17</td>
<td>MAJOR W. A. MCINTYRE</td>
<td>CAMP NAUKE</td>
<td>481 12</td>
<td>4/TA-4F, 2/A-4F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>NOTE</td>
<td>UNIT COMMANDER</td>
<td>LOCATION</td>
<td>STRENGTH</td>
<td>MAJOR EQUIPMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARS-12</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL J. L. DRIEFER</td>
<td></td>
<td>320</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-211</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>LTCOL D. G. GARCIO</td>
<td>CUBI PT</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNA(AW)-53</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL G. L. BUTTLE</td>
<td>IMAMI</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-1</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL C. A. HOUSEMAN</td>
<td></td>
<td>350</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATCU-62</td>
<td></td>
<td>LSTLT W. P. NAIZLI</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU 1, MAMS-12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 1ST MAW (JAPAN)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4369</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST MAW (OKINAWA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG-36</td>
<td></td>
<td>COL R. J. ZITNIK</td>
<td>OKINAWA</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>14/CH-46D, 5/CH-53D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAMS-36</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL R. E. SKINNER</td>
<td></td>
<td>477</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARS-36</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR B. C. DARR</td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATCU-66</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT W. S. ROGERS</td>
<td></td>
<td>260</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAC-8</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL M. S. JOLLY, JUN</td>
<td></td>
<td>244</td>
<td>5/CH-46D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMM-164</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL A. J. KETTERING</td>
<td></td>
<td>204</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMM-165</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>LTCOL H. M. HEATHER</td>
<td>1ST MAW</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMM-462</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL R. E. IVER</td>
<td>FUTEMA</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>14/CH-53D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-6</td>
<td></td>
<td>A. H. BLOOM</td>
<td></td>
<td>172</td>
<td>10/OF-10A, 12/CH-1E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMGR-152</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL R. W. DURPHING</td>
<td></td>
<td>314</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DET, MARAS-2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2983</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMSO-17</td>
<td></td>
<td>COL T. E. MULVHILL</td>
<td>IMAMI</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAMS-17</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL E. W. GILBERT</td>
<td></td>
<td>187</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WERS-17</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR W. T. SIMPSON</td>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 1ST MAW (OKINAWA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2983</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 1ST MAW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7351</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL WESTPAC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24,468</td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASTPAC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36,961</td>
<td>1288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HASCOCO</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR C. F. WIDECHE</td>
<td>CAMPEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST MAR DIV (REIN)</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR C. F. WIDECHE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HASCOCO, 5TH MAW, 1ST MARDIV</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR R. A. ANDERSON</td>
<td></td>
<td>1444</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST CIT</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT R. B. VORONEN</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5TH ITT</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT F. L. STOLZ</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9TH ITT</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT L. J. JANSEN</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19TH ITT</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT A. D. BREWIN</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23D ITT</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT R. D. TOMLIN</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25TH ITT</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT H. K. LEE</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13TH CIT (CADE)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LSTLT W. C. LANTZ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21ST ITT</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT R. R. WELPOTT</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>NOTE</td>
<td>UNIT COMMANDER</td>
<td>LOCATION</td>
<td>STRENGTH</td>
<td>MAJOR EQUIPMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9TH SSCT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CAMPEN</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENSOR CONTROL &amp; MORT PIAT</td>
<td></td>
<td>CWO A. L. SELLER, JR.</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DET. NRON, 1ST MAR-DIV(CAIRE)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST CIVIL AFFAIRS GROUP (CAIRE)</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR W. T. MACY</td>
<td>CAMPEN</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMM SPT CO, 9TH COMM BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR R. K. MILLER</td>
<td></td>
<td>290</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D MARINES (CAIRE)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIEUT K. L. CHRISTENSEN</td>
<td>CAMPEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARU (CAIRE)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIEUT B. C. IFFT</td>
<td></td>
<td>166</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brier (CAIRE)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIEUT R. F. KUEBSEN</td>
<td></td>
<td>82</td>
<td>8/106MM RR, 8/81 MORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D BN (CAIRE)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIEUT D. J. O'CONNOR</td>
<td></td>
<td>81</td>
<td>8/106MM RR, 8/81 MORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5TH MARINES</td>
<td></td>
<td>COL C. V. JUDGE</td>
<td>CAMPEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARU</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIEUT R. E. CAMPBELL</td>
<td></td>
<td>105</td>
<td>6/81 MORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST BN (CAIRE)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIEUT F. A. HART, JR.</td>
<td>ENR CORPS</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>9/106MM RR, 8/81 MORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIEUT T. M. HAMLEN</td>
<td>CAMPEN</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>8/106MM RR, 8/81 MORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIEUT H. L. JOHNSON, JR.</td>
<td></td>
<td>174</td>
<td>8/106MM RR, 8/81 MORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7TH MARINES</td>
<td></td>
<td>COL A. A. MONTI</td>
<td>CAMPEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARU</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIEUT W. G. MOORE, JR.</td>
<td></td>
<td>169</td>
<td>7/8/106MM RR, 8/81 MORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST BN (CAIRE)</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR R. C. HALL</td>
<td></td>
<td>133</td>
<td>2/105MM RR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIEUT R. R. BURRITT</td>
<td></td>
<td>1003</td>
<td>8/106MM RR, 8/81 MORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIEUT R. J. WILLE</td>
<td></td>
<td>1013</td>
<td>8/106MM RR, 8/81 MORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11TH MARINES (REIN)</td>
<td></td>
<td>COL R. M. RUDIS</td>
<td>CAMPEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4H HTRY (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR G. L. YENSSALL</td>
<td></td>
<td>222</td>
<td>6/8/105 MORT, 6/155 HOW SP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D BN (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR C. K. ME. AXEL</td>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
<td>8/106MM RR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D BN (REIN)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>LIEUT R. F. STEWART</td>
<td></td>
<td>424</td>
<td>8/155 HOW TD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST BN (-), 12THMAR (CAIRE)</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR L. E. KOEBER</td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST RECON BN (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIEUT B. E. TRAINOR</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO C (REIN), 3D RECON BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT J. W. PARRISH</td>
<td></td>
<td>76</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO D, 1ST RECON BN (CAIRE)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIEUT A. E. ANDERSON</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST FORCE RECON CO (REIN)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIEUT J. G. BAKER III</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO A (-), 3D RECON BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIEUT A. W. LAW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST TANK BN</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>MAJOR G. E. BERBAUM</td>
<td></td>
<td>502</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D AMTRAC BN</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>MAJOR D. W. MAILER</td>
<td></td>
<td>462</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5TH MT BN (REIN)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>LIEUT J. J. DOWD, JR.</td>
<td></td>
<td>191</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO B (-) (REIN), 10 MT BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIEUT J. C. HERING</td>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO B (REIN), 9TH MT BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIEUT R. F. WILLIAMS</td>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST MT BN (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIEUT R. B. TALBOT</td>
<td></td>
<td>77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO C, 1ST MT BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT M. A. SELBY</td>
<td></td>
<td>92</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST SP BN (-) (REIN)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>LIEUT T. F. GRAY</td>
<td></td>
<td>246</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO B (-) (REIN)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIEUT J. O. ALBER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7TH ENGR BN (-) (REIN)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>LIEUT J. P. KRAVANAK</td>
<td></td>
<td>367</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST BRIDGE CO (CAIRE)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIEUT D. N. TAYLOR</td>
<td></td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST ENGR BN (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIEUT D. E. RENSTEAD</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>UNIT COMMANDER</td>
<td>LOCATION</td>
<td>STRENGTH</td>
<td>MAJOR EQUIPMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO B (-) (REIN), 3D ENGR BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>1STLT L. H. PROSSER</td>
<td></td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST SERV BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>COL G. K. REID</td>
<td></td>
<td>786</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO C (-) (REIN), 3D MED BN (CAIRE)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LT D. B. COLLIDGE (USN)</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO C, 1ST MED BN (CAIRE)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTTG L. A. DAVIS (USN)</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D HOSPITAL CO</td>
<td></td>
<td>LT W. L. NICHOLS (USN)</td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST DENTAL CO (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT J. J. LYONS (USN)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7TH SEP HULK FUEL CO (CAIRE)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9TH SEP HULK FUEL CO (CAIRE)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST SEARCHLIGHT BTRY (CAIRE)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 1ST/MARDIV (-) (REIN)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9,380</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 1 MAF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9,380</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER EASTPAC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORCE TROOPS FMFPAC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H&amp;HS -</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR E. L. ROTTOLK</td>
<td></td>
<td>190</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOP, 1ST FSR</td>
<td></td>
<td>1STLT W. W. STEELE</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, 5TH FSR</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT T. R. GERIES</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9TH COMM BN (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL D. J. GARRETT</td>
<td></td>
<td>360</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17TH CTRY</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT A. G. WILSON</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21ST ENGL CO (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT G. W. HALEY (USN)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST FTR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 8&quot; HOW BTRY SP</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL J. A. HAMILTON</td>
<td></td>
<td>147</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 175MM GUN BTRY SP</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJ L. J. SIEFRENSKI, JR.</td>
<td></td>
<td>107</td>
<td>1/55 VTR, 6/175MM GUN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 175MM GUN BTRY SP</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT P. A. PANKEY</td>
<td></td>
<td>127</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21ST 175MM GUN BTRY SP</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT D. L. ROSENBERG</td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1/55 VTR, 6/175MM GUN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL FORTRPS, FMFPAC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,279</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST FSR</td>
<td></td>
<td>COL H. C. REED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H&amp;HS BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR R. E. JOHNSON</td>
<td></td>
<td>346</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPLY BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR R. J. WEBB</td>
<td></td>
<td>385</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAINT BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR A. R. R. WITTY</td>
<td></td>
<td>419</td>
<td>2/1VTR, 2/55 VTR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 1ST FSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D MAW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HM3-3 (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR P. J. VOGEL</td>
<td></td>
<td>645</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6TH CTRY</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT W. C. HAMICY</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4TH SSCT</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT M. G. WHITE</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMPS-3-3</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR J. S. LOOP</td>
<td></td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMPS-3-3</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR G. P. HOWLE</td>
<td></td>
<td>211</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU 1, HMPS-3</td>
<td></td>
<td>COL L. J. STEIN</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>NOTE</td>
<td>UNIT COMMANDER</td>
<td>LOCATION</td>
<td>STRENGTH</td>
<td>MAJOR EQUIPMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMM-37</td>
<td></td>
<td>COL R. A. SAVAGE</td>
<td>EL TORO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMM-37 (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR L. K. WARN</td>
<td></td>
<td>472</td>
<td>3/C-117D, 1/C-54P, 1/C-54Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU 1, HMM-37</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR H. C. IVY, JR.</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRS-37</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL M. HAMILTON</td>
<td></td>
<td>228</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNGH-352</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR L. P. MANN</td>
<td></td>
<td>282</td>
<td>8/VC-130P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC-38</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJ L. J. U. WAYMIR</td>
<td>EL TORO</td>
<td>245</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H&amp;MS-38 (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR L. D. CHAMBERLAIN</td>
<td></td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D LAAM BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR L. A. SOLLBERGER</td>
<td>29 PALMIS</td>
<td>619</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST RDEYE PLATOON</td>
<td></td>
<td>1STLT K. E. ROWE</td>
<td>EL TORO</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1D RDEYE PLATOON</td>
<td></td>
<td>2D LT J. B. DOWLING, JR.</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACS-7</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL J. O. GREGG</td>
<td>CAMPEN</td>
<td>228</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACS-1 (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR M. H. ALLEN</td>
<td>YUMA</td>
<td>210</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACS-1</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT R. P. PITTS</td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DET A, 2D LAAM BN</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR A. D. GLAD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACS-4 (CAIRED)</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR G. S. PRESCOTT</td>
<td>EL TORO</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC-11</td>
<td></td>
<td>COL Q. R. DAVIS</td>
<td>EL TORO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H&amp;MS-11</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL C. C. NEWMARK</td>
<td></td>
<td>588</td>
<td>227-T-48, 47A-47F, 9/A-8A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H&amp;MS-11</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR R. L. BAILEY</td>
<td></td>
<td>494</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-214</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL R. J. REID</td>
<td></td>
<td>155</td>
<td>10/A-4E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-22</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL J. W. LAZZO</td>
<td></td>
<td>121</td>
<td>9/A-4F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA(AM)-224</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL M. S. NEUMANN</td>
<td></td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2/A-6A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-314</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR A. G. PARTEL</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-323</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL D. L. MALINOGL</td>
<td></td>
<td>183</td>
<td>16/7-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-331</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL R. HUTCHISON</td>
<td></td>
<td>230</td>
<td>16/7-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-33</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL M. W. DENNING</td>
<td></td>
<td>265</td>
<td>10/R-4B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATCU-65</td>
<td></td>
<td>1STLT R. D. ANGERSON</td>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATCU-67</td>
<td></td>
<td>1STLT J. R. HANCOCK</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATCU-77</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT J. R. EVANS (USN)</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1STH FORCE (METAL CO)</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT J. R. KRUTHERS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMFA-334</td>
<td></td>
<td>COL M. B. PORTER</td>
<td>SANTA ANA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMM-36 (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL G. H. DUNN</td>
<td></td>
<td>143</td>
<td>19/CH-53A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU 1, HMM-50</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR G. W. LEE</td>
<td>CAMPEN</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR-36</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL B. G. WILSON</td>
<td>SANTA ANA</td>
<td>378</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATCU-74</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT G. V. BROWN</td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATCU-75</td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT P. D. HAYNES</td>
<td>CAMDEN</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HML-267</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL J. M. MORIARTY</td>
<td></td>
<td>250</td>
<td>12/CH-10A, 12/CH-1E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HML-161</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL B. T. LADD</td>
<td>SANTA ANA</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>22/CH-46D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HML-163</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL P. A. MATHEWS</td>
<td></td>
<td>205</td>
<td>16/CH-46F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Vietnization and Redeployment

**Unit Note Unit Commander Location Strength Major Equipment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Note</th>
<th>Unit Commander</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HMM-361</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL E. W. RAMLINS</td>
<td></td>
<td>196</td>
<td></td>
<td>10/CH-53A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMM-363</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL A. F. RIBECK, JR.</td>
<td></td>
<td>187</td>
<td></td>
<td>14/CH-53A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMO-2 (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ENROUTE</td>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMH-30</td>
<td></td>
<td>COL A. F. GARROTTI</td>
<td>SANTA ANA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNS-30</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR D. G. DUNLAP</td>
<td></td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9/CH-46F, 4/CH-53A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMH-301</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR D. A. DALRYMPLE</td>
<td></td>
<td>112</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>B/CH-53A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMH-302</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL P. L. MOREAU</td>
<td></td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13/CH-46F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCTO-10</td>
<td></td>
<td>COL R. B. SINCLAIR</td>
<td>WANA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNS-10</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR G. R. CALLISON</td>
<td></td>
<td>446</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMAF-101</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL T. R. MOORE</td>
<td></td>
<td>411</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18/FT-4B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMAF-102</td>
<td></td>
<td>LTCOL R. D. REID</td>
<td></td>
<td>292</td>
<td>29/FT-4K</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMT-103</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAJOR B. H. FREEMAN</td>
<td></td>
<td>233</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20/TA-4F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DET, HNS-11 (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ENROUTE</td>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DET, HNS-13 (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total 3D MAW**

1,960 187

**Total Other Eastpac**

12,930 297

**Total Eastpac**

21,410 730

### MIPAC

**1st Marine Brigade**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Note</th>
<th>Unit Commander</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BIOV</td>
<td>GROEN V. A. ARMSTRONG</td>
<td>KANEHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>MAJOR R. F. HALET</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>CAPT T. E. NADLOSKI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>CDR A. J. D. CRAMFORD (USN)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL H. W. WANEY</td>
<td>656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>CAPT R. E. WRIGHT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL R. B. BURNS</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL R. E. NICHOLSON</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL R. E. CAREY</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL W. R. LEDBETTER, JR.</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL P. R. GLOVER, JR.</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL R. F. GROVES, JR.</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL J. W. MOORE</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL P. L. ELLIOTT</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL C. L. PHILLIPS</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL W. R. LEDBETTER, JR.</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL P. R. GLOVER, JR.</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL R. F. GROVES, JR.</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL J. W. MOORE</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL P. L. ELLIOTT</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL C. L. PHILLIPS</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL W. R. LEDBETTER, JR.</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL P. R. GLOVER, JR.</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL R. F. GROVES, JR.</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL J. W. MOORE</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL P. L. ELLIOTT</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL C. L. PHILLIPS</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL W. R. LEDBETTER, JR.</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL P. R. GLOVER, JR.</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL R. F. GROVES, JR.</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL J. W. MOORE</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL P. L. ELLIOTT</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL C. L. PHILLIPS</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL W. R. LEDBETTER, JR.</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL P. R. GLOVER, JR.</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL R. F. GROVES, JR.</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL J. W. MOORE</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL P. L. ELLIOTT</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL C. L. PHILLIPS</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL W. R. LEDBETTER, JR.</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL P. R. GLOVER, JR.</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL R. F. GROVES, JR.</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL J. W. MOORE</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL P. L. ELLIOTT</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL C. L. PHILLIPS</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL W. R. LEDBETTER, JR.</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL P. R. GLOVER, JR.</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL R. F. GROVES, JR.</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL J. W. MOORE</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL P. L. ELLIOTT</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL C. L. PHILLIPS</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL W. R. LEDBETTER, JR.</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL P. R. GLOVER, JR.</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL R. F. GROVES, JR.</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL J. W. MOORE</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL P. L. ELLIOTT</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL C. L. PHILLIPS</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL W. R. LEDBETTER, JR.</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL P. R. GLOVER, JR.</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL R. F. GROVES, JR.</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL J. W. MOORE</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ST 1ST</td>
<td>LTCOL P. L. ELLIOTT</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Index

Key: boldface type = illustration; n = footnote; ff = following pages

A Shau Valley, 57, 69, 84, 195-196, 234, 307
Abrams, Gen Creighton W., USA, 4, 6-7, 12-13, 15-17, 58, 58, 62, 64n, 86-87, 128-129, 150, 188, 191, 195, 208, 212, 237, 248, 276, 283, 320-321, 325, 375, 391
Accelerated Pacification Campaign, 128
Adams, MajGen Arthur H., 387
Adams, Maj Gene A., Jr., 389
Adams, Maj Robert T., 99
Adams, Maj Thomas G., 380
Adamson, RAdm Robert E., Jr., USN, 319
Administrative discharges, 363, 363n, 364
Advisors
Army Advisory Group, 17
Army advisors, 231
Marine Advisory Unit, advisors, 195, 198, 240, 370-371, 391-392
Naval Advisory Group, 122n, 370, 384
Agency for International Development (AID), 133, 390
Agnew, Vice President Spiro T., 390
Aircraft types
Grumman A-6A (Intruder), 96, 189, 200, 280-283, 285n, 286, 295, 297
AC-119 Shadow gunships, 47, 280
AC-123, 280
AC-130, 280
AH-1Js, 231-232, 297-298
Bell AH-1J (Sea Cobra), 204-205, 231-232, 297-298
Bell UH-1G (Huey), 34
Boeing B-52 (Stratofortress), 279, 280-281, 282, 283-284, 295-297, 310-312, 373, 381
Boeing Vertol CH-46A (Sea Knight), 198, 279-281, 283-284, 295, 307, 376, 378
Boeing Vertol CH-47 (Chinook), 295, 203, 205
Cessna OH-1G (Bird Dog), 305
C-47, 373
Douglas A-4E (Skyhawk), 200
Douglas C-117D (Skytrain), 260, 270
Grumman EA-6A, 270, 280-281, 282, 283-284
Grumman US-2B, 260, 270
Lockheed C-130 (Hercules), 196, 202, 298
Lockheed KC-130F (Hercules), 213, 246, 270, 281
McDonnell-Douglas F-4H, 42n
MIG fighters, 281
North American OV-10A (Bronco), 34, 42, 42n, 47, 63-64, 96, 188, 201, 223, 239, 244, 260, 270-271, 273, 275, 281, 284, 286, 295-297, 310-312, 373, 381
North American YOV-10D, 298
OH-6 helicopters, 303
Sikorsky CH-54 (Flying Cranes), 99, 102
TA-4Fs, 270, 273, 281-284
UH-6, 303
Air Force Commands and Units
Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center, 200n
Military Airlift Command, 341
366th Tactical Fighter Wing, 2, 253, 253n, 270n
244th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 297
Tactical Air Operations Center, Seventh Air Force, 285
Air support radar teams (ASRTs), 271, 273, 286-287, 320n
Aitken, Col Hugh S., 334, 362
Albers, LtCol Vincent A., Jr., 52, 72-76, 91-93
ALMAR 65, 354-357
Ambert, 1st Lt Louis R., 49, 50-51, 345, 347
American Embassy, Saigon, 390
American Servicemen’s Union, 363
AMMI pontoon barges, 381
Amphibious Task Force 211, 371-373
Amphibious Warfare School, 370
An Tru (1), 122
An Xuyen, 130n, 380-381
AN/PRC-25 radios, 146
AN/TNC-5 radio, 246
AN/TPQ-10 radar, 200, 286-287
Anderson, Capt Peter C., 371
Andrus, LtCol Kermit W., 35
Annamite Mountains, 24, 279
Antenna Valley, 46, 46r, 71, 115, 211, 247, 260, 300, 302
Antiaircraft artillery, 280
Ap Quan Nam (1), 124
Ap Quan Nam (2), 123
Ap Quan Nam, 122, 162
Arc Light B-52 strikes, 71, 84, 283, 286, 370n
Area Security Concept, 186
Areas of Operation (AO), 187, 190
Arizona Territory, 41-45, 71, 78, 80, 82-83, 84, 97, 212-213, 234, 240, 263, 317

471
VIETNAMIZATION AND REDEPLOYMENT

Armed Forces Police, 252

Armed Propaganda Companies, 137

Armed Propaganda Team, 44, 171, 256-257


Army Commands and Units

Army Advisory Group, 2, 15, 17, 231

Army Foreign Claims Commission, 228

Army Port Authority, 241

Army Support Command, Da Nang, 2, 13, 172, 205, 216, 320-321

Special Forces Command, 15, 24, 41, 68n, 134, 234n

5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 286

Company G, 17

5th Transportation Command, 322

11th Combat Aviation Group, 245, 247

45th Engineering Group, 2, 324

67th Army Medical Group, 182, 329

80th Special Services Group, 366

95th Army Evacuation Hospital, 250, 256, 329

108th Artillery Group, 299, 300n


XXIV Corps Artillery, 240

1st Cavalry Division (Airborne), 15

4th Infantry Division, 56, 282


196th Infantry Brigade, 84, 118, 211-213, 221, 235-236, 240-245, 247-248, 252, 254, 262, 267

23d Infantry, 119

123d Aviation Battalion, 303

282d Aviation Battalion, 303

1st Squadron, 1st Armored Cavalry, 118, 242

B Troop, 243

2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, 118, 241, 247

3d Battalion, 1st Infantry, 51

3d Battalion, 82d Artillery, 118, 247

Battery D, 1st Battalion, 223, 240

4th Battalion, 31st Infantry, 240, 247

101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), 2, 15, 22, 36, 69, 84, 194, 211, 234, 286-287, 299, 306

1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), 2, 15, 22, 172, 286-287, 299, 364

1st Infantry

2d Battalion, 244

16th Artillery

3d Battalion, 99

21st Infantry

3d Battalion, 235

Company B, 235

29th Artillery

Battery G, 2d Battalion, 299

46th Infantry

1st Battalion, 240-241, 247

82d Artillery

Battery D, 1st Battalion, 221

26th Engineer Battalion, 325

39th Engineer Battalion, 325

504th Military Police Battalion, 222n, 250n, 253n

522d Replacement Battalion, 222n, 253n

7th Psychological Operations Company, 15, 170

21st Reconnaissance Aircraft Company, 303

29th Civil Affairs Company, 15, 171

478th Aviation Company, 222n, 253n

407th Radio Research Detachment, 258

Artillery operations, 299-314

Automated Services Center, 316

Ba Ren Bridge, 109, 177-179, 218, 225, 227-228

Ba Ren River, 74, 118, 218-219, 324-325

Baker, Col Robert R., 388

Ban Co, 97

Bannister, Cdr John M., 236n

BARCAP, 281-283 (See also Gulf of Tonkin)

Barrett, LCpl Ron J., 48

Batteri Island, 386

Barrier project, 258, 258n


Basic School, 370

Beard, Col Rutland B., Jr., USA, 247

Beck, Col Noble L., 41, 61, 65

Benet, Maj Peter E., 310

Bennett, 1stLt George S., 290

Benstead, LtCol Daryl E., 327

Best, Capt George V., Jr., 31

Bierman, Capt Edward O., 373

Binh, MajGen Nguyen Chanh, 26, 166, 309

Binh Nghia, 149, 149n

Binh Dinh, 130n, 248

Binh Ky, 148

Black Hammer package, 218, 231-232, 290, 293-294 (See also Night Hawk)

Black militancy, 344, 353, 359

Black Power, 354, 357

Blakely, LtCol William R., Jr., USA, 135n

Blanc, LtCol Richard J., 218

Blanchard, Col Don H., 13n, 121n, 238, 334

Block, LtCol Charles A., 294

Blue, Col Miller M., 60n, 320


Border Surveillance Zones, 10, 187

Bowman, MajGen George S., Jr., 242, 271, 293n

Boyd, LtCol Frank M., 36

Boyd, PPC Thomas R., 344, 347

Brigade Ridge, 240, 242-243, 245, 247 (See also Division Ridge)

Brown, Gen George, USA, 275, 278

Brown, LCpl William M., 81

Bruce, Col James P., 270, 273n

Bunker, Ambassador Ellsworth, 12, 390-391

Burke, BGen William A., USA, 2

Buse, LtGen Henry W., Jr., 4, 16, 62, 139, 141, 331, 362
INDEX

A-2, 205, 299
Birmingham, 201, 220, 287
Dagger, 97, 234-235
Datt, 72, 74
Defiant, 72-75
Delta, 198, 376-378
Hatcher, 75-76
Hotel, 202, 205, 376
Hotel II, 204
Los Banos, 299
Mace, 72-74
O’Reilly, 76n, 84-85
Roundup, 302
Sam, 80
Sophia II, 203
Vandegrift, 196, 199, 205-206, 376
Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC), 17n, 300, 305-306
Fire Support Information System, 256, 303
1st Australian Task Force, 384
Fitzgerald, Lt John B., USN, 362
Fixed-wing aircraft, operations, 270-287, 296, 298, 302, 310
“Flakey Snow" patrol, 309-310
Folsom, LtCol Arthur E., 52
Football Island, 44, 121
Ford, Capt Douglas O., 268
Foreign Claims Investigation unit, 228
Forward air controllers, 285-286
Airborne, 285-286
Fox, Col George C., 16-17, 57, 64
Fragging, 344, 352, 364
Frankovic, Col Boris J., 236
Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF), 9, 9n, 39
Freedom Hill Recreation Center, 253, 253n, 366-367
Frey, LtCol Francis X., 387
Futema, 335

Gaddis, RAdm Walter D., USN, 387
Ganey, LtCol Thomas P., 64
General Walt Scholarship Program, 171
Geneva Convention, 234n
Gestson, LtCol Johan S., 42, 44, 365
Go Noi Island, 41, 41n, 80, 137, 171, 173-174, 277, 300, 326
Go Van Number II Orphanage, 390
Goetz, 1Lt Peter F., 310
Goode, LCDr James G., USN, 358-359
Gray, Col D’Wayne, 386, 386n
Green, PFC Samuel G., 344, 347
“Green Anvil,” 219-220
Greene, Maj Wallace M. III, 266
Guam, 95, 200

Guay, LtCol Robert P., 362
Gulf of Thailand, 387
Gulf of Tonkin, 208-209, 386

Hackert, Hospitalman 2d Class Randall L., 267
Hagen, LtCol Jerome T., 200
Haggerty, Col John W. III, 155, 258, 342
Hai Van Vital Area, 134
Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), 130, 130n, 132, 149, 155, 157, 161, 174, 182, 184, 248
Hamins, LtCol Thomas M., 111, 113, 217
Han River, 24
Hanoi, 74, 234n
Happy Valley, 46
Harassing and interdiction (H&I) artillery fire, 105
Hardin, MajGen Ernest, USAF, 277n, 278
Harell, Col James E., 13, 31-32, 37, 366
Hart, LtCol Franklin A., Jr., 94, 114, 221
Harvey, Sgt Tom, 147, 147n, 148
Hatch, Maj Donald J., 258n
Hawaii, 60, 64, 188, 244
Hefferman, Col Neal E., 270, 273n, 358
Hehnen, Capt Mark T., 243
Helicopter operations, 288-298
Henley, Col Paul B., 270
Herrod, LCpl Randell D., 344-347
Herther, LtCol Herbert M., 387
Heywood, Col Ralph A., 31-32, 40
Hicks, LCpl Larry, 80
Hiep Duc, 58, 93-94, 118
Hiep, Col Phan Hao, 195n
Hieu Duc, 119, 134-135, 225, 350
Hieu Nhon, 130, 240
Hill 10, 32, 36-37, 100, 121, 216, 238, 240, 299-300, 350
Hill 22, 33-34
Hill 25, 42, 44, 80, 82, 172, 176, 316
Hill 34, 42, 44, 68, 217, 220, 222-223, 225, 238, 243, 245, 254, 299, 324, 334
Hill 37, 28, 33-34, 42, 44, 81, 96, 100-101, 108, 119, 121, 180, 193, 235, 243, 316, 325, 328
Hill 41, 36-37, 39
Hill 52, 42, 44, 80, 82, 100-101, 119-121, 172, 316, 325
Hill 65, 42, 44, 80, 82, 92, 99-100, 119, 121, 172, 213, 216, 221, 223, 234-236, 238, 240-241, 244, 247, 260, 299, 300n, 301, 316, 329
Hill 88, 32, 36
Hill 110, 75-76
Hill 119, 43, 75-76, 117, 300, 300n, 301
Hill 124, 32
Hill 147, 373
Hill 151, 244
Hill 190, 32, 36-37, 260
Hill 200, 300, 300n
Hill 218, 117, 221-222, 222, 224
Hill 250, 300-301

1st Australian Task Force, 384
Fitzgerald, Lt John B., USN, 362
Fixed-wing aircraft, operations, 270-287, 296, 298, 302, 310
“Flakey Snow" patrol, 309-310
Folsom, LtCol Arthur E., 52
Football Island, 44, 121
Ford, Capt Douglas O., 268
Foreign Claims Investigation unit, 228
Forward air controllers, 285-286
Airborne, 285-286
Index
VIETNAMIZATION AND REDEPLOYMENT

Hill 270, 36, 52, 117, 216, 221, 223, 238, 240, 247, 299, 300n
Hill 322, 113
Hill 350, 240-241, 247
Hill 381, 112, 113-114, 116, 220-222
Hill 383, 215-216
Hill 425, 117, 221, 235, 300, 300n, 301
Hill 441, 52, 118
Hill 502, 39
Hill 785, 238, 240
Hill 800, 53
Hill 845, 91-92, 94, 111, 313
(See also Landing Zone Vulture)
Hill 848, 53
Hill 953, 53-54
Hill, MajGen Homer S., 277
Himmerich, Maj Robert T., 65n, 246, 336
Hinh, MajGen Nguyen Duy, 196-198
Hixson, Col Wilmer W., 133-134, 136, 138, 184
Hoa Cam Territorial Forces Training Center, 222n, 253, 253n
Hoa Hieu Defensive Area, 135
Hoa Hieu Sub-Region, 134-135
Hoa Khanh Children's Hospital, 170, 171-172
Hoang Dieu, 103n
Hoang Que, 157
Hoa Thanh, 241
Hoa Vang, 119, 134-135, 150, 211, 225, 240, 242-243, 249, 350
Hoa Vinh Village, 241
Hogaboom, LtCol Pieter L., 31-32, 302
Hoi Chanh, 39, 54, 131-133, 145, 147, 161, 163, 179, 213, 218, 225
Hollier, Col Louis S., Jr., 136
Hong Kong, 391
Hood, 1stLt Ronald C. III, 207
Hopkins, LtCol Delos M., 258, 258n
Horn Direct Air Support Center, 275n, 285
Howe, LtCol James D., 395
Hue, 2, 4n, 5, 15, 24, 58, 69, 84, 137, 139, 174, 244, 322
Huff, SgMaj Edgar R., 344, 344n, 352, 359, 369
Humm, 1stLt Michael A., 206
Hunt, Col Sanford B., 18n
Huson, Capt Delbert M., 157-158
IBM Model 1401 computer, 319
IBM Model 360/50 computer, 319
III MAF Operation Plan 183-89, 13-14
Increment Four, 61, 62, 64, 64n
Increment VII redeployments, 236
Infantry Company Intensified Pacification Program (ICIPP), 151, 153, 155 (See also Combined Unit Pacification Program)
Infrared sensors, 259 (See also sensors)
Integrated observation device (IOD), 117, 215, 223, 234, 256, 302-303, 308, 313
Interrogation-translation teams, 256, 262
Iwakuni, Japan, 11, 13, 15, 95, 223, 236, 238, 271, 273, 284
Iwo Jima (LPH 2), 208, 208n, 209, 387
Jacobson, George D., 133
Japan, 188, 242, 315, 317, 332, 339-341, 363
Jefferies, Cpl Mitchell Y., 161
Jenkins, GtSgMaj Robert M., 391
Johnson, BGen William G., 11
Johnson, Col Herschel L., Jr., 111, 217, Col, 331
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 11-13, 59, 61, 86-87, 179, 188-190, 208, 212, 238, 271, 273-274, 280, 284-285, 331
Joint Field Force Vietnam, 16
Joint Tactical Processing Center, 258n
Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), 137, 391
Jones, 1stLt James D., 114
Judge, Col Clark V., 80-81, 97, 101, 105, 106, 119, 254, 291
Kaneohe, Hawaii, 95
Karch, Capt Lawrence G., 281
Kaufman, Maj Francis M., 334
Kay, Capt William M., 42
Keenan, LtCol John J., 139, 139n
Keith, LCol Miguel, 396
Keller, Capt William E., Jr., 391
Kelley, Col Paul X. "P.X.,” 77, 78, 119, 138, 147, 169, 214, 221, 235, 238
Kellog, SSgt Allan J., Jr., 397
Kelly, Col James P., 388
Kephart, LtCol William R., 25
Kettering, LCol Alvah J., 388
Kham Duc, 69, 84
Khanh Son, 349-350
Khmer Rouge movement, 56
Khoi, Col Nguyen Noc, 249
Kien Giang Province, 371
Kien Hoa, 130n
Killer teams, 344
Kim Lien, 122-123, 162, 241
King, Maj Robert D., 139n
King, VAdm Jerome H., USN, 381-382, 382n, 383
Kingfisher patrols, 34, 34n, 36, 42-43, 219, 258, 301, 305-306
Kirkland, Capt Golden C., Jr., 201
Kit Carson Scout Program, 165, 213, 264, 381
Kit Carson Scout Training Center, 165
Koler, Col Joseph, Jr., 388
Kontum, 130n
Korat, Thailand, 246
Koster, MajGen Samuel W., USA, 346
Kritchen, PFC Michael S., 344-345, 347
Kruk, LtGen Victor H., 294n
Kux, 1stLt Steven A., 233
Ky Lam River, 41, 100, 173
Ky Ngoc, 227
Ko, Vice President Nguyen Cao, 119, 129
INDEX

La Bong, 240
Laird, Secretary of Defense Melvin, 59
Lan, Col Bui The, 375n, 377
“Land-to-the-Tiller” law, 129, 132, 182
Landing Zones
Buzzard, 53-54
Chloe, 244
Crow, 53
Defiant, 73
Kilo, 202, 205, 207
Rainbow, 111-114 (See also LZ Vulture)
Ranchhouse, 111, 113-114
Robin, 73
Starling, 72-73
Vulture, 92, 94, 111 (See also Hill 845)
Lang Co Bridge, 52, 56
Langford, 1st Sgt James L., 10
Loas, 5, 22-23, 56, 70, 186, 196, 198-199, 200, 202-204, 210, 244, 271, 278-279, 281-282, 284-285, 296, 298, 373, 392
Larkins, Sgt Michael L., 308
Larson, 1st Sgt Larry J., 205
Laser Target Designation System, 297
Le Ba (2), 348, 348n
Le Nam (1), 44
Le Nam (2), 44
Leadership Councils, 357
Lebus, LCpl Gavin, 251
Ledbetter, Lt Col Walter R., Jr., 34-35
Ledeboer, Maj Willis D., 139n
Leder, Lt Col Frederick D., 42-43
Lefwich, Lt Col William G., Jr., 79, 111, 114, 114n, 121, 265, 311, 312n, 313
Lefwich (DD 984), 114n
Leisy, Lt Col Robert R., 202
Leonard, Col Bob, USA, 195
Liberty Bridge, 41, 41n, 42-44, 60, 80, 102, 181, 231
Liberty Road, 41, 41n, 43, 96, 102, 231 (See also Route 540)
Lien Chieu Esso Depot, 32, 36-37, 122, 180-181
Lloyd, Maj Russell, Jr., 388n
Loc Quang, 172
Lohman, 1st Lt Charles M., 47
Luat, Col Nguyen Tiong, 193
Ludden, Col Charles H., 212
Ludwig, Col Verle E., 388-390
Ly Ly River, 43, 48, 50-51
Magnetic Intrusion Devices, 259 (See also sensors)
Manila, 390
Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California, 15, 37, 95, 239, 271
Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, 95, 246
Marine Corps Air Station, Santa Ana, California, 15, 271
Marine Corps birthday, 121n
Marine Corps Commands and Units
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC), 4, 11-12, 13n, 16, 62, 85, 150, 184, 246, 275, 277, 301n, 331-334, 336-338, 346, 352, 355
Equal Opportunities Branch, 355
I Marine Amphibious Force, 242
I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), 11
III MAF (Reat), 191
Correctional Facility, 250
Criminal Investigation Department, 250
Freedom Hill Recreation Center, 222n
Redistribution Center, 336
Rest and Recuperation Processing Center, 315, 323, 366-367
Sensor Control and Management Platoon (SCAMP), 259, 259n, 260, 262, 320n
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center, 307, 307n
Transit Facility, 253, 253n
1st Marine Expeditionary Force, 14n
9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 384, 387-388
Headquarters and Service Battalion, 319
Supply Battalion
Preservation, Packing, and Packaging Facility, 338
Force Logistic Support Group A, 315n
Force Logistic Support Group B, 315, 315n, 320, 338
Logistic support units (LSUs), 77, 77n, 315
LSU-1, 317
LSU-3, 319
LSU-4, 315, 317, 319 (See also Sub-Unit 1, FSLG-B)
Data Processing Platoon, 16, 303, 316, 319
Data Processing Section, 28, 319
Retrograde Facility, 245, 337, 340
Ground
1st Force Service Regiment, 239, 315, 319, 319n
Headquarters and Service Battalion, 314, 367
Maintenance Battalion, 315
Supply Battalion, 315, 366
3d Battalion, 53-54, 59, 75, 92, 99, 101-102, 221, 299, 302, 306
  Battery G, 48, 53, 72, 75-76, 92n, 301
  Battery H, 92n, 99
  Battery I, 92n, 301
  Battery W, 72, 75-76, 76n, 92
  Mortar Battery, 92
4th Battalion, 59, 223, 241, 299, 302
  Battery K, 92n, 220-221, 301, 307
  Battery L, 13, 92m, 299-300, 306
  Battery M, 92n, 252, 306
3d Marine Division, 11, 14-15, 23, 28, 133, 147, 172, 236, 238, 259n, 288, 288n, 315n, 320, 345, 364, 386
  3d Marines, 242
5th Marine Division, 13
  1st Battalion, 13th Marines, 13, 15, 299-300
  Battery K, 4th Battalion, 13th Marines, 13, 299-300
26th Marines, 13-15, 27-28, 31-34, 36-37, 40, 78, 147, 155, 299-300, 317, 328, 366, 386
  2d Battalion, 32, 36
1st Service Battalion
  Supply Company, 315
  Truck Company, 315
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 368
1st Bridge Company, 95, 324
1st Dental Company, 171, 175m, 329
1st 8-Inch Howitzer Battery (SP), 54, 60, 252, 299, 306
1st Engineer Battalion, 60, 102, 220, 223, 239, 266-267, 317, 324-325, 327, 340
  Company C, 327
  1st Platoon, 93
  1st Force Reconnaissance Battalion, 60
  1st Battalion, Company D, 92
  1st Force Reconnaissance Company, 18, 60, 95, 253, 260, 307, 311, 313, 315
  1st Medical Battalion, 222m, 223, 239-241, 233m, 328
  Company C, 329
  1st Hospital Company, 328-329
  Neuropsychiatric Clinic, 360
1st Military Police Battalion, 60, 65, 85, 87, 228, 239, 243-245, 249-250, 252, 265, 315
  War Dog Platoon, 92
1st Motor Transport Battalion, 102, 110, 222m, 223, 239, 327, 327n
  Headquarters and Service Company, 328
  Company C, 328
1st 175mm Gun Battery (SP), 87, 90, 102, 299, 306
1st Radio Battalion, 60, 65, 258, 262, 303
  Company C, 310, 313
  Company D, 313
  Company E, 309, 313
  1st Service Battalion, 315, 315n, 316-317
  1st Shore Party Battalion, 13, 15, 36, 102, 239, 316-317
  Company C, 102, 295, 316-317, 319, 342
1st Tank Battalion, 13, 15, 27
  Company C, 79, 82-83, 87, 95
3d 175mm Gun Battery (SP), 60, 92m, 95, 299, 306
3d 8-Inch Howitzer Battery (SP), 92m, 216, 223, 240, 242, 245, 238, 299, 307
3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 13, 15
3d Bridge Company, 320n
3d Engineer Battalion, 172
3d Force Reconnaissance Company, 18, 60, 255, 260, 307
3d Force Reconnaissance Battalion, 95
3d Force Service Regiment, 236, 338
3d Military Police Battalion, 60, 65, 250, 265, 315
3d Service Battalion, 315n
5th Communication Battalion, 21, 65, 65n, 141, 335
5th Force Service Regiment, 319n
7th 175mm Gun Battery (SP) (Reinforced), 13, 15, 299-300, 320n
7th Engineer Battalion, 60, 87, 93, 239, 324-325
7th Motor Transport Battalion, 13, 15, 315, 327-328
9th Engineer Battalion, 60, 87, 93, 97, 315, 324-325
11th Dental Company, 329
11th Motor Transport Battalion, 223, 240-241, 253n, 327-328
31st Marine Amphibious Unit, 387-388
Counterintelligence teams (CITs), 79n, 256
  1st Counterintelligence Team, 256n
  3d Counterintelligence Team, 79, 256n
  5th Counterintelligence Team, 320m
Interrogation and Translation Teams (ITT), 79n, 256n, 320n
Marine Security Detachment, Da Nang, 390
Marine Security Guards, 391-392
American Embassy, Saigon, 247, 252
Provisional Service Battalion, Da Nang, 319
Regimental Landing Team (RLT) 4, 236n
Special Landing Force, Seventh Fleet (SLF), 11, 208, 341, 386
Air
  Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center, 260, 260n, 262
  1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Rear), 11, 236, 238
  3d Marine Aircraft Wing, 242
Marine Aircraft Groups (MAG)
  MAG-11, 56, 62-64, 95-96, 188-189, 192, 200, 239, 241, 243-245, 249, 270-271, 273, 273m, 284, 323, 358
  MAG-12, 15, 236m, 270-271, 315, 356
  MAG-13, 56, 87, 95, 102, 271, 282, 315, 356, 358, 369
  MAG-16, 35, 40, 55, 62-64, 72, 76-77, 96, 110, 118, 178, 192, 241-244, 249, 252, 270, 273, 273m, 289-292, 303, 320m, 323, 340-341, 353, 355, 356, 362
  MAG-24, 95
  MAG-36, 270
Air Control Groups (MACG)
  MACG-16, 245
  MACG-18, 229, 273, 275
  MACG-28, 360
Provisional Marine Aircraft Group 39 (ProvMAG), 288n
Wing Headquarters Group (MWHG)
  MWHG-1, 223, 273
  MWHG-11, 242
Wing Support Group (MWSG)
  MWSG-17, 317, 317n, 358-360
Aerial Refueler/Transport Squadrons (VMGR)
VMGR-152, 270
Sub-Unit 1, 213

Air Base Squadrons (MABS)
MABS-11, 123, 213, 245
MABS-12, 13
MABS-13, 95
MABS-16, 245

Air Control Squadrons (MACS)
MACS-4, 60, 220, 273

Air Support Squadrons (MASS)
MASS-3, 201, 220, 222, 253n, 273, 286-287

All-Weather Attack Squadrons (VMA[AW])
VMA(AW)-223, 13
VMA(AW)-225, 64, 96, 239, 241, 270, 283-284, 287
VMA(AW)-242, 59-60, 87, 95, 270-271

Attack Squadrons (VMA)
VMA-211, 13, 270-271
VMA-223, 13, 270-271
VMA-311, 64, 239, 243-244, 270-271, 273, 283-284, 290, 297, 387
VMA-542, 270-271

Composite Reconnaissance Squadrons (VMCJ)
VMCJ-1, 59-60, 87, 95, 255, 270-271, 281-283

Fighter/Attack Squadrons (VMFA)
VMFA-112, 270-271
VMFA-115, 220, 223, 270-271, 273, 281-283
VMFA-122, 59, 87, 95
VMFA-314, 59-60, 87, 95, 270-271, 282, 333
VMFA-542, 13, 281

Headquarters & Headquarters Squadrons (H&HS)
H&HS-1, 242
H&HS-18, 242

Headquarters & Maintenance Squadrons (H&MS)
H&MS-11, 239, 244-245, 273
H&MS-12, 13
H&MS-13, 87, 95
H&MS-17, 260, 270

Heavy Helicopter Squadrons (HMH)
HMH-361, 13, 13, 270-271, 294
HMH-463, 65, 96, 203-204, 220, 239, 245, 294-296

Light Helicopter Squadrons (HLG)
HLG-105, 245

Medium Helicopter Squadrons (HMM)
HMM-161, 52, 59, 87, 95, 270-271
HMM-164, 387-388
HMM-165, 387
HMM-262, 59-60, 96, 238, 244, 270-271, 273, 286
HMM-263, 34, 96, 114, 220, 239, 242, 244, 270, 273, 310
HMM-364, 42, 96, 220, 270, 273, 341
HMM-464, 215

Observation Squadrons (VMO)
Wing Communications Squadrons (MWCS)
MWCS-1, 242
Wing Facilities Squadrons (MWFS)
MWFS-1, 242

Marine Corps Development and Education Command, 259n, 278, 301n
Marine Corps Manpower Management System, 334n
Marine Corps Marksmanship Instructor Course, 370
Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action Fund, 227
Marine Corps Reserve, 171
Marine Corps Supply Activity, Philadelphia, 338-339
Marine House Number Two, Saigon, 390
Marousek, Col Lawrence A., 387
Massey, Sgt Thomas F., 265
Matthews, RAdm Herbert S., 56, 56n, 381, 383
McCain, Adm John S., Jr., USN, 63, 188, 207-208, 242, 311
McDonald, Capt Thomas C., 231
McGraw, Col William C., Jr., 317
McLennan, Col Kenneth, 337
McMillan, LtCol Alexander P., 374, 377; BGen, 199n
McNamara, Francis T., 150n
McNamara, Secretary of Defense Robert S., 258
“McNamara Line,” 31
Mead, Capt Meredith H., USN, 171, 175n, 329
Medal of Honor, 38, 81n
MedCaps, 175
Medical services, 328-330
Meibaum, Maj Gilbert R., 327
Mekong River, 56, 56n, 372
Metzger, Col Theodore E., 2, 141-142, 144-145, 147, 153n, 350, 358
Michaud, Col John B., 139, 139n
Midway Island, 95
MIGCAP, 281-283 (See also Laos)
MACV Directive 10-11, 17
MACV Directive 93-4, 278
MACV (Forward), 15 (See also Provisional Corps, Vietnam)
Tactical Air Support Element, 285
Military Assistance Service Fund, 370-371
Military Justice Act of 1968, 363
Military Region III, 370
Miller, 1stLt Thomas S., 178-179
Miller, Maj John G., 380, 381
Mission 80, 31, 290
Mission 86, 291
Mixmaster program, 332
Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT), 149n, 150
Mobile, 333
Moc Bai, 218
Moffett, Capt John W., 267
Monkey Mountain, 273, 285, 285n
INDEX

Moore, LtCol Marc A., 122, 216, 223
Morale, 344-369
Morton, Capt Merrill T., 207
Moss, LtCol Roy E., 222, 235, 243, 245
Movement for a Democratic Military, 363
MR 1, 201, 210
MR 3, 130n, 298
MR 4, 130n, 298, 380, 387
Murphree, Col Thomas E., 178
My Hiep, 83
My Hiep (1), 44
My Hiep (2), 76
My Hoa Orphanage, 391
My Lai, 346, 348

Nam Cam, 380-381
Nam O Bridge, 32, 36-37, 122, 155, 181
National Assembly, 129
National Liberation Front, 166
National Military Academy, 370
National Police Field Force (NPFF), 8-10, 27, 44, 51, 129, 131, 136, 162-163, 175, 182, 186-187, 230, 249-250, 252, 368
National Police Special Branch, 350
Naval Air Station, Cubi Point, Philippines, 15
Naval gunfire support, 307, 385
Navy Commands and Units
  Commander in Chief, Pacific, 60, 86, 188, 248, 331-332
  Pacific Fleet, 316
  Service Force, Pacific Fleet, 319
Seventh Fleet, 14n, 271, 283, 385, 388
  Task Force 77, 284
  Task Force 79, 14n
  Task Group 70.8, 385
  Task Group 76.4, 387
Navy Air, Pacific Fleet, 316, 316n, 317
  Fleet Air, Western Pacific, 317
  Light Attack Squadron (VAL) 4, 4, 298, 298n
Navy Forces Vietnam (NavForV), 56, 321-322, 329, 380-381, 383
Navy Investigative Service, 364-365
Naval Support Activity (NSA), Da Nang, 2, 13, 319-320, 321-323, 328-329
Naval Support Activity Hospital, Da Nang, 328-329
Navy Supply Depot, Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines, 316
Navy Supply Depot, Yokosuka, Japan, 316, 316n
Mobile Construction Battalions (MCB)
  MCB-3, 18
  MCB-5, 235n
  MCB-10, 235n
  MCB-62, 235n
  MCB-74, 382
  MCB-128, 172
Pacific Command Utilization and Redistribution Agency, 337-338, 340
Navy corpsmen, 50
Nek Luong, 373-374
New Jersey, 385
New Orleans (LPD 11), 388
Ngan Cau, 34

Nghi, MajGen, 383
Nhon Cau, 171
Nickerson, LtCol Herman Jr., 2, 10, 16-17, 20, 46, 61-62, 64n, 139, 149-150, 153, 155, 165, 184, 257, 267, 274, 288, 320
Niesen, Col Paul W., 297
Night Hawk, 40
Night Hawk helicopter patrol, 40, 290, 293 (See also Black Hammer)
Night observation device, 218
Night Observation Gunship System, 298
Nixon, President Richard M., 7, 11, 13, 56, 57, 58, 211, 237-238, 242, 391
Nixon, Tricia, 242
No-fire Zones, 305n
Nol Gen Lon, 56
Nong Son, 193
Norris, LtCol Donald J., 222
North Vietnam, 5, 26, 57, 77, 124, 166, 208, 231, 271, 273, 279-282, 297
2d NVA Division, 223
6th NVA Division, 26
29th Regiment, 324B NVA Division, 377
31st NVA Regiment, 50-51, 124
102d Battalion, 31st NVA Regiment, 39
38th NVA Regiment, 72, 76, 83-84, 97, 124, 231-233, 243, 247-248
141st NVA Regiment, 124
303d Regiment, 324B NVA Division, 377
3rd Mobile Strike Group, 68
V-25th Main Force Battalion, 22, 91, 178
Northern Artillery Cantonment, 216, 221, 223, 235, 238, 240, 242-244, 299-300
Northern Sector Defense Command (NSDC), 27, 31, 78, 88, 101, 254
Nui Dat, 384
Nui Kim Son, 164, 230
Nui Loc Son, 45, 47, 218

O'Neil, Capt J., USN, 388
Observation Point Roundup, 220
Observation Post (OP) Reno, 100
Ogden, LtCol Bruce F., 243
Ogden (LPD 5), 221, 244
Okinawa, 11, 14, 14n, 64, 95, 188, 208-209, 238, 246, 270, 315, 315n, 317, 324, 332, 336, 338-341, 363, 386-387
One-war strategy, 7-11, 391
Operation Plan 2-70, 28
Operations
  Barren Green, 82, 83
  Binh Tay 1, 282
  Caroline Hill, 247
  Catawba Falls, 97-100, 234, 258, 305
  Cavalier Beach, 18-19
  Colorado, 45
  Commando Bolt, 280
  Commando Hunt III, 280
  Cuu Long 44/02, 387
Da Nang 101, 248
Deckhouse II, 223
Defiant Stand, 11, 386
Double Eagle, 45
Dubois Square, 80, 83
Duong Son 3/70, 22
Duong Son 4/70, 91
Elk Canyon, 84
Frederick Hill, 22
Freeze, 364-365
Geneva Park, 22
Golden Dragon 6-2, 386
Golden Dragon 6-3, 386
Golden Dragon II, 224
Golden Fleece, 162-163
Green River, 22
Harvest Moon, 22
Hastings, 22
Hoan Dieu, 123
Hoang Dieu 101, 103, 105, 109-110, 119, 121, 214, 234
Hoang Dieu 103, 214
Hoang Dieu 107, 234
Hung Quang 1/32, 38
Hung Quang 1/32B, 71, 77
Imperial Lake South, 94-95, 101
Imperial Lake, 91-93, 101, 105-107, 110-116, 122, 164, 211-212, 217-218, 221-225, 234, 238, 241, 244, 256, 258, 267, 282, 304, 313
Iron Mountain, 22
Key Grasp, 95
Key Wallop, 15, 95
Lam Son 720, 234
Lyon Valley, 83
Mameluke Thrust, 223
Meade River, 223, 244
Mixmaster, 14
Nantucket Beach, 22
Nebraska Rapids, 93-94
Noble Canyon, 118
Oklahoma Hills, 39
Pennsylvania Square, 22
Pickens Forest, 69-72, 74-75, 77, 82, 91, 97, 164, 258, 282, 304
Pipestone Canyon, 41, 173
Prairie, 223
Randolph Glen, 22
Ripley Center, 91
Scott Orchard, 234-235
Starlite, 101
Tailwind, 295-296
Texas Star, 22
Threshlight, 295
Tran Hung Dao IX, 392
Tulare Falls I, 118, 211
Tulare Falls II, 211
Union, 45
Union I, 223
Union II, 223
Upshur Stream, 215-216, 223, 225, 314

Vu Ninh 12, 71, 77, 375
Operations Company, 1st Radio Battalion, 320n
Outposts
Reno, 32, 36-37, 122, 260
Roundup, 327

Pacification and Development Councils (PDC), 132, 136
Pacification and Development Plan for 1969, 8, 128
Pacification and Development Plan for 1970, 129, 131
Pacification and Development Program for 1971, 182
Pacification program, 7, 9, 11, 22-23, 26, 51-52, 70n, 72, 78, 86, 91, 103, 110, 162-185
Pacifier companies, 42, 42n, 43, 43n, 44, 72-73, 75, 81-82, 91, 101, 113n, 290
Paddocko, BGen Mauro J., 2, 170, 315, 319
Paris Peace Talks, 7, 11, 234n, 389
Parker, LtCol Warren E., USA (Ret), 134-135, 135n
Parnell, Col Robert L., 356
Parsons, LtCol Tom D., 374
Paul Revere (APA 248), 387
Peabody, Col Clifford J., 133n, 136, 138, 171-172, 174-175
Peers, LieGen William R., USA, 346
Pentagon, 13n
People's Self Defense Force (PSDF), 4, 8-10, 103, 123, 132-134, 136, 138, 144, 149, 175, 178, 182, 193, 196, 241, 249
Personal Response Program, teams, 157, 349
Personal Security Unit, 390
Philco-Ford, 323
Phnom Penh, 372
Phoenix/Phung Hoang Program, 130-131, 133, 137, 167-169, 182, 187 (See also "Protection of the People Against Terrorism")
Photo Imagery Interpretation Center, 255
Phu Bai, 15, 18-19, 139, 204n, 244, 270-271, 285, 287, 307, 322, 384, 386
Phu Huong, 218, 230
Phu Loc, 47, 171, 174, 218, 230, 302
Phu Loc (6), 171
Phu Phong, 174
Phu Quoc Island, 387
Phu Thai, 119
Phu Thanh, 177-179, 218-219
Phu Thu, 148
Phu Trach, 158, 161
Phu Yen, 130n
Phung Hoang, 130-131, 133
Piehl, Col Robert H., 91-92, 93n, 101, 258
Pitkin County (LST 1082), 339
Playboy, 281
Pleiku, 56, 130n, 282
Pnom Penh, 56, 56n, 390
Polakoff, LtCol Gerald H., 387
Political Warfare Teams, 171
Pommerenk, Col Albert C., 96, 192, 239, 245, 248, 271, 273n
PRC-25 radio, 312
Pre Veng, 373-374
Precleared Fire Zones, 305n
Prisoners of war, 234, 234n
Program Coordinator for Security, 133
Progressive aircraft rework system, 335
VIETNAMIZATION AND REDEPLOYMENT

Route 540, 44 (See also Liberty Road)
Rudzis, Col Edwin M., 300, 303
Rules of engagement, 348
Rung Sat Special Zone, 384
Ryan, Sgt Ted J., 251
Ryhanych, Maj George W., 97, 99

Sa Huynh, 319, 322
Saigon, 4, 4n, 7, 11, 56, 58, 60, 128-129, 181, 184, 212, 320, 368, 370-371, 382, 384, 389-391
Saint, LtCol C. E., USA, 118
Saint Louis (LKA 116), 100, 102, 246, 342
Sambito, Maj William J., 209
Sanctuary (AH 17), 191, 328-330
Saunders, Col William F., Jr., 387
Sav-A-Plane system, 305, 305n, 306
Savage, LtCol Cornelius F. “Doc,” 42, 91
Schiattone, Cpl Ronald J., 37
Schwartz, Pvt Michael A., 344, 347
Scott, lstLt John R., 118
Scout Dog Nick, 92
Scuba divers, 308
Sea Float (tactical support base), 380-381
Seabees, 18, 174, 324-325, 367, 381 (See also Naval Mobile Construction Battalions)
SEALS, 381
Vietnamese, 122, 122n
Sea Wolves, 381, 383
Secure Areas, 9-10
Sedberry, SSGt J.W., 46
Schulster, Maj James T., 112
Seiler, LtCol David F., 139, 146, 150
Seismic Intrusion Devices, 259 (See also sensors)
Semi-automatic Checkout Equipment, 283n, 317
Sensors, 78, 258, 260, 260n, 303, 365 (See also infrared sensors, magnetic Intrusion Devices; Seismic Intrusion Devices)
Sentry Dog Caesar, 251
Sentry Dog Max, 251
Severson, GySgt Ronald S., 204
Sherwood Forest, 314
Shook, Col Frank A., Jr., 284
Short Airfield for Tactical Support (SATS), 61
Shoults, LtCol Eugene E., 386
Shoup, Col John D., 303-306
Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, 386
Silard, Maj Connie, 235
Silva, 1stLt Herbert P., 293
Similk, Col Wilbur F., 64, 320-321, 324, 331
Simmons, BGen Edwin H., 65, 97, 125, 175, 189, 191, 228n, 229, 236-237, 255, 260, 261, 268, 331, 333, 360-361, 364
Simpson, MajGen Ormond R., 3, 6, 23, 31
Simpson, LtCol Thomas H., 384-385
Sloan, Col James A., 321
Smith, Col Albert C., Jr., 114n
Smith, Col Haywood R., 273n, 289, 292, 358
Solid Anchor, 381, 383
Son Tay POW camp, 234n
San Thang (4), 345-347, 350

Song Cai (River), 71
Song Thu Bon (River), 28, 93, 211
Song Vu Gia (River), 28
South China Sea, 5, 24, 27, 33, 41, 61, 97, 101, 119, 249, 386
South Vietnam, 2, 4-8, 10-11, 24, 26, 53-56, 68, 85, 126, 132, 186, 271, 273, 279-280, 283-284
Ministry of Defense for Territorial Security, 132
Ministry of Defense, 4n
Ministry of the Interior, 4n
Ministry of Resettlement, 184

South Vietnam Armed Forces
Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam, 68, 68n, 84, 180, 193, 383
Inspector General Directorate, JGS, 68n
I Corps Combined Coordinating Council, 133n
Corps Tactical Zones
I Corps, 2, 4-6, 9-11, 13, 15-17, 17n, 18, 21-23, 28, 56-57, 59-62, 141, 223, 329, 357
II Corps, 56
III Corps, 56-57
IV Corps, 56-57, 371

South Vietnamese Commands and Units
Air Force, 11, 68, 126, 181, 220
41st Wing, 1st Air Division, 270n

Armed Forces Police, 249
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), 4-5, 7, 9-10, 12, 26-27, 31, 39, 45, 55-56, 62, 64, 75, 81, 84, 96, 110, 121, 129, 131, 134, 136, 141, 145, 149, 181, 186, 189, 212, 291, 391-392
1st Area Logistic Command, 245, 320, 320n, 321, 323, 337
1st Division, 4, 22, 69, 84, 149, 234, 299, 378, 394
2d Division, 4, 69, 146, 193
21st Division, 381, 383-384
22d Division, 56, 282
1st Ranger Group, 4, 24n, 27, 68, 71, 77, 103, 135, 181, 193
1st Battalion, 312
21st Battalion, 24n
37th Battalion, 22, 24n
39th Battalion, 22, 24n
1st Armored Brigade, 4, 22, 27, 68, 91, 135, 193
1st Mobile Brigade Task Force, 193, 214, 222n, 248, 253, 253n
14th Regiment, 373
44th Quang Da Special Zone Artillery Battalion, 24n, 68, 222n, 253n
64th Quang Da Special Zone Artillery Battalion, 24n, 68, 306
17th Armored Cavalry Squadron, 27, 68, 91, 135
2d Troop, 307
3d Troop, 103
8th Engineer Company, 253n
15th Light Engineer Company, 253n
Border Defense Ranger Battalions, 68
78th Border Ranger Defense Battalion, 193
79th Border Ranger Defense Battalion, 193
INDEX

Marines, 56, 244, 247, 262, 336, 370, 391
147th Brigade, 373-380 (See also Brigade A)
256th Brigade, 71, 374-375
257th Brigade, 24n
258th Brigade, 68, 68n, 375-376, 378-380 (See also Budge B)

4th Battalion, 122
369th Brigade, 375-376, 379 (See also Brigade C)
Brigade A, 371, 373, 375 (See also 147th Brigade)
Brigade B, 373-375 (See also 258th Brigade)
Brigade C, 375 (See also 369th Brigade)

1st Artillery Battalion, 376
Battery B, 372
1st Infantry Battalion, 372, 376
2d Artillery Battalion, 24n, 372-374, 376
3d Artillery Battalion, 376
3d Infantry Battalion, 376, 378
4th Infantry Battalion, 24n, 372-374, 376
6th Infantry Battalion, 24n
7th Infantry Battalion, 373-374, 376, 383
8th Infantry Battalion, 373, 376
9th Infantry Battalion, 376

Navy, 321

Popular Forces
15th Popular Force Platoon, 152
123d Popular Force Platoon, 231
144th Popular Force Platoon, 177
171st Popular Force Platoon, 177
197th Popular Force Platoon, 218

Regional Forces
1/20 Regional Force Group, 218
1/25 Regional Force Group, 123, 135, 180, 306
59th Regional Force Battalion, 134-135
104th Regional Force Battalion, 212, 216-223, 229, 230, 235, 244, 252, 299, 301, 304-305, 310, 325
411th Regional Force Company, 220
412th Regional Force Company, 231
759th Regional Force Company, 176
796th Regional Force Company, 244, 252

Revolutionary Forces
101st Revolutionary Forces Battalion
1/158th Revolutionary Forces Company, 122-123
162d Revolutionary Forces Company, 118
323d Revolutionary Forces Company, 178


Sprait, Col Walter E., 286, 292, 294

Special Pacification and Development Campaign, 182
Special Pacification and Development Campaign, 182
Special Patrol Insertion/Extraction (SPIE) line, 312
Special Techniques for Repair and Analysis of Aircraft Damage Program, 317

Specified Strike Zones, 305, 305n
Sprait, Capt Robert E., USN, 384
Stack Arms center, 368
Steel Tiger area, 279 (See also Laos)
Steel Tiger missions, 282, 297
Steigelman, Capt Herbert M., Jr., 390
Stewart, Col Grover S., Jr., 273n
Stien, Col Laurence J., 356, 358, 369
Stingray patrols, 309, 309n

Street, Col Lewis C. III, 96, 192, 239, 245, 271, 273n, 389
Strike Plans Branch, Seventh Air Force, 275
Stroup, Maj William C., 380

Studies and Observation Group (SOG) teams, 295-296
Stuebe, Maj Jon A., 113
Subic Bay, Philippines, 207-209
Sudduth, Maj Donald E., 136

Supplementary Pacification and Development Campaign, 182
Sutherland, LiGen James W., USA, 69, 69, 75, 101, 137, 151, 184, 188, 194, 196, 200, 202, 203, 208n, 210, 211n, 220, 228, 248

Tactical air control parties, 386

Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC), 223, 239n, 285, 285n

Tactical Areas of Coordination (TAOC), 142, 145

Tactical Areas of Interest (TAOI), 187

Tactical Areas of Operation (TAOR), 186-187

Tactical Data Communications Center, 273

Tactical Information Deposit Retrieval System, 303

Taiwan, 388

Tam Ky, 324

Tanah Quat (2), 152

Tan My, 319, 322

Tank-infantry operations, 82

Target Information Section, Fire Support Coordination Center, 303

Task Force Burnett, 118-119

Task Force Saint, 118

Task Force X-Ray, 23

Tchepone, 198, 203, 210, 375

Teller, Col Robert W., 291-292, 333, 360

Tet Offensive of 1968, 2, 7, 12-13, 15, 18n, 33, 131, 244, 273, 349, 370, 390

Thailand, 200

Thien, Col Nguyen Van, 68, 181, 193n

Thieu, President Nguyen Van, 8, 68, 128-129, 182

Thompson, Sir Robert, 184

Thong Duc, 304-305


Thu Bon River, 24, 41, 41n, 43-44, 46, 70-71, 72, 73, 80, 89, 100, 121, 159, 173, 231, 235, 240, 243

Thu Bon Valley, 74-76, 102

Thuc Duc Training Center, 370, 376

Thua Thien, 2, 4-5, 15, 22, 24, 57, 69, 76n, 139, 148, 175, 182n, 194, 234, 284, 307

Thu Duc, 241-42, 44-45, 58, 60, 71, 76, 81-84, 96, 109, 119, 121, 153, 193, 214-215, 223, 228, 300, 325

Tief, Col Francis W., 373, 374, 375m, 377n, 378, 379, 382, 382n, 383, 383n, 384, 388, BGen, 199n

Tien Sha Deep Water Pier, 95, 336

Tien Sha Peninsula, 24, 27, 79 (See also Da Nang East)

Tilley, Capt Robert O., 218-219

Timmes, Col Edward A., 213, 216

Tim, Col Le Tri, 134, 136, 167, 226, 245

Tolleson, Maj Frederic L., 248

Tolnay, LtCol John J., 147, 149, 151-152, 192, 226-227

Tournane, 249
TPQ-10 radar, 302
Trainor, LtCol Bernard E., 81-82, 311, 314, 357; LtGen, 43n, 113n, 169n, 311n, 312n
Tropical Storm Kate, 111
Trung-si, 142, 145-146, 148, 160, 178
Truong, Gen Ngo Quang, 149
Tu Cau, 17
Tulare (LKA 112), 208n
Typhoons
Iris, 108
Joan, 102, 108
Kate, 108
Louise, 108
U Minh Forest, 383
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 344
U.S. Consulate, Da Nang, 250-251
U.S. Information Agency (USIA), 133
Unterkofler, LtCol John J., 36
USO, 366, 368

Dads Infantry Battalion,
K-2 Battalion, T-18 Regiment, 371-372
K-6 Battalion, T-18 Regiment, 371-372
Q-84th Main Force Battalion, 38-39
Q-83d Viet Cong Battalion, 44, 243
R-20th Infantry Battalion, 91
T-89th Sapper Battalion VC, 22, 91, 178
T-90th Sapper Battalion, 91
Viet Cong infrastructure, 4, 130n, 131-133, 137, 142-143, 161, 166-169, 175, 182, 186, 194, 234, 257
Vietnamese Coastal Security Service, 122n
Vietnamese Information Service (VIS), 137
Vietnamese Language School, III MAF, 366
Vietnamization program, 306, 389, 391
Vinh Binh, 130n
Vien Dinh River, 152
Vinh, 387
Voluntary Informant Program, 170, 257, 325
Vu Gia River, 24, 39, 41-49, 71, 78, 80, 96-97, 100, 105, 211, 234-235, 240
Vung Tau, 184

Wake Island, 95
Waldorp, Col Floyd H., 12, 60, 77, 263
Walt, Gen Lewis W., 133n, 191
War dogs, 250, 263
Warner, Undersecretary of the Navy John W., 243
Warren, Col Stephen G., 277, 277n, 278, 389
Washington, D.C., 4, 11-12, 58, 62, 64, 87, 188, 191
Wasko, Maj Michael J., Jr., 204
Weapons and ordnance
B-40 rocket launcher, 43, 119, 373
Bangalore torpedoes, 49
C-4 explosive, 215, 264
CBU-55 Low Speed Fuel-Air Explosive Munitions, 297-298
Claymore mines, 31, 175
CS riot gas, 113, 217
Gatling guns, 373
Laser Guided Bomb (Smart Bomb), 297
M14 rifles, 93
M16 rifles, 5, 7, 175-176, 227, 310, 351-352
M26 fragmentation grenades, 262, 264-265, 364
M60 machine gun, 31, 41n, 50, 125, 146, 158, 175-176
M72 LAAWs, 123
M79 grenade launcher, 50, 125, 227, 310
M101A1 105mm towed howitzers, 72, 75-76, 76n, 92, 97, 99-100, 103
M107 175mm gun, 61, 64, 88, 92, 214, 299-300, 303, 305
M110 8-inch howitzers, 299-300
Napalm, 293, 378
Rockeye II cluster bomb unit, 280-281
Rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), 49, 54, 84, 120-121, 175-176, 178, 216, 232
SKS rifles, 53, 74, 77 93, 152, 161, 345, 373
Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), 280, 283
Surprise Firing Devices, 262 (See also boobytraps)
XM-191 Multi-Shot Portable Flame Weapon, 366
2.75-inch rockets, 204, 294
4.2-inch mortars, 39, 76, 92, 99, 215, 299, 304-306
5-inch guns, 385
5-inch multiple rocket launchers, 385
5-inch Zuni rockets, 76, 280
8-inch howitzers, 13, 61, 64, 92, 299
12.7mm machine gun, 83, 310
20mm automatic cannon, 232, 297-298
23mm antiaircraft guns, 203
37mm guns, 203
40mm automatic grenade launchers, 204, 292
.45 caliber pistols, 351-352
.50 caliber machine guns, 31, 203, 205, 310, 372
.57mm guns, 203
60mm mortars, 43, 121-122, 146, 178, 241, 350, 372
75mm recoilless rifle, 372, 375
80mm mortars, 43
81mm mortars, 122, 175, 178, 253, 385
82mm mortars, 372, 374
106mm recoilless rifles, 31, 49-50, 76, 93, 224, 254
107mm mortars, 217
122mm rockets, 52, 76, 206, 213, 224, 231, 241, 247
130mm artillery, 377
500-pound bombs, 76, 280, 282
500-pound napalm cannisters, 76
1,000-pound bombs, 76, 282
Weapons-safety SOP, 351
Weaver, Col James R., 13, 259, 270-271
Wehrle, LtCol Robert E., 241-242, 335
Weisner, VAdm Maurice F., USN, 387
Wenheuer, Capt Robert E., 204
Westchester County (LST 1167), 208n
Westmoreland, Gen William C., USA, 6-7, 195, 273-275
Wheeler, MajGen Edwin B., 2, 6, 23, 39n, 345
White, LtCol William V. H., 36, 37n, 266, 367
Wilder, Capt Tracy H., USN, 209
Wilkinson, Col Herbert L., 19, 21, 32, 34, 37
Williams, Capt John C., 54
Wilson, Col Charles E., USA, 389
Wilson, 1stLt Wallace L., Jr., 53
Wonderach shelters, 327, 327n
Wood, Col Allan T., 336, 341
Wood, 1stLt James N., Jr., 120
Woodrow, LtCol Fitz W., Jr., 388
World Relief Commission, 171
Wright, MajGen John M., USA, 2
XM-3 Airborne Personnel Detector, 293-294
Xuan Phuoc, 219
Yeager, LtCol William M., 80
Yong, BGen Lee Dong, 212
Youngdale, MajGen Carl A., 288
Youngdale Board, 291
Zais, LtGen Melvin, USA, 2, 15-17, 19, 20-21, 60, 64, 69, 150
Zambeles Training Area, 388
Zumwalt, VAdm Elmo R., USN, 320-321
The device reproduced on the back cover is the oldest military insignia in continuous use in the United States. It first appeared, as shown here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804. With the stars changed to five points this device has continued on Marine Corps buttons to the present day.