

CHAPTER 26

Artillery and Reconnaissance Support in III MAF

*Marine Artillery Reshuffles—The Guns in the North
Mini-Tet and the Fall of Ngog Tavak and Kham Duc—Operations Drumfire II and Thor:
Guns Across the Border—Fire Base Tactics—Marine Reconnaissance Operations*

Marine Artillery Reshuffles

While not beset by the doctrinal debates and inter- and intra-Service differences that characterized air support in 1968, Marine artillery also went through a period of trial and tribulation. At the beginning of the year, two Marine reinforced artillery regiments, the 11th and 12th Marines, supported the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions, respectively. The 11th Marines provided the artillery support for the 1st Marine Division at Da Nang while the 12th Marines supported the far-flung 3d Division. The 12th had batteries spread from Dong Ha, near the coast, westward to Khe Sanh, and south to Phu Bai. In effect, Marine artillery extended from the DMZ to south of Da Nang in support of Marine and allied infantry.

Containing about 120 pieces, not as large nor as spread out as the 12th Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Clayton V. Hendricks' 11th Marines, the 1st Marine Division artillery regiment had an equally daunting task. The 11th Marines controlled an impressive amount of firepower, ranging from 175mm guns to 4.2-inch mortars.* Lieutenant Colonel Hendricks had a largely expanded force including two U.S. Army 175mm gun batteries. While his 1st Battalion was attached to the 12th Marines,** he

retained command of his other three battalions and was reinforced by several general support FMF separate units. These included the 3d 8-inch Howitzer Battery and the 3d 155mm Gun Battery. He also had attached to his command the 1st Armored Amphibian Company with its LVTH-6s, amphibian tractors equipped with a turret-mounted 105mm howitzer.¹

Lieutenant Colonel Hendricks had a two-fold mission, which included both artillery support of the Marine infantry operations and the defense of the Da Nang Vital Area from ground attack as the commander of the Northern Sector Defense Command. While not facing the array of North Vietnamese artillery that the 12th Marines did along the DMZ and at Khe Sanh, the 11th Marines was engaged in a counter-battery campaign of its own against the very real rocket threat to the crowded Da Nang Airbase. With the introduction by the Communist forces of long-range 122mm and 140mm rockets in 1967 against the Da Nang base, the Marines countered with what they termed the "rocket belt," extending some 8,000 to 12,000 meters, about the outside range of the enemy missiles. Employing a centralized control system, the 11th Marines erected a series of artillery observation posts and deployed its artillery so that each part of the rocket belt was covered by at least two firing batteries. By the beginning of 1968, the regiment had reduced the average response time from the launch of an enemy rocket to answering fire from the American guns to about three minutes.^{2***}

*With the arrival of the 2d Battalion, 13th Marines with the 27th Marines at Da Nang in February, the 11th Marines also took operational control of this battalion. The 2d Battalion included 107mm howitzers, a 4.2-inch mortar tube mounted on the frame of the 75mm pack howitzer of World War II vintage.

**Colonel Robert C. V. Hughes, who as a lieutenant colonel in 1968 commanded the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, noted that while the battalion was attached to the 12th Marines, it remained in direct support of the 1st Marines, a 1st Marine Division infantry regiment, also at the time under the operational control of the 3d Marine Division. In January 1968 it was at Quang Tri and then moved with the 1st Marines to Camp Evans, and then to Phu Bai. See Chapters 5–6. Hughes wrote, "We were never in ground contact with our rear echelon/admin support unit during the entire period." He declared that "Our primary source of spare parts was quite often the damaged and abandoned equipment encountered on our line of march." The 1st Battalion during this period consisted of "Hq Btry, A and B Batteries, Prov 155mm how[itzer] Btry; and a reduced 4.2 Mortar Btry." Col Robert C. V. Hughes, Comments on draft, n.d. [Jan95?] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Hughes Comments.

***See Chapter 6 for discussion of the rocket threat at Da Nang. Colonel George T. Balzer, who as a lieutenant colonel commanded the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines in early 1968, recalled that he had his command post on Hill 55, Nui Dar Son, south of Da Nang, together with his fire direction center, Battery K, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, and his 4.2-inch Mortar Battery. He observed that the amount of coordination "necessary to deliver artillery fire into areas where friendly forces [were] constantly dueling with enemy forces is tremendous." The Marines at Da Nang manned a network of observation towers equipped with azimuth measuring instruments and maintained a list of accurately identified coordinates throughout the TAOR. With constant alerts and testing of the system, Balzer claimed that "urmost proficiency was



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At night, the 3d 8-inch Howitzer Battery at Da Nang fires one of its self-propelled M55 8-inch howitzers, which had a maximum range of nearly 17,000 meters.



Photo from Abel Collection


Col Edwin S. Schick, the 12th Marines commander, pulls the lanyard of a Battery E, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines M101A1 105mm howitzer. This is the 200,000th round fired by the battery in Vietnam

By late 1967, the 12th Marines had become the largest artillery regiment in the history of the Marine Corps. If one included the artillery at Khe Sanh, the

achieved and maintained." Once the Marines manning the tower obtained "an intersection of two, preferably three . . . bearing[s] . . . , the critical coordination of friendly forces and potential enemy locations would precede the initiation of counter-rocket fire." He stated that the "authority to initiate fire was delegated to battery commanders." His "Golf Battery, 3/11 on Hill 10, held the response record of less than fifteen seconds" According to Balzer, the towers identified enemy rockets about to be launched "just as Golf was prepared to fire [a] Harassing and Interdiction mission" After being loaded with "high explosive projectiles and charge . . . [with] A minor adjustment to azimuth and quadrant, . . . the six howitzers were ready to fire in a direct fire mode." This incident resulted in the capture of the 122mm rocket launcher. Colonel Balzer observed that "the first rounds in a rocket attack are 'free' for the enemy. It is only for the subsequent rounds that counter-battery fire may be effective. Warning messages may be transmitted to potential target areas by the observers of rocket launches. The observers note the angle of the flame trail and thereby exclude target areas which are not involved." He concluded, "coordination of friendly patrol schedules, definite times for occupation of specific areas, and continuous monitoring of same are all critical to ensure that counter-battery fire may be initiated safely. Time lost in determining which areas are free of friendly forces after a rocket attack has been launched gives the enemy additional time to complete his mission with impunity." Col George T. Balzer, Comments on draft, dtd 10Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

12th Marines had some 180 field pieces of mixed caliber ranging from the 175mm gun to the 4.2-inch mortar. Colonel Edwin S. Schick, Jr., the regimental commander, had under his operational control his four organic battalions, the 1st Battalions of both the 11th and 13th Marines; the 1st 8-inch Howitzer Battery; the 5th 155mm Gun Battery; two provisional 155mm howitzer batteries, and the 2d Platoon, 1st Armored Amphibian Company with its six LVTH-6s. In addition, he also had subordinate to him the U.S. Army 108th Field Artillery Group and the Marine 1st Field Artillery Group (1st FAG). The Army group functioned as the administrative and tactical headquarters for the Army 175mm gun and 105mm howitzer batteries attached to the Marine regiment while the 1st FAG performed a similar role for the Marine units. All told, as the year began, the 12th Marines controlled about 35 firing units positioned at 12 different locations spread from Khe Sanh to Phu Bai.^{3*}

*Colonel Schick, a veteran of both World War II and Korea, observed in his comments that his entire career "has been supporting arms." He had assumed command of the 12th Marines in May 1967 and remarked on the wide dispersion of the 12th Marines which until early 1968 had its main headquarters with that of the division at Phu Bai. According to Schick the infantry often was unaware of the firepower



Department of Defense (USMC) A190978

A crane replaces a barrel of one of the U.S. Army M107 175mm self-propelled guns stationed at Camp Carroll. The 175mm gun had a maximum range of more than 32,000 meters.

During January, with the perceived increasing threat in the north, the Marine artillery, like the infantry units, participated in Operation Checkers, the northward deployment of the Marine divisions. With the establishment of the 1st Marine Division Task Force X-Ray at Phu Bai and the relinquishment of units by the 3d Marine Division, there was a corresponding shuffling of Marine artillery between the

two Marine divisions.* The idea was to concentrate the 12th Marines in northern Quang Tri and for the 11th Marines to cover both Quang Nam and Thua Thien Provinces.

In mid-January, Task Force X-Ray at Phu Bai and the 11th Marines assumed operational control of the 1st Field Artillery Group, now under Lieutenant Colonel John F. Barr. The 12th Marines also gave up operational control to Lieutenant Colonel Barr of the 1st 155mm Gun Battery and a provisional 155mm Howitzer Battery, both at Phu Bai. Lieutenant Colonel Hendricks also received the return of his 1st Battalion which remained in support of the 1st Marines at Phu Bai and deployed his 2d Battalion from An Hoa south of Da Nang to the Phu Loc sector northwest of the Hai Van Pass area in southern Thua Thien Province. To

available to them. He pushed his own officers to offer support: "Artillery does not do anything on its own. It's all in support of that infantry commander." He did not believe his weapons were employed to the best of their capabilities, but the situation improved in time as facilities were made available. He related that he was able to convince the Seventh Air Force to send Air Force personnel to become part of the 3d Marine Division Fire Support Coordination Center to provide for better coordination and to limit the number of artillery restrictive fires when Air Force aircraft were in artillery range. Col Edwin S. Schick, Jr., Comments on draft, n.d. [1994] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Schick Comments.

*See Chapter 6 also for the establishment of Task Force X-Ray.



Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A371665

A Marine M109 self-propelled 155mm howitzer at Phu Bai fires in support of Marine infantry. The 155mm howitzer had a range of slightly more than 15,000 meters.

take up the slack at An Hoa, Hendricks created a Provisional Battery Quebec which included a section of 8-inch howitzers and a section of 155mm guns to support the ARVN, Marine units, and Marine reconnaissance Stingray missions. He also moved five LVTH-6s from the 1st Armored Amphibian Company to Hoi An to cover the operations of the Republic of Korea Marines operating in that sector.⁴

With the implementation of Operation Checkers and the added reinforcement of Army units into I Corps through January, the 11th Marines controlled at the height of the Tet Offensive more than 190 artillery pieces. At Da Nang, the regiment played an important role in the disrupting of the *2d NVA Division* attack before it ever really started by the placement of accurate artillery fires upon enemy troops in the open.* Further north at Phu Bai, the 1st FAG supported the 1st Marines and ARVN in the defense and recapture of Hue city. According to the regiment's account, the Marine artillery during the month-long battle for the city fired 1,821 missions, expended 12,960 rounds, and reported 328 enemy dead.** Even with the expansion of the 11th Marines during Tet, the attention of both III MAF and MACV remained riveted upon the 3d Marine Division operations along the DMZ and at Khe Sanh.⁵

*See Chapter 8 for the attacks of the *2d NVA Division* at Da Nang.

**Nearly 800 of the missions and 5,000 of the rounds were fired during the last few days of the operation. According to the 11th Marines in its February report, the artillery in support of the Hue battle had fired during the month 1,049 missions and 7,357 rounds as contrasted to the much higher figures contained in the March report which covered the period 1 February–2 March 1968. Interestingly enough, the March report on the number of enemy dead was about 200 less than the February report. 11th Mar ComdCs, Feb and Mar68.

The Guns in the North

For the Marines at Khe Sanh, 21 January literally opened up with fireworks. While the Marine defenders repulsed several enemy assaults on hill outposts, enemy mortar and 122mm rocket bombardment exploded the main ammunition supply point on the base itself. About three or four rounds made a direct hit “and the ammunition cooked off for the next 48 hours.” Despite the destruction of nearly 11,000 rounds of ordnance, the number of casualties was surprisingly low, 14 Marines dead and 43 wounded. Hundreds of “hot duds” fell near the firing positions of three guns of Battery C, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines. One of the enemy rounds knocked out the artillery battalion’s generator for its field artillery digital automatic computer (FADAC), but the Marine artillerymen, relying on manually computed firing data, continued to return counter-battery fire at suspected NVA firing positions.^{6***}

While the enemy bombardment resulted in a temporary shortage, resupply flights soon brought the Marine ammunition stockpile at Khe Sanh up to adequate levels. The American artillery, nevertheless, worked at some disadvantage. With some of the enemy’s large guns at Co Roc in Laos, some 15 kilometers to the west, just outside of the maximum range of the 105mm and 155mm howitzers of the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines at Khe Sanh and the U.S. Army 175mm guns at Camp Carroll, the North Vietnamese 122mm, 130mm, and 152mm howitzers

***See Chapter 14 for the events of 21 January at Khe Sanh.



Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A190292

Marines of Battery W, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines at Khe Sanh are seen preparing to load a M114A 155mm howitzer. The M114A in contrast to the M109 is towed rather than self-propelled, but has the same range.

continued to shell the Marine base, unmolested by artillery counterfire.*

Still the enemy was in no position to make a final assault on the Marine base. Complemented by a massive air effort in Operation Niagara** ranging from B-52s to helicopters, Marine artillery supplemented by the Army 175mm guns kept the enemy at bay. In one of the more climactic moments, American sensors on 3-5 February indicated the possibility of a North Vietnamese regiment moving into an attack position. In coordination with supporting B-52 Arclight strikes, the American artillery including both the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines and four batteries of 175mm guns blasted the suspected North Vietnamese positions. While unable to confirm the extent of enemy casualties, U.S. intelligence officers believed that the heavy and accurate artillery fire (almost 2,000 rounds from the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines alone) prevented these troops from reinforcing the North Vietnamese attack on Hill 861A that occurred at the same time.***

While U.S. supporting arms failed to prevent the overrunning of the Special Forces Camp at Lang Vei

south of Khe Sanh a few days later, Marine gunners still made a valiant effort. In their attempt to keep back the North Vietnamese attackers, the 105mm howitzers of the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines employed, perhaps for the first time in Vietnam, the still-secret Controlled Fragmentation Munitions (CoFraM), otherwise known as "Firecracker Munitions." A CoFraM shell consisted of a number of small bomblets, which when ejected, spread over a wide area, with each bomblet exploding like a small grenade. It was considerably more lethal against troops in the open than the standard high explosive projectile. How effective the new munitions were at Lang Vei can only be a matter of conjecture.****

*The 1st Battalion, 13th Marines at Khe Sanh consisted of three 105mm howitzer batteries, a provisional 155mm howitzer (towed) battery, and a 4.2-inch mortar battery. See Chapter 14 about the question of the location of the enemy artillery pieces in Laos.

**See Chapter 23 for Operation Niagara.

***See Chapter 14 for the account of the attack on Hill 861A.

****Lieutenant Colonel John A. Hennelly, who commanded the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines at Khe Sanh, stated that he fired only a few of the CoFraM rounds. He doubted very much their effectiveness. LtCol John A. Hennelly, Comments on draft, dtd 3Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File). Colonel Edwin S. Schick, Jr., the 12th Marines commander, also emphasized the judicious use of the new munitions. Schick Comments. See Chapter 14 for further discussion of the use of CoFraM at Lang Vei. The 11th Marines at Da Nang fired their first CoFraM mission on 15 March 1968. On that date, the 1st Platoon, 3d 8" Howitzer Battery fired two rounds in support of a reconnaissance mission. An observer reported that the "munitions . . . covered an area 200 x 300 meters with excellent target coverage." According to the report, it resulted in enemy killed and that the Communist troops "appeared to be surprised, shocked, and quite confused. Those who were not hit by fragments remained standing and immobile." 11th Mar ComdC, Mar68, pp. 2-3.



Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A190802

Marines are seen stacking empty 105mm casings at Khe Sanh, indicative of the artillery support provided for the base. In the background, partially obscured by clouds, is Hill 950.

While Khe Sanh was the center of attention for MACV and the press, the war along the DMZ had not diminished. During January and February 1968, in addition to Khe Sanh, the 3d Marine Division had fought a series of heavy engagements ranging from the sector just north of Camp Carroll to the Cua Viet along the coast. During these two months, in support of all units, the 12th Marines fired a total of 411,644 rounds, 212,969 in January and 198,675 in February. The number in January represented a 12 percent increase over the previous month, and while February's total

was six percent lower than January, it was still much higher than the December figure.* It was not until March that the 3d Marine Division artillery regiment reported a significant reduction in its fire support. In some 30,000 missions, only 20 percent of which were observed,** the 12th Marines expended nearly 190,000 rounds of all calibers as enemy activity exhibited a "reduction in aggressiveness." For this three-month period, the 12th Marines fired about 15 to 17 percent of its total rounds in support of the 26th Marines at Khe Sanh with the rest in support of the other regi-

*There are differences between the total rounds reported fired in the 12th Marines reports and those of the division. While the figures are higher in the regimental reports, the ratios between the sources remain roughly the same. The totals listed above are based upon the reports in the 12th Marines command chronologies as they contain a breakdown of missions. The 3d Division reports only give totals and it is assumed that these did not include some of the categories listed by the regiment. See 12th Mar ComdCs and 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Dec67–Feb68.

**Lieutenant Colonel John A. Hennelly, the commander of the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, explained that at Khe Sanh with both the infantry and artillery forward observers locked into defensive positions at both the base and the hill outposts, "there weren't many 'eyes' to handle observed fire missions." He mentioned, however, that when Marine aerial observers (AOs) were "on station . . . we could get a lot done, counter-battery and otherwise. Without Marine AOs we were in a hurt locker." According to Hennelly, the Air Force AOs were less effective: "They kept insisting that they were flying at tree top level—but I never saw any 10,000-foot trees over there." Hennelly Comments.

ments of the 3d Marine Division and in counter-battery fire along the eastern DMZ.^{8*}

By this period there had been a change in command relations in the north. MACV (Fwd) in early March became Provisional Corps Vietnam (Prov Corps) under Lieutenant General William B. Rosson and in a reversal of roles became a subordinate command of III MAF.^{**} Under III MAF, Prov Corps was now responsible for the two northern provinces of I Corps and took under its operational control the two Army divisions there, the 1st Air Cavalry and the 101st Airborne, as well as the 3d Marine Division. With the concurrence of MACV and III MAF, General Rosson changed the designation for the Khe Sanh campaign from Operation Scotland to Operation Pegasus. In Pegasus, Rosson placed under the 1st Air Cavalry Division the 1st Marines, the 11th Engineers, and a Seabee battalion.^{***} This new operation resulted in the ending of the siege of Khe Sanh. On 8 April, Army cavalrymen linked up with elements of the 26th Marines and one week later Pegasus came to an end. The 1st Cavalry then deployed into the A Shau Valley in Operation Delaware, but left one brigade in the Khe Sanh sector under the operational control of the 3d Marine Division in Operation Scotland II.^{****}

The change in command relations also affected the command structure of the artillery units in the north.

*FMFPac reported that Marine and Army artillery under the operational control of the 12th Marines fired slightly over 102,000 rounds of mixed caliber in support of Operation Scotland at Khe Sanh from 1 November 1967 until its termination on 30 March 1968. Most of the artillery support for Scotland was provided in the period January through March, thus the rationale for the percentage given in the text. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p. 3.

**See Chapter 13 for the discussion of command relations in the north.

***Colonel Robert C. V. Hughes, who commanded the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines in 1968, related that his battalion continued to support the 1st Marines throughout this period. He recalled that his battalion received a field artillery digital automatic computer (FADAC) just prior to the Hue City battle. This permitted his Fire Direction Center to control the "fires of the varied caliber batteries" assigned to him ranging from 4.2-inch mortars to 155mm howitzers (towed). According to Hughes, his battalion kept the FADAC "in continuous operation through all subsequent operations including Pegasus." When the 1st Marines relieved the 26th Marines at Khe Sanh, 1/11 relieved 1/13. Hughes wrote that "all of 1/11's rolling stock was turned over to 1/13 to permit their departure from Khe Sanh. All of 1/13's inoperative equipment had been pushed to the far side of the air strip along the cliff face. We were able to place all but one of the pieces back in service." Hughes Comments.

****See Chapters 13, 14, and 16 for Operations Pegasus, Delaware and Scotland II.

Provisional Corps took over direct control of the U.S. Army 108th Field Artillery Group and the Marine 1st 8-inch Howitzer Battery and 5th 155mm Gun Battery, which all had been subordinate to the 12th Marines. These units were responsible for "general support" and "reinforcing" fires of the 12th Marines, which remained under the 3d Marine Division.^{*****}

The increasing deployment of both Marine and Army units to northern I Corps had already resulted in a much more complex coordination control of supporting arms. As early as the latter part of 1967, the 3d Marine Division had taken steps to automate further its fire support control systems. By March of 1968, the division had created in its fire support coordination center (FSCC), its staff agency for the coordination of all supporting arms, a fire support information center (FSIC). Using sophisticated computer techniques, the idea was to provide more realistic firing data that could be used in counter-battery fire and to refine the target list based upon previous fire missions and sightings. Limited computer memory and the use of a punch card stored data base, nevertheless, restricted "'real time' information retrieval in the FSIC."^{10*****}

General Cushman recalled several years later that the fire coordination and artillery support in the north during 1967 and early 1968 was not all that he wished that it was. While not mentioning any specific incidents such as the unusual number of "friendly fire"

*****Colonel James Leon, an experienced ordnance and artillery officer who served on the III MAF staff, believed that there needed to be a further transformation of artillery command relations at the III MAF level. He stated there was in his opinion, "a serious deficiency in the management of Marine artillery at the III MAF level. The 3d MarDiv artillery operated under the opcon of Prov Corps at Phu Bai. 1st Mar Div artillery had opcon in its area." On the III MAF staff, however, there was only an assistant artillery operations officer "who was saddled with additional duties that allowed him little time to perform his primary duty." According to Leon, "There was a need for a Field Artillery Group headquarters at the III MAF headquarters level. The allocation of resources between the division and the performance of support services suffered as a consequence of this deficiency." Leon wrote that as the III MAF ordnance officer, he "worked closely with the artillery assistant ops officer and in effect from time to time functioned beyond my regular duties. In effect I acted as III MAF artillery officer." Col James Leon, Comments on draft, n.d. [1993] (Vietnam Comment File).

*****Colonel Edwin S. Schick, Jr., the commander of the 12th Marines at the time, observed that the personnel for the FSIC came from the 1st Field Artillery Group at Phu Bai. Schick Comments. For initial developments and problems with the FSIC including its relationship with the FSCC and its computer limitations, see LtCol C. V. Hutcheson memo to Col Schick, dtd 4Feb68, Subj: The FSIC . . . Current Status, and 12th Marines, draft SOP for the 3d Div Fire Support Information Center, Jan68, Encls, Schick Comments.

incidents that occurred in the 3d Division during January 1968,* he related "a lot of Marines either weren't getting educated or had completely forgotten how . . . to set up a fire support coordination center and get it operating properly." He stated he "particularly noticed this up at Dong Ha. I noticed it, Westmoreland noticed it, gave me hell about Marines not knowing their business."^{11**}

General Cushman was not alone in his criticism. Brigadier General Louis Metzger, the 3d Marine Division assistant division commander in January 1968, later faulted U.S. artillery doctrine which called for firing artillery "at selected unobserved targets at certain intervals with the hope of catching the enemy at the point of impact or denying him movement." According to Metzger, this "was not very effective . . ." and resulted only in the "expenditure of large amounts of ammunition." While admitting that "massive fires may be useful in certain combat situations," they were "of uncertain value in many others."^{12***}

Still, by the end of March, the 12th Marines and the 3d Marine Division had taken several steps to improve artillery support. While acknowledging less enemy activity during the month, the author of the division's command chronology attributed a decrease of artillery ammunition expenditure more to "selective targeting and increased command emphasis on the judicious use of ammunition." In April, the division reported that it continued to place emphasis upon "the selection of the number of rounds and type fuze appropriate to the target under attack." Moreover, it claimed that the FSIC continued to "improve the accuracy and timeliness in reporting fire support information." During May, the 12th Marines drafted a new SOP (Standing Operational Procedure) for the 3d Division Fire Support Coordination Center that incorporated the changes in the combat situation and the establishment of the FSIC. By this time, the FSIC had largely expanded both the size and reliability of its data base.¹³

*See Chapter 3.

**Colonel Schick, the 12th Marines commander, observed that while there were occasional problems with the artillery, General Cushman never indicated to him that the job was not being done and that he remained in his command slot for a full tour. Schick Comments.

***Colonel Peter J. Mulroney, who assumed command of the 12th Marines in July 1968, observed there are times when it is necessary to employ unobserved fires: "Harassing and Interdiction fires are an essential ingredient of a coordinated fire plan. While they don't have to be massive they [need to] be thorough." Col Peter J. Mulroney, Comments on draft, dtd 10Nov94 (Vietnam Comment Files).

The month of May was a critical one for the 3d Division and its artillery. It marked the beginning of mobile operations in both western and eastern Quang Tri Province. In Operation Scotland II, the 3d Division Task Force Hotel would be moving into operational areas beyond the range of the guns at Khe Sanh and Ca Lu. The only solution was to build fire support bases for the artillery. In eastern Quang Tri, the month witnessed the successful repulse of a multi-battalion North Vietnamese force in the vicinity of Dong Ha, the main Marine base in the north. While the initial attack and fighting ended on 2 May in the Dai Do village sector, the North Vietnamese attempted a new offensive later in the month. Employing helicopter-borne cordon tactics, supplemented by artillery as well as close air support, Marine and attached Army infantry units drove the North Vietnamese troops back into the DMZ with heavy losses. In support of the May operations, the 12th Marines fired 330,000 rounds of mixed caliber, more than any previous month including the two months of Tet, January and February. In fact, the May total was only about 80,000 rounds short of the total of those two months.^{14****}

Mini-Tet and the Fall of Ngog Tavak and Kham Duc

The enemy thrust in the north in May was part of a second phase "Tet" offensive, labeled as "Mini-Tet" by the American command. For the most part, this second offensive was hardly a replica of the first as far as the extent and breath of the enemy actions. Except for the fighting in the north, a new assault on Saigon, and renewed pressure in the Central Highlands and along the Laotian border in southwestern I Corps, the enemy limited itself to attacks by fire and minor ground assaults. In the large Da Nang TAOR, the 1st Marine Division launched Allen Brook***** as a spoiling operation to prevent any consolidation of enemy forces in that sector. Still May was the bloodiest month of 1968 and for those Marine units involved in the heavier May engagements, they equalled any of the fighting up to that date. In the one major reversal for the allied forces during the enemy onslaught, the fall of the U.S. Special Forces camps at Ngog Tavak and Kham Duc, an artillery detachment from the 11th Marines, Battery D, 2d Battalion, 13th Marines, played a heroic role.

****See Chapters 15 and 16 for the battle for Dong Ha and operations in Operation Scotland II.

*****See Chapter 17 for Operation Allen Brook.

From February through March, the 11th Marines with its 190 guns surpassed the size of the 12th Marines. Reinforced not only by the 1st Field Artillery Group and Army artillery in the Phu Bai sector, the regiment also obtained operational control of the 2d Battalion, 13th Marines. The latter battalion arrived with the 27th Marines as part of the February reinforcements approved by President Johnson.^{15*}

As the enemy Tet attacks gradually subsided, the U.S. forces prepared to take the offensive. Towards the end of March, the 11th Marines lost operational control of several of the Army artillery units and the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines to the 1st Air Cavalry Division in preparation for that division's Pegasus operations. At the same time, the artillery regiment at Da Nang in its own way took more aggressive actions. It continued to support the reconnaissance Stingray patrols and began to employ "Firecracker Munitions". On 7 April, for example, the 1st Platoon, 3d 8-inch Howitzer Battery fired three CoFraM rounds on about 80 VC in the open and killed over 50 of them according to the reconnaissance Marines who called in the mission. In another "Firecracker" mission, three weeks later, the 4th Battalion, 11th Marines claimed to have killed more than 60 enemy troops attempting to cross a river. Of the total 1,100 reported enemy dead in the 1st Marine Division area of operations for the month of April, the 11th Marines maintained that nearly half were the result of its artillery fire.¹⁶

By the end of the month, the 1st Marine Division supported by the 11th Marines prepared for extensive offensive operations which would require more forward firing positions. The division planned to conduct two multi-battalion spoiling operations in May. In Operation Allen Brook, the 27th Marines planned to penetrate the Go Noi Island sector, while the 7th Marines and later the 26th Marines were to conduct Operation Mameluke Thrust in the Vu Gia River Valley near the U.S. Special Forces camp at Thuong Duc, about 25 miles southwest of Da Nang.**

At the same time, American intelligence reported that North Vietnamese troops posed a threat to two other Special Forces camps Ngog Tavak and Kham Duc, about another 35 miles southwest of Thuong Duc. Situated near Laos in Quang Tin Province, the two outposts provided the allies the ability to monitor the North Vietnamese infiltration through the Ho Chi

Minh Trail network across the border into South Vietnam. With the fall of Lang Vei near Khe Sanh earlier in the year, they remained the only Special Forces camps in I Corps near the trail.

With the increased likelihood that the North Vietnamese might attack, General Cushman, the III MAF commander and the senior I Corps advisor, decided to reinforce the bases. Army engineers had already started in early April to upgrade the runway at Kham Duc and to construct a radio navigation facility there. On 16 April, the 11th Marines alerted the 2d Battalion, 13th Marines to be prepared to send a 105mm howitzer detachment of two guns from Da Nang to Kham Duc. Thirteen days later, a fixed-wing transport ferried a platoon-sized detachment from Battery D of the battalion consisting of one officer and 43 enlisted men with two 105mm howitzers to the Kham Duc airfield. On 4 May, a Marine helicopter lifted the detachment together with its guns and equipment from Kham Duc to the satellite camp at Ngog Tavak, a distance of some five miles to the south. Sited on Hill 738 and within 10 miles of the Laotian border, the Marine artillerymen were in position to disrupt the movement of North Vietnamese troops along the nearby trails and avenues of approach.¹⁷

Besides the Marines, Ngog Tavak, with its defenses dating back from the days of the French war against the Viet Minh, was home to a 113-man CIDG Mobile Strike Force Company. Serving with the Vietnamese irregulars were eight U.S. Army Special Forces advisors and three members of an Australian Army training team. For a brief period, even with the arrival of the Marines, the North Vietnamese left the camp relatively unmolested. This all changed in the early morning hours of 10 May. At 0240, the Marine detachment reported that Ngog Tavak was under attack from four directions. By 0330, under cover of B-40 rockets, grenades, mortars, and small arms, North Vietnamese regulars had breached the wire of the outside defenses. According to reports, some of the CIDG troops manning the outposts turned their weapons upon their compatriots and Americans in the compound. The Marine artillery gunners lowered their howitzers and fired directly into the onrushing North Vietnamese. Other members of the detachment grabbed whatever weapons were available and continued to fend off the attackers as best they could.¹⁸

One Marine, Corporal Henry M. Schunck, rushed from the protective cover of his position near the command bunker to a more exposed, abandoned 4.2-inch mortar emplacement in the center of the compound.

*See Chapters 13 and 27 for the arrival of the 27th Marines.

**See Chapter 17 as well for discussion of Operation Mameluke Thrust.

Although wounded, Schunck single-handedly attempted to man the weapon. Unable to do so, he moved to the assistance of a more seriously wounded Marine who had tried to join him. Dragging the injured man to cover, he and another Marine moved to an 81mm mortar, which they continued to fire at the advancing enemy troops until running out of ammunition. Schunck was later awarded the Navy Cross.¹⁹

Another Navy Cross recipient from the same action at Ngog Tavak was Marine Lance Corporal Richard F. Conklin. Once the enemy attack began, Conklin grabbed a machine gun and opened up on approaching NVA troops. Frustrated in their attempts to reach the compound, the North Vietnamese returned concentrated automatic weapons fire and tried to knock out the Marine machine gun position with grenades. Conklin threw back several of the grenades and continued to fire his weapon until he collapsed from his wounds.²⁰

Despite such heroics, the defense of Ngog Tavak was a hopeless cause. Both Marine First Lieutenant Robert L. Adams, the commander of the Marine detachment, and Army Captain Christopher J. Silva, the Special Forces commander, had sustained severe wounds. About 0800, under cover of the Marine howitzers and automatic weapons, Marine and Army helicopters took out the most severely wounded. Among them were Lieutenant Adams, Corporal Schunck, Lance Corporal Conklin, and 15 other Marines from the artillery detachment. An attempt to bring in reinforcements proved futile and resulted in the loss of two of the helicopters. Out of 105mm ammunition, the Marine gunners "spiked" the guns with thermite grenades to render them inoperative.* Led by the senior Australian advisor, the remaining defenders of Ngog Tavak, including 13 Marines of the detachment, abandoned the camp to the enemy. After a trek through the jungle for six miles, American helicopters evacuated the survivors to Kham Duc. Of the 43 Marines and 1 Navy corpsman who made up the artillery detachment, 13 were dead and 20 were wounded. Only 11 men escaped relatively unscathed. In January 1969, the Secretary of the Navy awarded the detachment of Battery D, 2d Battalion, 13th Marines the Meritorious Unit Commendation for its part in the defense of Ngog Tavak.²¹

The survivors of Ngog Tavak were not to find Kham Duc a safe haven. After overrunning the former, on the afternoon of 10 May, the North Vietnamese turned their attention to the latter camp. At first, after consultation with Generals Westmoreland and Abrams, General Cushman had decided to reinforce the camp and counter the North Vietnamese offensive there. Air Force fixed-wing transports and Marine and Army helicopters brought in the Americal Division's 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry from Chu Lai reinforced by an additional infantry company and supported by some Army artillery. By 11 May, Kham Duc had about a 1,500-man force, including both the U.S. Army and Vietnamese CIDG units in the camp itself and in the surrounding hill outposts. That night, however, the 2d NVA Division began to pick off these outposts.²²

With concern about the obvious enemy strength and not wanting to deplete the limited allied forces at Da Nang, General Cushman began to have second thoughts about engaging the North Vietnamese so far out of range of any concentrated artillery. After listening to General Cushman brief the situation, General Abrams also had little desire for a protracted battle and agreed to a withdrawal. General Westmoreland approved the decision. Under an umbrella of American air support, Air Force transports and Marine and Army helicopters lifted out the last of the defenders on 12 May, abandoning Kham Duc to the Communists. The following day, some 60 B-52s participated in an Arclight strike, dropping some 12,000 tons upon the former allied camp. General Abrams termed the abandonment of Ngog Tavak and Kham Duc "a minor disaster." According to a former III MAF staff officer, CIDG camps existed only for the purposes of intercepting and detecting infiltration and when enemy "organized forces move against them—you're going to lose it." Brigadier General Jacob E. Glick, who was the III MAF operations officer at the time, later recalled "that the reporters and the press gave us a bad time about this and called it a 'defeat.'" According to Glick, however, "We considered that we were making the best decision in a tough situation and were saving people and conserving resources." The forward deployment of the two Marine 105mm howitzers proved to have little deterrence upon the North Vietnamese.²³

Operations Drumfire II and Thor— Guns Across the Border

Despite the loss of the two CIDG camps, the enemy offensive by the end of May had more or less faltered.

*An American air strike at noon on the then-abandoned camp insured that the guns were indeed destroyed. The 11th Marines operations journal on 10 May contained the notation: "D/2/13 dropped two 105mm how[itzers] as result of combat loss at Ngok Tavak." S-3 Jnl entry, dtd 10May68, Anx C, 11th Mar ComdC, May68. See also S-4 Jnl entry, dtd 10May68, Encl 1, 2/13 ComdC, May68.

In northern I Corps, the allies prepared to take the fight to the enemy in some of his former sanctuaries with massive new concentrations of supporting arms including both air and artillery. While American artillery had employed counter-battery campaigns across the DMZ from time to time, the NVA gun and rocket emplacements in Laos at Co Roc and other positions west of the Khe Sanh base, had remained relatively free from retaliation by the American guns.*

In mid-May, in support of Task Force Hotel's expanding operations in western Quang Tri, Provisional Corps Vietnam authorized the 12th Marines to conduct what amounted to an artillery raid, code-named Drumfire II, against NVA logistic centers, gun emplacements, and suspected troop rendezvous sites. From 29 through 30 May, the 12th Marines moved a total of seven large artillery pieces, four 175mm guns and three 8-inch howitzers, from Thon Son Lam, C-2, and Ca Lu to new firing positions inside or just outside the Khe Sanh fire base. Arriving first, the 8-inch howitzers opened up shortly after midnight on 30 May at the enemy guns at Co Roc across the border in Laos.²⁴

From 30 May through 1 June in Drumfire II, the American artillery fired a total of 158 missions (59 8-inch and 99 175mm) amounting to 1,825 rounds (1002 8-inch and 823 175mm) at enemy targets in the Laotian-South Vietnamese border region with mixed results. Bad weather during this period hampered the aerial observation over the region. Of the number of missions, only seven of the 175mm and five of the 8-inch missions were observed. Of the 175mm missions, air observers reported a total of three bunkers and two structures destroyed, one secondary fire, four road craters, and "excellent target coverage" on an enemy storage area. The results of the observed 8-inch fires were not spectacular either, with the possible exception of the bombardment of a North Vietnamese bunker complex west of Khe Sanh just inside the South Viet-

nam border that destroyed two of the bunkers with "outstanding coverage."²⁵

Lieutenant Colonel Wilson A. Kluckman, who had just assumed command of the 12th Marines on 22 May and had moved a forward control headquarters to Khe Sanh for Drumfire II, recommended more such operations, but admitted to several shortcomings in the past instance. For one thing, he observed that proximity to nearby infantry security units determined the artillery firing locations rather than the best judgement of the artillery commander. Kluckman further suggested that weather forecasts "be a primary determining factor when selection of artillery raid time frames are established." He further complained that "observation potential was far from realized." Kluckman maintained that "despite detailed briefings and prior coordination, unfamiliarity with the terrain, poor weather, and lack of aggressiveness combined to significantly reduce the desired destruction." Other problems included a failure to pre-position all of the 8-inch ammunition prior to D-Day which resulted in traffic congestion and in a delay of the battery to occupy its position. Kluckman also wanted a simpler convoy system that would have permitted the guns to move from their former positions to Khe Sanh in "a single artillery convoy with its own security elements." He argued that the 3d Division system called for an exchange of infantry security at LZ Stud which resulted in a "five-hour delay for the transfer of responsibility." Moreover one of the 8-inch howitzers became stuck on a bridge and had to return to its former position at Ca Lu. Despite the difficulties, Lieutenant Colonel Kluckman praised the overall fire support coordination and observed that the enemy failed to bring any effective counter-fire on the Marine big guns. He concluded that Drumfire II "verified the

*Colonel Robert C. V. Hughes, whose 1st Battalion, 11th Marines had relieved the 2d battalion, 13th Marines at Khe Sanh during Pegasus, recalled that 105 and 155mm howitzers' range limitations "did not permit us to effectively attack the NVA gun positions on Co Roc." Hughes stated, however, that the Marines improvised a counter-battery technique by employing the platoon of M-48 tanks at Khe Sanh. According to Hughes, the tank's "90mm guns had a greater range than the howitzer [and] we could compute firing data for them in an indirect fire, artillery role. We pushed up inclined ramps with dozers to give the tank guns increased elevation and thus range." According to Hughes, although this return fire was "not particularly accurate, due in part to distance of observers from the target, we were able to cause the enemy guns to discontinue firing on several occasions." Hughes Comments.

**While Operation Drumfire II may have had only limited success, it did provide a moral boost to the Marines at Khe Sanh. Colonel Hughes observed that the 8-inch howitzers were placed inside the Khe Sanh base "along the airstrip with the primary direction of fire directly across the flight line. BGen Carl Hoffman [Commanding General, Task Force Hotel] . . . had a lasting impression of the first 8-inch mission (midnight 30 May), as it was fired directly over his bunker." Hughes Comments. General Hoffman, himself, remembered that he thought "Drumfire II was terrific! After being blasted daily by NVA long-range artillery positioned at Co Roc, we thoroughly enjoyed watching our own long-range artillery, most of which had slipped up to Khe Sanh under cover of darkness, hitting pre-selected targets on Co Roc. My own morale soared as did that of the entire Task Force Hotel." MajGen Carl W. Hoffman, Comments on draft, dtd 15Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Hoffman Comments. For further discussion of Drumfire II see Chapter 16 and for discussion of the enemy emplacements in Laos and the question of Co Roc, see Chapter 14.

feasibility and desirability of the employment of heavy artillery units in forward firing positions for limited periods of time.”²⁶

About a month later, the 3d Marine Division artillery participated in a combined arms “raid” to silence the enemy guns across the eastern DMZ, especially in the Cap Mui Lay sector. Enemy gun emplacements in and north of the DMZ posed a credible artillery threat to American and South Vietnamese bases and positions in northeastern Quang Tri Province. Although employing brief sporadic volleys rather than a continuous bombardment, the North Vietnamese guns occasionally could disrupt U.S. operations and logistic activities. At 1615 on 20 June, for example, North Vietnamese gunners hit Dong Ha with six 152mm rounds which resulted in the destruction of the ammunition supply point there. Secondary explosions and fires continued throughout that night and the next day. In all, the enemy artillery caused the loss of 10,500 tons of Marine ammunition, about 20 days worth of supply.^{27*}

For more than a year, III MAF had undertaken several efforts to counter the enemy use of its relative sanctuary area in and north of the DMZ. Operations High-rise, Headshed, and Neutralize all involved variations of the same theme: air and artillery attacks on enemy firing positions in and north of the DMZ. These operations were frustrated by the enemy’s formidable array of antiaircraft weapons north of the DMZ, which precluded both effective bombing and the air observation necessary for adjusting artillery fire and assessing its effects. In each of these operations, even concentrated efforts failed to produce any noticeable effect on the Communist gunners.

On 20 June, by coincidence, the same date of the enemy artillery attack on Dong Ha, General Westmoreland approved an earlier III MAF proposal for another major combined arms interdiction campaign against the DMZ sanctuary area. Codenamed Operation Thor after the Norse god of thunder, the plan called for a week-long supporting arms effort involving units of III MAF, Seventh Fleet, and Seventh Air Force in a joint attack on North Vietnamese artillery, air defense, and coastal batteries located in the Cap Mui Lay sector. This sector included the area extending north of the southern boundary of the DMZ about 15 kilometers to Cap Mui Lay and inland about 25 kilometers. The objectives were twofold: to destroy NVA

antiaircraft and field and coastal artillery, and to facilitate further surveillance and continued attacks on targets in and north of the DMZ. The III MAF commander, Lieutenant General Cushman, hoped that success in this operation would preempt any NVA preparations for an autumn offensive, while at the same time ending the threat to forward III MAF bases and lines of communication.²⁸

The concept of operations included four phases. In Phase I, the first two days, B-52s and attack aircraft would conduct heavy airstrikes to cover artillery units displacing forward to positions near the DMZ. Phases II and III, together lasting five days, were to include integrated attacks by air, artillery, and naval gunfire, first on targets in the coastal area, then expanding to the entire Cap Mui Lay sector. The events scheduled for Phase IV emphasized accomplishment of Operation Thor’s second objective: the continued attack of targets in and north of the DMZ. In this last phase, most artillery units would withdraw to participate in other operations while observers would maintain surveillance of the area, directing the attack of reemerging targets. Phase IV, planned as an open-ended evolution, would continue indefinitely.²⁹

The staggering firepower available for Operation Thor was commensurate with the magnitude of the task at hand. Thirteen batteries of artillery would participate, including the three 155mm batteries of Major Billy F. Stewart’s 4th Battalion, 12th Marines, reinforced by Battery K, 4th Battalion, 13th Marines and the 1st 8-inch Battery. While these units temporarily came under the operational control of the U.S. Army’s 108th Field Artillery Group for Operation Thor, all other 3d Marine Division artillery units stood ready to participate in the operation, if necessary.³⁰ The Seventh Fleet provided two cruisers and six destroyers, as well as 596 sorties of tactical air. The MACV planners allocated 861 Air Force sorties, including 210 B-52 strikes. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing scheduled 540 sorties, including 65 photo reconnaissance and electronic warfare missions to be flown by Lieutenant Colonel Eric B. Parker’s Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron (VMCJ) 1, which would provide surveillance of the DMZ throughout the operation. All III MAF units participating in the operation were under the control of Brigadier General Lawrence H. Caruthers, Jr., USA, who commanded Provisional

*See Chapter 3 for discussion of the enemy gun positions in Cap Mui Lay.

**On 26 June, Prov Corps transferred counter-battery responsibility from the 12th Marines to the 108th Field Artillery Group. (12th Mar ComdC, Jun68, p. 1-III-7.)

Corps, Vietnam Artillery from his headquarters at Dong Ha.³⁰

Provisional Corps, Vietnam published its order for Operation Thor on 24 June 1968, barely one week before D-Day. In order for the attack to proceed as planned, much remained to be done. While communications personnel from all participating organizations began establishing a network for command and control of the operation, engineers and surveyors began repair and construction efforts which would allow artillery units to displace forward to new firing positions along the Dyemarker line. Marine logistic units also had to stockpile at forward ammunition supply points the large quantities of artillery and air-delivered ordnance required for the operation. Complicating this task was the 20 June 1968 explosion of the Dong Ha ammunition supply point which closed the Dong Ha Logistic Support Area for six days. In the interim, the Quang Tri ammunition supply point provided ordnance for Operation Thor. The Provisional Corps commander, Army Lieutenant General Richard G. Stilwell, later stated that "the execution of Thor so shortly after the huge loss of ammunition seemed out of place with known facts . . . " and therefore created an element of surprise.^{31*}

On D-3, VMCJ-1, along with units of the Seventh Air Force, began photo reconnaissance missions of the Cap Mui Lay sector. Based on the intelligence these missions produced, the staff of Provisional Corps, Vietnam prepared a target list and completed the plan. Operating from their bases at Da Nang and Chu Lai, on 1 July, the fixed-wing squadrons of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing launched into clear skies for their first strikes of Operation Thor. Using intelligence assembled over the previous three days, Marine F-4s, A-4s,

and A-6s rolled in on suspected and confirmed NVA positions in the Cap Mui Lay sector. At the same time, Air Force and Navy attack aircraft and Strategic Air Command B-52s pounded other targets while Seventh Fleet naval gunfire ships closed range along the North Vietnamese coast to engage Communist shore batteries. Apparently caught off guard by the large-scale attack, the enemy reacted sluggishly. U.S. aircraft encountered little opposition and the ships sailed to within 10 kilometers of the shoreline without being engaged by the normally active NVA coastal artillery.³²

Meanwhile, the artillery units which were to play their part in the following phases of the operation moved swiftly into position. Five Marine self-propelled batteries, located in positions along Route 9 between Camp Carroll and Dong Ha, rapidly displaced closer to the DMZ. Some batteries moved north as far as 12 kilometers, greatly increasing their ability to reach targets in the Operation Thor area. The 30 howitzers provided by the 3d Marine Division represented about half of the total III MAF artillery effort committed to Operation Thor. An additional 31 heavy caliber weapons, including 20 long-range 175mm guns, came from U.S. Army units.³³

Following the carefully planned phasing of the operation, air attacks dominated the first two days, although artillery units conducted a few fire missions. During this phase, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing crews flew 194 sorties in support of Operation Thor, contributing significantly to the total Phase I ordnance delivery of over 4,000 tons.³⁴

On 3 July, with the number of attack sorties slightly reduced and the B-52 sorties cut to one-half of the Phase I level, III MAF artillery and Seventh Fleet naval gunfire ships joined the attack in earnest. Remarkably, the ships closed to within five kilometers of the North Vietnamese shore without a hint of NVA fire. Over 12,000 rounds of various calibers struck Communist positions in a single day.

In an effort to exploit the effects of the powerful combined arms attack, psychological operations personnel conducted an aerial drop of 28,000 leaflets over the Cap Mui Lay sector. The leaflets, intended to take advantage of the anticipated lowered morale of NVA troops subjected to continuous heavy bombardment in what had been considered a "safe" area, advised that "desertion, defection, dereliction offer the only alternative to certain death."³⁵

The success of Operation Thor hinged on fire support coordination and target intelligence. The major challenge in fire support coordination was to engage

*Colonel William H. Dabney, who as a major served on the 3d Marine Division staff, recalled some of the extraordinary efforts taken to restock the artillery ammunition. He recalled that the road from Quang Tri to Dong Ha was not cleared of mines and that it required Marine engineers to sweep the road before it could be reopened. Each morning two Marine engineer minesweepers departed, one from Quang Tri and the other from Dong Ha, and when "they met in the middle about noon the road was open and the convoys could begin." According to Dabney, this meant that six hours of daylight was lost before Marine trucks could move the ammunition. At that point, drivers from the 3d Motor Transport Battalion "volunteered [emphasis in the original] to drive the road each morning at first light wearing 2-3 flak jackets and with the truck cab carpeted with sandbags, and if they made it, then the road was open. If not, push their blown-up truck off the road and roll another through till it hit something." From that point, Dabney claimed that as a result "the road was usually open by 0800, which almost doubled the time ammo could be hauled." Col William H. Dabney, Comments on draft, n.d. (Vietnam Comment File).

each target with the proper mix of accurately delivered ordnance, while maximizing the potential of the units and weapons systems available. Also, since this was a joint operation on a grand scale, scores of aviation, artillery, and naval surface units representing four different Services, had to deliver their firepower into the same areas at the same time without interfering with one another.

Although no accidents or serious incidents occurred, the operation was not without problems in fire support coordination. For example, the manual target list maintained by Provisional Corps, Vietnam and the automated list maintained by Seventh Air Force were not compatible, so, fire support coordinators found it necessary to use both lists. This proved difficult and time consuming. Also, the requirement for a three-day lead time for Arclight strikes was a burden which diminished the effectiveness of the powerful B-52s by preventing their use against targets of opportunity.

Target intelligence presented two problems: target identification and damage assessment. Target identification came initially from photo imagery interpretation and was supplemented, after the start of the operation, by pilot debriefings and air observer reports. Accurate battle damage assessments were a critical part of the targeting process. Without them, planners could not determine whether the attacks achieved the desired effects, and hence, could not know whether a target should be engaged further or struck from the target list as destroyed. Post-mission pilot debriefings and observer reports provided the initial battle damage assessment. The photo reconnaissance missions flown by VM CJ-1 and Seventh Air Force units provided additional information.* Covering the entire Cap Mui Lay sector each day, these sorties provided target intelligence personnel information which, in some cases, led to the engagement of new relatively stationary targets less than eight hours after the mission.³⁶

On the ground, other target intelligence agencies were at work. Artillery forward observers, operating

from positions along the DMZ, identified and engaged some targets visually, providing their own damage assessments. Another target acquisition system used during Operation Thor was the three-station sound-ranging base** installed in the northeastern portion of I Corps Tactical Zone. Modern technology also assisted the III MAF targeting effort. A system called "Firewatch," installed at Con Thien and manned by artillerymen of the 12th Marines, combined night observation devices, a laser range finder, and an acoustical system to determine accurate range and direction. During Operation Thor, "Firewatch" detected 41 enemy targets. The 12th Marines also used five counter-mortar radar units, capable of detecting projectiles in flight and computing their point of origin. In addition, Battery F, 26th Field Artillery, a U. S. Army target acquisition unit, manned another six counter-mortar radars.³⁷

Despite this all-out surveillance effort, only about one-third of the artillery, naval gunfire, and air missions reported to the 3d Marine Division Fire Support Information Center during the month of July 1968, which included the period of Operation Thor, involved human observation and first-hand reports. Only one-fifth of these observed missions reported any damage to the targets.³⁸

Still, those participating in Operation Thor realized that the weight of firepower was having immediate effects. By 5 July, antiaircraft fire over the Cap Mui Lay sector was so light that O-1 aircraft carrying

*Colonel Eric B. Parker, who commanded VM CJ-1 in 1968 at this time, recalled Thor later as an operation that "started and ended with a mosaic of the DMZ area covering several miles north of the DMZ. First for Target I.D., the last for BDA [bomb damage assessment]." He remembered his "continuing frustration with never being told what our efforts produced or, in other words, did our flights contribute in any way to the prosecution of the war effort. We got routine 'attaboys' which everyone got, but never heard to my recollection of any specific target being identified and subsequently destroyed." Col Eric B. Parker, Comments on draft, dtd 13Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

**Sound-ranging bases employ a series of microphones spread over a known distance and wired to a central station. Each microphone, in turn, picks up the sound of an enemy gun firing and signals the central station. The sequence in which the microphones are activated and the time between activations are used to compute the direction to the enemy gun. A network of sound-ranging bases can provide intersecting directions to determine an enemy gun's location. Compared with some other systems that were available in III MAF at the time, the sound-ranging bases were crude, but when used as one part of a large, redundant target acquisition network encompassing a variety of systems, they could conceivably provide the final bit of information needed to locate a Communist firing unit. Lieutenant General Louis Metzger, who as a brigadier general served as 3d Marine Division assistant division commander in 1967 and early 1968, noted that the sound-ranging system "was brought to Vietnam in 1967 in an attempt to locate the enemy artillery firing from north of the Ben Hai River into our bases. It was basically a World War II system that was intended to be used in a broadly held front. It was unsuited for a battle in which only certain strong points were held, which did not allow for its positioning along a line so that the enemy firing position could be triangled." LtGen Louis Metzger, Comments on draft, dtd 17Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File).

Marine and U. S. Army air observers ventured north of the DMZ—an area previously accessible to them only at grave risk—to assist in adjusting fire and providing battle damage assessments. The damage to the NVA defenses was so great that even the vulnerable O-1s operated over the area for the rest of Operation Thor without sustaining any casualties, or indeed, receiving any hits.

The air observers reported that the Cap Mui Lay sector was a fortified area. Most villages consisted of a group of dug-in huts, with only their roofs above ground, connected by a series of trenches. Although rice was visible in the open in many villages, there was no evidence of farming activity, indicating that the enemy shipped in rice from other areas. Few personnel sightings occurred, but light antiaircraft fire came from several of the fortified villages. Fire missions directed against these villages often caused secondary explosions, indicating the storage of ammunition or fuel. There was every sign that the Cap Mui Lay sector was a military garrison area and that its villages were actually supply dumps or troop staging points.

During the final days of Operation Thor, III MAF artillery continued to pump an average of about 4,000 rounds per day into the target area, while naval gunfire added another 3,300 rounds per day. Air strikes totaled a further 2,400 tons of bombs, with 1st Marine Aircraft Wing crews flying 256 attack sorties. On the afternoon of 7 July, VMCJ-1 flew the final photo reconnaissance mission of Operation Thor. The next morning, artillery units began withdrawing from the forward positions, while air and naval units resumed normal operations.

Operation Thor expended enormous quantities of ordnance. Attack aircraft delivered 3,207 tons of bombs, while B-52s dropped an additional 5,156 tons. III MAF artillery units fired 23,187 rounds of 155mm, 175mm, and 8-inch ammunition. Ships of the Seventh Fleet accounted for 19,022 rounds of 5-inch, 6-inch, and 8-inch naval gunfire. The human cost of this massive application of firepower was low. On the ground, one soldier was slightly wounded by NVA counterfire, while Marine, Navy, and Air Force aviation units flew more than 2,000 sorties with the loss of three aircraft destroyed and one crewman killed in action. Marine aviation units and artillery units sustained no losses.

In assessing the damage to the North Vietnamese in their former sanctuary area, the after-action report filed by XXIV Corps stated that “severe damage was

inflicted upon the enemy.” The report cited as evidence “the minimal and ineffective hostile fire from the Cap Mui Lay Sector in the thirty days subsequent to THOR and the continued ability of our observation aircraft to operate over that area.”³⁹

Damage assessments included the destruction of 789 antiaircraft positions containing 63 weapons; 179 artillery positions containing 19 guns; 143 bunkers; 9 surface-to-air missile sites; and numerous trucks, sampans, structures, storage areas, and other miscellaneous targets. Pilots and observers noted 624 secondary explosions and fires. Unconfirmed reports of North Vietnamese killed totaled 125, but without the opportunity to send ground troops to investigate the area, the actual figure could not be determined. MACV noted:

Finally, there may well have been one contribution that could not then or perhaps at any later time be measured with assurance: If the enemy had intended using the CMLS [Cap Mui Lay Sector] as a staging point for staging a major infiltration program into the South, that possibility had been preempted. And preemption has always been one purpose of interdiction.⁴⁰

Following the completion of Operation Thor, Lieutenant General Richard E. Stilwell, commanding the newly redesignated XXIV Corps, pressed for continued overflight of the Cap Mui Lay sector by air observers and forward air controllers to sustain the success of the operation by daily engagement of recovering NVA targets, but this was not done. On 1 November 1968, all questions of how best to exploit the gains of Operation Thor became academic when, by order of President Johnson, all offensive operations against North Vietnam and the DMZ, including air strikes, artillery missions, and naval gunfire missions, were discontinued, except as necessary to retaliate to Communist attacks. Thus, the sanctuary was restored.⁴¹

Fire Base Tactics

By July 1968 with the imminent abandonment of the Khe Sanh base, the 3d Marine Division had instituted a mobile concept of operations patterned to a large extent upon the 1st Air Cavalry. While not completely abandoning the Dyemarker strong points, Major General Raymond G. Davis, who assumed command of the 3d Marine Division in May, had each of them manned with as small a force as possible, usually not above company strength. Starting with the Task Force Hotel operations in western Quang Tri, the 3d Division began a series of wide-flung heli-

borne operations throughout the width and breath of the division area.*

A central component of the new tactical mode was the artillery fire base.** Where the infantry went, the artillery followed, thus always keeping the maneuver elements within a protective fire fan. Typically blasted out of jungle-covered hill tops, the new artillery fire bases were mutually supporting as well as providing supporting fires to the infantry units. By the end of the year, the 12th Marines artillery, with 13 fewer firing units, was operating out of 12 more "fire-bases" than in January. Of the 21 artillery sites, 7 contained 10 of the 22 firing units, and were accessible only by helicopter.^{42***}

*See Chapters 16, 18, 20 and 22 for a description of the 3d Marine Division mobile operations during the latter part of 1968.

**Colonel Edwin S. Schick, Jr., the former 12th Marines commander, remembered that sometime in May before he relinquished command of the regiment, he made a reconnaissance and plans for an artillery fire base. He briefed Major General Rathvon McC. Tompkins, then commanding the 3d Marine Division, who approved the concept as long as General Davis concurred. Schick Comments.

***The establishment of these fire bases was a learning process for both the infantry and artillery units involved. Captain Matthew G. McTiernan, commander of Company I, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, related some of the difficulties he encountered in late July 1968 when his company helped in the preparation of a landing zone for one of the bases. He recounted that the artillerymen were used to "large, well defended positions, [and] had some difficulty understanding why their infantry brothers were so exercised by their behavior. Their artillery SOP for establishing firing positions seemed, to the average Marine infantryman, to border on lunacy. It seemed the artillery lacked a certain appreciation for the fact that we were the middle of Indian country, on the outer edge of the Camp Carroll fire fan, with no nearby friendly units to call for assistance. The din was unnerving, shouts, loud banging, screaming, and other seemingly amplified noise carrying over the surrounding jungle in all directions. First the Company Gunnery Sergeant made contact with his counterpart, this effort lasting less than thirty minutes. Next the Company XO [executive officer] contacted his counterpart, again no relief from the din. Night was fast approaching, and India Company was convinced Ho himself knew of our location and strength. Finally, I called on the Battery Commander. This had the most promising, if not lasting effect. Not that the battery lacked discipline. Far from it, this was a proud, highly motivated unit. They simply did not appreciate the situation as we did. Night was almost upon us and it seemed evident that any NVA in the area probably knew we were up to something. It is my contention that if in fact there were NVA units in our area they were as astonished as we were about the unusual activity and probably thought it some kind of trick on our part. In any case, I instructed one of our LP's [listening post] to toss a couple of grenades. This action had an equally astonishing effect. It was as if someone had turned off a loud radio. Complete, and from our point of view, blessed silence. Silence which descended over the position as did the night." Capt Matthew G. McTiernan, Comments on draft, n.d. [Dec94] (Vietnam Comment File).

The dispersion of Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Scoppa, Jr.'s 2d Battalion, 12th Marines in December was typical of the deployment of the 3d Division's artillery. In support of the 9th Marines Operation Dawson River in and west of the Ba Long Valley, Scoppa established his battalion command post on Fire Base Dick, about 5,000 meters south of Ba Long. Collocated with the 9th Marines command post, the artillery battalion kept in addition to its headquarters at Dick, one of its 105mm howitzer batteries, Battery E. At Firebase Barnett, about 5,000 meters southeast of Dick was another 105mm battery, Battery F. Then to the southwest and about 8,000 meters south of Dick, was Firebase Shiloh with two artillery batteries, Battery D, a 105mm howitzer battery, and the 1st Provisional 155mm Howitzer Battery equipped with three 155mm towed howitzers.**** Scoppa's 4.2-inch mortar or Whiskey Battery was with the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines at the forward edge of the Battery D artillery fan. This in effect permitted the infantry battalion "to maneuver slightly further than the eight clicks [8,000 meters] that would normally govern the outer limits of its movement."⁴³

In the selection of the fire bases, Lieutenant Colonel Scoppa explained that the site must be within a specified range from other artillery positions for mutual support and consistent with "the scheme of maneuver of the infantry unit" In addition, the battalion commander stated that there were three other prerequisites: "the piece of ground must be of adequate size" to accommodate a battery of artillery; "it must be defensible by a platoon [of infantry]" or at most a reinforced platoon; and finally "capable of construction within 24 to 36 hours." He observed that the Marines were now capable of placing a 105mm battery in an "area as narrow as 15–20 meters wide and 75 meters long." Other fire bases such as Shiloh were large enough to hold both a 105mm battery and three additional 155mm towed howitzers.⁴⁴

The artillery battalion commander provided the following description of Fire Base Dick. He stated that the Marines in November carved the base out in 24 hours on the "very crest of a 618-meter-high

****Major General Hoffman observed that in Task Force Hotel and 3d Marine Division offensive operations, "We favored the towed 155's over the self-propelled 155's because the former were helo-transportable and therefore could be employed in places and circumstances where the self-propelled models could not." Hoffman Comments.



hill." In building the base, Marine engineers blew off the top of the ridgeline and used bulldozers to dig the gun pits. The 105mm artillery battery there had a battery front of 75 meters. There were sheer drops to the rear and front, as well as to the left flank of the howitzers. For resupply, Dick depended entirely upon helicopters. The base was large enough to accommodate 2,000 rounds of 105mm ammunition. According to Scoppa, the Marines carefully monitored "the levels of units [of fire] on a fire base so that you can provide uninterrupted support to the infantry as required."⁴⁵

This dependence upon air delivery of supplies required close coordination between the artillery and helicopters. First of all in establishing the landing zone on the fire base, the Marines attempted to place it on a piece of terrain "which is at perpendicular to the prevailing winds so that the helicopter can come in one smooth motion, drop his load, and proceed."

Above, Fire Support Base Dick near the Ba Long Valley is where Battery E, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines established a 105mm howitzer firing site. Below, a ground view of the Fire Support Base includes firing stakes and hootches made of empty ammunition boxes. An artillery tube can be faintly seen at the upper right of the fire base.

The top photo is from the 12th Mar ComdC, Dec68, and bottom is Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A801291



Another factor involved the use of check fires when the helicopters arrived for resupply. Usually the battalion checked its fire "in order to give the helicopter the priority that it requires to drop its load and proceed." On the other hand, when the artillery was "shooting on an active mission" in support of engaged infantry "the fires have priority and the helicopter must wait or return to base to resupply us at a later time." There were complications also when the helicopters were resupplying ground troops or carrying out medical evacuations. Since the fire bases were usually on the high ground, the artillerymen fired their guns exclusively at a high angle, thereby the artillery trajectory did "not interfere continuously with the helicopter traffic" and permitted the clearance of "helicopter lanes beneath or below the max ordinates of the battery."⁴⁶

The helicopters were important also in bringing the artillery units into position. Marine CH-46s and CH-53As could easily bring the 105mm howitzers into the rapidly expanding fire bases. Furthermore, Army Sky Crane CH-54s could lift into position the

A Marine Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter carrying a M101A1 105mm howitzer as an external load is about to place the artillery piece at a fire support base southwest of An Hoa during Operation Taylor Common.

Photo is courtesy of Col Joseph L. Sadowski USMC (Ret)



towed 155mm howitzers. As Lieutenant Colonel Scoppa related, the Marines needed to provide only about 48 hours advance notice to obtain the Army "bird" which could transport the towed 155mm howitzers from fire base to fire base.⁴⁷

In December 1968, the 2d Battalion, 12th Marines had three provisional 155mm batteries equipped with the towed howitzers attached to its command. While the 1st Provisional Battery was at Shiloh, the other two batteries were at Fire Base Cates and at Ca Lu. From these latter two bases, the 155mm howitzers provided protective fires for the northern and western edges of the 9th Marines area of operations.⁴⁸

According to Lieutenant Colonel Scoppa, the new mobility of the artillery had transformed the war in the north. He observed that his units on the fire bases took relatively little incoming and attributed this "to the fact that we do move into them quickly, we occupy them for a relatively short period of time, . . . and then move elsewhere." Scoppa believed the enemy did not know how to cope with this rapid deployment: "We are now able to get into areas where he did not expect us to be able to come into, . . . in a matter of days span 16 clicks, sometimes 24 in three moves. Charlie [the Communist forces] cannot move out quite that fast. We get in with him where he is."⁴⁹

Further south in the 1st Marine Division sector at the end of the year, the 11th Marines also began to experiment with the fire base concept. Since April, the Marine artillery had moved into forward artillery positions in support of the large operations such as Mameluke Thrust, Allen Brook, and Maui Peak. Yet for the most part, the 11th Marines did not have the assets and command arrangements to use the fire base concept on a large scale. With the departure of the 5th Marines from the Phu Loc sector and finally with the transfer of the 1st Field Artillery Group from Phu Bai to Da Nang, the 1st Marine Division was prepared to launch Operation Taylor Common in Base Area 112. Under 1st Marine Division Task Force Yankee in Taylor Common, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond B. Ingrando's 1st Field Artillery Group directed an artillery force of two direct support artillery battalions and elements of other units, including 8-inch howitzers, 155mm guns, and 175mm guns. The idea was to build a series of fire support bases between the Arizona territory and the Laotian border to interdict any Communist forces in the enemy base area. The operation continued into

1969. The fire support base became an integral part of Marine Corps artillery employment and deployment for the remainder of the war.^{50*}

Marine Reconnaissance Operations

The more mobile Marine operations would also have an impact on the employment of Marine reconnaissance units. In 1968, the Marine reconnaissance units consisted of the 1st and 3d Reconnaissance Battalions and the 1st and 3d Force Reconnaissance Companies. The two reconnaissance battalions remained under the control of their respective parent divisions, the 1st with the 1st Marine Division and the 3d with the 3d Division. Each of the Force Reconnaissance companies were attached to one of the battalions, the 1st to the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion and the 3d to the 3d Battalion.

Since mid-1966, the two divisions employed their reconnaissance battalions in much the same way, basically as an extension of their supporting arms in "Stingray" patrols, thus bringing Marine firepower to bear deep in enemy territory. In Stingray operations, a small reconnaissance unit (usually a squad, although platoon-sized operations were not uncommon) moved to an objective area by helicopter and occupied a position on commanding terrain from which it could observe enemy activity. From their observation posts, the Marines watched for Viet Cong and North Vietnamese moving through the area. By maintaining a radio link to their headquarters, the Marines were able to engage lucrative targets with artillery fire and

air strikes without revealing their position. This technique greatly extended the effectiveness of U.S. firepower by hitting the enemy in his own backyard. For example, the 1st Division credited its Stingray patrols in the Da Nang sector for disrupting the enemy main forces as they moved into attack positions just prior to Tet.^{51**}

Although the Stingray concept called for the patrols to remain clandestine, they went to the field prepared for the worst. A squad, accompanied by a corpsman and occasionally by an artillery forward observer, would take a considerable amount of equipment for the defense of their position.^{***} In addition to the squad's own rifles, the standard equipment included M60 machine guns (occasionally, Marines even took M2 .50-caliber heavy machine guns and 60mm mortars), grenade launchers, Claymore mines, sniper rifles, as well as binoculars, spotting scopes, night vision devices, and, of course, radios. Such heavy firepower was virtually a necessity because the observation posts used by the patrols were, for the most part, somewhat developed as defensive positions with concertina wire, lightly constructed bunkers, and fighting holes. There were only so many pieces of commanding terrain and the patrols returned to these again and again.

Most patrols remained in position about four to six days, although some teams were out for as long as 10 or 11 days. On the other hand, helicopters might extract them much sooner than planned if the enemy detected the patrol. One team which paid the price

* See Chapter 21 for Operation Taylor Common.

**See Chapter 8. Lieutenant Colonel Broman C. Stinemetz, who commanded the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion during this period, provided the following description of the experience of one patrol in a harbor site on the nose of Charlie Ridge west of Da Nang that overlooked a well-known trail on 30 January: "Suddenly a major force of NVA regulars, heavily armed, came marching single file down the trail heading in an easterly direction towards the Da Nang area. At the 1st Recon Battalion's opcenter [operations center] came the whispered voice over the tacnet [tactical net] of the patrol's radio operator relaying his leaders observation. 'Ask them how far they are away,' the battalion's operations officer said. There was an agonizing wait as the operator relayed the request to his leader and waited for a response. Then in a barely audible whisper came: 'the six [patrol commander] says they are within farting distance.' The patrol leader stuck with his position for a good thirty minutes and then called artillery strikes on points further down the trail. The darkness and the dense vegetation prohibited any damage assessment, but in debriefings patrol members reported lots of screaming from the impact area." Colonel Stinemetz attributed the success of Stingray in the 1st Division sector for the growth of the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion in 1967. By the latter part of the year, the four reconnaissance companies of the battalion were joined by an

enlarged Company E which had an additional fourth platoon. With the introduction of the 26th Marines into country in 1967, Company B, 5th Reconnaissance Battalion, was attached to the battalion. Together with the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, which had been under battalion control for some time, there were a total of seven reconnaissance companies, more than doubling the 1st Marine Division's capability to field patrols. According to Stinemetz, "at this stage the Recon Battalion was the largest battalion in the division. It had more rolling stock than a motor transport battalion and more communications equipment than the Communications Battalion." Col Broman C. Stinemetz, Comments on draft, dtd 2Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Stinemetz Comments. Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Berg, who commanded the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion from July until December 1968, observed that the Stingray patrols usually varied from 8–12 men. He noted that "patrols preferred going short rather than have a new man added to the patrol." In addition to the corpsman and depending up the situation, a doghandler and dog may be attached, as well as other specially skilled personnel such as a demolitions expert. According to Lieutenant Colonel Berg, one dog had two confirmed "KIAs" from Stingray actions. LtCol Donald R. Berg, Comments on draft, dtd 9Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).



Photo from the Abel Collection

His face covered with camouflage paint, Marine PFC Robert L. Scheidel looks out upon a landing zone for his Stingray team from inside a Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter. Note the smoke canisters strapped to his chest.

for detection by the enemy was known as "Cayenne".* On 30 May, Team "Cayenne" occupied a position on a narrow finger near the Song Thu Bon less than one kilometer north of the border between Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces. The jungle surrounding the position had been burned away, revealing a gentle slope upwards to the north with steep drops to the south, east, and west. Five days and four nights passed without a single sighting of the enemy. At 2245, on 3 June, the Communists struck suddenly. A series of explosions rocked the observation post and, almost instantly, 40 Viet Cong overran the Marines' position. The 1st Reconnaissance Battalion lost contact with the team immedi-

ately following the initial report and called for help in the form of a Douglas AC-47 "Spooky".^{52**}

"Spooky 11" arrived on station over Cayenne's position at 2340. At 2351, the patrol leader reestablished radio communications with the battalion headquarters and requested an emergency extraction for himself and his wounded corpsman. He reported that the other 13 Marines of Cayenne were either dead or missing. The 1st Reconnaissance Battalion called for the extraction as another AC-47 and a flareship responded to the call for help and arrived to support Cayenne.

Just over 50 minutes after the request, two Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters arrived, sup-

*The teams were distinguished from each other by their radio call signs, e.g. "Cayenne," "Elf Skin," "Auditor," and "Hanover Sue" to name but a few.

**The "Spooky," sometimes referred to as "Puff, the Magic Dragon," was an attack version of the venerable Douglas C-47 Skytrain cargo aircraft. Armed with Vulcan miniguns, "Spooky" was capable of placing 18,000 rounds of 7.62mm machine gun fire on a target in one minute.

ported by a pair of Bell UH-1E "Huey" gunships. With the flareship lighting the battlefield and the Hueys and AC-47s suppressing the enemy fire, the Sea Knights moved in to pick up the patrol leader and his corpsman, completing the extraction at 0209. Only a quarter of an hour later, Team Cayenne, thought to be destroyed by the enemy, suddenly came up on the radio. There were still six Marines alive, but wounded, on the hill. In the darkness and confusion of the sudden attack, the patrol leader had believed them lost. The rescue effort went back into motion, with two helicopter gunships arriving on station at 0254, closely followed by another pair of Sea Knights. By 0334, the six wounded men were on board the helicopters and on their way to Da Nang. One of these Marines later died of his wounds.

AC-47s remained on station over the abandoned position for the rest of the night, shooting at fleeting targets. As each gunship ran out of ammunition, another replaced it. At 0642, four CH-46s inserted a reaction force into the ruined position to search for additional survivors and to collect the remains of those who had died. The reaction force found seven dead Marines and one dead Viet Cong in and around the position.⁵³

Fortunately, the experience of Team Cayenne was the exception to the rule. Most Stingray patrols occupied their positions, remained there for several days, and departed again without serious incident, sometimes without even sighting the enemy. There was even occasion for the grim humor that is prevalent in combat. First Lieutenant Philip D. Downey, leader of Team "Night Scholar" during an insert atop Loi Giang Mountain, three kilometers southwest of An Hoa, turned in this report of a sighting on 10 June:

20 VC with 10 bathing beauties. 10 women were bathing with 6 guards. Black PJs, khakis and towels; packs, rifles, and soap. Called F[ire] M[ission], resulting in 3 VC KIA conf[irmed] and 5 VC KIA prob[able]. Unable to observe women after this due to bushes, but patrol felt the water frolics were over.⁵⁴

Stingray patrols were capable of inflicting enemy casualties far out of proportion to their own size. Team "Elf Skin," occupied a position on a narrow ridge overlooking the Arizona Territory and the Song Vu Gia from 10 June to 16 June.* In this Communist-infested area, it recorded 25 separate enemy sightings which

totalled 341 Viet Cong. From its concealed position, the team fired 24 artillery missions, for a reported tally of over 40 enemy dead.⁵⁵

Two weeks later, a team known as "Parallel Bars," took up a position at the peak of the dominant Hon Coc Mountain, six kilometers south of Go Noi Island. Just after noon on 25 June, it saw about 100 VC moving west along a narrow finger outside the hamlet of An Tam (1), just southwest of Go Noi Island. An artillery fire mission using "Firecracker" ammunition accounted for more than 30 reported enemy dead. A little over three hours later, another group of about 80 Communists moved west along the same finger, in the same direction. This group, too, appeared to be leaving Go Noi Island. The Marine patrol leader contacted an observation aircraft on station over the area and arranged for an airstrike, this time killing about another 30 of the enemy. At 1855 the same day, Parallel Bars spotted another group of 16 Viet Cong, also moving west, 100 meters west of the previous sighting. Another "Firecracker" mission fell upon the enemy, but it was too dark for the team to observe the results. Incredibly, at 0800 the next morning, the team sighted a fourth group of 27 Viet Cong moving along the same finger, but about 900 meters further southwest than the first three groups. Parallel Bars called for fire still again, and reported killing five or more VC.⁵⁶

Stingray patrols supported all major operations. Teams occupied positions in or near the area of operations and coordinated their activities with the responsible infantry unit. As an operation ebbed and flowed according to intelligence reports of the enemy's activity, the Stingray patrols moved to new observation posts to maintain support of the infantry. Even while some teams were supporting major operations, others remained far beyond the TAOR of any friendly unit, directing artillery and airstrikes on Communist forces moving to and from their base areas. For 1968, III MAF claimed Stingray operations to have resulted in more than 3,800 enemy killed.^{57**}

**Colonel Stinemetz, who commanded the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion until July 1968, quoted the following reconnaissance statistics for the month of May: 149 patrols, 476 sightings, 59 contacts, 6,606 enemy sighted, 362 fire missions and 42 air strikes; 46 enemy KIA by small arms, 681 enemy by air and artillery. He stated that the Marines captured five weapons and took two prisoners. Marine casualties were 6 dead and 45 wounded. Stinemetz Comments. As with all statistics of enemy casualties and body counts, however, the historian and reader must take these as trends rather than absolutes. Colonel James W. Stemple, who commanded the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines in the latter half of 1968, recalled an incident in October when his battalion entered an area where reconnaissance teams had

*The "Arizona Territory" was the name commonly used by the Marines to describe the area northwest of An Hoa bounded by the Song Thu Bon, the Song Vu Gia, and the mountains south of Thuong Duc.

3D RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION 11 JULY 1968-12 DECEMBER 1968

	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
No. of Patrols	133	147	143	165	158	105*	851
Average Duration	2.13	2.45	2.36	3.19	8.60	3.89	3.77
Average Size	6.09	6.61	6.72	7.22	7.10	6.50	6.72
No. of Sightings	45	54	78	71	55	20	323
No. of Enemy Sighted	288	778	508	289	314	114	2291
No. of Contacts	20	52	52	34	31	22	211
No. of Fire Missions	16	28	39	64	64	22	233
No. Rounds Fired	416	1203	914	1742	1363	249	5887
No. of Air Strikes	5	14	5	24	3	5	56
Enemy KIA (C)	22	63	102	25	23	13	248
Enemy Captured	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Weapons Captured	2	5	8	0	7	1	23
Friendly KIA	4	1	5	1	3	1	15
Friendly WIA	26	5	20	4	6	8	69

* Includes 31 teams deployed in the field as of 12 December 1968

Chart provided by LtCol Donald R. Berg USMC (Ret).

Still there remained some question among infantry and reconnaissance Marines whether III MAF was making the best use of its reconnaissance assets. This was especially true in the 3d Marine Division. Lieutenant Colonel William D. Kent, the commander of the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion until early July 1968, several years later expressed his concerns that the reconnaissance patrols were “fighten” the NVA rather than “watching them,” thereby losing “a lot of long-range intelligence.” He believed there was an overreliance on radio intercepts and that the North Vietnamese “were smart enough not to talk.” Kent commented that this was especially true in the NVA offensive in the Dong Ha sector at the end of April and beginning of May. He believed the system awarded “pats on the back for KIAs,” but not for obtaining the elements of combat information.⁵⁸

Both Lieutenant Colonel Kent and Major General Davis, the former deputy commander Prov Corps and new 3d Marine Division commander, were influenced by the tactics of the 1st Air Cavalry Division. According to Lieutenant Colonel Kent, after the relief of Khe

Sanh in mid-April, he began exchanging patrol leaders with the Army units and sending some of the reconnaissance Marines to the Army schools. According to its doctrine, the Air Cavalry employed rapid helicopter inserts of small reconnaissance teams of four to five men to explore a given terrain, often using decoy aircraft to keep any watching enemy forces off balance. Combining “Red” [usually gunships] and “White” [aero scout] teams, the Air Cavalry could make a rapid reconnaissance and either call in the “Blues” [the aero infantry] or move on elsewhere.⁵⁹

Lieutenant Colonel Kent observed, however, that the reconnaissance Marines also had things to teach their Army counterparts. According to Kent, the Marines taught them how to call in supporting arms, especially fixed-wing airstrikes, and, surprisingly enough, map reading. He stated that his patrol leaders explained to him that for the Air Cavalry, “land navigation was not a big thing . . .” They told him that the Air Cavalry reconnaissance troops “didn’t have to read maps. They depended on the airplanes. There were airplanes up there all the time.”⁶⁰

In any event, encouraged by General Davis, the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion began, as Lieutenant Colonel Kent observed, to “loosen up” and do more “snoopen and poopen.” While still using 10-man Stingray teams, the battalion also started deploying

reported extensive enemy casualties killed by supporting arms. When asked why his battalion had found so few enemy dead, he turned to his questioner and replied that he was “standing on top of what should have been 197 dead NVA.” Col James W. Stemple, Comments on draft n.d. [1995] (Vietnam Comment File).

smaller teams, about four to five men, very often out of artillery range. Using both walking patrols and helicopter inserts, these patrols were out to obtain information rather than fight. According to Colonel Alexander L. Michaux, the 3d Marine Division operations officer, these teams were sent out and told "not to call in fire or anything. . . . Just find them and tell us where they [the NVA] are. We'll fix them with a battalion." Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Berg, who relieved Lieutenant Colonel Kent in July as commander of the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, noted that when he took over the battalion three of his companies were attached to other units. By mid-September, he had these three companies returned to his command and carrying out reconnaissance missions. In December 1968, General Davis observed that he had anywhere from 58 to 60 active reconnaissance teams with about 40 to 45 out in the field at any given

time. Within artillery range, he employed the Stingray patrols while the smaller patrols, designated "key hole" missions,* operated usually further out with the mission of watching and reporting on enemy troop activity. Like the artillery firebases, the 1st Marine Division also adapted the 3d Division reconnaissance techniques in Operation Taylor Common at the end of the year.⁶¹

*Chaplain Ray W. Stubbe, who has written extensively on Marine operations at Khe Sanh and on Marine reconnaissance forces, observed that the keyhole missions were "a return to the original concept of the Force Recon Company of having 4-man patrols, very lightly equipped, with the mission *only* [emphasis in original] of gathering information, operating very deep in enemy controlled territory far beyond the artillery fan for support. (The original Force Recon concept was for 4-man patrols operating up to 300 miles inland). This is a very historical development of recon in Vietnam." LCdr Ray W. Stubbe, Comments on draft, dtd 28Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).

CHAPTER 27

Manpower Policies and Realities

*Personnel Turnover—The Quality Issue and Project 100,000—Training
The Search for Junior Leaders—Discipline—Morale—The Aviation Shortage
Filling the Ranks in Vietnam: Too Many Billets, Too Few Marines
The Deployment of Regimental Landing Team 27—Reserve Callup?
The Bloodiest Month, The Bloodiest Year—Foxhole Strength: Still Too Few Marines
The Return of RLT 27—The End of the Year—The Marine Corps and the Draft
The Marine Corps Transformed*

In 1968, the Vietnam War dominated every aspect of Marine Corps manpower policy. Since the landing of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (9th MEB) in 1965, the overall strength of the Marine Corps had increased over 60 percent. More than a quarter of all Marines were in Vietnam; almost a third were deployed west of Guam (*see* Table 1).¹ Marine Corps Commandant, General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., later stated that by 1968, "there were just three kinds of Marines; there were those in Vietnam, those who had just come back from Vietnam, and those who were getting ready to go to Vietnam."² Between March and September of 1968, 8 of the Marine Corps' 12 active infantry regiments were in Southeast Asia. In FMFPac

only one regiment, the 28th Marines of the 5th Marine Division, remained uncommitted. This left three battalions in California, with none in Okinawa or Hawaii. On the east coast, most Marines in the 2d Marine Division were awaiting either their discharge or orders to Vietnam, while the individual battalions of the division's three regiments continued their customary

deployments to the Mediterranean and Caribbean.

The dramatic growth of both its end strength and its overseas commitments compelled the Marine Corps to alter drastically many of its manpower policies. Between 1965 and 1969, the Marine Corps changed from an organization which encouraged long enlistments and stable units to one forced to rely on short-term Marines and high turnover within units. The Marine Corps Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel (G-1), Brigadier General Jonas M. Platt, later related, "we had no choice with respect to short-term Marines and high turnover and both were a Hell of a necessary evil."³

Personnel Turnover

Before the Vietnam buildup, new recruits entered the Marine Corps on an enlistment of at least three years, with over four-fifths joining for four or more years.⁴ The Vietnam buildup that began in the fall of 1965 required a large influx of new recruits, forcing the Marine Corps temporarily to begin accepting men on two-year enlistments. Between November 1965 and

¹General Chapman was Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1 January 1968 to 31 December 1971.

Table 1
Percent of Total Strength in Vietnam

as of 30 June	U.S. Marine Corps			U.S. Army		
	Total	in VN	% in VN	Total	in VN	% in VN
1965	190,213	18,100	9.5	969,066	27,300	2.8
1966	261,716	53,700	20.5	1,199,784	160,000	13.3
1967	285,269	78,400	27.5	1,442,498	285,700	19.8
1968	307,252	83,600	27.2	1,570,343	354,300	22.6
1969	309,771	81,500	26.3	1,512,169	360,500	23.8
1970	259,737	50,500	19.4	1,322,548	298,600	22.6
1971	212,369	500	0.2	1,123,810	190,500	16.9



Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A601734
Marine SSgt Robert D. Iverson, a drill sergeant at the Marine Corps Parris Island Recruit Training Depot in South Carolina addresses his platoon in a driving rain storm. Close order drill was not dependent upon the weather and training schedules were to be met.

May 1966 the Marine Corps also accepted 19,573 draftees.⁵ After this initial surge ended in October 1966, the Marine Corps returned to three- and four-year enlistments. This did not last long. Still faced with a manpower shortage, on 2 May 1967, Headquarters Marine Corps once again authorized two-year enlistments. To keep personnel turbulence to a minimum, the Commandant decreed that two-year contracts would constitute no more than 20 percent of all new enlistments. Between 1 July 1966 and 30 June 1967, only 16.9 percent of all enlistments were for two years; over half were for four years.⁶

Manpower planners quickly found this high percentage of four-year enlistments a mixed blessing. The Marine Corps tried to ensure that no one would be involuntarily sent overseas for a second tour before spending at least 24 months in the United States. This meant that a Marine enlisted for four years would spend at least 4 months in initial training, normally followed by 13 months in Vietnam. After his required 24 months in the United States, he would have only 7 months left on his enlistment. Unless he reenlisted, this Marine would not have enough time left to serve a second Vietnam tour. This would not have been a problem if the Marine Corps' authorized strength had included enough billets in the United States to provide

a sufficient rotation base. It did not.

In December 1965, the Marine Corps requested a strength increase of 85,169 Marines to support operations in Vietnam. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara approved this request in full. Between September 1966 and May 1968, the Marine Corps repeatedly requested further increases in its overall strength to provide a large enough rotation base for the rapidly growing forces in Vietnam (*see* Table 1). Under political pressure to keep military spending as low as possible, Secretary McNamara denied or drastically reduced every one of these requests.

By September 1966, the Marine Corps began to have difficulty sustaining its force level in Vietnam, and requested a further increase of 21,569 Marines to support operations in Southeast Asia and 12,827 Marines to improve the training flow of new recruits, for a total of 34,396. Secretary McNamara approved a strength increase of 14,464. In September 1967, the Marine Corps once again requested an increase in its end strength to support operations in Vietnam and to improve the readiness of units in the United States, this time for 19,293 Marines. The Defense Department approved an increase of 7,000 Marines.⁷

In July 1967, General Platt described to his fellow general officers how the Marine Corps was caught between large commitments in Vietnam and an insufficient rotation base in the United States. As a solution, he proposed increasing the percentage of two-year enlistments. A typical two-year enlistee would spend five months in the United States before going overseas, serve a 13-month tour in Vietnam, and then spend "a largely useless 3 months in the rotation base." General Platt suggested that the Marine Corps should let these two-year men leave the Marine Corps before their enlistment expired, and then recruit new men on two-year contracts to replace them. Thus, in a four-year period the Marine Corps would realize two Vietnam tours, instead of one, for a single place in its overall end strength authorization. While not proposing a set percentage, General Platt observed that the Marine Corps needed two-year enlistees "in sizeable numbers to maintain the flow overseas."⁸

By late 1967 there were only a few first-term Marines left, aside from new recruits, who had not already served in Vietnam. In the combat arms and combat support fields, junior officers and staff NCOs were barely getting their required 24 months in the United States before returning to Vietnam. The only way to maintain the flow of replacements to Southeast Asia was to increase the number of new Marines. In

Table 2
Male Enlisted Non-Prior Service Accessions
as Percentage of Male Enlisted Strength[†]

Year	USMC	Army	Navy	USAF
1961-64	18	25	15	13
1965	30	40	20	16
1966	42	53	16	21
1967	28	31	15	12
1968	35	35	19	14
1969	33	33	18	12
1970	26	26	14	11
1971	27	26	15	16
1972	31	34	20	12

[†]Percentages derived by dividing male enlisted end strength as of 30 June (calculated from *Selected Manpower Statistics*) by total male non-prior service accessions for that calendar year (from Bernard D. Karpinos, *Male Chargeable Accessions: Evaluation by Mental Categories (1953-1973)* [SR-ED-75-18], [Alexandria, Virginia: Human Resources Research Organization, 1977]).

order to remain within the Marine Corps' authorized strength, for every extra man arriving at a recruit depot, someone else had to be discharged early. To accomplish this, the Marine Corps reluctantly allowed Vietnam returnees to leave the Corps up to six months before the end of their enlistments.^{9*} On 1 October 1967, the Marine Corps increased the acceptable quota of 2-year enlistments to 35 percent.¹⁰ In January 1968, the Marine Corps requested a strength increase of 10,300 to allow it to end the early release program. The Defense Department denied this request.¹¹

Faced with Secretary McNamara's refusal to increase end strength, the Marine Corps turned to the alternative proposed by General Platt in July 1967. In January 1968, the Assistant Chief of Staff (G-1), Major General Raymond G. Davis, determined that "sizeable numbers" of two-year enlistments meant half of all enlistments. Through this and other measures, General Davis and his staff hoped to "increase personnel turnover in lower grades."¹² Between January 1968 and June 1969 just over half of all enlistments were for two years, excluding nearly 16,400 draftees who also served for two years.¹³

The increased use of two-year enlistments did indeed serve to "increase personnel turnover." In 1968, a third

of enlisted Marines had less than one year service, as compared to less than a fifth for the period 1961-1964 (see Table 2). To compound the problem, in fiscal year 1968 over 280,000 Marines were ordered to a new duty station—almost one set of orders for every Marine.¹⁴

Before 1965, the Marine Corps consciously fostered personnel stability: Marines tended to serve comparatively lengthy enlistments; a fairly small proportion of Marines entered or left the Corps in any given year; and Marines tended to serve with the same unit for long periods.¹⁵ By the beginning of 1968, the high level of personnel turnover generated by Vietnam made it unusual for any junior Marines to remain in the same unit for more than a year or in the Marine Corps for more than two years.

The Quality Issue and Project 100,000

Length of enlistment was not the only standard compromised in the Marine Corps' effort to find enough new recruits to support the Vietnam deployment. The Marine Corps was also forced to lower the mental scores required for enlistment and to accept fewer high school graduates. Project 100,000 has received much of the blame for this decline. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara launched this program in October 1966, directing the Services to take a set percentage of the new recruits from men scoring below the previous minimum acceptable scores on the entry tests. McNamara predicted that military training would provide these disadvantaged youths with skills that would greatly increase their opportunities in civilian life.¹⁵

Project 100,000 required the Marine Corps to accept between a fifth and a quarter of its new recruits from men scoring in Mental Group IV on the Armed Forces Qualification Test, the lowest category legally allowed to serve. Half of these mental Group IV's were "New Standards" men, men who would have been barred under the enlistment standards in effect in August 1966. From the start, the Marine Corps opposed Project 100,000 on the grounds that the quotas forced the Corps to turn away better qualified applicants.¹⁶

While Secretary McNamara heralded Project 100,000 as a new departure and part of the "Great Society" program, the Selective Service System had already lowered its minimum mental standards a few

*Colonel James W. Stemple, who served at Headquarters Marine Corps after his tour in Vietnam, recalled that manpower managers at headquarters referred to Marines who had returned from Vietnam with still time to serve in the Marine Corps as "throw away Marines." Col James W. Stemple, Comments on draft, n.d. [1995] (Vietnam Comment File).

**See Shulimson and Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam 1965*, p. 117, and Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam 1966*, n. p. 283, for a discussion of the change from unit to individual rotation policies.

months earlier in April 1966, in order to meet the demands of the Vietnam buildup.^{17*} According to Thomas D. Morris, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower in 1966, the high rejection rate for men in Mental Group IV created a serious problem when draft calls increased to support the Vietnam buildup. In his opinion, Project 100,000 would not have been implemented if the need for increased manpower had not existed, nor would it have been launched if it had been solely a social welfare program.¹⁸

After Project 100,000 began, the Marine Corps undermined its contention that this program forced it to turn away better qualified recruits by consistently exceeding its quotas of both Mental Group IV's and New Standards men by considerable margins.¹⁹ In fact, the Marine Corps had already lowered enlistment standards in November 1965, well before Project 100,000. Indeed, between November 1965 and October 1966 the Marine Corps, while barring some non-high school graduates who still met the minimum standards for induction from enlisting, accepted high school graduates who scored too low on the entry tests to be drafted.²⁰ This, combined with the fact that at the end of 1968 the Marine Corps was again forced to rely on the draft to fill its ranks,²¹ suggests that the Marine Corps could not in fact attract enough higher quality volunteers.

While the proportion of Mental Group IV's among new Marines increased, the proportion of high school graduates decreased. From the summer of 1965 to the summer of 1967, 65 percent of all new Marines had high school diplomas, 10 percent more than male civilians aged 18-19. In late 1967, while the proportion of civilian males graduating from high school remained fairly stable, the proportion of Marine recruits with diplomas declined. From July 1967 to June 1968 only 57.4 percent of new recruits possessed a diploma. This decline continued until fiscal year 1973, when only 49.6 percent of new male recruits had high school diplomas.²¹

Project 100,000 and the pressing need for new recruits forced the Marine Corps to lower its entry standards, but these standards remained considerably high-

er than those in effect in either World War II or Korea. In World War II, men in Mental group IV were accepted without complaint or comment, and about 25-30 percent of enlisted Marines fell in this group. The Marine Corps did provide remedial instruction for the roughly 5-10 percent of Marines in Mental Group V*** Men in Mental Group IV constituted 40.5 percent of all Marine male recruits during the Korean War.²² The Korean era Mental Group IVs included men who would have been excluded under Project 100,000. At the height of Project 100,000, between July 1968 and June 1969, 25.7 percent of all new Marines scored in Mental Group IV, with New Standards men comprising 13.8 percent of all recruits.²³

From 1965 to 1968, the educational level and test scores of new Marines declined. This decline, however, did not necessarily translate into poor combat performance. Former Marine lieutenant Lewis B. Puller, Jr., related in his memoir that he had in his platoon one older man, called "Pappy" by his fellow Marines, who had entered the Marine Corps through Project 100,000. Puller noted that "Pappy" could keep up with the younger members of his machine gun team and they took care of him, although the Marine officer wondered how the man's skills with a machine gun "were going to help him earn a living after the Marine Corps."²⁴ The quality of the leadership and training a Marine received counted for a great deal. As Lieutenant Colonel Howard Lovingood, who saw combat in Vietnam as both a senior enlisted man and company grade officer, recalled, "I looked on it as any other Marine leader would . . . you take the Marines and train them to the best of your ability and get on with the job."²⁵ Unfortunately, the manpower demands of Vietnam forced the Marine Corps to devote less time to training its new recruits.

*President Johnson introduced the term "Great Society" in a speech given in Ann Arbor, Michigan, 22 May 1964. The phrase soon came to refer to the numerous social welfare programs created by the Johnson administration.

**During 1968, the Marine Corps made three draft calls: in April for 4,000 men, May for 1,900 men, and December for 2,500 men. Starting in February 1969, the Marine Corps made a draft call every month, with the exception of July and August 1969, until February 1970.

***Although records of the exact mental group distribution of Marines are sketchy at best, Selective Service distributed men to all of the Services in roughly the same proportions. Even after President Roosevelt ended all voluntary enlistments beginning in February 1943, the Marine Corps managed to ensure a source of quality recruits by enlisting 17-year-olds into the Reserve and encouraging promising young men to volunteer for induction into the Marine Corps. The Army Air Corps also used these techniques, which probably kept the Army and Marine Corps' overall mental distribution fairly close. In World War II approximately 9 percent of all enlisted soldiers were in Mental Group V and 29 percent in Mental Group IV. Mental Group Vs did not serve in Korea or Vietnam, having been barred from service by law in 1948. Mark J. Eitelberg et al., *Screening for Service: Aptitude and Education Criteria for Military Entry* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Installations, and Logistics], 1984) pp. 24-25.

Training

Before the Vietnam War, male Marines spent 80 days in recruit training, and then received four weeks of Individual Combat Training before their first assignment. Marines who did not go to a formal school, a group that included most Marines assigned to the ground combat arms, required a further 90 days of on-the-job training (OJT) before the Marine Corps considered them to be fully trained in their specialty. A new recruit was not supposed to be sent overseas until he had completed his OJT, more than six months after his first day of boot camp.

The Vietnam buildup quickly forced the Marine Corps to shorten its training pipeline. In September 1965, the Marine Corps reduced the time a new recruit

spent in training before going overseas to four months, the minimum time required by law. Boot camp was reduced from 80 to 60 days; for all Marines save infantrymen, Individual Combat Training was reduced from four to two weeks; and OJT was replaced by a short period of formal instruction, usually lasting four weeks, called Basic Specialist Training. Infantrymen continued to receive four weeks of Individual Combat Training, but almost all of them spent only two weeks at their Basic Specialist Training. Finally, all lance corporals and below received 15 days Southeast Asia Orientation Training over a three-week period at Camp Pendleton's Staging Battalion before leaving for Vietnam. In January 1968 recruit training was again reduced, to 56 days. This reduced total training time

A Marine recruit platoon at Parris Island starts the day with a morning run in formation complete with platoon guidon. Despite the shortening of the training cycle, Marine recruit training still emphasized physical fitness.

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A602339



to exactly 17 weeks, more than 11 weeks shorter than the program in effect in August 1965.²⁶

In many ways Basic Specialist Training proved to be a significant improvement over OJT. Not only was Basic Specialist Training faster than OJT, the Basic Specialist Training graduate was "as well trained or better trained than the Marine who previously spent 90 or more days in on-the-job training."²⁷

Unfortunately, the efficiency of Basic Specialist Training came at a price. Before September 1965, a new Marine spent at least three months with his unit before deploying overseas, plenty of time for him and his squadmates to get to know each other and learn to work as a team. After that time, recruits rushed through a disorienting swirl of training programs and instructors, moving on before most of their superiors had time to learn much about them. Most new recruits joined their first permanent unit in Vietnam.

While Basic Specialist Training proved a mixed blessing, the reduced length of recruit training and Individual Combat Training remained a necessary evil. In April 1968, the Commandant of the Marine Corps regarded the ideal training program to be 10 weeks for recruit training, 4 weeks for Individual Combat Training, and 4 weeks for Basic Specialist Training, a full month more than the program in effect at that time. A policy statement noted that the shortened training course was a temporary measure, and that

the Marine Corps intends to return to a longer training period as soon as the international situation permits. The present length of training is the minimum time possible in an emergency situation to meet the objectives of recruit training.²⁸

In the meantime, the Marine Corps relied on the leadership of its captains, lieutenants, sergeants, and corporals to compensate for the lowered standards, high turnover, and reduced training period.

The Search for Junior Leaders

As the Marine Corps grew, the numbers of junior officers and noncommissioned officers increased proportionately. This expanded body of company-level leaders faced the challenges of dealing with declining recruit quality, increased personnel turbulence, and combat.

During the first years of the Vietnam War, the experience level of junior Marine officers actually increased. Following the practice of World War I, World War II, and Korea, the Marine Corps quickly expanded its

junior officer corps by offering temporary commissions to senior noncommissioned officers.²⁹ Between July 1965 and June 1967, the Marine Corps commissioned 4,059 warrant officers and senior enlisted as temporary second lieutenants. In July 1967, these officers constituted two-thirds of all ground and aviation-ground assignable lieutenants. By the beginning of 1968, over four-fifths of the ground first lieutenants were temporary officers.^{30*}

Between 1965 and 1968 the average length of commissioned service for Marine captains shrank from nine to six years, and for lieutenants from three to two years, but a large number of these officers had far more service than their pre-Vietnam peers. In fact, the temporary officers created an experience "hump" that slowly worked its way up in a bloc. On 31 December 1967, almost 60 percent of all first lieutenants had over 10 years of service, while the same was true for only 20 percent of captains. Only a quarter of captains were over 30 years old, while more than half of the first lieutenants were over 30 years old.

The temporary officers provided the Marine Corps with capable junior officers during the initial Vietnam build-up, but this program was intended as a stop-gap, providing lieutenants only until the normal commissioning programs could meet the demand for officers. Unfortunately, after the temporary commissioning ended in June 1967, officer recruiting did not meet expectations. Anti-war sentiments on college campuses made it difficult to recruit qualified young men.³¹ As early as August 1967, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., expressed his concern over the large number of candidates who quit the Officer Candidate's and Platoon Leader's Courses.³² Although the total numbers were small, the number of lieutenants commissioned from the NROTC program also declined dramatically in 1967. Only the introduction of the Enlisted Commissioning Program, which produced 410 lieutenants in fiscal year 1967 and 580 in fiscal year

*7Lieutenant Colonel Merrill L. Bartlett, who served in Vietnam as an intelligence officer, considered the temporary program "an unmitigated disaster! Certainly, we can all recall temporary officers who were successful. At the same time, I can recall that most were simply SNCOs [staff noncommissioned officers] wearing bars." He observed that his field "was fertile dumping ground for these types." He personally served with several and provided the following harsh generalization: "Hardly any of them could write, most had alcohol problems, and many worked mostly on figuring out ways to get their tours shortened or to find soft billets in the rear." LtCol Merrill L. Bartlett, Comments on draft, dtd 8Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Bartlett Comments.



Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A556673

New Marine second lieutenants receive realistic field training at the Marine Corps Basic School at Quantico, Virginia. Most new Marine officers after their commissioning attended the Basic School.

1968, enabled the Marine Corps to meet its officer goals.^{33*}

The noncommissioned officers' ranks expanded faster than the officers' and the Marine Corps as a whole. Between 1965 and 1968 the number of sergeants increased 95 percent and the number of corporals increased 101 percent. The rapid promotions needed to fill these billets drastically reduced the average length of service for noncommissioned officers. In 1965, more than 60 percent of sergeants had more than 10 years service, while fewer than 8 percent had less than 6 years service. Almost 50 percent of corporals had more than four years of service and fewer than 15

percent had less than three years of service. In 1968, over 50 percent of all sergeants had less than four years service, and over 25 percent had less than three years. More than three-quarters of all corporals had less than three years of service, and over 95 percent had less than four. A large number of these young NCOs achieved their rank while on their first tour in Vietnam.

Despite their short service, the newly promoted NCOs of 1968 were not necessarily less qualified than their peers of 1965. While the earlier NCOs had more time in uniform, most had acquired all of their experience through peacetime service, whereas the young NCOs of the Vietnam era "gain[ed] a lot of experience at a very rapid rate and under combat conditions."³⁴

The loss of experience in the face of wartime demands was hardly new for the Marine Corps. In 1945, lieutenants averaged only one year of commissioned service, captains, two, and majors, three. By 30 June 1945, the enlisted ranks had increased over eight-fold since 30 June 1942 and almost 24 times above the Marine enlisted strength on 30 June 1939. By the end of the war, few enlisted Marines of any rank had more than four years of service, and one with more than six years service would have been a rarity. Unlike World

*In the Enlisted Commissioning Program, promising enlisted Marines attended a 10-week Officer Candidate's Course. Graduates were commissioned as second lieutenants, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. Captain Matthew G. McTiernan, who commanded Company I, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, remembered that in July 1968 the 3d Marine Division had started a policy of sending non-infantry first and second lieutenants to infantry companies to serve 90 days. The intention was to make up for the shortage of infantry officers then existing in the division. He recalled that during Operation Thor in July, two of his platoon officers were a former motor transport officer and a former communications officer and that both men acquitted themselves well. Capt Matthew G. McTiernan, Comments on draft, n.d. [Dec96] (Vietnam Comment File).

War II, however, during Vietnam the Marine Corps was unable to keep most of its junior officers and NCOs for more than one combat tour. Despite the Marine Corps' efforts to retain its newly promoted and combat-experienced leaders, as the war progressed a sizeable portion of the career enlisted force did not reenlist; only a tiny minority of first term Marines, both officer and enlisted, opted to remain in the Corps.

The retention of officers became a major problem by 1968. In 1964, 54 percent of Marine officers completing their obligated service remained on active duty at least one additional year. By 1967 this proportion had dropped to 42 percent.³⁵ While regular officer retention remained close to the established goals, every month roughly 3 regular majors and 36 regular captains resigned their commissions. Unfortunately, regulars (excluding temporary officers) constituted just over a third of the company-grade officer ranks, and less than a fifth of the lieutenants. To meet its officer goals, the Marine Corps needed a sizeable number of Reserve officers to augment into the regular Marine Corps every year.

Before Vietnam, more Reserve officers applied for augmentation than the Marine Corps had room for, and the Marine Corps enjoyed the luxury of simply selecting the best qualified applicants. In fiscal year 1965, of 3,431 officers eligible for augmentation, 714 applied, approximately one out of every five eligible officers. The Marine Corps had room for 70.4 percent of the applicants, and accepted 66.8 percent of them. In FY 1966, while the number of eligible officers dipped to 2,380, only 314 applied for augmentation, slightly more than one out of every seven officers. The Marine Corps had room for every applicant, but only 88.5 percent were selected to become regulars.

This trend worsened as the war progressed. For every fiscal year from 1966 to 1969, the Marine Corps had more spaces than applicants for augmentation. In fiscal year 1968, fewer than one out of 14 eligible officers applied for augmentation. The 1968 augmentation board had a quota of 412, but only 240 officers applied. Of those 240 applicants, the board selected only 202, less than half its quota, apparently finding a shortage of officers preferable to retaining the other 38 officers. In fiscal year 1969, fewer than one out of 15 eligible officers applied for augmentation. Again the augmentation board was authorized to retain every one of the 198 applicants, but only 115 were considered fit to become regular officers.

In July 1969, Major General Platt explained to his fellow generals that the low selection rate most likely

Table 3
Unadjusted reenlistment rates for
Marine Regulars by Fiscal Year

	Marine Corps wide 1st term regular reenlistment rate	Inf, Gun Crews & Allied Specialists 1st Term regulars reenlistment rate	Marine Corps wide Career reenlistment rate	Inf, Gun Crews & Allied Specialists Career reenlistment rate
FY 65	16.3	15.7	84.5	88.3
FY 66	16.3	15.6	88.6	90.2
FY 67	10.6	9.2	77.9	76.1
FY 68	11.9	10.3	76.0	62.0
FY 69	7.4	6.2	74.5	59.8
FY 70	4.7	3.1	78.0	72.5

reflected the low quality of the applicants. General Platt also concluded that one of the major reasons for the poor retention record was the unwillingness of junior officers "to commit themselves to the prospect of repeated tours in Vietnam."³⁶

General Platt's assessment probably also applied to the noncommissioned officer ranks. The Marine Corps had great difficulty keeping its NCOs. The reenlistment rate for first-term regulars,* who provided the bulk of the corporals and sergeants in this period, dropped from 16.3 percent for fiscal years 1965 and 1966 to 11.9 percent in fiscal year 1968 (*see Table 3*). Headquarters Marine Corps tried to stem the exodus, creating the Career Advisory Branch on 1 April 1968. This branch's sole concern was the management of a career advisory program intended to persuade more Marines to reenlist.³⁷ Despite the efforts of the career advisors, reenlistments plummeted. In fiscal year 1969, only 7.4 percent of eligible first-term regulars reenlisted. Of every 100 first-term regulars leaving the Marine Corps, only 4.7 reenlisted or extended.

The situation was just as bad among the career regulars. Before 30 June 1966 almost 90 percent of all career Marines reenlisted. Between 1 July 1968 and 30 June 1969 this proportion dropped to less than 75 percent. The combat arms were hardest hit. In fiscal years 1965 and 1966, the reenlistment rate for career combat arms Marines was slightly higher than the average reenlistment rate for all career Marines. This trend ended in fiscal year 1967, when reenlistments for career combat arms Marines fell below the Marine Corps-wide average. By fiscal year 1969, combat arms career reenlistments ran almost 15 percentage points below the Marine Corps average; only 59.8 percent of eligible career combat arms Marines reenlisted.

*Regulars describes Marines who voluntarily enlisted in the Marine Corps, as opposed to draftees.

By relying on experienced NCOs with temporary commissions, rapidly trained lieutenants, and quickly promoted short-service NCOs to lead Marines in combat in Vietnam, the Marine Corps followed a familiar path. The same policies had been used in World War I, World War II, and Korea. Vietnam, however, differed from these conflicts in one crucial respect: during the Vietnam War, almost none of the newly trained and experienced officers and NCOs remained to lead Marines in combat for a second tour. By 1968, even the pre-war senior NCOs began to leave in alarming numbers. Rather than continually adding to its pool of combat-tested leaders, the Marine Corps had constantly to recreate it.

*Discipline**

The exodus of young officers and NCOs also meant that the older mustang officers [officers with prior enlisted service] and pre-war career NCOs provided most of the continuity, experience, and senior leadership at the company level. This tended to exacerbate the differences between short-service Marines of all ranks and "lifers," placing a further strain on the cohesion and discipline of small units.** At the beginning of 1968, men on four-year enlistments still comprised the bulk of the Marines in Vietnam.*** As

*For a description of how the issues described in this section developed later in the war, see Cosmas and Murray, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1970–1971: Vietnamization and Redeployment*, Chapter 20, Morale and Discipline.

**"Lifers" refers to career Marines of all ranks. There are natural frictions between leaders and the ranks as the former require the latter to perform unpleasant but necessary tasks, such as digging-in or wearing hot, heavy body armor. See Charles R. Anderson, *The Grunts* (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1976), Chapter 13, hereafter, Anderson, *The Grunts*. In *Vietnam: The Other War* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1982), Anderson describes the difference between "lifers" and short-service Marines. He also notes that many of the Marines who actively sought rear area assignments were careerists, and many were on their second tour in Vietnam (pp. 17–21). Some of the "short-timer" versus lifer animosity transcended the officer-enlisted barrier. Both James Webb in *Fields of Fire* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978) and Philip Caputo in *A Rumor of War* (New York: Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston, 1977), portray reserve lieutenants who are close to the riflemen they lead and hold careerist officers in contempt. In Gustav Hasford, *The Short Timers* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), all of the principal characters are on their first enlistment.

***As of 24 February 1968, 12.5 percent of all Marines in Vietnam were career Marines and 50.6 percent were on four-year enlistments. Only 13.1 percent had two-year obligations. AC/S G-1 memo to CMC, Subj: Replies to Questions, dtd 20Feb68, attachment, tab I-E, CMC Reference Notebook, 1968. The proportion of Marines with two-year obligations in Vietnam must have risen dramatically during the year as result of the large increase in two-year enlistments. Although the exact figures are not available, by December 1968, men with two-year contracts probably accounted for around half of all Marines in Vietnam.

short-service Marines with minimum training arrived and career Marines left in increasing numbers, signs of declining combat discipline began to appear.

In April 1968 Major General Donn J. Robertson, the commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, tartly informed his subordinate commanders that it was "almost unbelievable to receive reports of incidents in which Marines while on patrol, have gone off and left members of the patrol." General Robertson blamed leaders of all ranks for their failure to keep strict personnel accountability.³⁸

In August, the new commanding general, Major General Carl A. Youngdale, again lectured the 1st Marine Division on basic discipline. This time the subject was accidental discharges. In all of 1967, the units of the 1st Division reported 200 accidental discharges, with 156 Marines wounded and 16 killed. By 18 August 1968, Marines in the division had already fired 218 accidental discharges, wounding 189 and killing 26. A division bulletin noted that every incident resulted from negligence.³⁹ In October, the 1st Marine Division issued another bulletin addressing the same problem, noting that in September, 4 Marines died from accidental discharges, and another 18 were wounded.⁴⁰ Yet another bulletin came out in March 1969. In 1968, Marines of the 1st Division committed 323 accidental discharges. These incidents killed 40 and wounded another 309 men, more than twice the number of casualties inflicted in 1967.⁴¹

As the year progressed offenses also increased, particularly drug offenses. In the first four months of 1968, military authorities investigated 160 Marines for marijuana use, compared to 142 for all of 1967. Marijuana use was heaviest in Vietnam and the West Coast.⁴² Still, in July 1968, a Marine staff paper prepared for the annual General Officers' Symposium contained the observation that

While the presence of marijuana and drug users in the Marine Corps is a problem—even the use of drugs by one Marine must be considered a problem—the number of drug users in the Marine Corps is not considered alarming or threatening to the combat efficiency or the public image of the Marine Corps.⁴³

Shortly after this symposium, the drug problem increased markedly. In the first six months of 1968 the 1st Marine Division's Criminal Investigation Division opened a total of 17 investigations into the use of illegal drugs. In the last third of 1968 this divi-

sion opened an average of 24 investigations into drug offenses a month.*

By the end of 1968 Marine leaders realized that a problem even worse than illegal drug use had emerged: "fragging," the deliberate killing of officers and NCOs by their own men. Although small in absolute numbers, the knowledge that fraggings occurred often had a chilling effect on a leader's willingness to enforce discipline.**

More offenses naturally resulted in more prisoners, quickly overcrowding the limited brig space in Vietnam. Most Marine prisoners were confined at the III MAF brig in Da Nang, run by the 3d Military Police Battalion. This brig was built to house 200 prisoners.⁴⁴ In May 1968, it housed 175 prisoners, but by August it held 298. According to the officer who kept the prisoner's records, "[t]he most common offenses were smoking marijuana, refusing to get a haircut, or refusing to go on a second combat operation after surviving the hell of their first."⁴⁵ The prisoners tended to be poorly educated; about 30 percent were functional illiterates. At least a quarter had civilian judicial convictions.⁴⁶ Although the prisoners as a group lacked a particular ideology, they all shared a general resentment of and hostility toward authority. Major Donald E. Milone, who later commanded the 3d MP Battalion, observed that most of the "brig population did not have formal charges presented to them, and they had been confined for over 30 days awaiting charges."⁴⁷

On 16 August a scuffle between prisoners and guards escalated into a riot. The prisoners controlled the brig for two days, holding kangaroo courts and beating prisoners accused of collaborating with the

guards. Finally, on the 18th, the brig guards, using tear gas, reclaimed control of the prison.***

In addition to disciplinary problems, racial incidents also started to attract command attention in the latter half of 1968, and Headquarters Marine Corps began to make an effort systematically to track racial incidents.⁴⁸ In October, General Chapman asked Lieutenant General Buse, Commanding General FMFPac, to look into reports of racial trouble in III MAF, noting that this matter warranted "careful watching."⁴⁹ Shortly after this request, racial incidents led Commander Linus B. Wensman, USN, commander of Camp Tiensha at Da Nang, to put the China Beach recreation area off limits to casual users.⁵⁰ By July 1969, racial incidents had become serious enough to receive considerable attention at the annual General Officer's Symposium.***

While a growing problem, offenses and racial troubles tended to be confined to rear areas and did not have a serious impact on combat operations. Former corporal and squad leader Kenneth K. George recalled that:

[I]n the rear you get a lot of flak from the guys because they think that you are picking on them. When you are in the field and the second there is any kind of problem . . . the minute you open your mouth, they react and they react very quickly.⁵¹

Morale

In contrast to the discipline problem, which took a few years of fighting to appear, Marine leaders worked hard from the beginning to keep up morale. The

*Colonel Poul F. Pederson, the III MAF G-1, noted that in 1968 the Marine command introduced "sniffing dogs . . . to catch drugs coming and going." According to Pederson, this program was put under the Provost Marshal, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J. N. Gambardella, who also commanded the 3d MP Battalion. Col Poul F. Pederson, Comments on draft, n.d. [1994] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Pederson Comments.

**For further discussion of fragging, see LtCol Gary D. Solis, *Marines and Military Law in Vietnam: Trial By Fire* (Washington, D.C.: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1989), pp. 110-111, 133-138, 168-170, hereafter Solis, *Trial by Fire*; and Anderson, *The Grunts*, pp. 187-194. In *Platoon Leader* (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1986), pp. 74-76, former U.S. Army lieutenant James R. McDonough recounts how a soldier attempted to intimidate him with the threat of fragging. Colonel William J. Davis, a Marine tank officer who served in Vietnam in 1968 as a lieutenant, agreed that the threat of fragging had an effect on Marine officers, but most still enforced the rules and discipline. Col William J. Davis, Comments on draft, n.d. (Vietnam Comment File).

***Two weeks later, a violent prison riot occurred at the U.S. Army's Long Binh brig. Prisoners controlled a portion of the brig for more than a month. For a more detailed description of the Da Nang brig riot, see Solis, *Trial By Fire*. Major Milone, who took over the 3d MP Battalion in September 1968, noted that during the three-day riot, "no prisoner or guard was seriously injured during this 3-day period. If the procedure for brig riots had been put into effect the Marine Corps would have had [as] violent a riot that occurred at the Army's Long Binh Brig. During the investigation [of the III MAF incident] the officer-in-charge was criticized for not shooting prisoners that did not obey guards commands and for not going by the SOP. The investigation was dropped after the Long Binh riot when the Army went by a SOP." Maj Donald E. Milone, Comments on draft, n.d. [Dec94] (Vietnam Comment File).

****Colonel Maurice Rose, who relieved Colonel Pederson as III MAF G-1 in July 1968, noted that in the second half of 1968, "we set up a III MAF Watch Committee composed of G-1 Representatives which met monthly to discuss the situation in I Corps, report any problems, and recommend solutions if required." Col Maurice Rose, Comments on draft, dtd 25Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Rose Comments.

Marine Corps went to considerable trouble to make a Marine's time in Vietnam as tolerable as possible. Major General Carl W. Hoffman, who spent almost all of 1968 in Vietnam, recalled that "it was terribly important . . . that people had something to look forward to like a period of rest and recuperation."⁵² About halfway through their tour, every Marine rated an out-of-country Rest and Recuperation (R&R) trip. In every month of 1968, somewhere between 3,000 and 4,000 Marines flew to Hawaii, Australia, Japan, Thailand, or other Asian locales for a five-day respite. Marines could also enjoy shorter R&Rs in Vietnam, and every month a thousand or so spent extended liberties at the Navy's China Beach recreational facility near Da Nang.

The protracted nature of the Vietnam conflict led to the creation of large base camps. For troops in these

Noted Comedian Bob Hope, with two members of his cast, entertains the troops during his annual Christmas show at Da Nang. The Marines and U.S. military in general tried to raise morale and relieve stress at the big base areas by providing such entertainment.

Photo from the Abel Collection



areas, the biggest enemy was boredom.⁵³ To alleviate this problem, the Marine Corps tried to provide as many distractions as possible, and rear areas included numerous clubs, post exchanges, and air conditioning. Troops in the rear enjoyed many of the comforts of home, including "security, movies, free time, dry beds with clean sheets, mail and showers every day, radios and stereos, and plenty to eat and drink."⁵⁴ From January to September 1968, the China Beach recreation area received no fewer than 15,000 and often well beyond 30,000 daily visitors from the Da Nang area. After the local Navy commander restricted the use of the facility to authorized patrons in October, the number of daily visitors dropped to around 5,000 a month.⁵⁵

Between operations, front-line Marines often returned to these rear areas. During these sojourns these men undoubtedly enjoyed the security and amenities offered by these bases, but they could also plainly see the stark contrast between their lives in the field and the much safer and more comfortable lives of headquarters and support personnel. Many combat Marines resented the soft life of rear area troops, although this resentment was often tempered by the desire to enjoy these benefits themselves.^{56*}

At times the effort to make life as comfortable as possible became an end in itself. Major General Hoffman observed that

[A]lthough there's nothing wrong with getting yourself as comfortable as possible, there is something wrong with getting so preoccupied with the creature comforts that you don't get on with the prosecution of the job at hand.⁵⁷

The Marine Corps also sought to increase esprit by following Napoleon's maxim that "a soldier will fight long and hard for a bit of colored ribbon."⁵⁸ Beginning in 1967, the Marine Corps began increasing the number of medals and ribbons awarded to Marines. At the General Officers Symposium in July 1968, Brigadier General Ronald R. Van Stockum, Retired, Deputy Senior Member, Navy Department Board of Decorations and Medals,

*The disdain of frontline troops for rear area personnel is almost a universal part of military life. Combat troops typically invent derogatory terms to refer to non-combat men. In Vietnam, Marines usually used the term "pogue" and even more explicit derogatory language. Often support troops accept this disdain, acknowledging that the greater hardships and risks endured by combat men entitle them to deference from non-combat men. For a discussion of the relations of combat men and non-combat men in World War II, see Samuel A. Stouffer et al., *The American Soldier* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1949) 2 vols, v. 2, Ch. 6.



Photo from the Abel Collection

The 13-month tour was an important element of troop morale as evidenced by the humorous inscription on the helmet of the Marine: "Stop!!! Don't Shoot, I'm Short." The Marines are from Company M, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines

informed his fellow generals that the Marine Corps presented proportionally far fewer decorations to its members than the other services. For instance, while the Marine Corps awarded 1 Bronze Star for every 20 Purple Hearts, the Army gave out equal numbers of each medal.

General Van Stockum felt that the Marine Corps needed to liberalize its standards. He argued that "a combat Marine . . . should return from Vietnam wearing some personal award."⁵⁹ He also advocated recognizing career officers and reserve officers likely to stay in the Marine Corps, and greater use of unit awards. General Van Stockum's views were in keeping with the trend towards the creation of new awards in this period, including the Meritorious

Unit Citation, Navy Achievement Medal, and Combat Action Ribbon.^{60*}

*The Navy Achievement Medal, intended to recognize meritorious performance by junior officers and enlisted Marines, was authorized on 17 July 1967. This award could be used to recognize meritorious service in combat (for which a "V" attachment was authorized), giving the Marine Corps an award junior to both the Bronze Star and the Navy Commendation Medal to award exceptional combat performance. This award replaced the Secretary of the Navy's Commendation for Achievement; persons awarded this commendation after 1 May 1961 were authorized to wear the Navy Achievement medal. The Meritorious Unit Citation was created on 17 July 1967, and was intended to recognize units for exceptional performance not involving direct combat. The Combat Action Ribbon was introduced on 17 February 1969, and was awarded to individuals who participated in direct combat with the enemy. This award was also retroactively awarded to Marines who had served in direct combat since 1 March 1961.

Awards, creature comforts, and rest and recuperation trips undoubtedly improved the spirits of many Marines, but none of these outweighed the most important policy influencing morale: the 13-month tour in Vietnam. While an R&R might be eagerly anticipated or an award appreciated, the most important thing to almost every Marine was his rotation date. This policy also ensured that every unit rotated around a tenth of its total strength every month.*

The individual replacement policy has been criticized by many, but the Marine Corps had little choice. The Marine Corps could not keep 80,000 Marines in Vietnam through unit rotation without tripling its overall strength. Nor was the policy an unmitigated evil. Predetermined tour lengths had a positive effect on morale. Unlike the soldier of World War II, who felt (with a great deal of justification) that his only hope of escape from combat lay in death, severe wounding, or the end of the war, the 13-month tour gave the Marine in Vietnam a realistic goal. The benefits generated by the set tour length probably outweighed the reluctance of "short-timers" to take risks.⁶¹ In any case, it is unlikely that many men could have lasted much more than a year in combat zones.⁶² Navy doctors concluded that the policy of set tours significantly reduced the number of psychiatric casualties among Marines in Vietnam.^{63**}

The Aviation Shortage

As its Vietnam commitment increased, the Marine Corps could and did expand its ground forces fairly rapidly, albeit with growing pains. Unfortunately Marine aviation, which relied on a very long training pipeline, could not be expanded fast enough.

In fact, the Marine Corps suffered a shortage of pilots as early as the mid-1950s. Officers volunteering for flight training had to agree to remain on

active duty well beyond the normal period of service, a daunting prospect for those not committed to a Marine Corps career. To alleviate this concern, the Marine Corps instituted a number of commissioning programs which allowed an officer to bypass the Basic School and go directly to flight school.⁶⁴

Well before 1955, the Marine Corps accepted a number of graduates from the Navy's Naval Aviation Cadet (NavCad) pilot training program. These men went through flight training as cadets, and received their wings and commissions on the same day. After completion of flight training, they reported directly to a squadron.⁶⁵ In 1955, the Marine Corps instituted the Aviation Officer Candidate Course, and by 1957 the Platoon Leader's Class (Aviation) had been added.⁶⁶ Upon completing brief training periods at Quantico, men in these programs received their commissions and reported directly to flight school. In 1959, the Marine Corps stopped accepting NavCad graduates and created the Marine Aviation Cadet Program (MarCad), which operated in the same manner as NavCad.⁶⁷ As a result of these programs, by 1965 the majority of Marine naval aviators had not attended the Basic School.⁶⁸

With these new sources of aviators, the Marine Corps barely managed to meet its requirements for naval aviators. The Marine Corps' expansion after the 9th MEB landed in Vietnam in March 1965 threatened these hard-won gains. In an effort to keep the disruption from rapid growth to a minimum, on 13 August 1965, the Commandant announced that the retirement and resignations of regular officers would be delayed for up to 12 months.⁶⁹ This helped to prevent an immediate shortage of pilots. In the summer of 1966, the number of qualified aviators fell just 45 short of the authorized total of 4,284.⁷⁰

*Colonel Poul F. Pederson, the III MAF G-1, observed that the 13-month tour "to the day was a single stable element." He noted that as a general policy, "about two weeks prior to rotation the Marine would be sent to the 'rear with the gear.' Some believed that as the rotation date approached the Marine got anxious. If he remained in combat, he might be too aggressive or overly reluctant. In either case he could be a detriment to the unit." Pederson Comments. General Chapman remarked that all manpower considerations were "driven by the 13-month tour decreed by DOD . . ." Gen Leonard F. Chapman, Comments on draft, dtd 27Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File). In late 1965 III MAF instituted Operation Mixmaster, which transferred Marines among units to ensure that all Marines in a given unit would not rotate at the same time. See Shulimson and Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1965, p. 117.

**Lieutenant Colonel Merrill L. Bartlett, an intelligence officer who served with the 13th Interrogation and Translation Team in Viet-

nam, related that he "considered extending for purely professional reasons. By then, I couldn't imagine many officers who knew as much about the enemy order-of-battle or who could interrogate as well. I also realized that personally I had become calloused beyond belief; the death and destruction no longer bothered me. I recall spending the entire night in the intensive-care ward of the Naval hospital, interrogating a wounded NVA officer and seemingly oblivious to the horrible mutilation of the wounded Marines in the other beds. I can also remember interrogating POWs in the ARVN hospital in Da Nang amidst indescribable filth and suffering. By the end of my tour, sifting through the pockets of dead NVA or VC, searching for documents, no longer affected me. Perhaps it was time 'to return to the world.' Even so, the Marine Corps would have been better served and I would have served it better by remaining in-country rather than by protecting Camp Pendleton from a seaward invasion from whatever." Bartlett Comments.

This comparatively rosy situation proved short-lived, and by autumn the Marine Corps suffered a severe shortage of naval aviators, particularly helicopter pilots. To alleviate this shortage, the Marine Corps resorted to a number of expedient personnel actions, including again involuntarily retaining aviation officers, using ground officers to fill aviation billets, and sharply reducing the number of naval aviators attending professional schools.*

Despite the Marine Corps' efforts, the pilot shortage of 1966 persisted into 1968, making it impossible to man squadrons in Vietnam at their wartime strength; the Marine Corps could barely maintain the normal peacetime manning level.^{71**} Helicopter pilots still constituted the most critical shortage. In addition to fighting a war at peacetime strength, the pilots of the 1st MAW found themselves tasked to support Army and allied units in I Corps. By January 1968, despite the fact that the Commandant was under the impression that the III MAF "had everything it rated," the 1st MAW found itself forced to standdown pilots, particularly helicopter pilots, to let them get some rest.⁷³

June of 1968 found the Marine Corps still short roughly 850 naval aviators, a shortage that spilled over to Vietnam.⁶³ In July 1968, the 1st MAW calculated that it needed 703 helicopter pilots to meet its requirements. The manning level authorized 644 pilots; 606 were actually on board. Of these, only 552 were available for flight duty. In December 1968, the number of pilots in the 1st MAW finally reached the manning level, but only after the manning level was reduced to 581 pilots. The number of helicopter pilots in the 1st MAW available for flight duty remained at less than 80 percent of requirements into 1969.⁷⁴

*For a discussion of the origins of the pilot shortage and the steps taken to correct this problem, see Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam 1966*, p. 262.

**Tables of Organization (T/O) laid out the exact composition of every unit, showing every billet, and the rank and military occupational specialty for that billet. Ideally, in combat, every unit should have been up to T/O strength. Since this was not possible, the Manpower Division of Headquarters, Marine Corps set "manning levels" for units based on unit type and location. A unit with a manning level of 94 percent would only receive enough replacements to keep it at 94 percent of its T/O strength. Manning levels were adjusted based on a unit's mission, the availability of Marines with the appropriate skills, and a unit's location. Units in Vietnam generally had a higher manning level than other units.

Although Headquarters, Marine Corps tried to send enough replacements to each major unit to keep its subordinates up to their manning level, the final distribution of replacements rested with the field commanders. For further explanation, See Appendix.

The Naval Air Training Command, located at Pensacola, Florida, could not train enough Marine helicopter pilots to bring the units in Vietnam up to strength. In June of 1967, Marine officers destined to become fixed-wing pilots began reporting to Air Force bases for flight training. This freed Marine quotas at Pensacola which could be used to train helicopter pilots.⁷⁵ The first 15 pilots graduated from this program in June 1968.

A similar program with the U.S. Army attacked the shortage of helicopter pilots directly. In January 1968, the first Marines arrived at Fort Rucker, Alabama, for rotary wing pilot training, with the first pilots graduating in October. Marine officers trained by the Army and the Air Force then reported to Marine training groups for further instruction, including shipboard landings, before qualifying as naval aviators.⁷⁶ By June of 1969, 155 Marine officers had completed Air Force flight training and 150 had completed Army flight training.^{77***} Even with these programs, in early 1969 the Marine Corps had to order a number of fixed-wing pilots to transition to helicopters to fill the cockpits in Vietnam.⁷⁸

In addition to the pilots, the Marine Corps had difficulty finding enough enlisted Marines to maintain and repair the aircraft in Vietnam. It took a long time to train a Marine in the skills needed to maintain aircraft, so the Marine Corps only assigned men on four-year enlistments to these specialties. This policy created a shortage of aviation maintenance Marines in the Western Pacific and an overage in the United States.

As with most other occupational fields, the Marine Corps needed to train large numbers of first-term Marines in aviation specialties to maintain the flow of replacements to Southeast Asia. Most of these men spent a year in training, and then a year in the Western Pacific. Unlike most other specialties, however, upon returning from overseas aviation Marines still had two years left on their enlistments. These Vietnam returnees created overages in the United States and counted against total strength, reducing the number of new recruits that could be enlisted and sent overseas.⁷⁹

Despite this problem, the Marine Corps managed to exceed the enlisted manning level for aviation units in Vietnam, although it still fell short of the adjusted table of organization (T/O). Unfortunately, aviation units had to detail many of their highly trained spe-

***For a complete discussion of helicopter pilot availability and training during the Vietnam war, see Fails, *Marines and Helicopters 1962-1973*, Chapters 4, 11, and 12.

cialists to provide local security forces and to operate "clubs, messes, special services, exchanges, laundries, etc."⁸⁰ Marines who were wounded, sick, or on R&R constituted a further drain. During the last half of 1968, these commitments and losses drove the flight-line strength of helicopter groups down to less than 80 percent of the provisional T/O.⁸¹ In the opinion of a board of III MAF officers, the lack of men, particularly skilled helicopter maintenance Marines, put helicopter maintenance "behind the power curve."⁸²

*Filling the Ranks in Vietnam: Too Many Billets,
Too Few Marines*

In the summer of 1967 the Department of Defense's manning level for Vietnam, Program 4, called for 80,500 Marines. At the time, 79,000 Marines were actually in Vietnam or in a Special Landing Force (SLF)⁸³ On 10 August 1967, the Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, tentatively approved Program 5, which set a goal of just over 82,000 Marines in Vietnam.⁸⁴ McNamara officially approved Program 5 in October.⁸⁵ If filled, this ceiling would still have left III MAF with over 6,000 unfilled billets.⁸⁶ This point became moot as the Marine Corps could not even meet its authorized strength. The number of Marines in country declined from 79,337 on 30 April 1967 to 73,430 on 31 October 1967. This decline in strength largely resulted from a replacement shortage, administrative losses at the end of the year (particularly holiday leaves), and conversion from a tour lasting at least 13 full months in Vietnam to one lasting no more than 395 days from the day a Marine left the United States to the day he returned to the United States.⁸⁷

In order to correct this manpower shortage, the Commandant directed the commanding generals of Marine Corps Bases Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton to retrain 1,000 non-infantry Marines a month in August and September as infantry replacements for Vietnam. Since these Marines received seven weeks of training, the first of them did not arrive in Vietnam until early October 1967.⁸⁸ October also marked the beginning of the annual manpower surge. The Marine Corps normally experienced a recruit "surge" during the summer months, and the first of these summer recruits completed their mandatory four months initial training and became available for overseas assignment in early October.

On 10 November, Staging Battalion at Camp Pendleton went to a seven-day work week to handle the increased number of replacements. Five days later Headquarters, Marine Corps increased the normal replacement flow for the period from 23 November 1967 to 13 January 1968 by 3,135 Marines. This forced Staging Battalion to implement "Operation Kicker," shortening the number of training days from 15 to 12. On 6 January 1968, the last planeload of replacements trained under Operation Kicker left for Vietnam.⁸⁹ With these added inputs, overall strength in Vietnam rose by over 4,500 through November and December.

Changes to Program 5 reduced the number of Marines authorized to be deployed to Vietnam for December 1967 and January 1968 to 81,500. According to the MACV strength report, by 31 December 1967, the total number of Marines in country or assigned to SLFs amounted to only 78,013. Still, III MAF found itself in the unusual situation of having 74,058 Marines on board to fill 72,526 authorized billets.

Unfortunately for III MAF the formal tables of organization did not provide for a number of vital billets, including the 1,097 Marines involved in the Combined Action Program.⁹⁰ Despite the fact that III MAF was technically overstrength, the 23,778 Marines assigned to the 3d Division still left the division 62 Marines short of the number authorized. The 1st Marine Division, with 23,209 Marines, was 1,251 Marines short of its authorized strength. The average strength for infantry battalions in Vietnam was 1,188, only five Marines short of the T/O allowance of 1,193, but the infantry battalions of the 1st Marine Division averaged only 1,175 Marines. The two SLFs combined were 424 Marines short of their authorized strength of 3,900. Force Logistics Command contained 9,397 Marines, only 307 Marines short of its authorized strength. The 1st MAW had 15,308 Marines in Vietnam, 1,869 Marines more than its manning level, but still remained critically short of pilots and aircraft mechanics.⁹⁰

Total Marine Corps strength in Vietnam grew slightly in January 1968, reaching 78,436 by 28 Jan-

*Throughout this chapter, III MAF strength includes the SLFs unless specified otherwise.

**Provisional T/Os covered the Combined Action Program, additional personnel for the III MAF headquarters, and other billets needed in Vietnam. Although technically these billets should have been filled, the Marine Corps' inability to man III MAF fully meant that these provisional billets were filled at the expense of other units. See Chapter 29 for further discussion about the manning of the Combined Action Program.

uary, with 74,313 Marines in III MAF. While the shortfall in the divisions continued, the average strength of infantry battalions remained relatively stable at 1,186 Marines. The shortage among the battalions of the 1st Marine Division disappeared, as their average strength rose to 1,193, exactly their authorized strength. Just before the beginning of the Tet offensive, infantry companies had an average of 207.5 Marines assigned, only 8.5 below their T/O allowance of 216. However, an average of 15.4 Marines were on R&R, in hospital, or otherwise absent, leaving just over 192 Marines present for duty. Since a number of Marines present on the unit diary were in fact occupied with a variety of tasks, the number of Marines available for operations was somewhat lower.

During January 1968, 539 Marines died or were missing in action and 2,126 wounded in action.⁹¹ For the month, III MAF reported that another 60 Marines were hospitalized for injuries or illness. While these casualties were heavy, especially compared to the light casualties suffered during October, November, and December 1967,* they only foreshadowed what was to prove the costliest year of the war for the Marine Corps.

On the night of 30-31 January 1968 the Tet Offensive began. Marine counterattacks, particularly in Hue City, made February 1968 costlier for the Marine Corps than any previous month of the war. In February, 691 Marines were killed and 4,197 wounded in action. While some battalions suffered terribly in this month, the high flow of replacements ensured that the average strength of infantry battalions fell only slightly, to 1,157. One of the hardest hit battalions, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, which suffered 65 killed and 421 wounded in the battle for Hue City, saw its average monthly strength drop only 111, from 1,152 in January to 1,041 in February. Many of the Marines carried on the rolls of this and other badly bloodied battalions, however, were recovering from wounds.

By the end of February, while the average number of Marines assigned to rifle companies had fallen by only 5.4 from late January to 202.1, the average number physically present dropped to 174.8. Again, some companies were particularly bad off; while most companies numbered somewhere between 190 and 210 total strength, Companies E and I of the 7th Marines had only 172 and 176 Marines, respectively, on their rolls. Still, all but 17 Company E Marines and 31 Company I Marines were with their company. At the

end of February, the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, an SLF battalion, was still recovering from heavy fighting in the Cua Viet sector, and the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines was still feeling the effects of the battle for Hue. Company I, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines showed 202 Marines on its rolls, but only 150 were actually with the company. Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines carried a respectable 210 Marines on its rolls, only six shy of its T/O strength. However, about half, 109 Marines, were absent, most doubtless in hospitals.

The Deployment of Regimental Landing Team 27

The unexpected ferocity of the Tet offensive shook President Johnson. In the first days of February, while General Westmoreland felt that he had the situation in Vietnam under control, the President worried that a major reverse might still occur. President Johnson found the possibility of Khe Sanh falling particularly alarming. Although anxious to send additional troops to forestall the possibility of an embarrassing defeat, for political reasons Johnson could not send reinforcements to Vietnam without a clear request from Westmoreland. On 12 February, after repeated prompting from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler, General Westmoreland finally requested a brigade from the 82d Airborne Division and half a Marine division.

Immediately after the receipt of Westmoreland's request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the 82d Airborne Division and two-thirds of a Marine division/wing team should be readied for movement, and proposed also that enough Reserve units should be called up to reconstitute the strategic reserve before these additional troops left for Vietnam. President Johnson welcomed the opportunity to send reinforcements to Vietnam, but he had no desire to call up the Reserves. At a meeting at the White House later on the 12th, the Joint Chiefs "unanimously" agreed to send one brigade of the 82d Airborne Division and a Marine regimental landing team immediately to Vietnam. The President, however, directed them to study the issue of the Reserve call-up further.⁹²

That night, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a message to the Commandant directing the movement of a reinforced regiment from the 5th Marine Division to Vietnam, with one battalion moving by sea and the other two by air. Air transport would begin by 14 February, and the entire regiment was to be in Vietnam by 26 February.⁹³ The Commandant promptly directed Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, Commanding Gen-

*Monthly deaths for this period averaged 240.3, peaking in December 1967, when 273 Marines died in Vietnam.

eral, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, to prepare Regimental Landing Team (RLT) 27 for deployment to Vietnam by the afternoon of 14 February.⁹⁴

Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/27, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John E. Greenwood, normally stationed in Hawaii, was already at sea, having embarked on board amphibious shipping for a four-month training deployment on 10 and 12 February. On 13 February, General Krulak simply canceled the training exercise and directed the battalion to steam directly to Da Nang. The change in destination caught the BLT unprepared. Not only was the BLT seriously understrength, with only an average of 119 Marines present in the rifle companies, but nearly 400 embarked Marines and sailors did not meet the criteria for assignment to Vietnam.

The first element of BLT 1/27, consisting of Companies C, D, and elements of Headquarters and Service Company, embarked on board the USS *Vancouver* (LPD 2), arrived in Da Nang on 23 February. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed the entire regiment to be in Vietnam by 26 February, the rest of BLT 1/27 could only move as fast as its ships could steam. Companies A, B, and other portions of Headquarters and Service Company, on board the USS *Bexar* (APA 237), arrived a day late on 27 February, while the last of Headquarters and Service Company arrived the next day on board the USS *Washburn* (AKA 108).^{*} Upon arrival, the battalion immediately had to transfer all non-deployable Marines and sailors out of Vietnam. On 28 February, after this transfer, the rifle companies averaged just 87 Marines. This situation quickly improved as 400 replacements flown out from Camp Pendleton with the rest of RLT 27 joined the battalion.

The rest of the 27th Marines also had a difficult time. Colonel Adolph G. Schwenk, the commanding officer of the 27th Marines, received a verbal warning order on 12 February, but the official message ordering the regiment to deploy did not arrive until the next day. After some initial confusion over the deployability criteria, the regiment learned that 17-year olds, sole surviving sons, Marines returned from Vietnam under the twice/thrice wounded policy, officers and corporals and below within four months of their discharge date, enlisted Marines already ordered to WestPac, and officers in receipt of transfer orders would not deploy to Vietnam. Marines with one year or more of duty in the United States since their last tour in Southeast Asia were deployable, a major departure from the policy

mandating two years between Vietnam tours.^{95**}

Even with the reduction of the time between tours from two years to one, only 33 officers and 660 enlisted men out of a regiment of 2,160 met the deployment criteria. After combing the 5th Marine Division for every deployable Marine, the regiment still had a shortfall of 900 infantrymen. Lieutenant General Krulak cut this shortfall to 600 by administratively reducing the regiment's personnel strength objective from fully combat ready to marginally combat ready. He then decided that some 400 infantry billets could be filled by Marines with other specialties. Nearly 100 infantrymen waived a disqualifying factor and volunteered to deploy with the regiment, while 100 infantry replacements from Staging Battalion rounded out the units leaving from California. Another 200 replacements from Staging Battalion and 200 Marines culled from FMFPac security forces, headquarters, and 9th MAB went to fill the 400-man shortfall in BLT 1/27. In just over a week, the regiment transferred out nearly 1,500 non-deployable Marines and sailors while simultaneously joining over 1,900 others to bring it up to strength. Units attached to the regiment to form an RLT added another 840 Marines and sailors.^{***}

^{**}Colonel Thomas P. O'Callaghan, who was the 5th Marine Division assistant operations officer at the time, remembered that the initial request for the 27th Marines came "from FMFPac in the clear over the phone. I pointed out to go to secure line and I would get G-3 and CG when they called back! This was done." Colonel O'Callaghan related that the criteria for deployment created "a mess, but the 5th Div couldn't make the move in time if we sorted everyone out before they left." Col Thomas P. O'Callaghan, Comments on draft, n.d. [Jan95] (Vietnam Comment File).

^{***}Lieutenant Colonel Louis J. Bacher, who commanded the 2d Battalion, 27th Marines, remembered that on 12 February, Colonel Schwenk, the 27th Marines commander, called a conference and announced that the regiment was deploying to Vietnam with the 2d and 3d Battalions departing by air and with BLT 1/27 arriving by ship. Bacher recalled that the "first plane was scheduled to leave Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) El Toro at noon" on the 14th. He stated that the 5th Marine Division staff "did an incredible task of transferring out over 850 officers and men . . . not qualified for deployment and replacing them with those that were, in the two days prior to mount-out." Lieutenant Colonel Bacher had a new executive officer, S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4 and three new company commanders. Lt Col Louis J. Bacher, Comments on draft, dtd 7May95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Bacher Comments. Colonel Tullis J. Woodham, Jr., who commanded the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines, recalled that the priority for transfers of infantrymen into the 27th Marines went to the 2d Battalion which was scheduled to depart first. According to Woodham, "by the time it came to filling out 3/27, . . . it became necessary to assign non-infantry MOS's [military occupational specialty] in large numbers. This resulted in a 'cooks, bakers, and candlestick makers' label to be tagged to the battalion. In reality this 'hardship' worked to the battalion's advantage and in Vietnam, the large numbers of cooks, mechanics, communicators, engineers, tankers, etc. with specialized skills other than infantry, paid off in tight places more than once. The old adage 'Every Marine a rifle man, first' never was more true." Col Tullis J. Woodham, Jr., Comments on draft, dtd 7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

^{*}During the Vietnam War, BLT Headquarters and Service Companies included Marines and sailors attached from other units.

At 1335 local time, 14 February, less than 48 hours after the initial verbal warning had been given, the first planeload of men from RLT 27 left Marine Corps Air Station El Toro. The last planeload left just before midnight on 22 February. A total of 3,349 Marines and sailors from RLT 27 and supporting units flew from El Toro in those eight days. Another 1,956 men from units needed to support RLT 27 arrived in Vietnam by sea, with the last ship arriving on 12 March.⁹⁶ Of the Marines deployed with the RLT, 973 were involuntarily ordered to their second tour in Vietnam after less than two years out of Southeast Asia.⁹⁷ Most of the Marines went on their first orientation patrol the day after they arrived in Vietnam. By 1 March, every battalion of the 27th Marines had begun combat patrols around Da Nang.* Several years later then-Lieutenant General Schwenk remembered that the rapid deployment of the RLT "amazed General Westmoreland," who "just couldn't believe how we had gotten there."^{98**}

The arrival of RLT 27 put 24 of the Marine Corps' 36 active infantry battalions in or off the shores of Vietnam. Before Tet, the Marine Corps had been barely able to sustain 21 battalions in country. The emergency deployment not only further strained the replacement system, but it also used up the next month's replacement pool to bring RLT 27 to a marginal strength level. On 3 May, as a result of Tet and the *Pueblo* incident, the Secretary of Defense authorized an increase in the Marine Corps' active strength of 9,700, bringing it to 311,600.^{99***} While helpful, this increase was not nearly large enough to sustain the level of Marine forces then currently in Vietnam.

*For a discussion of operations by RLT 27 and subordinate units upon arrival in Vietnam, see Chapter 13.

**Lieutenant Colonel Louis J. Bacher related that his battalion the month before had conducted a mount-out exercise involving the USAF 63d Military Airlift Wing stationed at Norton Air Force Base, California. At that time, the Marine battalion staged at Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, California, where the troops boarded C-141 aircraft of the Air Force Wing which flew them to Naval Air Station (NAS), Fallon, Nevada. After a seven-day counterinsurgency exercise, the Air Force aircraft returned the Marine battalion to El Toro where it then motored back to its base at Camp Pendleton, California. According to Bacher, on 14 February, "the same C-141s and crews that had lifted us to NAS Fallon a short time ago were going to lift us to Da Nang. Fortunately we had loading plans and manifests which, with some minor and some major changes served us well." Bacher Comments.

***On 23 January 1968, the North Koreans seized the USS *Pueblo* (AGER 2).

Reserve Callup?

On 13 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the President immediately activate selected Reserve units, including one Marine RLT. They also recommended that other Reserve units, including the rest of the IV Marine Expeditionary Force, be prepared to be called up on short notice.¹⁰⁰ President Johnson rejected this proposal. On 27 February, General Wheeler relayed a request from General Westmoreland for an additional 206,000 troops.¹⁰¹ The magnitude of his request prompted the President and his closest advisors to reexamine their policies concerning the war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the President mobilize the Reserves to both meet General Westmoreland's request and reconstitute the strategic reserve. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Wheeler, eagerly sought to have the Reserves activated, while the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Chapman, reluctantly agreed with this recommendation.¹⁰² In retirement General Chapman recalled that no matter how short their period of service after call-up, by law demobilized Reservists had fulfilled their obligated service. This made the Reserve "like a huge [piece] of artillery that has only one round," which "you can fire once, and then it will be 20 years, probably, before you can fire it again."¹⁰²

The Marine Corps Reserve had been reorganized recently from a collection of independent companies and batteries into the 4th Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), "a 'mirror like' image of the regular establishment MEF."¹⁰³ Largely due to the influence of the draft, in January 1968, the personnel readiness of the Marine Corps Reserve had never been better. The quality of Reservists was outstanding. Between 1 July 1967 and 30 June 1969, 80 percent of enlisted Reserve recruits scored in Mental Groups I or II, compared to only 32 percent of active-duty recruits. Only one percent of new Reservists scored in Mental Group IV. Fewer than 8 percent of the new Reservists did not have high school diplomas, while 10 percent were college graduates and many of the rest had some college. Still, only 48,000 Reservists received drill pay, not enough Marines to fill IV MEF. The Marine Corps planned to

****There are a number of excellent works on the impact of Tet and the debate it sparked within the Johnson Administration. The *Pentagon Papers*, IV. C. 6. c. is perhaps the most important source; perhaps the best treatment of the subject is Herbert Y. Schandler, *The Unmaking of a President: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).

bring units to full strength by calling up Class III (non-drill pay) Reservists.¹⁰⁴

Before Tet, the Marine Corps had only one plan in the event of a Reserve mobilization: to activate the entire IV MEF. On 4 March, the Secretary of Defense proposed to send 22,000 reinforcements to Vietnam by 15 June, including IV MEF (-), consisting of 18,100 men. The Secretary of Defense's proposal to activate less than the entire Reserve structure caught the Marine Corps unprepared, requiring frantic planning. Creating a composite Marine Aircraft Group would have undermined the readiness of the entire 4th MAW. Task organization plans envisioned calling up detachments of combat support and combat service support, a move which would have left the Marine Corps open to serious legal challenges. Political constraints ruled out the call up of Class III Reservists, upon whom the mobilization planners had relied to fill "gaping holes" in activated Reserve units.¹⁰⁵

Up until the last minute, administration officials considered calling up 26,000 Marine Reservists.¹⁰⁶ On 13 March, President Johnson decided to send an additional 30,000 troops to Vietnam, but his troop list did not include any Marine units. From 14 to 28 March, administration officials contemplated various proposals with even larger numbers of Reservists to be activated, but still none of them included Marines. When the President announced the callup of 62,000 Reservists on 31 March, no Marines were activated.¹⁰⁷

The Bloodiest Month, The Bloodiest Year

Although not as bad as February, casualties remained high throughout March and April. In May 1968, 810 Marines died in Vietnam, making that month the bloodiest of the war for the Marine Corps. Another 3,812 Marines were wounded in action. The first six months of 1968 proved the costliest of the war for the Marine Corps, accounting for almost one quarter of all Marine deaths during the Vietnam War. In these months 3,339 Marines died, less than 500 short of the 3,803 Marines killed in all of 1967. During this period the 3d Marine Division averaged around 220 Marines killed and over 1,250 wounded a month,

while the 1st Marine Division suffered about 190 Marines killed and 1,450 wounded each month. The casualty rate of the 3d Division remained fairly steady, with a bad month in March, while the 1st Division suffered almost half of its casualties in February and May.

The high casualty rate concerned General Cushman, who sent a message on 20 May, telling the commanders of the 1st and 3d Divisions that "we are suffering too many Marine casualties—particularly KIA." General Cushman attributed these excessive casualties to a misplaced reliance on "do or die assaults" more appropriate for amphibious attacks. He provided a list of tactical principles to reduce casualties, emphasizing firepower and supporting arms. Division commanders were directed to school their officers from the division to the company level in these principles. General Cushman concluded by saying:

[I]t is hard to soft pedal a generation of training in the assault as required for establishment of a beachhead, but it must repeat must be done if we are to fight and win this war.¹⁰⁸

Lieutenant General Krulak, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, quickly responded to this message. While agreeing that "there has been needless loss of Marine lives" during the war, and that "we need to do all we can to diminish the number of avoidable white crosses," General Krulak was troubled by the implication that the war in Vietnam required a set of tactical values different from those used in amphibious assaults. While agreeing with most of the principles espoused by General Cushman, he argued that "basic tactical principles are immutable," and that "there is no evidence that those basic principles should in any way be altered."¹⁰⁹

General Cushman's message also drew criticism from General Chapman. The Commandant was "convinced that in the main the offensive principles taught to our Marines from Boot Camp to C&SC [Command and Staff College] are sound." Although endorsing most of the tactical techniques espoused by General Cushman, General Chapman worried that a "literal interpretation" of General Cushman's direction to assault only by firepower "could lead to a derogation and even the loss" of the Marine Corps' traditional "can do" offensive spirit.¹¹⁰

Perhaps in response to General Cushman's concerns, Headquarters, Marine Corps directed that all majors and lieutenant colonels bound for Vietnam, except for recent graduates of professional schools, would receive instruction on the use of helicopters and supporting

*In mid-March 1968, Brigadier General Earl E. Anderson, the III MAF Chief of Staff, observed in a personal letter that the Marine command had hopes at that time of obtaining another Marine and division headquarters for Vietnam together with units associated with such an increase. BGen E. E. Anderson ltr to MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, dtd 14Mar68, Encl, Gen Earl E. Anderson, Comments on draft, dtd 14Mar68 (Vietnam Comment File).

Marine Casualties in Southeast Asia, 1968.

<i>Month</i>	<i>Killed</i> [†]	<i>Missing</i> [†]	<i>Wounded</i> ^{††}	<i>Total</i>
January	439	7	1,770	2,216
February	691	3	4,197	4,891
March	504	3	2,930	3,437
April	450	2	2,610	3,062
May	810	4	3,812	4,626
June	445	1	2,962	3,408
July	357	3	2,683	3,043
August	389	0	2,210	2,599
September	348	0	1,968	2,316
October	180	1	1,432	1,613
November	227	0	1,612	1,839
December	223	2	1,134	1,359
Total	5,063	26	29,320	34,409

[†] From MGySgt Lock file, compiled from records of the Vietnam War Memorial, May 1990. Killed includes all Marines who died in Southeast Asia or as a direct result of injuries suffered in Southeast Asia; Missing includes only those still officially considered missing as of May 1990.

^{††} From CMC Reference Notebook 1968; includes serious wounds resulting from accidents.

arms.¹¹¹ The field grade officers course at Staging Battalion, which lasted only three days before 19 June, expanded to seven and a half days on 31 July. In October 1968, the Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, recommended that infantry corporals and sergeants also receive two days of fire support training. This training began in January 1969.¹¹²

Shortly after this flurry of concern, the casualty picture improved markedly, due not to Marine Corps action, but to the inaction of the North Vietnamese Army. In June, July, and August, the reluctance of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units to engage in combat resulted in the casualty rate falling by a quarter.¹¹³ Throughout the rest of the year casualties in the 1st Division remained fairly steady, averaging approximately 120 dead and 1,000 wounded a month. In the 3d Division, casualties dropped dramatically in July, August, and September, averaging around 80 killed and less than 700 wounded, and then fell to about 30 dead and 250 wounded in the last three months of 1968. Over the course of the year, the 1st Division suffered somewhat more casualties than the 3d Division.

The types of casualties in the two divisions also differed greatly. The 3d Division was tied to the DMZ, and faced North Vietnamese regulars supported by artillery. In contrast, the 1st Division fought a guerilla war in the heavily populated coastal areas around Da Nang. Between 1 January 1968 and 31 May 1969, mortars, artillery, and rockets caused 47 percent of the

3d Division's casualties, while mines and boobytraps inflicted only 18.2 percent. The 1st Division experienced exactly the reverse, suffering only 17.9 percent of its casualties from indirect fire while mines and boobytraps accounted for 50.8 percent.¹¹⁴

In 1968, the Marine Corps lost 5,063 killed or missing and 29,320 wounded, more than a third of all casualties during the entire war. Over half of all casualties had less than one year of service. Infantrymen accounted for over four-fifths of all casualties. While privates, privates first class, and lance corporals made up just above half of the total Marine Corps, they accounted for almost three-quarters of the casualties. Their average age was about 20 years and six months.¹¹⁵

Foxhole Strength: Still Too Few Marines

The total number of Marines in Vietnam reached its wartime peak of 85,996 on 30 April 1968, with 85,402 of these Marines assigned to III MAF. This increase largely resulted from the deployment of RLT 27. The average strength of line battalions actually declined. The Marine Corps had already resorted to extraordinary efforts to maintain numbers in Vietnam in late 1967. The deployment of RLT 27 not only increased the number of replacements needed, it had also used up much of the March replacement pool to bring the deploying units up to strength. Manpower planners at Headquarters Marine Corps reacted by moving 300

infantry replacements from April into March and adding another 400 men to the scheduled replacements for April.¹¹⁶

Despite these efforts, in the spring of 1968, the Marine Corps could not find enough replacements to keep up with the high rate of casualties and normal rotations. The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved a new manpower ceiling for Vietnam, Program 6, on 4 April, calling for the number of Marines in Vietnam to increase to 87,700 by 30 June 1968. Instead of rising to this goal, however, the number of Marines in Vietnam declined slowly, but steadily, through the spring of 1968.

Midsummer marked the nadir of manpower for the year. In June, infantry battalions averaged only 1,043 Marines. At the end of June, rifle companies averaged 179.6 Marines. An average of only 158.5 Marines was actually present, or 73.4 percent of the T/O strength. The 1st Marine Division continued to bear the brunt of the manpower shortage, averaging just 1,005 Marines in its infantry battalions in July.

Naturally, some companies were worse off than others. On any given day, sick call, working parties, and other routine requirements siphoned off a number of Marines counted as "present," exacerbating the problem. In the early summer of 1968, senior officers returning from Vietnam spoke of the fighting strength of rifle companies averaging 120 men, and sometimes falling as low as 80 or 90 men.^{117*}

*There were questions among the different commands as to what amounted to effective strength of rifle companies. For example, Major General Raymond G. Davis, then commanding general of the 3d Marine Division, did not want to count as effective, personnel who were on light duty or awaiting transportation for TAD (Temporary Attached Duty) or R&R (Rest and Recreation) leave, but were still in the company sector. III MAF disagreed and was backed up by FMFPac. See BGen E.E. Anderson ltr to LtGen W. J. Van Ryzin, dtd 11Sep68, Encl, Gen Earl E. Anderson, Comments on draft, dtd 18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File). Colonel Pederson, the III MAF G-1, remembered that the term "foxhole strength" caused "a stir at various levels. The media reported what . . . [they] saw and in an indicting fashion reported that many were absent from the battlefield. When the story hit the streets reporters milked it with questions posed at SecNav, CMC, CGFMFPac. These officials shot messages to CGIIIMAF for info[rmation]. By then several days had passed. The same unit observed in the first place was now up to strength (T/O manning level etc.) . . . [but now] further reduced by combat casualties, transfers, etc. Massaging numbers did not solve much. Commanders at all levels were aware of personnel shortages, some of which were caused by assigning 'trigger pullers' to base-type functions such as R&R and China Beach R&R, out of country R&R. Our Combined Action Platoons used up more trigger pullers. There seemed to be some variation in casualty reporting, some counted by operation and experienced difficulty in accuracy when reporting daily by unit." Pederson Comments.

In contrast to the field units, the Marine Corps "got awfully heavy at [its] headquarters levels in Vietnam."¹¹⁸ The personnel situation improved on each succeeding rung of the chain of command. Infantry battalion headquarters and service companies averaged 91.8 percent of the T/O allowance of 329 Marines; regimental headquarters companies, 94.9 percent of their authorized strength of 218; and division headquarters battalions, almost 150 percent of their T/O strength of 1,248 Marines. Taken together, the headquarters overages of III MAF and the two divisions amounted to 1,568 Marines, nearly half the shortfall among the infantry battalions in country.

Much of this overmanning could not be helped. The tables of organization for headquarters units did not provide for many crucial billets, such as instructors for sniper, NCO, engineer, and other vital in-country schools.¹¹⁹ Task forces placed a further drain on headquarters assets, particularly the creation of Task Force X-Ray in January 1968.¹²⁰ Still, many Marines were assigned to headquarters units more as a matter of convenience than necessity.** Whether combat requirement or unnecessary luxury, since the Marine Corps could never reach its programmed strength in Vietnam, every extra Marine in a headquarters unit in effect came out of an infantry squad.

This situation concerned both Lieutenant General Henry W. Buse, General Krulak's replacement as Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, and General Chapman, the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Between 15 and 18 July, General Buse held a manpower conference at his headquarters to address this and other problems. After the conference, General Buse reported to the Commandant that while he could not tell how much or how soon effective rifle company strength would improve, except for Marines with medical limitations and certain overriding requirements, all infantrymen were being assigned to infantry and reconnaissance units.¹²¹

According to the MACV strength report, on 31 July 1968, III MAF included 82,871 Marines, 2,069 fewer than its authorized strength of 84,940. The two divisions combined, however, fell 4,130 below their authorized strength, and the SLF's contained 164 Marines less than their manning levels called for. Much of the difference could be found in Combined Action groups, which included 1,951 Marines. As in January,

**For instance, in the summer of 1967, in the midst of a critical shortage of combat engineers, the 3d Marine Division had five combat engineer NCOs building an officer's club at its base camp. Marsh intvw.

the divisions bore the brunt of the personnel shortage. The Force Logistic Command was only 227 Marines short of its authorized strength of 10,266, and the 1st MAW was only three Marines short of its authorized strength of 16,180.

Despite the large size of headquarters units, most Marines in Vietnam were "trigger-pullers." According to the MACV strength report for 31 July 1968, 44,522, or 53.7 percent, of the Marines in III MAF were assigned to infantry, artillery, tank, reconnaissance, amphibian tractor, or engineer battalions, battalion landing teams, or a Combined Action group.

At the end of July Lieutenant General Buse visited III MAF, devoting most of his time to the manpower problem. His visit convinced him that III MAF was taking vigorous steps to improve foxhole, flightline, and cockpit strength. Even so, he felt that III MAF needed more men, and recommended that Operation Kicker be reinstated at Staging Battalion to bring about an immediate improvement in the personnel readiness of III MAF.¹²² On 1 August, Staging Battalion complied with this request, maintaining the seven-day work week of Operation Kicker from 1 to 31 August. Between 20 August and 13 September, the battalion also reduced the schedule from 15 to 12 training days.¹²³

In August, the strength of infantry battalions increased somewhat, with the average strength rising to 1,072 Marines. The short-term steps taken by III MAF and Staging Battalion undoubtedly helped, but things were bound to improve around this time as the unusually large number of recruits joined from January through May, including over 5,000 draftees called in April and May, finally worked their way through the training pipeline and arrived in Vietnam.

The Return of RLT 27

RLT 27 left for Vietnam as an emergency measure, and was originally scheduled to spend only three months in country.¹²⁴ This was quickly lengthened to six months, but the Defense Department realized that the Marine Corps could not sustain this force level and that an Army unit had to replace the regiment as soon as possible. On 13 March, President Johnson and his advisors set 15 July as the date for RLT 27 to begin returning to the United States.¹²⁵ Twelve days later, the Army designated the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), located at Fort Carson, Colorado, to relieve the 27th Marines. After a schedule which included 13 training weeks, on 22 July, the first ele-

ments of the Army brigade departed for Vietnam. The last of the brigade arriving in country on 31 July.¹²⁶ The brigade still needed a full month of in-country orientation training before it was ready to participate in major combat operations.

This meant that the 1st Brigade could not relieve the 27th Marines until the end of September, delaying the planned return of the regiment for over a month and creating serious manpower problems for the Marine Corps. On 15 June 1968, a key issue paper for the Commandant contained the estimate that if RLT 27 did not leave Vietnam by July, the Marine Corps could not sustain its forces in Vietnam without a Reserve call up, or a combination of shortening time between tours and increasing strength.¹²⁷ About a week later, MACV informally asked III MAF exactly when the 27th Marines would leave Vietnam. General Cushman recommended that the 27th Marines not redeploy until after a relief in place could be effected. The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) would not be ready for combat until a month after its arrival in Vietnam. Since the proposed schedule actually involved having the brigade relieve the 1st Marines, which would in turn relieve the 27th Marines, General Cushman estimated that the earliest date the 27th Marines could leave Vietnam was 10 September.¹²⁸

General Abrams, who had relieved General Westmoreland as Commander USMACV in June, concurred with this recommendation. The proposed two-month postponement for the return of the 27th Marines prompted Paul H. Nitze, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to note on 19 July that "this delay will have adverse personnel implications for the Marine Corps." Secretary Nitze politely tasked General Wheeler to ask General Abrams to review his relief plan, stating that "[I]f feasible, the 27th RLT should be returned to the U.S. by 15 August."¹²⁹ General Cushman insisted that RLT 27 could not be withdrawn before the replacement Army brigade became combat ready without "unacceptable risk."¹³⁰ On 10 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the redeployment of RLT 27 between 10 and 15 September.^{131*}

*Charles F. Baird, Under Secretary of the Navy, noted that the delay in RLT 27's return resulted from the Army brigade's need for 30 days' training after arrival in Vietnam before it began combat operations. He unfavorably contrasted this with the record of RLT 27, which "took its place in the Da Nang TAOR a day after it arrived" when it deployed to Vietnam in February. Charles F. Baird, Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analyses), Subj: RLT 27; return of, dtd 16Jul68, tab JJ, RLT Redeployment File.

In August, the 27th Marines had an average strength of over 3,500 Marines and sailors. Only those Marines close to the end of their enlistments or those who had originally deployed with less than two years in the United States would actually leave Vietnam with the regiment. Of the over 5,000 Marines and sailors deployed with RLT 27 in February, some 1,500 had already reached the end of their enlistments or become casualties and returned to the United States.¹³² Only 800 of the remaining men met the return criteria. Under Operation Mixmaster, the rest of the Marines and sailors in the 27th Marines and attached units transferred to other commands to complete their tours in Vietnam.* Public announcements by the Marine Corps made it clear that most of the Marines were staying in Vietnam and that the return of RLT 27 did not represent the beginning of a withdrawal from Vietnam.¹³³

On 12 September, the first planeload of returning Marines left for Okinawa. On 16 September, the last of 699 Marines and sailors from RLT 27 arrived in California, and on 17 September the last group of the 101 returnees from BLT 1/27 arrived in Hawaii. Nearly 400 Marines from other units who had completed a full tour in Vietnam returned with the regiment.¹³⁴

The End of the Year

The redistribution of men from the 27th Marines brought about a dramatic improvement in the manpower situation. In October, infantry battalions in Vietnam carried an average of 1,183 Marines on their rolls, only 10 Marines below their T/O strength. These gains proved shortlived, for the departure of the 27th Marines marked the beginning of a slow but steady reduction in the number of Marines in III MAF. The Defense Department Program 6 strength authorization set the total number of American servicemen in Vietnam at 549,500. Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze made it clear that this number represented an upper limit

not to be exceeded. To stay within this limit while adding Army and Air Force units, the Defense Department reduced the Marine Corps' Vietnam troop ceiling to 82,100 for September, falling to 81,600 by December.¹³⁵

Both General Cushman and General Buse vigorously opposed the new Program 6 limits. To reduce Marine strength to the proposed level some Marine units would have to leave Vietnam, although the Defense Department had no plans to reduce the commitments of the remaining units. More importantly, the proposed Defense Department manning levels not only did not allow for the previously approved strength overages needed to support the extended operations in Vietnam, but they also failed to authorize enough Marines to man all units at their T/O strength.

In late September and early October the staffs of Headquarters, Marine Corps; III MAF; Fl  t Marine Force Pacific; and the Defense Department debated exactly which units would be withdrawn or cut, with the attention focusing on amphibian tractor, aviation support, reconnaissance, and headquarters units. No units were actually withdrawn, and on 21 November the Deputy Secretary of Defense ruled out the redeployment of any units since this might have a negative impact on the Paris Peace talks. At the same time he denied any increases in the Marine Corps' Southeast Asia allowance.¹³⁶

In early November, General Cushman complained that his efforts to stay within the Program 6 ceiling had already led to a shortage of experienced officers and decline in foxhole strength.¹³⁷ This problem was exacerbated by the lack of replacements. In contrast to the normal "summer surge" at the recruit depots, the number of new recruits joined between July and September fell well below the level of the previous summer, it did not even reach the level met during the first six months of 1968. The fall replacement flow was unable to keep the battalions up to strength. By December, the average strength of infantry battalions had fallen to 1,136 Marines. Rifle companies averaged 197.9 Marines on their rolls, of whom 178.5 were actually present. The division headquarters battalions were still relatively well off, with well over half again as many Marines as their tables of organization called for. The strength of III MAF's headquarters had grown by over 300 Marines since July. On 31 December there were 79,960 Marines in III

*See Shulimson and Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam 1965*, p. 117, and Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam 1966*, n, p. 283, for an explanation of Operation Mixmaster. Since most units in Vietnam had arrived before the end of 1966, in 1967 there was little need to "Mixmaster" units. RLT 27 was the first major Marine unit to return to the United States, and the personnel transfers it underwent foreshadowed the policies used when Marine Corps forces began to withdraw from Vietnam. See Cosmas and Murray, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam 1970-1971*, pp. 331-34.

Marine Corps Non-Prior Service Enlisted Accessions

Month	1967		1968		1969	
	Total Recruits	Draft Call [†]	Total Recruits	Draft Call [†]	Total Recruits	Draft Call [†]
January	3,968		8,646		7,620	
February	2,523		8,000		7,653	1,500
March	3,486		7,504		7,144	1,500
April	3,984		8,894	4,000	8,261	2,500
May	5,988		9,035	1,900	7,252	2,000
June	9,394		9,429		9,273	2,000
July	9,038		7,497		8,372	
August	8,342		7,573		7,643	
September	8,664		7,573		7,606	1,500
October	5,593		7,947		7,817	1,400
November	5,468		6,898		7,224	1,000
December	5,555		8,346	2,500	6,887	1,500
Total	73,970	0	99,310	8,400	94,721	14,900

[†] This is the number of draftees called for, *not* the number of draftees actually joined in a given month. Due to the workings of Selective Service, none of the calls were completely filled, while the Marine Corps received a few draftees in months in which it did not make a call. The Marine Corps accepted 145 draftees in 1967, 7,702 in 1968, and 12,872 in 1969.

Source: *Annual Report of Qualitative Distribution of Military Manpower; Selected Manpower Statistics*.

MAF and the SLFs, and another 468 other Marines in various assignments in Vietnam, over 1,000 short of the number authorized by Program 6.^{138*}

The only way to maintain the flow of replacements to Vietnam was to further increase the number of new recruits. In December 1968, the Marine Corps made a draft call, and made further calls in 9 of the next 12 months.

The Marine Corps and the Draft.

Traditionally, the Marine Corps took great pride in the fact that every Marine had voluntarily enlisted. Well before the Vietnam War, senior Marine officers recognized that the Marine Corps indirectly benefited from the draft by recruiting draft-motivated volunteers.¹³⁹ The rapid expansion of the Marine Corps in late 1965 and early 1966 forced the Marine Corps to turn to Selective Service to find enough recruits to fill the ranks. The Marine Corps made four draft calls between November 1965 and March 1966, accepting

19,636 draftees in fiscal year 1966. As soon as possible, however, the Marine Corps returned to its traditional reliance on voluntary enlistments. The Marine Corps did not make another draft call until April 1968, after the Tet offensive, followed by a second call in May. The next call came in December 1968, inaugurating a steady reliance on the draft until February 1970, well after Marine forces had begun withdrawing from Vietnam.^{**}

Ostensibly, the increased reliance on the draft reflected in part a need to "smooth out" the traditionally large summer volunteer recruit cohorts to ensure an even flow of replacements for Vietnam.¹⁴⁰ For most of the months in 1969 in which draft calls were made, however, the total number of new recruits was actually lower than that for the same month in 1968 (see chart). To accommodate the large flow of replacements needed, the Marine Corps requested an end strength for fiscal year 1969 of 320,700. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), Dr. Alain C. Enthoven, disagreed with Headquarters, Marine Corps' estimates, trimming over 10,000 spaces off the allowance for the

*The average strength of III MAF appeared to fluctuate from month to month. According to Colonel Maurice Rose, who became the III MAF G-1 in July 1968, he recalled receiving "almost daily calls from MACV telling me to get down to our authorized strength. It got to the point that I was making nightly calls to the G-1s of subordinate commands to determine strength." He remembered that sometime in September or October, III MAF sent a message to FMFPac "stating the urgency of the situation." Rose Comments.

**The withdrawal of Marine Forces from Vietnam began in July 1969, with the withdrawal of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines; the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion; and numerous supporting units. The 3d Marine Division departed Vietnam on 7 November 1969. For a discussion of the withdrawal of Marine Forces from Vietnam, see Smith, *The U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1969: High Mobility and Standdown*.

Southeast Asia surge and 4,500 off the transient allowance to come up with a figure of 304,500.¹⁴¹ The Department of Defense eventually relented, but not by much: the active-duty strength of the Marine Corps reached its Vietnam War peak on 31 March 1969, at 314,917. Even two-year enlistments proved too long to maintain the flow of replacements within this end strength, and the Marine Corps embarked on another round of early releases. During 1969 almost 70,000 Marines accepted "early-outs," well over half of all enlisted separations.

The Marine Corps Transformed

By the end of 1968, the demands of the Vietnam War seemed to have pushed the Marine Corps manpower system as far as it could go. In 1965, The Marine Corps took only volunteers on long enlistments,

invested in lengthy training, and fostered personnel stability in units. While these policies were "inefficient," in that they did not produce the maximum number of riflemen, they were effective, producing exceptionally combat-ready units. By the end of 1968 this had changed. As the need to fill foxholes in Vietnam grew, and with no hope of the oft-requested and much needed increases in end strength, the Marine Corps reluctantly became an "efficient" organization, concentrating on producing the maximum number of riflemen for duty in Southeast Asia. The Marine Corps turned to short enlistments (with early outs, often as little as 18 months), short training programs, high personnel turnover, and eventually draftees, to meet the needs of III MAF. Yet, even with these efforts, the Marine Corps still did not have the resources to meet its authorized strength in Vietnam.

CHAPTER 28

Backing Up The Troops

A Division of Responsibility—Naval Logistic Support—Marine Engineers—The FLC Continues to Cope

A Division of Responsibility

By the beginning of 1968, III MAF had hopes that its major logistical problems were over. The unexpected problems with the new M16 rifles during the past year not only delayed the conversion from the older M14 rifles, but also required the modification of all of the M16s. Compounding the difficulties for III MAF logisticians were the grounding of the CH-46s,* personnel shortages, combat losses, accidents, and continuing threat of enemy rocket and artillery bombardment of Marine supply and ammunition points. Still, by January 1968, Brigadier General Harry C. Olson, Commanding General, Force Logistic Command (FLC), had taken several steps to alleviate the situation. He had implemented an M16 repair program that was moving at an accelerating pace. Moreover, the FLC had realigned its command structure to meet new deployments, had created new facilities, and had attained a relatively full logistic pipeline.

At Da Nang, General Olson had established the headquarters of the FLC/1st Force Service Regiment together with a supply battalion and maintenance battalion. Additional elements of the FLC at Da Nang were the 1st and 3d Military Police Battalions, the 5th Communication Battalion,** and the 7th Motor Transport Battalion. The FLC complex at Da Nang provided the logistic support for both the 1st Marine Division and the Korean Marine Brigade.

Two reinforced service battalions, the 1st and 3d, made up the major field elements of the FLC. The 3d Service Battalion which was redesignated Force Logistic Support Group (FLSG) Alpha at Phu Bai maintained subunits at Khe Sanh and Camp Evans. In mid-January, with the arrival of U.S. Army units into Thua Thien, FLSG Alpha temporarily supported elements of

the Army's 1st Cavalry Division and 101st Airborne Division. On 29 January, the Army assumed responsibility for its own logistic support at Camp Evans and the Marine logistic unit there then augmented the Marine subunit at Khe Sanh. FLSG Alpha retained responsibility for the 1st Marine Division Task Force X-Ray elements, newly arrived in the Phu Bai and Phu Loc areas. At Dong Ha, in the 3d Marine Division sector, FLSG Bravo, based upon the 1st Service Battalion, remained responsible for the logistic support of the division units along the DMZ and at Quang Tri.*** During January 1968, III MAF supported 49,000 troops north of the Hai Van Pass, requiring about 2,000 short tons of supplies per day.¹

To support the fuel needs of the augmented forces arriving in northern I Corps, the FLC had completed construction in January of a 3,000-barrel capacity steel fuel tank near the Hue LCU ramp in the city.**** Unfortunately, on 2 February, during the enemy attack on Hue, rockets slammed into the fuel farm, destroying 110,000 gallons of JP-4 jet aviation gas. While the enemy offensive forced the allies to close the LCU ramp and the fuel farm temporarily, the FLC had the facility back in operation by mid-February.

Elsewhere during their Tet offensive, the Communist forces struck at other Marine logistic targets. At Da Nang, like all other III MAF units, the FLC Marines were on full alert. The two military police battalions, the 1st and 3d MP Battalions, assisted the Marine infantry and local ARVN units in turning back

*See Chapter 25 relative to the problem with helicopters.

**In addition to the 5th Communication Battalion in Vietnam there was the 7th Communication Battalion directly under the 1st Marine Division. The Wing had under its command Marine Wing Communications Squadron 1 (MWCS-1) and directly under III MAF was Sub-Unit 1, 1st Radio Battalion which at the beginning of the year was at Khe Sanh.

***FLSG Bravo also maintained a supply company at Chu Lai in Quang Tin Province to provide logistic support for the Marine aviation units that remained based there. Colonel Rex O. Dillow, the III MAF G-4 or logistics officer, noted that with the relocation of units there were constant requests for materials and engineers to build hospitals, headquarters buildings, and permanent structures at the new locations. He declared that the generators practically required armed guards because of their limited availability. Col Rex O. Dillow, Comments on draft, dtd 10Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Dillow Comments.

****The allies maintained LCU ramps at both Hue and at Dong Ha because LCUs were the largest craft which could negotiate the Perfume and Cua Viet Rivers, respectively, due to silting problems in both rivers.




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BGen Henry C. Olson, CG FLC, presents a letter of appreciation to LCpl Ralph Choate relative to donations by the FLC to a children's hospital near Da Nang.

the aborted enemy attack on the I Corps headquarters compound.* While a few rockets landed nearby during the offensive, the FLC complex at Red Beach remained relatively unscathed.

The Marine logistic facilities at Chu Lai did not fare as well. On 31 January, an enemy rocket struck the FLSG Bravo ammunition dump, causing the destruction of 649 tons of bombs and 26 tons of bulk explosives. Scattered unexploded ordnance proved to be troublesome for many weeks after the attack. According to the FLSG Bravo Supply Company monthly report: "... thousands of 500-pound bombs buried in the sand. These bombs have been blown from their pallets and are being excavated, palletized, and issued."² According to Marine accounting, the cost of the munitions destroyed by the attack amounted to \$2,215,358.52.³

The greatest damage of the enemy offensive was to the Marine lines of communication.** Through January and February, the NVA and VC attacked river convoys on the Cua Viet and Perfume Rivers and successfully interdicted Route 1 at several points. In fact during

February, the Marines halted all truck convoys north from Hue to the DMZ. Observing that "logistics was the key" to countering the NVA offensive in the north, General Westmoreland, the MACV commander, stressed in a message to Army General Earle G. Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and Admiral Sharp, CinCPac, "this means opening Highway 1."⁴

It would not be until the beginning of March, however, that the roads would be open again in the north. Even then, as an Army historian noted, "interdiction continued—mining, demolition of bridges, road cratering, and ambushes."⁵ Still on a typical day during this period, 14 LCUs would be either loading cargo or enroute from Da Nang to northern I Corps together with truck convoys from Da Nang to Phu Bai and from Phu Bai to Dong Ha. From its outset, the enemy offensive, as the Marine command noted in a mid-year report, was aimed "against our supply lines."⁶

During this interval, the FLC assumed the additional responsibility for the preponderance of support for the 1st Air Cavalry and 101st Airborne Divisions as they deployed into northern I Corps. With the tactical units arriving ahead of the Army support units, the FLC provided both divisions interim assistance with food, fuel, and ammunition. Within 10 weeks, both FLSG Alpha at Phu Bai and Bravo at Dong Ha became responsible for 90,000 U.S. personnel of all Services, nearly double the number in early January. On 19 February, Brigadier General Earl E. Anderson, the III MAF Chief of Staff, wrote in some exasperation, "Our logistic problems have become immense . . . Yet, in spite of our pleas to slow down the introduction of troops because of the tenuousness of our land, air, and water LOCs [lines of communication], the four stars in Saigon merely wave their hands and release dispatches directing the units to move."^{7***}

Despite Anderson's misgivings, the FLC's central control of assets and its capability to move critical items to combat units rapidly enabled the Marine logisticians to cope with the situation under the most difficult of circumstances. To help the Marines, on 26 February 1968, the U.S. Army established the U.S. Army Support Command Da Nang (Provisional) to

*See Chapter 8.

**See Chapters 7–13. Colonel Rex O. Dillow, the III MAF G–4, recalled that his section created a Transportation Control Center (TCC) that operated similar to a tactical logistic group in an amphibious operation in order to determine priorities over limited resources. While headed by an officer in the G–4 section, the TCC included representatives from the III MAF G–3 section; the U.S. Seventh Air Force Tactical Air Liaison section; the U.S. Army 1st Logistical Command; the FLC, and the Naval Support Activity. Dillow Comments and Draft of III MAF report on Logistics for General Officers' Symposium, Jul68, n.d. [Jun68], Encl, Dillow Comments.

***According to Army historian Joel Meyerson, "The decision to shift troops north at a rate that exceeded the capability to create a supply base for their support . . . reflected the gravity of the situation." He went on to state: "To develop combat power quickly, the four-stars in Saigon chose manpower over logistics, taking a calculated risk. But time, they believed was of the essence." Joel D. Meyerson, Chief, Operational History Branch, CMH, Comments on draft, dtd 6Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Meyerson Comments.



Department of Defense (USMC) unnumbered photo

An overview of the FLC compound near Red Beach at Da Nang. The sprawling FLC now supported a III MAF command that numbered more than 100,000 soldiers, sailors, and Marines in January 1968 and would soon expand further.

provide both logistical support and direction for Army units. This command sent out subordinate logistic task forces to both the 101st Airborne and 1st Cavalry Divisions. The FLC logistic field units, FLSG A and FLSG B, at Phu Bai and Dong Ha, respectively, continued to provide rations to the Army units in the northern two provinces, however, until the Army logistic units became self-sustaining.^{8*}

*Colonel Dillow, the III MAF G-4, praised the efforts of two Army generals in assisting the Marine logisticians to cope with the situation. These were Brigadier General Henry A. Rasmussen, USA, the USMACV J-4, and Brigadier General George H. McBride, USA, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang. According to Dillow, "here we had the largest field force ever commanded by a Marine Corps headquarters, with multi-division Army and Marine Corps forces depending upon support from U.S. Air Force, Navy, Marine and Army units. Despite the rapid buildup, difficulties from long and tenuous lines of communication and adverse weather, logistic support was steady throughout." Dillow Comments. In letters of appreciation to the two Army generals, General Cushman, the III MAF commander, recognized their efforts. He credited Rasmussen with providing "guidance and impetus" to logistic planning which made it "possible to promptly deploy support forces and commence operations in support of much larger reinforcements than had been expected, but which were moved to Northern I Corps on very short notice and committed to action immediately upon arrival." Copy of CGIIIMAF ltr to ComUSMACV, Subj: Contributions to III MAF by . . . BGen Henry A. Rasmussen, n.d. [Jul68], Encl, Dillow Comments. In his letter to General McBride, Cushman observed that the Army general directed the "phasing in" of some 52 U.S. Army logistical support units of about 7,000 total personnel. CGIIIMAF ltr to ComUSMACV, Subj: Performance of duty by BGen George H. McBride . . . [USA], n.d. [Jul68], Encl, Dillow Comments.

Through heroic efforts, III MAF was able to maintain a satisfactory logistic stock level. For example in February, Marine helicopters alone lifted 7,724 tons of cargo, attaining their highest monthly tonnage, despite low ceilings, rain, fog, and basically miserable flying conditions.⁹ The following random statistics for the period January through April illustrate in part the massive effort by the Marine logisticians of the FLC:

In January, FLSG Bravo issued 362,100 C-Rations, brought 1,747,504 pounds of ice, transported 11,213 tons of supplies over a total of 58,161 truck miles and issued 4,227.3 tons of ammunition.¹⁰

During February, FLC processed 23,442 transients, processed 87,000 requisitions, baked 860,692 pounds of bread, and air delivered a daily average of 143 tons of supplies to Khe Sanh Combat Base.¹¹

During March, FLSG Alpha issued more than 1,743,000 gallons of various types of fuel.¹²

The FLC laundry units processed 201,000 pounds of laundry in the month of April, and its ammunition company handled 55,415 tons of ammunition, a daily average of more than 1,800 tons.¹³

Specifically during this period, the Marine command arranged for the helicopter delivery under extreme weather conditions of 300 short tons daily from ships off the coast to U.S. shore facilities, as well as the air drop of 200 short tons daily to 1st Air Cavalry units in the Camp Evans sector. "Rough Rider" truck convoys from Da Nang north through the Hai Van Pass involved 10,471 Marine and U.S. Army vehicles.¹⁴

Once the heavy Army logistic units arrived they were able to ease the burden on the Marines. Representatives of III MAF; the FLC; MACV; U.S. Army Vietnam; 1st Logistical Command; U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang (Provisional); and Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, mutually agreed on the division of support. Marine Corps and Army dumps would provide common item support, Class I (Rations), Class III (Petroleum), and Class V (Ammunition) to both Army and Marine units. The respective Service logistic facility would furnish Class II (General Supply items) and Class IV (Special Items). With this understanding, FLSG Alpha became responsible for common item support for all III MAF units, both Marine and Army in the Phu Bai sector. The Army's new Prov Corps 26th General Support Group at Quang Tri assumed the same responsibility for those units located south of Quang Tri and north of Hue. FLSG Bravo continued to provide support for those units in the Dong Ha and DMZ sector. By March 1968, the supply requirements

for U.S. forces in northern I Corps had reached 3,000 short tons per day. Colonel Rex O. Dillow, the III MAF G-4, later observed, "the rapid buildup in requirements, and the effects of enemy action and adverse weather, presented perhaps the biggest threat of curtailing tactical operations during the Tet offensive."¹⁵

During this critical period, the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang; the Army's 1st Logistical Command; Army Support Command, Da Nang; and the FLC cooperated to move the supplies where they were most needed. In March, they opened a LOTS (Logistics Over the Shore) Facility at Thon My Thuy. The Army positioned a task force of over 1,000 men from its 159th Transportation Battalion, with six attached companies, at this site (Wunder Beach) to facilitate the movement of supplies.* A Seabee-built 8.6-mile road from Route 1 near Hai Lang, tied this installation into the major road network in northern I Corps. As an Army historian commented, "even then Wunder Beach was no rose garden: The Hai Lang Road remained subject to heavy mining, and was sometimes seeded with metal objects to impede clearance." The

LCpl John M. Martin pulls a pan of freshly baked loaves of bread from the oven. The FLC had the responsibility of providing III MAF everything from bread to ammunition.

Photo is from the Abel Collection



*Colonel Dillow, the III MAF G-4, remembered that in February 1968, General Cushman directed him to ask the Seventh Fleet for a Navy pontoon causeway unit then stationed in Japan to "be brought to Da Nang Harbor. This required considerable effort by the Navy; several ships were required to move the causeway sections. They objected, pointing out that in all probability a causeway, if installed could not be kept in place for any appreciable time due to the winds and tides during the monsoon season. However, General Cushman insisted, stating that we may have to take a calculated risk and install it despite the odds. It was therefore available when the drawdown of supplies in NICTZ [Northern I Corps Tactical Zone] necessitated its installation." Dillow Comments. Army historian Joel Meyerson quoted the following from a 1st Logistical Command Operational Report, Lessons Learned for the period: "The Navy was asked to find the best location for the establishment of a LOTS site. After studying the problem, the Navy concluded that it was impractical to establish such an operation and that the results would be minimal. . . . In spite of this conclusion, the Army, faced with the need to support two divisions, proceeded to establish Wunder Beach . . ." Meyerson Comments. Colonel Dillow recalled that "installing the causeway in the high winds and heavy seas of the monsoon season was no small task, although it was kept in place once installed. Installation was often interrupted." According to Dillow, the Army unit operating the facility "had been commanded by an officer named Wunder. They referred to themselves as 'Wunder's Wonders.' They asked us if they could name the facility Wunder Beach, which was readily approved (although to the consternation of a few Marine Corps officers!)." Dillow Comments. The U.S. Army 159th Transportation Battalion was actually commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Sunder. The men of the battalion called themselves Sunder's Wonders and with a slight play of words, the LOTS facility was named Wunder Beach. LtGen Willard Pearson, USA, *The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966-1968*, Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C. Dept of the Army, 1975), p. 61.

facility, nevertheless, remained open until the northeast monsoon would make operations there too dangerous.* From 6 March until its closing at the end of the summer, more than 100,000 short tons moved across Wunder Beach.¹⁶

At the end of March, General Creighton W. Abrams, Westmoreland's deputy, extolled the logistic efforts of all of the Services, with perhaps a left-handed compliment for the Navy:

The Marines and the Army are working together realistically without any vestige of Service pride interfering with service to the common effort. The Navy shows positive signs of moving out as the others clearly have. I am encouraged and gratified at what has been done, with clearly more to come from these men who have thrown off the fetters of conventionality and gotten with the job.

He concluded: "The logisticians have thus far accomplished the impossible by supporting the reinforcements dumped into the northern area so precipitously."¹⁷

Naval Logistic Support

Despite Abram's rather lukewarm praise for the naval efforts, it was the Navy logistic system that provided the fundamental support for III MAF including the Army forces in I Corps. The Marine Corps traditionally had relied upon the Navy for medical support, for extensive and heavy construction efforts, and for the administrative and logistic tasks involved with an advanced naval base. Vietnam was not to be any different. In July 1965, the Navy had established the Naval Support Activity (NSA), Da Nang, which by January 1968 under Rear Admiral Paul L. Lacy, had become "the Navy's largest overseas logistic command," consisting of 10,000 officers and men.¹⁸

The Navy command structure made for some wrinkles in the U.S. I Corps organizational charts. Originally, NSA, Da Nang was under the commanding general, III MAF, who at the time was also the MACV Naval Component commander, but this changed in 1966 with the establishment of U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, directly under General Westmoreland. In its

command history, the NSA, Da Nang reported that it came under the operational control of U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, under the command of Commander, Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, "less operational control," and finally under the "military control" of III MAF. For all practical purposes, however, the NSA in I Corps remained a component part of III MAF.¹⁹

From his headquarters building in downtown Da Nang, nicknamed the "White Elephant" after its white decor and decorative elephant friezes, Admiral Lacy controlled the beach and port logistic activities for U.S. forces throughout I Corps. By January 1968, he had a small fleet of over 100 lighterage craft including LCM 8s (landing craft, mechanized), LCM 6s, and LCU (landing craft, utility) to move cargo from sea-going vessels in the crowded harbors into the ports and onto the beaches. Ashore, Lacy's command warehoused supplies, established supply points, assembled amphibious fuel pipe lines, and provided fuel storage bladders in support of both the Marines and Army in I Corps.²⁰

While Da Nang was the hub of port activity in I Corps, the NSA, Da Nang established smaller detachments to assist the offloading and to provide for immediate shore storage facilities elsewhere in I Corps. By 1968, NSA Da Nang had three main port detachments deployed outside of Da Nang: one at Chu Lai, south of Da Nang, the site of a Marine air base and headquarters of the U.S. Army Americal Division; the second at Tan My near the Cos Co causeway at the mouth of the Perfume River; and the third at the Cua Viet Port Facility, which supported allied forces in the DMZ sector. Later in the year, NSA, Da Nang relieved the Army for port logistic support of the 11th Light Infantry Brigade of the Americal Division at Sa Huyen, which then became the southernmost supply point in I Corps. Each of these port detachments became a microcosm of the larger NSA, Da Nang, and each commander had the authority to establish direct liaison with the commands he supported in his sector. At the height of the U.S. buildup in northern I Corps in mid-1968, NSA, Da Nang with its subordinate detachments were controlling on a monthly average more than 350,000 tons of cargo for approximately 200,000 troops in the corps area.²¹

The 1968 Tet offensive brought home the reliance that the allied forces placed upon their water-borne lines of communication. With most of the main roads cut, the only means of resupply was by air or by water. Given the relatively small amount of material and equipment that could be airlifted, the Army and Marine forces in northern I Corps were entirely depen-

*At a III MAF logistics conference in May 1968 chaired by Army Major General Richard G. Stilwell, then the Deputy CG III MAF, Army, the conferees estimated the continuing support that would be required in northern I Corps. At the meeting there was a general consensus that "Wunder Beach should be abandoned, since both the road and the area . . . [would] be impassable" during the upcoming monsoon season. III MAF, Memo for the Record, Subj: III MAF Logistics Conference, dtd 15May68, Encl Dillow Comments.

dent upon keeping open the vital waterways, especially the Cua Viet and the Perfume River. This necessitated the extensive convoying of the various river craft including LCUs, LCMs, and barges bringing supplies into the embattled city of Hue on the Perfume River and, further north, up the Cua Viet from the port facility to the 3d Marine Division's main base at Dong Ha in Quang Tri Province.

While the river clearing and convoy system was a closely coordinated effort employing both air and ground forces, the Navy's "brown water" fleet played an important role. Since the previous year, Task Force 116, the U.S. Navy, Vietnam's River Patrol Force, had kept River Section 521 at Tan My where the section had established its headquarters on a floating barge complex. Thus at the breakout of the Tet offensive and assault upon Hue, the section was in position to support the flow of water-borne supplies up the Perfume River. With its mainstay consisting of four-man crew PBRs (patrol river boats) powered by Jacuzzi jet pumps and capable of maneuvering at speeds of 25 to 29 knots and equipped with surface radar, four machine guns, and a grenade launcher, the Navy unit cleared the waterway to Hue. Smaller boat detachments operating on the Cua Viet also kept that passage open. For its participation in the Tet offensive, River Section 521 received the Presidential Unit Citation.²²

Given the importance of these riverine operations in the fight for Hue and the Cua Viet, Rear Admiral Kenneth L. Veth, the commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, together with General Cushman, decided to establish a separate Navy river task force directly under the operational control of III MAF in northern I Corps.* On 24 February, Veth assigned Navy Captain Gerald W. Smith as commander of the new task force, designated Task Force Clearwater. Smith originally established his headquarters at Tan My, but then on the 29th moved his mobile base to the Cua Viet Port Facility. Through the course of the year, Task Force Clearwater would consist of armored river "monitors," PBRs, PACV (Patrol Air Cushioned Vehicles), minesweeping craft, and other diverse watercraft. Among its attached personnel were Marines from the 3d Marine Division's 1st Searchlight Battery and soldiers from the U.S. Army's 63d Signal Battalion. Organized eventually into two river groups, the Hue River

Security Group and the Dong Ha/Cua Viet Security Group, Task Force Clearwater protected and kept open the two major water routes in the north—the Cua Viet and the Perfume Rivers.²³

One area in which the Navy retained prime responsibility was medical support for the Marine command. Navy doctors and medical personnel manned the battalion and squadron level aid stations. At an even lower echelon, Navy corpsman were assigned to Marine infantry units down to the platoon level. Navy doctors commanded the 1st and 3d Medical Battalions which supported respectively the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions. These battalions ran the intermediate medical facilities at Dong Ha, Phu Bai, and Da Nang, reinforced by the 1st Hospital Company and 1st, 3d, and 11th Dental companies.**

In addition to these medical organizations, NSA, Da Nang maintained a 750-bed hospital at Da Nang, the equivalent of a general hospital. Finally during 1968, two Navy hospital ships, the *Repose* (AH 16) and the *Sanctuary* (AH 17), remained off the coast each with a capacity of 350 beds that could be doubled if needed, and within a 30-minute helicopter flight from shore.²⁴ According to statistics maintained by the Marine Corps, out of 100 Marines that were wounded, 44 were treated in the field and returned to duty, while 56 were admitted to a hospital. Of those admitted to a hospital, only nine would remain in county and the rest would be evacuated. Approximately 7 percent would receive disability discharges, 5.5 percent would require long-term care, but a remarkably low percentage, 1.5, would die of their wounds.²⁵

In one other area, heavy engineering and construction support, the Navy greatly supplemented Marine capabilities. Since the spring of 1965 when Navy mobile construction battalions (NMCB), popularly known as Seabees, helped to build the airfield at Chu Lai, the Navy augmented the Marine engineering effort in Vietnam. By January 1968, the Navy had established the 3d Naval Construction Brigade, under Rear Admiral Robert R. Wooding, which while under the operational control of Naval Forces, Vietnam, made its headquarters at Da Nang. Under his control, were two naval construction regiments in I Corps, the 30th at Da Nang, which directed the Seabee construction efforts there, and the 32d at Phu Bai, which coordinated those projects in the northern two

*III MAF eventually delegated operational control of Task Force Clearwater to Provisional Corps, Vietnam (later XXIV Corps), when that command was established in the northern two provinces of I Corps in March 1968. See Chapter 13.

**During the siege of Khe Sanh, a detachment from Company C, 3d Medical Battalion, better known as "Charlie Med," operated the dispensary there.



Photo from the David Douglas Duncan Collection

Navy doctors and corpsmen from Company C ("Charlie Med"), 3d Medical Battalion, wearing helmets and flak jackets, conduct an emergency operation on a wounded helicopter pilot at the Khe Sanh dispensary. Most wounded were evacuated out of Khe Sanh as soon as possible.

provinces. Throughout most of 1968, some 12 Seabee battalions remained assigned to I Corps and were involved in almost every major I Corps construction effort from reinforcing the defenses at Khe Sanh, building new roads and bridges, extending airfields, erecting new cantonment buildings, to operating stone quarries and drilling wells.²⁶

Marine Engineers

Despite the supplementing efforts of the Seabees and Army engineering units, the Marine command depended upon its own resources for its basic engineering requirements. Throughout 1968, the Marines had five engineering battalions in-country to provide both combat engineering and general construction support. In the north, the 3d Marine Division had Lieutenant Colonel Jack W. Perrin's 3d Engineer Battalion in direct combat support, while the 1st Engineer Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Logan Cassidy, came under the 1st Marine Division at Da Nang. In

addition, III MAF had three heavy engineering battalions to accomplish those tasks beyond the scope of the division engineers. Attached to the 1st Marine Division were both Lieutenant Colonel Ray Funderburk's 7th Engineering Battalion, which operated out of its cantonment, Camp Love at Da Nang, and Lieutenant Colonel Horacio E. Perea's 9th Engineer Battalion, which worked out of Chu Lai. The 11th Engineer Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Victor A. Perry, reinforced the 3d Engineer Battalion along the DMZ.

In the 3d Marine Division sector in early 1968, the 11th Engineer Battalion remained committed to the DMZ barrier project while the 3d Engineer Battalion was involved with the usual division engineering tasks. With its headquarters at Phu Bai, the 3d Battalion supported the division's regimental bases from Khe Sanh to Dong Ha with task-organized engineer detachments. In its January report, the battalion observed that the "primary work performed was mine sweeping, demolitions, and bunker construction." Much of the

3d Battalion's activity was involved in road sweeps, keeping open the main lines of communication among Camp Carroll, Dong Ha, Quang Tri, Camp Evans and Phu Bai. By the end of January, the battalion had conducted over 300 mine sweeps, averaging nearly 38,456 meters per day.²⁷

At Da Nang, Lieutenant Colonel Cassidy's 1st Battalion performed much the same engineering role for the 1st Marine Division. Here, the mine-clearing mission took on even more importance given the VC emphasis on surprise explosive devices or boobytraps. In fact, in January, the engineers suffered almost all of their casualties in accomplishing this mission, seven out of the eight killed and 15 out of the 18 wounded. Like the 3d Battalion in the north, the 1st Battalion was spread out in support of its division's various regiments. At the beginning of the month, Cassidy's headquarters, Company C, and Company B were at Da Nang in support of the 7th Marines and 5th Marines respectively. With the formation of Task Force X-Ray in mid-January, Company B joined the 5th Marines at Phu Bai. The 1st Battalion's Company A stayed with the 1st Marines throughout the month, first at Quang Tri, then at Phu Bai.²⁸

The enemy Tet offensive at the end of January and through most of February would impact on the engineers as much as on any of the III MAF units. In the struggle for Hue, engineer detachments from both Companies A and B, 1st Engineer Battalion accompanied the Marine infantry in the retaking of the city. The engineers built a pontoon bridge to replace the destroyed An Cuu Bridge over the Phu Cam Canal so that much-needed supplies could flow again into the city. Together with the reinforcing Army engineers and Seabees, the Marine engineer battalions worked to reconstruct the blown bridges, culverts, and highway cuts along the main lines of communication in I Corps, especially along Highway 1, the main north-south artery. Finally, by 2 March 1968, Route 1 was open from Da Nang to Dong Ha.²⁹

During the relief of Khe Sanh in Operation Pegasus, the Marine engineers again played a vital role. Beginning in mid-March, Lieutenant Colonel Perry's 11th Engineer Battalion, together with Seabees and Army engineers, began the building of Landing Zone Stud at Ca Lu, the jumping-off point for the 1st Air Cavalry Division. While the Air Cavalry leapfrogged towards Khe Sanh, the 1st Marines slogged forward along Route 9 with the 11th Engineers clearing the path for them. In the advance, the engineers constructed 11 bridges and made 18 culvert bypasses along the road.³⁰

The engineers had as large a role in the abandonment of Khe Sanh as they had in its relief. Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion, which had accompanied the 1st Marines in the relief of Khe Sanh, reported that its most significant accomplishment was the closing of the base. Beginning on 18 June and ending in early July, the engineers destroyed or buried 95 bunkers and more than 2,770 meters of trenchline. Using over 2,100 pounds of TNT, the engineers exploded unexpended ammunition and caved in the former Marine defenses. What equipment they could not carry out, they demolished or buried so that it could not be used against allied forces in the future.³¹

In the north after the enemy Tet and Mini-Tet offensives and the closing of Khe Sanh, both the 11th Engineer Battalion and the 3d Engineer Battalion took on new missions as the 3d Marine Division took the offensive. While the 11th Engineer Battalion still continued to have a limited responsibility for the barrier, the battalion confined most of this effort to some minor road and bunker construction.* For the most part, the 11th Engineers took on the task of establishing the permanent fire bases for the division. By July, it had transformed LZ Stud near Ca Lu into Fire Support Base Vandegrift. Given the emphasis of the new commander of the 3d Marine Division, Major General Raymond G. Davis, upon mobile helicopter tactics, the construction of permanent and semi-permanent fire support bases became the major responsibilities of both engineer battalions in the north. In a remarkably short time, employing explosives, helicopter-transportable bulldozers, and chain saws, the engineers denuded and flattened entire mountain tops and transformed them into fortified gun positions so that Marine artillery could keep the fast-moving infantry within supporting range.

In the Da Nang area, the 1st Engineer Battalion inaugurated in the spring a series of clearing operations in support of the 1st Marine Division. Beginning in April, the engineers in support of the 7th Marines in the western sector began Operation Woodpecker, "designed to eliminate known or potential enemy rocket launching and ambush sites." After clearing

*After the initial enemy offensives in January and February, almost all construction of the barrier ended for all practical purposes. Planning for the barrier and some limited construction continued, however, under the Codename *Duel Blade*. On 22 October 1968, General Abrams, now the MACV commander, ordered the halt of all planning and construction for the project. Before all work came to a stop, the engineers had implanted three sensor fields in the eastern portion of the DMZ, south of the Ben Hai River. See Chapter 22.



Both photos are from the Abel Collection

Top, a truck convoy is about to roll across the new Khe Gio Bridge on Route 9 north of Camp Carroll just constructed by the 11th Engineer Battalion. Below, an 11th Engineer Battalion bulldozer pulls out a M48 tank stuck in a stream bed during Operation Pegasus on the road between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh.





Photo is from the Abel Collection

LCpl James L. Phillips, at the wheel of a M103 bulldozer and a member of the 1st Engineer Battalion, clears a treeline in the western sector of the Da Nang area of operations during Operation Woodpecker. The land clearing operation was designed to deny the enemy possible ambush and rocket sites.

over four million square meters in the 7th Marines sector, the 1st Battalion in June moved into the Go Noi Island area and joined the 27th Marines in Operation Allen Brook. Clearing over two million meters from June through August with bulldozers, tractors equipped with some plows, and even tanks with dozer blades, the Marine engineers, once the civilian population was evacuated, literally razed the Go Noi.* With the completion of the Go Noi project, the battalion continued with further clearing operations, Operation Woodpecker II and III, in the area west of the Yen River, and after September, in the 1st Marines sector along the coast.³²

The Marines at Da Nang also experimented with a barrier project aimed at keeping enemy rocketeers from bombarding the Marine base. Beginning in May, the 7th Engineer Battalion started putting down a single-apron barbed wire fence along the outer edges of the so-called Da Nang Rocket Belt, a semi-circle centering on the airfield and extending out to the extreme range of the enemy 122mm and 144mm rockets. By

June, the 1st Marine Division completed the initial plans for the project. The original concept called for a 500-meter-wide cleared strip of land consisting of two parallel barbed wire fences, concertina wire entanglements, observation towers, and minefields. Beginning in earnest on 2 July, the 7th Engineers completed the initial phase of the project in the 7th Marines sector, clearing more than 15,000 meters by 23 August. The task involved more than 37,000 man-hours, including mine sweeps, security, equipment operators, and averaging two 25-man platoons from the engineers and an equal number of personnel from the supported units. Beginning in September, but hampered by flooding and heavy rains, the engineers continued with Phase II into December. Although the 7th Engineer Battalion would end on 12 December the laying of the two parallel barbed wire fences, the project would remain unfinished at the end of the year. It would not be until the following March that the Marines would renew their emphasis and begin anew the barrier effort.³³

By the end of 1968, the Marine engineers together with the Navy Seabees and Army engineers had accomplished almost minor miracles in the restoration

*See Chapter 17.



Department of Defense (USMC) A192420

Marines from the 3d Engineer Battalion construct bunkers on LZ Cates, a new fire support base for the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines. The fire support bases were part of the new emphasis on helicopter-mobile operations by both Marine divisions at the end of the year.

of the I Corps lines of communications. They had not only helped in the restoration of the road network including both Routes 1 and 9, but were even involved in the completion of the railroad link between Da Nang and Hue.* By December 1968, both the 1st and 3d Engineer Battalions, supported by the three heavier battalions, the 7th, 9th, and 11th Engineer Battalions, had taken on new tasks in establishing fire bases in support of the helicopter mobile tactics adopted by both divisions. From the building of bunkers, mine sweeps, road building, improving the living cantonments of the troops, to supporting III MAF civic action engineering projects, all five engineer battalions contributed to the allied resumption of the offensive by the end of the year.

The FLC Continues to Cope

Even with the end of the initial Tet offensives enemy gunners continued to threaten III MAF stockpiles. While few attacks were as spectacular as the one

on 21 January at Khe Sanh,** both conventional enemy artillery in the DMZ and Laos and large-caliber rockets struck at facilities at Khe Sanh, Dong Ha, and Cua Viet. In the rest of I Corps, enemy rockets throughout the year continued to fall upon Marine base areas with their large storage facilities. Despite the best efforts of Marine ground and air combat units to prevent them, these attacks by fire were relatively cost effective as the enemy with limited resources could cause extensive damage. One of the worst incidents occurred on 10 March, when enemy artillery hit the Cua Viet Facility, blowing up the ammunition dump. The resulting explosions destroyed the mess hall and 64 10,000-gallon fuel bladders, caused American casualties of 1 dead and 22 wounded, and knocked out communications for 30 hours. Even at the end of the month, more than 40 percent of the damaged equipment and buildings remained unrepaired.³⁴

From mid-April through 14 May, the enemy gunners enjoyed a series of minor successes in the north

*See Chapter 29.

**See Chapter 14.

from Khe Sanh to the Cua Viet. On 11 April, they rocketed the Cua Viet fuel farm, destroying 40,000 gallons of gas. Five days later, rockets fell on the Khe Sanh base demolishing 300,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and 2,705 propellant charges for 155mm ammunition. Finally, on 14 May, Communist artillery shelling resulted in the blowing up of the Dong Ha ammunition supply point and the loss of 150 tons of munitions of all types.³⁵

The Cua Viet and Dong Ha facilities remained favorite targets. Less than a month after the Dong Ha bombardment, 13 June, the NVA artillery fired 61 rounds into Camp Kistler at the mouth of the Cua Viet River. This time the shells hit the FLSG Bravo fuel dump and set fire to 16 10,000-gallon fuel bladders containing 104,000 gallons of petroleum. A week later, the North Vietnamese gunners turned their attention to Dong Ha, once more blowing up the Dong Ha ammunition dump with the loss this time of 8,500 tons of munitions. Five days later, they hit the Cua Viet fuel farm again. This time more than 187,000 gallons of gasoline and jet fuel went up in flames, resulting in the destruction of 17 of the 10,000-gallon fuel bladders and associated pumping equipment.³⁶

While relatively quiet during July, the NVA struck the Dong Ha facility again in August. While missing the ammunition dump, some 55 enemy rounds damaged some 19 buildings, destroyed 6 vehicles, and killed 2 Marines and wounded 3 others. Finally on 30 October, just before the so-called neutralization of the DMZ agreed to at Paris, the enemy hit Dong Ha once more. Forty-eight 130mm rounds fell on the base, killing one Marine, wounding another, and causing damage to buildings and vehicles. This was to be the last major attack on Marine facilities in the north during the year.³⁷

Marine logisticians also had to be concerned about the elements as well as enemy artillery capability. In many respects, weather patterns were more predictable and the FLC could make some preparations for the fall monsoon season. Still, monsoon storms could hit suddenly and create havoc. On 5 September, Typhoon Bess swept across the South China Sea with the center of its impact area just north of Da Nang. With 60-knot winds and 20 inches of rain, the storm caused landslides closing Route 1 in the Hai Van Pass sector and submerged Liberty Bridge in the An Hoa area south of the Marine base. Even as the storm abated the rain continued, resulting in more flooding and restricting movement of

supplies and troops. By the end of September, almost all construction projects were at a standstill. Route 1 and the various secondary roads were in bad condition. The water and winds had damaged the LCU ramps at Tan My and Hue as well as the Tan-My-Quang Tri pipeline. The Marines estimated that Bess would cost them the equivalent of 7,000 man-hours to make the needed repairs to the various lines of communication and installations.

Although the worst of the damage was over, the weather provided little relief for the FLC in October. Twelve inches of rain fell at Dong Ha on the 14th and 15th, followed by 15 inches at Da Nang in the next two days. Route 1 south of Camp Evans was once more under water as was the Tan My causeway. Bridges on Route 1 required reinforcement. Still the Marine logisticians were able to cope with the situation. Based on past experience with the monsoons, they had stockpiled the most-needed supplies at forward positions. Operations throughout the period continued and the bad weather proved to be more of a nuisance than an impediment.

During this period, the FLC had resolved the M16 rifle situation. By mid-July, the FLC had obtained enough of the modified M16 rifles, known as the M16A1 to equip both the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions. As a result of extensive investigations of charges that the M16 was prone to jamming, the FLC had implemented in late 1967 a program designed to replace the original barrel/sight assembly of the rifles with a chromed chamber assembly. The new assembly reduced chamber friction and facilitated extraction of the 5.56mm ammunition with its "ball propellant"* which had caused most of the difficulty. By the end of September, the FLC had completed the retrofit and replacement of the old M16s for both Marine divisions and their attachments. In October, the new rifles were issued to the Marines of the FLC and the 1st MAW and the following month to the Korean Marines. By November, the FLC had about completed the conversion of the remaining 9,100 rifles and established a reserve. In all, under the retrofit program, the FLC had handled more than 61,100 rifles.³⁸

Despite the occasional reduction in Marine stockpiles caused by such programs as the M16 retrofit pro-

*The ball propellant was a spherical grain powder in the 5.56 ammunition which speeded up the cyclic rate of the rifle beyond its design rate and also "fouled the chamber and bore." Moody, Donnelly, and Shore, "Backing Up the Troops," Chap 22, pp. 23-23A.



Photo is from the Abel Collection

A Marine truck convoy winds its way along Route 9, now open between Dong Ha and Vandegrift Combat Base. The Motor Transportation Coordination Center, located at Dong Ha and operated by FLSG Bravo, controlled Marine truck convoys in the north.

gram, enemy actions, and monsoon rains, they were relatively minor when compared to the sheer volume of supplies and services provided by the FLC. By mid-year, the FLC had grown to 490 officers and 9,908 enlisted men and had made several adjustments. In July, the FLC established a logistic support unit at Fire Support Base (FSB) Stud to support Task Force Hotel after the evacuation of the Khe Sanh base. Stud, later named FSB Vandegrift, became the main combat support base for operations in western Quang Tri. In the Da Nang sector, two logistic support units, LSU 1 at An Hoa and LSU 2 on Hill 55, provided the logistic support for the Go Noi Island campaigns south of the Ky Lam Rivers. In December 1968, the FLC was supporting 10 major operations as well as the day to day operations of III MAF units. For the year, the FLC had

filled a staggering 420,976 requisitions, nearly 90,000 more than the previous year.³⁹

At the end of the year, Brigadier General James A. Feeley, Jr., who on 26 October had relieved General Olson as commander of the FLC, had some reason for satisfaction. The road net in I Corps was in good condition and Marine truck convoys were moving with relative ease through most of I Corps. For the most part, the Marine supply "pipeline" was in relatively good order and the Army had taken over much of the logistic burden in northern I Corps. At Phu Bai, FLSG Alpha continued to transfer most of its activities to the Army's 26th General Support Group. The plan was to consolidate FLSG Alpha at Da Nang, which would permit more flexibility. While a difficult year for the Marine logisticians, they had persevered.

PART VI
OTHER PERSPECTIVES:
PACIFICATOIN AND
MARINES OUTSIDE OF III MAF

CHAPTER 29

Pacification

Prelude—The Tet Offensives and Operation Recovery—III MAF and Pacification
Homicide in the Countryside—Changing Attitudes
The Boys Next Door: The Combined Action Program—The Accelerated Pacification Plan

Prelude

From the beginning of the III MAF expansion of its base areas during the spring and summer of 1965, the Marine command was involved in a pacification campaign. Employing the “ink blot” or “spreading oil spot” theory, the Marine strategy was to build upon success in one area to reinforce that in another to provide momentum for the linking together of the Marine enclaves. During their first year in country, both through trial and error and possibly a residual institutional memory of their early 20th century Caribbean interventions, the Marines developed several pacification techniques that showed some promise.*

In one of its first efforts, III MAF established a civic action program which emphasized village and hamlet self-help projects and medical assistance. Marine units provided materials and equipment to local villagers in the building of schools and other local improvement facilities. Navy corpsmen and occasionally doctors visited nearby hamlets where they would dispense soap, hold sick call, treat minor injuries and diseases, and teach basic hygiene to the inhabitants. The idea was to win the good will of the local populace, gain intelligence, and hopefully enhance the prestige of local government officials, especially the village and district chiefs.

As the Marines expanded their area of operations into the populated area south of Da Nang, they soon realized that security from the Viet Cong guerrillas was

a decisive factor if the South Vietnamese government were to retain or establish control of the countryside.** In this connection, the Marine units employed relatively innovative tactics that they called “Golden Fleece” and “County Fair.” Golden Fleece operations were basically rice protection missions. A Marine battalion would provide a shield behind which the villagers harvested and kept their crops from the VC tax collectors. The County Fair operations were cordon and search affairs with psychological overtones. A Marine battalion would surround a hamlet, bring its population into a large clearing where the troops had erected large tents. While the division band and Vietnamese drama groups provided entertainment, the Marines would search the village and provide medical and dental assistance. Local officials would conduct an informal census and hold any suspicious persons for further questioning. By the end of 1967, however, while the Marine units continued to use County Fair and Golden Fleece tactics, III MAF no longer kept a statistical account of these types of operations.***

**Lieutenant Colonel William R. Corson, who in 1967 headed the Marine Combined Action Program and helped to articulate Marine pacification concepts, commented that pacification was not the equivalent of giving the Vietnamese in the countryside “the Great Society War on Poverty” and hoping that they in return would give “their hearts and minds to those who provided them with the dole.” Corson defined pacification as a condition rather than merely a series of processes: “In the case of the hamlets in South Vietnam, it was the belief and perception of the Vietnamese people that they were safe in their own homes. This idea, or feeling of safety was the sine qua non without which there was no ‘pacification purpose’ or potential gain simply from providing the humanitarian assistance that the indigenous government had never provided.” The people needed to believe that they “at least would be protected.” LtCol William R. Corson, Comments on draft, dtd 30Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Corson Comments.

***As in most aspects of the pacification campaign, there are varying views of its impact in the local hamlets and villages. William D. Ehrhart, a Marine veteran who served as an enlisted intelligence specialist with the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines in 1967 and early 1968 and participated in County Fairs, wrote, “my experience was that ‘County Fairs’ worked much better in the telling than in the doing; that is, the theory sounded good, but the reality fell far short of the theory.”

*See also the discussion in Chapter 1 on the “inkblot” concept. While the link to the Caribbean experience is rather indirect, General Lewis W. Walt, who commanded III MAF in 1965, observed that he was taught the fundamentals of his profession “from men who had fought Sandino in Nicaragua or Charlemagne in Haiti.” Still, as others have pointed out, most Marine officers who served in Vietnam were much junior to Walt and obtained most of their training on counter-insurgency in U.S. Army Schools based on doctrine articulated by the British from their experience in Malaya and adopted by the Army. For the Walt quote and the development of III MAF pacification in 1965, see Shulimson and Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1965, pp. 133–46. The quote is on p. 133.

Perhaps the most innovative and unique of the Marine pacification programs was Combined Action. Growing out of the security needs of the Marine battalion at Phu Bai in the summer of 1965, the Marines integrated the local Vietnamese militia units, the Popular Forces, with a 14-man Marine squad.* First called a Joint Action Company, then changed to Combined Action Company, and finally, to avoid unfavorable connotations in Vietnamese by the acronym CAC, the program became known as the Combined Action Program or CAP. CAP also stood for Combined Action Platoon, the basic tactical unit. By the end of 1967, the Marines had formed 79 platoons organized administratively into 14 companies and three Combined Action groups (CAGs). As Ambassador Robert W. Komer, who in 1967 was General Westmoreland's deputy for pacification, later wrote that the Combined Action Program was the "only sustained experiment with encadrement in our entire Vietnam experience."¹

III MAF was also the first of the MACV commands to develop a systematic measurement of security and other aspects of pacification in its area of operations. Beginning in February 1966, it required subordinate units to submit a monthly analysis of the degree of pacification in each village in its area of operations. Based on supposedly objective quantitative elements, the report gave a numerical grade which could be roughly translated into a qualitative value and provide some basis for analysis. This program later served as the model for the MACV country-wide Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), which used letters rather than numerals for grading purposes. District advisors filled out the HES reports while the military unit completed the III MAF forms. At the end of 1967, both systems were in use in I Corps. Obviously, as one Army historian observed, all such reports and documents were prepared "by Americans for American eyes and ears . . . [and] we don't know really what the Vietnamese thought." Still, as a senior operations analyst concluded, these reports contained



Photo is from the Abel Collection
Marine LCpl Edward J. Byrne, part of a Marine civic action team from the Force Logistics Command, shares a soft drink with a small friend at a refugee orphanage near Da Nang. The team was on a visit to the orphanage to distribute clothing donated from the United States.

"critical patterns" that permitted analysis as long as one did not focus on any specific element.^{2**}

*William D. Ehrhart, Comments on draft, dtd 24Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Ehrhart Comments. In his somewhat fictionalized biographical account of his experience in Vietnam, Ehrhart describes a County Fair operation. See William D. Ehrhart, *Vietnam-Perkasie, A Combat Marine Memoir* (Jefferson & London: McFarland, 1983), pp. 31–38. Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, in early 1968 the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, (CGFMFPac), observed recently about Marine pacification accomplishments, "truthfully, our performance, although much the best, was spotty, because of ignorance, operational pressure, or shortage of means." LtGen Victor H. Krulak, Comments on draft, dtd 31Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Krulak Comments.

**While allowing that there was an element of ad hoc growth of the Combined Action Program due to local security needs, Lieutenant Colonel Corson argued that the basic drive behind the program was the perception of Marine leaders such as General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., the Marine Corps Commandant, and Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, and Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt, the III MAF commander, and their emphasis upon the population and pacification in contrast to the MACV large unit strategy. Corson Comments. Despite the refined statistical analysis, many would still agree with Lieutenant Colonel Corson who wrote that "anecdotal evidence" in the villages was "far more accurate than spurious statistics." According to Corson, pacification could not be "expressed as a linear function, nor could it be frozen in time . . ." Corson Comments. Lieutenant General Krulak wrote that the Combined Action platoons knew what was going on in the villages in contrast to the various system evaluation processes. Krulak Comments.



Department of Defense (USMC) A191442

Navy Lt Runas Powers, Jr., battalion surgeon of BLT 2/4 (with the stethoscope), bandages a baby's head with the assistance of an unidentified Navy corpsman, as the mother holds the child. Medical assistance was an important factor in Marine civic action.

III MAF also made extensive use of psychological warfare. By 1967, the Marine command had two specialized Army units attached to it, the 29th Civil Affairs Company and the 7th Psychological Warfare Battalion. With elements of these units, Marine line companies and battalions would employ both air and ground loudspeakers as well as leaflets to influence both the civilian population and the enemy. Specialized South Vietnamese units, such as Armed Propaganda Teams and drama teams, would present and act out themes in the countryside illustrating that the American forces were present to assist the government in making a better life for the individual Vietnamese villager.³

At the same time, both the Vietnamese and Marines addressed their message to the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese to surrender under a special "Chieu Hoi" (Open Arms) amnesty program, which had been in effect since the early 1960s. The enemy troops that



Photo is from the Abel Collection

During a County Fair operation, a Vietnamese elder watches enthralled at a magic presentation. County Fairs were cordon and search operations with psychological overtones.

turned themselves in were called Hoi Chanh (ralliers). III MAF in early 1966 had started a pilot program using the Hoi Chanh. Taking selected and carefully screened former VC, and providing both language and tactical training, the Marines then assigned them to Marine infantry battalions. The Marines employed these former enemy, nicknamed "Kit Carson Scouts," much as the cavalry units in the old American West used Indian scouts. They were to warn the American units against likely ambushes and to locate hidden enemy stores and marshaling areas. By the end of 1967, III MAF had 132 Kit Carson Scouts attached to Marine units. The 3d Marine Division had hopes of assigning at least one scout to every Marine infantry company in 1968.

By the summer of 1966, both Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt, then the III MAF commander, and Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, the FMFPac commander, became concerned about the cultural

shock caused by the sudden influx of large American combat forces upon both the Vietnamese peasant and the young American Marine. In order to recognize the extent of the problem, the Marine command undertook sample attitudinal surveys among both Marines and the South Vietnamese villagers. A Navy chaplain, Lieutenant Commander Richard McGonigal, who also held a master's degree in sociology, conducted the first opinion survey in September 1966, using two percent of the III MAF personnel and a much smaller percentage of the local civilian populace.⁴

The first findings among the American troops were not surprising. McGonigal discovered nearly 60 percent of the Marines held relatively low opinions about the South Vietnamese. Only 43 percent of the sample stated that they held a positive feeling toward the local populace. Still even the negative reactions among the Americans revealed an ambivalence rather than an intense dislike of the villagers. Among the CAP units, however, possibly as would be expected, the Marines tested much more affirmatively.

Perhaps more surprisingly, the South Vietnamese, if the survey were accurate, showed a relatively positive view toward the Marines. More than 70 percent indicated that they personally liked the Americans. On the other hand, over 40 percent perceived hostility towards them from the U.S. troops.

Chaplain McGonigal refined his testing procedures and conducted two more surveys, the last in June 1967, which more or less confirmed the earlier ones. With this impetus, III MAF initiated a "personal response" program down to the battalion level. Each command at either the G-5 or S-5 level appointed a Personal Response officer, very often the chaplain, whose responsibility was to teach the troops the local customs and culture, largely through group discussions and class instruction. As could be expected, the program met with mixed results. As the FMFPac chaplain, Navy Captain John H. Craven, later observed, he had to walk a "fine line between Marine officers on one hand, who questioned the need for any such project, and chaplains on the other hand, who felt that chaplains should have nothing to do with the project."*

*Colonel James L. Black, Jr., who as a lieutenant colonel was the III MAF G-5 for Civil Affairs in 1968, commented that the 29th Civil Affairs Company should have had the responsibility for the Personal Response Program rather than the Chaplains. Col James L. Black, Jr., Comments on draft, n.d. [Nov94] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter James Black Comments. William D. Ehrhart, who served in Vietnam with the 1st Marines from mid-summer 1967 until February 1968 and has written extensively upon his experience in Vietnam and that of

With its large commitment to the pacification campaign, III MAF also implemented the first Corps-wide coordination effort involving not only III MAF and the Vietnamese authorities, but also the various U.S. civilian assistance programs. As early as August 1965, III MAF and the U.S. civilian operations mission for I Corps formed the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council (ICJCC), an interagency clearing committee to direct both the civilian and military civic action programs in the Corps area. With permanent representation, the council soon began meeting on a regular basis. Before long, General Hoang Xuan Lam, the I Corps commander, also assigned a representative to the committee. By the end of 1967, ICJCC had several subordinate subcommittees and had even extended down to the provincial and district level. General Cushman had made his deputy III MAF commander, Major General Raymond L. Murray, his personal representative to the council.⁵

Despite recognizing the initiatives of the Marines relative to pacification, General Westmoreland, the MACV commander, was unhappy about the emphasis of the Marine Corps. He believed that the Marines, with their concentration on the security of the hamlets, were ignoring the enemy regular forces operating outside of the Marine areas of operations. While supporting civic action on the part of American troops, the MACV commander was concerned about incidents with the civilian population. He desired to place the main responsibility for pacification upon the ARVN forces.⁶

In February 1966, at the Honolulu Conference, which included the leaders of the Vietnamese government and the United States, the emphasis was upon pacification. Still, the conference was not a repudiation of Westmoreland's large unit strategy. He won his point that the main responsibility for pacification and protection of the people would lie with the ARVN forces.⁷

While the Honolulu Conference called for a renewal and reemphasis upon pacification, the reality was largely rhetorical. The actual gains in pacification were fairly modest. The South Vietnamese did expand their Revolutionary Development (RD)

other enlisted Marines, observed that in the several months between the institution of the program and his departure that he "never heard of, let alone participated in, any such program." Ehrhart Comments.

Program* and increased the number of Revolutionary Development teams in targeted hamlets and villages. Actually, the government had hoped to place about 300 of these specially trained pacification teams in the countryside by the end of 1966. It succeeded in achieving only about a third of that goal. While by the end of 1967 the number of RD cadre numbered over 32,000, they had one of the largest attrition rates of all the forces in Vietnam. The overall attrition rate among the cadre was 32 percent per year with a desertion rate of 21 percent.⁸

Unsatisfied with the progress and coordination in Vietnam among the various component civilian agencies within the U.S. mission in Saigon, the Johnson administration initiated an entirely new approach. One of the chief architects was Presidential advisor Robert W. Komer. Nicknamed "the blowtorch" by former Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Komer had the support of the new Ambassador to Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker. An articulate and forceful man, Komer convinced President Johnson and General Westmoreland to place the formal American pacification effort under the U.S. military chain of command in Vietnam.⁹

In May 1967, the former Office of Civil Operations under the direct control of the American Embassy became Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) under MACV with Robert Komer as its head. With the rank of Ambassador, Komer was Westmoreland's deputy for pacification. According to the MACV commander, he assigned

Army Major General George Forsythe to Komer as his assistant "to keep Komer out of my hair." Still, while describing Komer as "volatile" and "abrasive," Westmoreland agreed he "was the man for the job."¹⁰

For his part, Komer had a clear idea what changes he wanted to make. He believed that for too long there had been no unified management structure concerned with pacification. He argued that the solution was "to require the U.S. and ARVN military to take on most of the pacification job." Up to this time, it was his opinion that when the U.S. entered the war in Vietnam, "we further 'Americanized' it—on an even grander scale—by playing out our military repertoire." He perceived Westmoreland's search and destroy and attrition strategy as a natural response of an American commander "against an elusive enemy who could not be brought to decisive battle in a classic military style." In so doing, however, Komer contended that both the Vietnamese and Americans had neglected the only means of attaining their goal—the establishment of local security and the extension of government administration into the countryside. He wanted to place more resources in civilian administration, the Revolutionary Development cadre and program, and to build up local defense forces, especially the Popular and Regional Forces. Under CORDS, Komer formed unified U.S. civilian-military teams that operated in all 250 districts and 44 provinces. Later, he would write that not until CORDS was formed, "did a major sustained pacification effort begin to take place."¹¹

Still, in many respects, CORDS carried forward what was already in place. Beginning in 1966, the South Vietnamese and their American advisors had established the basis for a nation-wide pacification plan. While not developing an overall plan for 1967, they together with the Revolutionary Development Ministry designated four National Priority areas and developed the guidelines for Revolutionary Development. Each province was to develop its own plan. The 1967 pacification plan, then, if it could be called such, consisted of the aggregate of the 44 provincial plans.¹²

In reviewing the progress of Revolutionary Development during 1967, the CORDS planners determined that the so-called designated National Priority Areas and 26 priority provinces "did not produce demonstrable progress." According to the CORDS'

*Here too, much of the change was rhetorical. While changing the name of their pacification program from Rural Reconstruction to Revolutionary Development in English, they retained the old name for the program in Vietnamese. The Revolutionary Development Ministry was headed by Vietnamese General Nguyen Duc Thang. Later, he assumed the title, Commissioner General for Revolutionary Development, and additional responsibility as Assistant to the Chief, Joint General Staff for Territorial Affairs and Pacification. These additional duties provided him with authority in both civilian and military aspects of pacification and jurisdiction over the Popular and Regional Forces.

The heart of the Revolutionary Development Program was the so-called Revolutionary Development cadre or teams. Started under a pilot program by the CIA in late 1964, the U.S. had assisted the Vietnamese in training at Vung Tau some 16,000 Vietnamese pacification cadre by 1966, which were then formed into what were called Political Action Teams. These teams consisted of approximately 40 of these anti-Communist indoctrinated cadre, who like the Communist guerrillas dressed in black pajamas. After Honolulu, the teams were renamed Revolutionary Development Teams, but still retained their Vietnamese designation *Can Bo*. See Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1966, pp. 254–55, and Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie, John Paul Vann and America in South Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 608.

**Lieutenant General Krulak observed that from his perspective at FMFPac, "at bottom, Westy [Westmoreland] did not believe in pacification. He created CORDS to decentralize the worries. He didn't care for Komer, and vice versa." Krulak Comments.

point of view, blame for the slowness of RD largely lay in the "inefficiencies" of the respective South Vietnamese ministries. The Americans asserted that the "most serious—and telling—flaw was the conspicuous shortage of good Vietnamese leadership." In CORDS, the Americans began a systematic collection of dossiers on "incompetent or venal" province and district chiefs. Komer later claimed that the agency had a "respectable batting average" in placing pressure on the Vietnamese government to remove the worst offenders.¹³

The CORDS leadership convinced the South Vietnamese that a new tactic was necessary. They decided that there was a need to "concentrate resources in carefully chosen areas which met criteria for current progress plus the capacity to achieve greater results with more resources." Planners selected only a few priority provinces and priority areas based upon "their relative importance to the overall pacification effort." The emphasis was to be upon III and IV Corps. In fact, in I Corps, only Quang Ngai became a designated priority province where a 50 percent increase in pacification resources would be made. The authors of the MACV 1967 history claimed that the Combined Campaign Plan for 1968 contained "the first fully integrated treatment of pacification within the framework of a campaign plan."¹⁴

In Washington, Marine Corps leaders wondered about the new priorities and whether the III MAF pacification effort in Vietnam was to receive even less support. In October 1967, General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., then Commandant of the Marine Corps, voiced his concerns to Lieutenant General Krulak at FMFPac headquarters in Honolulu. He observed that the omission of I Corps provinces with the exception of Quang Ngai "has an ironic twist in view of the historic fact that only in the III MAF area of responsibility has the target of pacification, civic action, and Revolutionary Development been accorded primary emphasis from the outset of U.S. major involvement in Vietnam."¹⁵

General Krulak tried to assuage the Commandant's concerns. He observed that the reason for the change in priority was that I Corps had become "the battleground and that RD has the best chance for success in areas most remote from the battle." He mentioned that Ambassador Komer had conveyed this idea to him during recent discussions. Krulak then stated that, although I Corps was to have only one priority province, this was misleading. There was not to be any diminution of the pacification effort in the Corps area, and, in fact, there was to be an increase in Revolutionary Development resources for the coming year. He observed that under the 1968 plan, I Corps was to

receive a 20 percent increase in the number of RD teams and the number of hamlets and villages to be developed. Moreover, the Corps would receive a 49 percent increase in funds over the previous year and could request additional monies if required.¹⁶


Krulak then compared the degree of pacification resources in I Corps, both presently available and those planned for 1968, with those for the other Corps areas. He noted that under the 1968 plan, I Corps was allotted an average of 33 Revolutionary Development teams per province, the highest number in all the Corps areas. The next closest, IV Corps, was to average only 19 teams per province. In actual funds, I Corps was to receive 100 million piasters, only slightly less than II and IV Corps, which were to get 104 million and 103 million piasters respectively, and more than III Corps.¹⁷

The FMFPac commander then discussed the actual Revolutionary Development plans for I Corps. General Lam, the I Corps commander, had just requested from the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff 31 additional Regional Forces companies, 21 of which would have specific pacification missions. Furthermore, Lam planned to assign two additional ARVN regular battalions to support the Revolutionary Development campaign. This would mean that 16 out of the 28 ARVN battalions assigned to the Corps sector would be in support of Revolutionary Development.¹⁸

He then detailed the reasons for the selection of Quang Ngai Province as the priority province: "relative population density, economic potential in terms of rice and salt production, remoteness of the NVA threat . . . , and because it is contiguous to the northernmost II Corps Priority Province of Binh Dinh." Krulak then speculated about the real reason for the choice of Quang Ngai. He believed that "the RD planners were mesmerized by the thought of a continuous line of priority provinces along the coast, without jeopardizing the stated concept that priorities rank from south to north."¹⁹

Despite all the verbiage, Krulak saw little difference between 1967 and 1968 for I Corps, relative to the emphasis upon pacification. He related, for example, that Quang Nam Province was authorized 38 Revolutionary Development teams, more than 23 of the 26 so-called priority provinces. It also received more pacification funds than another 16 priority provinces in other Corps sectors. He concluded: "In the final analysis, the priority listing will not result in degradation of the RD effort in I Corps." Instead, he believed that the "increased emphasis in RD in Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, and Thua Thien should enhance the chances of RD success

PACIFICATION PROGRESS IN III MAF AREAS JANUARY 1967-JANUARY 1968



From Operations of US Marine Forces Vietnam 1968.

in 1968 . . .” This would occur “without the heat of the spotlight, absent because of the lack of priority status which exists only in a concept, not in practice.”²⁰

By the end of 1967, progress in pacification in both I Corps and country-wide was very much in the eye of the beholder. According to the latest HES ratings more than 60 percent of the population country-wide lived in relatively secure areas. In I Corps, III MAF reported that more than half of the people in that sector lived in “secure hamlets.” Both of these figures, nevertheless, needed to be taken with several grains of salt. Thomas Thayer, a senior Defense Department analyst, later wrote that there were several factors that may have caused the increase. These included the fact that the secure population included urban regions, refugees, and not the least, “optimistic evaluation of programs.” The statistics also underestimated the strength of the VC control in Communist-dominated hamlets. Given all that, Thayer believed that the extension of allied protection into the countryside accounted for most of the hamlet security gains.²¹

Other factors at the Saigon level reinforced this initial optimism. According to the MACV historians, the momentum of 1967 progress “gave hope to all concerned that a workable solution to the problem of pacification had at last evolved.” CORDS officials spoke about “Project Takeoff, a management tool designed to bring maximum pacification assets to bear on the most important problems.”²²

The MACV intelligence estimate also gave impetus to the belief that the war was finally going the allies’ way. In their analysis of enemy strength in the second half of 1967, MACV intelligence officers began to talk about enemy casualties reaching the “crossover point,” where the gaps left in enemy strength could not be filled by new replacements and recruits. Westmoreland then approved a controversial decision to omit from the MACV order of battle two whole classes of so-called Communist irregulars: Self Defense Forces and the VC infrastructure. This reduced the estimated total number of guerrillas, irregulars, and cadre from 114,348 to 81,300. All of the 81,300 irregulars carried in the proposed new MACV estimate were under the category of guerrillas. Under the classification spaces for Self Defense Forces and VC infrastructure were two footnotes. According to the MACV rationale, “the self-defense forces provide a base for recruitment as well as for political and logistical support, but are not a fighting force comparable to the guerrilla.” While acknowledging that local VC hamlet self-defenses “cause some casualties and damage, they do not represent a contin-

ual or dependable force and do not form a valid part of the enemy’s military force.” Relative to the enemy infrastructure, “the political cadre (infrastructure) has no military function.”²³


As could be expected, the proposed revised MACV order of battle caused a furor among the various intelligence agencies, especially the CIA. In an eventual compromise, essentially everyone agreed to disagree. The new estimates carried the MACV changes, but with the footnotes explaining that Self Defense Force and VC figures were not included in the new figures. MACV HES estimates, however, continued to show an enemy guerrilla force of about 155,000 rather than the 81,000 published by the MACV-J2 or intelligence section. Furthermore, MACV through CORDS supported the newly initiated CIA-sponsored Phung Hoang (All Seeing Bird) or “Phoenix” program as it was known in English, aimed at the elimination of high-ranking VC cadre.^{24*}

At the end of 1967, despite some feeling of optimism, there were continuing doubts about progress in pacification both in I Corps and the country at large. From both American and South Vietnamese sources came indications of increased enemy offensive intentions. This was especially true in I Corps where the allies expected another large enemy push in the north. At Da Nang, also, there were reports of a major enemy attack on the base and the number of enemy small unit actions had increased.**

*Although later alleged to be an assassination campaign, the stated purpose of the Phung Hoang was “to enlist and coordinate the efforts of local leaders police and paramilitary groups to identify and dismantle the subversive apparatus.” Based upon the newly created District Intelligence Operational Coordinating Committees, consisting of police and village and hamlet officials, the idea was to target by name and arrest the local enemy ranking cadre, employing force if necessary. Various Vietnamese agencies carried out the actual campaign, including the national police, military security teams, armed propaganda teams, Census Grievance cadre, RD cadre, and an especially CIA-trained group called Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU). Colonel Black, who was responsible for III MAF civil affairs, recalled that because of its classification, not even the III MAF staff was “in the know” on the program, but that the staff “thrived on rumor about Phoenix.” James Black Comments. Major Donald E. Milone, who commanded the 3d MP Battalion in 1968, related that the program “failed to coordinate its activities” with Marine units, especially the Combined Action platoons: “No one knew what was happening in a certain village.” Maj Donald E. Milone, Comments on draft, n.d. [Dec94] (Vietnam Comment File). Lieutenant Colonel Corson, who headed the Combined Action Program in 1967, considered Phoenix “a bounty program . . . with little regard . . . for ‘guilt’ or ‘innocence.’” He stated that he reached an understanding that the Phoenix teams would keep away from the Combined Action hamlets. Corson Comments.

**See Chapters 1 and 6.

CIVILIAN LOSSES DURING TET IN I CTZ AND HUE



From Operations of US Marine Forces Vietnam 1968.

The Tet Offensives and Operation Recovery

Initially, the enemy Tet offensive was a tremendous setback for both the Marine and country-wide pacification program. With the attacks on the major cities of Vietnam and especially the one-month battle for Hue, the enemy added an entire new dimension to the war. The enemy attacks during the holiday period resulted in an enormous increase of new refugees, ranging from estimates of 750,000 to over a million, with nearly 170,000 in I Corps and, of that number, about 75,000 from the city of Hue. In February 1968, III MAF reported that the number of enemy defectors was the lowest in five months. According to pacification reports, before Tet, the allies claimed 5,331 out of 12,000 hamlets under government control. The number cited after Tet was 4,472, a loss of 859. By April 1968, Ambassador Komer related that the total of hamlets then under government control had risen slightly, reaching 4,559, a gain of some 87 hamlets "back in the fold." Despite the tremendous onslaught of the enemy, the ARVN had not defected and the South Vietnamese government apparatus had not collapsed.²⁵

After the first attacks and initial surprise, the South Vietnamese government launched Operation Recovery. At the urging of U.S. pacification officials, President Thieu created, with American participation and support, a high-level task force "to direct and coordinate"

civilian relief activities. Thieu temporarily placed Vice President Ky in charge of the South Vietnamese government endeavor while Ambassador Komer directed the U.S. effort. Both men set up subordinate complementary organizations on the corps, province, and district levels, whose mission was four fold: to provide immediate assistance to the refugees, to get the cities functioning once more, to open lines of communication so the economy could function, and to reestablish order. According to MACV, the major innovation in the project was the "provision of cash and commodities to the people so that they themselves could rebuild." In actuality, III MAF had employed this same concept as the basis for its civic action program since 1965, but with fewer resources.²⁶

In I Corps under Operation Recovery, the South Vietnamese apparatus authorized a 57 million piaster (\$485,000.00) budget for a three-month period. The first aim was to provide for food, reconstruction of homes, and some compensation to survivors of those civilians killed and to the wounded as a result of the fighting. In Hue, each displaced person was entitled to 10,000 piasters (\$85.00), 20 sheets of roofing, and 10 bags of cement to begin to rebuild. By the end of March, more than 830 families received reconstruction material and all the displaced received a temporary relief payment. For the most part, the initial phase of the rebuilding of the city had been completed. Relief workers brought in 4,100 tons of rice to feed the peo-

ple, work groups buried more than 6,000 bodies killed in the battle for the city, and other work gangs cleared the debris and rubble from the streets. Municipal employees had returned both water and electricity to "satisfactory operation condition." U.S. and South Vietnamese munitions disposal specialists had disarmed or otherwise disposed of unexploded ordnance. Work had started on the second and third phases, the repair of public buildings and the reconstruction of private homes.²⁷

Elsewhere in I Corps, the South Vietnamese also had made some inroads on the damage caused by enemy assaults. Outside of Hue, displaced people were entitled to a somewhat lesser sum, 5,000 piasters (\$42.00), but the same amount of roofing and cement to rebuild their homes. By the end of March, more than 1,400 families received all or part of their settlement. III MAF units had provided over 1,000,000 meals to civilians, nearly double the usual amount of foodstuffs provided under civic action programs. Relief workers distributed more than 21,000 tons of rice in the Corps' five provinces. Corps officials

had also taken steps to eliminate abuses and some of the most ineffective leaders in local government. They had dismissed one province chief, two district chiefs, and two village chiefs.

Despite an impressive start, Operation Recovery soon bogged down upon the unusual demands put upon the overburdened and inefficient South Vietnamese administrative apparatus. While acknowledging that the government had begun reconstruction, resettlement, and economic revival programs, American observers reported that by April the strains were beginning to show. They charged: "There was a critical decline in effectiveness when the program should have been gathering even greater momentum." Local officials had overspent their budgets and projects came to a standstill.²⁸

Under Operation Recovery, the country also made some starts on mobilization of the populace. Vice President Ky authorized the establishment of special Self-Defense Groups in urban areas so they could defend themselves against any further incursions by the Communists. The idea was to distribute arms to the people

South Vietnamese civilian refugees gather in a park near Hue University as the fighting continued in the city. In Operation Recovery, the South Vietnamese attempted to help the displaced residents to rebuild their homes.

Photo is from the Abel Collection



so that they would be able to provide some form of organized protection to their neighborhood or local community to supplement the territorial forces. The Self-Defense forces were divided into two groups: one combat and the other support. Further divided into three groups, the support forces consisted of youth, women, and elders. Membership was voluntary and open to all citizens seven years of age or above. The new mobilization law required all youths between 16 and 17 and men between 38–50 to serve in the combat Peoples Self Defense Corps. Within each of the combat forces were to be specially trained personnel, organized into 35-man teams, each man being armed.²⁹

Like the rest of Operation Recovery, after much fanfare and formation and drilling of units, the program lacked cohesion. While a wide variety of units were organized, they received little direction, training, or weapons. American CORDS officials observed aimless drift and almost no coordination. By the end of June, according to the MACV history, "the population was, in effect, ahead of the government in terms of its willingness to participate actively in self-defense."³⁰

The second wave of the Tet offensive in May gave a new impetus to Operation Recovery in both reconstruction and the mobilization of the population. As North Vietnamese officials met formally with the Americans in Paris for the first time, these negotiations reinforced the new sense of urgency. Ambassador Komer later wrote that the South Vietnamese government's "realization that a far greater effort on its part would be required to survive finally led to


actual national manpower mobilization, extensive training programs for local officials, a major acceleration for pacification efforts, several economic reforms and the like."³¹

At this point President Thieu called a meeting of his Corps commanders and expressed his unhappiness. He told them in "no uncertain terms that whatever the anomaly involved in exercising authority, recovery was not to wither on the vine." By July, according to American officials, the reconstruction of the rural economy in I, II, and III Corps had reached pre-Tet levels.³²

The South Vietnamese president also took the initiative relative to the Self-Defense Corps. In July, he placed the program directly under his prime minister, who formed a National Peoples Self Defense Committee chaired by himself. By the end of the year, some 1,000,000 people were members of such groups and nearly half of them had received training. The government had distributed some 173,000 weapons. In I Corps, for example, at the end of October, nearly 106,000 of the civilian population had joined the Self Defense Corps with 16 percent armed. At the end of the year, the number had increased to 225,162 with 10 percent of them armed.³³

Operation Recovery itself came to an end in October with the claim of the government that it had accomplished its basic mission, the return of security and extension of public services to the level enjoyed prior to the offensives. The third enemy offensive by this time had petered out and wreaked far less damage than the earlier attacks. The October Hamlet Evalua-

PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE ORGANIZATION - I CTZ



From Operations of US Marine Forces Vietnam 1968.

tion figures showed 69.8 percent of the population country-wide living in generally secure areas, a record high exceeding that of the pre-Tet period. According to American observers, the improvement was country-wide and reflected in all four Corps areas. The general mobilization had not only created the Self Defense Corps, but had improved the caliber of the Regional and Popular Forces, most of whom were now equipped with American M16 rifles. In all Corps areas, pushed by the central government, provincial and district chiefs "slowly began to increase their pacification efforts."³⁴

The results were equally impressive in I Corps. Although the enemy attacks near Da Nang in August had caused some diminishment in Revolutionary Development, according to the American statistics, both the security and the economy picked up in the following months. From the onset in mid-February of Operation Recovery until its end in October, the Corps provincial and local governments had spent in excess of \$500,000.00 to reestablish "normalcy to the lives of victimized civilians in I CTZ." The government had resettled more than 152,000 or 98 percent of the temporary refugees. Through the funds provided for the purpose, local officials had given more than 131,000 bags of cement and 276,000 sheets of roofing tin for the rebuilding of homes. In addition, the relief groups had distributed nearly 50,000 tons of rice and grain to the devastated areas and medical workers inoculated approximately 500,000 civilians against contagious disease under the program. Yet, as one observer cautioned, these quantitative figures, which he referred to as a "wonderful futility," did not necessarily measure the qualitative aspects of the war.³⁵

While not formally under Operation Recovery, one of the more notable accomplishments during the period was the effort to reopen the national railroad in I Corps from Da Nang to Hue. Part of a combined U.S.-South Vietnamese plan to have unhampered railroad traffic from the capital of Saigon in the south to Dong Ha in the north by the end of 1969, the idea was to work simultaneously on two important sections, the 103 kilometer Da Nang-Hue link and the 375 kilometer segment from Saigon to the I Corps/II Corps border. While the latter had priority, the planners called for the Da Nang-Hue portion to be completed by the end of February 1969.³⁶

Despite rail communications between Da Nang and Hue having been cut by the VC in 1964, by 1967, the allies had three trains a week running, but requiring armed escort and subject to frequent delays and sabo-

tage incidents. The enemy Tet offensive disrupted even this small traffic. In May 1968, MACV ordered III MAF in coordination with the Commanding General I Corps and the Vietnamese National Railroad System (VNRS) to "restore to operational condition the railroad from Da Nang to Hue when required security forces are available." On 19 June, General Cushman issued a combined plan to carry out the mission. Navy Seabees were to repair four long-span bridges in the rugged terrain north of Da Nang while Army engineers cleared debris and mines from a vital tunnel north of the Esso depot of Lien Chieu. Two South Vietnamese VNRS work crews would make the repairs of the roadbed and the track, one working south from Hue and the other north from Da Nang. They were to make their junction at Phu Loc in Thua Thien Province. The 101st Airborne Division and 1st Marine Division were responsible for general protection of the workers in their respective TAORs, while RF and PF troops reinforced by a VNRS security battalion provided close-in security.³⁷

Starting work on 15 July, the work crews made rapid progress. By 10 October, they had completed repairs of track over half of the distance, 63 kilometers. In the 101st Airborne sector, the crew had reached the Truoi River Bridge while the southern crew had completed restoration in the 1st Marine Division area. As of 10 October, there had been no incidents of sabotage to hamper the work. By the end of November, the northern crew had reached a position about seven miles north of Phu Loc. While the VC blew a bridge just east of Phu Loc, the Seabees immediately started their repairs which were completed before Christmas. This left at the end of the year only 12 kilometers of track to be restored. The project was nearly two months ahead of schedule. As a III MAF report observed, completion of the railroad link would be "a tangible sign of return to normalcy." Thus, country-wide, a MACV historian concluded about Operation Recovery, "efficiency was often lacking but the overall GVN performance in reestablishing over a million refugees and renewing urban viability was one of the bright spots of 1968."³⁸

III MAF and Pacification

During 1968, there was to be little of the debate between the MACV search and destroy strategy of attrition and the emphasis on pacification that marked the Marine stance toward the war. There were of course several reasons for this, not the least of which were the Tet offensive and the Mini-Tets in May and September.

At that time there was no difficulty in finding either the NVA or VC. As Ambassador Komer of CORDS later observed, the attrition strategy appeared to work during the offensives because the enemy "abandoned his hit and run strategy" and more or less met the allies on their own terms. Through at least the first nine months of 1968, pacification took a back seat until the Communists apparently reverted to their concept of protracted war at the end of the year.³⁹

Still, there were other reasons for the lack of contention between MACV and III MAF over strategy and emphasis on pacification. With the establishment of the Marine base at Khe Sanh and the beginning of the building of the barrier along the DMZ in 1967, the depletion of Marine troop strength from the populated coastal areas, especially around Da Nang and Chu Lai, dashed any hopes that the Marines may have had to push a strong population control strategy. Even the commitment of the Army's Americal Division to I Corps in 1967 did not provide III MAF with the density of troop strength it required, especially in the Da Nang area. General Cushman, the III MAF commander, later commented that "the threat in the north . . . drained the resources from pacification. I would say it prevented us from doing more pacification."⁴⁰

Personality also was a consideration. While General Cushman professed to support the pacification concepts of General Walt, he was less the crusader and evangelical believer than his predecessor. According to Major General Norman J. Anderson, the 1st MAW commander, from his perspective, "there was a lessening of emphasis upon the population during the period I was in the III MAF area. I think that General Cushman was very skeptical of that idea."* To be fair to the III MAF commander, in 1968, there were several issues that competed for his attention, not the least of which were Khe Sanh, the Tet Offensive including the battle for Hue, the insertion of Army units under his command, the establishment of MACV Forward later to become XXIV Corps, and Single Manager.⁴¹

*General Earl E. Anderson, who as a brigadier general served as the III MAF Chief of Staff, disagreed with Major General Norman Anderson, and contended that General Cushman supported Marine pacification efforts especially the Combined Action Program, "even though III MAF had to contribute quite a bit of infantry to the program, he thought that it was well worth the effort." Gen Earl E. Anderson, Comments on draft, dtd 18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter E. E. Anderson Comments. Lieutenant General Krulak on the other hand agreed with Major General Norman Anderson that General Cushman was "more skeptical" about the possibility of pacification than General Walt. Krulak Comments.

Another factor that played a role in lessening tension over pacification with MACV was the expanding role that CORDS began to play in pacification. With the advent of CORDS in May 1967, Henry Koren, an experienced foreign service officer and diplomat, became the CORDS chief in I Corps. With the CORDS organization now part of the military chain of command, Koren reported directly to Cushman as well as through the CORDS administrative network. According to the III MAF commander, Koren served as "my advisor so to speak—staff officer [on pacification] . . . he was always at briefings every morning and worked right in with us." Under Koren, there was a CORDS advisor in each of the five provinces who worked directly with the South Vietnamese province chief in support of the local Revolutionary Development program. Cushman described the I Corps CORDS organization as relatively effective: responsible for logistic and policy support of Revolutionary Development, "it went side by side" with the III MAF Combined Action program and "you could get down to province capitals with supplies and so on and advice."⁴²

This cooperation in support of Revolutionary Development continued for the most part with Koren's successor, another civilian, C. T. Cross, through 1968, although questions remained about coordination on the local level, especially with the Combined Action Program. The CORDS organization in I Corps reflected the new intermixture of the military and U.S. civilians in the pacification program. For example, in October 1968, the New Life Development program, Revolutionary Development, Psychological Operations, Public Safety, and Refugees were all run by civilians. The Assistant Deputy for CORDS, L. D. Puckett, was also a civilian. U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel H. W. Naushuetz, the commanding officer of the 29th Civil Affairs Company, and U.S. Army Major R. D. Becker, who headed the Chieu Hoi advisory office, both came under the I Corps CORDS organization. Of the U.S. five province senior advisors, three were military and two were civilian.⁴³

While the CORDS organization may have been a combination of both military and civilian personnel, the new structure actually enhanced General Cushman's authority in I Corps. As the I Corps Senior Advisor together with his responsibility as Commanding General, III MAF, Cushman already controlled all the U.S. military forces in the Corps sector. Now with the CORDS organization under him, he combined in his person both the U.S. military and pacification responsibilities for the northern five provinces.

As a manifestation of this added stature, the III MAF commander ended some of the redundancies in the Marine pacification program. After the Tet offensive postponed the monthly meeting of the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council, he, together with General Lam, abolished the organization in March on the basis that its missions and functions "have basically been assumed by the committees and sub-committees of Project Recovery, under the chairmanship of the CG, I Corps." Finally at the end of the year, General Cushman terminated the FMFPac village evaluation system in I Corps as duplicative and not as accurate as the MACV hamlet evaluation system. As Colonel Ross R. Miner, 1st Marine Division G-5 officer, explained, the FMFPac system was only effective as long as the reporting unit remained in a specific area of operations. As far as the division was concerned, with "these [U.S.] units moving in and moving out . . . the whole report is fallacious." On the other hand, the CORDS district advisor, who

was responsible for making the hamlet evaluation system, was in a much better position to give an accurate assessment.⁴⁴


For the most part, outside of the Combined Action and Personal Response programs, the main focus of the III MAF Marine units relative to pacification was on civic action and psychological operations. As part of this latter effort, the Marine command, augmented by the Army's 7th Psychological Operations Battalion, placed a high priority on sophisticated and not so sophisticated communication techniques to get their message to the targeted audiences. For example, after Tet, III MAF made a special effort together with CORDS personnel to reestablish local radio, TV, and newspaper service in Hue. According to III MAF, "special efforts to reestablish these medias were immediately undertaken and the problem solved." Local officials appeared on both television and radio "to make the people aware of what the GVN was doing to allevi-

A member of the psychological operations team from SLF Bravo throws out leaflets explaining to the local population why the Marine units were operating in the sector. This was part of an overall psychological operation campaign aimed at various audiences, including the enemy.

Photo courtesy of Col Warren A. Butcher USMC (Ret)



I CTZ CHIEU HOI RETURNEES - 1968



From Operations of US Marine Forces Vietnam 1968.

ate the critical situation." In radio broadcasts and propaganda flyers, the command countered a prevailing VC rumor campaign that the U.S. would support a coalition government.⁴⁵

Through the year, the III MAF psychological warfare experts mounted a three-pronged campaign to exploit VC/NVA atrocities during Tet, to publicize to enemy soldiers and possible civilian sympathizers the Chieu Hoi or South Vietnamese amnesty program, and to "encourage nationalism" among the civilians throughout the Corps area. They accomplished this through aerial loudspeaker broadcasts and distribution of leaflets by both ground and air means. During March, the first month of the effort, they distributed over 268 million propaganda leaflets and made more than a 1,000 aerial and ground broadcasts. By the end of December, the number of leaflets distributed per month reached over 280 million and nearly 3,000 aerial loudspeaker broadcasts were made. At that time, the 3d Marine Division experimented with firing artillery "leaflet-loaded rounds" at known enemy positions which, after solving some initial fusing and packing problems, proved feasible.⁴⁶


While impossible to measure directly the success of the psychological warfare campaign, the increasing numbers of Chieu Hoi and Kit Carson volunteers indicated that enemy troops were well aware that there were steps they could take to return or come over to the government side. Despite a dip from 250

defectors in January 1968 to only 66 in February, the number of Hoi Chanhs in I Corps at the end of the year reached 3,118, exceeding the total for 1967 by 759. The Kit Carson Scouts showed an even more impressive expansion, increasing from 132 in 1967 to 476 in 1968. In December 1968, 102 served with the 1st Marine Division, 106 with the 3d Marine Division, 153 with the 101st Airborne Division, and 115 with the Americal Division. Another 22 former VC or NVA were undergoing training in the various division Kit Carson schools.⁴⁷

In February, after two of the scouts were identified as "suspected penetration agents for the VC," III MAF improved and augmented its initial screening and also provided "for continuous evaluation and observation of individual KCS." Still, by the end of the year, the Marines credited their Kit Carson Scouts with apprehending 851 suspects and killing 312 of the enemy. They also helped the American units uncover some 720 enemy caves, tunnels, and caches. More importantly, the scouts discovered more than 1,300 explosive devices, many set as boobytraps (surprise firing devices) to catch the unwary. As Major General Donn J. Robertson later stated about the entire program: "Every time you got a few Chieu Hois and could convert them into Kit Carson Scouts where they could give you some assistance that was a plus that could save the lives of Marines."⁴⁸

For 1968, III MAF civic action had much the same gradations as the overall pacification effort.

KIT CARSON SCOUT (KCS) PROGRAM: 1968



From Operations of US Marine Forces Vietnam 1968.

The enemy Tet offensive hampered many civic action projects as the allies turned most of their effort into repulsing the Communist attacks. For example, in February 1968, the only increase in civic action was in two categories, the number of pounds of food distributed and number of persons fed, nearly double in both cases over the previous month. The obvious reason for that expansion was the pressing need to feed those displaced by the Communist onslaught. During the next two months there was a steady growth in all the civic action classifications. Again there were dips in May

and September during the Mini-Tets and a final push in the last quarter of the year.^{49*}

Most civic action largely consisted of programs that had a quick impact on the local populace such as the distribution of clothes, food, and soap to local vil-

*Colonel James R. Black, Jr., who was the III MAF G-5 officer and responsible for the coordination of civic action among his duties, recalled that when he first arrived in September 1967, "it was difficult to comprehend what the G-5 role really was, particularly after the III MAF had a Deputy for CORDS. It was difficult for me to find out who I was really working for, except [Brigadier General] E. E. Anderson [the III MAF Chief of Staff] made it quite clear, and that provided me with the impetus to overcome all personal and professional objections. . . ." James Black Comments.

lagers; medical assistance patrols; and assisting with various construction efforts. The Marines, nevertheless, also supported some long-term projects. In January 1968, the 3d Marine Division in Thua Thien Province near Phu Bai sponsored 15 experimental fields devoted to the cultivation of improved strains of rice. With the assistance of local CORDS officials and the South Vietnamese Ministry of Land Reform and Agriculture, the division civic action team had introduced a higher yield rice developed in the Philippines, called "IR-8," which the Ministry immediately relabeled Thon Nong 8 (literally meaning "God of Agriculture" in Vietnamese). According to the Marine division account, "the psychological impact of attaching a Vietnamese name to an improved rice variety may have considerable influence upon its acceptance by the farmers of Vietnam."⁵⁰

The 1st Marine Division also had similar projects. In January, it sponsored four schools and two breeding farms, and assisted in the building of five wells, two dispensaries, two maternity hospitals, and one Buddhist temple. Just prior to Tet, the Marines at Da Nang had overseen the giving away of more than 16,000 toys to children in the area. The 7th Engineer Battalion at the Da Nang base had one of the most active civic action programs. It sponsored a soil brick factory in its cantonment which provided affordable building material for local civilian projects approved by the village, district, and provincial councils. Employing about 25 workers and eight simple hand block presses, the factory could produce 1,760 bricks daily. While somewhat curtailed by Tet, these enterprises continued through the rest of the year.⁵¹

From the beginning, the civic action effort was larger in the 1st Marine Division sector, which included in the Da Nang area one of the richest farming and heaviest populated regions in all of South Vietnam. This disparity between the two divisions grew during the year as the 1st Marine Division took over the responsibilities of the 3d Division in Thua Thien Province. In the last two months of the year, the 1st Marine Division had completed 56 civic action projects. In December, the division was working with local authorities and villagers in the building of 2 schools, a dispensary, a market place, and 2 wells, as well as sponsoring 15 agricultural plots and 2 pig projects. In the 7th Engineer Battalion, for example, the engineers had begun an agricultural education program on improved farming techniques for the local villagers and introduced stronger types of produce seeds to be used on an experimental basis.⁵²

While assigned to the less populated Quang Tri Province, the 3d Marine Division made a significant contribution to the Marine civic action projects. The division rented some 50 rice threshing machines to local farmers in Quang Tri who had the option of purchasing them. To demonstrate the advantages of the machine, the civic action officer sponsored a threshing contest in one hamlet between a water buffalo and the machine. The machine threshed about twice the amount of rice as the animal. In May, 10 of the farmers bought threshers. Both the rental and purchase proceeds went into the 3d Marine Division civic action fund.⁵³

While introducing mobile helicopter and firebase tactics into the 3d Marine Division, Major General Raymond G. Davis was proud of the civic action exploits of the division. After reviewing his accomplishments as division commander in the spring of 1969, Davis remarked on his efforts in Cam Lo and joint efforts with the 2d ARVN Regiment. The ARVN and Marines conducted a series of cordon and search "County Fair" operations which succeeded in identifying the local VC infrastructure in coastal Quang Tri Province. With the defeat of the NVA divisions in the north, according to Davis, the division could concentrate on pacification and civic action.⁵⁴

Lieutenant Colonel Bryon T. Chen's 2d Battalion, 3d Marines with its Companies F and H played a large role in the Cam Lo Campaign. In Cam Lo District, Captain Donald R. Myers who commanded Company H remembered, "I had squads or platoons in nearly every hamlet along the Cam Lo River . . . [and that] we even had the RFs go on patrol with us across the . . . River. They hadn't done that in years." In nearby Huong Hoa District, First Lieutenant Justin M. Martin's Company F adopted similar tactics. Operating in the villages of Mai Loc and Doc Kin, the company supported a Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) operating with the U.S. Special Forces and the 220th Regional Forces Company. According to Martin, he had two bosses, "I not only have to report to my colonel but also an [U.S.] Army major," the District Advisor. While somewhat critical of his South Vietnamese Regional Force counterpart, who ran his operations from a small cafe in Mai Loc, he believed "we have given the Vietnamese some muscle that they have not had in this area." Both Myers and Martin viewed the pacification campaign as a welcome change of pace from the war of maneuver against the North Vietnamese regular units. Myers observed "we made an impact, but it was not noted in the number of body



Photo Courtesy of LtCol Justin M. Martin USMC (Ret)

Photograph presents a street view of the village of Mai Loc in Huong Hoa District, Quang Tri Province. Company F, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines operated in the village together with a Regional Force Company whose commander made his headquarters in a cafe on this street.

counts. What did not happen is a better indication of our success. Incidents dramatically went down while we operated and trained the RFs.”⁵⁵

Yet, one of the most ambitious of the division civic action projects, the establishment of a children’s hospital in Quang Tri, proved how ephemeral such undertakings could be. With much fanfare and publicity, the division announced in August the scheduled opening of the 30-bed Dong Ha facility of what was planned eventually to be the “3d Marine Division Memorial Children’s Hospital” dedicated as a “lasting memorial to 3d Marine Division Marines and Sailors killed in action in Vietnam.” In addition to providing medical care for children, the hospital was to be a training center for Vietnamese medical personnel and serve as a symbol of American and Marine concern for the Vietnamese people. According to the division plans, the Marines were to finance the facility from troop donations, Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action funds, and by fund raising appeals to community and veterans organizations in the United States. The estimated cost of the finished modern hospital complex was \$75,000 which was to be located in the Quang Tri Combat

Base. Despite the high hopes and auspicious beginning, the hospital never expanded beyond the small Dong Ha facility. When the division left Quang Tri Province and Vietnam in 1969, the hospital remained largely on the drawing boards except for six unfinished buildings. With the assistance of III MAF, the South Vietnamese turned these into a combination of clinic, orphanage, and dormitory, a far cry from the initial ambitious plans. As Colonel Clifford J. Peabody, the III MAF civil affairs officer in 1970, later commented, “a project which was outstanding in its humanitarian ideal of providing help . . . has proved to be a real albatross in the long run.”⁵⁶

Like much of the pacification effort, the effectiveness of the III MAF civic action program was difficult to determine. It often challenged the best in many

⁵⁵Colonel William E. Kerrigan, who served as the G-5 of the 3d Marine Division in the latter part of 1968, observed that “although never operated as a Children’s Hospital, one wing became an infirmary and several were used as youth hostels for high school students who lived in areas too remote to be able to commute to schools in Quang Tri City.” Col William E. Kerrigan, Comments on draft, dtd 14Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

Marine enlisted men and officers, but also could bring out the worst. Captain Merrill L. Bartlett, a former Marine intelligence officer, remembered one regimental S-5 officer "already 'in his cups' by late afternoon," ordering the scores of Vietnamese civilians employed on the base, into a formation. According to Bartlett, the Marine officer "would then parade the lines with a club, looking for contraband. Finding something like a package of C-ration cigarettes, he would assault the luckless person with the club. My last memory of this officer is . . . seeing him passed out in a mud puddle in front of his hooch on New Year's Eve." On the other hand, Charles R. Anderson, a former Marine lieutenant assigned to the 3d MP Battalion at Da Nang during the latter part of 1968, described his battalion's S-5 officer as one who "wore his commission better than most who carried one" and who had volunteered for the S-5 job with the hopes of transferring into a combat unit. After a brief time in his new position, "he soon became seriously interested in the Vietnamese people and forgot about going into the bush." According to Anderson, despite cynicism on the part of other officers in the battalion, "those in S-5 labored on, determined to show the Vietnamese that America was trying to do things other than burning and killing."⁵⁷

Homicide in the Countryside

In a sense, the civic action program was part of the larger effort to win the so-called "hearts and minds" of the local populace, but this called for a special interaction between different and often alien cultures. For example, the deployment of the Korean Marine Brigade from the relatively unpopulated Chu Lai area into the Da Nang sector in January 1968 caused a deterioration of relations with the local villagers. According to General Cushman, he never really had control of the Koreans. Cushman stated our relationship was "operational guidance . . . [and] they didn't do a damn thing unless they felt like it." Cushman's deputy, Major General Rathvon McC. Tompkins,* observed that the Vietnamese feared the Koreans more than anyone else and Cushman later confirmed that the South Vietnamese "people don't like them." According to the III MAF commander, General Lam, the South Vietnamese I Corps commander "hates their guts . . . He smiles, he's polite, but he'd just as soon they'd go the hell

home or some other Corps area." Tompkins later related that if the Korean Marines received fire "or think they'd get fired on from a village . . . they'd divert from their march and go over and completely level the village . . . It would be a lesson to them." Cushman concurred with Tompkins, remarking several years afterwards, "we had a big problem with atrocities attributed to them which I sent on down to Saigon." According to the III MAF commander, "I don't know how that ever came out . . . I doubt if anything ever came out of it." He stated the Koreans "of course denied it, so I don't know exactly what went on. I had some heart to heart talks with them, but I didn't really get anywhere."^{58**}

Of course, incidents with the local population were not confined only to Korean or to ARVN troops. In March 1968, in the hamlet of My Lai in Quang Ngai Province, a platoon from the Army's Company C, Task Force Barker, 11th Light Infantry Brigade, Americal Division, led by 1st Lieutenant William L. Calley, murdered over 120 villagers including old men, women, and children.^{***} It would be nearly a year later before the details of the massacre surfaced. A Department of the Army special board, headed by Army Lieutenant General William R. Peers, discovered that the 11th Brigade and Americal Division held only perfunctory investigations into the killings and failed to report any suspicions through the chain of command to either III MAF or U.S. Army, Vietnam. When asked about My Lai several years later, General Cushman answered, "the administrative chain to which these reports had to be made in no way went through III MAF. It went from [Major General Samuel] Koster [the Americal Division commander] to [Lieutenant General Bruce] Palmer, the Army [deputy] component

^{**}According to Igor Bobrowsky, who served with Combined Action Platoon Delta 2 in the Thanh Quit sector, this incident occurred in the nearby Phong Ni hamlets "when the Koreans made their way north from Dien Ban to relieve our units." He wrote it was "a very serious incident of that particular type (even *we* [italics in original] felt it was above & beyond acceptable bounds)." Igor Bobrowsky, Comments on draft, n.d. [Jan95] (Vietnam Comment Files). General E. E. Anderson, then the III MAF Chief of Staff, remembered that the incident occurred on 12 February 1968, "and a very close hold confidential investigation was held by a III MAF investigating officer. Since the ROK Marine brigade was not a subordinate of III MAF, the investigation was limited. It was completed and typed by my stenographer and hand carried to MACV in an "Eyes Only" sealed envelope on April 16, 1968. Rather revealing photographs were enclosed. A few weeks later, the package was returned to my office without any comment whatsoever." E.E. Anderson Comments.

^{***}See also Chapter 13.

*MajGen Tompkins was the 3d Marine Division commander until 21 May when he relieved MajGen William J. Van Ryzin as Deputy Commander, III MAF. See Chapter 15.

commander in Vietnam. It was an Army chain, and I had nothing to do with it."⁵⁹

While nothing as horrendous or on the scale of My Lai, the Marines had their own incidents with the local populace as well. Obviously, when the battlefield was the village or the rice paddy, civilian casualties occurred, wittingly or unwittingly. While cognizant of the difficult circumstances, the Marine command attempted to hold Marine units to the highest standard. General Cushman remembered that while there were a number of atrocities, "we tried them by court-martial." He related that, in most instances, they usually involved only a few victims and Marines and "we really came down on them . . ."⁶⁰

From 1965–1973, Marine or Navy court-martials convicted 27 Marines of the murder of noncombatant South Vietnamese. Additionally another 16 were convicted of rape and another 18 of assault "with intent to commit murder, rape, or indecent assault." Another 15 Marines were found guilty of manslaughter and one of attempted murder. The most notorious Marine court-martial of 1968 involved seven men from a squad of the 1st Battalion, 27th Marines. Accused of participating in the execution style murder of five Vietnamese men on 5 and 6 May, the seven were brought to trial and five of them convicted within five months of the incident.⁶¹

Obviously, while convictions provide some basis for judging the effectiveness of the Marine discipline system, as one Marine lawyer/historian, Lieutenant Colonel Gary D. Solis, wrote: "Acquittals can be as revealing as sentences imposed, because acquittals may indicate the reluctance of a court to convict." In an analysis of the 43 Marines brought up on murder charges of South Vietnamese civilians, Solis observed

that 16 Marines, or 37 percent, "were acquitted or had their charges judicially dismissed." He compared this favorably with the ratio of homicide case acquittals in U.S. District Courts, which for 1969 was 33 percent. Still, in examining the sentences served by the 27 Marines convicted of murdering South Vietnamese noncombatants, he observed that the average incarceration was less than five years.⁶²

Despite the best efforts of the Marine command to punish all individuals that may have been guilty of crimes against the local populace, there were deviations. As Lieutenant Colonel Solis would later maintain "there clearly were far fewer prosecutions than there were grave breaches of the law of war." Much depended upon individual unit leadership and command sensitivity to the needs and predicament of the local civilian population. While never condoned and often condemned by the senior Marine command, there emerged among some troops and perhaps some commanders what was called the "'mere gook' rule." For some Marines, this permitted the "killing of Vietnamese—regardless of age, sex, or combatant status—because 'after all they're only gooks,' a derogatory nickname for an Oriental which was carried over from the Korean War." As Major W. Hays Parks, in 1968 the 1st Marine Division Chief Trial Counsel, wrote eight years later, while describing the so-called rule as "an unfair distorted description of military attitudes and conduct . . . [but acknowledged that] it was not altogether false, and was a key factor in most of the serious incidents reported." Lieutenant Colonel Solis in his history of military justice in Vietnam observed that certain Marine defense counsels were aware of this attitude and often tried to use it to their advantage. He described the efforts of one counsel to include senior enlisted men on the court-martial panel, quoting the lawyer to the effect that they "would not be particularly disturbed about the death of another 'gook' . . . my hypothesis proved correct."⁶³

As Major Parks pointed out the "mere gook rule" was not original with U.S. troops in Vietnam nor for that matter Korea.⁶⁴ He quotes the American writer Ambrose Bierce writing in the 1860s, "The soldier

*General E. E. Anderson observed that while true that III MAF was out of the administrative chain of command for the My Lai investigation, he was "later questioned by members of the Peers Commission about the subject as I had the responsibility, as Chief of Staff of III MAF, of releasing our nightly operations reports. I pointed out to the questioners that the operations report by the Americal Division for the period when the My Lai incident occurred contained nothing that would trigger any suspicion." E. E. Anderson Comments.

**The Marines later established a Combined Action Platoon in the hamlet where the incident took place. Andrew Lewandowski, who commanded this platoon, recalled that he took over this platoon in November 1968, but "did not learn of this incident until I sat in a doctor's office in Mt. Penn, Pa" the following year and read an account of the atrocity in *Look Magazine*. According to Lewandowski, if he had known about the situation at the time, he would have altered somewhat his civic action program in the hamlet. Andrew Lewandowski, Comments on draft, dtd 30Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).

***Colonel W. Hays Parks, a former Marine lawyer and who has written extensively on the subject, denied, however, "that time served for murder of a Vietnamese was less than time served for a similar crime in the U.S. against a non-Vietnamese victim . . ." Col W. Hays Parks, Comments on draft, dtd 6Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

****According to LtCol Solis, Marines used the term gook in reference to Nicaraguans during the Marine intervention there in the 1920s. Solis, *Trial by Fire*, p. 138.

never becomes wholly familiar with the conception of his foes as men like himself; he cannot divest himself of the feeling that they are another order of beings, differently conditioned, in an environment not altogether of the earth." This obviously reinforced Chaplain McGonigal's observation that it was important that the individual Marine view the individual South Vietnamese peasant as a "*full-fledged human being*."^{64*}

This, of course, was much easier said than done. As strong a supporter of the Marine pacification program as Major General Murray, the III MAF deputy commander, remarked, "I'd visit villages where the village chiefs and the villagers themselves would give every appearance . . . that we were just the greatest people in the world," but there also remained in the back of his mind the fugitive thought "who in this crowd of people would lead us to believe that they love us . . . [but] actually were ready to slit our throats, the first chance they would get." Obviously, the young Marine who took sniper fire from a village or witnessed a comrade either killed or horrendously wounded by an enemy boobytrap or mine set by these same villagers had his doubts about the friendliness of the local population. The attempt to convince him otherwise would take some doing.^{65**}

*Michael E. Peterson, a former Combined Action Marine and who has published a book on the Combined Action Program, questioned "how could any Marine view the South Vietnamese peasant as a *full-fledged human being* . . . when, from the very beginning . . . we were fed "Luke the Gook" from Boot Camp onward? The enlightenment of the writers of the *Small Wars Manual*, Lew Walt, Victor Krulak, and other pacification commanders simply could not offset the condescension, at best, or vicious . . . racism, at worst—of American commanders and soldiers toward the Vietnamese. And, given the Vietnamese tradition of xenophobia, a single negative act was multiplied manifold in their eyes; and across the country by many thousands of Americans." Michael E. Peterson, Comments on draft, dtd 10Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).

**In a letter to his parents in 1968, William R. Black, Jr., then a second lieutenant, wrote about some of the contradictory emotions pulling at the Marines as they fought the war in the villages. He wrote about his platoon taking heavy sniper fire in a hamlet. Black permitted some of the men to throw hand grenades into family bunkers before entering them because he "felt the whole place was unfriendly and that enemy were probably hiding in the family bomb shelters." The troops saw "very few civilians," but suddenly they heard a child cry. A family had been in one of the shelters. While sniper fire continued against his forward platoons, he directed his Navy Corpsman, "Doc, do what you can for them *immediately*, [emphasis in original] we can't leave you here." According to Black, this was a "sore spot among many of our troops that the corpsmen spend their medicine and energy helping the VN civilians." He quoted one of his men saying "Damn, man! This is a *war*! [emphasis in the original] We can't go hold'n up for no gook civilians!" The corpsman reported that the civilian wounds were superficial and the troops moved on. 2dLt William R. Black, Jr., ltr to parents, dtd 20–1 Apr 68, Encl, William R. Black, Jr., Comments on draft, dtd 4Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File).

Changing Attitudes

Such attitudes were a disturbing factor to the Marine command and lay behind the continuing efforts of the Marine Corps Personal Response Program. The Marine Corps pacification program depended upon the troops understanding the complexity of the situation they faced. While it might be too much to expect all Marines to like the Vietnamese, the command undertook extensive efforts to ensure that the Marines respected the rights and lives of the villagers who depended upon their protection.

Working against the perception on the part of some Marines and even some commanders that it was a "chaplain's program" or a "do-gooder concept," Personal Response officers tried to bring relevance to their message. Each Marine infantry platoon commander received a Personal Response notebook, a 53-page booklet, with examples and suggestions for further discussion with the Marines under him. For example, it offered the case where a CAP Marine by holding hands with a local girl destroyed the existing good relationship within the hamlet between the Marines and the villagers. In a graphic paragraph, the pamphlet observed:

Put it this way. If a foreigner squatted down on a street corner in Chicago and crapped in the gutter we would be offended. Most of us would hardly notice it, however, if a Vietnamese man walked down the street holding hands with an American girl. Here it is just the other way around—only worse. Holding hands with a Vietnamese girl in public is labeling all their women as prostitutes.⁶⁶

Of course, the effectiveness of the pamphlet depended upon the initiative of the individual platoon commander and the command interest of his seniors. Each division, the wing, the Force Logistic Command, and Naval Support Activity had Personal Response contact teams. Each team consisted of a commissioned officer and a senior noncommissioned officer who were responsible for the conduct of schools and orientation in their respective commands.

The emphasis was upon formal and informal instruction. For example, in January 1968, the 3d Marine Division contact team held a two-day division Personal Response course for Personal Response officers at lower echelons. Personal contact teams gave field lectures and held discussion groups with seven infantry battalions which numbered over 970 Marines in attendance. The division teams provided instruction at the Combined Action Group school, the 3d Recon-

naissance Battalion indoctrination Course, and the Division staff NCO leadership course. For the month, the division reported that 104 officers, 139 staff NCOs, and 931 other enlisted men (a total of 1174 personnel) listened to 37 hours of formal school presentations and 24 hours of field lectures relative to Personal Response.⁶⁷

All of the commands would accumulate similar statistics through the rest of the year. Furthermore, the III MAF Personal Response office issued a monthly flyer called "Spice," which was to add "seasoning to presentations," while another periodical called "Viewpoints" was to depict a "'happening' in American-Vietnamese Relations." At the end of September, III MAF placed its Personal Response program under the III MAF Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans) rather than the G-5 Division, Civic Action. This, however, made little difference for the program since all the subordinate commands retained their Personal Response officers and teams in their G-5 or S-5 civic action sections.⁶⁸

Again the question remains, how much difference did the entire effort make? While any conclusion would be conjecture, the evidence implies the effect was positive. In a presentation for General Walt in October 1968, who was then the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, the briefer stated that the 3d Marine Division credited the Personal Response training "as a major factor in the reduction of that command's serious incident rate by more than one-fourth over the past 12 months." He observed that the 1st Marine Division reported an 11 percent decrease in non-operational serious incidents in the past year and also attributed this to its Personal Response efforts. Later in a debriefing at FMFPac, Major General Tompkins, the former 3d Marine Division commander and Deputy CG III MAF, commented that while difficult to assess the effectiveness of Personal Response, he believed the entire effort worthwhile and brought forth unexpected benefits in the form of intelligence about enemy units and infrastructure in the local communities.⁶⁹

Despite the promulgation of all the various directives and the distribution of materials, their impact was uneven. Major Parks later concluded that most serious incidents involved men from units in which:

those directives had not been re-promulgated or implemented. . . . A command which implemented these directives, in which the commander knew what his subordinate units were doing and in which an intolerance of misconduct was manifest, seldom suffered either in the accomplishment of its mission or from serious incidents. Fortunately this was the rule rather than the exception.⁷⁰

In the final analysis, while the Personal Response officer provided assistance and direction, the program's success depended upon the effectiveness of the individual commander, down to the platoon level, to support the policy. As one Marine historian wrote, the best that could be said about the Personal Response program was that the Marines "never gave up the effort to maintain a measure of humanity and compassion in the conduct of an often savage war . . . [but] probably dislike and distrust, tempered by a wary tolerance dictated by self-interest, were the dominant sentiments" on the part of both the Marines and the local populace.⁷¹

The Boys Next Door: The Combined Action Program

Relationships between Marines and the villagers were most important in the Marine Corps Combined Action Program. While Chaplain McGonigal found attitudes among Combined Action (CAP) Marines more positive than troops in line units, still there was reason for concern even in this supposedly show-case pacification program. As McGonigal later stated, one of the problems of the CAPs was that you had "people with little maturity" and "we got a lot of shitbirds."⁷²

During 1967, the program had expanded, but not without difficulty. One matter of concern was the lack of support from some infantry regimental or battalion commanders, who still retained operational control of the individual Combined Action Marines in their sectors. In February 1967, to provide more direct command influence over the program, Lieutenant General Walt, then the III MAF commander, assigned Lieutenant Colonel William R. Corson as the Combined Action Company officer in a newly created billet in the G-3 section. Colorful and charismatic, but lacking formal command over the Combined Action Marines, Corson gave structure to the program. He established guidelines, formed a school at Da Nang, provided some initial screening of applicants, and obtained approval of a table of organization for the CAPs. By the end of May, Corson had formed a Combined Action Group headquarters at Da Nang with administrative responsibility over the various Combined Action Companies.⁷³

In June 1967, after succeeding General Walt as Commanding General III MAF, General Cushman placed the Combined Action Program under his deputy, Major General Herman Nickerson, the former commander of the 1st Marine Division. As 1st Division commander at Da Nang, Nickerson was an enthu-



Department of Defense (USMC) A192361

LtGen Herman Nickerson, Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower at HQMC, on a visit to Vietnam, talks with South Vietnam Popular Force troops, part of CAP 1–3–5. The Combined Action Program was placed under Gen Nickerson when he was Deputy Commander, III MAF. Col Edward F. Danowitz, the Director, CAP (wearing glasses), is to the left and behind Gen Nickerson.

siastic supporter of the Marine pacification program, including Combined Action. General Nickerson also knew Corson in that the latter “was my tank battalion commander . . . and did a magnificent job of relating to the people . . .” With confidence in Corson, Nickerson gave him a new title, III MAF Deputy Director for Combined Action, and delegated authority over the program to him. By July, Corson formed two new Combined Action Groups and III MAF distributed a formal standard operating procedure (SOP) that defined the structure, mission, and command relations of the program.* Once and for all, III MAF assumed direct operational control of the CAPs with line units out of the chain of command, except for occasional combat support and coordination. The 1st CAG, based at Chu Lai, was responsible for Marine Combined Action operations in the southern two provinces,

Quang Tin and Quang Ngai. Similarly, the 2d CAG at Da Nang controlled the CAPs in Quang Nam Province, and the 3d CAG at Phu Bai, the CAPs in the two northern provinces, Quang Tri and Thua Thien.⁷⁴

Command relations with the Vietnamese were a little more blurred. The Combined Action Marines did not have operational control of the Popular Force platoons with whom they worked. Instead the relationship was one of coordination and advice. Supposedly the South Vietnamese platoon leader answered to the local district chief, and it was the responsibility of the commanders of the CAGs and CACOs to coordinate with the South Vietnamese provincial and district officials relative to the CAPs. The Marine Combined Action platoon squad leader, in effect, was an advisor to the platoon leader. He could not command the South Vietnamese, but only offer suggestions and advice. Obviously, much depended upon the personal relationship between the individual Marines and the South Vietnamese Popular Force troops for the effectiveness of the program.

The finding of the ideal and idealistic Marines to run such a program would take some doing and by

*Lieutenant Colonel Corson wrote that “the SOP was totally illegal in that only the CMC can create a new organization. However, with General Nickerson’s support we did it, no matter the legality.” He mentioned that the changes took off very quickly despite the protests of several regimental commanders. Corson Comments.

November, the program had floundered. Generals Walt and Nickerson, who had both strongly pushed the program, had left. In August, Corson also had departed and a few months later, very much disillusioned, wrote a bitter and biting indictment of American strategy in the war.* His handpicked successor, Lieutenant Colonel Francis R. Hittinger, Jr., was killed by a mine explosion in the Da Nang area of operations. Instead of the 114 Cap units that were supposed to be in place at the end of the year, the Marines only had 79.⁷⁵

According to Lieutenant Colonel Byron F. Brady, he met on Thanksgiving Day 1967 with Major General Raymond L. Murray, the new III MAF deputy commander, who offered him the position of III MAF Deputy Director for Combined Action.** In contrast to the flamboyant Corson, the relatively staid Brady was more traditional in his approach. Joining the Marine Corps in 1938 as a private, he received a commission during World War II. Called back to active duty during Korea, Brady remained in the Corps as a career officer. While knowing very little about the Combined Action Program, Brady immediately began to read what was available about the concept. He was particularly impressed with Commander McGonigal's evalua-

tion of the program and the importance of the relationship between the Marines and the Vietnamese Popular Force troops and the villagers. Concerned about what he considered the degradation of the quality in the training of Marines now coming to Vietnam, Brady established as his first priority the recruiting of good men for the program.⁷⁶

By this time the growing demands and limitations on Marine manpower would have its effect upon the Combined Action Program. An exchange of messages among the Commandant, General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Lieutenant General Krulak at FMFPac, and General Cushman at III MAF highlighted this concern. As early as August 1967, General Krulak observed to the Commandant that he had directed General Cushman "to proceed with CAP activations out of his present resources to the extent possible, although realism prompts the conclusion that he may not be able to do much." As the year came to a close these manpower constraints became even tighter.⁷⁷

Even more disconcerting for the Marine Corps was the possible loss of CORDS support for the program, specifically by Ambassador Komer. General Westmoreland always had some skepticism about the Combined Action Program. Although calling the concept "ingenious," he also wrote, "I simply had not enough numbers to put a squad of Americans in every village and hamlet" Apparently Komer had come to much the same opinion. While asking for an evaluation of the program by CORDS personnel at Da Nang, in early December 1967, Komer canceled a Combined Action briefing by Lieutenant Colonel Brady at an orientation course for Joint U.S. Public Affairs Officers. According to a MACV official at the session, CORDS had concluded that "the Combined Action Program is too expensive to continue." On 5 December, in a message to the Commandant, General Krulak recalled that in a conversation that he had with Komer "some time ago," the latter "spoke with enthusiasm about the idea but said because of its broad interface with civilian affairs, that the program probably ought to be under CORDS." The FMFPac commander believed that the whole matter was one of turf: "It could be, having met no success in the endeavor to take it over, that he [Komer] is now committed to abolishing the program."⁷⁸

As would be expected, Ambassador Komer had a completely different recollection of the events than General Krulak. According to Komer several years later, he remembered that when he asked "Wally Greene and Krulak for more people for the CAPs, their answer was,

*Corson's book *The Betrayal* was published in July 1968, although the draft was completed by April. Corson in his comments stated that he did not start writing until mid-March 1968. In the book, he condemned both the Johnson Administration and MACV, including Ambassador Komer and General Westmoreland, for their direction of the war and in particular for neglecting the "other war" or pacification. He praised, however, both Marine Generals Walt and Krulak for their efforts, and in particular, the Combined Action Program, although presenting an exaggerated and idealized version of the successes of the program. There was some talk about official reprimands and possible court-martial of Corson because he failed to submit the manuscript for review, according to Department of Defense regulations, prior to publication. It was decided that such a course of action would only give undue publicity to the book. In his comments, Corson stated that a copy of his unedited galley proofs was stolen from a safe in his office. He claimed that his application for retirement to the Secretary of the Navy was first approved then rescinded upon basis that he had violated some Department of Defense administrative rule. According to Corson, his lawyer obtained a writ for the Secretaries of the Navy and of Defense to show cause for the revocation of his retirement, and only after the matter had reached the President was the decision made in his favor. See LtCol William R. Corson file, Biog Files, RefSec, MCHC and Corson Comments. Corson dedicated the book "To the hearts and minds of the CAP Marines, both living and dead." See also LtCol William R. Corson, *The Betrayal* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 1968).

**Lieutenant Colonel Brady noted that when he first took over the billet, he only loosely controlled the Combined Action Groups, but that it was "later established as a command billet . . ." LtCol Byron F. Brady, Comments on draft, dtd 30Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File).



Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A422186

Marine Cpl Gilbert J. Davis, a member of the CAP Mobile Training Team, trains two South Vietnamese Popular Force troops. MACV pressed III MAF to form Mobile Assistance Teams to supplement the Combined Action platoons.

Bob we haven't enough people to keep our . . . Marine forces going—we are really people poor." The CORDS chief explained that the CAPs performed well, but the program demanded an "enormous requirement for American infantry which we did not have."⁷⁹

In any event, on 7 January 1968, Ambassador Komer met with the new Marine Corps Commandant, General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., who was in Saigon on an information gathering visit. In the meeting, Komer acknowledged that the Combined Action program had value and was proving effective, but that "it was very expensive in manpower . . . [and] is too slow a program to accomplish the pacification ends at an early date." He believed that the Marines should reduce the size of their squads in the hamlets to eight-man teams and experiment with more mobile techniques. Komer especially pushed the newly created MACV program of Mobile Assistance Teams consisting of a five-man team including an ARVN officer, an American officer, and three American veteran combat enlisted men that would move from one Popular Force platoon in a province to another, to teach basic infantry tactics to the Vietnamese militia. General Chapman

remained noncommittal, but promised "to monitor the program and insure that the maximum value is gained from the personnel committed."⁸⁰

From a III MAF perspective, the Marines remained skeptical about the motives of MACV. Although the only true similarity between the MACV Mobile Assistance Teams and that of the CAPs was that they both worked with the Popular Forces, General Westmoreland would later insist that the MACV teams were an adaptation of the CAP concept.* In April 1968, to ward off possible Saigon tampering with the program, General Cushman and Lieutenant Colonel Brady eventually established Mobile Training Teams (MTT) in the CAP program. These teams, which consisted of regular Combined Action Marine squads, were assigned to a non-CAP Popular Forces platoon for about a two-week period, and would provide a crash-training course in infantry tactics. The teams would then move on to another such Popular Force platoon in the same province and repeat the process. Brigadier General Earl E. Anderson, the III MAF Chief of Staff, would later state that it was the III MAF belief that Komer wanted to "absorb the CAPs into the RF/PF structure . . . controlled by CORDS," but that General Cushman "resisted this, and he felt that by coming up with some new idea . . . he would get more mileage out of the CAP program and forestall any attempt on the part of Komer and other people at MACV to destroy the CAP program." Ambassador Komer, nevertheless, would later contend, "I was a big fan of the CAPs."⁸¹

On 30 January 1968, just before Tet, III MAF submitted a revised Table of Organization for the Combined Action Program to reflect the actual command structure. The old tables still retained the authority of the individual battalion and division commanders over the Combined Action Companies. General Cushman objected and declared that since June 1967, control resided with the respective Combined Action Groups. With the redeployment of 1st Marine Division infantry battalions to Phu Bai from Da Nang, the situation in both sectors had become fluid. New units in new TAORs were unfamiliar with the Combined Action Marines, and III MAF worried that the CAPs were vulnerable to enemy attack. Cushman wrote in a letter to General Chapman that, because of the need for close coordination and liaison with the South Vietnamese authorities relative to the CAPs, there was a

*In his comments, Lieutenant General Krulak called the Mobile Assistance Team concept "worthless." Krulak Comments.



Photo courtesy of Igor Bobrowsky

Members of CAP Delta-1 are on patrol near the hamlet of Thanh Quit south of Da Nang. One CAP member, Igor Bobrowsky, remembered that prior to Tet the local populace began "making coffins."

need for "unity of command" on the Marine side. He continued that, with the "increased mobility of infantry units, it is impractical for the infantry unit commander to effect continued and close liaison with Vietnamese officials." This had to be handled through the Combined Action structure itself, pointing out for example, that the 3d CAG at Phu Bai had units in both the 1st and 3d Marine Division area of operations. Earlier, in a telephone conversation with FMFPac, General Cushman observed that he was conducting a study to find the best way to use the CAPs.⁸²

The Tet offensive, however, in January and February 1968, would have more effect upon the changes made in the Combined Action program than the jurisdictional battles with CORDS and MACV and out of date tables of organization. Even before Tet, there were strong indications that things were different. Combined Action Platoons, both near Da Nang and Phu Loc, increasingly came under attack.* One CAP Marine, Igor Bobrowsky, assigned to one of the ham-

lets of Thanh Quit below Da Nang, remembered, "it was just that the intensity of what was going on kept on increasing, increasing, increasing." He observed the contacts with the VC became "increasingly more frequent and stronger ripples turning into waves around us" Sources of intelligence had dried up but in a macabre way villagers provided an indication that something big was about to occur: "As we'd walk through some place, people were making coffins." Bobrowsky recalled thinking: "Who died? Was . . . there a plague?" The people "were just getting a jump start on the burials to come . . .," but before the Marines realized the import of the situation, "the shit hit the fan, but it wasn't . . . all at once. It was just that suddenly we found ourselves totally isolated . . ."⁸³

In any event according to a Department of Defense analysis, from 1 November 1967 through 31 January 1968, nearly half or 49 percent of enemy initiated attacks in I Corps occurred against the CAPs. In February the percentage dropped to 38 percent. According to the report, "It is significant that this period of high activity against the CAPs coincides with the buildup and attack phases of the Tet offensive."⁸⁴

*See Chapters 6, 7, and 8 for description of the attacks on the CAPs during this period and during Tet.

After the heavy fighting during and after Tet had died down, III MAF reexamined the entire Combined Action structure. Colonel Harold L. Oppenheimer, a Marine reservist on active duty, who was on special assignment to III MAF, prepared a study on the program for General Cushman. Oppenheimer basically called for more centralization of the Combined Action command organization and the consolidation of units into more defensible units.⁸⁵

More importantly, however, Lieutenant Colonel Brady, the III MAF Deputy Director for Combined Action, completed his own report on the program. While aware of Oppenheimer's study, he depended more upon the initiatives of his CAG commanders, especially the 3d CAG commander at Phu Bai, Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Keller. Since the fall of 1967, Keller had advocated less of a "fortified village" concept for the CAP defenses and more of a combat capability based upon night patrols and ambushes. After the overrunning of CAPs Hotel 5, 6, and 7* in the Phu Loc sector in January, Keller decided to reform these units into mobile CAPs. While assigned to a general village sector consisting of several hamlets, the mobile CAP had no specific base, but moved from hamlet to hamlet. According to Brady, the restructured CAPs had some success "in combat situations." He talked the concept over with Keller and then made a personal staff study.⁸⁶

From his analysis of the situation, Lieutenant Colonel Brady noted that the preliminary evidence would indicate that the mobile CAPs sustained fewer casualties in relation to VC KIA than the CAPs in fixed positions. Still Brady noted that both types of Combined Action units had their advantages. The Compound CAPs were better geared to provide civic action and to obtain intelligence from the villagers. On the other hand, the mobile CAPs formed better relations with their Vietnamese Regional Force and Popular Force counterparts since they were "both living at the same level." At this point, Brady suggested that when III MAF form new Mobile CAPs that they be in the same vicinity of a compound CAP. According to Brady, this would insure that there would be a safe haven for the mobile units. In June, General Cushman concurred with Brady's recommendations.⁸⁷

Following Tet, there were other changes in the Combined Action Program besides the establishment of the Mobile CAPs and the Mobile Training Teams. In April, III MAF changed the designations of all of the

CAPs to numbers. Until that time, the Combined Action Platoons had been identified by a combination of letters and numbers. All of the Combined Action Companies carried letter identifiers, similar to infantry and artillery companies and batteries. The platoons then carried the letter plus a number. For example, the Combined Action Company at Phu Loc was CACO H or Hotel and the individual platoons under the control of CACO H were known as H or Hotel 1 through 8. This made for some confusion as there was no systematic way to identify which platoon or company belonged to a specific Combined Action Group. Under the new system, the Combined Action Companies took the number of the CAG they belonged to while the platoons in turn took the numbers of both the CAG and CACO plus an additional number. For example, CAP 3-2-1 would stand for the 1st Combined Action platoon, of the 2d Combined Action Company, of the 3d Combined Action Group.⁸⁸

Concerned about the results of a survey of CAP Marines following Tet by Lieutenant Commander McGonigal that several experienced a sense of betrayal on the part of the PFs and some of the villagers for not warning them, Lieutenant Colonel Brady continued with both the efforts to systemize the program and to raise the standards for Marines to enter the Combined Action platoons. On 18 April, III MAF issued a Force Bulletin outlining the Combined Action Program and urging "commanders to actively recruit highly qualified personnel as volunteers for duty with the Combined Action Program." It remarked upon the need that every member of a CAP "must be a potential leader, who through professional capability, personal example, courage and dedication can foster the respect of Vietnamese Nationals and lead small unit combined forces in combat." Signed by Major General William J. Van Ryzin, who had relieved General Murray as III MAF deputy commander, the bulletin "requested that command interest be directed towards the recruiting of volunteers and the final selection of personnel . . ." It ended on the high note that the "recruiting of one highly qualified individual is repaid at least three fold in terms of military combat potential alone . . ."⁸⁹

In June, III MAF followed up the bulletin with a new Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the Combined Action Program. While canceling the SOP of the previous year, it reconfirmed many of the basic tenets of the Combined Action Program. It continued the integration of a Marine squad plus a corpsman with the Popular Forces platoon and the command structure through III MAF exercised by the Director, Combined

*See Chapter 6 for a description of the fighting in Hotel 6.

Action Program, and the Combined Action Groups. Again, the new SOP emphasized that the command relationship between the Marines and the PFs was on a "coordination and cooperation basis. The USMC squad leader does not command the PF element of the platoon, nor does the PF platoon leader command the Marines." While the new SOP did not stipulate that new Combined Action platoons should be mobile, it emphasized that the "CAP compound is to be an administrative and logistical headquarters for the platoon and is not meant to be a citadel."⁹⁰

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the new order was the codification of the standards for CAP volunteers. These were divided into two groups—one for lance corporals and below and the other for non-commissioned officers. For regular enlisted men, the criteria included a minimum of six months remaining on their current tour in Vietnam; to be true volunteers "and motivated to live and work with the Vietnamese people"; to be recommended by their commanding officer and to be a "mature, motivated Marine"; to have had "no non-judicial punishment within the past three months"; and to have had no court-martials during the past year. The selection process preferred high school graduates and those with an infantry military occupational specialty. It limited volunteers to those Marines who had less than two Purple Hearts on their current Vietnam tour. Noncommissioned officers were not only to meet the above standards but in addition were to have had combat experience, "demonstrated a high quality of leadership," and to be deemed "highly qualified for promotion." While waivers were permitted for "highly motivated" personnel recommended "with enthusiasm," these personnel still had to appear before the CAP screening board before any waiver would be granted. All commanders were to maintain rosters of qualified personnel for Combined Action and were to fill quotas for the program from that list. Although not specifically specified in the SOP, it would be assumed that all volunteers had to be approved by the Screening Board.⁹¹

With the restructuring of the Combined Action Program, there was also a growth in the number of Combined Action platoons and groups. From 79 platoons in January, the number increased to 85 in May, and reached 93 in July. On 20 July, III MAF activated the 4th Combined Action Group in Quang Tri Province. By the end of the month with four CAGs, the Marines assigned to the program totaled 38 officers and 1,913 enlisted men, not including 104 Navy corpsmen with the platoons.⁹²

The establishment of the 4th CAG in Quang Tri was not a unanimous decision. Colonel Richard B. Smith, who commanded the 9th Marines until 13 July, objected to the establishment of CAP units in the DMZ sector. Colonel Alexander L. Michaux, who had also just completed his tour as the 3d Marine Division G-3, had his doubts, declaring "we don't have too much use for the CAPs."⁹³ Despite these reservations, the 3d Marine Division commander, Major General Davis, believed the Combined Action concept could contribute to the pacification effort in his sector.⁹³

With the support of the 3d Division commander, III MAF transferred Lieutenant Colonel John E. Greenwood, Jr., from command of the 1st Battalion, 27th Marines, to take over the new CAG. On 9 August, the 4th CAG commander submitted a plan that called for the establishment of one new Combined Action Company and six new Combined Action platoons. While III MAF approved the request except for one platoon, there was a delay of several weeks until the South Vietnamese gave their consent. Finally on 30 September, Lieutenant Colonel Brady informed Greenwood that General Lam concurred. In the interim, the 4th CAG commander took advantage of this interval to organize the new volunteers into platoons and provide them with training. While the delay caused some inconvenience, it resulted, according to Greenwood, in the Marines being better prepared for their assignment. By the end of October, with the activation of the new units, the 4th CAG consisted of three companies, 12 Combined Action platoons, and 2 mobile training platoons. Of the 12 CAPs in Quang Tri, 8 were mobile.⁹⁴

*Colonel Robert J. Keller, who commanded the 3d CAG in 1968, recalled that he earlier briefed General Krulak, CGFMFPac, and recommended that a 4th CAG be formed which would take over responsibility for the area north of Hue including those CAPs in Quang Tri Province. While General Krulak, according to Keller, appeared enthusiastic, the Army's 1st Air Cavalry Division "did not agree and preferred that Marines not operate in their TAOR." Keller also remembered that Colonels Michaux' and Smith's objections were "longstanding" and that he was well aware of them. He believed the two officers failed "to recognize the fighting [qualities] as well as pacification aspects of the CAPs." Col Robert J. Keller, Comments on draft, dtd 2Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File). Both Colonel Smith and Michaux reiterated their doubts about the Combined Action Program in their comments. Colonel Michaux wrote, "I can empathize with those Marines involved in the Pacification Program. However, from the standpoint of the one with the combat units, the two programs [the war against the regular NVA units in the DMZ sector and CAP] appear contradictory." Col Alexander L. Michaux, Comments on draft, dtd 4Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File). See Chapter 7 for Smith's objections to the CAPs.

COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM EXPANSION-1967-1968

1ST CAG

UNITS	1967	1968
Group HQ	1	1
Company HQ	3	3
Platoons	15	21
Mobile Training Teams	-	2
STRENGTHS		
USMC	213	364
USN	19	34
RVN	334	664

2D CAG

UNITS	1967	1968
Group HQ	1	1
Company HQ	7	8
Platoons	40	38
Mobile Training Teams	-	1
STRENGTHS		
USMC	633	571
USN	42	41
RVN	1,070	1,043

3D CAG

UNITS	1967	1968
Group HQ	1	1
Company HQ	2	5
Platoons	15	31
Mobile Training Teams	-	2
STRENGTHS		
USMC	296	546
USN	18	28
RVN	378	809

4TH CAG

UNITS	1967	1968
Group HQ	-	1
Company HQ	2*	3
Platoons	9*	12
Mobile Training Teams	-	2
STRENGTHS		
USMC	123	282
USN	9	19
RVN	229	540

* Includes three CAPs and one company headquarters deactivated at Khe Sanh.

From Operations of US Marine Forces Vietnam 1968.

By December, the four Combined Action Groups together totaled 19 Combined Action Companies, 102 Combined Action Platoons, and 7 Mobile Training Teams. During the course of the year, III MAF had activated one Combined Action Group, six companies, 28 Combined Action platoons, and all seven of the Mobile Training Teams. At the same time, one company and five CAPs had been deactivated. According to FMFPac, the number of Marines assigned to the program had increased by nearly 500 over 1967, from 1,265 in December 1967 to 1,763 in December 1968. Almost all of the 28 new CAPs were mobile rather than fixed and a large percentage of the compound CAPs were to be transformed into mobile ones. For example, according to the 2d CAG at Da Nang, 75 percent of its CAPs were eventually to become mobile. By the end of December, 13 of its 39 CAPs, or about 37 percent, were already in the mobile status.⁹⁵

Despite the growth and expansion of the Combined Action Program, many questions remained unresolved. MACV, CORDS, and even some of the Army units in I Corps still kept the Combined Action Program at arm's length. While individual CORDS provincial and district officials looked sympathetically on the program, a III MAF staff officer in a briefing for General Walt, the Assistant Commandant, referred to the CAP concept as an "I Corps exclusive." In personal letters, Brigadier General Anderson, the III MAF Chief of Staff, wrote that U.S. Army Lieutenant General Richard G. Stilwell, the XXIV Commander in northern I Corps, had been "very vociferous to his staff with respect to the CAP Program . . . [and later] voiced strong objections to having them [Combined Action Platoons] placed along the LOCs [lines of communication]." Because of that attitude, III MAF decided not to activate several CAP units between Hue and Quang Tri. According to Anderson, General Cushman agreed since he believed "to put them in an area where they're not wanted, especially when you have to rely on the U.S. unit in the area for supporting fires and reinforcement when under ground attack, would not be wise and that we can better use them elsewhere." The III MAF commander several years later observed, "we had

a basic philosophical difference with the Army on it [Combined Action]. We kept on with it."^{96*}

Lieutenant Colonel Brady, the Combined Action Director, declared that as far as he was concerned, the relationship with both MACV and CORDS was "very poor." He later related the frustration that he experienced in attempting to ensure a coordinated U.S. pacification effort in the countryside. Brady had convinced General Cushman in July, as the Senior U.S. Advisor to I Corps and General Lam, to issue an order that called upon each of the Corps province senior advisors to chair a monthly conference for that purpose. At the conference would be representatives of CORDS, military advisors, and III MAF units including Army units attached to the Marine command, and the Combined Action Group commander. The province senior advisor would then forward through all three channels—CORDS, advisory, and III MAF—a "conference report (to include minority opinions on items of controversy) to CG III MAF." Upon the strong objection, however, of the senior CORDS official, III MAF canceled the order and issued a new one. The new order only stipulated that "province senior advisors may at their discretion convene combined meetings of appropriate military and civilian personnel to discuss and coordinate pacification within their respective provinces." No specific mention was made of the Combined Action Group commander.^{97**}

Even in I Corps, the effectiveness of many of the reforms, especially that of screening and training of new volunteers, remains a matter of conjecture. Despite questionnaires, Combined Action Schools, and screening boards, much depended upon circumstances and events. The questionnaires consisted of little more than 20 questions which largely dealt with the volunteer's attitudes. While statistical data remains elusive, anecdotal evidence in the form of oral history interviews would imply that both the initial screening and training of Marines for the program was often haphazard. Lieutenant Colonel Brady, for example, remembered that the school at Da Nang could last anywhere from two weeks to two months, "depending on personnel requirements in the field." Igor Bobrowsky recalled only very vaguely receiving any indoctrination training, but later wrote "there *was* a 'school' at 2d

*According to General Anderson, there was a difference of attitude among Army units in I Corps towards the Combined Action Program. For example, he wrote that the 1st Air Cavalry Division had "no use for the CAPs" while he had heard that the "101st Airborne Division thinks quite highly of the CAPs and will take any that they can get." BGen E. E. Anderson ltr to LtGen W. J. Van Ryzin, dtd 11Sep68, Encl, E. E. Anderson Comments. Throughout this period, Combined Action Platoons remained assigned in the U.S. Army Americal Division area of operations.

**General Earl E. Anderson, who as the III MAF chief of staff, believed that the problem with CORDS extended beyond I Corps. In a contemporary letter, he wrote: "We still have problems with Komer in Saigon. He is adamant about the CAP Program and wants it placed under the CORDS advisory effort." BGen E. E. Anderson to LtGen W. J. Van Ryzin, dtd 16Oct68, Encl, E. E. Anderson Comments.

CAG. It *did* give instructions on everything from Vietnamese culture to small unit tactics, ambushes, recon, artillery, communications . . . I did not participate in any of it to any extent.”⁹⁸

The selection process was also different for various Marines. Bobrowsky, for example, stated he had little choice and was selected for the program by his company commander. He recollected that his captain told him that it would only be a 30-day assignment, and perhaps was the reason he did not go to the CAG school. It was, however, a permanent transfer. The captain later wrote Bobrowsky, explaining, “I had to pick someone who I felt was . . . a responsible person who knew how to . . . work a small unit . . .” Bobrowsky’s commanding officer, at least, made an attempt to send good men to the CAPs rather than “stick em with anybody.”⁹⁹

This was not always the case. Eugene H. Ferguson, an 18-year old corporal and high school dropout, after completing a Vietnamese language course in the United States, arrived in Vietnam in early 1968. Despite his language capability, Ferguson was assigned directly to a Marine infantry line battalion. Outside of being used to check on the veracity of the Kit Carson Scout with his unit, Ferguson functioned like any newly assigned Marine squad leader. About a month after Ferguson was in-country, the North Vietnamese ambushed his squad which was on a “Sparrow Hawk” mission to assist another Marine unit. Except for his radioman, Ferguson lost all of his squad, either dead or wounded, in the clash. Although physically unscathed, Ferguson went into a deep depression: “I just couldn’t seem to get into the hang of what everybody else was doing.” At that point, Ferguson recalled his company commander called him in and asked, “If I wanted to go into CAG. I didn’t know what it was or where it was or who was doing what and I said ‘sure.’ I need to get out of here.” Ferguson suspected “they [his unit leaders] were anticipating trouble from me and shipped me out to CAG.” After a two-week familiarization course at the 3d CAG School at Phu Bai in April, the young corporal became a member of a Combined Action platoon.¹⁰⁰

The only thing that can be said of both the Bobrowsky and Ferguson cases were that they illustrated the variegated backgrounds and motives for entering the CAP Marines. Bobrowsky was the son of immigrant Ukrainian parents and was born in a repatriation camp in Europe after World War II with ambitions to attain a commission. Ferguson was the son of a retired 20-year Navy veteran and enlisted in the Marine Corps because his father hated Marines.



Photo courtesy of Col Edward F. Danowitz, USMC (Ret)
Col Edward F. Danowitz, Director, III MAF Combined Action Program, presents a certificate and an award (a pair of Marine combat boots) to the outstanding Popular Force graduate of the Combined Action school at the Combined Action Group headquarters. Col Danowitz assumed command of the program in October 1968.

Sergeant Andrew Lewandowski, a career Marine with a Japanese wife and a veteran of the Khe Sanh siege, volunteered for the CAPs in October, 1968, because he claimed he wanted to help the people. At the same time, he admitted he was having difficulties with both his platoon lieutenant and sergeant. If there was one common factor that all three commented upon in their initial screening process was their attitude towards the Vietnamese people. Lewandowski remembered appearing before a CAP screening board headed by Colonel Edward F. Danowitz, who, in October, had replaced Lieutenant Colonel Brady as Director of the Combined Action program.* To put the Marine sergeant at ease, Danowitz spoke a few phrases in Polish to Lewandowski.

*Colonel Danowitz commented that upon his arrival at III MAF on 1 October, General Cushman assigned him as the Director of the Combined Action Program, stating “he wished to have a senior colonel at that post, citing his support for the program and wishing to get better cooperation from the Vietnamese, particularly General Lam.” According to Danowitz, Cushman and Lam agreed to weekly meetings “to coordinate the program.” Colonel Danowitz believed this was a good idea, “but was never fully implemented. My counterpart seldom appeared for scheduled meetings and passed on problems to other officers for resolution. . . . [where there should have been] cooperation and coordination there was little or none.” Danowitz remained as the CAP Director until April 1969, when he assumed command of a Marine regiment. Col Edward F. Danowitz, Comments on draft, dtd 27Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Danowitz Comments.

ki after he learned that the latter understood the language. The concern, however, of the board, according to Lewandowski was his feeling toward Orientals in general and the Vietnamese in particular.¹⁰¹

A former CAP Marine, Edward F. Palm, who retained serious reservations about the entire program, observed that in his perfunctory interview in July 1967, the concern of the interviewer was his attitude towards the Vietnamese. Unlike the three previous CAP members listed above, Palm had no combat experience. He had served his first six months in Vietnam as a supply clerk in what he described as a "prosaic, humdrum routine." To break loose from this stultifying job, Palm volunteered for the Combined Action Program. The only qualification for the program, according to Palm, "was the enthusiastic recommendation of my commanding officer, who was probably only too glad to get a disaffected and unmotivated supply clerk off his roles." Like Ferguson, Palm attended the 3d CAG School for a brief two-week period and learned some fundamentals of squad tactics and how to call in artillery. The exposure to both the Vietnamese language and the society's mores was rudimentary at best.¹⁰²

The Combined Action mission was a daunting one for even the most motivated of Marines, and especially for young Marines. With the best of intentions, the Combined Action schools could only provide a modicum of knowledge about South Vietnamese customs, let alone language training. Even ideal CAPs outlined by Chaplain McGonigal in his interim report would have had difficulties adjusting to the conditions of an alien society at war with itself in the countryside. Lieutenant Colonel Brady half seriously stated that the qualification for a good CAP leader was a "tough Marine sergeant, who has a PhD in social anthropology." Obviously the young Marine lance corporals, cor-

porals, and sergeants hardly met that criteria.^{103*}

How well did these young Marines do then in bridging the gap between them and the villagers and the PFs? Again there is no hard evidence except for the anecdotal. Citing the example in his own CAP, Edward Palm later wrote: "The cultural gulf was just unbridgeable out in the countryside." He observed "our PFs eventually refused to patrol with us [and] I never really knew any of the PFs I worked and lived with." On the other hand, another young CAP, James DuGuid, recalled that when, in December 1967, told that he was going home, he replied "but I am home." According to DuGuid, "I felt more love from those people in my village than I had ever prior to Vietnam. I took that back with me."^{104**}

Other Marines had different experiences. According to Bobrowsky, his exposure to the village helped him to understand the complexity of the Vietnamese countryside. As a Marine in a line unit, he was only interested if the villagers were hostile or not, otherwise they were neutral. As a CAP Marine, he came to understand that there were all kinds of interrelationships that extended from family to village. While on relatively friendly terms with the villagers, the members of his CAP knew they were outsiders. Bobrowsky tells about his patrol sometime after Tet 1968 coming upon an old woman burying two North Vietnamese soldiers. Half-jokingly, Bobrowsky asked the woman if she would do the same for them. The woman laughed and pointed to the PFs with the Marines and said she would bury them, but "No, the Americans I'd just have to throw them in the river."¹⁰⁵

**Arliss Willhite, who served in the same CAP unit as DuGuid, wrote that he "felt a real kinship to the people and a loyalty to my ville. I lived in Ngoc Ngot for 15 months. Longer than I had lived at a single location in my life. . . . To me CAP was Vietnamization in reverse. . . . I didn't let anybody mess with the people, steal chickens, burn hootches or shoot at Buffalo. I'm still more Vietnamese than American. I was watching out for the people on my block." Willhite stated that he was not typical of most of the Marines in his hamlet. He recalled that he was teased by some of his comrades, asking him if he was "going to start voting?" Arliss Willhite, Comments on draft, dtd 28Sep94 (Vietnam Comment File). Former Sergeant John J. Balanco was another CAP Marine who identified very closely with the local population, in his case the Bru tribesmen that he served with in CAP Oscar in Khe Sanh village. Recalling in his memoirs the fate of the Bru refugees including the CAP members who were denied entry into the American base at Khe Sanh, Balanco wrote: "These were the people we were fighting with and for. Now we were abandoning them? It gave me an outraged and hopeless feeling that has never left my heart or soul." John J. Balanco, "Abandoned, Reflections of a Khe Sanh Vet," ms, Encl, Balanco, Comments on draft, dtd 15Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File). See Chapter 14 for the description of the overrunning of Khe Sanh village and the aftermath.

*As a former Marine officer, now an Army historian, Charles R. Anderson, observed, "all Marines in the infantry were ill-prepared to serve in CAP, since their training before arrival in Vietnam was combat-oriented." Charles R. Anderson, Comments on draft, n.d. [Dec 1994] (Vietnam Comment File). Colonel Danowitz stated that he insisted on obtaining the best available men. He noted that when he took over in October 1968, that he was unimpressed with the "volunteers" being sent from both the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions. He stated that he had good relations with both division commanders and "immediately, the word went out to the regiments and a board was formed at each headquarters where the G-1 'culled' men sent in from the field and only the better ones came to our final selection board." While acknowledging that some "misfits" slipped through the selection process, he noted a decided improvement in the quality of the Marines in the program. Danowitz Comments.

In remarking about the quality of the Marines in his CAP and their qualifications, Bobrowsky remarked that about half had probably been "pressganged" into the unit much the same way he had. At the same time, they worked well together and "I saw them as being guys who knew what they were doing." Most of the Marines had little language training, but had picked up "rudimentary Vietnamese and fortunately, the Vietnamese picked up a lot more rudimentary English." Ferguson, who was fluent in Vietnamese, stated that the situation was similar in the CAP platoons that he served in. He estimated that about 50 percent of the Marines in his first platoon were qualified for their role, while the other "fifty percent were just trying to get away from a bad situation they were in before." One of the Marines in Bobrowsky's platoon, Lance Corporal Tom Harvey, was an exception to the above. Somewhat older than the other CAP Marines, a college graduate and a civil engineer, Harvey had enlisted in the Marines rather than be drafted into the Army. After serving in an engineer battalion, he volunteered for the CAPs. Having some facility with languages, Harvey had taught himself rudimentary Vietnamese.¹⁰⁶

Despite anomalies like Harvey, Ferguson, and DuGuid, who had some degree of fluency, most CAP Marines had relatively little Vietnamese language skills. As a former South Vietnamese officer, Lam Ha, who served as a liaison officer with the CAPs, later wrote, the "language barrier was a vital problem" with the program. Without being able to converse with the people or the PFs, it was almost next to impossible for the Marines to have anything but a superficial knowledge of the people they were to protect.^{107*}

Notwithstanding all of these obstacles, there was some statistical evidence that the CAPs were effective. Although based upon American military reports and the hamlet evaluation system, these analyses were completed at the MACV and at the DOD levels, two agencies which at best had shown only lukewarm support for the program. According to periodic reports from January through November 1968, prepared by the Southeast Asia Office of the Assistant Secretary of


Defense for System Analysis, hamlets with Combined Action platoons assigned to them showed that they fared markedly better during and after the enemy's Tet offensive than hamlets without them. According to the HES ratings, there was about a 30 percent difference between the security ratings of the CAP hamlets and those without the platoons after Tet. In their November report, the DOD analysts concluded that "the CAP concept may provide a useful way to upgrade security in the short run and to ensure that application of massive allied firepower does not hurt pacification efforts."¹⁰⁸

Still, many questions remained. One was the transformation from the stationary or compound CAP to the mobile CAPs. Some former Combined Action Marines including Lieutenant Colonel Corson criticized the change as altering the entire concept of the program. They suggested that instead of providing protection for the hamlets, the CAPs in effect became guerrillas themselves. In their view, the CAPs "had to maintain a demonstrably visible presence in commitment to the hamlet. It had to be an *alternative* to the guerrilla, as well as a tactic *against* the guerrilla." Others rejected that argument, stating that the compounds were usually outside of the hamlets and, moreover, they were sitting targets for the VC and NVA. Almost all of the Marines agreed that going to the mobile concept probably resulted in fewer casualties. Tom Harvey, who served in both, later wrote: "I think nearly everyone interested in the matter now recognized the advantages of the mobile CAP as opposed to those bound to fixed bases or compounds." Taking a middle ground, Michael Peterson argued that there was room for the two different approaches depending on the area. During 1968, both continued to coexist.¹⁰⁹

In their November 1968 report, while in general praising the Combined Action Program, the DOD analysts also pointed out some of the basic weaknesses of the program. Although not accepting the Komer and Westmoreland argument that one needed to place a Combined Action platoon in every hamlet in Vietnam, the analysts showed that the Marines had not met even their more modest goals. Two of the original objectives of the Combined Action program in 1968 were to obtain three effective Popular Force members for every Marine and to improve the PFs to the extent where the Marines could begin to phase out of the program. According to the DOD report, in November 1968 there was a ratio of 1.4 PFs per Marine and that the prevailing trend was downwards. Even more to the point, the Marines were taking about twice the num-

* Lieutenant Colonel Brady, the CAP Director until October 1968 wrote that "Because of the importance of cross cultural communication an ongoing language program was instituted in mid-1968." Brady Comments. Each CAP Marine was also provided with a phrase book "designed primarily for use in the Combined Action Program." It contained such phrases such as "100% alert tonight . . ." to make immediate contact with the PF members of the CAP. The book was also designed for independent study of both English and Vietnamese by the Marines and the Vietnamese. *Vietnamese/English Phrase Book*, n.d., Encl, Brady Comments.

COMBINED ACTION UNIT ACTIVITY



From Operations of US Marine Forces Vietnam 1968.

ber of casualties as the PFs. Moreover, the report concluded, "in over three years of operations no evidence exists that U.S. Marines have been able to withdraw from a CAP solely because their Vietnamese counterparts were able to take over."¹¹⁰

How successful were the CAPs? Much depended on the effectiveness of the individual CAP. To a large extent, most improved the security within the hamlets and the village. Some even won the begrudging loyalty and perhaps even affection of the villagers. But few were able to attain the loyalty of the people to the Government of South Vietnam. When asked about the relationship between his Combined Action unit and villagers, on one hand, and with the South Vietnamese authorities, on the other, Igor Bobrowsky answered, "the fewer the better." Michael Peterson remarked upon the unique elan of the CAPs "although it was a maverick, gone-bam-

boo, anti-brass, kind of spirit." Lawrence A. Yates wrote in his analysis of the program: "There were good and bad, successful and unsuccessful CAP platoons. Accomplishments varied depending on such factors as time, place and personnel, not to mention a host of other variables that were beyond the control of the CAP Marines."¹¹¹

One former Defense Analyst, Francis J. "Bing" West, the author of several studies on CAP, wrote that in his opinion the "essential problem" with the program was the "lack of a warfighting strategy" at both MACV and III MAF:

Without a strategy, there was no yardstick for measuring the amount of resources dedicated to Mission X vs Mission Y. So the CAP was seen as a drain of Marine manpower. It, in fact, saved manpower.

He believed that the Marine TAORs should have consisted of "overlapping CAP patrol areas" with the Marine regular battalions making up a central reserve. Instead, according to West, "the CAP was treated as an interesting tactical study in sociology; its strategic cost-effectiveness was overlooked both by III MAF and by MACV."¹¹²

*Lieutenant Colonel Brady took exception to the assertion that the CAPs had not succeeded in turning over any hamlets to the RFs. He stated that in the five CAP units that were deactivated during the year, the Marines were "reassigned to other CAPs leaving trained PFs on their own." Brady Comments.

The Accelerated Pacification Plan

With the petering out of the last phase of the enemy "Tet" offensive from August into October, the allies began to take the offensive in pacification operations. Claiming that they had reached the goals of Operation Recovery, MACV, CORDS, and the South Vietnamese inaugurated a new campaign, called *Le Loi* in Vietnamese and the Acceleration Pacification Campaign in English. The campaign was to last from November through January 1969. Country-wide it had five objectives: to upgrade at least 1,000 contested villages to relatively secure ratings on the Hamlet Evaluation Scale; to disrupt the Viet Cong command and control system by identifying and capturing if possible 3,000 members of the infrastructure for the next three months; to set a goal of 5,000 Hoi Chanh a month under the Chieu Hoi Program; to continue the organization and arming of the South Vietnamese Self Defense units; and finally to mount a propaganda campaign to the effect that the Government of Vietnam "has seized the initiative and is moving rapidly toward the end of the war." Each Corps area was given its quota in this multi-faceted effort.¹¹³

By the end of the year, the Accelerated Pacification Campaign was in high gear in I Corps. Both the 1st Marine and 3d Marine Divisions as well as the Army and ARVN regular units had launched supporting operations using cordon and County Fair techniques to eradicate both enemy regular units and the guerrilla

infrastructure in their assigned areas.* In each of the categories of the campaign, the allies had made substantial progress. During November and December, the allied forces had entered all of the 140 hamlets targeted in I Corps. According to Marine Corps measurements the number of government controlled hamlets had risen from 47 on 31 October to 116 on 31 December. A corresponding decrease had occurred both in contested and Viet Cong-controlled hamlets. By 31 December, the number of contested hamlets fell from 73 on 31 October to 46 on 31 December while Viet Cong-controlled hamlets fell from 48 on 31 October to six on 31 December. In other categories of the campaign in I Corps similar progress was shown. For the year, 3,118 former VC had come over to the government side as Hoi Chanh, 4,000 VC infrastructure were "neutralized" under the Phoenix program, close to 225,000 civilians were organized in Peoples Self Defense Organization, and nearly 70 percent of the population of I Corps lived in what was considered secure areas. Enemy-initiated attacks in December fell to the lowest level in over two years. In an obvious change of strategy, probably because of the heavy casualty rate suffered in their various offensives, the Communists reverted to a low-level war. Despite this seeming progress and some guarded optimism on the part of the allies, the enemy remained a formidable foe.¹¹⁴

*See Chapters 21 and 22 and especially the description of Operation Meade River in Chapter 21.

CHAPTER 30

Outside of III MAF:

The Special Landing Forces, Marine Advisors, and Others

*The 9th MAB and the SLFs—Sub-Unit 1, 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO)
Embassy Marines—Individual Marines in Saigon and Elsewhere in Vietnam—Advisors to the Vietnamese Marine Corps*

The 9th MAB and the SLFs

In January 1968, Brigadier General Jacob E. Glick commanded the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, the Fleet Marine Force component of the Seventh Fleet, with its headquarters on Okinawa which controlled all Marine forces in the Western Pacific outside of Hawaii and Vietnam. At this time, the MAB contained nearly 8,000 men with nearly half assigned to the two Seventh Fleet Special Landing Forces (SLF) Alpha and Bravo.* The two SLFs each consisted of a Marine infantry battalion, supported by a helicopter squadron and reinforced by small detachments of artillery, tanks, engineers, and other specialized units, totaling about 2,000 men embarked upon the ships of a Navy amphibious ready group (ARG).¹

At the beginning of the year, SLF Alpha, commanded by Colonel John A. Conway, had just returned control of BLT 1/3, its infantry battalion, to III MAF. The former SLF battalion had come ashore during November, operated with the 9th Marines in Operation Kentucky, and was about to take over part of the Operation Osceola sector near Quang Tri from the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines. On 4 January, the latter battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel William Weise, in turn, embarked in the ships of the amphibious ready group, Seventh Fleet Task Group 76.4, which included the USS *Cleveland* (LSD 7), USS *Comstock* (LSD 19), and USS *Wexford County* (LST 1168), and the helicopter aircraft carrier the *Iwo Jima* (LPH 2) with HMM-361, under Lieutenant Colonel Daniel M. Wilson, on board as the SLF aircraft contingent. Two days later the entire SLF in its amphibious shipping set sail for the Philippines. About a week later, 14 January, Colonel Bruce F. Meyers assumed command of the reconstituted SLF Alpha.²

*The other components of the 9th MAB were the 26th Marines (Rear) headquarters, a communications support company, and a provisional service battalion on Okinawa as well as MAG-15 with squadrons at both Iwakuni, Japan and on Okinawa. Although the 26th Marines (Forward) and its three infantry battalions together with its attached artillery, the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, were in Vietnam under the operational control of III MAF, these units remained under the administrative control of the 9th MAB.

SLF Bravo, commanded by Colonel Maynard W. Schmidt, in the meantime, consisting of BLT 3/1 (Lieutenant Colonel Max McQuown) and HMM-262** (Lieutenant Colonel Melvin J. Steinberg), had just completed Operation Badger Tooth. Reembarking on board its amphibious shipping of Navy Task Group 76.5 on 3 January, the SLF deployed to Da Nang where both the battalion and squadron underwent a one week rehabilitation period. On 10 January, HMM-165, under Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Romine, replaced HMM-262 on board the *Valley Forge* (LPH 8) and the ARG/SLF once more put to sea, remaining off the coast of Quang Tri Province for possible insertion into the Cua Viet sector.^{3***}

Operation Badger Tooth had been a bloody experience for BLT 3/1 and raised some questions about the effectiveness of the SLF and the future employment of Seventh Fleet Marine amphibious forces. In Badger Tooth, BLT 3/1 had operated in the "Street Without Joy" coastal region east of Route 1 in southern Quang Tri Province for about a week from 26 December 1967 until 2 January 1968. After moving through the hamlet of Thom Tham Khe on the 26th, the battalion made another sweep of the area the following day. This time the Marines ran into a well-sprung ambush. Calling the coastal hamlet "literally a defensive bastion," Lieutenant Colonel McQuown in 24 hours sustained 48 Marines killed and 86 wounded. According to their body count, the Marines accounted for 31 enemy dead. By 28 December, the NVA had slipped away and Marines of the SLF began to close out the operation.^{4****}

***Because of the shortage of CH-46 aircraft, a small detachment of HMM-262, HMM-262 Alpha, under Major David I. Althoff, remained embarked on board the *Valley Forge* LPH 8, from 24 November until 4 January, when the detachment was deactivated.

***The other ships of the amphibious task group included the USS *Navarro* (APA 215), USS *Alamo* (LSD 33), USS *Whetstone* (LSD 27), and *Vernon County* (LST 1161).

****In his comments, Colonel McQuown wrote that ARVN forces later found in a draw north and west of Thom Tham Ke the bodies of over 100 North Vietnamese from the 166th NVA Battalion. This count was not included in the report of the action nor in the investigation that followed. Col Max McQuown, Comments on draft, dtd 22Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter McQuown Comments.



Both photos are from the Abel Collection

Top, a Navy corpsman from Company K, BLT 3/1 runs across an open paddy carrying a litter to assist a wounded Marine during Operation Badger Tooth. Below, Marines from BLT 3/1 search a hamlet in the same operation. During Badger Tooth, the BLT suffered 48 dead and 86 wounded, which resulted in an investigation.



Following the end of the operation, higher headquarters wanted to know the reasons for the Marine battalion suffering such heavy casualties. As Brigadier General Glick later stated, "any time that something like that happened, there was a lot of pressure all the way from the White House down of 'what happened.'" On 30 December, General Glick ordered a full investigation of the matter. The investigating officer, Lieutenant Colonel George H. Benskin, Jr., visited the village the next day and began taking testimony from various commanders and staff officers, including Lieutenant Colonel McQuown, the BLT 3/1 company commanders, and the SLF Bravo intelligence officer or S-2. Completing his fact-finding mission on 2 January, Lieutenant Colonel Benskin sent his preliminary findings three days later to General Glick. In this initial report, Benskin emphasized the strength of the enemy positions with "fields of fire" permitting them to "neutralize efforts of all attacking units except Company K when supported by tanks." The enemy had withheld its fire "on all fronts until attacking units were drawn into the killing zones." According to all accounts, the terrain together with the village defenses combined in the favor of the enemy "in every respect."⁵

On 15 January, General Glick forwarded the complete report to Lieutenant General Krulak, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific. In his covering message, General Glick observed: "I purposely did not make a recommendation in the investigation report concerning replacement of the BLT commander

because of the channels which the report may go through and the possible political implications of relief of commanders concerned." In that message and in a interview over 20 years after the incident, he insisted that Lieutenant Colonel McQuown "was an exceptionally good battalion commander." He also observed in the interview that BLT 3/1 "was not the first unit that ran into trouble in that 'Street Without Joy.'" Glick's main concern was that MACV would use the casualties sustained by BLT 3/1 as "justification for reopening the entire question of command relations for SLF/ARG operations." He believed that "any relief of the BLT commander at this time might add weight to any implications that serious deficiencies do exist in present arrangement." According to Glick, "the tactical decisions made in Badger Tooth were in no way dictated by the command arrangements in effect."⁶

Despite the 9th MAB commander's attempt to separate the investigation of Badger Tooth from the subject of general amphibious command relations, there was to be a reexamination of the entire subject. While representatives of MACV, III MAF, FMFPac, PacFlt, and Seventh Fleet had worked out an agreement to streamline the procedures for SLF operations in Vietnam during the spring of 1966, some friction between the in-country and the amphibious commands, especially the 9th MAB, continued to exist. Lieutenant General Krulak the FMFPac commander in October 1967 outlined the various perspectives on the SLF in a long extended message. According to the FMFPac commander, "MACV would like to see Ninth MAB units in-country continually . . . he pretty much sees them as so many battalions, helo squadrons . . . etc." From what Krulak called a "parochial Marine Corps view" the best system would be to maintain the SLFs as a separate organization, but "employed in a manner completely responsive to the will of CG III MAF . . ." While sympathizing and identifying himself with this latter viewpoint, Krulak believed in the necessity of intra-theater rotation of Vietnam-based units between the SLF and rehabilitation for a brief period on Okinawa. He also insisted that "some accommodation with the Navy as essential to preserve our use of the amphibious shipping. . . ." According to the FMFPac commander, unless the Marines worked "hand and glove with them, the Navy

⁵Colonel McQuown stated that he reported to General Glick after he reembarked upon the Seventh Fleet Amphibious Ready Group shipping and made several observations. He pointed out that the AOA [amphibious objective area] was not a free fire zone and that Company L followed the rules of engagement "to the letter." He noted that when the company was 25 meters from the village, "the lead elements of Lima Company were blown away. This was, in part, a major cause of the heavy casualties of this fight." McQuown related that he had "opposed Operation Badger Tooth from the onset because it was ill conceived and tactically unsound. It failed to use any of BLT 3/1's Task Organization, except the LVT's that would have enabled the BLT to conduct a sustained operation ashore." Furthermore the village was "occupied and defended by a major NVA force. The village had been turned into a well concealed, skillfully constructed—almost impregnable defensive position that withstood heavy air strikes and naval gunfire. To conquer the defenders was an extremely difficult task made more difficult because the BLT landed without its key supporting elements—the tanks, Ontos, artillery, and heavy mortars." According to McQuown, "Badger Tooth was an SLF operation in name only because SLF Marines were involved. In reality it was a water-borne/helicopter landing of a 'bare bones' *unsupported* [emphasis in the original] Marine infantry battalion moving 8 to 10 miles from the waters edge to objectives that lacked even a shred of intelligence to justify the operation." McQuown Comments.

⁶Colonel Maynard W. Schmidt, the SLF Bravo commander through February 1968, wrote that at the time he did "not realize that Operation Badger Tooth caused that much attention at the higher echelons." Colonel Maynard W. Schmidt, Comments on draft, n.d. [1994] (Vietnam Comment File).

is going to take the amphibious shipping away, and either move it out of the theater or join forces with the Army . . .” Krulak, nevertheless, recognized that there were circumstances where either one or both of the SLFs would have to be committed to an in-country operation for an extended period of time.⁷

In a sense, General Cushman, the III MAF commander, found himself betwixt and between. He answered to both Generals Krulak, the FMFPac commander, and to Westmoreland, the MACV commander. Both of these commanders had differing but equally valid concerns about the SLF. In answer to Krulak’s message, Cushman attempted to explain his predicament. While agreeing in principle with the FMFPac commander’s desire to retain the rotation between in-country forces and Okinawa via the SLF, Cushman declared that at that time the situation in Vietnam was so “fluid and dynamic that I cannot at present in good conscience recommend to Westy [Westmoreland] the resumption of intra-theater BLT rotation to and from Okinawa.” He then suggested an alternative that Krulak had suggested in his message—namely that the SLFs refit out of the U.S. naval base at Subic Bay in the Philippines. According to the III MAF commander, he would hope that “the issue and turn-in at Subic could be so expedited as to permit a short but concentrated amphib[ious] training period . . .” Both Westmoreland and Krulak eventually concurred in this policy.⁸

The matter of amphibious command relations was not only a dispute between Marines and Navy on one side and MACV and the Army on the other, but also caused division within Marine Corps circles. Marine commanders in III MAF shared to a certain extent some of the same opinions as their Army counterparts

and MACV about the SLF. They saw the Seventh Fleet forces largely as a reinforcement for their own forces in Vietnam. With control of the air and landing areas, in-country commanders believed there was little need for many of the amphibious doctrinal procedures relative to amphibious operational area and command.⁹ The Navy and the Marine amphibious commanders, on the other hand, regarded the SLFs as the Seventh Fleet or Western Pacific reserve force. While ready to reinforce the forces in Vietnam when needed, they also looked to other possible crises areas in the Pacific. They feared any dilution of their authority might result in the loss of the amphibious forces to the Seventh Fleet for other Pacific contingencies.⁹

Major General Rathvon McC. Tompkins, the 3d Marine Division commander, later recalled when General Westmoreland, the MACV commander, “was screaming his head off for more troops, there were at least two battalions of well-trained Marines who were floating around on the ships.” According to Tompkins “simply from an operational point of view . . . Better to have two battalions ashore than two battalions floating around, looking at each other.” One of Tompkins’ staff officers, Colonel Alexander L. Michaux carped that the SLF landings were largely administrative and designating them as amphibious was “a joke.” According to Michaux, its only purpose was to give the Navy amphibious commander control of the operation for a day.^{10***}

Even while critical of the employment of the SLF, General Tompkins maintained that if one looked beyond Vietnam, the Navy was “well advised to have the two battalions not under the operational control [of MACV].” Both Generals Cushman, the III MAF commander, and Major General Donn J. Robertson, the 1st Marine Division commander, viewed the SLF capability positively. Robertson declared that the “SLF gave us

*Colonel Warren A. Butcher, who relieved Col Schmidt in command of SLF Bravo, wrote that the Marines had anticipated the decision to make Subic Bay the main base for the refitting of the SLF. He noted that “sections of 9th MAB under G-4 cognizance were sent to Subic to contact opposite numbers early on. When the directive came out of FMFPac, we had a completed plan. I had never seen Service troops in operation before, at least to the extent they were used in the rehabs at Subic.” He noted that the first group there did a “masterful job.” According to Butcher, General Krulak complimented the group “for doing in 10 days at Subic, what it had taken 6 weeks to do on Okinawa.” Butcher stated that the Service troops accomplished their technical inspections by first identifying units to be “retrograded. They started in country, continued aboard ship enroute to Subic, and finished at Subic Bay. Flood lights were set up for around the clock operations. Even though the first BLT was pulled out earlier than expected, the completion percentage was in the high nineties, and the BLT reembarked with all equipment in near new condition.” Col Warren A. Butcher, Comments on draft, dtd 5Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

**Colonel George F. Warren, who served in 1968 as the executive officer of BLT 2/4, wrote, “in-country commanders had a propensity for breaking up the SLF into its component parts (air/ground) and then further breaking up the BLT into its component parts (combat, combat support and combat service support units). Ultimately the SLF was reconstituted into a single entity and loaded back aboard . . . [Navy] shipping. One can imagine the movement of operational control between commanders in such a situation and the administrative time and effort that was consumed during SLF operations, to say nothing about the confusion such movement generated.” Col George F. Warren, Comments on draft, dtd 28Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

***Colonel Butcher, the former SLF Bravo commander, conceded the point that most SLF landings were administrative but denies the assertion that the purpose of the landings was to give the Navy amphibious commander control of the operation for a day. Butcher Comments.

a flexibility . . . It added that extra punch that we often needed." Cushman agreed, professing that "It was just like having another couple of battalions."¹¹

In mid-December 1967, Cushman reemphasized to his division commanders that "first and foremost" he wanted the "ARG/SLF used in an amphibious role in accordance with current doctrine for amphibious operations." He reminded both commanders that the SLFs were available to III MAF "for employment against time sensitive targets." Not only did he want the SLF operations to be "in consonance with our amphibious doctrine," but that they "be based on best III MAF intelligence estimates."¹²

Concurrent with this Marine emphasis about the employment of the SLF, General Westmoreland's MACV staff was involved in contingency planning for a possible amphibious landing north of the DMZ. With a possible 30,000 enemy in the objective area, the planning for Operation Durango City, the codename for the proposed amphibious assault, by necessity involved both Army and Marine ground forces as well as support from the Seventh Air Force. In this planning effort, General William W. Momyer, the Seventh Air Force commander, raised the subject of air control in the objective area. While the chances of approval of the Operation Durango City plan or any amphibious operation in the north was dubious at best, any discussion over command relations was serious business, especially at a time when the whole question of single manager of air in South Vietnam was about to surface.^{13*}

Thus, in this general context, General Westmoreland wanted another look at the entire subject of the SLF and the results of the Badger Tooth operation only added fuel to this desire. In mid-January, the MACV commander expressed his doubts to Admiral Sharp, CinCPac, and proposed that changes be made. The Pacific commander agreed with Westmoreland that there was justifiable concern over Badger Tooth and was willing to consider transfer of operational control of the ashore forces from the amphibious task force commander at an earlier time in an SLF amphibious operation. Sharp also mentioned that he was thinking about the possibility of basing one of the SLFs ashore as a permanent element of III MAF. While maintaining "that present command relations for the conduct of

amphibious operations in South Vietnam are valid," he stated that he had asked Vice Admiral John J. Hyland, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to conduct a broad-based study of SLF operations in Vietnam.¹⁴

While CinCPacFlt established a study group with representatives from both the Marine and Navy amphibious forces, the whole question about the SLF would be overtaken by events. While the study group reasserted the validity of the basic command and control system for the SLF then in effect, it would, essentially permit ComUSMACV "to prescribe virtually every important aspect of the employment of amphibious forces, from specifying the mission to delineating the characteristics of the amphibious objective area." By the time, the study came out both SLF BLTs were ashore.¹⁵

With the massing of enemy forces in the north followed by the Tet offensive, the SLF battalions, for all intents and purposes, became part of III MAF for the next few months. In mid-January, both SLFs were in an alert status off the coast of northern I Corps. On 22 January, SLF Alpha's BLT 2/4 initiated Operation Ballistic Armor in which the unit relieved the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines at Camp Evans which in turn deployed to Khe Sanh. Upon itself being relieved by elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division four days later, the BLT reembarked upon its amphibious shipping. The following day in Operation Fortress Attack, the BLT went ashore near the C-2 combat base, coming under the operational control of the 9th Marines.** In the meantime, the SLF Bravo battalion conducted

**Colonel Bruce F. Meyers, the commander of SLF Alpha, recalled his concerns about the irregularity and departure from normal amphibious doctrine during this period. He wrote that on 26 Jan "op con was passed back to me (CTG 79.4) at noon and we had all elements of BLT 2/4 back aboard our shipping in five hours and 15 minutes (261830)." He was then directed to land his tank and amtrac platoons at the mouth of the Cua Viet at the request of III MAF. On 27 January, BLT 2/4 began Operation Fortress Attack in the 9th Marines operational area and he passed operational control to the 9th Marines at 1500. Meyers declared that he "recognized the exigency of the threat in the Tet offensive, and our immediate response and accommodation to that threat . . ." As the SLF commander, he "was worried that Gen. Westmoreland would pick up on this usage out of our traditional 'amphibious' role . . . It was obvious to both my [Navy] ARG [Amphibious Ready Group] counterpart . . . [and to Meyers] that both Adm. Sharp and Gen. Krulak were both worried about this same aspect of the use of the ARG/SLF . . ." At his debriefing at FMFPac, Meyers referred to "grave reservations and possible implications for the future of the Marine Corps role as a result of what I believed at the time to be bordering on a misuse of the ARG/SLF. In the end, we accomplished what the ground commanders needed—an immediate 'fire brigade' response to a perceived serious threat. In retrospect, it was probably the wisest response to the situation that we could have achieved." Col Bruce F. Meyers, Comments on draft dtd 20Feb95 (Vietnam Comment File).

*General Cushman stated that the planning for an amphibious operation "never went anywhere . . . it was just another plan sticking up . . . They wanted to have one up to date, just in case, you know, got lucky or somebody else got to be President or some damn thing." (Cushman intvw, 1982, p. 46.) See Chapters 23 and 24 for discussion of the Single Manager controversy.

Operation Badger Catch in the Cua Viet sector from 23–26 January. Badger Catch became Operation Saline and then Operation Napoleon/Saline. Until June, both SLF battalions remained ashore in the DMZ sector, often transferring from one operational area to another. In effect, both BLTs functioned as any other infantry battalion of the 3d Marine Division in the north.*

By June, the situation in the DMZ had clarified to the extent that both ComUSMACV, now General Abrams, and General Cushman believed that it was time for the SLFs to be reconstituted. A member of General Cushman's staff, Colonel Franklin L. Smith related that III MAF wanted them back on ship: "Once you get people . . . Nobody wants to leave them go." Complicating the situation was the attitude of the Seventh Fleet amphibious commander, Commander Task Force 76, whom Smith believed had been intimidated by the Operation Badger Tooth experience. According to Smith, "Badger Tooth scared the hell out of the guy. . . . As soon as the battalion goes ashore, he wants to dump it."¹⁶

Despite the various reservations, in early June 1968, BLT 3/1, now under Lieutenant Colonel Daniel J. Quick, and HMM-164, under Lieutenant Colonel Robert F. Rick, reconstituted SLF Bravo, under Colonel Warren A. Butcher, and reembarked upon the TG 76.5 (ARG) amphibious shipping.^{***} From 7–14 June, BLT 3/1 conducted Operation Swift Saber in Elephant Valley, a known VC infiltration route just northwest of Da Nang, under the operational control of the

1st Marine Division. At the end of the operation, in which the Marines encountered only slight resistance, the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, under Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Mueller, and HMM-265, under Lieutenant Colonel Roy J. Edwards, relieved BLT 3/1 and HMM-164 respectively as the infantry and helicopter components of SLF Bravo.^{17****}

Taking a respite, the newly reconstituted SLF Bravo departed for the new SLF training and rehabilitation encampment at Subic Bay in the Philippines. After a brief stay at Subic, the SLF Bravo units returned to Vietnam for a one-week operation, Eager Yankee, lasting from 9–16 July, in Thua Thien Province near Phu Loc. Operating in support of Task Force X-Ray's Operation Houston, the SLF Marines reported killing 9 of the enemy and captured 6 prisoners while sustaining casualties of 8 dead and 34 wounded. On 16 July, BLT 2/7 joined the 5th Marines in Operation Houston and on 22 July reembarked on its amphibious shipping. After reembarking, BLT 2/7 landed the following day at Da Nang in Operation Swift Play which lasted from 23–24 July in the Go Noi Island area.^{*****} On the 25th, the 27th Marines assumed operational control of the BLT which would remain in the Hoi An sector through October.¹⁸

In the meantime, BLT 2/4, the SLF Alpha battalion, remained in the DMZ sector as part of Operation Lancaster II.^{*****} On 13 August, BLT 2/26 relieved the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines as the SLF Alpha infantry component. This was largely a paper transfer. The SLF BLT

*See Chapters 7, 13, and 15 for the description of the fighting and the activities of the SLF BLTs in the north during this period. Colonel McQuown, the former commander of BLT 3/1, wrote that the two "SLFs should have been tremendous assets for III MAF. However, in order to realize their full potential the III MAF Command would have had to insist that the using command select objectives based on hard intelligence, and just as important, follow the Marine Corps Amphibious Doctrine. Properly employed, the SLFs could have responded rapidly to requests from the 1st and 3d Divisions and would have been the '911' forces during the Vietnam War." He believed, however, they were "seldom employed with sound tactics . . ." and that the 3d Marine Division in particular "had a myopic view of the use of the SLFs." He, nevertheless, granted that his BLT's operations in the Cua Viet sector in January and February were a "profitable use of a potent fighting force." McQuown Comments.

**Colonel Butcher, the SLF Bravo Commander, agreed with Colonel Smith about the attitude of the amphibious task force commander. Butcher wrote that while in the "sea cabin of CTF 76 (who was a deep-selected, 'frocked' rear admiral with expertise in the nuclear field), . . . [Butcher] was told the conditions under which the landing force would 'chop' ashore . . . Basically, the Admiral's idea was to toss the ball ashore as soon as the helicopters went 'feet dry.'" Butcher Comments.

***The ships of TG 76.5 now consisted of the USS *Valley Forge* (LPH 8), *Vancouver* (LPD 2), *Thomaston* (LSD 28), and *Washburn* (AKA 108).

****In July, USS *Tripoli* (LPH 10) replaced the *Valley Forge* as the helicopter carrier of TG 76.5. On 1 September 1968, HMM-165, under Lieutenant Colonel George L. Patrick, relieved HMM-265 as the SLF Bravo helicopter squadron. On 28 December 1968, HMM-164, now under Lieutenant Colonel Richard T. Trundy, once again became the SLF squadron in place of HMM-165.

*****See Chapter 17.

*****HMM-363, commanded by Major James L. Harrison, relieved HMM-362 on 6 September 1968 as the helicopter squadron for SLF Alpha. Lieutenant Colonel Walter H. Shauer, Jr., who commanded HMM-362 during this period, noted that "we were fragged to support our BLT 2/4 ashore, and other division units . . ." With its maintenance support on board ship, the squadron was "able to achieve maximum aircraft availability each day averaging over 20 H-34s available for frags. During our SLF A tenure we flew over 46,000 sorties, and set the record on board the LPH 5 *Princeton* for the most shipboard carrier landings, 285 in a 24-hour period and supported 25 major operations." LtCol Walter H. Shauer, Jr., Comments on draft, dtd 1 Nov 94 (Vietnam Comment File). Colonel Warren A. Butcher, the SLF Bravo commander, wrote about the advantages for the Marine Corps to have the helicopters on board ship as the SLF squadrons "benefitted from the more sterile conditions on board the LPH and, from, what the squadron commanders told me, a more responsive supply system." Butcher Comments.



Both photos are from the Abel Collection

Above, Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters from HMM-165 take off from the Phu Bai Airstrip to relieve HMM-265 on board the USS Tripoli (LPH 10). HMM-165 became the SLF Bravo helicopter squadron. In bottom photo, a Sikorsky UH-34D Sea Horse from HMM-362, the SLF Alpha helicopter squadron on board the USS Princeton (LPH 5), lands Marines from BLT 2/4 in a LZ near Camp Carroll.



had been assigned to the 1st Marines in the Cua Viet sector and returned there in Operation Proud Hunter after a brief period of amphibious training. On the 28th, in Operation Swift Pursuit, the BLT established a new area of operations in the Mai Loc sector in the Operation Lancaster II TAOR. Into October, the battalion essentially operated under the 3d Marines as another infantry battalion in the Lancaster II sector.¹⁹

Thus by mid-October, the situation with the SLFs had almost reverted to the situation that existed until June. Both SLF infantry battalions had been operating for an extended period with III MAF units ashore. The main difference was that one was attached to the 3d Division and the other to the 1st Marine Division. BLT 2/26, which was still operating in the 3d Marine Division sector, was slated for rehabilitation training in the SLF base at Subic Bay. Concurrently, MACV had directed III MAF to undertake an expanded pacification campaign while at the same time increasing operations against the enemy base areas and main force units. III MAF wanted to use the SLFs in this campaign in "swift short duration operations . . . principally in cordon and search operations to root out and eliminate the VC infrastructure." The principle target areas were to be the Batangan Peninsula just south of Chu Lai and the Barrier Island sector south of Hoi An. At this point, III MAF consulted with the commander of the 9th MAB, Brigadier General John E. Williams,* who on the basis of these proposed new operations decided to cancel the BLT 2/26 rehabilitation trip to the Philippines.²⁰

The SLF Alpha ARG which had embarked BLT 2/26 on 19 October at Quang Tri began to steam for Da Nang.** On 25 October, the BLT landed at Da Nang in Operation Eager Hunter. The following day, the BLT came under the operational control of the 1st Marines and conducted Operation Garrard Bay until mid-November in the coastal hamlets between Marble Mountain and Dien Ban. On 20 November, the BLT joined the 1st Marines Operation Meade River in the "Dodge City" sector north of the Go Noi Island area in the Da Nang TAOR.^{21***}

*Brigadier General Williams relieved Brigadier General William C. Chip as CG 9th MAB on 12 August 1968. Brigadier General Chip had relieved Brigadier General Glick on 20 January 1968 when the latter became 3d Marine Division assistant division commander.

**Amphibious Ready Group Alpha (TG 76.4) now consisted of the USS *Princeton* (LPH 5), USS *Dubuque* (LPD 8), USS *Oak Hill* (LSD 7), and USS *Windham County* (LST 1170).

***See Chapter 21 for discussion of the *Le Loi* campaign and Operation Meade River.



Photo is from the Abel Collection
Marines of BLT 2/26 waded through streams in the Barrier Island area southeast of Hoi An. The BLT, the SLF Alpha battalion, is conducting Operation Valiant Hunt.

In the meantime the SLF Bravo battalion, BLT 2/7 remained also under the operational control of the 1st Marines until early November when it embarked upon its amphibious shipping.**** III MAF and the ARG/SLF Bravo commanders had planned to mount their first of the new amphibious cordon and search operations on the Batangan Peninsula. While liaison officers from the amphibious task group met with the Americal Division at Chu Lai, General Cushman and his staff decided that a similar operation on the Barrier Island would prove more lucrative. Landing on the coast southeast of Hoi An, just below the Cua Dai River, on 10 November, BLT 2/7 carried out the new operation, called Daring Endeavor, for the next seven days. Although supposed to extend the operation to the south, the battalion encountered significant opposition in the original area. Using cordon and search techniques, the Marines reported killing 39 of the

****The 1st Marines relieved the 27th Marines in the Da Nang area of operations when the latter regiment redeployed to the United States. See Chapter 21. Amphibious Ready Group Bravo (TG 76.5) now consisted of the USS *Merrick* (AKA 97), USS *Monticello* (LSD 35), USS *Ogden* (LPD 5), USS *Tripoli* (LPH 10), and *Seminole* (AKA 104).

enemy and captured 30 POWs, at a cost of 1 Marine dead and 36 wounded. The BLT conducted no civic action because the population in the area was "considered to be hostile and hard line psy ops [psychological operations] was used." According to the amphibious task group commander, the operation demonstrated the SLF ability "to temporarily deny enemy forces the use of their territory, while destroying their fortification and supplies, was fully realized." On 20 November, BLT 2/7 returned to the operational control of the 1st Marines and prepared to relieve the SLF Bravo battalion, BLT 2/26, in Operation Meade River.²²

On 8 December, BLT 2/26 reembarked upon ARG/SLF Alpha shipping "conducting rehabilitation and training for future operations."* One week later, on 15 December, the BLT initiated SLF Alpha Operation Valiant Hunt. Remaining under the operational control of the SLF Alpha commander, now Colonel John F. McMahon, the BLT conducted a cordon and search in the southern Barrier Island sector just south of the earlier Daring Endeavor area of operations. Operation Valiant Hunt lasted until 5 January 1969. Lieutenant Colonel William F. Sparks, the battalion commander, observed that "Operation Valiant Hunt was the first time the BLT was responsible for conducting a total cordon operation. In this respect, the operation was a good 'training exercise' . . . However, there were no significant problems or enemy techniques encountered."²³

As the year ended, the SLF battalions were in much the same situation as the year had begun. One battalion was bringing a separate operation to a close while the other was ashore attached to a Marine division. In fact the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines was about to relieve BLT 2/7 as the infantry component of SLF Bravo. Even more important, many of the issues over the use of the SLF had not fully been settled. Even as late as July 1969, the 9th MAB operations officer, Colonel Clyde W. Hunter, would remark that the MAB staff believed that the "divisions were using the SLFs improperly, actually ginning up operations just to get them ashore and tie them down to a TAOR, or into some kind of operation, that had no connection to their mission as an SLF."²⁴

*On 7 December, HMM-362, now under Lieutenant Colonel Jack E. Schlarp, embarked upon the USS *Okinawa* (LPH 3) relieved HMM-363, as the SLF Alpha helicopter squadron. Lieutenant Colonel Schlarp recalled that while embarked "we conducted assault landings, put our BLT ashore, supported them completely, evacuated the wounded and extracted them at the completion of the operation." LtCol Jack E. Schlarp, Comments on draft, dtd 21Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File). The other ships of ARG Alpha (TG 76.4) were the USS *Duluth* (LPD 6), USS *Fort Marion* (LSD 22), USS *Winslow* (AKA 94).

Still, as 1969 was about to begin, Brigadier General Williams, the 9th MAB commander, was about to embark on board amphibious shipping as Commanding General, Task Force 79, to help oversee one of the largest amphibious operations of the Vietnam War. In Operation Bold Mariner, both SLFs of the 9th MAB would land on the Batangan Peninsula under the command of Brigadier General Wilson. While beginning in this spectacular fashion, the SLFs for the remainder of 1969 would follow much the same pattern as that of 1968. For 1969, there would be 14 SLF operations as compared to 13 in 1968, and 25 in 1967. By the end of 1969, the SLFs had become a moot question for operations in South Vietnam. With the reduction of forces in Vietnam, the SLF could only be committed with the specific permission of the JCS.²⁵

Sub-Unit 1, 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO)

In Vietnam, there was another Marine-Navy connection with both the Seventh Fleet and the in-country forces. Sub-Unit 1, 1st ANGLICO was a Fleet Marine Force, Pacific separate organization whose primary mission was to call in U.S. naval gunfire from ships offshore or Marine and Navy air in support of allied or other U.S. Service forces. In Vietnam, Sub-Unit 1 remained outside of the regular Marine chain of command and under the direct operational control of MACV in Saigon. At the beginning of 1968, Lieutenant Colonel Carlton D. Goodiel, Jr., the unit commander, maintained his headquarters in Saigon, but kept detachments in each of the Corps areas with the largest in I Corps.

In January 1968, the I Corps Liaison Naval Gunfire Team, headed by Navy Lieutenant Commander Philip B. Hatch, Jr., was at Da Nang and provided direct liaison with the South Vietnamese I Corps military establishment.** Under his control were two shore fire parties, one at Hue with the 1st ARVN Division and a smaller one at Quang Ngai with the 2d ARVN Division. Navy Lieutenant Robert A. Keeling headed the naval gunfire liaison team with the U.S. Army Americal Division with four shore fire parties attached to Army units at both Chu Lai and Duc Pho. At this time, the largest ANGLICO detachment in I Corps, and for that fact in the country, commanded by Marine Major Enos S. Olin, was

**No ANGLICO detachments or teams were assigned to Marine units of III MAF since Marine units maintained in their FSCC and DASC organizations the ability to call in their own naval gunfire and air support.

with the 2d ROK Marine Brigade at Hoi An. One of the few detachments in Vietnam with an air control party, Olin had under him over 70 enlisted Marines and usually nine officers, eight Marines and one Navy lieutenant (j.g.).²⁶

While smaller and more scattered, Lieutenant Colonel Goodiel's command maintained similar naval gunfire liaison teams in the other corps areas of South Vietnam. In II Corps, Navy Lieutenant William L. Vandiver maintained the headquarters of his naval gunfire liaison team at Nha Trang with five shore fire control parties under his control. Further south, from the III Corps Naval Gunfire Liaison Team headquarters at Bien Hoa, Navy Lieutenant Dale W. Lucas controlled three shore fire control parties in the Corps area. In IV Corps, Marine Captain Ronald K. Roth, commander of the naval gunfire liaison team headquartered at Can Tho in the Mekong Delta, had two fire control parties, one at Ben Tre and the other at Tra Vinh. All told in January, ANGLICO Sub-Unit 1 numbered more than 230 personnel, both Marine and Navy, including about 35 at the Saigon headquarters.²⁷

During Tet, one of the most significant contributions of the ANGLICO teams was in the battle for Hue. At the outbreak of the attack on Hue on 31 January, the naval gunfire spot team attached to the 1st ARVN Division under Navy Lieutenant (j.g.) Marvin L. Warkentin, like the rest of the U.S. advisors, remained isolated from their units at the MACV compound in the southern sector of the city and had all they could do to repel the enemy attack on the compound itself. In a short time, however, with the arrival of the reinforcing Marine forces in the city, the team resumed its primary mission.²⁸

Through 13 February, all of the naval gunfire was employed against suspected enemy lines of communications outside of the city. Beginning on 14 February, with the initial onslaught of the enemy forces in the city contained north of the Perfume River and the NVA units cleared out south of the river, the naval gunfire support then shifted to targets in the Citadel north of the river with the exception of the former Imperial palace and its grounds. Because of the heavy cloud cover and other hampering weather conditions, the ships depended upon Warkentin's team for ground spotting. On the basis of military necessity and with the permission of the 1st Marines' commander, Colonel Stanley S. Hughes, who had operational control of the Marine forces in the city, the spotting team occupied a hotel which had been the headquarters in Hue of the

International Control Commission* and supposedly neutral ground. The building, however, provided the best view of the targets. For the first two days, the team directed the fires of the cruiser USS *Providence* (CLG 6) and the destroyer *Manley* (DD 940) against first the Citadel walls, and then on the 17th, against specific enemy strongholds in the old city. After the 17th, the Seventh Fleet gunships during the remainder of Operation Hue City turned their attention once more to harassing and interdiction fires.** According to interrogations of captured enemy troops in the Hue fighting, the naval gunfire inflicted many casualties "and had an extremely demoralizing effect."²⁹

Elsewhere in Vietnam during Tet, in II Corps, naval gunfire contributed to the defeat of the VC attacks against the cities. According to ANGLICO reports at Nha Trang, prior coordination planning with the installation defense command there permitted Navy Lieutenant Vandiver to call upon the destroyer USS *Mansfield* (DD 728), which was in the harbor, to provide counter-rocket and counter-mortar fires and to interdict avenues of approach to the city. Further south in the II Corps sector at Phan Thiet on 3 February, the naval gunfire liaison spot team there attached to the U.S. Army's 3d Battalion, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne Division directed defensive fires from the destroyer USS *Frank E. Evans* (DD 754) into the city against the attacking 840th VC Battalion. The following day, the ANGLICO team adjusted the fires within 100 meters of friendly troops. In its after-action report, the team observed that the enemy troops "became disorganized, fled the area, and was soon driven out of the city by ARVN forces." Later in the month, the team once more called upon the *Evans* and another destroyer, the USS *Pritchett* (DD 561), to frustrate a renewed VC assault on Phan Thiet.³⁰

Following Tet, naval gunfire continued to play a large role especially in I Corps with its large buildup of forces especially in the north beginning even before Tet. By mid-March 1968, III MAF contained in the northern two provinces of I Corps one Marine division,

*The International Control Commission was created by the Geneva Agreement of 1954 to ensure the provisions of that treaty. It consisted of Polish, Indian, and Canadian members. Although by this time, the Commission was unable to enforce anything, it still retained facilities and personnel in both North and South Vietnam. See also Chapter 10.

**Two other destroyers and the cruisers *Canberra* (CAG 2) and the *Newport News* (CA 148) supported Operation Hue City. See CinCPacFlt, "Pacific Area Naval Operations Review," Feb68 p. 29, (OAB, NHDD).

elements of a second, and two Army divisions, and in addition a new command structure. Although subordinate to III MAF, Provisional Corps, Vietnam, commanded by Army Lieutenant General William B. Rosson, had operational control of U.S. forces in Quang Tri Province and Thua Thien Provinces including the 3d Marine Division, the 1st Air Cavalry Division, and the 101st Airborne Division.*

These changes in command relationships and the arrival of the new Army divisions in northern I Corps had an effect upon the ANGLICO organization in the corps sector. Since 26 January, Marine First Lieutenant Pasquale J. Morocco headed the ANGLICO fire control party with the 1st Air Cavalry Division at Camp Evans. Prior to the establishment of Provisional Corps, Lieutenant Hatch, the I Corps Naval Gunfire Liaison officer, also doubled as the MACV (Forward) Liaison officer when that command was temporarily installed at Phu Bai under General Creighton W. Abrams in early February. He remained in that dual capacity until 10 March when Provisional (Prov) Corps came into existence and General Abrams returned to Saigon. On 16 March, Navy Lieutenant Dale W. Lucas became the Provisional Corps Naval Gunfire Liaison officer. At about the same time, Navy Lieutenant Warkentin transferred from Hue to Camp Eagle outside of Phu Bai to head the shore fire control party attached to the 101st Airborne Division. On 23 April, ANGLICO spotters called in a Marine close air strike in support of the 101st marking "the first time" during the war that non-Air Force personnel controlled a close air support mission for the division.³¹

Throughout the period from February through June 1968, the tempo of naval gunfire support increased throughout Vietnam with the bulk going to support U.S. and allied forces in I Corps. For example, in February, Navy ships off the coast of South Vietnam fired more than 94,000 rounds. Of this total, ANGLICO teams in I Corps controlled missions firing nearly 18,000 of those rounds, which did not include the missions fired in support of the 3d Marine Division along the DMZ. By June, while somewhat reduced from February, the U.S. Seventh Fleet fired more than 79,000 rounds in support of all forces, with ANGLICO in I Corps controlling missions which provided

over 18,000 of those rounds. Again, the figures for I Corps did not include the missions fired in support of the two Marine Divisions in the corps sector. For the first half of 1968, Navy gunfire support exceeded that of the entire previous year.³²

In perhaps the largest demonstration of joint supporting arms of the war, Operation Thor in July 1968, naval gunfire ships and naval air played a large role in the aerial, ground, and ship bombardment of the North Vietnamese batteries in the Cap Mui Lay sector of the DMZ. Although Provisional Corps exercised command and coordination, Navy Lieutenant Dale W. Lucas, the Prov Corps ANGLICO naval gunfire liaison officer, and his team at the Dong Ha forward headquarters, processed all naval gunfire and then passed the direction to the 3d Marine Division naval gunfire section for action. All told, for the first seven days of July, nine gunships (three cruisers and six destroyers) fired over 19,000 rounds of 5-inch, 6-inch, and 8-inch ammunition against the enemy gun positions. In addition, Navy aircraft from four carriers flew 512 sorties and dropped 812 tons of ordnance upon the NVA positions. According to aerial photography and observation, the joint bombardment created extensive damage and hampered for the time being the NVA artillery support and coastal defense ability in the Cap Mui Lay area.^{33**}

About this time, the Navy prepared to add a powerful new arsenal to its naval gunfire capability, the recently refurbished battleship *New Jersey* (BB 62) with its 16-inch guns. On 16 July, I Corps and Prov Corps ANGLICO liaison teams participated in a targeting planning conference for the ship which was to arrive off the waters of Vietnam at the end of September. On 30 September, the battleship fired its first observed mission against NVA positions in the DMZ which "was spotted by an ANGLICO spotter flying in a Marine TA-4F from MAG 11" According to the ground data assessment (GDA), the *New Jersey's* big guns silenced 1 antiaircraft site, destroyed 1 truck and 4 bunkers, and caused 11 secondary explosions. During her first month off the coast of Vietnam, the warship steamed back and forth between I and II Corps and off the coast of the DMZ. Through the end

*The Prov Corps command did not include the 1st Marine Division Task Force X-Ray which operated in Phu Loc District and the Hai Van area of Thua Thien Province. In August 1968, Provisional Corps became XXIV Corps. For the changes in the military structure in I Corps, see Chapter 13.

**See Chapter 26 for a detailed account for Operation Thor. The Navy ships that took part in the operation were the cruisers *Boston* (CAG 1), *Providence* (CLG 6), and *St. Paul* (CA 73); the destroyers *Banner* (DD 807), *Boyd* (DD 544), *Cochrane* (DDG 21), *Turner Joy* (DD 951), *O'Brien* (DD 725), and *Henry B. Wilson* (DDG 7); and the carriers *Bon Homme Richard* (CVA 31), *Constellation* (CVA 64), *Ticonderoga* (CVA 14), and *America* (CVA 66).

of the year, the *New Jersey*, in the words of one Navy report, moved from one offshore position to another, "wreaking havoc on the enemy wherever she employed her might." For ANGLICO and Lieutenant Colonel Frederick K. Purdum, who relieved Lieutenant Colonel Goodiel as the commander of the Sub-Unit in August, the battleship provided a convincing argument to allied and Army commands of the capabilities and uses of naval gunfire and the services of ANGLICO naval gunfire liaison teams.³⁴

By the end of the year, the ANGLICO Sub-Unit 1 in Vietnam was somewhat smaller than in January, but it had become more self-sufficient. Until November, although its headquarters was in Saigon, it drew its supplies from III MAF at Da Nang. With approval of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Sub-Unit obtained its own supply account and more importantly through an inter-Service agreement, it was now able to obtain common item supplies from the U.S. Army 1st Logistic Command in South Vietnam. By the end of the year, the Sub-Unit contained 217 personnel, but had expanded its operations in IV Corps. While the final six months did not require the extensive naval gunfire support of the first half, this support was more dispersed and employed more evenly in all four Corps areas.

Embassy Marines

Another special Marine detachment in Vietnam was the Marine Embassy guard. In 1968, although somewhat larger than the usual Embassy security guard, the Saigon detachment performed much the same missions as their counterparts elsewhere: protected classified material and U.S. government officials and property, especially the Ambassador and the Embassy. From 1965 through 1967, the detachment in Saigon had shown only sporadic growth. While more than doubling in 1966, it had remained the same size for over a year and was subordinate to Company C, Security Guard Battalion (State Department) headquartered in the Philippines capital, Manila. In January 1968, the detachment consisted of one officer, Captain Robert J. O'Brien, and 67 enlisted men.³⁵

Until the Tet offensive in January 1968, except for increased security watch, the war had largely bypassed the Marines assigned to the Saigon Embassy. On the afternoon of 30 January, however, a State Department security officer met with Captain O'Brien and informed him about the possibility of a VC attack that evening or sometime during Tet in the Saigon area. The Marine captain immediately increased the alert

status and put a second man on all one-man posts. He also placed a rooftop watch on the Embassy's chancery building and assigned two men to the Norodom compound next to the Embassy compound. That night he and one of his sergeants visited all of the posts, finding nothing out of the ordinary, and about 0130 on the 31st, returned to Marine House, which doubled as the headquarters and barracks for the guard. O'Brien then stretched out on a sofa and gave orders to wake him in time so he could make another tour at 0300.³⁶

The Viet Cong disrupted the captain's schedule. At 0245, a group of approximately 20 members of the VC C-10 *Battalion* armed with satchel charges, automatic weapons, and grenades, blew a hole in the wall surrounding the Embassy compound near the northeast gate. The two U.S. Army Military Police (MPs) from the 716th Military Police Battalion raised the alarm, but were gunned down by the intruders. Two more MPs in a jeep patrol tried to come to the assistance of their comrades, but also died in a burst of machine gun fire.³⁷

At the time this occurred, Sergeant Ronald W. Harper, one of the three Marines posted in the Embassy Chancery building, was visiting and drinking coffee with the Marines in the guard shack by the Norodom compound. He suddenly looked up and saw a strange Vietnamese and then heard rocket and machine gun fire. Harper made a dash back to the chancery, finding the main entrance door still unlocked. He found Corporal George B. Zahuranic at the front receptionist desk on the telephone calling for help. Sergeant Harper immediately locked the door and then ran to the armory inside the building to obtain additional weapons.³⁸

At that point, the VC fired several B-40 rockets at the front entrance. The rockets knocked out the windows behind the steel bars and penetrated the door, but failed to unlock it or force it open. Although knocked to the ground by the initial blast, Harper was unhurt. Corporal Zahuranic was not as fortunate—he was hit by a piece of metal and was bleeding profusely from the right side of his head and ear. Sergeant Harper provided what first aid he could for Zahuranic and then answered the phone from another post. He relayed the information about the wounded Zahuranic and pressed upon his caller the urgency of the situation.

On the roof of the Chancery was Sergeant Rudy A. Soto, armed with a shotgun. Like Harper, Soto witnessed the VC blasting their way into the Embassy courtyard. He tried to take the VC troops under fire, but his weapon jammed. Sergeant Soto had a radio

with him, but was unable to contact either Harper or Zahuranic and presumed that the VC had entered the building. He then radioed Marine House and informed them of the situation as he knew it.

By this time, Captain O'Brien was on his way. The duty noncommissioned officer at Marine House had awakened him with the news about the attack almost as soon as it had occurred. The Marine captain with Sergeant Richard G. Frattarelli, his driver, jumped into the sedan that had a radio and departed for the Embassy, some five blocks away. Three other Marines, two sergeants and a corporal, followed in a jeep. Reaching a South Vietnamese police check point about a block away from the Embassy and hearing that the VC were still there, O'Brien decided that the Marines should leave the two vehicles at the police station.³⁹

Covering the rest of the distance to the Embassy compound by foot, O'Brien and his small entourage arrived at the northeast gate unseen by any of the VC attackers. He called out to the MPs who were supposed to be there, but instead of the Americans, he saw five or six of the VC who still had their backs to the Marines. Captain O'Brien remembered being, "momentarily stunned by the abrupt . . . confrontation with the VC," but quickly recovered, ordering the one Marine with the Beretta submachine gun to open fire. As the Beretta gave a long burst, the other Marines shot their .38-caliber pistols at the enemy inside the gate. A sudden automatic weapons fusillade forced O'Brien and his men to take cover behind the compound wall and some nearby trees.

At this point, Captain O'Brien directed Sergeant Frattarelli to return to the sedan and radio Marine House for reinforcements. Frattarelli ran down the street about a half a block, when some frightened South Vietnamese police opened up upon him. The Marine sergeant took cover in an entrance way and "called out American" and the police let him through. Reaching the radio, he requested the additional men and ammunition and then retraced his route back to O'Brien.⁴⁰

Back at Marine House, Gunnery Sergeant Allen Morrison had taken charge of the situation there. Although not in contact with Captain O'Brien until Frattarelli had radioed him, Morrison had communicated with both Sergeant Soto and the Marine sergeant with the Ambassador. The Ambassador was safe and had moved from his residence to the house of one of the Embassy security officers. According to Morrison, the Ambassador had delegated the defense of the Embassy

to him in that he not been able to reach anyone else. Even before hearing from Sergeant Frattarelli, Gunnery Sergeant Morrison had sent a reaction team consisting of Staff Sergeant Leroy J. Banks and five other Marines in a vehicle to the Embassy.⁴¹

On the way, U.S. Army MPs stopped the Marines about 300 yards from the Embassy compound and told Staff Sergeant Banks to take his men out of the area as the VC were attacking. Banks told the MPs that they were Embassy Marines and "our job and orders were to get to the Embassy and save it." The Marine staff sergeant then directed his men to leave their vehicle and the team went the rest of the way on foot reaching the Norodom building, housing the Consulate and other U.S. government offices, on the southwest side of the Embassy. Banks' Marines then tried to maneuver north using the compound wall to find an entrance into the Embassy compound itself. They almost reached the police station where the first group had left their vehicles, but like Sergeant Frattarelli, came under fire from the edgy Vietnamese policemen. Unable to advance any further, Banks led his men back to the Norodom Building and joined the Marine guards already there.⁴²

In the meantime, at the northeast end of the Embassy, Captain O'Brien and his group placed as much fire upon the VC inside the compound as best they could. They tried unsuccessfully to shoot off the locks of one of the gates. Joined by six MPs about 0330, the Marines continued to lay down a base of fire and two of the MPs took positions in a nearby building. The Marine captain also told Sergeant Frattarelli to return to the sedan and radio for more assistance and weapons. The Vietnamese police again shot at Frattarelli, who once more yelled out that he was an American, but "this time it didn't work, they just kept firing." While taking up new positions, O'Brien and his Marines would remain out of radio contact until daylight.⁴³

At the Norodom, Staff Sergeant Banks positioned his men in defensive positions and placed several on the roof where they could fire down on the VC in the compound. Banks and a small group made an unsuccessful attempt to enter the Embassy compound through the Norodom gate, but were forced to fall back as the VC had all the gates covered with automatic weapons. Although reinforced by an Army MP lieutenant with seven MPs under him, the Americans with a few M16s, three Beretta submachine guns, and .38 caliber pistols, were badly outgunned by the VC armed with machine guns, rocket launchers, and

grenades. Unlike Captain O'Brien, however, Sergeant Banks was able to maintain radio contact with Gunnery Sergeant Morrison in Marine House and remain in telephone communication with Sergeant Harper inside the Embassy. After consulting with Gunnery Sergeant Morrison and Harper, Banks and the Army lieutenant thought it best to wait until daylight and more reinforcements before making any further moves. With American MPs and Marines surrounding the Embassy and the continuing harassing fire, the VC had little chance to escape and no prospect of reaching the Chancery itself.⁴⁴

The waiting until daylight proved to be a sound tactic. At about 0630, a U.S. Army helicopter alighted on the Chancery roof and evacuated both Sergeant Soto and the wounded Corporal Zahuranic. Shortly afterward, Captain O'Brien was able to reach his radio and radioed Gunnery Sergeant Morrison for additional weapons and a few more men, both of which were forthcoming. With the additional reinforcements and with strong covering fires, the Marines and MPs by 0730 finally forced their way into the compound from both over the northeast wall and through the Norodom compound gate. The VC only offered a desultory resistance and took what refuge they could. At 0800, another Army helicopter landed troops from Company C, 502d Infantry, 101st Airborne Division on the roof of the Chancery. All that was left was the moping up. At 0900, Captain O'Brien grouped his Marines together and made a floor to floor sweep of the Chancery to make sure none of the attackers had somehow taken refuge there. It would be another two hours before the building would be clear. The Marine captain estimated that there were about 200 people swarming around the Embassy grounds and the building itself including "reporters, writers, cameramen, MPs, 101st Airborne troops, and civilians." People were "taking pictures, asking questions, and picking up anything in sight, everything was up for grabs." Finally by late morning, the crowd had thinned out and the Marines had effected some "semblance of order." From the onset of the attack until the last Viet Cong was killed by retired Army Colonel George Jacobsen, the Mission Coordinator for the Embassy, in his house on the grounds, was about seven hours. Most of the VC attackers were dead except for two prisoners and the Americans suffered casualties of five dead and five wounded. One of the dead, Corporal James C. Marshall who had been killed by a sniper bullet while on the roof of the Norodom Building, and five of the wounded were Marines.

While one of the most dramatic events of the Communist Tet offensive, especially considering the play it received upon American television, the attack on the Embassy was in reality a sideshow. The attack had failed miserably, and the attackers never reached the Chancery building, but largely milled about in the compound until finally killed or taken prisoner. Despite its futility, the assault on the Embassy compound provided a propaganda coup for the enemy and pointed out the need for further security at the Embassy. By the end of the year, the Marine Security Guard had expanded by 39 men with plans to form the detachment into a separate company. On 1 February 1969, the Saigon detachment became Company E, Marine Security Guard Battalion (State Dept).⁴⁵

Individual Marines in Saigon and Elsewhere in Vietnam

At the beginning of the year, outside of I Corps and mostly stationed in Saigon were some 200 individual Marines almost evenly divided between officers and enlisted men. Most were assigned to the MACV headquarters staff, but others served on the MACV radio and television staff, with the Studies and Observation Group (SOG), and other special groups. On the MACV staff, the senior officer was Brigadier General John R. Chaisson, who as MACV Deputy J-3 for Operations, ran the MACV Combat Operations Center, and developed a very close relationship with General Westmoreland, the MACV commander. To a certain extent, Chaisson became Westmoreland's informal advisor on Marine matters. A frank, outspoken officer, Chaisson was perhaps best remembered for his press conference on 3 February 1968, when he admitted that the Viet Cong had surprised the MACV command with the intensity and coordination of the Tet offensive.⁴⁶

In mid-1968, Marine Brigadier John N. McLaughlin relieved Chaisson in the same capacity. By the end of November, for whatever reason, there was some reduction in the Marines assigned to MACV, now consisting of 77 officers and 53 enlisted men.⁴⁷

In I Corps, there was another group of Marines who served individually as advisors under MACV to South Vietnamese Army units. In late 1967, 20 Marine officers and 23 enlisted men served in that capacity. Another 129 Marine enlisted men provided security to the I Corps Advisory Group at Da Nang. By the end of 1968, the total number of Marine advisors was 27, 15 officers and 12 enlisted men. The enlisted Marines for security were no longer needed.⁴⁸

Advisors to the Vietnamese Marine Corps

The largest Marine advisory effort was with the South Vietnamese Marine Corps. Beginning with one U.S. Marine advisor in early 1955, the U.S. Marine Advisory Unit (MAU) to the South Vietnamese Marine Corps had by January 1968 grown to an authorized strength of 33 personnel consisting of 27 Marine officers, a Navy doctor, four enlisted Marines and a Navy corpsman. Commanded by Colonel Richard L. Michael, Jr., who held the title, Senior Marine Advisor, the MAU was part of the Naval Advisory Group in the U.S. MACV advisory organization. In Saigon, Michael maintained a small headquarters which consisted of the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor, Lieutenant Colonel Glenn W. Rodney, and a small administrative staff. The rest served in the field with the deployed units of the Vietnamese Marine Corps.⁴⁹

Outside of the supply, ordnance, artillery, and amphibious specialist officers, the remaining 16 U.S. Marine advisors served with the two South Vietnamese Marine task force headquarters or the six infantry battalions. Each task force was allotted a U.S. Marine major and captain as an advisor and assistant advisor. A U.S. Marine captain and first lieutenant were assigned to each of the battalions as the advisor and assistant advisor to the commander. For the individual Marine infantry individual advisor, it meant a continued "nomadic lonely life." As one Marine officer wrote it was not "unusual for a Marine advisor to report aboard; undergo in-processing of two or three days; and join a deployed unit not to return to the Advisory Unit for months at a time." A senior advisor to one of the Vietnamese battalions, Captain Jerry I. Simpson, commented that while serving with the Vietnamese he subsisted "on the same rations" as the Vietnamese Marines and would not see any Americans, including his assistant advisor, "for several days at a time."⁵⁰

As could be expected, the South Vietnamese Marine Corps attempted to pattern itself after the U.S. Marine Corps model. It consisted of a Lieutenant General Commandant and a small central headquarters in Saigon, two combat task forces, Task Force Alpha and Task Force Bravo, six infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, an Amphibious Support Battalion, and a training center. Most of the Vietnamese Marine field officers and many of the company grade officers had attended at least the U.S. Marine Corps Basic School at Quantico, Virginia. A few of the more senior officers also graduated from the more advanced U.S. Amphibious Warfare School at the U.S. Marine base. By Janu-

ary 1968, the Vietnamese Marines numbered over 7,300 men and prided itself like its sister service in the United States on its elan and its reputation as one of the country's elite fighting force.⁵¹

Despite the similarities between the two Marine Corps, there were important differences. While its officers and some of its enlisted men had received amphibious warfare training, the South Vietnamese Marine Corps actually participated in very few amphibious operations. Having its origins in the Vietnamese commando and riverine companies under the French, the Vietnamese Marine Corps at first operated much in the French tradition after its establishment in 1954. In fact until May 1955, a French officer remained in command of the Vietnamese Marines. With the growing American influence, the Vietnamese Marine organization tended to reflect the U.S. Marine Corps with a growing emphasis upon the amphibious mission. Still, from the very beginning of their existence, the Vietnamese Marines were committed to campaigns against the Viet Cong. While still continuing riverine operations, especially in the Mekong Delta and in the Rung Sat sector south of Saigon, there was little call for assaults across a defended beach.⁵²

The basic advantage that the Vietnamese Marines offered was their national character. Recruited from the nation at large, rather than from any one region as most of the South Vietnamese Army divisions were, they could be deployed anywhere in Vietnam when the situation demanded. Together with other specialist units such as the South Vietnamese rangers and airborne, the Vietnamese Marines formed the National General Reserve. Operating directly under the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS), these units became in effect fire brigades to rush to the most urgent hot spots and put out the flames. In one sense, the most important quality of the Vietnamese Marines was their demonstrated loyalty over time to the central government and the Joint General Staff.⁵³

Given the dominance of the Vietnamese military in the central government, no South Vietnamese military organization could be entirely divorced from internal politics. In the coup against then-President Diem in 1963, Vietnamese Marines played a decisive role in toppling the regime. While the Vietnamese Commandant, Le Nguyen Khang, did not take an active part in bringing down the government, he was aware of the plot and took no action to prevent it. Following the coup, Khang became the South Vietnamese military attache in the Philippines, but in three months he once more resumed his duties as Commandant of the Viet-



Both photos are courtesy of Col Talman C. Budd, USMC (Ret)

Above, U.S. Marine advisors to Vietnamese Marine Task Force Alpha in 1968 are from left: Capt Thomas B. Bagley, Jr., Assistant Advisor, TF Alpha; 1stLt Larry S. MacFarlane, Assistant Advisor, 1st Bn, VNMC; Capt Ronald D. Ray, Assistant Advisor, TF Alpha; 1stLt Louis Garcia, Senior Advisor, 1st Bn, VNMC; an unidentified U.S. Marine warrant officer; and Maj Talman C. Budd, Senior Advisor, TF Alpha. Below is the main gate to the South Vietnamese Marine headquarters in Saigon. The Vietnamese Marine Corps symbol is clearly visible on the sign above the gate.



namese Marine Corps. In 1966, Khang and his Marines sided with the central government against the "Struggle Movement" in I Corps and helped to subdue those ARVN units loyal to the former I Corps commander, Lieutenant General Nguyen Chanh Thi.⁵⁴

By January 1968, Khang, now a lieutenant general, not only was Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, but according to his count, wore as many as six different "hats." In addition to his Marine Corps command, he was the Commander of the Capital Military District which included the city of Saigon and its immediate vicinity; he was the commanding general of the South Vietnamese III Corps Military Tactical Zone; and also was a member of the National Leadership Council, which "in effect ruled the country." Moreover, as III Corps commander, he was the "governor-delegate for administration" or III Corps administrator, and as commander of the Capital Military District, he was the military governor of Saigon. Despite these various responsibilities, Khang considered that his "main job was still command of the Marines."⁵⁵

While Khang still held overall control of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, he relied on his assistant and chief of staff, Colonel Bui Thi Lan for the day to day running of the headquarters. The two task force commanders, for the most part, had direct operational control of the infantry battalions. In January 1968 prior to Tet, Task Force Alpha consisting of two infantry battalions and an artillery battalion was committed to the Bong Son area in II Corps, encountering only light and sporadic resistance. The other task force, TF Bravo, also with two battalions, was attached to the 7th ARVN Division in the IV Corps sector. Of the remaining two Marine infantry battalions, one remained under the direct control of the Capital Military District just outside of Saigon and the other had retired to its base camp at Vung Tau.⁵⁶

This all changed in the early morning hours of 31 January, when the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army launched their country-wide Tet offensive. In Saigon, Viet Cong sappers had entered the Embassy compound while other Communist units struck the Vietnamese Joint General Staff headquarters, the adjoining Tan Son Nhut airbase, and other military bases on the outskirts of the city. After the

initial surprise, mixed U.S. and South Vietnamese forces in and around the city regrouped and began the counterattack.⁵⁷

The Vietnamese Marines quickly became enmeshed in the fighting. At the outset of the enemy offensive the only Marine unit anywhere near Saigon was the 3d Battalion, attached to the Capital Military Command, but committed to an operation several thousand meters west of the city. When the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff began to realize the intensity of the enemy effort, they immediately called upon the Marine units to reinforce the ARVN units already in Saigon. At 0430 on the 31st, the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff alerted the 4th Battalion, which was "more or less [in] a standdown" at its base camp at Vung Tau for air movement into Tan Son Nhut Airport on the outskirts of the city.⁵⁸ Because of ground fog and enemy ground fire near Tan Son Nhut, the aircraft carrying the Marines did not land until 0930. After an initial briefing, the battalion then moved to reinforce the Joint General headquarters south of the airbase. Although killing a reported 20 Viet Cong but sustaining 9 wounded, the battalion was unable to close with the enemy out of concern of "inflicting excessive civilian casualties." Engaging in a desultory fire fight until 1430 with Communist troops who had penetrated the JGS compound, the battalion received orders to move north in the Gia Dinh sector of Saigon to relieve the ARVN Phu Dong armored base that was under attack.⁵⁹

The battalion arrived at its destination, 4,000 meters north of its previous position, about 1630. It immediately mounted a two-company assault, supported by ARVN tanks, and two U.S. helicopter gunships providing limited air support against the ARVN compound, now held by an estimated NVA battalion. The enemy commander warned the Marines that his troops would kill the South Vietnamese civilian dependents, being held as hostage. After the supporting tanks in the lead "blew a large opening" in the surrounding wall, the Vietnamese Marines entered the armored compound headquarters "with machine guns blazing" and found the charred bodies of the dependents heaped in a large pile. Among the dead were the wife and eight children of the base commander, an ARVN lieutenant colonel, who also had been murdered. With enemy forces still in strength in the sector, darkness coming on, and the inability to provide continuing air support, the South Vietnamese JGS ordered the battalion commander to withdraw to more defensible positions. For the day, the battalion had sustained

*Lieutenant Colonel John J. Hainsworth, who as a captain served as an assistant battalion advisor to the Vietnamese Marines, noted that "many of these VNMC Battalion assignments were politically sensitive and motivated within the VNMC hierarchy and the Joint General Staff." LtCol John J. Hainsworth, Comments on draft, dtd 12Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Hainsworth Comments.

casualties of 7 dead and 52 wounded and claimed to have killed 100 of the enemy.⁶⁰

In the meantime, the JGS had brought Task Force Bravo headquarters and the 1st and 2d Battalions into Saigon. At 1500, the 1st Battalion began arriving in an improvised helicopter landing zone inside the Joint General Staff headquarters compound from Cai Lay in IV Corps. With the completion of the helilift a half-hour later, the battalion occupied the positions vacated by the 4th Battalion when it deployed north to relieve the armored base. U.S. C-130 transport aircraft brought the task force headquarters and the 2d Battalion into Tân Sơn Nhut Airport with the last elements landing at 1930. The task force headquarters and the 2d Battalion then joined the 1st Battalion near the Joint General Staff compound.⁶¹

While making his overnight command post outside of the JGS compound, the Marine task force commander

received new orders for the next day. He was to turn over operational control of his 2d Battalion to a nearby South Vietnamese airborne commander and then move with the 1st Battalion to the positions of the 4th Battalion near the armor base. After taking command of the 4th Battalion, the task force, once more, was to reassume the attack.⁶²

On the morning of 1 February, however, the North Vietnamese launched a counterattack on the Vietnamese forces near the armored compound. The NVA overran a neighboring ARVN artillery base, but the Vietnamese Marine forces in defensive positions, supported by air repulsed the enemy in fighting which even involved "some hand to hand combat." The two battalions of Task Force Bravo then mounted their own offensive. In heavy seesaw fighting that lasted until 3 February, the Vietnamese Marines finally cleared the sector. The costs, however, had been heavy on both sides. For the three days, the Vietnamese

Vietnamese Marines are seen with a Viet Cong prisoner in the streets of Saigon during the Tet offensive. In one of the most memorable scenes of the war, captured by Associated Press photographer Eddie Adams, a few minutes after this scene South Vietnamese National Police Chief BGen Nguyen Ngoc Loan, would personally execute the prisoner.

Photo courtesy of Col John W. Ripley, USMC (Ret)



Marines suffered casualties of 17 dead and 88 wounded and reported over 220 enemy dead. In the fighting, three of the U.S. Marine advisors were among the wounded. These included both the senior and assistant advisors of the 4th Battalion, Major William P. Eshelman and Captain John J. Hainsworth, and the senior advisor to the 1st Battalion, Captain Jerry I. Simpson. All three of the Americans recovered from their wounds although only Major Eshelman returned to his battalion.^{63*}

Beginning on 3 February, the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff began its official counteroffensive in Saigon, codenamed Operation *Tran Hung Dao*, and General Cao Van Vien, Chief of the Joint General Staff, took personal command. According to the plan, Vien divided Saigon into five zones and gave them letter designations A through E. He later added a sixth zone, Zone F, in the outlying southern suburbs that became the responsibility of U.S. forces. South Vietnamese Airborne, Army, police, and Ranger units were given Zones A, C, D, and E to clear. Task Force Bravo assumed control of Zone B, containing the Gia Dinh sector which included the northeastern part of the city and its suburbs. The 2d Battalion remained under the operational control of the Capital Military Command going wherever it was needed until 18 February when it rejoined Task Force Bravo.⁶⁴

Task Force Bravo remained committed to Operation *Tran Hung Do* in the Gia Dinh sector until the operation came to an end on 11 March. While action flared up occasionally during this period, by 7 February, the Vietnamese forces supported by U.S. forces had broken the back of the enemy offensive. Never fewer than two battalions, more often with three, Task Force Bravo and the individual Marine battalions in the operation reported over 700 of the enemy dead, captured 54, and detained over 2,000 suspects. They recovered 44 crew-served and 241 individual Communist weapons. The cost to the Marines was also high, 49 dead and 227 wounded.⁶⁵

While Task Force Bravo and at least one other Vietnamese Marine infantry battalion attached to the Capital Military Command remained in Saigon, Task Force Alpha deployed to Hue and took part in the retaking of the Citadel in that city. From its initial commitment to II Corps, at the start of Tet, Task Force Alpha and its battalions had returned to Saigon to be in position to reinforce Task Force Bravo if needed. After losing operational control of two of its battalions, on 9 February, the task force headquarters and the 1st Battalion departed Tan Son Nhut Airport by air for Phu Bai. By 14 February, the initial units were reinforced by two more battalions, the 4th and 5th. After some initial misunderstandings, the commander of the 1st ARVN Division, General Ngo Quang Truong, assigned Task Force Alpha to clearing the western Citadel. Taking part in some of the heaviest fighting in the war, Task Force A remained under the operational control of the 1st ARVN Division and in Hue or its environs until 27 March when it relieved Task Force Bravo in Saigon. In the fighting for Hue, the Vietnamese Marine task force sustained casualties of nearly 90 dead and 350 wounded.⁶⁶ All told, for the period 30 January through 27 March which included the battles for both Saigon and Hue, Vietnamese Marines reported killing over 1,300 of the Communists and captured another 82 while detaining nearly 2,000 suspects. The entire VNMC suffered 128 killed, 588 wounded, and 1 missing in action.⁶⁶

For the rest of the year, the two Vietnamese Marine task forces and individual battalions would be committed to combat situations without hardly any reprieve. While encountering little of the ferocity of Tet during most of the remaining months, the intensity of the fighting that flared up in Saigon again in May and June for the Vietnamese Marines almost matched that for the earlier period. For the entire year, including Tet, the Vietnamese Marine Corps conducted 196 battalion-size operations or larger which resulted in 2,761 reported enemy killed, 352 prisoners, and 1,150 captured weapons. While on operations 98 percent of the time, the Marines sustained losses of 369 killed, 1,651 wounded, and 4 missing in action. According to Lieutenant Colonel James T. Breckinridge, who relieved Lieutenant Colonel Rodney in April, "the Vietnamese Marine Corps is the best unit in RVN for the amount of money spent to support it. If these Marines are

*Lieutenant Colonel Simpson remembered that the enemy could have used "the 105mm howitzers in the artillery compound . . . to shell the entire Ton Son Nhut area." He recalled that in the enemy attack on the artillery compound, the Vietnamese Marine 1st Battalion closely coordinated fires with the only American in the artillery compound, a U.S. Army major. The ARVN artillerymen lowered their howitzers "to 0 elevation and were firing point blank at the VC." The resulting shelling hit a gasoline station north of the 1st Battalion and provided "excellent illumination of the entire area." LtCol Jerry I. Simpson, Comments on draft, dtd 10Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File). Lieutenant Colonel Hainsworth noted that he had just joined the 4th Battalion. Hainsworth Comments.

**For description of the battle for Hue City see Chapters 9–12.

properly employed and supported and given a target, they can and have outperformed other RVNAF ground units.”⁶⁷

Despite such praise, the Vietnamese Marines had come under significant criticism during the course of the year. Frustrated at what he considered the slow progress of Task Force Alpha in the Hue Citadel, General Creighton W. Abrams, then Deputy ComUSMACV, radioed General Westmoreland that he was considering recommending to the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff the dissolution of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. In perhaps an even more delicate political situation for the Vietnamese Marines Corps, General Khang, the Vietnamese Marine Commandant, resigned all of his positions in June except his command of the Marine Corps after an American helicopter gunship accidentally hit a friendly position, killing several supporters of Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky. While Khang had been identified as a supporter of Ky, he claimed that Ky and his supporters blamed him for the incident.



Above, a Vietnamese Marine lieutenant artillery forward observer calls for a fire mission during street fighting in Saigon during the Tet offensive. Below, Marine infantrymen supported by armor advance in Saigon fighting. Note that the lead Marine has his gas mask open and ready to put on.

Both Photos are courtesy of Col John W. Ripley, USMC (Ret)





Photo courtesy of Col Talman C. Budd, USMC (Ret)

A Vietnamese tank protects the Vietnamese TF Alpha command post in Gia Dinh in renewed fighting in Saigon during May 1968.

According to Khang, to avoid all suspicion, he retained only his post as Marine Corps Commandant. Lieutenant Colonel Breckinridge observed that there apparently was a rumor campaign to discredit Khang in October, claiming that he was about to bring in Marine battalions into Saigon to topple the government. By the end of the year, however, Khang accompanied President Thieu on a ceremonial trip to IV Corps. Breckinridge interpreted this fact to show that Khang was not in disfavor.⁶⁸

While the U.S. Marine advisors for the most part respected their Vietnamese counterparts and the fighting qualities of the Vietnamese Marine, they also recognized several of the shortcomings of the Vietnamese organization. According to Breckinridge, who reviewed all of the American advisor after action and monthly reports, there was a constant theme of lack of staff work and refusal of commanders to delegate authority, lack of tactical coordination, poor employment of mortars, and poor caliber of the noncommissioned officers. During the battle for Hue, for example, the 1st Battalion was heavily engaged for two days while the "two other battalions of the task force watched the fighting from a distance of about one kilometer." The Marine advisor to the battalion attributed some of the heavy losses of the

Marines during the fighting on the failure of the task force commander "to commit all or part of his watching idle battalions."⁶⁹

Despite such obvious weakness on the part of the Vietnamese Marines, Breckinridge, who was serving his second tour in Vietnam, the first being in 1955 with the first advisory group, also saw much improvement. The Vietnamese took several steps to improve both tactics and leadership. The Marines opened up a school for noncommissioned officers and a school for the use of mortars. In March 1968, after a review of the entire organization with the Joint General Staff, MACV agreed to support the transformation of the Marine Corps into a Marine light division. In October the Vietnamese Marine Brigade officially became the Vietnamese Marine Corps division consisting of two brigades. With the potential of continued growth and an earned combat reputation, the Vietnamese Marine Corps had become an even more integral part of the Vietnamese General Reserve.⁷⁰

*Colonel Breckinridge noted in his comments that his "after-tour report was a compilation of many such reports submitted by previous advisors and was an attempt to assist both advisors and Vietnamese. Areas wherein . . . [it] was reported that the VNMC made mistakes, in many cases, are the same areas that Americans would also have fallen short." Col James T. Breckinridge, Comments on draft, dtd 1Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).

1968: An Overview

The year 1968 had been a momentous one in the Vietnam War, possibly the defining year, for the U.S. effort in that conflict, including the Marine Corps role. As the year began, III MAF, the Marine Corps command in Vietnam, had one of its two Marine divisions, the 3d, strung out along the eastern DMZ in largely fixed positions tied to the strong point obstacle system (SPOS) or barrier. While pressing the 3d Marine Division forces in eastern Quang Tri, the North Vietnamese succeeded in isolating the Marine regiment, the 26th Marines, at Khe Sanh in northwestern I CTZ, near the Laotian border. The enemy had cut Route 9, the main east-west land artery, and forced the Marines to rely entirely upon air for resupply. Even in southern I Corps, there were portents of growing enemy strength. The newly formed U.S. Army 23d or Americal Division continued to engage NVA and VC forces. Furthermore, U.S. commanders obtained intelligence that the *2d NVA Division* planned attacks aimed at both the fire support bases of the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division in the Que Son Valley and the 1st Marine Division positions in the Da Nang sector.

As with most aspects of the Vietnam War, the message was mixed. Together with the intelligence about the expansion of the war, there were continuing rumors about new peace initiatives by the North Vietnamese. Earlier, MACV published intelligence estimates that claimed enemy total strength had declined. Moreover, General William C. Westmoreland, the MACV commander, in November 1967, had proclaimed that the end of the war was in sight and issued directives calling for a full offensive by allied forces on all fronts. According to American pacification measurements, more and more villages were supposedly under allied control. In I Corps, for example, at the end of December, III MAF reported about 55 percent of the population living in so-called secure areas.*

Yet as January progressed, MACV and III MAF focused more and more upon the north. The buildup of enemy forces around Khe Sanh could no longer be denied. Originally planning deep penetration operations into enemy base areas in the Do Xa and A Shau areas in I Corps, General Westmoreland decided

instead to reinforce the Marine forces in the north with two more Army divisions, the 1st Air Cavalry and 101st Airborne. The MACV commander expected the enemy major thrust either to be directly across the DMZ, or more likely at Khe Sanh, while launching diversionary attacks throughout South Vietnam.

III MAF also prepared for the onslaught, with its focus also on the north. Beginning in December 1967, Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, the MAF commander, directed the 1st Marine Division at Da Nang to take over the 3d Marine Division area of operations in Thua Thien Province. In a massive relocation of units between the two Marine Divisions during December and January, appropriately called Operation Checkers, the 1st Marine Division assumed responsibility for the Phu Loc area and established its Task Force X-Ray at Phu Bai, as well. The increasing enemy strength around Khe Sanh in mid-January forced the 3d Marine Division to reinforce the garrison with yet another battalion. With the arrival of the 1st Air Cavalry Division in northern I Corps and the establishment of its base area at Camp Evans, about the same time, made the original Checkers plans obsolete. All eyes were now on Khe Sanh.

As General Westmoreland prepared for what he thought would be the decisive battle of the war, his relationship with the Marine command had grown rather tenuous. From the beginning of the commitment of Marine forces to Vietnam, there had been differences between the MACV approach and that of the Marine. From the start, the Marines emphasized pacification and population control while the MACV commander had stressed the large unit war against the VC and NVA regular units. The commitment of large Marine forces to the barrier project along the DMZ also had placed a strain upon the relationship. Although irreverently referred to as the "McNamara Wall," Westmoreland fully backed the venture and believed the Marines to be dragging their feet. Finally there was the subject of Khe Sanh, itself. Only under MACV pressure did III MAF garrison the isolated outpost in the first place and Westmoreland was concerned that the Marines tended to underestimate the threat to the base. Given these circumstances and what he considered Marine inflexibility about control of its own avia-

*See Chapter 1.

tion, the MACV commander gave some consideration about a change in command relations in the north. He finally decided, as a half measure, to establish a MACV (Forward) headquarters at Phu Bai under his deputy, General Creighton W. Abrams, and prepared the way for single management of Marine air under his deputy for air, Air Force General William Momyer.

While, on 21 January 1968, the Communists initiated a massive bombardment on Khe Sanh, their main offensive thrust was not the Marine base nor the DMZ forces, but the cities and lines of communication throughout South Vietnam from the Mekong Delta in the south to Quang Tri City in the north. Khe Sanh would remain under siege from 21 January until early April. Although making several strong probes, overrunning the Special Forces at Lang Vei, and maintaining large troop formations around the base, the North Vietnamese never launched a full-fledged ground assault against Khe Sanh. Speculation and controversy still dominate the discussion about the siege and the motivation of the North Vietnamese. Did the enemy hope for a replay of Dien Bien Phu, its successful campaign against the French in 1954, or merely use Khe Sanh as a feint for his Tet offensive? Given the number of troop resources that the enemy placed around Khe Sanh and the pounding they absorbed from artillery and air, there can be no doubt that the North Vietnamese would have taken the base, if they could have done so. On the other hand, there was a limit on the price they were willing to pay, and in all probability, Khe Sanh was only one objective among many. The Communists hoped and possibly believed that their Tet offensive would bring about a true people's revolution against the South Vietnamese regime, resulting in the defection of the ARVN and the fall of the government.

Arguably, however, the Communists may never have realistically expected their Tet offensive to cause an uprising throughout South Vietnam and probably had in mind a more limited and attainable goal. A case could be made that at least in I Corps, their main objective was not Khe Sanh, but Hue. They perhaps hoped that the capture of Hue would result in the defection of the South Vietnamese forces and the loss of other population centers in the two northern provinces of South Vietnam. Such a result would have cut the allied lines of communication and left the 3d Marine Division suspended without support in the northern regions bordering the DMZ and Laos. This would have left the Communists in a strong position for obtaining their own terms. Given both the

resources that the North Vietnamese put into the battle and the tenacity with which they fought, it was obvious that the Hue campaign was a major component of the entire Tet offensive. According to an enemy account, the North Vietnamese military command in planning the offensive took into consideration that the U.S. and South Vietnamese had concentrated their forces in the north, expecting an attack along Route 9. It viewed Hue as the weak link in the allied defenses in the northern two provinces.

The battle for Hue was a relatively near thing. Only the failure of the North Vietnamese to overrun the *Mang Ca* and MACV compounds permitted the allies to retain a toehold in both the Citadel and the new city. With the holding of these two positions, the Americans and South Vietnamese were able to bring in reinforcements to mount a counteroffensive. Even then, if the enemy had blown the An Cuu Bridge across Route 1 on the first day, the Marines would not have been able to send in their initial battalions and supplies into the city. If the enemy had made a stronger effort to cut both the water and land lines of communications, the outcome of the struggle for Hue would have been less predictable. The Marine rapid response and quick adaptability to street fighting together with the fact that the South Vietnamese forces did not defect permitted the allied forces to attain the upper hand. Fortunately, the 1st Air Cavalry Division had arrived in northern I Corps prior to Tet and was eventually able to commit four battalions to the battle. By the end of February, the allies controlled Hue.

With the securing of the city of Hue, the enemy's countrywide Tet offensive had about spent itself. While the enemy offensive failed, public opinion polls in the United States revealed a continuing disillusionment upon the part of the American public. President Johnson also decided upon a change of course. On 31 March, he announced his decision not to stand for reelection, to restrict the bombing campaign over North Vietnam, and to authorize only a limited reinforcement of American troops to Vietnam.

Notwithstanding the mood in Washington and ready to begin his counter-offensive, General Westmoreland altered again his command arrangements in I Corps. On 10 March, he disestablished his MACV (Forward) Headquarters. He replaced it with Provisional Corps, later XXIV Corps, whose commander, an Army lieutenant general, was directly subordinate to III MAF. At the same time, however, General Westmoreland designated the Seventh Air Force commander, as "single manager for air" and gave him "mission

direction" over Marine fixed-wing aircraft. Despite Marine Corps protests, Westmoreland's order prevailed. While obtaining major modifications to the ruling, Marine air in Vietnam would operate under the single manager system to the end of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

With the end of the enemy offensive, the allies planned to breakout from Khe Sanh. While North Vietnamese ground forces did not follow up on their Lang Vei attack, they incessantly probed the hill outposts and perimeter. Employing innovative air tactics, Marine and Air Force transport and helicopter pilots kept the base supplied. Finally on 14 April, the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division reinforced by a Marine regiment relieved the base. On 14 April, the 77-day "siege" of Khe Sanh was over.

The North Vietnamese were far from defeated, however, and in early May launched their "mini-Tet offensive." Except for increased fighting in the capital city of Saigon and the heavy fighting in the eastern DMZ sector, the North Vietnamese May offensive was largely limited to attacks by fire at allied bases and acts of terrorism in the hamlets and villages. In I Corps, the major attempt was to cut the supply lines in the DMZ sector which led to the very bloody fighting at Dai Do and around Dong Ha. The result again, however, was the defeat of the North Vietnamese forces.

By mid-1968, the allied forces were on the offensive throughout I Corps. General Abrams had succeeded General Westmoreland as Commander, USMACV. Unlike Westmoreland, Abrams had little or no commitment to either keeping a garrison at Khe

Sanh or to the barrier. The closing out of the base at Khe Sanh in July 1968 permitted the 3d Marine Division under Major General Raymond G. Davis to launch a series of mobile firebase operations ranging the length and breadth of the northern border area. Long neglected, the barrier concept was officially abandoned in October.

In the late summer of 1968, the Communists launched another "mini-Tet" offensive, but were again bloodily repulsed. By the end of 1968, both the 3d Marine and 1st Marine Divisions were conducting large mobile operations. After a standstill for most of the year, Marine measurements of pacification showed progress in regaining the countryside. In December, enemy-initiated attacks fell to the lowest level in over two years.

Still, no one was about to predict victory and the Communists were far from defeated. The various "Tet" offensives had provided a benchmark for both sides, forcing both to reassess their strategies. After the last "mini-Tet," the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong scaled down their large-unit war, probably out of both weakness and the expectation that the Americans would eventually withdraw. While Tet was a military setback for the Communist forces with the decimation of the Viet Cong and many of their political cadre in the South, the American government, people, and military establishment also realized that there was a limit to American participation in the war. As Marine Lieutenant General John R. Chaisson, later stated, the Marine Corps "had adopted from 1969 on, the idea that we were in the postwar period."¹

Notes

PART I Pre-Tet 1968

CHAPTER 1 A PUZZLING WAR

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from MilHistBr, Office of the Secretary, Joint Staff MACV, Command History, 1967, hereafter MACV ComdHist, 1967; MilHistBr, Office of the Secretary, Joint Staff MACV, Command History, 1968, hereafter MACV ComdHist, 1968; HQMC, Status of Forces, Dec67–Jan68; FMFPac, Marine Operations in the Republic of Vietnam, hereafter FMFPac, MarOpsV with specific month; CGFMFPac, Pacific Operations, tab F, General Officers Symposium Book, 1967, hereafter CGFMFPac, Pacific Opns; III MAF ComdCs, Dec67–Jan68; LtGen John R. Chaisson Papers (Hoover Institution on War, Peace and Revolution, Stanford University), hereafter Chaisson Papers; Assessment and Strategy Files (Indochina Archives, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley), hereafter A&S Files, Indochina Archives; LtGen Victor H. Krulak, *First to Fight, An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1984), hereafter Krulak, *First to Fight*; Adm Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, USN, CinCPac, and Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA, ComUSMACV, *Report on the War in Vietnam (As of 30 Jun 1968)* (Washington: GPO, 1968), hereafter Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Gen William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co, Inc., 1976), hereafter Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; Edward J. Marolda, *By Sea, Air, and Land, An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in Southeast Asia* (Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1994), hereafter Marolda, *By Sea, Air, and Land*; Jack Shulimson and Maj Charles M. Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, The Landing and the Buildup*, (Washington: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1978), hereafter Shulimson and Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1965; Jack Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, An Expanding War*, 1966 (Washington: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC 1982), hereafter, Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1966; Maj Gary F. Telfer, LtCol Lane Rogers, and Victor K. Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, Fighting the North Vietnamese Army*, 1967 (Washington: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1984), hereafter Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*; BGen Edwin H. Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1968," *Naval Review*, 1970 (Annapolis, Maryland: U.S. Naval Institute, 1970), pp. 290–320, hereafter Simmons, "Marine Operations, 1968."

III MAF in January 1968

1. HQMC, Status of Forces, Dec67–Jan68. See also III MAF ComdC, Jan68; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec67–Jan68; and MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp. 127–8.
2. III MAF ComdC, Jan68; MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp. 127–8.
3. Gen Robert E. Cushman, Jr. Biographical File (Ref Sec, MCHC).

MACV and Command Relations

4. MACV ComdHist, 1967, p. 124; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*, pp. ii–iii, 79, 156, 291–4; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, passim.

5. MACV ComdHist, 1968, p. 248.
6. Ibid., pp. 238, 345; MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp. 156–7; HQMC, Status of Forces, Dec67–Jan68.
7. Gen William C. Westmoreland USA (Ret.) intvw, dtd 4Apr83, p. 11 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); MACV ComdHist, 1968, pp. 248, 443, 475–77; MACV ComdHist, 1967, p. 9.
8. MACV ComdHist, 1967, p. 124. For relations between FMFPac and III MAF, and between III MAF and Seventh Air Force, see the previous volumes in this series, Shulimson and Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1965; Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1966; and Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1967, passim. See also BGen John R. Chaisson ltrs to his wife, dtd 6Sep67, 30Sep67, and 14Nov67 (Chaisson Papers).
9. MACV ComdHist, 1967, p. 167; For command relations between Army and Navy Florilla Group see MajGen William B. Fulton, *Riverine Operations 1966–69*, Vietnam Studies (Washington: Dept of the Army, 1973), pp 85–8.
10. MACV ComdHist 1967, p. 6; MACV ComdHist 1968, pp. 217, 222–23.
11. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 127. See also MACV ComdHist 1968, pp. 7 and 22–3.
12. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 240.
13. Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA, Comments on Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1966, dtd 28Jul78 (Vietnam Comment File).
14. Willard Webb, JCS Historical Office, in *Vietnam Historians Workshop, Plenary Session, 9 May 1983* (Washington: Hist&MusDiv, n.d.[1984]), p. 12.

South Vietnam and I Corps

15. The preceding paragraphs of this section were largely drawn from Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam, A History* (New York: The Viking Press, 1983), pp. 213–311, 386, 444–452, hereafter Karnow, *Vietnam*; Col Dave R. Palmer, *Summons of the Trumpet*, (San Rafael, California: Presidio Press, 1978), pp. 1–48, hereafter Palmer, *Summons of the Trumpet*; and the previous volumes in this series: Capt Robert H. Whitlow, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954–64, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era* (Washington, D.C.: Hist&Mus Div, HQMC, 1977); Shulimson and Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1965; Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1966; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1967, passim.
16. MACV ComdHist, 1968, pp. 142–3, 270, 300–01, 335, 341; HQMC, Status of Forces, Dec67–Jan68. There is a slight discrepancy between the figures in the command history and the Status of Forces. The text uses the figures in the Status of Forces as more representative of the period at the beginning of 1968. For the strength of the Navy, see Marolda, *By Sea, Air, and Land*, p. 216. For the powers of the Military Council, See Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 219.
17. MACV ComdHist, 1968, pp. 275, 300–01.
18. CGFMFPac, Pacific Opns, pp. 10–11.
19. MACV ComdHist 1968, p. 376; HQMC, Status of Forces, Dec67–Jan68.
20. Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1966, pp. 73–91.

21. MACV ComdHist, 1968, pp 378–80; HQMC, Status of Forces, Dec67; Simmons, "Marine Operations, 1968," p. 293.
22. Ibid.; III MAF msg to CG1stMarDiv, dtd 26Dec67, Encl 27, 1st MarDiv, ComdC, Dec67.
23. Gen Robert E. Cushman intvw, Nov 1, 1982, (OralHist Coll, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), pp. 8–9, hereafter Cushman Intvw, 1982.
24. 3d MarDiv, III MAF Campaign Plan Review, Working Paper, n.d., Subj: Command Relations with 1st ARVN Division, Encl 78, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Pt II, Supporting Documents, Dec67.

The Enemy

Additional Sources for this section are: Douglas Pike, "The Other Side," in Peter Braestrup, ed., *Vietnam as History, Ten Years After the Paris Peace Accords* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1984), pp. 71–7, hereafter Pike, "The Other Side;" Robert Pringle, "NVA Order of Battle" ms, hereafter Pringle, Order of Battle;" David Fulgham, "If MACV Hasn't Said It, DIA Won't Say It;" ms; hereafter Fulgham, "If MACV Hasn't Said It"; Gen William C. Westmoreland, News Conference Folder, dtd 26Jan1982.

25. Pike, "The Other Side," p. 73; Television France, Transcript of Intvw with General Giap, "La Peste Ho Chi Minh" [The Ho Chi Minh Trail], 18Feb83, "The 10,000 Day Lie," *The Washington Times*, dtd 16Mar83, p. 11. See also Karnow, *Vietnam*, pp. 257–9.
26. MACV ComdHist 1967, pp. 15–7; MACV ComdHist, 1968, pp. 60–7, 96, 103–4, 108; Pike, "The Other Side," pp. 73–4; Pringle, "NVA Order of Battle."
27. Ibid.
28. MACV, Briefing on Enemy Order of Battle, dtd 23Nov67 (A&S Files, Indochina Archives), MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp. 27–8; CIA, Special National Intelligence Estimate, "Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for Fighting in South Vietnam," dtd 13Nov67 (Westmoreland News Conference Folder, 1982); Pringle, "NVA Order of Battle;" Fulgham, "If MACV Didn't Say It."
29. Gen William C. Westmoreland, Press Statement, dtd 26Jan1982 (Westmoreland News Conference Folder, 1982).
30. MACV Briefing, Nov67; MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp. 2 and 11; Pringle, "NVA Order of Battle;" Fulgham, "If MACV Didn't Say It."
31. MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp. 2 and 11.
32. Vo Nguyen Giap, *Big Victory, Great Task* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 18–19.
33. War Experiences Recapitulation Committee of the High-Level Military Institute, *The Anti-U.S. Resistance War for National Salvation*, trans by Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Hanoi: People's Army Publishing Houses, 1980) [Joint Publications Research Service No. 80968, dtd 3Jun82], pp. 100–01. For speculation about North Vietnamese internal differences, see Pike, "The Other Side"; P.J. Honey, "The Offensive, Hanoi's Change of Strategy," clipping from *China News Analysis*, dtd 22Mar68 and V. Zorza, "Hints from Hanoi," Clipping *Washington Post*, dtd 10Oct68 (A&S Files, Indochina Archives); Donald Oberdorfer, *Tet!* (Doubleday & Company, Inc, 1971), pp. 42–46, hereafter Oberdorfer, *Tet!*; Palmer, *Summons of the Trumpet*, 163–7; MACV ComdHist 1967, p. 74.
34. MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp. 75, 98; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1967, pp. 132–39; Palmer, *Summons of the Trumpet*, pp. 167–9; Oberdorfer, *Tet!*, pp. 107–8; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 236–9.
35. Capt Moyers S. Shore III, *The Battle for Khe Sanh* (Washington: Hist&Mus Div, HQMC, 1969), pp. 26–7, hereafter Shore, *Khe Sanh*.

36. MACV ComdHist, 1968, pp. 128–9.

37. Krulak, *First to Fight*, p. 217.

Focus on the North

38. Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1966, pp. 139–98; Telfer, Rogers, Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1967, passim.
39. Shulimson, op. cit., pp. 314–18; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, op. cit., pp. 86–94; LtGen Louis Metzger, "Memoir," ms, pp. 57–114.
40. This and the following paragraph are derived from: *The Pentagon Papers, The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, The Senator Gravel Edition*, 4 vols (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), vol 4., pp. 285–89 hereafter, *The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition*; MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp. 143–49; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 227–230; Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Vantage Point, Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963–1969* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1971), pp. 369–71, hereafter Johnson, *The Vantage Point*.
41. Additional source for this paragraph is III MAF ComdC, Dec67.

MACV vis à vis Marines

Additional sources for this section are: Gen Wallace M. Greene, Personal Notes and Related material Pertaining to United States and Marine Corps Participation in Operations in Vietnam Binder, Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Personal Papers Collection, MCHC, hereafter Operations in Vietnam Binder, Greene Papers; Victor H. Krulak Papers, hereafter Krulak Papers; Cushman intvw, 1982; MajGen Raymond L. Murray Intvw, 27Jun75 (OralHist Coll, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Murray intvw; Senior Officers Debriefing Program, U.S. Army, Military Institute, Carlisle Bks, Pa., hereafter Senior Officers Debriefing, Carlisle.

42. For examples of General Greene's views see: CMC, Memorandum For the Record, dtd 22Jul65, Subj: Record of Conference on Southeast Asia held at White House and CMC, Memorandum for the Record, dtd 7Nov66, Subj: I Corps Estimate "Force Requirements and Long Range Estimates for I Corps, RVN" in Operations in Vietnam Binder, Greene Papers. For examples of General Krulak's views see: "A Strategic Appraisal" Dec65, Box 4, Krulak Papers; CGFMFPac, Pacific Opns; Krulak, *The First to Fight*, pp. 186 and 197–203. See also Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1966, pp. 11–14; Jack Shulimson and Maj Edward F. Wells, "First In, First Out, The Marine Experience in Vietnam, 1965–1971," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jan 84, pp. 36–46.
43. General Greene is quoted in Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1966, p. 14. See various CMC, Memorandum for the Record in Operations in Vietnam Binder, Greene Papers relative to his efforts via the Joint Chiefs and even the President to present the Marine Corps perspective. For General Krulak, see Krulak ltr to Hon Robert S. McNamara, dtd 11Nov65, Box 4, Krulak Papers and Krulak, *First to Fight*, p. 186. Interestingly enough, former Secretary McNamara makes no mention of this letter or these conversations with Krulak in his memoir, Robert S. McNamara with Brian VanDeMark, *In Retrospect, The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: Time Books, Random House, Inc., 1995), passim.
44. Cushman Intvw, 1982, p. 63.
45. CGFMFPac, Pacific Opns, pp. 5–7; MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp. 319–20.
46. LtGen Victor H. Krulak, Comments on draft, dtd 31Oct1994 (Vietnam comment File), hereafter Krulak Comments.
47. MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp. 319–20.
48. Quoted in Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1966, p. 75; III MAF ComdC, Jan68.

49. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 166.
50. Cushman Intvw, 1982, pp. 43–44.
51. *Ibid.*, pp. 13–16.
52. MajGen Rathvon McC Tompkins intvw, 1973, pp. 50–1 (Oral Hist Coll, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Tompkins Intvw.
53. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 342.
54. Murray Intvw, pp. 32, 45. See also MajGen Raymond L. Murray, Comments on draft, dtd 10Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 48–9. See also Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1967, pp. 229–31; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67; III MAF ComdC, Dec67.
56. Tompkins Intvw, p. 88.
57. Conversations between LtGen William R. Peers, USA, and LtCol Jim Breen, USA, and LtCol Charlie Moore, USA, 13Apr77, pp. 77–8, 81, and Conversations between Gen Harold K. Johnson, USA, and LtCol Rupert F. Glover, USA, v. 2, intvw No. 9, p. 16 (Senior Officers Debriefing, Carlisle).
58. Cushman Intvw, 1982, pp. 38–9.
59. CGFMFPac, Pacific Opns, p. 12.
60. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 166–7. See also BGen John R. Chaisson ltr to wife, dtd 29–30 Nov67 (Chaisson Papers).
61. Cushman Intvw, 1982 pp. 64–5.
62. BGen John R. Chaisson, Diary, entries for 26–28 Jan68 (Chaisson Papers). For relationship between Cushman and Westmoreland, see Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 342; Cushman Intvw, 1982, passim. For description of III MAF staff see Tompkins Intvw, pp. 71–3, 77, 87; Murray Intvw, pp. 15–16.

An Ambivalent Outlook

63. Quoted in Karnow, *Vietnam*, p. 514. See also Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 230–2; Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, p. 376.
64. MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp. 340–5.
65. *Ibid.*; MACV ComdHist 1968, pp. 13–7, 20–3, 781–2, 788.
66. *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 23–4.
67. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 314. See also MACV ComdHist, 1968, 773–4; Murray Intvw, pp. 55–6.
68. MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp. 152–3, Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1967, pp. 120 and 139; 3d MarDiv FragO 62–67, dtd 29Dec67, Encl 13, Plans and Orders, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67; 1st MarDiv, ComdC, Dec67; Simmons, “Marine Operations, 1968,” p. 292.
69. 3d MarDiv and 1st MarDiv, ComdCs, Dec67.
70. III MAF ComdC, Dec67.
71. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, p. 46; Status of Forces, Dec67.
72. MACV ComdHist, 1968, p. 375. See also III MAF Cease Fire Msg Folder.
73. Johnson, *Vantage Point*, p. 379.
74. MACV ComdHist, 1968, pp 881–3. See also 1st MarDiv, PerIntRpt No. 1–68, dtd 8Jan68, tab A, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68.
75. III MAF ComdC, Dec67.
76. “Dissemination of Order for the General Offensive and the General Uprising,” Trans of enemy document, dtd 12Nov67 (A&S Files, Indochina Archives). See also MACV ComdHist, 1968, pp. 881–3.
77. Gen Harold K. Johnson, USA, ltr to LtGen Fred C. Weyand, USA, dtd 17Jan68 (19Dec–4Jan68 SEA Trip Folder, Box 45, H. K. Johnson Papers, U.S. Army, Military History Institute, Carlisle Bks, Pa), hereafter Johnson Papers, Carlisle.

after Johnson Papers, Carlisle.

78. Gen Harold K. Johnson, USA, to MajGen R. G. Fergusson, USA, dtd 11Jan68 (Personal Correspondence File, 1968, Johnson Papers, Carlisle).

79. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 316.

CHAPTER 2 THE 3D MARINE DIVISION AND THE BARRIER

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from MACV ComdHist, 1967; MACV ComdHist 1968; HQMC Msg Files; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan1967–Feb 68; CGFMFPac, Pacific Opns; III MAF ComdCs, Dec67–Jan68; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Nov67–Jan68; Vietnam Comment Files, MCHC; Tompkins Intvw; Murray Intvw; Gen William C. Westmoreland Papers, Center of Military History, hereafter Westmoreland Papers; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1966; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1967; Simmons, “Marine Operations, 1968.”

The 3d Marine Division in the DMZ

1. CGFMFPac msgs to CGIIIMAF, dtd 23 and 27Sep67 (HQMC Msg File).
2. CGFMFPac, Pacific Opns, Tab F, p. 15.
3. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 23Sep67 (HQMC Msg File).
4. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 27Oct67 and CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 14Oct67 (HQMC Msg File). See also General Entry, Historical Summary, 27Dec67–31Jan68, vol. 28 (Westmoreland Papers).
5. Quoted in CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 12Oct67 (HQMC Msg File).
6. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 23Nov67 (HQMC Msg File).
7. MACV J–00, Memo for the Record, dtd 18Dec67, History File, vol. 26 (Westmoreland Papers).
8. MACV, C/S Action Memo, Subj: CIIB Meeting, 16Dec67, dtd 17Dec67, History File, vol. 27 (Westmoreland Papers).
9. Simmons, “Marine Operations, 1968,” pp 292–3. III MAF, Movement Timetable, TF X-Ray Units, n.d., 3dMarDiv Msgs, Jan68.
10. HQMC, MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins, Biographical File, Jul71 (Ref Sec, MCHC).
11. Col James R. Stockman, Comments on draft, Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, “U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967,” dtd 27Jun81 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Stockman Comments, 1981.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Simmons, “Marine Operations, 1968,” p. 294.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Tompkins Intvw, pp. 15–16. See also LtCol Lane Rogers and Jack Shulimson, Memo for the Record, Subj: Conversation with MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins, 7Sep76, dtd 15Sep76 (Vietnam Comment File).
16. Stockman Comments, 1981, and Col James R. Stockman, Comments on draft chapter, dtd 14Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).

The Barrier

Additional sources for this section are: III MAF Dyemarker Msg File 1967–Feb68, hereafter Dyemarker File; MajGen Louis Metzger ltr to CGFMFPac, Subj: Debrief, dtd 22Jan68, hereafter Metzger Debrief; LtGen Louis Metzger, “Memoir,” ms, hereafter Metzger Memoir; Murray Intvw; Gen Wallace M. Greene Papers (Personal Papers Section,

MCHC), hereafter Greene Papers; Samuel T. Williams and Edward G. Lansdale Collections (Hoover Institution on War, Peace, and Revolution, Stanford University), hereafter either Williams or Lansdale Collection; Bruce Palmer, Jr., *The Twenty-Five Year War, America's Military Role in Vietnam* (Lexington, Ky: University of Kentucky Press, 1984), hereafter Palmer, *The Twenty-Five Year War*.

17. Samuel T. Williams ltr to Richard Stilwell, dtd 31Dec68, Box 19 (Williams Collection).
18. Edward G. Lansdale ltr to Robert W. Komer, dtd 31May71 (Lansdale Collection).
19. Palmer, *The Twenty-Five Year War*, p. 40
20. ComUSMACV msg to DCPG, dtd 25Sep66, as quoted in Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1966, p. 316.
21. LtGen Lewis W. Walt ltr to LtGen H. W. Buse, Jr., dtd 29 Dec66, as quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 318.
22. Briefing Paper, Practice Nine Requirements Plan of 26Nov66 and Briefing Paper, Practice Nine Requirements Plan of 26Jan67, as quoted in *Ibid.*, pp. 318–19.
23. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 19Apr67, as quoted in Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1967, p. 89.
24. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 30Apr67 (HQMC Msg File). See also Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1967, p. 89.
25. III MAF OPlan 11–67, dtd 18Jun67. See also Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1967, p. 91.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 92. For the Metzger quote, see LtGen Louis Metzger, Comments on draft chapter, dtd 17Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Metzger Comments.
27. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 13Jun67 (HQMC Msg File).
28. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1967, p. 91.
29. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 30Jul67 (HQMC Msg File).
30. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 30Jul67 (HQMC Msg File).
31. III MAF, Dyemarker Phase I Brief, dtd 10Aug67, Encl 6, CMC Trip Report 3–12 Aug 67 (Greene Papers).
32. CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 16Aug67 (Dyemarker File).
33. CGIIIMAF handwritten comments on CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 1Sep67 (Dyemarker File).
34. CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 5Sep67 (Dyemarker File).
35. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 8Sep67; CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 14Sep67; CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 14Sep67 (HQMC Msg File). See also Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1967, p. 93.
36. III MAF OPlan 12–67, dtd 12 Sep 67 in III MAF OPlans, 1967. See also Telfer, Rogers and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1967, p. 93.
37. Metzger Memoir, pp. 105–7.
38. ComUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 22Oct67 (Dyemarker File).
39. CGIIIMAF msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 22Oct67 (Dyemarker File).
40. III MAF OPlan, dtd 24Nov67.
41. Murray Intvw, pp. 5–15, 58. See Metzger Comments relative to the sandbag problem.
42. 3d MarDiv, Quarterly Review . . . of III MAF Campaign Plan I–67, dtd 5Jan68, Logistics Operations, Encl 8, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68; ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 26Jan68 (HQMC Msg File); 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67, p. 40; MajGen Louis Metzger, Observations on Dyemarker, dtd 10Jan68, Encl 2, Metzger Debrief,

hereafter Metzger Observations.

43. Historical Summary, Entry 26Dec67, vol. 27 (Westmoreland Papers).
44. ComUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 29Dec67 (HQMC Msg File).
45. Tompkins Intvw, p. 44.
46. Murray Intvw, pp. 58–9. See also Historical Summary, Entry for 14Jan68, vol. 28 (Westmoreland Papers).
47. Metzger Observations and Metzger Comments.
48. 3d MarDiv OpO 61–67, dtd 31Dec67, Encl 10, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67.
49. 9th Mar OpO 2–68, dtd 22Jan68, Tab E, 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68.
50. See Maj Justice M. Chambers intvw, 25Apr85 (OralHistColl, MCHC). Major Chambers as a first lieutenant was the 9th Marines Dyemarker officer.
51. Metzger Observations.
52. ComUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 15Jan68 (HQMC Msg File); ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 20Jan68 in Historical File, vol. 28 (Westmoreland Papers).
53. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, p. 16.
54. CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 20Jan68 (HQMC Msg File).
55. Cushman Intvw, pp. 13–16.
56. Tompkins Intvw, pp. 12–14.

CHAPTER 3

THE WAR IN THE DMZ SECTOR

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from MACV ComdHist, 1967; MACV ComdHist, 1968; HQMC Msg Files; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec1967–Feb 68; CGFMFPac, Pacific Opns; III MAF ComdCs, Dec67–Jan68; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Nov67–Jan68; Vietnam Comment Files, (MCHC); Tompkins Intvw; Murray Intvw; Westmoreland Papers; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1966; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1967; Simmons, "Marine Operations, 1968."

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Additional sources for this section are: FMFPac, "Estimate of the Enemy Situation, DMZ Area, 1Jan68," n.d. [Jan68] (MCHC), hereafter FMFPac, "Enemy Estimate, DMZ"; Pringle, "NVA Order of Battle"; Metzger Debrief; Metzger Memoir.

1. MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp. 18 and 70; Pringle, "NVA Order of Battle", pp. 10–12; FMFPac, "Enemy Estimate, DMZ," pp. 16–8.
2. FMFPac, "Enemy Estimate, DMZ," pp. 16–8; III MAF ComdC, Dec67, p. 23.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.* See also III MAF G–2, Periodic Intelligence Report No. 2–68, dtd 15Jan68 (III MAF PerInt Rpts) and 9th Mar IntSum No. 61, dtd 2Jan68, tab b, 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68.
5. FMFPac, "Enemy Estimate, DMZ," pp. 16–8.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 22–4, 55, 83.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 22–4; Murray Intvw, p. 47; Metzger Debrief.
8. FMFPac, "Enemy Estimate, DMZ," pp. 22–24, 81; Metzger Debrief.
9. FMFPac, "Enemy Estimate, DMZ," pp. 22–29; Metzger Debrief.

10. Gen William C. Westmoreland, Entry 16Dec67, Historical Summary, 29 Nov–16Dec67 (Westmoreland Papers, CMH); Metzger Memoir, pp. 94–96; 9th Mar IntSum No. 65, dtd 6Jan68, 9th Mar ComdC, Jan 68, tab b.
11. FMFPac, "Enemy Estimate, DMZ," pp. 38–40.
12. Ibid., pp. 9–11, 38–41.
13. Ibid., pp. 39–41.
14. Ibid. pp. 40–1; Capt Moyers S. Shore II, *The Battle for Khe Sanh* (Washington, D.C.: Hist Br, G–3 Div, HQMC, 1969), p. 29.
15. FMFPac, "Enemy Estimate, DMZ," pp. 55, 66–7; Gen William C. Westmoreland, General Entry, 27 Dec67–31Jan68, Historical Summary (Westmoreland Papers, CMH); Gen William C. Westmoreland intvw, 4Apr83, p. 14 (OralHist Coll, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Westmoreland Intvw.
16. FMFPac, "Enemy Estimate, DMZ," passim.
17. Ibid., pp. 42–3.
18. Ibid., pp. 43–4.
19. Ibid., pp. 56–7.
20. Ibid., pp. 66–68; CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 13Jan68 (HQMC Msg File, III MAF Outgoing, Dec67–Feb68); G–2 III MAF PerIntRpt No. 2–68, dtd 15Jan68 (III MAF PerIntRpts, 1968); Westmoreland msg to Sharp and Wheeler, dtd 15Jan68 (v. 28, Historical File, 27Dec67–31Jan68, Westmoreland Papers).

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21. MACV ComdHist, 1968, v. 1, pp. 371, 374. See also 3d MarDiv, Rules of Engagement, an. J, Letter of Instruction (LOI), 1–67, dtd 11Feb67 in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67, tab 3–1, Supporting Documents.
22. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec67, p. 98; VAdm Edwin B. Hooper, *Mobility, Support Endurance, A Story of Naval Operational Logistics in the Vietnam War, 1965–1968* (Washington, D.C.: NHD, 1972), pp. 119–22.
23. 1st AmTrac Bn ComdCs, Apr, May, and Nov 67; Rogers, Telfer, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967*, pp. 142.
24. 1st AmTrac Bn, ComdCs, Nov–Dec 67; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec 67, p. 21; Working Papers, input to III MAF Campaign Plan Quarterly Review, n.d. [Dec67], Encl 78, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67; Rogers, Telfer, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967*, pp. 142, 145–47.
25. 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan68; 3d MarDiv Task Organization, dtd 31Dec67, tab 3–2, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67.
26. 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan68; 3d MarDiv Task Organization, dtd 7Jan68, Encl 13, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan 68.
27. Quote from letter to mother in Ron Asher, Comments on draft, dtd 10Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File). See also 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan68; CG3d MarDiv msg to 1st AmTrac Bn, dtd 6Jan68, 3d MarDiv Msg File.
28. 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan68.
29. Ibid.

Kentucky Operations and the Barrier

Additional sources for this section are: Col Richard B. Smith intvw, Jul68, Tape 3041 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Smith Intvw; Maj Justice M. Chambers intvw, 25Apr85 (OralHistColl, MCHC), hereafter Chambers Intvw; Col Richard B. Smith, "Leatherneck Square" *Marine Corps Gazette*, Aug69, pp. 34–42, hereafter Smith. "Leatherneck Square."

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31. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967*, p. 142; CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 1Nov67, HQMC Msg File.
32. 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 3d MarDiv Sit Rep No. 271, Opn Kentucky, dtd 7Jan68 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File); Smith, "Leatherneck Square," p. 36.
33. Smith Intvw; Chambers Intvw.
34. Smith, "Leatherneck Square," p. 36; 2/1 ComdC, Jan68.
35. Chambers Intvw.
36. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967*, p. 94; Smith, "Leatherneck Square," p.39.
37. 2/1 ComdC, Jan68, p. II–4; "Marines Direct Artillery at Retreating NVA Flag," *Sea Tiger*, dtd 19Jan68, p. 9.
38. 2/1 ComdC, Jan68, p. II–4.
39. 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68, p. III–1; 9th Mar SitRep No. 260b, dtd 5Jan68, in Ibid; 2/1 ComdC, Jan68, p. II–4 and attached S–3 Jnl.
40. 2/1 ComdC, Jan68, p. II–4 and attached S–3 Jnl; 3d MarDiv SitRep No. 285, dtd 11Jan68, Opn Kentucky (III MAF Jnl & Msg File); 9th Mar SitRep No. 283, dtd 11Jan68, tab A, 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68.
41. III MAF SitRep No. 301, Opn Kentucky, dtd 15Jan68; 3d MarDiv SitRep No. 301, Opn Kentucky, dtd 15Jan68; and 3d MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 15Jan68 (all in III MAF Jnl and Msg File). See also 2/1 S–3 Jnl entries for 14–15Jan68 in 2/1 ComdC, Jan68.
42. Col Billy R. Duncan, Comments on draft, dtd 15Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).
43. LtGen Louis Metzger, Comments on draft, dtd 17Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Metzger Comments.
44. Chambers Intvw; 1/4 ComdC, Jan68, p. 13; Smith, "Leatherneck Square," p. 36.
45. 1/4 ComdC, Jan68; 3d MarDiv SitRep No. 282, dtd 10Jan68, Opn Kentucky (III MAF Jnl & Msg File); 3d Recon Bn ComdC, Jan68.
46. For this and the following paragraph see Smith Intvw; 1/4 ComdC, Jan68.
47. In addition to the sources listed in the preceding note, some reviewers of the draft manuscript remarked on the difficulties and shortcomings of the Marine fortification effort. See Metzger Comments; Col John C. Studt, Comments on draft, dtd 22Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File); Maj Gary E. Todd, Comments on draft, dtd 28Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File) as cited in Chapter 1.
48. See various msgs, 24–29 Dec67, Opn Kentucky (III MAF Jnl & Msg File) and 2/9 ComdC, Jan68.
49. 2/9 ComdC, Jan68.

50. Smith, "Leatherneck Square," p. 38; various msgs, 24–29 Dec67, Opn Kentucky (III MAF Jnl & Msg File); 3/3 ComdC, Jan68.
51. Smith, "Leatherneck Square," pp. 38–9; 3/3 ComdC, Jan68.
52. 3/3 ComdC, Jan68.
53. 3/3 ComdC, Jan 68; 9th Mar SitReps, tab A, 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68; various msgs, 1–19 Jan68, Opn Kentucky (III MAF msg and Jnl File); 2/12 ComdC, Jan68; Col Robert C. Needham, Comments on draft, dtd 7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).
54. 3/4 ComdC, Jan68; LtCol Lee R. Bendell intvw, 16Jan68, Tape 2617 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Bendell intvw.
55. Bendell intvw.
56. Col Lee R. Bendell, Comments on draft, n.d. [Nov94] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Bendell Comments.
57. 3d MarDiv SitRep No. 239, dtd 30Dec67, Kentucky Msg File; 3/4 ComdC, Dec67.
58. Bendell intvw; 3/4 ComdC, Dec67, pp. 14–5; 3/4 Newsletter, Dec67, Encl, 3/4 ComdC, Dec67.
59. 3/4 ComdC, Dec67, pp. 14–5.
60. For this and the following two paragraphs, see Ibid. and Bendell intvw. See also 3d MarDiv SitReps, Nos. 243–44 and SpotRpt No. 115 (Kentucky Msg File).
61. Additional source for this paragraph is 1st MAW Press Release, dtd 8Jan68 in 1st MAW Information Services, Press Releases, App. 6, 1st MAW ComdC, Jan68.
62. Ibid.
63. Bendell intvw.
64. Ibid.; 3/4 ComdC, Dec67; FMFPac, Computerized Award Readout, 1965–1973.
65. 9th Mar SitRep, Opn Kentucky, No. 263, 6Jan68, tab A, 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68.
66. 3/4 ComdC, Jan68; 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68, p. III–1 and 9th Mar SitReps No. 269 and 270, Opn Kentucky, dtd 7Jan68, tab A, 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 3d MarDiv SitRep No. 272 and SpotRep No. 5, dtd 8Jan68 (Kentucky Msg File); Bendell intvw.
67. Bendell intvw and 3/4 ComdC, Jan68.
68. Bendell intvw; 3/4 ComdC, Jan68; 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68, p. III–1 and 9th Mar SitReps No. 269 and 270, Opn Kentucky, dtd 7Jan68, tab A, 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 3d MarDiv SitRep No. 272 and SpotRep No. 5, dtd 8Jan68 (Kentucky Msg File).
69. 1st MAW Press Release, dtd 16Jan68 in 1st MAW Information Services, Press Releases, App. 6, 1st MAW ComdC, Jan68.
70. Bendell intvw; 3/4 ComdC, Jan68.
71. 3d MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 8Jan68 (Kentucky Msg File); Bendell Intvw.
72. This and the following two paragraphs are based upon: Bendell intvw; Capt Raymond W. Kalm, Jr., et al. intvw, 16Jan68, Tape 2618 (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Kalm et al. intvw.
73. Bendell Comments.
74. Kalm et al. intvw.
75. 3/4 ComdC, Jan68, 9th Mar SitReps, Operation Kentucky, tab A, 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68.
76. Bendell Comments; Bendell intvw; Kalm et al. intvw.
77. 3/4 ComdC, Jan68 and Bendell Comments.

Operation Lancaster and Heavy Fighting in Mid-January

78. 3d Mar, AAR, Operation Lancaster, dtd 18Feb68, Encl 3d Mar ComdC, Feb68, hereafter 3d Mar, AAR, Opn Lancaster; 3/9 *Gazette*, Battalion Newsletter, n.d. [Dec67–Jan68], Encl, Col Gorton C. Cook, Comments on draft, dtd 30Nov68, hereafter Cook Comments. See also III MAF msg to MACV, dtd 2Jan68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File, Operation Lancaster).
79. 3d Mar, AAR, Opn Lancaster.
80. 3d Mar AAR, Opn Lancaster; 3d Mar ComdCs, Dec67 and Jan68; 3d Mar msg to 3d MarDiv, dtd 4Jan68, pt IV, 3d Mar ComdC, Jan68.
81. 3d Mar Staff Jnls, pt IV, 3d Mar ComdC, Jan68 and 3d MarDiv SpotReps, dtd 12–13Jan68 and III MAF SitRep No. 292, dtd 13Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File, Operation Lancaster).
82. For this and the next four paragraphs see: 3d Mar AAR, Opn Lancaster; 3d Mar ComdC, Jan68; 3d Mar IntSum No. 13, dtd 13Jan68, Pt IV, 3d Mar ComdC, Jan68; 3d MarDiv SitReps and Spot Rpts to III MAF and III MAF msgs to MACV, dtd 13–15Jan68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File, Operation Lancaster); Cook Comments.
83. 3d Mar AAR, Opn Lancaster; 3d MarDiv msgs to III MAF and III MAF msgs to MACV, dtd 16–17 Feb68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File, Operation Lancaster); 3d Mar, Staff Jnl, Pt IV, 3d Mar ComdC, Jan68.
84. 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 3/4 ComdC, Jan68; Bendell Comments; Col Kenneth L. Christy, Comments on draft, dtd 8Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Christy Comments.
85. Christy ltr to Michael Madden, dtd 4Dec88, Encl to Christy Comments, hereafter Christy ltr, Dec88.
86. The description of the ambush of Company L in this and the following paragraphs is derived largely from 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 9th Mar IntSum No. 80, dtd 21 Jan68, tab B, 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 9th Mar SitRep No. 313, Operation Kentucky, tab A, 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 3/4 ComdC, Jan68; 3d MarDiv msgs and spot rpts to III MAF, dtd 18 Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File, Operation Kentucky). See also Michael John Madden Statement, dtd 19Jun90, Encl, Bendell Comments, hereafter Madden Statement, Jun90 and Christy ltr, Dec88.
87. Christy ltr, Dec88.
88. Christy ltr, Dec88; Madden Statement, Jun90.
89. Christy ltr, Dec88.
90. 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 3/4 ComdC, Jan68; Bendell Comments.
91. 3d Mar, AAR Opn Lancaster; III MAF SitRep No. 322, dtd 20Jan68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File, Operation Kentucky); 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan68.

CHAPTER 4

KHE SANH: BUILDING UP

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul67–Jan68; III MAF ComdCs, Jul67–Jan68; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jul67–Jan68; 26th Marines ComdCs, Jul67–Jan68; Khe Sanh Monograph Comment File; Khe Sanh Correspondence File; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; Ray W. Stubbe, "Khe Sanh: Valley of Decision" ms, 1987 (Copy in Personal Papers Collection, MCHC), hereafter Stubbe, "Khe Sanh"; John Prados and Ray W. Stubbe, *Valley of Decision, The Siege of Khe Sanh* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1991), hereafter Prados and Stubbe, *Valley of Decision*; Shore, *Khe Sanh*. Paul D. Stevens, ed., *The Navy Cross, Vietnam, Citations of Awards to Men of the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps, 1964–1973*, (Forest Ranch, CA: Sharp and Dunnigan, 1987).

The Battlefield

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2. Joann L. Shrock, et al., *Minority Groups in the Republic of Vietnam* (Washington, DC: The American University, 1966), pp. 56–57.
3. Ibid.

The Early Days

4. LtGen Victor H. Krulak, *First to Fight, An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1984), p. 205, hereafter Krulak, *First to Fight*.
5. Prados and Stubbe, *Valley of Decision*, pp. 22–23; Stubbe, "Khe Sanh," p. 31; Khe Sanh Area Report, n.d., Encl, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan67; LCdr Ray W. Stubbe, Comments on draft, dtd 23Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Stubbe Comments.
6. Capt Robert K. Whitlow, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954–1964* (Washington: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1977) p. 139; Prados and Stubbe, *Valley of Decision*, pp. 19–21. See also Stubbe Comments.
7. LtGen John R. Chaisson intvw, 3Apr72 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), pp. 371–372. See also Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1966, pp. 141–43.
8. Col Thomas M. Horne intvw, 17–19Jan67, Tape 384 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
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10. Stubbe, "Khe Sanh," p. 349; Prados and Stubbe, *Valley of Decision*, p. 71.
11. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1967, p. 45.

Protecting the Investment

12. Stubbe Comments. See also Clarke Comments; LtCol Harper L. Bohr, Jr., Comments on draft, dtd 2Nov1994 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Bohr Comments; Prados and Stubbe, *Valley of Decision*, pp. 152–55; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1967, p. 129.

The Isolation of Khe Sanh

13. Stubbe, "Khe Sanh," p. 48; LtGen John A. Chaisson intvw, 3Apr72, pp. 370–74 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); AC/S G–4 memo to AC/S G–3, 4Jul67, Subj: Planning Conference, Encl, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jul67.
14. LtCol James B. Wilkinson, Comments on "The Battle for Khe Sanh," 19Dec68 (Khe Sanh monograph Comment File, MCHC).
15. Ibid.
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17. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Nov67, p. 45.
18. 1/26 ComdC, Nov67, p. 4.
19. Stubbe, "Khe Sanh," p. 388.
20. Ibid. p. 408.
21. 26th Mar ComdC, Nov67, p. 7.
22. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, pp. 8–9; 26th Mar ComdC, Dec67, p. 3; "Intel Estimate of Situation in the Area Between Khe Sanh and Ca Lu," Encl, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67; Robert Pisor, *The End of the Line* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1982), p. 17.
23. MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins, Comments on draft, dtd 19Nov69, Maj Thomas Donnelly and Capt Moyers S. Shore II, "Ho Chi

Minh's Gamble," in LtCol Ralph F. Moody, et al., "Marines in Vietnam, 1954–68," 8 pts (ms, MCHC, Washington, D.C., 1971), pt VI (Vietnam Comment Files, MCHC); Tompkins Intvw, 13Apr73, p. 20.

24. LtCol Harry L. Alderman, Comments on "The Battle for Khe Sanh," n.d. (Khe Sanh Monograph Comment File, MCHC); 1/26 ComdC, Dec67, pp. 3 and 5.
25. Operation Scotland SitReps No. 252 and 254, Encl, 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68; Stubbe "Khe Sanh," p. 462; 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, p. 5.
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27. For discussion relative to the XM–3 and other intelligence efforts see Maj Gary E. Todd, Comments on draft, dtd 28Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File) and Stubbe Comments.

The Decision to Hold

28. CG FMFPac msg to CG III MAF, dtd 8Jan68 (Reel No. 1, HQMC Msg File); Gen Westmoreland msg to Adm Sharp, dtd 21Jan68 (File No. MAC 00992, Westmoreland Papers).
29. W. Scott Thompson and Col Donaldson D. Frizzell, USAF, eds., *The Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: Crane, Russak and Co., 1977), pp. 137–138, 183.
30. CG FMFPac msg to CG III MAF, dtd 11Jan68 (Reel No. 6, HQMC Msg File). Note: This source is a message which contains a verbatim quote of the Wheeler to Westmoreland message mentioned in the text. See also LtGen Victor H. Krulak, Comments on draft, dtd 31Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File) and Krulak, *First to Fight*, pp. 215–16, and Westmoreland, *A Soldier's Report*, p. 336 which note the Washington obsession with Khe Sanh.
31. Khe Sanh Area Report, n.d., Encl, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan67.
32. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 337–338; Prados and Stubbe, *Valley of Decision*, pp. 350–51. Westmoreland journal entry of 11Feb68 is quoted in Prados and Stubbe, *Valley of Decision*, p. 351.
33. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 337–338. It is interesting that General Krulak makes almost the identical case in his book. See Krulak, *The First to Fight*, pp. 215–16. For the account of Dien Bien Phu, see: Bernard B. Fall, *Hell in a Very Small Place* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1966), pp. 101–102; Jules Roy, *The Battle of Dienbienphu* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 149, 162.
34. LtGen Robert E. Cushman intvw, 1Nov82, p. 89 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Cushman Intvw; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 335. For Gen Westmoreland's and the MACV staff's concerns about Marine defenses at Khe Sanh, see LtGen Philip B. Davidson, *Vietnam at War, The History: 1946–1975* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988), pp. 555–556, hereafter Davidson, *Vietnam at War*.
35. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 336.
36. Gen Westmoreland msg to Adm Sharp, dtd 15Jan68 (File No. MAC 00686, in Westmoreland Papers); Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 171–2; MacGarrigle Comments.
37. Gen William C. Westmoreland ltr to Gen Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., dtd 21Apr69 (Khe Sanh Correspondence File, MCHC).
38. LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Comments on "The Battle for Khe Sanh," 26Dec68 (Khe Sanh Monograph Comment File); Cushman Intvw, pp. 22–23.
39. CG FMFPac msg to CINCPAC, dtd 13Jan68 (Reel No. 4, HQMC Msg File, MCHC).
40. Krulak, *First to Fight*, p. 218.
41. LtGen Victor H. Krulak intvw, 22Jun70, p. 8 (Oral HistColl, MCHC). See also Krulak, *First to Fight*, pp. 218–19.

42. Davidson, *Vietnam at War*, pp. 553–54.

43. "Recapitulation of the Spring-Summer 1968—Khe Sanh-Route 9 Campaign Rear Service Operations," compiled by the General Directorate for Rear Services in February 1969, in People's Army of Vietnam, General Directorate for Rear Services, *Rear Service Operations-Khe Sanh-Route 9 Campaign, Spring Summer 1968* (Hanoi, 1988). Copy and translation provided by Mr. Robert DeStatte.

The Stage is Set

44. Stubbe, "Khe Sanh," p. 469.

45. CG III MAF msg to CG 3d MarDiv, dtd 13Jan68 (Reel No. 4, HQMC Msg File).

46. Stubbe, "Khe Sanh," p. 475; Lt Ray W. Stubbe, USN, Diary, 13Jan68 (Personal Papers Coll, MCHC).

47. 3d MarDiv SitRep No. 299 for Opn Scotland in 3d MarDiv SitReps, Jan68; 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pt. III.

48. 2/26 ComdC, Jan68, p. 2; Tompkins Intvw; 2/26 Journal for 14–15Jan68, Ser. Nos. 404 and 404A, in 2/26 ComdC, Jan68.

49. 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, p. 3.

50. CG III MAF msg to CG 3d MarDiv, dtd 16Jan68 (HQMC Message Files, III MAF Outgoing, Dec67–Feb68).

51. LtCol Frederick J. McEwan, Comments on draft, dtd 7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

52. Ibid.; William J. O'Connor, Comments on draft, dtd 29Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).

53. Harry F. Fromme, Comments on draft, dtd 27Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).

54. PFC Leonard E. Newton award citation, n.d. (Decorations and Medals Branch, HQMC, Washington, D.C.).

55. 26th Mar SitRep Nos. 319 and 320 for Opn Scotland, dtd 19Jan68, Encl, 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68.

56. Col William H. Dabney intvw, 20May82, p. 63 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Dabney Intvw. See also Col William H. Dabney, Comments on draft, n.d. [Dec94] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Dabney Comments.

57. 26th Mar SitRep No. 320 for Operation Scotland, dtd 19Jan68, Encl, 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68; Items of Significant Interest (ISI), dtd 21Jan68 (HQMC Command Center File (MCCC), MCHC).

Sortie to Hill 881 North

58. Maj Matthew P. Caulfield Comments on "The Battle for Khe Sanh," 4Jan69, p. 8, in "Khe Sanh: Transcriptions of Oral History" (Archives Section, MCHC), hereafter Caulfield Comments. [Maj Caulfield's comments were taped and are available on Tape 6157, Oral HistColl, MCHC]; Col William H. Dabney intvw, 20May82, p. 63 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Dabney Intvw.

59. 26th Mar SitRep Nos. 322 and 323 for Opn Scotland, Encl, 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pt. IV. See also Dabney Comments.

60. Caulfield Comments, pp. 8–9; 26th Mar SitRep No. 322 for Opn Scotland, op. cit.; Dabney Comments.

61. Caulfield Comments, p. 8; Stevens, ed., *The Navy Cross*, pp. 319–320.

62. Dabney intvw, p. 63; Shore, *The Battle for Khe Sanh*, p. 39.

The Enemy Plan Unfolds

63. LtCol James B. Wilkinson, Comments on "The Battle for Khe Sanh," 19Dec68 and Maj Kenneth W. Pipes, Comments on "The Battle for Khe Sanh," n.d. (Khe Sanh Monograph Comment File).

64. Tompkins Intvw.

CHAPTER 5 THE 3D DIVISION WAR IN SOUTHERN QUANG TRI AND NORTHERN THUA THIEN, OPERATIONS OSCEOLA AND NEOSHO

Protecting The Quang Tri Base, Operation Osceola, 1–20 January 1968

1. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967*, pp. 139–42.

2. Ibid. pp. 94, 119–20, 139–42.

3. Biographical Files (Ref Sec, MCHC); 1st Mar, CAAR, Operation Osceola, n.d., Tab K, 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68, hereafter 1st Mar CAAR, Opn Osceola.

4. 1st Mar CAAR, Opn Osceola.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.; 2/4 ComdC, Dec67.

7. "Youth Alerts Marines," *Sea Tiger*, 12Jan68.

8. 1st MAR CAAR, Opn Osceola; 1st Mar SitReps 286–291, 31Dec67–1Jan68, tab H, 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68.

9. 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68, p. II–C–4 and 1st Mar SitRep Osceola, No. 305, dtd 5Jan, tab H, 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68.

10. 1st Mar CAAR, Opn Osceola; MCCC, Items of Significant Interest, dtd 6Jan68.

11. 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68, p. II–C–4.

12. 1st Mar SitReps No. 326 and 328, dtd 11Jan68, tab H, 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68.

13. 1st Mar SitRep No. 339, dtd 14Jan68 and 1st Mar CAAR, Opn Osceola.

14. 1/1 ComdC, Jan 68, p. 1–II–3; 1st Mar CAAR, Opn Osceola.

15. III MAF ComdC, Jan68, p. 10; 1st Mar CAAR, Opn Osceola.

16. 1st Mar SitRep No. 340, dtd 14Jan68, tab H, 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68.

17. 1/1 ComdC, Jan68, p. 1–II–3.

18. Ibid., pp. 1–II–3—I–II–4.

19. 1st Mar CAAR, Opn Osceola, pp. 40–1.

20. 1st Mar FragO 1–68, dtd 6Jan68, tab d, 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68; 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68, pp. II–C–2 and II–C–5—I–C–6; 1st Mar CAAR, Opn Osceola.

21. 1st Mar CAAR, Opn Osceola; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67, pp. 20–1; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, p. 18.

Operation Neosho and Operations in the CoBi–Thanh Tan, 1–20 January 1968

22. Shulimson, *An Expanding War, 1966*, pp. 69, 143–44, 150–56, 198, 224–26; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967*, pp. 142 and 168.

23. 4th Mar ComdC, Nov 67; 4th Mar, CAAR, Opn Neosho, 1Nov67–20Jan68, dtd 7Apr68, Encl 4th Mar ComdC, Jan68, hereafter 4th Mar CAAR, Opn Neosho; 4th Mar, CAAR, Opn Granite, 25 Oct–6 Nov 67, dtd 17Dec67, tab K, 4th Mar ComdC, Nov 67, hereafter 4th Mar CAAR, Opn Granite.

24. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967*, pp. 173–74; 4th Mar CAAR, Opn Granite; Ron Asher, Comments on draft, dtd 10Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

25. 4th Mar ComdCs, Nov–Dec 67; 4th Mar CAAR, Opn Neosho; 4th Mar Sit Repts, Opn Neosho, Nov–Dec67, III MAF Jnl&Msg File, Opn Neosho.

26. 4th Mar ComdCs, Nov–Dec 67; 4th Mar CAAR, Opn Neosho; CG 3dMarDiv msg to CG III MAF, dtd 29Dec67, Encl 79, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *Fighting the North Vietnamese*, 1967, pp. 176–79.

27. CG 3dMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 29Dec67.

28. Col William L. Dick, Comments on draft, dtd 1Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Dick Comments.

29. 4th Mar CAAR, Opn Neosho; 1/9 ComdC, Jan68; Col John E. Mitchell, Comments on draft, dtd 5Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Mitchell Comments.

30. 3d Recon Bn, Patrol Report, 550–67, dtd 4Jan68, encl 3, 3d Recon Bn ComdC, Jan68, hereafter 3d Recon Bn, Patrol Report, 550–67, dtd 4Jan68.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Sgt Ray Wilkinson, "Ambush Survivors Journey to Safety," *Sea Tiger*, Jan 19, 1968, p. 1, hereafter Wilkinson, "Ambush Survivors"; 3d MarDiv COC telecon to III MAF COC, dtd 2Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).

34. 3d Recon Bn, Patrol Report, 550–67, dtd 4Jan68 and Wilkinson, "Ambush Survivors," p. 1.

35. Ibid. and III MAF SitRep, No. 254, Opn Neosho, dtd 3Jan68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).

36. 1/9 AAR, Opn Neosho, dtd 4Mar68, 1/9 ComdC, Jan68, hereafter 1/9 AAR Opn Neosho; Mitchell Comments; Dick Comments.

37. 1/9 AAR Opn Neosho; 3d Recon Bn, Patrol Report, 550–67, dtd 4Jan68.

38. 1/9 AAR, Opn Neosho.

39. 4th Mar CAAR, Opn Neosho; 1/9 ComdC, Jan68; III MAF ComdC, Jan68.

40. 4th Mar CAAR, Opn Neosho; Col William Dick debriefing at FMFPac, 21Jul68, Tape 3036 (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.). For enemy casualties in the 4th Marines sector, see also MSgt Dennis R. Johnson memo to Col William Dick, dtd 17Nov94, Encl, Dick Comments. Sgt Johnson served with the Marine 15th Interrogation Translation Team (ITT) assigned to Camp Evans and gives the number of confirmed enemy dead in Neosho as 78 rather than 77, and lists enemy casualties in Operations Cove and Foster.

Operation Checkers

41. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68.

42. 1st Mar, 3d Mar, and 4th Mar ComdCs, Jan68.

CHAPTER 6 HEAVY FIGHTING AND REDEPLOYMENT, THE WAR IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN I CORPS

Unless otherwise noted the sources in this chapter are derived from MACV ComdHist, 1968; HQMC Msg File; HQMC, Status of Forces, 1967–68; FMFPac, MarOpsV, 1967–68; III MAF ComdCs, Dec67–Jan68; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Dec67–Jan68; Westmoreland Papers, CMH; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*.

A Time of Transition

1. CMH Intvw Notes with BGen Samuel W. Koster, USA (Ret), dtd 26Aug88 (Working Folder, Americal Division), hereafter Koster Intvw notes; Gen Robert E. Cushman intvw, 1 Nov 82 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), pp. 29 and 37, hereafter Cushman Intvw, Nov82.

2. Cushman Intvw, Nov82, pp. 10–11; Koster Intvw notes; III MAF msg to 1st MarDiv, dtd 24Dec67, Encl 22, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec67; LtGen Donn J. Robertson intvw, 1973–76 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), pp. 14–6, hereafter Robertson Intvw; LtGen Robert E. Cushman debriefing at FMFPac, 31Mar69, Tape 4058 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), pp. 465–66, hereafter Cushman Intvw, Mar69.

3. Cushman Intvw, Nov82, p. 8.

4. CG III MAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 21Oct67 (HQMC Msg File, III MAF Outgoing); HQMC, Status of Forces, Dec 67, p. 35–1. Lieutenant Colonel Bradley is quoted in Jeffrey J. Clarke, *Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973* (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1988), pp. 334–35, hereafter Clarke, *The Final Years*.

5. HQMC, Status of Forces, Dec 67, p. 35–1; Koster Intvw notes; Cushman Intvw, Nov 82, p. 8.

6. LtCol Byron F. Brady intvw, 12Oct86 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), pp. 1–5; III MAF ComdC, Dec67, p. 6; Resume of Telecon, dtd 10Jan68, Subj: opcon CAP ((III MAF Special Rpt to FMFPac Folder); FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, p. 47; Michael E. Peterson, *The Combined Action Platoons, The U.S. Marines' Other War in Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1989), pp. 47, 50, and 56; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1967, p. 191; Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1966, p. 240.

7. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov67, pp. 30–1.

8. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p. 32; 1st Mar Div, Commanders AAR, Tet Offensive, 29 Jan–14 Feb68, dtd 25May68 (1st MarDiv Admin Files), p. 14, hereafter 1st MarDiv AAR Tet Offensive.

9. 1st MarDiv AAR, Tet Offensive, p. 14; George MacGarrigle, "The 2d North Vietnamese Division," ms, pp. 32–4 (Working Papers, Americal Division), hereafter MacGarrigle, "The 2d North Vietnamese Division."

10. MacGarrigle, "The 2d North Vietnamese Division," ms, pp. 32–4; III MAF ComdC, Dec67, p. 22.

11. LtCol John F. J. Kelly intvw, 23 May 1968, Tape 2760 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); III MAF ComdC, Dec67, p. 22.

The Da Nang TAOR

12. LtGen Donn J. Robertson, USMC, Biographical File (RefSec, MCHC).

13. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1967, pp. 109, 222–23.

14. Ibid.; MajGen Raymond L. Murray intvw, 1975 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), pp. 46–7, hereafter, Murray Intvw.

15. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1967, p. 109; Cushman Intvw, Nov82, pp. 50–60; Robertson Intvw, p. 9–11.

16. 1st MarDiv Periodic IntRpt No. 1–68, dtd 8Jan68, tab A, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68.

Operation Auburn: Searching the Go Noi

17. Ibid.; 1st MarDiv Periodic IntRpt No. 3–68, dtd 22Jan68, tab A, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68; III MAF ComdC, Dec67, p. 23; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, p. 15; Robertson Intvw, p. 29.

18. 1st MarDiv Periodic IntRpt No. 1–68, dtd 8Jan68, tab A, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68. For the 1965 activities of the R–20, see Shulimson and Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1965, p. 129.

19. Col William K. Rockey, Comments on draft, dtd 10Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

20. 5th Mar Frag O 74–67, Opn Auburn, dtd 25 Dec 67, in App B, 5th Mar ComdC, Dec67.

21. Ibid. and 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 26Dec67 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File, Opn Auburn).

22. 3d Bn, 5th Mar CAAR, Opn Auburn, dtd 5Jan68, Encl, 3/5 ComdC, Jan68, hereafter 3/5 CAAR Auburn; "Australian Captain Heads Marine Company," *Sea Tiger*, 5Jan68, pp. 1 and 9; Isherwood COC telecon to III MAF COC, dtd 28Dec67 and 1st MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 29Dec67 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File, Opn Auburn).

23. 3/5 CAAR, Opn Auburn; 1st MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 29Dec67 and III MAF Spot Rpt to MACV, dtd 28Dec67 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File, Opn Auburn).

24. 3/5 CAAR, Opn Auburn; 1st MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC (III MAF Jnl and Msg File).

25. Ibid. and "Being First Hurts," *Sea Tiger*, 26Jan68, p. 9.

26. 3/5 CAAR, Opn Auburn; 1st MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC (III MAF Jnl and Msg File); "Sure Shot Marine Logs 'Lucky Run,'" *Sea Tiger*, 19Jan68, p. 5.

27. 3/5 CAAR, Opn Auburn; 1st MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, 29Dec67 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File); 2/5 CAAR, Opn Auburn, dtd 5Jan68, App B, 2/5 ComdC, Jan68, hereafter 2/5 CAAR, Opn Auburn. The 3/5 AAR and 1st MarDiv msg do not break down Marine casualties by company for 28 December 1967; the 2/5 CAAR, on the other hand, mentions the bodies of nine Marines from the action on the 28th recovered in the objective area the following day. Those bodies could only have been from Company E, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines.

28. 5th Mar FragO No. 75-67, Opn Auburn, dtd 28Dec67 in App B, 5th Mar ComdC, Dec67.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. 3/5 CAAR, Opn Auburn and 2/5 CAAR, Opn Auburn.

32. 2/5 CAAR, Opn Auburn.

33. 1st MarDiv to III MAF and info to 5th Mar, dtd 29Dec67 and 1st MarDiv to 5th Mar, dtd 30Dec67 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File, Opn Auburn); 5th Mar FragO No. 76-67, Opn Auburn, dtd 30Dec67 in App B, 5th Mar ComdC, Dec67.

34. 3/5 CAAR, Opn Auburn.

35. Ibid. and 2/5 CAAR, Opn Auburn.

36. 3/5 CAAR, Opn Auburn; 1st MarDiv PerIntRpts, tab A, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68; 1st MarDiv AAR, Tet Offensive, p. 16; MajGen Robert D. Bohn intvw, Apr-Jun, 89 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), p. 213, hereafter Bohn Intvw.

A Busy Night at Da Nang

37. The following sources pertain to this and the following three paragraphs: 1st MarDiv PerIntRpt, dtd 8Jan68, tab A, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68 and 7th Mar SitRep No. 265, dtd 3Jan68, tab C, 7th Mar ComdC, Jan68.

38. Additional source for this and the following two paragraphs are: 7th Mar Jnl, tab A, 7th Mar ComdC, Jan68.

39. Col W. J. Davis, *Tet Marine, An Autobiography* (San Diego, CA, 1987), p. 103, Encl to Col William J. Davis, Comments on draft, dtd 2Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Davis, *Tet Marine*.

40. Additional sources for this and the following paragraph are: 1st Tank Bn SitRep No. 3, dtd 3Jan68; 1st Tank Bn, ComdC, Jan68; 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 2Jan68 in III MAF Folder, Rocket Attack, 2-3 Jan 1968.

41. Additional sources for this paragraph are: 1st MarDiv, ComdC, Jan68, p. 25; 2/5 ComdC, Jan68; I Corps TOC telecon to III MAF COC, dtd 3Jan68 in III MAF Folder, Rocket Attack 2-3 Jan68.

42. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: 7th Mar

SitRep No. 265, dtd 3Jan68, tab C, 7th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 7th Mar Jnl, 2-3 Jan68, tab A, 7th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 11th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 1st Tank Bn ComdC, Jan68; III MAF to FMFPac, dtd 4Jan68 in III MAF Special Report to FMFPac Folder; 1st MarDiv to III MAF, Narrative Summary of Events of Rocket Attack, [3]Jan68 and miscellaneous handwritten notes in III MAF Folder, Rocket Attack 2-3 Jan68; 1st MarDiv PerIntRpt, dtd 8Jan68, tab A, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68.

43. Additional source for this paragraph is MacGarrigle, "The 2d North Vietnamese Division," ms, p. 37.

Continuing Heavy Fighting and Increasing Uncertainty

44. MacGarrigle, "The 2d North Vietnamese Division," ms, p. 43 and III MAF ComdC, Jan68.

45. MacGarrigle, "The 2d North Vietnamese Division," ms, pp. 34-6.

46. Additional sources for this and the following paragraph are: Ibid.; III MAF msg to subordinate units, dtd 2Jan68, Encl 2, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68; III MAF ComdC, Jan68.

47. Additional sources for this paragraph are: CGIIIMAF msg to FMFPac, dtd 4Jan68 (III MAF Special Rpt to FMFPac Folder); F. Clifton Berry, Jr., *Air Cav, The Illustrated History of the Vietnam War* (Bantam Books: New York, New York, 1988), pp. 100-02.

48. MacGarrigle, "The 2d North Vietnamese Division," ms, pp. 38, 41-2.

49. Ibid., pp. 40-1.

50. Ibid.; [Major General Samuel B. Koster, USA,], "Americal Division, 1967-1968," n.d. (Working Folder, Americal Division); III MAF to FMFPac msgs, 4-13Jan 68 (III MAF Special Rpt to FMFPac Folder); and III MAF Sit Reps, 4-13Jan68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File, Opn Wheeler/Wallowa).

Phu Loc Operations

51. 1/5 ComdCs, Dec67 and Jan 68.

52. 1st MarDiv Periodic IntRpt No. 1-68, dtd 8Jan68, tab A, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68; Intelligence Annex, 5th Mar OPlan 3-67, dtd 14Dec67, App 1, tab I, 1/5 ComdC, Dec67; III MAF ComdC, Dec67, p. 22.

53. James Duguid intvw, 14 Oct 1984 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Duguid Intvw; 1st MarDiv Periodic IntRpt No. 1-68, dtd 8Jan68; III MAF ComdC, Dec67, p. 22.

54. 1/5 ComdC, Jan68, p. 3-2.

55. Ibid., p. 3-3.

56. Ibid., pp. 3-2-3-4.

57. 1st MarDiv PerIntRpt No. 1-68, dtd 8Jan68, tab A, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68; Arliss Willhite and Thomas Krusewski intvw, 13Oct84 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Willhite and Krusewski Intvw, Oct84.

58. 1/5 ComdC, Jan68, pp. 3-4, 3-5; 5th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pp. 3-2, 3-3; 1st MarDiv PerIntRpt No. 1-68, 8Jan68; IIIMAF to FMFPac, dtd 7Jan68 (III MAF Special Rpt to FMFPac Folder); III MAF PerIntRpt No. 2-68, dtd 15Jan68 (III MAF PerIntRpts, 1968).

59. Cpl Arliss Willhite et al., intvw, 15Aug68, Tape 2276 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Willhite Intvw, Aug68; Willhite and Krusewski Intvw, Oct84.

60. Willhite Intvw, Aug68; Willhite and Krusewski Intvw, Oct84.

61. Willhite Intvw, Aug68; Willhite and Krusewski Intvw, Oct84; 1st MarDiv Periodic IntRpt No. 1-68, dtd 8Jan68.

62. Willhite Intvw, Aug68; Willhite and Krusewski Intvw, Oct84; 1st MarDiv Periodic IntRpt No. 1-68, dtd 8Jan68; IIIMAF to FMFPac, dtd 7Jan68 (III MAF Special Rpt to FMFPac Folder).

63. 1/5 ComdC, Jan68.

64. Ibid.; III MAF PerIntRpt No. 2–68, 15Jan68; 1st MarDiv PerIntRpt No. 1–68, 8Jan68; IIIMAF to FMFPac, dtd 7Jan68 (III MAF Special Rpt to FMFPac Folder).

65. 1/5 ComdC, Jan68; IIIMAF msg to FMFPac, dtd 11–15Jan68 (III MAF Special Rpt to FMFPac Folder).

The Formation and Deployment of Task Force X-Ray

66. "History of Task Force X-Ray," n.d., Attachment to Col A. J. Poillon, comments on Maj Thomas Donnelly and Capt Moyers S. Shore II, "Ho Chi Minh's Gamble," in LtCol Ralph F. Moody, et al., "Marines in Vietnam, 1954–68," 8 pts (ms, MCHC, 1971), pt VI, dtd 30Oct69 (Vietnam Comment Files), hereafter "History of Task Force X-Ray," Poillon Comments; CG 1st MarDiv msg to CG TF X-Ray, dtd 3Dec67, Encl 57 and 1st MarDiv OpO 309–68, 18Dec67, Encl 45, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec67, hereafter 1st MarDiv OpO 309–68, 18Dec67.

67. 1st MarDiv OpO 309–68, 18Dec67.

68. Ibid.; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec67, p. 18; CG 1st MarDiv msg to CG 3d MarDiv, dtd 15Dec 67, Encl 58, and dtd 23Dec67, Encl 63, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec67; CG3d MarDiv msg to CG 1st MarDiv, n.d., Encl 44, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67; LtCol A. Van Winkle et al. intvw, 25Jan68, Tape 2478 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Van Winkle Intvw; 1/5 ComdC, Dec67.

69. 1st MarDiv FragO 4–68, 11Jan68, 3d MarDiv Messages, Jan 1968.

70. III MAF COC, Resume of telecon, 15Jan68 in III MAF Special Report to FMFPac, Jan68; 5th Mar ComdC, Jan68; TF X-Ray ComdC, 13–31Jan68.

71. Bohn Intvw, Apr89 and May89, pp. 272–3, 278.

72. Bohn Intvw, pp. 274–78; SSgt Donald O. Taylor in LtCol A. Van Winkle et al. Intvw.

73. Bohn Intvw, pp. 274–8, 308; LtCol Joseph W. Malcolm debriefing at FMFPac, 28Oct68, Tape 3453, (Oral HistColl, MCHC); LtCol James C. Hecker in LtCol A. Van Winkle et al. Intvw.

74. Task Force X-Ray OpO 301–68, 12Jan68, Encl 36, 1st MarDiv, ComdC, Jan68.

75. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 4Oct67, HQMC Msg File, III MAF, Incoming; Cushman intvw, Nov 82, p. 8; HQMC, Status of Forces, Dec 1967–Jan68, pp. 31–1; Clarke, *The Final Years*, p. 334; Col Hoang Ngoc Lung, *The General Offensives of 1968–69*, Indochina Monographs, (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1981), p. 78.

The Cavalry Arrives

76. MACV ComdHist, 1968, v. 1, pp. 23–4; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67, p. 16; 4th Marines, CAAR, Opn Cumberland, dtd 11Oct67 (4th Marines Miscellaneous Reports); Cushman Intvws, Nov82 and Mar68, pp. 25 and 490; Murray Intvw, pp. 55–6; CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 8Dec67, HQMC Msg File.

77. MACV ComdHist, 1968, v. 1, pp. 23–4; Entry for 16Dec67, Historical Summary, 29Nov67–16Dec67, and HQMACV C/S Action Memo, No 67–178, subj: CIIB Meeting, 16 Dec 67, dtd 17 Dec 67, v. 22, History File, Westmoreland Papers, CMH; CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 16Dec67, HQMC Msg File; MajGen John J. Tolson intvw, 24Jun68, 14th MHD (Copy in CMH), hereafter Tolson Intvw.

78. Tolson Intvw; Westmoreland msg to Sharp and Wheeler, dtd 12 and 15Jan68, Backchannel Messages and C/S Memo No. 68, dtd 14Jan68, v.28, History File, 22Dec67–31Jan68, Westmoreland Papers.

79. Westmoreland msg to Sharp and Wheeler, 15Jan68 and Entry for

17Jan68, Historical Summary, v. 28, History File, Westmoreland Papers.

80. See for the York II planing CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 26 and 28Dec67, 3 and 12Jan68, and CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 6Jan68 (HQMC Msg File). For the Niagara planning and General Westmoreland's concerns see ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac dtd 21Jan68 and Entry for 19Jan68, Summary, v. 28, History File, 27Dec67–31Jan68, Westmoreland Papers.

81. Westmoreland entry for 19Jan68, Historical Summary; CinCPac msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 19Jan68, Back Channel Messages, Westmoreland Papers.

82. Tolson Intvw; III MAF to FMFPac, 23Jan68 (Special FMFPac Rpt Folder).

83. Tolson Intvw.

84. Ibid.; III MAF ComdC, Jan68; BGen Herbert L. Beckington, Comments, dtd 25Oct69 in BGen Edwin H. Simmons, Comment Files on May 1970 *Naval Review* article.

The Changed Situation in the North

85. 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68; 1st Mar, CAAR Opn Neosho II, dtd 22Feb68, tab J, 1st Mar ComdC, Jan 68; CGIIIMAF, CG3dMarDiv, CTF76.4, CTF 79.4, and BLT 2/4, exchange of msgs, 3d MarDiv, Messages, Jan68.

86. 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68; 1st Mar, CAAR Opn Neosho II, dtd 22Feb68, tab J, 1st Mar ComdC, Jan 68; 1st Mar OpO 3–68, dtd 26Jan68, tab G, 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68.

87. 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68; 1st Mar OpO 3–68, dtd 26Jan68, tab g, 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68; CG1stMarDiv msg to CGTFX-Ray, dtd 24Jan68, Encl 20, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68; Bohn Intvw, pp. 279–80.

88. 5th Mar ComdC, Jan68 and 1/5 ComdC, Jan68.

89. 5th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 5th Mar OpO 301–68, dtd 18 Jan68, Encl 17 and 5th Mar FragO 7–68, dtd 25Jan68, Encl 52, 5th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 2/5 ComdC, Jan68.

90. TF X-Ray ComdC, Jan68; "History of Task Force X-Ray," Poillon Comments.

91. Historical Summary, General Entry, 27Dec67–31Jan68, Entry for 22Jan68, History File, v. 28, Westmoreland Papers; Westmoreland msg to Wheeler, dtd 22Jan68 and Westmoreland msg to Sharp and Wheeler, dtd 26Jan68, Westmoreland Messages, Westmoreland Papers; John R. Chaisson, entries for 26–28 Jan68, Diary, Chaisson Papers; Cushman Intvw, Mar69, pp. 459–60 and 465–66.

92. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 27Jan68 and CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 27Jan68 (HQMC Msg File); Abrams msg to Cushman, dtd 31Jan68, Creighton B. Abrams Papers, CMH; MACV msg to III MAF, dtd 3Feb68 (III MAF Incoming Msgs); Cushman FMFPac debriefing; Maj Miles D. Waldron and Spec 5 Richard W. Beavers, XXIV Corps, "The Critical Year, 1968," pp. 4–5 (CMH); LtGen Willard Pearson, USA, *The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966–1968*, Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C. Dept of the Army, 1975); Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 345.

PART II The Tet Offensive

CHAPTER 7 THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE IN THE DMZ AND SOUTHERN QUANG TRI, 20 JANUARY–8 FEBRUARY

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan and Feb68; Maj Thomas Donnelly and Capt Moyers S. Shore II, "Ho Chi Minh's Gamble," in LtCol Ralph F. Moody, et al., "Marines in Vietnam, 1954–68," 8 pts (ms, MCHC, Washington, D.C., 1971), pt VI, hereafter Donnelly and Shore, "Ho Chi Minh's Gamble"; III MAF ComdCs, Jan and Feb68; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jan and Feb68; HQMC Msg File; III MAF Jnl & Msg File; Vietnam Comment Files; A&S Files, Indochina Archives; *Sea Tiger*, Jan–Feb68; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; LtGen Willard Pearson, USA, *The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966–1968*, Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C. Dept of the Army, 1975), hereafter Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*; Col Hoang Ngoc Lung, ARVN, *The General Offensives of 1968–69*, Indochina Monographs (Washington, D.C., CMH, 1981), hereafter Lung, *The General Offensives*; LtCol Pham Van Son, ARVN, et al., *The Viet Cong Tet Offensive, 1968* (Saigon, RVN: Joint General Staff, RVNAF, 1968), hereafter Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*.

The Cua Viet is Threatened

Other sources for this section are: 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan68; 3/1 ComdC, Jan68; BLT 3/1 CAAR, Operation Badger Catch, dtd 14Mar68, Encl, 3/1 ComdC, Feb68, hereafter 3/1 CAAR, Operation Badger Catch.

1. 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan68.
2. Ronald R. Asher, Comments on draft, dtd 10Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).
3. This and the following paragraph are based on the following sources: 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan68; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68; III MAF ComdC, Jan68.
4. See also MCCC, Items of Significant Interest, dtd 22Jan68 and HQMC, G–3, Point Paper, Status of WestPac Units, dtd 23Jan68, HQMC Point Papers, Jan–Jun68.
5. 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan68.
6. Ibid.
7. CGIIIMAF msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 22Jan68 and also CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 22Jan68 (HQMC Msg File, III MAF Outgoing, Dec67–Feb68).
8. CGIIIMAF msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 5Jan68 and ComSeventhFlt to CTG 76.5, dtd 15Jan68, Encls 5 and 7, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68.
9. CGIIIMAF msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 17Jan68 and CGIIIMAF msg to CG3dMarDiv and ComUSMACV, dtd 22Jan68 (HQMC Msg File, III MAF Outgoing, Dec67–Jan68).
10. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 23Jan68, Encl, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68; 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan68; 3/1 CAAR, Operation Badger Catch; "Operation: Badger Catch/Saline/Napoleon-Saline," BLT 3/1, *Newsletter Battalion Landing Team 3/1 RVN, Dec 67–Jun68*, Apr 1988, p. 6.
11. 3dMarDiv COC msg to IIIMAFCO, dtd 23Jan68, Encl 29, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68.

12. CGIIIMAF msg to CTG 76.5, dtd 24Jan68, Encl 42, and CTG 79.5, SitRep, Opn Badger Tooth, dtd 2Jan68, Encl 87, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68.

Adjustment of Forces in Southern Quang Tri Province

Other sources for this section are: 3d Mar ComdC, Jan68; 3d Mar AAR, Opn Osceola II, dtd 20Mar68, 3d Mar Miscellaneous File, hereafter 3d Mar AAR, Opn Osceola II; 1st AirCavDiv, Operational Report Lessons Learned, for period ending 31Jan68, dtd 17Mar68 (CMH Working Papers), hereafter 1st AirCavDiv, ORLL, 31Jan68.

13. 3d Mar ComdC, Jan68; 1st Mar Operation Osceola SitRep No. 363, dtd 20Jan68, tab H, 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68.
14. 3d Mar ComdC, Jan68; 3d Mar AAR, Opn Osceola II.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid. and III MAF ComdC, Jan68.
17. CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 22Jan68 (HQMC Msg File, III MAF Outgoing, Dec67–Feb68).
18. 1st AirCavDiv, ORLL, 31Jan68; William Ehrhart, ltr to Shulimson, dtd 2Jul91 (Vietnam Comment File).
19. 3d Mar ComdC, Jan68; 3d Mar AAR, Opn Osceola II.

Heavy Fighting Along the DMZ

Other sources for this section are: 3d MarDiv, AAR, Operation Lancaster II, dtd 9Sep69[?], Encl, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Nov68, hereafter 3d MarDiv AAR, Operation Lancaster II; 4th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 3/4 ComdC, Mar68.

20. 4th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 3d MarDiv AAR, Operation Lancaster II.
21. 4th Mar ComdC, Jan68.
22. This and the following paragraph are based on the following sources: 4th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 3/4 ComdC, Jan68; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68; III MAF ComdC, Jan68; 3d MarDiv AAR, Operation Lancaster II; MCCC, Items of Significant Interest, dtd 26Jan68; G–3, HQMC, Point Paper, Status of Forces in WestPac, dtd 31Jan68 (HQMC Point Papers, Jan–Jun68). For reference to Dien Bien Phu and the 320th NVA Division, see George L. MacGarrigle, Comments on draft, dtd 5Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).
23. This and the next two paragraphs are based on the following sources: 3d MarDiv AAR, Operation Lancaster II; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68.
24. Col Lee R. Bendell, Comments on draft, n.d. (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Bendell Comments.
25. Additional sources for this and the following paragraph are: 3/4 ComdC Jan68; 4th Mar ComdC, Jan68.
26. Additional source for this paragraph is: "Marines Blast 'Wall to Wall,' NVA After Ambush," *Sea Tiger*, 1Mar1968, p. 4. See also Bendell Comments.
27. 3/4 ComdC, Jan68; 3d MarDiv AAR, Operation Lancaster II.
28. 3/4 ComdC, Jan68.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid. See also Bendell Comments.
31. Sources for this and the following three paragraphs are: 3/4 ComdC, Jan68; "Marines Blast 'Wall to Wall,' NVA After Ambush," *Sea Tiger*, 1Mar1968, p. 4. See also Maj John S. Leffen, Jr., Comments on draft, n.d. (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Leffen Comments.

32. Additional sources for this and the following two paragraphs are: 3d MarDiv AAR, Operation Lancaster II; Abdullah Hassan (Frank Craven) intvw, 2Oct86 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Hassan Tape.
33. Leffen Comments.
34. Hassan Tape.
35. 3/4 ComdC, Jan68; Bendell Comments.
36. Bendell Comments.
37. 3/4 ComdC, Jan68.
38. Ibid.
39. Sources for this and the following paragraph are: 3/4 ComdC, Jan68; 3d MarDiv AAR, Operation Lancaster II.
40. Messages quoted in 3/4 ComdC, Jan68.
41. III MAF ComdC, Jan68; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68; 4th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 9th Mar Int Sum, Opn Kentucky, No. 87, dtd 28Jan68, tab B 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 3/4 ComdC, Jan68; 3d MarDiv AAR, Operation Lancaster II.

A Lull in Leatherneck Square

Additional sources for this section are: 9th Mar ComdC, Jan–Feb68; 2/1 ComdC, Jan68; 3/4 ComdC, Jan68; 3d MarDiv Messages, Jan 1968.

42. CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 20Jan68 (HQMC Msg File); 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 3/4 ComdC, Jan68; MCCC, Items of Significant Interest, dtd 22Jan68.
43. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 17Jan68, 3d MarDiv Messages, Jan 1968.
44. 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 2/1 ComdC, Jan68; MCCC, Items of Significant Interest, 23–25Jan68.
45. 9th Mar SitRep No. 354, Operation Kentucky, dtd 29Jan68, tab A, 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68.
46. 9th Mar Int Sum, Opn Kentucky, No. 87, dtd 28 Jan68, tab B, 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68.
47. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 27Jan68 (HQMC Msg File); exchange of messages between CG3dMarDiv and CTG 76.4, dtd 26Jan68, Encl 116–18, 3d MarDiv Messages, Jan68.
48. Exchange of messages between CG3dMarDiv and CTG 76.4, dtd 27Jan68, Encl 126–29, 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jan68; 9th Mar SitReps, Operation Kentucky, Nos. 347–64, dtd 27–31Jan68, tab A, 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68.
49. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68; 9th Mar SitRep, Operation Kentucky, No. 364, dtd 31Jan68, tab A, 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68; CG3dMarDiv to CGIIIMAF, dtd 3Feb68, HQMC Message File, III MAF Incoming, Dec67–Feb68.

The Cua Viet Continues to Heat Up

Other sources for this section are: 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan–Feb68; 3/1 ComdCs, Jan–Feb68; 3/1 CAAR, Operation Badger Catch.

50. 1st AmTrac Bn, ComdC, Jan68; CG3dMarDiv msg to CGIII MAF, dtd 30Jan68, 3d MarDiv Messages, Jan68.
51. BLT 3/1 AAR, Badger Catch; 1st AmTrac Bn msg to CO 9th Mar and CO 12th Mar n.d., attached to S–2/3 Jnl, 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan68.
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53. Ibid.
54. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 30Jan68, 3d MarDiv Messages, Jan68.
55. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68; Enemy Order of Battle, 9th Mar ComdC, Feb68; BLT 3/1 AAR, Badger Catch.
56. BLT 3/1 AAR, Badger Tooth.
57. Sources for this and the following three paragraphs are: BLT 3/1 AAR, Badger Tooth; 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Jan68.
58. Additional source for this and the following paragraph is 3d Mar Div ComdC, Jan68.
59. BLT 3/1 AAR, Badger Tooth.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid; ComUSMACV msgs to III MAF, 27–29Jan68 (III MAF Cease-fire Policy Folder); Maj Gen Rathvon McC. Tompkins, Comments on BGen Edwin H. Simmons *Naval Review* Article, dtd 19Nov69, Simmons Comment Notebook, Personal Papers, MCHC; Maj John Regal, “Surprise for the 803d,” reprinted from *Marine Corps Gazette*, Apr70 in *BLT 3/1, Newsletter Battalion Landing Team 3/1, RVN, Dec 67–Jun68*, Apr88, pp. 3–5, p. 3, hereafter Regal, “Surprise for the 803d.”
62. BLT 3/1 AAR, Badger Catch.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.

The Battle For Quang Tri City

Other sources for this section are: 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Air Cav Div, “Battle of Quang Tri, 31Jan–6Feb68,” dtd 1Apr68, CMH Working Papers, hereafter 14th MilHist, “Battle of Quang Tri”; 3d Mar AAR, Opn Osceola II; Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*, pp. 298–300; Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*, pp. 55–6.

67. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 4Oct67, HQMC Msg File, III MAF Incoming.
68. Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*, 1968, pp. 298–99 and 302.
69. Ibid.
70. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: Pham Van Son, *The Tet Offensive*, pp. 298–99, 302; 14th MilHist, “Battle of Quang Tri.”
71. 14th MilHist, “Battle of Quang Tri”. See also, Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*, p. 55.
72. 3d Mar AAR, Opn Osceola II.
73. 14th MilHist, “Battle of Quang Tri”.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.; Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*, p. 55.
76. Oral History intvw with Capt Michael Nawrosky (USA) and 1stSgt Robert B. Fowler (USA), n.d. [Feb68] (CMH Working Papers), hereafter Nawrosky Intvw (CMH Working Papers).
77. This and the following paragraph are based on the following sources: 14th MilHist, “Battle of Quang Tri”; Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*, pp. 55–6.
78. Additional sources for this paragraph are: Nawrosky Intvw (CMH Working Papers); Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*, p. 300.
79. 14th MilHist, “Battle of Quang Tri”; Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*, pp. 55–6.

Tet Aftermath Along the DMZ

Additional sources for this section are: Regal, "Surprise for the 803d," BLT 3/1 AAR, Badger Catch; 3/3 draft AAR, n.d., Anx B, 3/3 ComdC, Jan68, hereafter 3/3 draft AAR; Jeff Kelly, *DMZ Diary*, *A Combat Marine's Vietnam Memoir* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland and Company, Inc., 1991), hereafter Kelly, *DMZ Diary*.

80. The sources for this and the following three paragraphs are: BLT 3/1 AAR, Badger Catch; Regal, "Surprise for the 803d;" "'Missing' Kilo Co Kills 144 Enemy," *Sea Tiger*, dtd 23Feb68.

81. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: Regal, "Surprise for the 803d;" "'Missing' Kilo Co Kills 144 Enemy," *Sea Tiger*, dtd 23Feb68.

82. Additional source for this paragraph is BLT 3/1 AAR, Badger Catch. See also LtCol Max McQuown, Comments on draft, dtd 22Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter McQuown Comments.

83. BLT 3/1 AAR, Badger Catch; McQuown Comments; Regal, "Surprise for the 803d," p. 5.

84. Sources for this and the following two paragraphs are: 9th Mar IntSum No. 90, Operation Kentucky, dtd 31Jan68, tab B, 9th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 9th Mar ComdC, Feb68; 9th Mar SitReps and IntReps, Operation Kentucky, dtd 2-3 Feb68, tabs A and B, 9th Mar ComdC, Feb68; FMFPac, MarOpV, Jan68, p. 49.

85. Additional sources for this and the following paragraph are: "Leatherneck Unit Clobbers Enemy in Fierce Battle," *Sea Tiger*, dtd 23Feb68, p. 1 and Clipping "Cam Lo—Hub of the DMZ," *Sea Tiger*, n.d. [Feb68], Encl, Bendell Comments.

86. Col Franklin L. Smith debriefing at FMFPac [May 1968] Tape 2904 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); Col Richard B. Smith intvw, Jul68, Tape 3041 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

87. Sources for this and the following four paragraphs are: 9th Mar ComdC, Feb68; 3/3 ComdC, Feb68; 3/3 draft AAR.

88. Additional source for this and the following two paragraphs is: Kelly, *DMZ Diary*, pp. 27-36. Quotes are from pp. 27-28.

89. Kelly, *DMZ Diary*, p. 33.

90. LtCol Otto Lehrack, Comments on draft, dtd 29Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File). See also LtCol Otto J. Lehrack, *No Shining Armor, The Marines at War in Vietnam, An Oral History* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1992), pp. 228-29, hereafter Lehrack, *No Shining Armor*.

91. The quote is from Kelly, *DMZ Diary*, pp. 35-6. See also Lehrack, *No Shining Armor*, pp. 215-33 and 3/3 draft AAR.

92. 3d MarDiv, Lancaster 11, AAR; 3d MarDiv Periodic Intelligence Rpt, dtd 18Feb68, Encl, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68.

CHAPTER 8

THE TET OFFENSIVE AT DA NANG

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV ComdHist, 1968; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan and Feb68; Maj Thomas Donnelly and Capt Moyers S. Shore II, "Ho Chi Minh's Gamble," in LtCol Ralph F. Moody, et al., "Marines in Vietnam, 1954-68," 8 pts (ms, MCHC, Washington, D.C., 1971), pt V1, hereafter Donnelly and Shore, "Ho Chi Minh's Gamble;" 1st Mar Div, Commanders AAR, Tet Offensive, 29 Jan-14 Feb68, dtd 25May68 (1st MarDiv Admin Files), hereafter 1st MarDiv AAR Tet; TF X-Ray ComdC, Jan68; III MAF Jnl & Msg File; Vietnam Comment Files; Sharp and

Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; Don Oberdorfer, *Tet!* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co, 1971), hereafter Oberdorfer, *Tet!*; LtGen Willard Pearson, USA, *The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966-1968*, Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C. Dept of the Army, 1975), hereafter Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*; Col Hoang Ngoc Lung, ARVN, *The General Offensives of 1968-69*, Indochina Monographs (Washington, D.C., CMH, 1981), hereafter Lung, *The General Offensives*; LtCol Pham Van Son, ARVN, et al., *The Viet Cong Tet Offensive, 1968* (Saigon, RVN: Joint General Staff, RVNAF, 1968), hereafter Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*.

Allied Dispositions

1. 7th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p. 14.
2. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 5 and 17; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, p. 35; LtGen Donn J. Robertson intvw, p. 29, 1973-76 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Robertson Intvw.
3. Col William K. Rockey, Comments on draft, dtd 10Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Rockey Comments; Igor Bobrowsky intvw, 3Dec1982, Tape Three, p. 2 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Bobrowsky Intvw, Tape Three; 2d ROK Bde SitRep No. 29, dtd 29Jan68 and I CorpsAdvGp, Da Nang msg to III MAF, dtd 29Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File); 7th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 3/5 ComdC, Jan68.
4. ComUSMACV msgs to III MAF, dtd 27-29Jan68 (III MAF Cease-fire Policy Folder).
5. Robertson Intvw, p.32.

The Enemy Plans His Offensive

6. General Entry, Historical Summary, Jan68, p. 24, v. 28, History File, 27Dec62-31Jan68 (Westmoreland Papers); 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p. 19; 1st MarDiv PerIntRpt 3-68, dtd 22Jan68, tab A, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, pp. 12 and 31; Col W. J. Davis, *Tet Marine, An Autobiography* (San Diego, CA, 1987), pp. 116-18, Encl to Col William J. Davis, Comments on draft, dtd 2Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Davis, *Tet Marine*.
7. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p. 19; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, pp. 12 and 31; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, pp. 25-6; Davis, *Tet Marine*, pp. 117-18.
8. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p. 19; CWO Stuart N. Duncan intvw, n.d. [1968], Tape 2978 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
9. 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 29Jan68 and NSA to III MAF, Resume of telecon, dtd 29Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File); 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p. 19.
10. Rand Corporation, Tet Quang Ngai Interview, dtd 18Apr68, No. 20, Folder No. 2, Tet (A&S Files, Indochina Archives), hereafter, Quang Ngai intvw, 18Apr68, 20 (A&S Files); III MAF msg to MACV, dtd 29Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).
11. Quang Ngai Interview, 18Apr68, 20 (A&S Files); 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 30Jan68 and III MAF msg to I Corps TOC, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File); FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, pp. 25-6.
12. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 19-20; ICorpsAdvGp, Da Nang msg to III MAF, dtd 30Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).
13. Hq, South Vietnam Liberation Army, Order of the Day of the Headquarters, All South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces, n.d., trans (Tet 68, Folder 2, Indochina Archives).

The Attack

14. 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, pp. 31-33; 1st MarDiv to III MAF, resume of telecon, dtd 29Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).

15. Jack W. Jaunal, *Vietnam '68, Jack's Journal*, (San Francisco, CA: Denson Press, 1981) p. 39, hereafter Jaunal, *Vietnam '68*.
16. Maj Gen Raymond L. Murray intvw, 27Jun75, pp. 42-3 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
17. Robertson Intvw, pp. 32-3; 1st MP Bn to III MAF, Resume of telecon, dtd 30Jan68, 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 30Jan68, and CO ICorpsAdvGp to III MAF, dtd 30Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File); 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, pp. 31-3; 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 23-5.
18. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 30Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File); 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 25-6.
19. An additional source for this paragraph is: CG1stMarDiv msg to HqBn, 1st MarDiv, dtd 30Jan68, Encl 25, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68.
20. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 25-6; Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*, pp. 303-04; CO ICorpsAdvGp to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).
21. Lung, *The General Offensives of 1968-69*, pp. 47-9.
22. Ibid.; Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*, pp. 303-04; 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 25-6; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, pp. 21-5; 1st MarDiv COC, Summary of Events of Attack, dtd 30Jan68 and ICorpsAdvGp msg to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).
23. Col Twyman R. Hill, Comments on draft, dtd 29Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Hill Comments; 1st MP Bn ComdC, Jan68; 1st MarDiv COC, Summary of Events of Attack, dtd 30Jan68 and ICorpsAdvGp msg to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).
24. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 25-6; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, pp. 21-5; 1st MarDiv COC, Summary of Events of Attack, dtd 30Jan68 and ICorpsAdvGp msg to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File); Donald Oberdorfer, *Tet!*, pp. 125-26.
25. Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*, pp. 303-04; 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 25-6; 1st MP Bn ComdC, Jan68; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, pp. 21-5; 1st MarDiv COC, Summary of Events of Attack, dtd 30Jan68 and ICorpsAdvGp msg to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File); Hill Comments.
26. The sources for this and the following two paragraphs are: 1st MarDiv COC, Summary of Events of Attack, dtd 30Jan68, and 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 30Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File); 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 23-5; 11th Marines ComdC, Jan68; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68.
27. An additional source for this paragraph is Rocky Comments.
28. Col Franklin L. Smith intvw, 10Jun68, Tape 2878 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Smith Tape; CO ICorpsAdvGp msg to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).
29. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*, p. 305; 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 26-7. See also CO ICorpsAdvGp msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 31Jan68; 2d ROKBde to CGIIIMAF, Resume of telecon, 30Jan68; ROKAdv to III MAF, Resume of Telecon, dtd 30Jan68; 1st MarDiv to III MAF, Resume of Telecon, dtd 30Jan68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).
30. Lung, *The General Offensives of 1968-69*, p. 46; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 322-23; LtGen Philip B. Davidson, USA, *Vietnam at War, The History: 1946-1975* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988), p. 474.
31. CO ICorpsAdvGp msg to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 and Americal Div to III MAF, Resume of Telecon, dtd 30Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).
32. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 24-26; CAP Hq to III MAF, resume of telecon, dtd 30Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).
33. Jaunal, *Vietnam '68*, p. 40.
34. CAP Hq to III MAF, resume of telecon, dtd 30Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File); 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 24-26; LtCol Gene W. Bowers, Comments on draft, dtd 30May95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Bowers Comments; Rocky Comments; John L. Gundersen, Comments on draft, dtd 9Dec94 and 11Sep96 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Gundersen Comments; Extract of 1st MarDiv COC [Combat Operations Center], 30Jan68, Encl, Gundersen Comments, hereafter Extract of 1st MarDiv COC, 30Jan68.
35. Gundersen Comments; 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 24-6; 3/5 ComdC Jan68; ITOC to III MAF, Resume of Telecon, dtd 30Jan68, 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).
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37. Gundersen Comments.
38. Bowers Comments; Gundersen Comments.
39. Bowers Comments; Rocky Comments.
40. Bowers Comments.
41. Ibid. and Rocky Comments.
42. Gundersen Comments; Bowers Comments; 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 24-6; 3dAmTrac to III MAF, Resume of Telecon, dtd 30Jan68, 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).
43. Gundersen Comments; Bowers Comments; Rocky Comments; 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 24-6; 3/5 ComdC Jan68; ITOC to III MAF, Resume of Telecon, dtd 30Jan68, 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).
44. FLC to III MAF, resume of telecon, dtd 30Jan68 and 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 30Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).
45. This and the following paragraph are derived from the following sources: 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 26-8, 31; 1st MarDiv to III MAF, Resumes of Telecons, dtd 30-31Jan68, and 1st MarDiv msgs to III MAF, dtd 30-31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).
46. 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).
47. ICorpsAdvGp, Da Nang msg to III MAF, dtd 30Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File); Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*, pp. 303-04.
48. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p. 28; 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 30Jan68; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, p. 40.
49. Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*, pp. 303-04.
50. This and the following paragraph are derived from the following sources: Ibid.; COC ICorpsAdvGp msg to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68; 1st MarDiv resume of telecon to III MAF, dtd 30Jan68; ROK Lia Off, Resume of telecon to III MAF, dtd 30Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).
51. 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File); 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p. 29.
52. This and the next two paragraphs are based on the following sources: 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p. 29; 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 30Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).
53. 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68; Resume of telecon from Phu Bai to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68; 1st MarDiv COC Notes, dtd 31Jan68; I TOC to III MAF, Resume of Telecon, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File). See also 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 19, 45-47; Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*, p. 306.
54. Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*, pp. 339-58.

The Fighting Continues

55. Col Dean Wilker, Comments on draft, dtd 18Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).
56. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, p. 56; 1st MAW to III MAF, Resumes of telecon, 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).
57. 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File); 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 29-30; FMF, MarOpsV, Jan68, p. 56.
58. This and the next paragraph are based on the following sources: 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p. 30; 1st MarDiv to III MAF, Resume of Telecon, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).
59. An additional source for this paragraph is 1st FSR/FLC msg to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).
60. Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*, pp. 303-04.
61. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 30-32; III MAF Jnl&Msg File; 1st MP Bn ComdC, Jan68.
62. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 31-2; 1st MarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).
63. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p. 31; 1st MarDiv to III MAF, Resume of Telecon, dtd 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).
64. I Corps to III MAF, Resumes of Telecon, dtd 31Jan68; CAG-2 to III MAF, Resume of Telecon, dtd 31Jan68; 2d ROK MarBde msg to III MAF, dtd 31Jan68; Americal Div to III MAF, Resume of Telecon, dtd 31Jan68; III MAF msg to MACV COC, dtd 31Jan68; (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).
65. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, Jan68, p. 32.
66. Ibid.

A Brief Lull and Renewed Fighting

67. The sources for this and the next paragraph are: 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p. 24; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, p. 17.
68. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p. 33.
69. Ibid., p. 20; LtCol John F. J. Kelly intvw, 23May68, Tape 2760 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
70. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 34-5.
71. Ibid.
72. Bobrowsky intvw, Tape Three, p. 6.
73. This and the next two paragraphs are based on the following sources: 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 35-6; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb68.
74. An additional source for this and the next paragraph is 3/5 ComdC, Feb68.
75. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 36-7; Robertson Intvw., pp. 32-33.
76. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 341-2; General Entry, Historical Summary, 1-29Feb68, Folder 29 (Westmoreland Papers, CMH).
77. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 341.
78. Robertson Intvw, pp. 30-1; Cushman Intvw, Nov82, p. 29; Smith Tape.
79. Smith Tape.
80. CGIIIMAF msg to CGAmericalDiv, CG1stMarDiv, CG1stMAW, and CG2dROKMC, dtd 7Feb68, Encl 7, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68.
81. The sources for this and the following six paragraphs are: 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p. 37; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb68.
82. An additional source for this and the following paragraph is III MAF ComdC, Jan68.
83. An additional source for this paragraph is FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, pp. 28-30.

84. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet 68; III MAF ComdC, Feb68, pp. 19-20; CGIIIMAF msg to CG1stMarDiv [and other subordinate commands], dtd 11Feb68, Encl 10, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb68.
85. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p. 64; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, pp. 21-25; Smith Tape.
86. Document Relating to Action and Mission South of Da Nang, dtd 31Jan68, CDEC Log No. 03-1127-68 (Tet 68, Folder No. 1, Indochina Archives); 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p. 70; Robertson Intvw., pp. 32-3.

CHAPTER 9 THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE— THE BATTLE BEGINS

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV ComdHist, 1968; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan and Feb68; Maj Thomas Donnelly and Capt Moyers S. Shore II, "Ho Chi Minh's Gamble," in LtCol Ralph F. Moody, et al., "Marines in Vietnam, 1954-68," 8 pts (ms, MCHC, Washington, D.C., 1971), pt VI, hereafter Donnelly and Shore, "Ho Chi Minh's Gamble"; Maj Miles D. Waldron, USA, and Specialist 5 Richard W. Beavers, USA, "Operation Hue City," 31st Mil Hist Det, Hq Prov Corps, Vietnam, Hist Study, 2-68, hereafter Waldron and Beavers, "Operation Hue City"; 1st MarDiv, Commanders AAR, Tet Offensive, 29 Jan-14 Feb68, dtd 25May68 (1st MarDiv Admin Files), hereafter 1st MarDiv AAR Tet; TF X-Ray ComdC, Jan68; TF X-Ray AAR, Opn Hue City, dtd 14Apr68, with enclosures, hereafter TF X-Ray AAR Hue City; 1st Mar CAAR, Opn Hue City, dtd 20Mar68 in TF X-Ray AAR Hue City, hereafter 1st Mar AAR Hue City; 1/1 ComdC, Jan68; III MAF Jnl & Msg File; Hue City Jnl & Msg File in III MAF Jnl & Msg File, hereafter Hue City Jnl & Msg File; Vietnam Comment Files; BGen Foster C. LaHue debriefing at FMFPac, Apr68, Tape 2932 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter LaHue debriefing; LtCol Marcus J. Gravel intvw, 17Jul73 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Gravel intvw; Lt Col Ernest C. Cheatham, Maj G. Ron Christmas, Maj Mike P. Downs, and Maj Charles L. Meadows presentation, 23Jul73 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Cheatham et al. presentation; A&S Files, Indochina Archives; Truong Sinh, "The Fight to Liberate the City of Hue During *Mau Than Tet* (1968)," translated from *Hoc Tap*, Dec 1974 in Hue Folder, Tet Box, A&S Files, Indochina Archives, hereafter Truong Sinh, "The Fight to Liberate the City of Hue"; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; Keith William Nolan, *Battle for Hue, Tet*, 1968 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983), hereafter Nolan, *Battle for Hue*; Eric Hammel, *Fire in the Streets, The Battle for Hue, Tet 1968* (Chicago, Ill: Contemporary Books, 1991), hereafter Hammel, *Fire in the Streets*; Don Oberdorfer, *TET!* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co, 1971), hereafter Oberdorfer, *TET!*; LtGen Willard Pearson, USA, *The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966-1968*, Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C. Dept of the Army, 1975), hereafter Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*; Col Hoang Ngoc Lung, ARVN, *The General Offensives of 1968-69*, Indochina Monographs (Washington, D.C., CMH, 1981), hereafter Lung, *The General Offensives*; LtCol Pham Van Son, ARVN, et al., *The Viet Cong Tet Offensive, 1968* (Saigon, RVN: Joint General Staff, RVNAF, 1968), hereafter Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*.

The Two Faces of Hue

1. "The Battle for Hue," n.p., n.d., Encl 1, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68; Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*, pp. 39-40; Lung, *The General Offensives*, pp. 75-77; Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*, pp. 248-9; Peter Braestrup, Comments on draft, n.d. [Jan95] (Vietnam Comment File).

The NVA Attack

2. Enemy OOB, Anx A, III MAF Periodic Intel Rpt, No. 2, dtd 13Jan68 (III MAF Periodic Intel Rpts); MACV ComdHist, 1968, pp. 881–3; 1st Mar AAR Hue City; 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, pp. 49–50; Waldron and Beaver, "Operation Hue City," p. 6.
3. People's Liberation Army Forces List of Military Objectives in Hue, Jan 68, trans (Hue Folder, Tet Box, A&S Files, Indochina Archives).
4. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, pp. 18–20 and Feb68, pp. 8–10; Cushman Intvw, Nov1982; Truong Sinh, "The Fight to Liberate the City of Hue," p. 95.
5. Truong Sinh, "The Fight to Liberate the City of Hue," p. 90.
6. Ibid. and Waldron and Beavers, "Operation Hue City," p. 6.
7. Truong Sinh, "The Fight to Liberate the City of Hue," pp. 93–4.
8. Ibid., pp. 96–7.
9. Ibid. p. 97; Lung, *The General Offensives*, p. 79; Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*, p. 249.
10. Ibid.; Waldron and Beaver, "Operation Hue City," pp. 7–8; 1st ARVN Div Advisory Detach, "The Battle of Hue," n.d., n.p., pp. 2–3, Encl 1, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, hereafter "The Battle of Hue" (3d MarDiv ComdC).
11. This paragraph is based on the sources listed above and Nolan, *Battle for Hue*, pp. 6–8.
12. Truong Sinh, "The Fight to Liberate the City of Hue," p. 101; 1st Mar AAR Hue City.
13. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: Waldron and Beaver, "Operation Hue City," pp. 13–4; "The Battle of Hue," pp. 3–4, (3d MarDiv ComdC); Lung, *The General Offensives*, p. 79; Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*, p. 249.
14. Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*, p. 250.

Redeployment at Phu Bai and the Marines Go to Hue

15. 1/1 ComdC, Jan68; 1st Mar Div Sit Rep No. 1, Hue City, dtd 3Feb68, Hue City Jnl & Msg File.
16. TF X-Ray ComdC, Jan68; TF X-Ray AAR Hue City; 1st Mar AAR Hue City; LaHue debriefing; "History of Task Force X-Ray," n.d., Attachment to Col A. J. Poillon, Comments on draft ms, dtd 30Oct69, Donnelly and Shore, "Ho Chi Minh's Gamble" (Vietnam Comment File).
17. 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68; 5th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 1/1 ComdC, Jan68; Col Gordon D. Batcheller, Comments on draft, dtd 10Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Batcheller Comments.
18. 5th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 2/5 ComdC, Jan68; Batcheller Comments.
19. 5th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 2/5 ComdC, Jan68.
20. 5th Mar ComdC, Jan68, and attached Jnl and SitRep files.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.; 2/5 ComdC, Jan68; BGen Michael P. Downs, Comments on draft, dtd 19Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Downs Comments.
23. 5th Mar ComdC, Jan68, and attached Jnl and SitRep files.
24. This and the following paragraph are based upon Ibid. and 2/5 ComdC, Jan68.
25. Additional sources for this paragraph are Downs Comments,

Dec94 and BGen Michael P. Downs, Taped Comments on draft, dtd 11Dec92 (Vietnam Comment File).

26. 1st MarDiv AAR Tet; 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68; 1/1 ComdC, Jan68; Batcheller Comments.
27. Batcheller Comments; 1st Mar ComdC, Jan68, p. III–A–4.
28. TF X-Ray AAR, pp. 9–10; III MAF Jnl and Msg File, passim., 30–31 Jan68.
29. Batcheller Comments.
30. This and the following two paragraphs are based upon: Nolan, *Battle for Hue*, pp. 12–3; Hammel, *Fire in the Streets*, 62–68; Gravel intvw; Batcheller Comments; Medal of Honor Recommendations, dtd 25May68, in Sgt Alfredo Gonzalez Biographical File (RefSec, MCHC); Paul Drew Stevens, ed., *The Navy Cross, Vietnam, Citations of Awards to Men of The United States Navy and The United States Marine Corps, 1964–1973*, (Forest Ranch, CA: Sharp & Dunnigan, 1987) pp. 27–8, 54., hereafter Stevens, ed., *The Navy Cross*.
31. Maj Ernest Cook, Comments on draft ms, dtd 20Oct69, Donnelly and Shore, "Ho Chi Minh's Gamble," (Comment File); Gravel intvw, pp. 22, 49; Cheatham et al. presentation, p. 23.
32. Gravel intvw, pp. 51–2.
33. Ibid. pp. 5–6; 1st Mar AAR Hue City; 1st MarDiv AAR Tet, p. 56.
34. 1st MarDiv COC Notes, 31Jan68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File); LaHue debriefing; Gravel intvw, p. 5.
35. Gravel intvw, pp. 5–6.
36. Ibid., pp. 6–7; Nolan, *Battle for Hue*, p. 20.
37. 1st Mar AAR Hue City; Gravel intvw, pp. 7–8; Cheatham et al., presentation, p. 23.
38. 1st Mar AAR Hue City; 1st MarDiv COC Notes, 0001–0900, 1Feb68, III MAF Jnl & Msg File; Gravel intvw, p. 53.
39. LaHue debriefing; Westmoreland msg to Wheeler, dtd 31Jan68, Westmoreland Messages, Westmoreland Papers, CMH.

CHAPTER 10 THE STRUGGLE FOR HUE, THE SECOND PHASE

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV ComdHist, 1968; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan and Feb68; Donnelly and Shore, "Ho Chi Minh's Gamble"; Maj Miles D. Waldron, USA, and Spec 5 Richard W. Beavers, USA, "The Critical Year, 1968, The XXIV Corps Team," 31st Mil Hist Det, HQ, XXIV Corps, Jan69, hereafter Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year"; 1st MarDiv AAR Tet; TF X-Ray AAR Hue City; 1st Mar AAR Hue City; 1/1 ComdCs, Jan–Feb 68; 2/5 draft CAAR, Operation Hue City, dtd 5Mar68, hereafter 2/5 AAR Hue City; III MAF Jnl & Msg File; Hue City Jnl & Msg File; Vietnam Comment Files; Cushman Intvw, Nov82; LaHue debriefing; Gravel intvw; Cheatham et al. presentation; LtCol Ernest C. Cheatham, Jr., et al. intvw, 28Feb–4Mar68, Tape 2511, (Oral HistColl MCHC), hereafter Cheatham et al. intvw Tape 2511; A&S Files, Indochina Archives; Truong Sinh, "The Fight to Liberate the City of Hue"; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*, Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; Nolan, *Battle for Hue*; Hammel, *Fire in the Streets*; Oberdorfer, *TET!*; Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*; Lung, *The General Offensives*; Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*; Peter Braestrup, *Big Story: How the Amer-*

ican Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington, 2 vols. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977), hereafter Braestrup, *Big Story*.

More Reinforcements

1. Quoted in Braestrup, *Big Story*, vol. 1, pp. 294–5.
2. 1st Lt Philip M. Scherer et al. intvw, 30Apr68, Tape 2772 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); TF X-Ray AAR Hue City, p. 10.
3. 1st Mar AAR Hue City, p. 11.
4. 1st ARVN Div Advisory Det, "The Battle of Hue," n.d., n.p., Encl 1, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68; Waldron and Beavers, "Operation Hue City," p. 15; Capt Denis M. Dunagan intvw, 5Mar68, Tape 2560 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
5. Cheatham et al. presentation, pp. 14 and 21 and BGen Michael P. Downs, Taped Comments on draft, dtd 11Dec92 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Downs, Taped Comments, Dec92. See also 1st Mar ComdC, Feb68 and 1st Mar AAR Hue City.
6. 1st Mar AAR Hue City, p. 12; 1st Mar ComdC, Feb68.
7. Cushman Intvw, Nov82, pp. 19–20.
8. Waldron and Beaver, "The Critical Year," pp. 14–5; Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*, pp. 44, 55–7; CG1stAirCav msg to CGTFX-Ray, dtd 1Feb68, and III MAF msg to 1st AirCav, dtd 2Feb68 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File).
9. 1st AirCav SitRep No. 33, dtd 2Feb68, hereafter 1st AirCav SitRep 33, 2Feb68, and III MAF msg to I Corps TOC, dtd 2Feb68 (III MAF Msg and Jnl File).
10. Braestrup, *Big Story*, vol. 1, p. 314. See also Peter Braestrup, Comments on draft, n.d. [Dec94–Jan95] (Vietnam Comment File).
11. Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*, p. 44; 1st AirCav, SitRep 33, 2Feb68.
12. 1st Mar AAR Hue City, p. 13; 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 1, dtd 3Feb68 (Hue City Jnl and Msg File).
13. 1st Mar AAR Hue, p. 13; LCpl M. Vernon Jr. in Cheatham et al. intvw Tape 2511.
14. TF X-Ray SitRep, Operation Hue City, dtd 2Feb68, Encl, 1st Mar ComdC, Feb68.
15. 1st Mar AAR Hue City, p. 13; Cpl George E. Minor intvw in Cheatham et al. intvw Tape 2511.
16. Cheatham et al. presentation, p. 24.
17. 1st Mar AAR Hue City, p. 14; 2/5 AAR Hue City.
18. Cheatham et al. presentation, p. 51.

The Beginning of the Advance

19. Cheatham et al. presentation, pp. 19–20.
20. 2/5 AAR Hue City; 1st Mar AAR Hue City, p. 14; Cheatham et al. presentation, pp. 19–20.
21. III MAF SitRep No. 5, Hue City, dtd 4Feb68 (Hue City Jnl & Msg File) and 1st Mar AAR Hue, p. 15.
22. Gravel intvw, pp. 18–9.
23. Ibid., p. 30; 1stLt Ray L. Smith ltr to Capt Gordon D. Batcheller, dtd 25Mar68, Encl to Col Gordon D. Batcheller, Comments on draft, dtd 10Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Smith ltr, Mar68.

24. Gravel intvw, p. 31; Medal of Honor Recommendations, dtd 25May1968, in Sgt Alfredo Gonzalez Biographical File (RefSec, MCHC); Smith ltr, Mar68.

25. Gravel intvw, p. 41.
26. Cheatham et al. presentation, p. 31.
27. SSgt James R. Long and Sgt Terry Cochrane in Cheatham et al. intvw Tape 2511.
28. Nolan, *Battle for Hue*, p. 50; LtCol Ralph J. Salvati, Comments on draft, n.d. [1994] (Vietnam Comment File).
29. Nolan, *Battle for Hue*, pp. 50–1; BGen Michael P. Downs, Taped Comments on draft, dtd 11Dec92 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Downs Taped Comments, Dec92; 2/5 AAR Hue City.
30. TF X-Ray AAR Hue City, p. 11; 1st Mar AAR Hue City, pp. 15 and 18; 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 7, Hue City, dtd 4Feb68 (Hue City Jnl & Msg File).
31. 1st Mar AAR Hue City, pp. 74–75.

Block by Block

32. *Sea Tiger*, 8Mar68, p. 8.
33. Cheatham et al. presentation, p. 12; Gravel intvw, p. 10.
34. Cheatham et al. presentation, p. 37.
35. Ibid., pp. 16, 20.
36. Ibid. p. 17.
37. Gravel intvw, p. 28.
38. Cheatham et al. presentation, p. 42; TF X-Ray AAR Hue City; 3d Tank Bn ComdC, Feb68; 1st Tank Bn ComdC, Feb68.
39. 1st Mar AAR Hue City, pp. 80–1; Cheatham et al. presentation, p. 43.
40. Cheatham et al. presentation, p. 44 and LtCol Cheatham in LtCol Cheatham et al. intvw Tape 2511.
41. Cheatham et al. presentation, pp. 39 and 42; Downs Taped Comments, Dec92.
42. Gravel intvw, pp. 15, 19; Smith ltr, Mar68; 1st Mar AAR Hue City, p. 18.
43. 1st Mar AAR Hue City, p. 20; 2/5 AAR Hue City.
44. 2/5 AAR Hue City.
45. Ibid. and Cpl Riley in Cheatham et al. intvw Tape 2511.
46. 2/5 AAR Hue City; Sgt G. B. Zachary and 2dLt Michael A. McNiel in LCpl Charles D. Bedford et al., intvw, 10 May 68, Tape 2673 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Bedford et al. intvw Tape 2673.
47. 2/5 AAR Hue City; PFC George Ciprio? in LtCol Cheatham et al. intvw Tape 2511.
48. "Old Glory Replaces Viet Cong Flag," *Sea Tiger*, 1 Mar 68, p. 1; Nolan, *Battle for Hue*, pp. 77–9.
49. Cheatham et al. presentation, p. 56; Gravel intvw, p. 18; Smith ltr, Mar68.
50. 2/5 AAR Hue City; 1st Mar AAR Hue City, p. 25.
51. 2/5 AAR Hue City; 1st Mar AAR Hue City, pp. 24–34.
52. 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 33, dtd 11Feb68 (Hue City Jnl and Msg File); Bedford et al. intvw Tape 2673.
53. 1st Mar AAR Hue City.

CHAPTER 11

STALEMATE IN THE OLD CITY

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV ComdHist, 1968; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan and Feb68; 1st ARVN Div Advisory Det, "The Battle of Hue," n.d., n.p., Encl 1, 3d MarDiv, ComdC, Feb68, hereafter, 1st ARVN Adv Det, "The Battle of Hue"; Waldron and Beavers, "Operation Hue City"; 1st MarDiv AAR Tet; TF X-Ray AAR Hue City; 1st Mar AAR Hue City; 1/5 AAR Hue City, dtd 15Mar68, hereafter 1/5 AAR Hue City; III MAF Jnl & Msg File; Hue City Jnl & Msg File; Vietnam Comment Files; A&S Files, Indochina Archives; Truong Sinh, "The Fight to Liberate the City of Hue"; Keith B. Nolan Papers, Personal Papers Collection, MCHC, hereafter Nolan Papers; U.S. Army, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Cav Div (AM), "The Battle of Hue, 2–26 February 1968," dtd 10Mar68 (Copy in Nolan Papers), hereafter 14th MHD, "The Battle of Hue," Mar68; MajGen John J. Tolson (USA) intvw, 24Jun68 (CMH, Washington), hereafter Tolson Intvw, Jun68; Alexander W. Wells, Jr. Papers, Personal Papers Collection, MCHC, hereafter Wells Papers, MCHC; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; Nolan, *Battle for Hue*; Oberdorfer, *TET!*; Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*; Lung, *The General Offensive*; Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*; Peter Braestrup, *Big Story*.

A Faltering Campaign

1. 1st ARVN Adv Det, "The Battle of Hue," p. 5.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 7.
4. Ibid. pp. 6–7.
5. Ibid.; 1st Mar AAR Hue City.
6. Tolson Intvw, Jun 68, pp. 3–4.
7. 14th MHD, "The Battle of Hue," Mar68, pp. 1–2; Waldron and Beavers, "Operation Hue City," pp. 23–4.
8. In addition to the sources listed above, see also III MAF msg to MACV, dtd 4Feb68 (III MAF Msg & Jnl File, Hue City).
9. Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*, p. 44; F. Clinton Berry, Jr., *The Illustrated History of the Vietnam War—Air Cav*, (New York and Toronto: Bantam Books, 1988), pp. 110–12; 14th MHD, "The Battle of Hue," Mar68, pp. 1–2; Waldron and Beavers, "Operation Hue City," pp. 23–4.
10. 14th MHD, "The Battle of Hue," Mar68, p. 3; 1st AirCav Div SitRep No. 38, dtd 7 Feb68 (IIIMAF Msg & Jnl File); Tolson Intvw., p. 4.
11. 14th MHD, "The Battle of Hue," Mar68, p. 3; 1st AirCav, SitSum No. 38, dtd 8Feb68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).
12. 14th MHD, "The Battle of Hue," Mar68, p. 3.
13. 1st Mar AAR Hue City; Braestrup, *Big Story*, I, pp. 316–7.
14. CGIIIMAF msg to 1st ACD, dtd 13Feb68 (III MAF Outgoing Messages).
15. Waldron and Beaver, "The Critical Year," pp. 14–5; TF X-Ray AAR Hue City; Maj Talman C. Budd II, USMC, OSMA, NAG, AAR, Opn Hue City (Song Than 739–68), dtd 25Jul68 in SMA, MACV, AARs, 1968–69, hereafter Maj Talman C. Budd II, MAU, NAG, CAAR, Hue City, dtd 25Jul68; 1/5 FragO 6–68, dtd 9Feb68, Encl 1, 1/5 AAR Hue City.

Going into the Walled City

16. 1/5 AAR Opn Hue City; 1st Mar AAR Hue City; 1st MarDiv Hue City Sitrep No. 32, dtd 10Feb68, TF X-Ray to IIIMAF COC, Resume of Telephone Call, dtd 10Feb68, and III MAF Hue City Sitrep No. 33, dtd 10Feb68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File). Although the 1/5 AAR does not show Company A going into Hue until 11 February, all the other sources reflect that the company was in Hue city on the afternoon of 10 February 1968.
 17. 1st FAG ComdC, Feb68, p. 5; Col Robert C. V. Hughes, Comments on draft, n.d. [1995] (Vietnam Comment File).
 18. 1st FAG ComdC, Feb68, p. 5; Alexander W. Wells, Jr., "Synopsis From Combat Report: February 1968—Vietnam," in Alexander W. Wells, Jr. Papers, MCHC, hereafter Wells, "Excerpts from Combat Report"; Alexander W. Wells, Jr., Comments on draft, dtd 3Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Wells Comments, Dec94.
 19. Wells, "Excerpts from Combat Report"; Wells Comments, Dec94.
 20. Wells Comments, Dec94.
 21. Ibid. and Wells, "Excerpts from Combat Report".
 22. Although there was no specific plan, General Truong's intentions can be inferred from the following sources: 1st Infantry Division Advisory Detachment, Advisory Team 3, CAAR, Opn NVA/VC Tet Offensive: Hue, dtd 30Mar68 (copy in Nolan Papers), hereafter 1st InfDiv, Adv Tm 3, CAAR, Hue; TF X-Ray AAR Hue City; 1st Mar AAR Hue City; Maj Talman C., Budd II, MAU, NAG, CAAR, Hue City, dtd 25Jul68; 1/5 AAR Hue City; Col Richard H. Thompson ltr to Keith B. Nolan, 16Sep80 with attached copy of briefing map (Nolan Papers), hereafter Thompson ltr, 16Sep80; Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*, pp. 256–59.
 23. Maj Talman C. Budd II, MAU, NAG, CAAR, Hue City, dtd 25Jul68 and SMA, MAU, NAG, 1st Endorsement on Hue City CAAR, 12Aug68.
 24. Maj Talman C. Budd II, MAU, NAG, CAAR, Hue City, dtd 25Jul68.
 25. 1/5 AAR Hue City.
 26. Thompson ltr, 16Sep80.
 27. Ibid.
 28. Ibid.
 29. Ibid.
 30. The basis of this and the following two paragraphs are: Thompson ltr, 16Sep80 and 1/5 AAR, Opn Hue City.
- #### The Fight For the Tower
31. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: Thompson ltr, 16Sep80 and 1/5 AAR, Opn Hue City.
 32. For this paragraph, see also unattributed account, "The Citadel," ms, n.d., in Harrington Folder, Nolan Papers, hereafter "The Citadel," ms.
 33. Thompson ltr, 16 Sep 80.
 34. Ibid.; 1/5 AAR, Opn Hue City; "The Citadel," ms; 1st Lt Andrew C. Delaurier, 19Apr68, Tape 2667 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
 35. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: Thompson ltr, 16Sep80; Citadel ms; 1/5 AAR, Opn Hue City.
 36. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: Nolan notes, n.d. Harrington File (Nolan Papers); Nolan, *Battle for Hue*, pp. 124–27.

37. Col Myron C. Harrington, Comments on Nolan ms, dtd 24May83, Harrington Folder, Nolan Papers.

38. Ibid.; 1/5 AAR, Opn Hue City; "Like John Wayne," *Sea Tiger*, dtd 22Mar68.

39. 1/5 AAR, Opn Hue City; Nolan notes, n.d. Harrington File (Nolan Papers).

Continuing the Advance

40. The sources for this and the following three paragraphs are: 1/5 AAR, Opn Hue City; "The Citadel," ms; 1st Mar AAR, Hue City.

41. An additional source for this and the following two paragraphs is: Thompson ltr, 16Sep80.

42. An additional source for this paragraph is: PFC Thomas L. Foster in Cheatham et al. intvw, Tape 2511 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

43. Edward M. Landry ltr to author, dtd 7Dec86 and entry for 17 Feb 1968 in excerpts from diary, Edward M. Landry Papers, Personal Papers Collection, MCHC. See also TF X-Ray AAR Hue City; 1st Mar AAR Hue City; 1/5 AAR, Opn Hue City.

44. Thompson ltr, 16Sep80; "The Citadel," ms. See also 1/5 AAR, Opn Hue City.

CHAPTER 12 THE TAKING OF THE CITADEL AND AFTERMATH

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV ComdHist, 1968; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan and Feb68; 1st ARVN Adv Det, "The Battle of Hue"; 1st InfDiv, Adv Tm 3, CAAR, Hue; Waldron and Beavers, "Operation Hue City"; 1st MarDiv AAR Ter; TF X-Ray AAR Hue City; 1st Mar AAR Hue City; 1/5 AAR Hue City; 2/5 AAR Hue City; III MAF Jnl & Msg File; III MAF Outgoing Msgs; III MAF Incoming Msgs; Hue City Jnl & Msg File; Maj Talman C. Budd II, MAU, NAG, CAAR, Hue City, dtd 25Jul68, hereafter Budd, AAR; Vietnam Comment Files; Gravel intvw; Cheatham et al. presentation; Cheatham et al. intvw Tape 2511; A&S Files, Indochina Archives; Truong Sinh, "The Fight to Liberate the City of Hue"; Thompson ltr, 16Sep80, Nolan Papers; 14th MHD, "The Battle of Hue," Mar68; Tolson intvw, Jun68; Wells, "Excerpts from Combat Report"; Peter Braestrup Papers, Personal Papers Collection, MCHC, hereafter Braestrup Papers; Westmoreland Papers, CMH; Gen Creighton W. Abrams Papers, CMH, hereafter Abrams Papers, CMH; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; Nolan, *Battle for Hue*; Oberdorfer, *TET!*; Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*; Lung, *The General Offensives*; Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*; Peter Braestrup, *Big Story*.

The Struggle in the Western Citadel

1. Budd, AAR and Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*, 257–259.

2. Budd, AAR.

3. Ibid.; Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*, pp. 262–66.

4. 1st ARVN Adv Det, "The Battle of Hue," p. 8; Waldron and Beavers, "Operation Hue City," p. 38.

5. Wells, "Excerpts from Combat Report".

6. III MAF COC msg to MACV(J2), dtd 17Feb68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File). See also Hallmark 62 msg to Hallmark 6, Hue City SitRep, dtd 17Feb68, App 5, tab C, 1st FAG ComdC, Feb 68 and Wells, "Excerpts from Combat Report."

An Estimate of the Situation and Mounting the Offensive

7. Abrams msg to Cushman (Information to Westmoreland), dtd 16Feb68 (Abrams Papers, CMH).

8. Ibid.

9. Historical Summary and Summary of CIIB Meeting, 18Feb68, vol. 29, p. 12 and Encl 62 (Westmoreland Papers, CMH); TF X-Ray AAR Hue City.

10. Waldron and Beavers, "Operation Hue City," pp. 42–3.

11. Pham Van Son, *The Viet Cong Tet Offensive*, p. 267; Budd, AAR; Lung, *The General Offensives*, p.83.

12. Thompson ltr, 16Sep80, Nolan Papers; 1/5 AAR Hue City.

13. Clark Dougan, Stephen Weiss, and the editors of Boston Publishing Company, *The Vietnam Experience: Nineteen Sixty-Eight* (Boston, Ma: Boston Publishing Company, 1983), p. 30; Clipping, *Washington Post*, dtd 19Feb68, Braestrup Papers.

14. Abrams msg to Cushman, info: Westmoreland, dtd 20Feb68 (Abrams Papers, CMH).

15. Abrams msg to Tolson, dtd 20Feb68 (Abrams Papers, CMH).

16. 14th MHD, "The Battle of Hue," Mar68, pp. 5–6; Waldron and Beavers, "Operation Hue City," pp. 43–7.

17. Thompson ltr, 16Sep80, Nolan Papers.

18. Ibid.; AP despatch, dtd 22Feb68, Clipping in Polk Folder (Nolan Papers, MCHC); 1/5 AAR Hue City. These sources are also the basis for the next two paragraphs.

19. See also Maj Denis J. Kiely and Capt Gary L. Post intvws, 19Apr68, Tape 2551 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

20. Budd, AAR; Abrams msg to Westmoreland, dtd 23Feb68 (Abrams Papers, CMH)

21. Budd, AAR; 1st InfDiv, Adv Tm 3, CAAR, Hue.

22. 1/5 AAR Hue City; Thompson ltr, 16Sep80, Nolan Papers.

Closing Out Operation Hue City

23. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: 2/5 AAR Hue City; 1st MarDiv SitRep, Hue City, No. 86, dtd 24Feb68 (Hue City III MAF Jnl & Msg File).

24. See also 2/5 S–3 Jnl, 2/5 ComdC, Feb68, hereafter 2/5 S–3 Jnl, Feb68.

25. 2/5 AAR Hue City; 2/5 S–3 Jnl, Feb 68; LtCol Ernest C. Cheatham in Cheatham et al. intvw, Tape 2511.

26. 2/5 AAR Hue City; 2/5 S–3 Jnl, Feb 68; Robert A. Sutlack in 1stLt P. M. Scherer intvw, 31 Apr 68, Tape 2722 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

27. The sources for this and the following two paragraphs are: 2/5 AAR Hue City; 2/5 S–3, Feb 68.

28. 1st Marines AAR Hue City; 2/5 AAR Hue City; 1/5 AAR Hue City; Cheatham et al. presentation, pp. 11–12 and 28–29.

A Summing Up

29. The sources for this and the following three paragraphs are: TF X-Ray AAR Hue City; 1st InfDiv, Adv Tm 3, CAAR, Hue; Budd, AAR; 14th MHD, "The Battle of Hue," Mar68; 1st Bde, 101st Airborne Div, CAAR, Opn Hue City, dtd 23Mar68, Encl 5, TF X-Ray AAR Hue City; Pham Van Son, *The Tet Offensive*, p. 271.

30. Additional source for this and the following two paragraphs are:

1stLt John R. Morse, USA, Thua Thien Sector, S-2 Order of Battle Advisor in Hue, RVN, intvw, 8Mar68 (U.S. Army, 45th Military History Detachment, Interview Enclosures Folder, Nolan Papers, MCHC).

31. Additional source for this and the following paragraph is: Rand Interview No. 28 in Interviews concerning the NLF, May 1968, Folder 2, Tet Box, A&S Files, Indochina Archives.

32. Additional source for this paragraph is: I Corps, Tactical Opns Center to III MAF, Resume of Telecon, dtd 6Feb68 (Hue City III MAF Jnl & Msg File).

33. Truong Sinh, "The Fight to Liberate the City of Hue," p. 90.

34. Truong Sinh, "The Fight to Liberate the City of Hue," pp. 105-7; Pham Van Son, *The Tet Offensive*, pp. 271-84; Westmoreland and Sharp, *Report on the War*, p. 160; Lung, *The General Offensives* p. 85; Oberdorfer, *Tet!*, pp. 232-33; Braestrup, *Big Story*, vol. 1, pp. 201-16.

35. Gravel intvw, pp. 2-3.

36. 14th MHD, "The Battle of Hue," Mar68; Tolson Intvw, Jun68, p. 5; Col Talman C. Budd II, Comments on draft, dtd 30Mar95 (Vietnam Comment File).

37. 1/5 AAR Hue City; Thompson ltr, 16Sep80, Nolan Papers.

38. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: TF X-Ray AAR Hue City; 1st Mar AAR Hue City.

39. TF X-Ray AAR Hue City.

40. 1st Mar AAR Hue City; LtCol Ernest C. Cheatham in Cheatham et al. intvw, Tape 2511.

41. 1st Marines AAR Hue City.

42. Ibid. and TF X-Ray AAR Hue City.

43. 1st Marines AAR Hue City; Maj Jack E. Walker intvw, 9 Mar 68 (U.S. Army, 45th Military History Detachment, Interview Enclosures Folder, Nolan Papers, MCHC).

44. Pham Van Son, *The Tet Offensive*, p. 281; Gravel intvw, p. 42.

45. MajGen Kerwin C/S MACV msg to BGen Anderson, C/S III MAF, dtd 27Feb68 and Gen Westmoreland ComUSMACV, msg to LtGen Cushman CGIIIMAF, dtd 28Feb68 (III MAF Incoming Messages)

46. CGIIIMAF msg to CG1stMarDiv and CGTFX-Ray, dtd 26Feb68 (III MAF Outgoing Msgs); Gen Abrams msg to Gen Westmoreland, dtd 2Mar68 (EO Files, Abrams Papers, CMH), hereafter Abrams msg to Westmoreland, 2Mar68.

47. Abrams msg to Westmoreland, 2Mar68.

48. Ibid.

49. LCpl M. Vernon Jr. in Cheatham et al. intvw, Tape 2511; W. Roger Lansbury with Daniel F. Ring, editor, "Notes Between Two Worlds: The Diary of Roger Lansbury, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines," *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, Summer 1985, pp. 257-97, p. 296.

50. Gravel intvw, p. 42; Cheatham et al. presentation, pp. 57-59.

51. Clipping "18 Days Under the Bed," *Washington Post*, n.d. and clipping, "Hue Marines: Bitter as They Are Brave," *Washington Post*, dtd 20Feb68 (*Washington Post* Clipping File, Peter Braestrup Papers).

52. Budd, AAR and LtCol Joseph W. Malcolm, Jr., debriefing at FMFPac, 28Oct68, Tape 3453 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

53. Abrams msg to Westmoreland, dtd 5Mar68 (Abrams Papers, CMH); Westmoreland msg to Abrams, dtd 26Feb68 (EO File, Abrams Papers, CMH); CG III MAF to subordinate commands, dtd 28Feb68 (III MAF Outgoing Files).

PART III After Tet, Khe Sanh, and Mini-Tet

CHAPTER 13 POST-TET IN I CORPS

Unless otherwise noted the sources in this chapter are derived from MACV ComdHist, 1968; HQMC Msg File; HQMC, Status of Forces, 1968; FMFPac, MarOpsV, 1967-1968; III MAF ComdCs, Feb-Apr68; III MAF Jnl & Msg Files; III MAF Provisional Corps Folder, hereafter PCV Folder; Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year"; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Feb-Apr68; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Feb-Apr68; Westmoreland Papers, CMH; A&S Files, Indochina Archives; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Lung, *The General Offensives*; Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*.

The Immediate Ramifications of the Tet Offensive

1. Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*, p. 161; MACV ComdHist, 1968, pp. 161-62; LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., III MAF Presentation, General Officers Symposium Book, July 1968, tab F, pp. 1-8, hereafter Cushman Presentation. See also FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p. 5.

2. Circular from COSVN, trans., dtd 31Jan68, in U.S. Mission, Press Release, dtd 29Mar68, A&S Files, Indochina Archives, hereafter COSVN Circular, 31Jan68; War Experiences Recapitulation Committee of the High-Level Military Institute, *The Anti-U.S. Resistance War for National Salvation*, trans by Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Hanoi: People's Army Publishing Houses, 1980) [Joint Publications Research Service No. 80968, dtd 3Jun82], p. 110; Pham Van Son, *Tet Offensive*, pp. 475-6.

3. COSVN Circular, 31Jan68; CT/AB (Unknown provincial headquarters), Directive No. 1, dtd 10Feb68; COSVN Communique, dtd 13Feb68; PLAF, 3d Special Communique, dtd 26Feb68. All in A&S Files, Indochina Archives.

4. Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*, p. 235; Lung, *The General Offensives*, pp. 39-41; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, pp 3-4; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 322-23; LtGen Philip B. Davidson, USA, *Vietnam at War, The History: 1946-1975* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988), p. 474; Cushman Presentation, tab F, pp. 1-8; 58-9; BGen John R. Chaisson, ltr to wife, dtd 11Feb68 (Chaisson Papers).

5. Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968), pp. 384-5.

6. Messages quoted in Herbert Y. Schandler, *The Unmaking of a President, Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 92-93, 95.

7. Ibid., pp. 94-5.

Readjustment in I Corps

8. FMFPac MarOpsV, Feb68, pp. 89-90, 103; 5th MarDiv, RLT 27 Deployment AAR, dtd 8May68; 27th Mar ComdC, Feb68; Cushman Intvw, Nov82, p. 80; BGen Foster C. LaHue debriefing at FMFPac, Apr68, Tape 2932 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter LaHue debriefing.

9. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb68, p. 104; III MAF ComdC, Feb68; Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*, pp. 58-9, 68; Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year," p. 19; TF X-Ray ComdC, Feb68, pt 2. Pearson states that nearly 45,000 Army reinforcements arrived in I Corps during January and February, but it is obvious that the author confused the total number of Army troops in I Corps with the number of reinforcements.

10. III MAF ComdC, Feb68; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb68, p. 33.

11. See charts of enemy attacks in I Corps from 1 May 1967–31 May 1968 in FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, pp. 30–1.

12. III MAF ComdC, Feb68, pp. 13–4.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

14. 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb68 and LtCol Louis J. Bacher, Comments on draft, dtd 7May95 (Vietnam Comment File); Col Tullis T. Woodham, Jr. Comments on draft, dtd 7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Woodham Comments.

15. 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, p. 16; Col Ross R. Miner, Debriefing by FMFPac, dtd 5Sep68 (Tape No. 3068, Oral HistColl, MCHC).

16. 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, p. 7; Woodham Comments.

17. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, pp. 22–3; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, p. 17–A; TF X-Ray ComdC, Feb68, pt 2.

18. III MAF ComdC, Feb68, pp. 23–4; TF X-Ray ComdC, Feb68, pt 2; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, p. 22; Col Harold L. Oppenheimer, debriefing at FMFPac [May 1968] Tape 6379 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

19. TF X-Ray ComdC, Feb68, pt 2; VAdm Edwin B. Hooper, *Mobility, Support, Endurance, A Story of Naval Operational Logistics in the Vietnam War, 1965–1968* (Washington: Naval Historical Division, 1972), pp. 117–18, hereafter Hooper, *Mobility, Support, Endurance*.

20. Col Edward L. Fossum, debriefing at FMFPac, 11Jul68, Tape 2911 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); Gen William C. Westmoreland, Historical Summary, General Entry, v. 28, Historical File, 27Dec67–31Jan68, Westmoreland Papers, CMH; Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*, pp. 58–9; Col Rex O. Dillow, Comments on draft, dtd 10Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).

21. III MAF ComdC, Feb68, pp. 11–2; 3d MarDiv ComdC, 16–7; 3d Mar AAR Osceola II, dtd 20Mar68, Encl, 3d Mar ComdC, Mar68.

22. III MAF ComdC, Feb68, p. 22; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, pp. 15, 22, 30–31; Tompkins Intvw, p. 72.

23. Hooper, *Mobility, Support, Endurance*, p. 126; Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*, pp. 62–65.

24. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, pp. 17–8, 54; III MAF ComdC, Feb68, pp. 10–1.

25. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, pp. 17–8.

26. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, p. 18; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb68, p. 31;

27. Col Alexander L. Michaux debriefing at FMFPac, 18Jul68, Tape 2915 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, p. 17; 3d MarDiv, AAR, Lancaster II, dtd 9Sep69?, Encl, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Nov68.

28. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, p. 16; 3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 16Feb68, 3d MarDiv PerIntRpt No. 5–68, dtd 18Feb68, and 3d MarDiv Oplan 4–68, dtd 17Feb68, Encls, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68.

29. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb68, pp. 29 and 65; III MAF ComdC, Feb68, p. 10; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, p. 16; 3d MarDiv PerIntRpt No. 6–68, dtd 23Feb68, Encl, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68. For a detailed account of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines action see LtCol Otto J. Lehrack, *No Shining Armor, The Marines at War in Vietnam, An Oral History* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1992), pp. 238–40.

30. III MAF ComdC, Feb68, p. 22; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, pp. 31 and 33; Hooper, *Mobility, Support, Endurance*, p. 126; Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*, pp. 62–65; Cushman Presentation, tab F, p. 35.

Readjustments in the U.S. I Corps Command Structure

31. CMC Norebook, Visit to Vietnam, Jan68; Chaisson Diary, Jan68, Chaisson Papers; ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 18Jan68, and CMC msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 19Jan68 (HQMC Msg File).

32. CMC msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 19Jan68 (HQMC Msg File).

33. 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jan–Feb68; BGen Jacob Glick intvw, 20 Jun and 11Jul89, pp. 65–71 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

34. CGFMFPac msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 20Jan68 (HQMC Msg File); 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jan–Feb68; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Jan–Feb68; CGIII MAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 24Jan68 (HQMC Msg File, III MAF Outgoing); MajGen Carl W. Hoffman intvw, 14Nov68, pp. 129–30 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Hoffman intvw.

35. Hoffman intvw, p. 130; CG1stBde, 101st Abn Div msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 22Jan68 and ComUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 27Jan68 (HQMC Msg File, III MAF Incoming); CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 25Jan68 (HQMC Msg File, III MAF Outgoing).

36. LtGen Robert E. Cushman debriefing at FMFPac, 31Mar69, pp. 465–66 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); Col Franklin L. Smith debriefing at FMFPac [May 1968] Tape 2904 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); Cushman Presentation, tab F, pp. 18–9.

37. Murray Intvw., p. 58; Tompkins Intvw, pp. 82–4.

38. III MAF ComdC, Feb68; Entry for 12Feb68, Chaisson Diary and Chaisson ltrs to wife, dtd 14 and 15Feb68, (Chaisson Papers); LtGen William J. Van Ryzin intvw, 2Apr75, pp. 214–15 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); Tompkins intvw, p. 74.

39. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 18Feb68 (III MAF Outgoing Msgs).

40. DepComUSMACV (Fwd) msg to III MAF and other commands, dtd 20Feb68 (PCV Folder).

41. ComNavForceV msg to DepComUSMACV, dtd 23 Feb68 and CGIIIMAF msg to DepComUSMACV (Fwd), dtd 23Feb68 (PCV Folder).

42. CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 28Feb68 (PCV Folder).

43. USMACV Letter of Instruction, Subj: Role and Missions of Provisional Corps, Vietnam, dtd 3Mar68 (PCV Folder); FMFPac MarOpsV, Mar68, p. 59.

44. Hoffman intvw, p. 130; MajGen Carl W. Hoffman, Comments on draft, dtd 15Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File); Smith debriefing; Cushman intvw, Mar69, pp. 465–66.

Planning for the Future

45. Cushman Presentation, tab F, pp. 35–50; Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year, 1968," p. 20.

46. Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*, p. 69.

47. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: III MAF Staff Study, Subj: Military Posture, Northern I Corps, 1 Sep 1968, dtd 31Mar68, p. 1 (III MAF Miscellaneous Documents). See also ComUSMACV msg to CMC, dtd 13Mar68 (III MAF Incoming Msgs, 5–14Mar68).

March Operations in the DMZ Sector

48. Sources for this and the following two paragraphs are: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar 68, p. 17; III MAF ComdC, p. 20; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, pp. 11–2; *BLT 3/1, Newsletter Battalion Landing Team 3/1*,

RVN, *Dec 67–Jun 68*, Apr 1988, p. 10; Col Max McQuown, Comments on draft, dtd 22Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).

49. Additional sources for this paragraph are: 7th ITT, III MAF, ITT Rpts, 64– and 65–68, dtd 2 and 4Mar68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg Files), hereafter ITT Rpts, 64– and 65–68.

50. ITT Rpts, 64– and 65–68.

51. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68 p. 16; III MAF ComdC, Mar68, pp. 11–2; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p. 20.

52. III MAF ComdC, Mar68, pp. 11–2, and 22; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p. 20.

53. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p. 80.

54. Ibid., pp. 16–8; III MAF ComdC, Mar68, pp. 11–2; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p. 20; BGen William Weise intvw, 21Feb83 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

55. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar 68, pp. 16–18; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p. 49.

56. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, pp. 13–6; III MAF ComdC, Mar68, p. 13; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p. 19; 3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 4Mar68, Encl 1, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68; Lt Col Roger Zensen, Comments on draft, dtd 4Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

57. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, pp. 13–6; III MAF ComdC, Mar68, p. 13; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p. 19.

58. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p. 19; 1st Lt Daniel J. Razaluck and Sgt Ronald C. Trawick in Sgt R. C. Trawick et al. intvw, 21Mar68, Tape 2762 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

59. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p. 80; III MAF ComdC, Mar68, pp. 22–4; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, pp. 6, 17, 30–2, 34–6; Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*, p. 70.

60. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, pp. 17, 19–20; 3d MarDiv FragO 7–68, dtd 25Mar68, Encl 4, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68.

March Operations in the Rest of I Corps

61. III MAF ComdC, Mar68, pp. 10–11 and 13; Cushman Presentation, tab F, pp. 58–9.

62. Copy of UPI News Release, dtd 16Mar68 (Courtesy of Lawrence Lichty).

63. 27th Mar ComdC, Mar68; Capt William R. Black intvw, 9Nov85 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Black intvw.

64. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p. 51; Col William S. Fagan, Comments on draft, dtd 31Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File).

65. 1st MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p. 18; HQMC, G–3 Point Papers, Mar68; 7th Mar ComdC, Mar68.

66. Task Force X-Ray ComdC, Mar68, pt 2.

67. Ibid.; 1st MarDiv ComdC, p. 18.

68. TF X-Ray ComdC, Mar68, pt 2; Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year," p. 22.

69. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, pp. 19–20; III MAF ComdC, Mar68, p. 11; TF X-Ray ComdC, Mar68, pt 2.

70. TF X-Ray ComdC, Mar68, pt 2; Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year, 1968," pp. 25–35; Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*, pp. 69–71.

71. 1st MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, pt 2; TF X-Ray ComdC, Mar68; Black intvw.

72. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p. 52; TFX-Ray ComdC, Mar68, pt 2; HQMC A03H15, Point Paper, Subj: Attack on Phu Bai, 26Mar68, dtd 27Mar68 (HQMC, G–3 Point Papers).

73. TF X-Ray ComdC, Mar68, pt 2; 5th Mar Spot Rpt, dtd 31Mar68, tab N, TF X-Ray ComdC, Mar68.

74. TF X-Ray ComdC, Mar68, pt. 2.

Regaining the Initiative

75. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, pp. 6, 31, 40, 49–50; III MAF ComdC, Apr68, pp. 18–20.

76. III MAF ComdC, Apr68, p. 11; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Apr68, p. 18.

77. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, pp. 28–9 and 74–5; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Apr68, pp. 35–6.

78. LtCol John F. J. Kelly, Comments on draft, dtd 13Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Kelly Comments; TF Kelly, AAR, Opn Quick Track, dtd 16May68, Encl to Kelly Comments.

79. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, pp. 20–1; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Apr68, pp. 14, 18, 40; 1st MarDiv ComdC, May68, p. 40; BGen Robert D. Bohn, Comments on Simmons, "Marine Opns, Vietnam, 1968" (Simmons Comment Notebook).

80. Lahue debriefing; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Apr68, p. 4.

81. TF X-Ray ComdC, Apr68, pt. 2, p. 6; 1/27 ComdC, Apr68, pt. 2, p. 5; Black intvw; William R. Black, Jr., Comments on draft, dtd 4Jan95 and attached ltr to parents, dtd 20–21Apr68 (Vietnam Comment File).

82. TF X-Ray ComdC, Apr68, pt. 2, pp. 7–8.

83. Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year, 1968," pp. 40–2, 45–6; Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*, pp. 89–90; 1st MarDiv, Anx A (Intelligence), 1st MarDiv Oplan 108–68, dtd 26Apr68, pp. A–1—A–2, Encl 9, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Apr68.

84. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, pp. 21–2, May68, pp. 3 and 20; III MAF ComdC, Apr68, p. 19; LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., debriefing on A Shau Valley Operation, Da Nang, 2May68, in Cushman Transcript Book, p. 480; Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year, 1968," pp. 45–53, 65–6; Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*, pp. 89–92.

85. Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year, 1968," p. 48; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr68, pp. 4, 19; 3d MarDiv SitRep No. 1, Opn Rice, dtd 21Apr68, Encl 22, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr68.

86. III MAF ComdC, Apr68, p. 10; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr68, pp. 18 and 20; III MAF Opn Charlton SitRep, No. 17, dtd 16Apr68, Encl 21, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr68.

87. Maj William Dabney, "The Battle of Dong Ha," ms, pp. 5–8; III MAF ComdC, Apr68, p. 22; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, p. 73, May, 68, pp. 8–9; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr68, p. 18.

88. Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam, A History* (New York, New York: Viking Press, 1983), pp. 564–66.

CHAPTER 14 THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: HQMC Msg Files; FMFPac, MarOpsV, May67–Apr68; III MAF

ComdC, Sep67–Apr68; 3d MarDiv ComdC, May67–Apr68; 26th Mar ComdC, Sep67–Apr68; III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File; Khe Sanh Comment File; John Prados and Ray W. Stubbe, *Valley of Decision, The Siege of Khe Sanh* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1991), hereafter Prados and Stubbe, *Valley of Decision*; Capt Moyers S. Shore III, *The Battle for Khe Sanh* (Washington: Hist&Mus Div, HQMC, 1969), hereafter Shore, *Khe Sanh*.

Digging In

1. Gen Westmoreland msg to Gen Wheeler, dtd 12Jan68 (File No. 091/VN Jan68, CJCS Historical Files, HistDiv, JCS, Washington, D.C.); Adm Sharp msg to Gen Wheeler, dtd 14Jan68 (File No. 091/VN Jan68, CJCS Historical Files, HistDiv, JCS, Washington, D.C.).
2. CGIIIMAF msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 13Jan68 (Reel No. 4, HQMC Msg Files); CGIIIMAF msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 16Jan68 (HQMC Msg Files, III MAF Outgoing, Dec67–Feb68).
3. 1/26 ComdC, Jan68, p. 6; Peter Braestrup, Comments on draft, n.d. [Dec94–Jan95] (Vietnam Comment File).
4. CGIIIMAF msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 13Jan68 (Reel No. 4, HQMC Msg Files).
5. CGIIIMAF msg to DepCOMUSMACV, dtd 19Jan68 (HQMC Message File, III MAF Outgoing, Dec67–Feb68).
6. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 21Jan68 (3d MarDiv Messages).
7. CG3dMarDiv msg to 26th Mar, dtd 21Jan68 (3d MarDiv Messages); U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings Before the Electronic Battlefield Subcommittee of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee*, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 18, 19, and 24 Nov 1970, p. 82, hereafter *Hearings Electronic Battlefield*.

Opening Moves

8. 26th Mar SitRep Opn Scotland No. 24, Encl, 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68; 26th Mar AAR, Opn Scotland, dtd 31May68, p. 3, Encl 26th Mar ComdC, Mar68; 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pt. III.
9. 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pt. III; Col William H. Dabney intvw, 20May82, p. 64 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); 26th Mar SitRep No. 326, in 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pt. IV.
10. Maj Matthew P. Caulfield intvw, 4Jan69, p. 10, in Khe Sanh: Transcriptions of Oral History Tapes, MCHC, hereafter Caulfield intvw.
11. Stevens, ed., *The Navy Cross*.
12. Caulfield intvw, p. 11.
13. 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pt. III; 3/26 ComdC, Jan68, p. 10; LtCol Harry L. Alderman intvw, 10–24Feb68, p. 21, in Khe Sanh: Transcriptions of Oral History Tapes, MCHC.

"Incoming!"

14. Maj Jerry E. Hudson, Comments on "The Battle for Khe Sanh," 2Jan69 (Khe Sanh Comment File, MCHC).
15. LtCol James B. Wilkinson, Comments on "The Battle for Khe Sanh," 19Dec68 (Khe Sanh Comment File); Bernard Nalty, *Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1973) pp. 24–25, hereafter Nalty, *Air Power*; LtCol Kenneth W. Pipes, Comments on draft, dtd 10Mar95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Pipes Comments, 1995.
16. BGen Marshall B. Garth, Memorandum for the Record, Subj: Attack on the Khe Sanh Air Base, dtd 21Jan68 (File No. 091/VN

Jan68, JCS HistOff, Washington, D.C.); 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, p. 6; 1/26 ComdC, Jan68, p. 7; Ray W. Stubbe, "Khe Sanh: Valley of Decision" (ms., Wauwatosa, WI, 1987), p. 540, hereafter Stubbe, "Khe Sanh."

17. 1stLt William L. Eberhardt intvw, 10Feb68, Tape 2535 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); William J. O'Connor, Comments on draft, dtd 29Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).
18. LtCol James B. Wilkinson Comments, "The Battle for Khe Sanh," 19Dec68 (Khe Sanh Comment File).
19. 26th Mar SitRep Opn Scotland No. 328, Encl 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pt. IV.
20. 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, Pt. III; 3/26 ComdC, Jan68, p. 4; 26th Mar SitRep Opn Scotland No. 329, Encl 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pt. IV.
21. MCCC Status of Forces, WestPac, 23Jan68; Stubbe, "Khe Sanh," pp. 560–561.
22. Nalty, *Air Power*, pp. 24–25; TSgt Bruce W. Pollica and TSgt Joe R. Rickey, *834th Air Division Tactical Airlift Support for Khe Sanh, 21Jan–8Apr68*, quoted in Stubbe, "Khe Sanh," pp. 567–568.

The Fall of Khe Sanh Village

This section is based on the following sources: Col Bruce B. G. Clarke, USA, Comments on draft, n.d. [Apr95] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Clarke Comments; Capt Bruce Clarke, untitled account, dtd Apr68, attached to Clarke Comments, hereafter Clarke Account, Apr68; John J. Balanco, Comments on draft, dtd 15Nov94 and 5Apr95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Balanco Comments; John J. Balanco, "Abandoned, Reflections of a Khe Sanh Vet," ms, dtd 14Nov94 and 5Apr95, attached to Balanco Comments, hereafter Balanco, "Abandoned"; 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pt. III; Stubbe, "Khe Sanh," p. 573; Prados and Stubbe, *Valley of Decision*, pp. 255–265.

23. Prados and Stubbe, *Valley of Decision*, p. 263.

24. Balanco, "Abandoned," p. 182.

25. Col David E. Lownds intvw, 13Mar68, pp. 22–23, in Khe Sanh: Transcriptions of Oral History, MCHC.

26. Balanco, "Abandoned," p. 184. See also Prados and Stubbe, *Valley of Decision*, p. 264.

27. Clarke Comments and Clarke Account, Apr68.

28. Balanco, "Abandoned," pp. 184–85.

Reinforcement and Fighting Back

29. Nalty, *Air Power*, pp. 25–26; HMM–362 ComdC, Jan68, pt.II; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, p. 43; 26th Mar SitRep Opn Scotland No. 331, Encl, 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pt.IV.

30. For this and the following paragraph see Col John F. Mitchell, Comments on draft, dtd 5Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Mitchell Comments. See also FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, p. 10; 1/9 ComdC, Jan68, pt. II.

31. 26th Mar SitRep Opn Scotland No. 335, Encl, 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pt.IV.

32. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, p. 7.

33. 26th Mar AAR, Opn Scotland, dtd 31May68, p. 5, Encl 26th Mar ComdC, Mar68.

34. Maj Gary E. Todd, Comments on draft, dtd 28Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File) and Capt Bernard D. Cole, USN, Comments on draft, dtd 27Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File).

35. Col William H. Dabney, Comments on draft, n.d. [Dec94] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Dabney Comments.

36. Ibid. See also Shore, *Khe Sanh*, pp. 58–9, 97–8.

37. Dabney Comments; Shore, *Khe Sanh*, p. 59.

38. 26th Mar SitReps Opn Scotland, Nos. 338, 339, Encl 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pt. IV; 2/26 ComdC, Jan68, pp. 7–8; S–2 Officer, 2/26 ltr to S–2 Officer, 26th Mar, no subject, dtd 25Jan68, Encl 2/26 ComdC, Jan68, pt. IV; S–2 Officer, 2/26 ltr to S–2 Officer, 26th Mar, Subj: Enemy Activity Vicinity of XD803457, dtd 26Jan68, in 2/26 ComdC, Jan68, pt. IV.

39. Prados and Stubbe, *Valley of Decision*, p. 282.

40. 26th Mar SitRep Opn Scotland No. 351, Encl 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pt. IV; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, p. 10; Gen Westmoreland msg to Adm Sharp, dtd 23Jan68 (Westmoreland Papers, CMH, Washington, D.C.); MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins, Comments on “The Battle for Khe Sanh,” dtd 19Nov69 (Khe Sanh Comment File); LtCol James B. Wilkinson, Comments on “The Battle for Khe Sanh,” dtd 19Dec68 (Khe Sanh Comment File).

41. 1/26 Journal for 28Jan68, Ser. No. 52, in 1/26 ComdC, Jan68, pt. IV; 1/26 Journal for 24Jan68, Ser. No. 21, in ComdC, Jan68, pt. IV.

42. 1/26 Journal for 30Jan68, Ser. No. 12, in 1/26 ComdC, Jan68, pt. IV; 1/26 Journal for 29Jan68, Ser. No. 21, in 1/26 ComdC, Jan68, pt. IV.

43. Statement of MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins, *Hearings Electronic Battlefield*, pp. 84–85; ComUSMACV msg to CinCPAC, dtd 23Jan68 (File No. 091/Vietnam, Jan68, pt. II, JCS HistOff).

Round Two

44. Jack Shulimson and LtCol Lane Rogers, Memorandum for the Record, Subj: Conversation With MajGen Tompkins, dtd 7Sep76 (MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins intvw transcript, Oral HistColl, MCHC).

45. 1/26 Journal for 29Jan68, Ser. No. 24, in 1/26 ComdC, Jan68, pt. IV.

46. 26th Mar SitRep Opn Scotland, No. 360, Encl 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, pt. IV; 26th Mar ComdC, Jan68, p. 4.

47. Nalty, *Air Power*, p. 82.

48. Addresses by Gen Earle G. Wheeler, USA, 7Jul64 to 2Jul70, pt. II (JCS HistOff, Washington, D.C.).

49. Gen William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1976), p. 337, hereafter Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; Adm Sharp msg to Gen Wheeler, dtd 2Feb68 (File No. 091/Vietnam, JCS HistOff, Washington, D.C.).

50. This and the following paragraph are based upon: Maj Mirza M. Baig Comments on “The Battle for Khe Sanh,” dtd 23Dec68 (Khe Sanh Comment File), hereafter Baig Comments.

51. Ibid.; Capt Earle G. Breeding intvw, 8Mar68, in Khe Sanh: Transcriptions of Oral History, MCHC, hereafter Breeding intvw.

52. 26th Mar ComdC, Feb68, p.8.

53. Ibid.; Breeding intvw; 26th Mar SitRep Opn Scotland, No. 385, Encl, 26th Mar ComdC, Feb68, pt. IV.

54. Breeding intvw.

55. 26th Mar AAR, Opn Scotland, dtd 31May68, p. 3, Encl 26th Mar ComdC, Mar68; Baig Comments; 3/26 ComdC, Feb68, p. 3; 3/26 AAR Opn Scotland, dtd 15Apr68, p. 9, Encl, 3/26 ComdC, Mar68, pt. IV.

The Fall of Lang Vei

56. Gen Westmoreland msg to Adm Sharp, dtd 24Jan68, in Westmoreland Papers (CMH, Washington, D.C.).

57. 1/13 ComdC, Jan68, p. 6; Col David E. Lownds intvw, 13Mar68, in Khe Sanh: Transcriptions of Oral History, MCHC.

58. 2/26 OpO 5–68, dtd 15Mar68, Anx D (Antimechanized Plan), Encl, 2/26 ComdC, Mar68, pt. IV; Co C, 5th SFGA AAR for Battle of Lang Vei, 22Feb68, in 3d MarDiv, U.S.A. AARs, hereafter Co C, 5th SFGA AAR, Feb68; III MAF COC msg to MACV COC, dtd 7Feb68, in III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File.

59. 26th Mar AAR, Opn Scotland, dtd 31May68, p. 4, Encl, 26th Mar ComdC, Mar68, pt. IV.

60. Maj Matthew B. Caulfield intvw, 2Jan69, pp. 26–27, in Khe Sanh: Transcriptions of Oral History, MCHC; Col Franklin L. Smith intvw, 10Jun68, Tape 2878 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

61. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 341–2; Prados and Stubbe, *Valley of Decision*, pp. 331–33; Col Jonathan F. Ladd, USA (ret) intvw, n.d. [1977?] (U.S. Army, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA), pp. 25–30, attached to Clarke Comments; BGen John R. Chaisson ltr to his wife, dtd 8Feb68 (Chaisson Papers, Hoover Institute).

62. Prados and Stubbe, *Valley of Decision*, pp. 331–33; Co C, 5th SFGA AAR, Feb68, p. 5.

63. Gen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., intvw, 1Nov82, p. 30 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

64. LtCol Edward J. A. Castagna intvw, 13Mar68, p. 29, hereafter Castagna intvw and LtCol Harvey M. Harper intvw, 10–24Feb68, p. 6, in Khe Sanh: Transcriptions of Oral History, MCHC.

The Intensifying Battle

65. L. J. Seavy-Cioffi, “Our Victory for Alpha One,” (ms., 1986, MCHC), hereafter Seavy-Cioffi, “Alpha One.”

66. Col John F. Mitchell, Comments on “The Battle for Khe Sanh,” dtd 31Jan69 (Khe Sanh Comment File); Seavy-Cioffi, “Alpha One,” p. 23. See also Larry J. Seavy-Cioffi, Comments on draft, dtd 12Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Seavy-Cioffi Comments.

67. Seavy-Cioffi, “Alpha One,” p. 49.

68. 1/9 ComdC, Feb68, pt. III; 26th Mar ComdC, Feb68, pp. 48–49; 26th Mar SitReps Opn Scotland, Nos. 397, 398, 399, Encl 26th Mar ComdC, Feb68, pt. IV.

69. Casualty figures for this engagement vary among sources. Three Marines were initially declared missing in action, but were later added to the list of those killed. Counts of enemy dead range from 124 to “over 150.” 1/9 AAR, Opn Scotland, n.d., p. 7, Encl, 1/9 ComdC, Mar68, pt. IV; 1/9 ComdC, Feb68, p. 13; 26th Mar SitRep Opn Scotland, No. 399, Encl, 26th Mar ComdC, Feb68, pt. IV; 3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 9Feb68, in III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, p. 15.

70. 1/26 ComdC, Feb68, p. 7.

71. BGen Robert P. Keller, Comments on “The Battle for Khe Sanh,”

dtd 17Dec68 (Khe Sanh Comment File), hereafter Keller Comments, Dec68.

72. Castagna intvw, p. 29.

73. Keller Comments, Dec68.

74. 1/26 ComdC, Feb68, p. 8.

75. MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins intvw, 26Aug68, p. 9, in Khe Sanh: Transcriptions of Oral History, MCHC.

76. Baig Comments.

77. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb68, p. 23; 3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 24Feb68, in III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File; 3/26 ComdC, Feb68, p. 11; Transcript, Hanoi VNA International Service English Broadcast, 24Feb68.

78. 1/26 Journal for 25Feb68, Ser. No. 47, in 1/26 ComdC, Feb68, pt. IV.

79. 1/26 Journal for 25Feb68, Ser. Nos. 49 and 51, in 1/26 ComdC, Feb68, pt. IV.

80. Author conversation with Mr. George W. Jayne, dtd 22Sep88.

81. Maj Kenneth W. Pipes, Comments on "The Battle for Khe Sanh," n.d. [1968?] (Khe Sanh Comment File), hereafter Pipes Comments, [1968?].

82. Casualty figures recorded for this action also vary, especially concerning the numbers of dead and missing. While many sources show 24 missing from the 3d Platoon, they fail to note one Marine missing from the 1st Platoon. Also, early reports which indicated only one Marine killed are often cited. 1/26 ComdC, Feb68, p. 8; Author conversation with Mr. George W. Jayne, dtd 22Sep88; Pipes Comments, [1968?]; 3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 26Feb68, in III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File. According to Prados and Stubbe, a corrected version was issued two weeks later giving the casualties as 9 dead, 25 wounded, and 19 missing. *Valley of Decision*, p. 405.

83. 1/26 Journal for 27Feb68, Ser. No. 45, in 1/26 ComdC, Feb68, pt. IV.

84. 26th Mar SitRep Opn Scotland, No. 484, Encl, 26th Mar ComdC, Feb68, pt. IV.

85. Baig Comments.

86. 26th Mar ComdC, Mar68, p. 3; 3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 2Mar68, in III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File.

87. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, pp. 18, 48. See also the following messages in III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File: 3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 2Mar68; 3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 3Mar68; 3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 4Mar68; 3d MarDiv msg to PCV, dtd 14Mar68; 3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 18Mar68; 3d MarDiv COC msg to PCV COC, dtd 19Mar68.

88. 26th Mar ComdC, Mar68, p. 7.

89. 26th Mar ComdC, Mar68, p. 11; 1/9 ComdC, Mar68, pt. III.

90. 3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 2Mar68, in III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File.

91. 3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 7Mar68, in III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File.

92. 3d MarDiv COC msg to PCV COC, dtd 15Mar68, and 3d MarDiv COC msg to PCV TOC, dtd 25Mar68, in III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File.

93. 26th Mar ComdC, Mar68, p. 6.

94. Ibid. p. 7.

95. CGProvCorpsV msg to CGIII MAF, dtd 23Mar68, and CGProvCorpsV msg to CGIII MAF, dtd 25Mar68, in III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File.

96. 3d MarDiv COC msg to PCV TOC, dtd 25Mar68, in III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File.

97. Seavy-Cioffi Comments, Mitchell Comments, 1995, and Mullins Comments. See also 1/9 ComdC, Mar68, pt. II; 3d MarDiv COC msg to PCV TOC, dtd 27Mar68, and CGPCV msg to CGIII MAF, dtd 27Mar68, in III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File.

Settling the Score

98. 1/26 AAR Opn Scotland, dtd 11May68, p. 8, Encl, 1/26 ComdC, Mar68, pt. IV; LtCol Frederick J. McEwan, Comments on draft, dtd 7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

99. 1/13 ComdC, Mar68, p. 6.

100. 26th Mar ComdC, Mar68, pp. 9–10; 1/26 Journal for 30Mar68, Ser. No. 20, in 1/26 ComdC, Mar68, pt. IV; 26th Mar SitReps Opn Scotland, Nos. 602 and 603, Encl, 26th Mar ComdC, Mar68, pt. IV; 1/26 ComdC, Mar68, pp. 4–5; 26th Mar ComdC, Mar68, pp. 9–10; Prados and Stubbe, *Valley of Decision*, p. 424; Charles E. Davis III, ltr to Ray W. Stubbe, dtd 22Dec91, Encl to Pipes Comments, 1995, hereafter Davis Ltr, Dec91.

101. 1/26 ComdC, Mar68, pp. 4–5.

102. Davis ltr; Wayne Morrison ltr to LtCol Pipes, n.d. [1980's], Encl, Pipes Comments, 1995.

103. Pipes Comments, 1995; CO, 1/26 ltr to CG, 3d MarDiv, Subj: Meritorious Unit Commendation, recommendation for, case of Company B, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, dtd 5Jun68, in Pipes Comments [1968?]; 1stLt John W. Dillon intvw, 3Jan69, Tape 3716 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

104. Casualty figures for the raid vary among reports, with some claiming 3 Marines missing, and others showing 9 dead and either 42 or 71 wounded. The figures in the text are from 1/26 AAR Opn Scotland, dtd 11May68, p. 8, in 1/26 ComdC, Mar68, pt. IV. Other sources include: 26th Mar SitReps Opn Scotland, Nos. 602 and 603, Encl, 26th Mar ComdC, Mar68, pt. IV; 1/26 ComdC, Mar68, pp. 4–5; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p. 54; CGPCV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 31Mar68, in III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File. The Marine artillery officer is quoted in Prados and Stubbe, *Valley of Decision*, p. 424. For General Krulak's observations, see LtGen Victor H. Krulak, *First to Fight, An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps* (Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, Md., 1984), p. 220.

105. 26th Mar AAR, Opn Scotland, dtd 31May68, p. 4, Encl, 26th Mar ComdC, Mar68, pt. IV. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 347.

106. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p. 3.

107. 26th Mar AAR Opn Scotland, dtd 31May68, Encl, 26th Mar ComdC, Mar68, pt. IV.

Operation Pegasus

108. 3d MarDiv PerIntRep, dtd 15Feb68, in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, pt. IV.

109. For this and the following paragraph see: MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins intvw, 26Aug68, Tape 3088 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); Gen William B. Rosson, Comments on draft, dtd 27Feb95 (Vietnam Com-

ment File); LtGen John J. Tolson, *Vietnam Studies: Airmobility, 1961–1971* (Washington: Dept of the Army, 1973), p. 169, hereafter, Tolson, *Airmobility*; John R. Galvin, *Air Assault: The Development of Airmobile Warfare* (New York: Hawthorne Books, Inc., 1969), p. 307, hereafter, Galvin, *Air Assault*.

110. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p. 17; Tolson, *Airmobility*, pp. 170–171; III MAF ComdC, Mar68, p. 25; 1st Mar ComdC, Mar68, p. II–D–2; 1st Mar AAR Opn Pegasus, dtd 3May68, p. 11, in 1st Mar ComdC, Apr68, pt. IV.

111. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p. 53; LtGen John J. Tolson, Comments on “The Battle for Khe Sanh,” dtd 2Jan69 (Khe Sanh Comment File); Tolson, *Airmobility*, pp. 171–172.

112. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, pp. 17–18, 20; LtGen Willard Pearson, *Vietnam Studies: The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966–1968* (Washington: Dept of the Army, 1975), p. 81, hereafter, Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*; CGPCV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 30Mar68 (III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File).

113. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p. 55; 1/26 AAR Opn Scotland, dtd 11May68, p. 2, in 1/26 ComdC, Mar68, pt. IV; 26th Mar ComdC, Mar68, p. 10.

114. 1/26 AAR Opn Scotland, dtd 11May68, p. 3, in 1/26 ComdC, Mar68, pt. IV.

115. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, p. 7. Some sources report that Operation Pegasus numbered 18 infantry battalions, apparently overlooking the ARVN 37th Ranger Battalion at Khe Sanh.

116. 1st Mar ComdC, Apr68, p. II–C–2; Pearson, *War in the Northern Provinces*, p. 81; Tolson, *Airmobility*, p. 173; Galvin, *Air Assault*, p. 307; CGPCV msg to III MAF COC, dtd 2Apr68 (III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File); Gen Westmoreland msg to Gen Wheeler and Adm Sharp, dtd 1Apr68 (File No. MAC 04395, Westmoreland Papers, CMH, Washington, D.C.).

117. CGPCV msg to III MAF COC, dtd 2Apr68 (III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File); Galvin, *Air Assault*, p. 307; Tolson, *Airmobility*, p. 173; Pearson, *War in the Northern Provinces*, p. 81; 26th Mar ComdC, Apr68, pp. 7–9; 1st AirCavDiv AAR Opn Pegasus, dtd 11Jul68, p. 6, in 3d MarDiv U.S.A. AARs, hereafter 1st ACD AAR Opn Pegasus.

118. Friendly casualty figures for this action vary. Figures in the text are from 1/9 AAR Opn Pegasus, dtd 22May68, p. 4, in 1/9 ComdC, Apr68, pt. IV and 1/9 ComdC, Apr68, pp. 4–5. Other sources include 26th Mar ComdC, Apr68, p. 9; 26th Mar PerOpsSum Opn Pegasus, No. 5 in 26th Mar ComdC, Apr68, pt. IV; 26th Mar AAR Opn Pegasus, dtd 10May68, in 26th Mar ComdC, Apr68, pt. IV; III MAF ComdC, Apr68, pp. 11–12; Tolson, *Airmobility*, p. 175.

119. 1/9 ComdC, Apr68, p. 5; 1/9 AAR Opn Pegasus, dtd 22May68, p. 5, in 1/9 ComdC, Apr68, pt. IV, hereafter 1/9 AAR Opn Pegasus; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, p. 9. Again, casualty figures vary. One source even provides conflicting numbers on two different pages of the same document. For other reports, see 1/9 AAR Opn Pegasus, p. 3; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p. 12; III MAF ComdC, Apr68, p. 12; CGPCV msg to III MAF COC, dtd 6Apr68 (III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File); 26th Mar AAR Opn Pegasus, dtd 10May68, p. 3, in 26th Mar ComdC, Apr68, pt. IV, hereafter 26th Mar AAR Opn Pegasus; 26th Mar ComdC, Apr68, p. 10; 26th Mar PerOpsSum Opn Pegasus, No. 6 in 26th Mar ComdC, Apr68, pt. IV.

120. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: 2/26 ComdC, Apr68, p. 3; 2/26 AAR Opn Pegasus, dtd 5May68, p. 4, in 2/26 ComdC, Apr68, pt. IV.

121. An additional source for this paragraph is: 26th Mar Opn Pegasus PerOpsSum, No. 7 in 26th Mar ComdC, Apr68, pt. IV.

122. Ibid.

123. 1st ACD AAR Opn Pegasus, p. 7.

124. CGPCV msg to III MAF COC, dtd 7Apr68 (III MAF Khe Sanh File); Tolson, *Airmobility*, p. 176.

125. 1st ACD AAR Opn Pegasus, p. 7.

126. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, p. 10; 1/9 ComdC, Apr68, p. 6; 1st ACD AAR Opn Pegasus, p. 3; 2/26 ComdC, Apr68, pp. 3–8; Pearson, *War in the Northern Provinces*, pp. 85–86; Tolson, *Airmobility*, pp. 85–87.

127. CGPCV msg to CGIII MAF, dtd 8Apr68, and CGPCV msg to III MAF COC, dtd 9Apr68 (III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File).

128. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p. 12; Tolson, *Airmobility*, p. 177.

129. 1/9 ComdC, Apr68, p. 6.

130. CGPCV msg to CGIII MAF, dtd 10Apr68 (III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File).

131. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p. 7; Pearson, *War in the Northern Provinces*, p. 88; Tolson, *Airmobility*, p. 178.

132. CGPCV msg to III MAF COC, dtd 12Apr68 (III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File).

133. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, p. 10.

134. LtCol John C. Studt, Comments on “The Battle for Khe Sanh,” dtd 24Dec68, in Khe Sanh Comment File, hereafter Studt Comments, Dec68; Col Bruce F. Meyers, Comments on draft, dtd 20Feb95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Meyers Comments, Feb95.

135. LtCol John C. Studt, “Battalion in the Attack,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, July 1970, pp. 39–44; Meyers Comments, Feb95.

136. Meyers Comments, Feb95.

137. Studt Comments, Dec68; 26th Mar ComdC, Apr68, pp. 11–12; Col Bruce F. Meyers, Comments on “The Battle for Khe Sanh,” dtd 16Dec68, in Khe Sanh Comment File; III MAF ComdC, Apr68, p. 12; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, p. 10; 26th Mar AAR Opn Pegasus; CGPCV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 15Apr68 (III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File); Pearson, *War in the Northern Provinces*, p. 87. Quote is from Meyers Comments, Feb95.

138. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: Gen Westmoreland msg to Adm Sharp, dtd 15Apr68 (File No. MAC 05008, Westmoreland Papers, CMH, Washington, D.C.); CGPCV msg to III MAF COC, dtd 14Apr68, and CG, PCV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 15Apr68 (III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File); Pearson, *War in the Northern Provinces*, p. 88; Tolson, *Airmobility*, p. 178; Dabney Comments. Quotes in this paragraph are from Col John C. Studt, Comments on draft, dtd 22Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).

CHAPTER 15 THE BATTLE FOR DONG HA

The major sources for this chapter are: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr–Jun68; III MAF ComdCs, Apr–Jun68; III MAF Jnl & Msg Files; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Apr–Jun68; 9th Mar ComdCs, Apr–Jun68; 3d Mar ComdCs, Apr–Jun68; Maj Thomas Donnelly and Capt Moyers S. Shore II, “Ho Chi Minh’s Gamble,” in LtCol Ralph F. Moody, et al., “Marines in Vietnam, 1954–68,” 8 pts (ms, MCHC, Washington, D.C., 1971), pt VI, hereafter Donnelly and Shore, “Ho Chi Minh’s Gamble”; Waldron and Beavers, “The Critical Year”; Maj William H.

Dabney, "The Battle of Dong Ha," ms, Apr75, hereafter Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha"; BGen William Weise intvw, 21Feb83 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Weise intvw, 21Feb83; BGen William Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," ms, 7Feb87, hereafter Weise, "Memories of Dai Do"; BGen William Weise Folder on Dai Do, hereafter Weise Folder, Dai Do; BGen Edwin H. Simmons, USMC, Comment Notebook, May 1970, *Naval Review* article, MCHC, hereafter Simmons Comment Notebook, May 1970, *Naval Review* article.

Why Dong Ha?

1. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr68, p. 31; Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha," passim.
2. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: CG3dMarDiv msg to CGProvCorps, dtd 19May68, Encl 5, and 3d MarDiv, Summary Report and notes, Battle of Dong Ha, n.d., Encls 6–10, 3d MarDiv ComdC, May68, hereafter 3d MarDiv, Summary Report; Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha," pp. 2–5. For organization of Task Force Robbie, see LtCol Karl J. Fontenot, Comments on draft, n.d. [Dec94] (Vietnam Comment File).
3. 3d Mar ComdC, Apr68, p. 27; BLT 2/4 CAAR, Operation Napoleon/Saline, dtd 4Jul68, tab H, 3d Mar ComdC, Jul68, hereafter BLT 2/4 CAAR Napoleon; Weise, "Memories of Dai Do."
4. Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha," pp. 5–6; 3d MarDiv, Summary Report.
5. The sources for this and the following two paragraphs are: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, pp. 12–4; Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha," pp. 5–6; 3d MarDiv, Summary Report; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr68, p. 19; John Randolph, "Viet Battle Pits Huge Field Units," *Los Angeles Times*, 8May68, pp. 1–2 (Clipping in Weise Folder, Dai Do), hereafter Randolph, "Viet Battle Pits Huge Field Units".
6. Additional sources for this paragraph are: Weise intvw, 21Feb83; BLT 2/4 CAAR Napoleon.
7. Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha," pp. 12–5; 3d MarDiv, Summary Report.

The Fight For Dai Do, The First Day

8. Weise intvw, 21Feb83; BLT 2/4 CAAR Napoleon; 3d Mar ComdC, May68.
9. The sources for this and the following two paragraphs are: Weise intvw, 21Feb83; BLT 2/4 CAAR Napoleon.
10. Additional source for this and the following paragraph is: 3d MarDiv, Summary Report.
11. Additional sources for this paragraph are: 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr68, p. 18; Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," p. 2.
12. BGen William Weise, "Sequence of Events—Battle of Dai Do," dtd 11Mar83 (Weise Folder, Dai Do); Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," p. 3; BLT 2/4 CAAR Napoleon, p. 32; 3d Mar ComdC, May68, p. 26; Weise intvw, Feb83.
13. BGen William Weise, "Sequence of Events—Battle of Dai Do," dtd 11Mar83 (Weise Folder, Dai Do); Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," p. 3; BLT 2/4 CAAR Napoleon, p. 6; Weise intvw, Feb83.
14. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: BGen William Weise, "Sequence of Events—Battle of Dai Do," dtd 11Mar83 (Weise Folder, Dai Do); Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," pp. 5–6; BLT 2/4 CAAR Napoleon, p. 32; 3d Mar ComdC, May 68, p. 26; Weise intvw, Feb83.

15. An additional source for this paragraph is: Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," pp. 6–7.

16. The sources for this and the following three paragraphs are: BGen William Weise, "Sequence of Events—Battle of Dai Do," dtd 11Mar83 (Weise Folder, Dai Do); Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," pp. 6–8; BLT 2/4 CAAR Napoleon, p. 32.

17. Additional sources for this and the following two paragraphs are: 3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp. 26–7; Weise intvw, Feb83.

18. Additional sources for this and the following paragraph are: Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," pp. 8–10; LtCol William Weise, Comments on draft ms., dtd 1Oct69, Donnelly and Shore, "Ho Chi Minh's Gamble" (Comment File), hereafter Weise Comments, 1Oct69.

19. The quote is from Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," ms., 7Feb87.

20. Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," pp. 9–10; BLT 2/4 CAAR Napoleon, p. 32.

21. The sources for this and the following three paragraphs are: Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," pp. 10–11; Weise, "Sequence of Events"; Weise Comments, 1Oct69.

22. Additional sources for this and the following two paragraphs are: 3d Mar ComdC, May68, p. 27; BLT 2/4 CAAR Napoleon, p. 32.

23. Additional sources for this and the following paragraph are: Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," p. 12; Weise intvw, Feb83.

24. 3d Mar ComdC, May68, p. 27; BLT 2/4 CAAR Napoleon, p. 32.

25. Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," p.13; Weise Comments, 1Oct69.

26. Col William H. Dabney intvw, 20May82, p. 34 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha," pp. 12–5; 3d MarDiv, Summary Report; Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year," pp. 57–8.

27. Randolph, "Viet Battle Pits Huge Field Units," pp. 1–2.

28. Gen William B. Rosson, USA, Comments on draft, dtd 27Feb95 (Vietnam Comment File).

29. Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha," pp. 12–5; 3d MarDiv, Summary Report; Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year," p. 59; MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins, Comments on Simmons, "Marine Opns, Vietnam, 1968," dtd 19Nov69 (Simmons Comment Notebook, May 1970, *Naval Review* article).

The Continuing Fight For Dai Do

30. The sources for this and the following four paragraphs are: Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," p. 13–4; Weise intvw, Feb83; Weise, "Sequence of Events."
31. Additional sources for this and the following three paragraphs are: 3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp. 27–8; BLT 2/4 CAAR, Operation Napoleon, p. 33.
32. Additional sources for this and the following paragraph are: Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," p. 15; Peter Braestrup, "Daido: Marines Open Supply Line," *The Washington Post*, 8May68, pp. D-1—D-3, p. D-2 (Clipping in Weise Folder, Dai Do).
33. Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," pp. 15–6; FMFPac MarOpsV, May68, p. 64.
34. Sources for this and the following two paragraphs are: Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," pp. 17–18; Weise intvw, Feb83; BLT 2/4 CAAR, Operation Napoleon, pp. 33–4; 3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp. 28–9.

35. An additional source for this and the following paragraph is: Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," Insert 5.

36. An additional source for this paragraph is: Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," pp. 19–21.

37. Sources for this and the following paragraph are: Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," p. 13–4; Weise intvw, Feb83; Weise, "Sequence of Events," 2/4 CAAR, Operation Napoleon, pp. 33–4.

38. MGySgt James W. Rogers, Comments on draft, dtd 21Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Rogers Comments, Nov94.

39. An additional source for this paragraph is: Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," pp. 21–2.

40. The sources for this and the following 12 paragraphs are: Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," p. 23; Weise intvw, Feb83; Weise, "Sequence of Events."

41. Additional sources for this and the following 10 paragraphs are: Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," p. 24; BLT 2/4 CAAR, Operation Napoleon, pp. 34–5.

42. Prescott is quoted in Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," Insert 2.

43. Lieutenant Taylor is quoted in Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," p. 25.

44. Rogers is quoted in Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," p. 26. See also Rogers Comments, Nov94.

45. Additional source for this paragraph is Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," p. 27.

46. Additional sources for this and the following four paragraphs are: Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," pp. 28–30; Weise Comments, 1Oct69.

47. Additional source for this and the following three paragraphs are: 3d Mar ComdC, May68, p. 30. Quote is from Weise intvw, Feb83.

48. Quotes are again from Weise intvw, Feb83.

49. An additional source for this and the following paragraph is: Weise, "Memories of Dai Do," pp. 30–33. The quotes again are from Weise intvw, Feb83.

50. 3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp. 30–1; BLT 2/4 CAAR, Operation Napoleon, pp. 35–6; 1/3 ComdC, May68; Weise Comments, 1Oct69.

51. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, p. 20; III MAF ComdC, May68, p. 11; 3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp. 27–30. The Weise quotes are from Weise intvw, Feb83.

The End of the First Offensive

52. The sources for this and the following two paragraphs are: Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha," pp. 17–8; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, pp. 18–9, May68, p. 9; Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year," p. 63.

53. An additional source for this and the following paragraph is: 3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp. 3–5.

54. 3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp. 5–7, and Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year," pp. 63–4.

55. 3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp. 5–7.

56. The sources for this and the following two paragraphs are: Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha," pp. 19–21; 3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp. 32–3; 1/3 ComdC, May68.

57. LtCol Charles V. Jarman ltr to wife, dtd 5May68, Encl Col Charles V. Jarman, Comments on draft, dtd 12Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

58. Ibid.

59. 3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp. 8–9.

60. 3d MarDiv, Summary Report; Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year," p. 64; Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha," pp. 23–4. The quote is from Dabney's account. Major Dabney during this period served on the 3d Marine Division staff as the Assistant G–3 officer at Dong Ha.

61. 3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp. 8–9 and 32–33.

62. III MAF ComdC, May68, p. 14; 3d MarDiv SitReps 2–4, Operation Concordia Square, dtd 9–11 May68, Encl 17–19, 3d MarDiv ComdC, May68; Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year," p. 64; Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha," pp. 23–4.

63. 3d Mar ComdC, May68, p. 10.

64. 3d MarDiv SitRep No. 32, Opn Concordia Square, dtd 18May68, Encl 46, 3d MarDiv ComdC, May68; III MAF ComdC, May68, p. 14; Waldron and Beavers, "The Critical Year," p. 64; Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha," pp. 25–8.

65. 3d MarDiv, Summary Report; Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha," pp. 25–8. The quotes are from Dabney's account.

The Second Offensive

66. III MAF ComdC, May68, pp. 11–2; 3d MarDiv ComdC, May68, pp. 17–8; Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha," pp. 25–8.

67. BGen Lawrence H. Caruthers, Jr., intvw with Dr. Lewis Sorley, Washington, 15Sep89 (quote courtesy of Dr. Lewis Sorley); Gen Raymond G. Davis intvw, 2Feb77, pp. 11–12 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Davis intvw, 2Feb77; BGen John R. Chaisson ltr to wife, dtd 16May68 and diary entry, 16May68 (Chaisson Papers).

68. MajGen Raymond G. Davis debriefing at FMFPac, 15Apr69, pp. 329–30 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Davis FMFPac debriefing.

69. For detailed accounts of the 8 May action see: Otto J. Lehrack, *No Shining Armor, The Marines at War in Vietnam, An Oral History* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992), pp. 269–75; Jeff Kelly, *DMZ Diary, A Combat Marine's Vietnam Memoir* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland and Company, Inc., 1991), pp. 80–92.

70. The general sources for this and the following four paragraphs are: CG3dMarDiv msg to CGPCV, dtd 4Jun68, Encl 7, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, hereafter 3d MarDiv msg, 4Jun68; FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, pp. 11–2; 9th Mar ComdC, May68, p. 9; Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha," pp. 28–9. The quotes in this paragraph are from Capt Matthew G. McTiernan, Comments on draft, n.d. [Jan 1995] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter McTiernan Comments.

71. The quote is from 9th Mar ComdC, May68, p. 9.

72. An additional source for this paragraph is: 3d Mar ComdC, May68, p. 18.

73. Additional sources for this paragraph are: 3d Mar ComdC, May68, p. 19; MajGen Raymond G. Davis intvw, 1Jan69, p. 276 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

74. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: 9th Mar ComdC, May68, p. 9; 3d MarDiv msg, 4Jun68; FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, pp. 13–4; Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha," pp. 30–3.

75. An additional source for this paragraph is: McTiernan Comments.

76. 9th Mar ComdC, May68, pp. 9–10; 3d MarDiv msg, 4Jun68; FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p. 15.

77. 3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp. 19–22; 3d MarDiv msg, 4Jun68; Dabney, "Battle of Dong Ha," pp. 30–3.

78. 3d MarDiv msg, 4Jun68.

79. Ibid; 3d Mar ComdC, May68, pp. 21, 43–4; Davis FMFPac debriefing, p. 300.

80. CG3dMarDiv msg to 3d MarDiv, dtd 22May68, tab A, 9th Mar ComdC, Jun68; Davis intvw, 2Feb77; 9th Mar ComdC, May68, pp. 3–4, 12.

81. Quote is from Jack Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, An Expanding War*, 1966 (Washington: Hist&Mus Div, HQMC, 1982), p. 319.

CHAPTER 16

KHE SANH: FINAL OPERATIONS AND EVACUATION, 16 APRIL–11 JULY 1968

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr–Jul68; III MAF ComdCs, Apr–Jul68; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Apr–Jul68; 1st Mar ComdCs, Apr–Jul68; 4th Mar ComdCs, May–Jul68; 26th Mar ComdCs, Apr–Jun68; Khe Sanh Comment File.

To Stay or Not to Stay

1. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 336.
2. Gen William C. Westmoreland, Comments on “The Battle for Khe Sanh,” dtd 29Mar69, in Khe Sanh Comment File.
3. Gen William B. Rosson, USA, Comments on draft, dtd 29May95 (Vietnam Comment File).
4. Ibid.; Gen William C. Westmoreland msg to Adm Ulysses S. G. Sharp, dtd 15Apr68 (File No. MAC 05008, Westmoreland Papers, CMH, Washington, D.C.); Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 348; Westmoreland, Comments on “The Battle for Khe Sanh,” dtd 29Mar69, in Khe Sanh Comment File.

The ‘Walking Dead’

5. 1st Mar ComdC, Apr68, p. II–C–6; BGen Jacob E. Glick intvw, 20 Jun and 11Jul89, pp. 2–3 and 70 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); BGen Jacob E. Glick, Comments on draft, dtd 25Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Glick Comments.
6. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr68, p. 20A; 1/26 ComdC, Apr68, p. 2; 2/26 ComdC, Apr68, p. 5; 3/26 ComdC, Apr68, p. 3; 2/1 ComdC, Apr68, pt. II; Copy of Statement of Col Bruce F. Meyers to Board for Correction of Naval and Military Records, n.d. [1968], Copy attached to Col Bruce F. Meyers, Comments on draft, dtd 20Feb95 (Vietnam Comment Files).
7. Col Walter H. Cuenin ltr to CG3dMarDiv, Subj: Informal investigation into the circumstances of a night operation conducted by the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 3d Marine Division, in the vicinity of Khe Sanh, Republic of Vietnam, on the night of 16–17 April 1968, including the methods used in the recovery and accounting for, casualties incurred therein, dtd 3May68, pp. 5–6, in “Informal investigation of an Opn conducted by 1/9 in the vicinity of Khe Sanh, RVN, 16–18 Apr 68,” hereafter Investigation; Statement of Captain Henry D. Banks, dtd 21Apr68, in Investigation, hereafter Banks Statement.
8. Banks Statement; Testimony of LtCol John J. H. Cahill, p. 5, in Investigation, hereafter Cahill Testimony; Statement of Col Bruce F. Meyers, p. 2, in Investigation, hereafter Meyers Statement; Statement of Maj Joseph A. Donnelly, in Investigation, hereafter Donnelly Statement.
9. Investigation, pp. 6–7; Statement of LtCol John J. H. Cahill, p. 1, in Investigation, hereafter Cahill Statement.

10. Investigation, pp. 7–8; Cahill Statement, p. 1; Cahill Testimony, p. 5; Meyers Statement, p. 2.

11. Investigation, pp. 9–10; Cahill Statement, pp. 1–2; Cahill Testimony, pp. 8–9; Statement of 1stLt John K. Leblond, p. 2, in Investigation; Statement of 1stLt William C. Connelly, p. 2, in Investigation, hereafter Connelly Statement.

12. Investigation, p. 10; Cahill Statement, p. 2; Cahill Testimony, pp. 9–10; Donnelly Statement, pp. 2–3; Statement of Capt Charles B. Hartzell, in Investigation, hereafter Hartzell Statement; Statement of Capt John W. Cargile, p. 2, in Investigation, hereafter Cargile Statement.

13. Investigation, pp. 10–11; Cahill Statement, p. 2; Cahill Testimony, p. 10; Donnelly Statement, p. 3; Testimony of Maj Joseph A. Donnelly, in Investigation, p. 5, hereafter Donnelly Testimony; Banks Statement, p. 2; Hartzell Statement, p. 4, 6; Cargile Statement, p. 2.

14. Cahill Statement, p. 2; Cahill Testimony; Meyers Testimony; Donnelly Statement, p. 3; Donnelly Testimony; Hartzell Testimony; Cargile Testimony; Connelly Testimony; Statement of 2dLt Francis B. Lovely, Jr., p. 2, in Investigation, hereafter Lovely Statement; Testimony of 2dLt Francis B. Lovely, Jr., in Investigation, hereafter Lovely Testimony. The recounting of this engagement in 1/9 ComdC, Apr68, pp. 8–9, indicates that Company D “swept up and over the ridge.” As far as this statement implies that Company D overran the enemy, it cannot be supported by any participant’s statement or testimony included in the investigation report.

15. Investigation, pp. 13–14; Cahill Statement, p. 2; Cahill Testimony; Meyers Statement, p. 5; Meyers Testimony.

16. Investigation, p. 14; Cahill Testimony; Donnelly Testimony; Connelly Statement, p. 3; Connelly Testimony; Statement of Corporal Hubert H. Hunnicutt III, p. 5, in Investigation, hereafter Hunnicutt Statement.

17. Investigation, p. 15; Hartzell Testimony; Capt Donald F. Engel Testimony, in Investigation, hereafter Engel Testimony.

18. Investigation, p. 16; Cahill Testimony.

19. Investigation, pp. 16–17; Cahill Testimony; Meyers Statement, pp. 10–11; Meyers Supplementary Statement; Meyers Testimony; Statement of BGen Jacob E. Glick, pp. 1–2, in Investigation, hereafter Glick Statement; Donnelly Testimony; Hartzell Testimony; Connelly Statement; Connelly Testimony.

20. Hunnicutt Statement.

21. Investigation, p. 18; Hunnicutt Statement.

22. 1st Mar ComdC, Apr68, p. II–C–7; CG3dMarDiv ltr to CGIIIMAF, Subj: Informal investigation of an operation conducted by 1st Battalion, 9th Marines . . . , dtd 20May68, in “Informal investigation of an Opn conducted by 1/9 in the vicinity of Khe Sanh, RVN, 16–18 Apr 1968”.

Operation Scotland II

23. BGen Jacob E. Glick intvw, 20 Jun and 11Jul89, p. 12 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

24. 3d MarDiv OPlan 10–68, dtd 15Apr68, Opn Scotland II, in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr68, pt. IV; 3d MarDiv OPlan 11–68, Opn Scotland II, in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr68, pt. IV; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr68, p. 50; 26th Mar Opn Scotland II SitRep No. 6, in 26th Mar ComdC, Apr68, pt. IV; 1st Mar ComdC, Apr68, p. II–C–6–9; 1/1 Journal for 16Apr68, in 1/1 ComdC, Apr68, pt. IV; 1/1 ComdC, Apr68, p. 1–II–3; 3/4 ComdC, Apr68, p. III–3; 1/9 ComdC, Apr68, p. 3.

25. Col Robert C. V. Hughes, Comments on draft, n.d. [Jan95?] (Vietnam Comment File).
 26. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, pp. 11–12; 1st Mar ComdC, Apr68, p. II–C–7, 9; 1/1 ComdC, Apr68, p. 1–II–5; 1/11 ComdC, Apr68, p. 5; 3/4 ComdC, Apr68, p. IV–5; BGen Edwin H. Simmons, “Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1968,” *The Marines in Vietnam, 1954–1973* (Washington: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1985), hereafter Simmons, “1968.”
 27. MajGen Carl W. Hoffman, Comments on draft, dtd 15Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File); MajGen Carl W. Hoffman intvw, 14Nov68, pp. 144–45 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
 28. 1st Mar ComdC, May68, p. II–E–1.
 29. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p. 16; 3d MarDiv ComdC, May68, pp. 56–57; 1st Mar ComdC, May68, p. II–C–3; 1st Mar SitReps Opn Scotland II, Nos. 114, 118, 119, in 1st Mar ComdC, May68, pt. IV; 2/3 ComdC, May68, pt. III.
 30. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p. 17; III MAF ComdC, May68, p. 10; 3d MarDiv ComdC, May68, p. 19; 1st Mar SitReps Opn Scotland, Nos. 126, 128, 131, in 1st Mar ComdC, May68, pt. IV; 1st Mar ComdC, May68, p. II–C–5; 2/1 ComdC, May68, pt. III.
 31. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p. 17; 1st Mar ComdC, May68, p. II–C–4.
 32. 3d MarDiv ComdC, May68, p. 19; 1st Mar ComdC, May68, p. II–C–4; 1st Mar SitReps Opn Scotland II, Nos. 132, 133 in 1st Mar ComdC, May68, pt. IV; 2/3 ComdC, May68, pt. III.
 33. This and the following paragraph are derived from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p. 17; III ComdC, May68, p. 10; 3d MarDiv ComdC, May68, pp. 58–59; 1st Mar ComdC, May68, p. II–C–5; 2/1 ComdC, May68, pt. II, III; 2/1 S–3 Journal for 19May68, in 2/1 ComdC, May68, pt. IV; Col Billy R. Duncan, Comments on draft, dtd 15Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Duncan Comments.
 34. Duncan Comments.
 35. Some sources cite initial body counts of 66 enemy killed in the ambush battle. A follow up report, however, contained in 2/1 S–3 Journal for 20May68, in 2/1 ComdC, May68, pt. IV, shows that the battalion found three additional enemy bodies the day following the ambush.
 36. 2/1 S–2 Journal for 19May68, in 2/1 ComdC, May68, pt. IV.
 37. Duncan Comments.
 38. 1/11 ComdC, May68, p. 34.
 39. III MAF PerIntRep 24–68, dtd 17Jun68, p. B–1, in III MAF PerIntReps; 1st Mar SitReps Opn Scotland II, Nos. 137, 147, in 1st Mar ComdC, May68, pt. IV; 3/9 ComdC, May68, p. 6; Simmons, “1968,” p. 118.
 40. III MAF ComdC, May68, p. 10; 1st Mar SitReps Opn Scotland II, Nos. 154, 156, 159, in 1st Mar ComdC, May68, pt. IV; 2/3 ComdC, May68, pt. III.
 41. 1st Mar ComdC, May68, p. II–B–2; 1st Mar SitReps Opn Scotland II, No. 168, in 1st Mar ComdC, May68, pt. IV; 2/3 ComdC, May68, pt. III.
 42. 1st Mar ComdC, May68, p. II–C–5.
 43. 1st Mar SitRep Opn Scotland II, No. 171 in 1st Mar ComdC, May68, pt. IV.
 44. 1st Mar ComdC, May68, p. II–C–5.
 45. 2/3 ComdC, May68, pt. III.
 46. 2/3 ComdC, May68, pt. III. Casualty figures vary slightly for both sides among various sources. Other counts are given in FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p. 18; III MAF ComdC, May68, p. 10; 3d MarDiv ComdC, May68, pp. 19–20; 1st Mar ComdC, May68, pp. II–B–2, II–C–5.
 47. Glick Comments.
 48. 3d MarDiv FragO 19–68, in 3d MarDiv ComdC, May68, pt. IV.
 49. III MAF ComdC, May68, p. 10; 1st Mar SitReps Opn Scotland II, Nos. 181, 183, in 1st Mar ComdC, May68, pt. IV; 2/3 ComdC, May68, pt. III.
 50. 1st Mar ComdC, May68, p. II–C–6; 1st Mar SitReps Operation Scotland II, Nos. 181, 182, 183, in 1st Mar ComdC, May68, pt. IV; 1/1 ComdC, May68, p. 1–II–5; 2/3 ComdC, May68, pt. III. Casualties figures vary. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p. 19 shows 14 Marines killed and 88 wounded, 141 NVA dead.
- Operation Robin**
51. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p. 7; III MAF PerIntRep 23–68, dtd 11Jun68, p. 1, in III MAF PerIntReps; III MAF PerIntRep 25–68, dtd 25Jun68, p. 2, in III MAF PerIntReps; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, pp. 24–27; 1st Mar ComdC, Jun68, pt. II–B–1; 4th Mar ComdC, Jun68, p. 11.
 52. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, pp. 24–27.
 53. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, pp. 8, 64, and 73; 1st Mar ComdC, Jun68, p. II–C–2.
 54. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p. 8; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, p. 26; 1st Mar ComdC, Jun68, p. II–C–2; 1/1 ComdC, Jun68, p. 1–II–3.
 55. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p. 8; 1st Mar ComdC, Jun68, p. II–C–2; 1/1 ComdC, Jun68, p. 1–II–5.
 56. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p. 9; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, pp. 26–27; 1st Mar SitRep Opn Scotland, No. 197, in 1st Mar ComdC, Jun68, pt. IV; 1st Mar ComdC, Jun68, p. II–B–1, II–C–3; 1/11 ComdC, Jun68, p. 5.
 57. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, pp. 24–27; 1/1 ComdC, Jun68, p. 1–II–5; 1/12 ComdC, Jun68, p. 4.
 58. 1/4 ComdC, Jun68, p. 3; 2/4 ComdC, Jun68, p. 7.
 59. 1st Mar ComdC, Jun68, p. II–C–4; 1/1 ComdC, Jun68, p. 1–II–3.
 60. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, p. 27; Some sources say “approximately 150” enemy troops. Considering the outcome of the engagement, the estimate of a battalion is probably correct.
 61. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p. 6, 10; 4th Mar ComdC, Jun68, p. 6.
 62. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p. 9; III MAF PerIntRep 23–68, dtd 11Jun68, p. 1, in III MAF PerIntReps; III MAF ComdC, Jun68, p. 10; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, p. 27; 1/4 ComdC, Jun68, p. 3.
 63. Maj Gary E. Todd, Comments on draft, dtd 28Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File).
 64. III MAF PerIntRep 24–68, 17Jun68, p. 2, in III MAF PerIntReps; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, p. 27; 3/9 ComdC, Jun68, p. 3; 3/9 Journal for 9–16Jun68, in 3/9 ComdC, Jun68, pt. IV; Co A, 3d Engr Bn AAR for Opn Scotland II, n.d., in 3d Engr Bn ComdC, Jun68, pt. IV.
 65. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p. 10; 4th Mar OpO 5–68, in 4th Mar ComdC, Jun68, pt. IV.

66. 3/4 ComdC, Jun68, p. IV-6.
67. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, pp. 11-12; 2/4 ComdC, Jun68, pp. 5, 8.
68. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p. 12; III MAF ComdC, Jun68, p. 10; III MAF PerIntRep 24-68 and 25-68, in III MAF PerIntReps; Interrogation Report of PWs Do Van Huan, Linh Xuan Duc, Trinh Van Chien, Nguyen Duc Huong and Dang Truong Vien, in III MAF PerIntRep 25-68, p. B-1, in III MAF PerIntReps; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, p. 27; 4th Mar ComdC, Jun68, p. 6; 3/4 ComdC, Jun68, p. IV-8.
69. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p. 11; III MAF ComdC, Jun68, p. 10; 4th Mar ComdC, Jun68, p. 6; 1/4 ComdC, Jun68, p. 3; 1/4 Journal for 11Jun68, in 1/4 ComdC, Jun68, pt. IV; 1/12 ComdC, Jun68, p. 5; 1/12 S-3 Journal for 11Jun68, in 1/12 ComdC, Jun68, pt. IV.
70. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p. 12; III MAF ComdC, Jun68, p. 10; III MAF PerIntRep 25-68, dtd 25Jun68, p. 1, in III MAF PerIntReps; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, p. 27; 4th Mar ComdC, Jun68, p. 6; 3/4 ComdC, Jun68, p. IV-9.
71. 4th Mar ComdC, Jun68, p. 6; Other sources show different numbers of NVA dead. See also 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, p. 27.
72. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, p. 26.
73. 2/4 ComdC, Jun68, p. 5.
74. 4th Mar ComdC, Jun68, p. 7.

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75. 3d MarDiv OPlan 21-68, dtd 8Jun68, in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, pt. IV; 1st Mar ComdC, Jun68, p. II-C-6.
76. 1st Mar ComdC, Jun68, p. II-C-1, II-C-6; 1/11 ComdC, Jun68, p. 6.
77. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68, p. 106; 1st Mar ComdC, Jun68, p. II-E-2.
78. III MAF PerIntRep 27-68, pp. 4-5, in III MAF PerIntReps.
79. 1st Mar ComdC, Jul68, p. II-B-1; Conflicting enemy casualty figures are contained in FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, pp. 15-16; III MAF ComdC, Jul68, pt. III; III MAF PerIntRep 27-68, dtd 9Jul68, p. 1, in III MAF PerIntReps.
80. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul68, p. 18; 2/1 ComdC, Jul68, pt. III.
81. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p. 16.
82. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68 Summary, p. 106; 1/11 ComdC, Jul68, p. 5.
83. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul68, p. 19; III MAF ComdC, Jul68, pt. III; 1/1 ComdC, Jul68, p. 1-II-3, 1-II-5, 1-II-6, 1-II-9; 1/11 ComdC, Jul68, p. 5.
84. Laura Palmer, "The General, At Ease: An Interview with Westmoreland," *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History*, Autumn88, p. 33.

CHAPTER 17 MINI-TET AND ITS AFTERMATH IN SOUTHERN I CORPS

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Aug68; III MAF ComdCs, May-Aug68; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, May-Aug68; 1st MarDiv Journal and File, May-Aug68; 1st MarDiv SitReps,

May-Aug68; TF X-Ray ComdCs, May-Aug68; 5th Mar ComdCs, May-Aug68; 7th Mar ComdCs, May-Aug68; 26th Mar ComdCs, May-Aug68; and 27th Mar ComdCs, May-Aug68.

Going into the Go Noi

1. 3/7 ComdCs Apr-May68; 7th Mar AAR, Allen Brook, dtd 27Jun68, in 1st MarDiv Admin Files, hereafter 7th Mar AAR, Allen Brook.
2. 7th Mar AAR, Allen Brook.
3. Ibid. and FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p. 21.
4. 7th Mar AAR, Opn Allen Brook and FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p. 22.
5. 7th Mar AAR, Allen Brook.
6. Ibid. and FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p. 22. The quote is from cover ltr CG1stMarDiv to ComUSMACV, dtd 17Jul68, 7th Mar AAR, Opn Allen Brook.
7. 7th Mar AAR, Allen Brook; Col Roger H. Barnard, Comments on draft, dtd 13Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Barnard Comments.
8. Barnard Comments; 7th Mar AAR, Allen Brook; FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p. 22.
9. 7th Mar AAR, Allen Brook; Barnard Comments.
10. Barnard Comments.
11. Ibid.
12. Col Tullis J. Woodham, Jr., Comments on draft, dtd 7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Woodham Comments; "Eleven Days in May," ms, Encl, Woodham Comments, hereafter "Eleven Days in May"; 27th Mar ComdC, May68; 3/27 ComdC, May68; 3/27 CAAR, Operation Allen Brook, dtd 11Jun68, Encl 3/27 ComdC, May68, hereafter 3/27 CAAR, Allen Brook, Jun68.
13. Woodham Comments; 3/27 CAAR, Allen Brook, Jun68.
14. CG1stMarDiv SitRep No. 42 [misnumbered], Opn Allen Brook, in 27th Mar ComdC, May68, pt. IV; 7th Mar SitRep No. 42, Opn Allen Brook, in 27th Mar ComdC, May68, pt. IV [The 7th Mar report is in the 27th Mar ComdC]; 27th Mar SitRep for Period 170001H to 172400H May68, in 27th Mar ComdC, May68, pt. IV; 3/7 ComdC, May68, pt. II; Woodham Comments; 3/27 CAAR, Allen Brook, Jun68. NVA casualty figures are from 7th Mar SitRep No. 42 and CG1stMarDiv SitReps Nos. 48 and 49, Opn Allen Brook, in 27th Mar ComdC, May68, pt. IV; See also 7th Mar AAR, Opn Allen Brook and FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p. 22.
15. Barnard Comments; 7th Mar AAR, Allen Brook; 3/27 CAAR, Allen Brook, Jun68.
16. This and the following paragraph are derived from these sources: Woodham Comments; 27th Mar ComdC, May68, pt. III; CG1stMarDiv SitRep No. 45, Opn Allen Brook, in 27th Mar ComdC, May68, pt. IV; 27th Mar AAR for Opn Allen Brook, dtd 18Jul68, in 1st MarDiv Admin Files, hereafter 27th Mar AAR, Allen Brook; 3/27 CAAR, Allen Brook, Jun68; FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p. 23.
17. This and the following paragraph are derived from: 27th Mar AAR, Allen Brook; 3/27 CAAR, Allen Brook, Jun68; FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p. 24.
18. An additional source for this paragraph is: LtCol Donald N. Rexroad, Comments on draft, dtd 20Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

19. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, pp. 23–24; 27th Mar ComdC, May68, pt. III; CG1stMarDiv SitReps Nos. 44 and 45, Opn Allen Brook, in 27th Mar ComdC, May68, pt. IV; 27th Mar SitReps for 180001H to 182400H May68 and 240001 to 242400H May68, in 27th Mar ComdC, May68, pt. IV; 27th Mar SitRep No. 77, Opn Allen Brook, in 27th Mar ComdC, May68, pt. IV.

20. Sources for this and the following paragraph are: 7th Mar AAR, Opn Allen Brook; FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, pp. 23–24; 27th Mar AAR, Allen Brook.

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21. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, pp. 56–58; 7th Mar ComdC, May68, p. 6.

22. CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 9May68 (File No. 28, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 10May68); 1st MarDiv FragO 116–68, in 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 18May68.

23. 1st MarDiv FragO 116–68, in 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 18May68.

Operation Allen Brook Continues

24. 27th Mar ComdC, May68, pt. III; 27th Mar SitReps Nos. 85 and 93 for Opn Allen Brook, in 27th Mar ComdC, May68, pt. IV; 27th Mar SitReps for periods 280001H to 282400H May68 and 300001H to 302400H May68, in 27th Mar ComdC, May68, pt. IV; 1/26 ComdC, May68, pt. II; 1/27 ComdC, May68, p. 5; 3/5 ComdC, May68, p. 8.

25. 27th Mar AAR, Allen Brook, p. 18.

26. LCpl Jackie L. Bibbs intvw, 6Jul68, Tape 3048 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

27. 1st MarDiv FragO 151–68, in 1st MarDiv Journal and File 1–7Jun68.

28. 1/27 ComdC, Jun68, p.6.

29. PFC Michael W. Orr (?) intvw, 30Jun68, Tape 3053 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

30. 1st MarDiv FragO 151–68, pp. 1–2, in 1st MarDiv Journal & File, 1–7Jun68.

31. LtCol Albert W. Keller intvw, 19Jul68, Tape 3043 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter, Keller intvw.

32. Cpl Mark A. Guarinello intvw, 19Jul68, Tape 3043 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

33. 1/27 ComdC, Jun68, p.7.

34. Keller intvw.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. 2/27 AAR for Opn Allen Brook, p.8.

38. CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 17Jul68 (File No. 34, 1st MarDiv Journal File for 17Jul68).

Mameluke Thrust Also Continues

39. 1st MarDiv FragO 151–68, in 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 3Jun68.

40. Ibid.

41. Sgt Randle C. Dixon intvw, 8Jul68, Tape 3054 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter, Dixon intvw; and 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jun68, p.30.

42. 1st MarDiv Special SitRep No. 99 for Opn Mameluke Thrust, in 1st MarDiv SitReps, Jun68.

43. Special SitRep No. 102 for Opn Mameluke Thrust, in 1st MarDiv SitReps, Jun68.

44. CO 7th Mar msg to CG1stMarDiv, dtd 15Jun68 (File No. 15, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 16Jun68).

45. Stevens, ed., *The Navy Cross*, p. 53.

46. Corporal David M. Sivak intvw, 8Jul68, Tape 3054 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

47. Dixon intvw.

48. 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 829, in 1st MarDiv Daily SitReps, Jul68.

49. 1/5 AAR for Opn Mameluke Thrust, dtd 20Jul68, p. 4, in 1/5 ComdC, Jul68, pt. IV.

50. 7th Mar ComdC, Jul68, p. 6.

51. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul68, pp. 54, 57–8. See also C. A. Rocco, memo to CO 7th Engr Bn, dtd 23Aug68, Subj: Completion of Barrier Project, encl to LtCol Themistocles T. Annas, Comments on draft, dtd 6Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

52. 7th Mar ComdC, Jul68, p. 6.

53. 1st Recon Bn PatRep, dtd 31Jul68, in 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Jul68, pt. IV, tab B–185.

54. 5th Mar FragO 72–68, in 5th Mar ComdC, Jul68, pt. IV.

55. 1st Recon Bn SitRep No. 214–68, in 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Aug68.

56. 1st MarDiv SitReps Nos. 297–299 for Opn Mameluke Thrust, in 1st MarDiv SitReps, Aug68.

57. Col James W. Stemple, Comments on draft, n.d. [1995] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Stemple Comments.

58. Stevens, ed., *The Navy Cross*, pp. 112–113.

59. 2/5 ComdC, Aug68, pp. 4, 9.

60. 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 317 for Opn Mameluke Thrust, in 1st MarDiv SitReps, Aug68; Stemple Comments.

61. 1st MarDiv FragO 300–68, in 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 10Aug68.

62. 1st MarDiv FragO 312–68, in 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 16Aug68; and 5th Mar FragO 79–68, in 5th Mar ComdC, Aug68, pt.IV.

63. 5th Mar FragOs and SitReps, Operation Mameluke Thrust, 16–17Aug68, 5th Mar ComdC, Aug68.

64. 5th Mar ComdC, Aug68, p. 2–1; Stemple Comments. See also 5th Marines FragOs and SitReps, Operation Mameluke Thrust, 5th Mar ComdC, Aug68.

65. BLT 2/7 AAR for Opn Swift Play/Allen Brook/Mameluke Thrust, in BLT 2/7 ComdC, Aug68, pt. IV, hereafter BLT 2/7 AAR.

66. Ibid., p. 7.

67. 5th Mar SpecSitRep Nos. 86, 88, and 90 for Opn Mameluke Thrust, in 5th Mar ComdC, Aug68, pt. IV.

PART IV

The War Continues: Offensive and Counter-Offensive

CHAPTER 18

3D DIVISION TAKES THE OFFENSIVE

Unless otherwise noted material in this chapter is derived from: MACV ComdHist, 1968; FMFPac, MarOpsV, May–Jul68; III MAF ComdCs, May–Jul68; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jun–Jul68; 1st Mar ComdCs, Jun–Jul68; 3d Mar ComdCs, Jun–Jul68; 4th Mar ComdCs, Jun–Jul68; 9th Mar ComdCs, Jun–Jul68; and 2/26 Mar ComdCs, Jun–Jul68.

The Enemy Situation

1. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May–Jun68; III MAF G–2, Periodic Intelligence Report 22–68, dtd 4Jun68; III MAF G–2, Periodic Intelligence Report 23–68, dtd 9Jun68; and 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68.

The Offensive Takes Shape

2. MajGen Raymond G. Davis intvw, 2Feb77, p. 17 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Davis intvw, 2Feb77.
3. Ibid.
4. Col Marion C. Dalby intvw, Jan69, Tape 3770 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
5. Davis intvw, 2Feb77, pp. 20–21.
6. Ibid., p. 23.
7. HQMC, Revision 2 to Table of Organization, M–1099, Infantry Regiment, Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force, dtd 6Jun67.
8. Col Robert H. Barrow intvw, 12Dec68, Tape 3772 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Barrow intvw, 12Dec68.
9. Gen Robert H. Barrow intvw, 30Jan87 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
10. Barrow intvw, 12Dec68.
11. Gen Raymond G. Davis, Comments on draft ms, "U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1969," Aug86 (Vietnam 1969 Comment File, MCHC).
12. LtCol Joseph J. Scoppa, Jr. intvw, 9–12Dec68, Tape 3372 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
13. MajGen Raymond G. Davis intvw, 1Jan69, Tape 3768 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Davis intvw, 1Jan69; LtCol William J. Spangler, Comments on draft, n.d. [Dec94] (Vietnam Comment File).
14. Ibid.
15. "Khe Sanh Inactivated . . . New 'Mobility' Emphasized," *Sea Tiger*, 12Jul68.

The Eastern DMZ

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 3d Mar ComdC, Jun68; 1/3 ComdC, Jun68; 2/3 ComdC, Jun68; 3/3 ComdC, Jun68; 9th Mar ComdC, Jun68; 1/9 ComdC, Jun68; and 2/26 ComdC, Jun68.

16. Col R. B. Smith, "Leatherneck Square," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Aug69, p. 41, hereafter Smith, "Leatherneck Square."

The Pressure Continues

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul68; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jul68; 1st Mar ComdC, Jul68; 3d Mar ComdC, 4th Mar ComdC, Jul68; 9th Mar ComdC, Jul68; and 2/26 ComdC, Jul68.

17. Col Vaughn R. Stuart, Comments on draft, dtd 20Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File) and Col William H. Dabney, Comments on draft, n.d. [Dec94] (Vietnam Comment File).
18. HQ, XXIV Corps CAAR, Operation Thor, 16Aug68, in U.S. Army After Action Reports, 1968.
19. 1/3 ComdC, Jul68.
20. "Marines Smash NVA Near DMZ," *Sea Tiger*, 2 Aug 68.
21. 3d Mar AAR, Operation Napoleon/Saline, dtd 26Jul68 in 3d Mar ComdC, Jul68.
22. Ibid. and Capt Matthew B. McTiernan, Comments on draft, n.d. [Dec94] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter McTiernan Comments.
23. 2/1 ComdC, Jul68.
24. Smith, "Leatherneck Square," pp. 41–42.
25. 9th Mar ComdC, July68.
26. 2/26 Mar ComdCs, Jul–Aug68.

Into the Western Mountains

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 3d Mar ComdC, Jul68; 1/3 ComdC, Jul68; 2/3 ComdC, Jul68; 3/3 ComdC, Jul68; 4th Mar ComdC, Jul68; 1/4 ComdC, Jul68; 2/4 ComdC, Jul68; 3/4 ComdC, Jul68; 9th Mar ComdC, Jul68; 1/9 ComdC, Jul68; 2/9 ComdC, Jul68; and 3/9 ComdC, Jul68.

27. Task Force Hotel OpO 10–68, dtd 14Jul68 in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jul68; 3d Recon Bn ComdC, Jun68.
28. CG, Task Force Hotel, Critique of Lancaster II "July Action," n.d., in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Aug68, p. i, hereafter TF Hotel Critique.
29. Ibid.
30. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGProvCorpsV, dtd 26Jul68, in III MAF Message File.
31. TF Hotel Critique, pp. 6–7; 9th Mar AAR, "Lancaster II July Action," dtd 29Aug68, p. 10, in 9th Mar ComdC, Jul68.
32. Barrow intvw, 12Dec68.
33. Ibid.
34. BGen Carl W. Hoffman intvw, 12Aug68, Tape 3482 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
35. CG, Task Force Hotel "Final Comments," in TF Hotel Critique.
36. CG, Task Force Hotel, Critique "Canton II Action," n.d., in 4th Mar ComdC, Jul68.
37. Ibid., pp. 6–14.

Southern Quang Tri and Thua Thien

38. Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1st Air CavDiv, Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968, dtd 20Aug68; 101st Air CavDiv, Operational Report of 101st Air Cavalry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1968, dtd 15Aug68; 3dBde, 82d AbnDiv, Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for

period ending 31 July 1968, 15Aug68; Task Force X-Ray ComdCs, Jun–Jul68.

CHAPTER 19 THE THIRD OFFENSIVE: DA NANG

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul–Sep68; III MAF Comd, Jul–Sep68; III MAF PerIntRep Nos. 29–35, 14Jul–31Aug68; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jul–Sep68; 1st MarDiv Journal and File, Jul–Sep68.

Indicators

1. *Facts on File*, vol. XXVIII, No. 1447, 18–24Jul68, p. 289.
2. Quoted in FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug68, p. 25.
3. III MAF PerIntRep No. 32–68, dtd 11Aug68, p. B–5; III MAF PerIntRep No. 34–68, dtd 27Aug68 in III MAF PerIntReps, 14Jul–31Aug68.
4. III MAF PerIntRep No. 36–68, dtd 10Sep68, p. C–2, in III MAF PerIntReps, 1Sep–12Oct68.
5. III MAF PerIntRep No. 33–68, dtd 20Aug68, pp. 7–8, in III MAF PerIntReps, 14Jul–31Aug68.
6. III MAF PerIntRep No. 35–68, dtd 3Sep68, p. B–1, in III MAF PerIntReps, 14Jul–31Aug68.
7. III MAF PerIntRep No. 29–68, dtd 23Jul68, p. 1, in III MAF PerIntReps, 14Jul–31Aug68.
8. *Ibid.*
9. CG1st MarDiv msg to 1st MarDiv, dtd 20Aug68 (File No. 37, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 20Aug68); CG1stMarDiv msg to 1st MarDiv, dtd 10Aug68 (File No. 6, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 11Aug68).
10. 1st MarDiv FragO 300–68, dtd 10Aug68 (File No. 64, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 10Aug68).
11. 1st MP Bn ComdC, Aug68, p. 8; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug68, p. 32.
12. CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 18Aug68 (File No. 43, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 18Aug68).
13. 1st MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 20Aug68 (File No. 38, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 20Aug68).
14. 1st MarDiv FragO 322–68, dtd 21Aug68 (File No. 54, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 21Aug68).
15. 1st MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 21Aug68 (File No. 30, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 21Aug68).

The Storm Breaks

16. 1st MP Bn Unit Diaries (UDs), 22Aug68 and 28Aug68.
17. Statement of PW 2dLt Nguyen Dinh Bon, NVA in III MAF PerIntRep No. 36–68, dtd 10Sep68, p. B–7 in III MAF PerIntReps, 1Sep–12Oct68.
18. 1st Tk Bn ComdC, Aug68, pt. II.
19. Sgt Larry K. Bucklew intvw, 7Sep68, Tape 3234, (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Bucklew intvw.
20. Crane Davis, "The Bridge at Cam Le," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Feb70, pp. 35–36, hereafter Davis, "The Bridge."
21. LCpl Stephen D. Hott intvw, 7Sep68, Tape 3234, (Oral HistColl, MCHC) and Davis, "The Bridge," pp. 35–36.

22. Cpl Wayne D. Brown intvw, 7Sep68, Tape 3234, (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Brown intvw.

23. SSgt Gary C. Sanders intvw, 7Sep68, Tape 3234, (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

24. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug68, p. 35.

25. Davis, "The Bridge," p. 36.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 36–37.

27. *Ibid.* and Col Joseph J. N. Gambardella, Comments on draft, dtd 16Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Gambardella Comments.

28. LCpl Henry Lowery and PFC Andrew Marlock, Jr., intvw, 7Sep68, Tape 3234, (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

29. Bucklew intvw and PFC David S. Levalley intvw, 7Sep68, Tape 3234, (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

Counterattack

30. Capt William O. Moore intvw, 6Sep68, Tape 3233, (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Moore intvw.

31. 1st Tk Bn Operational SpotRep, dtd 23Aug68 in 1st Tk Bn Journal for 23Aug68, Serial No. 11, 1st Tk Bn ComdC, Aug68, pt. IV.

32. Moore intvw.

33. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug68, pp. 33–34; Moore intvw.; Gambardella Comments; Stevens, ed., *The Navy Cross*, p. 126.

34. 1st Tk Bn ComdC, Aug68, pt. II.

35. 5th Mar msg to 1st MarDiv COC, dtd 24Aug68 (File No. 42, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 24Aug68) and 7th Mar msgs to 1st MarDiv COC, dtd 24Aug68 (File Nos. 44 and 45, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 24Aug68).

Pursuit

36. Davis, "The Bridge," p. 38; 1/27 ComdC, Aug68, p. 9a.

37. 1st MP Bn ComdC, Aug68, p. 9.

38. 3d AmTrac Bn msg to 1st MarDiv COC, dtd 24Aug68 (File No. 89, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 24Aug68).

39. 1st MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 24Aug68 (File No. 62, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 24Aug68).

40. Davis, "The Bridge," p. 38; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Aug68, p. 34.

41. 1st MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 25Aug68, (File No. 60, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 25Aug68).

42. 1st MarDiv FragO 333–68 in 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 26Aug68.

43. Stevens, ed., *The Navy Cross*, pp. 262–63.

44. 7th Mar msg to 1st MarDiv COC dtd 30Aug68 (1st MarDiv Journal and File for 30Aug68); 3/7 ComdC, Aug68, p. 4.

45. 5th Mar msg to 1st MarDiv COC, dtd 29Aug68 (File No. 13, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 30Aug68).

46. 1/5 AAR for Opn Mameluke Thrust, dtd 31Oct68, p. 22, in 1/5 ComdC, Oct68, pt. IV.

47. 1st MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 29Aug68 (File No. 55, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 29Aug68).

48. CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 30Aug68, (File No. 25, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 30Aug68).
49. 2/5 ComdC, Aug68, p. 12.
50. 5th Mar msg to 1st MarDiv COC, dtd 30Aug68 (File No. 89, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 30Aug68).
51. 1st MarDiv Special SitReps, Nos. 10 and 11 for Opn Sussex Bay in 1st MarDiv SitReps, Aug68.
52. 2/5 ComdC, Aug68, p. 13.
53. 3d AmTrac Bn ComdC, Sep68, p. 3.
54. 1st MarDiv Special SitReps for Opn Sussex Bay, Nos. 17–29, in 1st MarDiv SitReps, Sep68; Col James W. Stemple, Comments on draft, n.d. [1995] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Stemple Comments.

Typhoon Bess

55. 1st MAW ComdC, Sep68, p. 20.
56. Stemple Comments.
57. 7th Mar msg to 1st MarDiv COC, dtd 5Sep68 (File No. 33, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 5Sep68).
58. 7th Mar msg to 1st MarDiv COC, dtd 5Sep68 (File No. 17, 1st MarDiv Journal and File for 5Sep68).
59. III MAF PerIntRep No. 37–68, dtd 17Sep68, p. 1 in III MAF PerIntReps, 1Sep–12Oct68.
60. 5th Mar Special SitRep No. 41–68 for Opn Sussex Bay, in 5th Mar ComdC, Sep68.
61. 5th Mar Special SitRep No. 172 for Opn Mameluke Thrust, in 5th Mar ComdC, Sep68.
62. 5th Mar ComdC, Sep68, p. 3–2.
63. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug68, p. 35.
64. Moore intvw.

CHAPTER 20 AUTUMN OFFENSIVE HALTED

A New Orientation

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: MACV ComdHist, 1968; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul–Oct68; III MAF ComdCs, Jul–Oct68; 3d Mar ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; 4th Mar ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; 9th Mar ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; and 2/26 Mar ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; and 31st MilHistDet, “The Critical Year, 1968: The XXIV Corps Team,” Jan69.

1. CG, 3d MarDiv memo to AC/S, G–3, 20Jul68, in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Aug68.
2. HQ, 3d MarDiv, Infantry Company Operations in northern Quang Tri Province (Draft), 4Aug68, in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Aug68.
3. HQ, 3d MarDiv, Infantry Company Operations in Northern Quang Tri Province, 26Aug68, p. 2, in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Aug68.
4. Ibid., p. 9.
5. Ibid., p. 2.
6. MajGen Raymond G. Davis intvw, 1Jan69, Tape 3768 (Oral Hist-Coll, MCHC), hereafter Davis intvw, 1Jan68.
7. Ibid.

8. Gen Raymond G. Davis, Comments on draft ms, Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC).
9. III MAF ComdCs, Jul–Aug68; III MAF G–2, Periodic Intelligence Report 30–68, dtd 28Jul68; III MAF G–2, Periodic Intelligence Report 31–68, dtd 4Aug68.

The Eastern DMZ

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1st InfBde, 5th InfDiv(M), Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 October 1968, 7Mar69; 1/1 ComdC, Aug68; 2/1 ComdC, Aug68; 3/1 ComdC, Jul68; 1/3 ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; 2/3 ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; 3/3 ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; 1/9 ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; 2/9 ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; 3/9 ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; 1st AmTrac Bn ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; 3d Recon Bn ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; and 3d Tank Bn ComdCs, Aug–Oct68.

10. 3d Tank Bn ComdC, Aug68, p. 8.
11. CGXXIVCorps msg to COMUSMACV, dtd 16Aug68, in III MAF Message File.
12. Ibid.
13. *New York Times*, 21Aug68.
14. CG3dMarDiv Warning Order, 15Aug68, in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Aug68.
15. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 18Aug68, in III MAF Message Files.
16. CGXXIVCorps msg to CG3dMarDiv, 20Aug68, in III MAF Message File.
17. BLT 2/26 ComdC, Aug68.
18. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGXXIVCorps, dtd 19Aug68, in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Aug68.
19. CO 3d Recon Bn msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 26Aug68, in 3d Recon Bn ComdC, Aug68.
20. Ibid.
21. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 21Jun68, in III MAF Message File.
22. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 29Jun68, in III MAF Message File.
23. CMC msg to FMFPac, dtd 29Jun68, in III MAF Message File.
24. Hq, 3dBde, 82dAbnDiv, Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 July 1968, 15Aug68, pp 3–4.
25. 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Sep68.
26. HQ, 1stBde, 5thInfDiv(M), Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 October 1968, pp. 2–3.
27. 3d Tank Bn, ComdC, Sep68.
28. HQ, 1stBde, 5thInfDiv(M), Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 October 1968, dtd 13Dec68, p. 3; HQ, 1/77Armor, AAR Operation Sullivan, dtd 1Nov68.
29. III MAF ComdC, Sep68.
30. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 19Sep68; CG3dMarDiv msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 20Sep68.
31. HQ, 1stBn, 11thInf AAR, Pioneer I, dtd 1Nov68.
32. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 11Oct68; CG3dMar

Div msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 11Oct68; CGXXIV Corps telcon to III MAF, dtd 12Oct68.

33. 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Oct68.

34. CG3d MarDiv msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 15Oct68, in III MAF Message File.

35. CG3d MarDiv msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 16Oct68, IIIMAF Message File.

36. 1st AmTrac Bn ComdC, Oct68.

37. CG3d MarDiv msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 23Oct68, in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Oct68.

38. CG3d MarDiv msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 25Oct68, in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Oct68.

39. MajGen Townsend msg to LtGen Cushman, dtd 21Nov68, in III MAF Message File.

40. CG3d MarDiv msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 29Dec68, in III MAF Message File.

Defeat of the 320th Division

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1/3 ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; 2/3 ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; 3/3 ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; 1/4 ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; 2/4 ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; 3/4 ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; 1/9 ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; 2/9 ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; 3/9 ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; 1/12 ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; 2/12 ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; 3/12 ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; 4/12 ComdCs, Aug–Oct68; MajGen R. C. Davis and 1stLt H. W. Brazier, "Defeat of the 320th," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Mar69, pp. 22–30; and 3d MarDiv AAR, Lancaster II, dtd 9Sep69.

41. Maj Gary E. Todd, Comments on draft, dtd 19Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Todd Comments.

42. Col Robert H. Barrow intvw, 12Dec68, Tape 3772 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Barrow intvw, 12Dec68.

43. Todd Comments.

44. Barrow intvw, 12Dec68.

45. 3d Recon Bn ComdC, Aug68.

46. Davis intvw, 1Jan69.

47. III MAF G–2, Periodic Intelligence Report 33–68, dtd 18Aug68, p. B–1.

48. 9th Mar AAR, Operation Lancaster II Jupiter, dtd 12Nov68, in 9th Mar ComdC, Aug68.

49. Barrow intvw, 12Dec68.

50. 3d Recon Bn ComdCs, Aug–Sep68.

51. Barrow intvw, 12Dec68.

52. 9th Mar AAR, Operation Lancaster Trousdale/Trousdale North, dtd 26Oct68, in 9th Mar ComdC, Oct68.

53. Barrow intvw, 12Dec68.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. MajGen R. C. Davis and 1stLt H. W. Brazier, "Defeat of the 320th," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Mar69, p. 28.

57. Barrow intvw, 12Dec68.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. HQ, 4th Mar, Anx B (Intelligence) to OpO 8–68, dtd 1Sep68, in 4th Mar ComdC, Sep68.

65. Barrow intvw, 12Dec68.

Coastal Quang Tri and Thua Thien: A Shift

Additional sources for this section are: HQ, XXIV Corps, Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 October 1968, dtd 10Feb69; HQ, 1st CavDiv(AM), Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 October 1968, dtd 7Mar69; and HQ, 101stAbnDiv, Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 October 1968, dtd 11Mar69.

66. Gen Abrams msg to Gen Cushman, dtd 28Oct68, in III MAF Message File.

67. HQ, 1st CavDiv(AM), Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 January 1969, dtd 6Jun69.

68. CGIIIMAF msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 4Oct68, in III MAF Message File.

69. Col Thomas H. Galbraith, Comments on draft, n.d. [Dec94] (Vietnam Comment File).

CHAPTER 21 COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ICTZ

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Sep–Dec68; III MAF ComdCs, Sep–Dec68; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Sep–Dec68; 1st MarDiv Journal and File, Sep–Dec68.

The Situation in September

1. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Sep68, pp. 3–4, 61; 1st Mar ComdC, Sep68, p. II–B–2, III–B–1; 5th Mar ComdC, Sep68, p. 3–3; 3/26 ComdC, Sep68, p. 5.

2. Major Gary L. Telfer, Lieutenant Colonel Lane Rogers, and V. Keith Fleming, Jr., *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967* (Washington, D.C.: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1984), p. 139; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct68, p. 66; Jack Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966* (Washington, DC: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1982), p. 270; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Sep68, pp. 14–15; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Sep68, p. 17; 1st MarDiv FragO 349–68 (File No. 18, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 3Sep68); 1st MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, dtd 5Sep68 (File No. 41, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 5Sep68); 1st Mar ComdC, Sep68, p. II–G–1; 2/27 ComdC, Sep–Dec68, p. 3.

3. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Sep68, p. 48; CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 15Sep68 (File No. 33, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 15Sep68); 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 891, in 1st MarDiv SitReps, Sep68; 1st Mar ComdC, Sep68, p. II–B–1, II–C–4, III–C–1; 1/1 ComdC, Sep68, pt. III.

4. 3/7 ComdC, Sep68; 7th Mar S–3 Jnl entries for 14Sep68 and 7th Mar

SitRep No. 490, dtd 15Sep68 in Jnl and SitReps, Encl, 7th Mar ComdC, Sep68, hereafter 7th Mar S-3 Jnl entries and 7th Mar SitRep 490.

5. 3/7 ComdC, Sep68; BLT 2/7 ComdC, Sep68.

6. 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 898, 1st MarDiv SitReps, Sep68; BLT 2/7 AAR, Opn Dodge City, in 2/7 ComdC, Sep68, pt. IV, hereafter BLT 2/7 AAR, Dodge City; 2/7 ComdC, Sep68, pt. III; 3/7 ComdC, Sep68, pp. 5, 10; 7th Mar S-3 Jnl entries for 15Sep68 and 7th Mar SitRep 490.

7. BLT 2/7 AAR, Dodge City.

8. Ibid.

9. This and the following six paragraphs are derived from these sources: BLT 2/7 AAR, Dodge City, pp. 5, 7; 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 902, in 1st MarDiv SitReps, Sep68; 7th Mar msg to 1st MarDiv COC, dtd 19Sep68 (File No. 28, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 19Sep68).

10. Additional sources for this and the next four paragraphs are: 7th Mar msg to 1st MarDiv, dtd 19Sep68 (File No. 205, 7th Mar Journal and File, 19Sep68, 7th Mar ComdC, Sep68, pt. IV); 7th Mar msg to 1st MarDiv COC, dtd 20Sep68 (File No. 6, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 20Sep68).

11. An additional source for this and the next three paragraphs is: 7th Mar msg to 1st MarDiv, dtd 20Sep68 (File No. 208, 7th Mar Journal and File, 20Sep68, 7th Mar ComdC, Sep68, pt. IV).

12. 7th Mar msg to 1st MarDiv COC, dtd 21Sep68 (File No. 50, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 21Sep68); 2/7 AAR, Dodge City, pp. 6, 8.

13. 2/7 ComdC, Sep68, pt. III; 2/7 AAR, Dodge City, pp. 6, 9, 12.

14. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: III MAF ComdC, Sep68, pt. III; PerIntRep No. 39-68 (III MAF PerIntReps), p. 3; 1/26 SpotReps (File Nos. 1, 2, and 7, 1/26 Journal and File, 21Sep68, in 1/26 ComdC, Sep68, pt. IV).

15. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Sep68, p. 17; 5th Mar ComdC, Sep68, p. 3-2.

Operation Maui Peak

16. 1st MarDiv FragO 397-68 (File No. 7, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 1Oct68), p. 1; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct68, p. 7; III MAF ComdC, Oct68, p. 21; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Sep68, pp. 4, 57; III MAF PerIntRep No. 39-68 (III MAF PerIntReps), p. 3.

17. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct68, p. 7; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Oct68, p. 21; 1st MarDiv FragO 405-68 (1st MarDiv Journal and File, 5Oct68), p. 1; 2/7 AAR, Opn Maui Peak, in 2/7 ComdC, Oct68, pt. IV.

18. Col James W. Stemple, Comments on draft, n.d. [1995], hereafter Stemple Comments.

19. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: Ibid.; 5th Mar ComdC, Oct68; 7th Mar AAR, Opn Maui Peak, pp. 7-8, in 7th Mar ComdC, Nov68, pt. IV, hereafter 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak; 3/7 ComdC, Oct68, p. 5.

20. III MAF PerIntRep No. 41-68 (III MAF PerIntReps), p. 3; 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak; 2/5 AAR, Opn Maui Peak, pp. 2, 8, in 2/5 ComdC, Nov68, pt. IV, hereafter 2/5 AAR, Maui Peak.

21. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct68, p. 7; III MAF PerIntRep No. 41-68 (III MAF PerIntReps), p. 3; 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 1, Opn Maui Peak, in 1st MarDiv SitReps, Oct68; 5th Mar ComdC, Oct68, p. 2-1; 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak, pp. 6, 8; 3/5 ComdC, Oct68, pp. 3, 7.

22. 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak, pp. 8-9; 2/7 AAR, Opn Maui Peak, p. 3, in 2/7 ComdC, Oct68, pt. IV, hereafter 2/7 AAR, Maui Peak.

23. 2/5 AAR, Maui Peak, p. 4.

24. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct68, pp. 7-11; 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak, pp. 8-9; 2/5 AAR, Maui Peak, p. 4.

25. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak, p. 9; 2/5 AAR, Maui Peak, p. 4.

26. Additional sources for this paragraph are: III MAF PerIntRep No. 41-68 (III MAF PerIntReps), p. 3; 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 5, Opn Maui Peak (1st MarDiv SitReps, Oct68); 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak, pp. 6, 10.

27. 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak, p. 9; 2/5 AAR, Maui Peak, p. 3. Another source claims the Marines suffered 19 wounded. See 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 6, Opn Maui Peak, in 1st MarDiv SitReps, Oct68.

28. 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak, p. 10; 2/5 AAR, Maui Peak, p. 5.

29. 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 7, Opn Maui Peak, in 1st MarDiv SitReps, Oct68; 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak, pp. 10, 12.

30. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct68, pp. 11-12; III MAF ComdC, Oct68, p. 10; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Oct68, p. 34; 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 25, Opn Maui Peak, in 1st MarDiv SitReps, Oct68; 7th Mar msg to 1st MarDiv COC, dtd 12Oct68 (File No. 28, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 12Oct68); 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak, p. 15; 2/5 AAR, Maui Peak, p. 6; Stemple Comments. Enemy casualty claims for this engagement vary from 31 to 61. Figures in the text are from FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct68, pp. 11-12; 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak, p. 15; 2/5 AAR, Maui Peak, p. 6. The quotation is from Stemple Comments.

31. 1st MarDiv SitRep Nos. 23-34, Opn Maui Peak, in 1st MarDiv SitReps, Oct68; 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak, pp. 16-17.

32. 1st Mar ComdC, Oct68, p. II-B-2; 1/1 ComdC, Oct68, p. 1-II-3; 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak, pp. 6, 18-19, 23-24; 11th Mar ComdC, Oct68, pp. 8-9; 2/7 AAR, Maui Peak, pp. 5, 8.

33. III MAF PerIntRep No. 42-68 (III MAF PerIntReps); 1st MarDiv SitRep Nos. 43, 45-47, 49, 52-54, Opn Maui Peak, in 1st MarDiv SitReps, Oct68; 1st MarDiv FragO 420-68 (File No. 2, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 20Oct68); 7th Mar AAR, Maui Peak, pp. 19-21; 2/7 AAR, Maui Peak, p. 5; 3/7 ComdC, Oct68, p. 5.

The End of Mameluke Thrust and Renewed Attacks on Da Nang

34. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct68, p. 14; III MAF ComdC, Oct68, p. 10, 22; III MAF PerIntRep No. 43-68 (III MAF PerIntReps); 1st MarDiv ComdC, Oct68, pp. 14, 18-19; 1st Mar ComdC, Oct68, p. II-B-1; 5th Mar ComdC, Oct68, p. 2-1, 3-1, 3-3; 5th Mar AAR, Opn Mameluke Thrust, p. 4, in 5th Mar ComdC, Nov68, pt. IV; 5th Mar AAR, Opn Henderson Hill, pp. 5-6, in 5th Mar ComdC, Dec68, pt. IV; 2/5 ComdC, Oct68, p. 2; 2/5 AAR, Opn Henderson Hill, p. 2, in 2/5 ComdC, Dec68, pt. IV; 3/5 ComdC, Oct68, p. 3; 3/5 AAR, Opn Henderson Hill, p. 4, in 3/5 ComdC, Nov68, pt. IV; Stemple Comments.

35. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct68, pp. 4, 48; III MAF PerIntRep Nos. 41-44 (III MAF PerIntReps).

36. Peter Grose, "22 Days of Tension Led to Turning Point in Talks," *The New York Times*, 1Nov68, p. 1; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov68, pp. 4 and 47; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68 and Summary, p. 78.

37. III MAF ComdC, Oct68, p. 37.

38. 5th Mar ComdC, Nov68, p. 2-1; 5th Mar FragO 112-68 (File No. 10, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 13Nov68); 2/5 ComdC, Nov68, p. 3.

39. III MAF ComdC, Nov68, p. 20; III MAF PerIntRep No. 46-68,

p. 5; III MAF PerIntRep No. 47–68, p. 4 (III MAF PerIntReps); 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 961, in 1st MarDiv Daily SitReps, Nov68; 1/26 ComdC, Nov68, pp. 7, 13; 1/26 SpotRep, 17Nov68 (File No. 1, 1/26 Journal and File, 17Nov68).

40. III MAF PerIntRep No. 47–68, p. 4 (III MAF PerIntReps); 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 965, in 1st MarDiv Daily SitReps, Nov68.

41. 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 119 for Opn Henderson Hill (1st MarDiv SitReps of Operations, Nov68); 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 136, Opn Henderson Hill, in 1st MarDiv SitReps for Operations, Nov68; 5th Mar ComdC, Nov68, p. 2–1; 5th Mar SpotRep, 22Nov68 (File No. 4, 5th Mar Journal and File, 22Nov68), in 5th Mar ComdC, Nov68, pt. IV; 5th Mar SpecSitRep No. 119 for Opn Henderson Hill, 5th Mar ComdC, Nov68, pt. IV.

42. III MAF PerIntRep No. 48–68, pp. 4–5 (III MAF PerIntReps).

Operation Meade River

43. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov68, pp. 3, 28; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68 and Summary, p. 55; III MAF ComdC, Dec68, p. 21; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Oct68, p. 21; 1st Mar ComdC, Nov68, p. II–F–1.

44. 1st Mar AAR, Opn Meade River, dtd 10Jan69, Encl Col Robert G. Lauffer, Comments on draft, dtd 29Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter 1st Mar AAR, Meade River.

45. Col Robert G. Lauffer, Comments on draft, dtd 29Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Lauffer Comments; 1st Mar AAR, Meade River.

46. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov68, pp. 6–7; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Nov68, pp. 18–19; 1st Mar ComdC, Nov68, pp. II–C–5, II–E–1, III–A–4; 1st Mar AAR, Opn Meade River; 1/1 ComdC, Nov68, p. 1–III–4; 2/5 AAR, Opn Meade River (2/5 ComdC, Dec68, pt. IV), p. 3; 3/5 ComdC, Nov68, p. 7; 2/7 AAR, Opn Meade River (2/7 ComdC, Nov68, pt. IV), p. 4, hereafter 2/7 AAR, Meade River; 2/26 ComdC, Nov68, p. 5; 2/26 AAR, Opn Meade River (2/26 ComdC, Dec68, pt. IV), p. 4; Lauffer Comments.

47. 1st Mar ComdC, Nov68, p. II–C–1; 2/26 ComdC, Nov68, pp. 7, 13.

48. 1/1 ComdC, Nov68, p. 1–II–7; 1/1 SpotReps, dtd 20Nov68 (File Nos. 19, 27, 1/1 Journal and File, 20Nov68, in 1/1 ComdC, Nov68, pt. IV).

49. 2/7 AAR, Meade River, p. 6.

50. III MAF ComdC, Nov68, p. 9; 2/26 ComdC, Dec68, pp. 9–10.

51. 2/7 AAR, Meade River, p. 7.

52. LtCol Ronald R. Welpott, Comments on draft, dtd 19Mar95 (Vietnam Comment File).

53. 2/7 AAR, Meade River, p. 7; 2/5 AAR, Opn Meade River, in 2/5 ComdC, Dec68, p. 9.

54. 2/7 AAR, Meade River, pp. 7–8; 3/26 ComdC, Dec68, p. 5.

55. 2/7 AAR, Meade River, pp. 8–9; Col Neil A. Nelson, Comments on draft, n.d. [Dec 1994] (Vietnam Comment File).

56. 1st Mar AAR, Meade River.

57. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov68, pp. 8–9; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Nov68, p. 23; 1st Mar ComdC, Nov68, p. II–C–2; 2/26 ComdC, Dec68, p. 6; LtCol James F. Foster, Comments on draft, n.d. [Dec94] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Foster Comments.

58. 2/7 AAR, Meade River, pp. 9–10.

59. 1st Mar AAR, Meade River and LtCol John W. P. Robertson, "Operation Meade River," Taped Comments, n.d. [Dec68–Jan69], Encl Col John W. P. Robertson, Comments on draft, dtd 10Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Robertson Taped Comments.

60. 2/7 AAR, Meade River, p. 5; 3/26 ComdC, Nov68, p. 15.

61. 1st Mar ComdC, Dec68, p. II–C–1.

62. 1st Mar AAR, Meade River.

63. Ibid.; 1st Mar ComdC, Nov68, p. II–C–3; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov68, p. 8; Stemple Comments.

64. 1st Mar AAR, Meade River.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.; Robertson Taped Comments; Stemple Comments.

67. 1st Mar AAR Meade River; Robertson Taped Comments; III MAF ComdC, Dec68, p. 9; III MAF PerIntRep No. 49–68, in III MAF PerIntReps; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec68, p. 29; 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 62, Opn Meade River, in 1st MarDiv Operations SitReps, Dec68; 1st Mar ComdC, Dec68, p. II–C–2; 1st Mar SitRep Nos. 62, 63, Opn Meade River, in 1st Mar ComdC, Dec68, pt. IV; 26th Mar SpotRep, 5Dec68 (File No. 24, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 5Dec68). Most of the reports give differing enemy casualty figures, the lowest in Robertson Taped Comments and the largest in the 1st Mar AAR Meade River.

68. 1st Mar AAR Meade River.

69. Mr. Ronald J. Drez intvw, 29Mar89, Tape 6512 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Drez intvw; Stemple Comments.

70. Drez intvw.

71. Foster Comments.

72. 1st Mar AAR, Meade River.

73. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov68, p. 10; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec68, p. 29; 1st Mar SpotReps, 7Dec68 (File Nos. 34, 55, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 7Dec68); 3/26 ComdC, Dec68, p. 6; Foster Comments.

74. Drez intvw.

75. 1st Mar SpotRep, 8Dec68 (File No. 47, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 8 Dec68); Drez intvw.

76. Capt George B. Meegan, Comments on draft, dtd 2Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Meegan Comments.

77. 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 75, Opn Meade River, in 1st MarDiv Operation SitReps, Dec68; Drez intvw.

78. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov68, pp. 10–11; III MAF ComdC, Dec68, p. 9; 1st Mar ComdC, Dec68, p. II–C–4; 1st Mar SpotRep, 8Dec68 (File Nos. 11, 12, 13, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 9Dec68); 1st MarDiv SitRep Nos. 74, 76, Opn Meade River, in 1st MarDiv Operation SitReps, Dec68; 3/26 ComdC, Dec68, pp. 17–18.

79. 3/26 ComdC, Dec68, p. 6.

80. Medal of Honor Citation, SSgt Karl Gorman Taylor, Sr., 1971.

81. Robertson Taped Comments and Col JWP Robertson, Recommendation for Army Capt Luigi Lombardi, n.d. Apr93, Encl Col John W. P. Robertson, Comments on draft, dtd 10Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

82. Robertson Taped Comments; Drez intvw.

83. Foster Comments.

84. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov68, pp. 10–11; III MAF PerIntRep No.

50–68 (III MAF PerIntReps); 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 78, Opn Meade River, in 1st MarDiv Operation SitReps, Dec68; 1st Mar SpotReps, 9Dec68 (File Nos. 63, 64, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 9Dec68); 3/26 ComdC, Dec68, p. 18; Meegan Comments.

85. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov68, p. 3; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec68, p. 17; 1st Mar ComdC, Dec68, p. II–C–4, 5; 1st MAR AAR Meade River; CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 6Dec68 (File No. 25, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 7Dec68); III MAF PerIntRep No. 48–68 (III MAF PerIntReps), p. 5.

86. 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec68, p. 15; 1/1 ComdC, Dec68, p. 1–II–3.

Operation Taylor Common

87. CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 4Dec68 (File No. 30, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 4Dec68); MajGen Ross T. Dwyer intvw, 17Oct77, p. 35 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Dwyer intvw.

88. TF Yankee AAR, Opn Taylor Common (TF Yankee AAR, Opn Taylor, pt. 1), hereafter, TF Yankee AAR; TF Yankee FragO 1–68 (File No. 13, 1st MarDiv Journal and File, 7Dec68).

89. TF Yankee FragO 1–68 (File No. 18, TF Yankee Journal and File, 7Dec68).

90. III MAF PerIntRep No. 49–68 (III MAF PerIntReps), p. 5; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec68, p. 17; 5th Mar ComdC, Dec68, p. 3–2; 1/5 ComdC, Dec68, p. 2–1.

91. III MAF ComdC, Dec68, p. 10; 5th Mar ComdC, Dec68, p. 2–1; 2/7 ComdC, Dec68, p. 1–5; 2/7 AAR, Opn Taylor Common, in 2/7 ComdC, Dec68, pt. IV, hereafter 2/7 AAR, Taylor Common; Stemple Comments.

92. Dwyer intvw, pp. 45–46.

93. TF Yankee AAR, p. 39; 3d Mar ComdC, Dec68, p. 2–1; CG TF Yankee msg to CG1stMarDiv, 12Dec68 (File No. 9, TF Yankee Journal and File, 12Dec68); CG TF Yankee msg to 3d Mar and 5th Mar, 10Dec68 (File No. 3, TF Yankee Journal and File, 13Dec68); 5th Mar SpotRep to TF Yankee COC, 11Dec68 (File No. 4, TF Yankee Journal and File, 11Dec68).

94. 5th Mar SpotRep to TF Yankee COC, 11Dec68 (File No. 4, TF Yankee Journal and File, 11Dec68); TF Yankee AAR, p. 7; 3d Mar ComdC, Dec68, p. 5.

95. TF Yankee AAR, Encl 41, pp. 7–8; Stemple Comments.

96. 3d Mar ComdC, Dec68, p. 5.

97. Dwyer intvw, p. 44.

98. Ibid., p. 45; LtGen John H. Hay, Jr., *Vietnam Studies: Tactical and Materiel Innovations* (Washington, D.C.: Dept of the Army, 1974), p. 39.

99. TF Yankee AAR, Encl 41, p. 9; 3d Mar ComdC, Dec68, p. 5.

100. TF Yankee AAR, Encl 41, p. 11;

101. Dwyer intvw, pp. 31, 33.

102. Stemple Comments.

CHAPTER 22

THE DIVISION'S LABORS BEAR FRUIT

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: MACV ComdHist, 1968; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov–Dec68; III MAF ComdCs, Nov–Dec68; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Nov–Dec68; 3d Mar ComdCs, Nov–Dec68; 4th Mar ComdCs, Nov–Dec68; and 9th Mar ComdCs, Nov–Dec68.

Elimination of the Infrastructure

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1st InfBde, 5th InfDiv(M), Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 January 1969, dtd 17Feb69; TF Bravo ComdC, 9–31Dec68; 1/3 ComdCs, Nov–Dec68; 2/3 ComdCs, Nov–Dec68; 3/3 ComdCs, Nov–Dec68; 3d Tk Bn ComdCs, Nov–Dec68; 1st AmTrac Bn ComdCs, Nov–Dec68; 3d MarDiv AAR, Napoleon Saline (Draft), n.d.; 1st InfBde, 5th InfDiv(M) AAR, Napoleon Saline II/Marshall Mountain, dtd 8Apr69.

1. CGIIIMAF msg to COMUSMACV, dtd 30Oct68; COMUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 3Nov68, in IIIMAF msg file.

2. CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 17Jul68, in III MAF Message File.

3. COMUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 22Oct68.

4. 1/9 ComdC, Nov68.

5. LtCol Walter W. Damewood, Jr. Comments on draft, dtd 31Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).

6. 3d Mar OpO 8–68, dtd 12Nov68, in 3d Mar ComdC, Nov68.

7. 3d Mar OpO 9–68, dtd 21Nov68, in 3d Mar ComdC, Nov68.

8. CGIIIMAF msg to CGXXIVCorps, dtd 28Nov68, in 3d MarDiv Message File, Nov68.

9. 2/3 ComdC, Dec68.

10. MajGen Raymond G. Davis, FMFPac debrief, 15Apr69, Tape (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

Rough Soldiering

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1/4 ComdCs, Nov–Dec68; 2/4 ComdCs, Nov–Dec68; 3/4 ComdCs, Nov–Dec68; 1/9 ComdCs, Nov–Dec68; 2/9 ComdCs, Nov–Dec68; and 3/9 ComdCs, Nov–Dec68.

11. 2/4 ComdC, Dec68.

12. BGen Joseph E. Hopkins, Comments on draft, dtd 6Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

13. Ibid.

14. Col Robert H. Barrow intvw, 12Dec68, Tape 3772 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Barrow intvw, 12Dec68.

15. Ibid.

16. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGXXIVCorps, dtd 26Nov68, in 3d MarDiv Message File, Nov68.

17. Barrow intvw, 12Dec68.

18. Ibid.

19. 9th Mar OpO 1–69, dtd 30Dec68, in 9th Mar ComdC, Dec68.

Thua Thien

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: HQ, 101stAbn Div(AM), Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 January 1969, dtd 24Feb69.

20. James Walters, Comments on draft, dtd 7Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).

PART V Supporting the Troops

CHAPTER 23

MARINE AIR AT THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR AND AIR SUPPORT OF KHE SANH

Unless otherwise noted the sources in this chapter are derived from MACV ComdHist, 1968; HQMC Msg File; HQMC, Status of Forces, 1968; FMFPac, MarOpsV, 1967–1968; III MAF ComdCs, Jan–Apr68; III MAF Jnl & Msg Files; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan–Apr68; Westmoreland Papers, CMH; A&S Files, Indochina Archives; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; LtGen Willard Pearson, USA, *The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966–1968*, Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C.: Dept of the Army, 1975), hereafter Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*; Capt Moyers S. Shore II, *The Battle for Khe Sanh* (Washington, D.C.: HistBr, G–3Div, HQMC, 1969), hereafter Shore, *The Battle for Khe Sanh*; Bernard C. Nalty, *Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh* (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1969), hereafter Nalty, *Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh*; Naval Historical Center, *Command and Control of Air Operations in the Vietnam War*, Colloquium on Contemporary History, January 23, 1991, No. 4 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Hist Center, 1991), hereafter *Command and Control of Air Operations in the Vietnam War*; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962–70,” *Naval Review* 1971 (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1971), pp. 122–55, hereafter McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962–70.”

Marine Air at the Beginning of the Year

1. McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962–70,” pp. 134 and 155; 1st MAW ComdC, Jan68, p. 1–4; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, p. 58a. See also “Distribution of Personnel, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 31Dec67,” in Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967*, App G, pp. 319–23.
2. 1st MAW ComdC, Jan68; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, p. 58a; HQMC, Status of Forces, dtd 10Jan68, “Distribution of Aircraft, Fleet, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific,” p. 10–1, hereafter “Distribution of Aircraft,” 10Jan68. Because of the fluctuation of the number of aircraft from time to time, the figures are taken from the “Distribution of Aircraft,” 10Jan68 as reflecting the figures as of that date.
3. MAG–16 ComdC, Jan68; “Distribution of Aircraft,” 10Jan68; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec67, p. 74.
4. MAG–16 ComdC, Jan68.
5. MAG–12 and MAG–13 ComdCs, Jan68; “Distribution of Aircraft,” 10Jan68; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec67, p. 74.
6. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, p. 63; McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962–70,” p. 131.
7. 1st MAW ComdC, Jan68, pp. 1–4; MAG–36 ComdC, Jan68; “Distribution of Aircraft,” 10Jan68; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec67, p. 74.
8. VMGR–152 ComdC, Jan68; “Distribution of Aircraft,” 10Jan68; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967*, p. 205; McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962–70,” p. 132.
9. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, pp. 59–60.
10. Ibid., pp. 59–60 and 65–66; MajGen Norman J. Anderson to MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, dtd 17Jan68, McCutcheon Papers, PC464, 1968 Correspondence, File A.

11. III MAF ComdC, Jan68, p. 27; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, pp. 5, 59–60.

12. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan68, p. 68; 1st MAW ComdC, Jan68.

Marine Control of Air

13. MajGen Norman J. Anderson, Comments on draft, n.d. [Jan95] (Vietnam Comment File).
14. McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962–70,” p. 132.
15. CGFMFPac, “Pacific Operations,” General Officers Symposium Book, July 1967, Tab F, p. 21, hereafter CGFMFPac, “Pacific Operations;” McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962–70,” pp. 134–36; Gen Keith B. McCutcheon intvw, 22Apr71, pp. 1–4, 6 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter McCutcheon intvw, 22Apr71.
16. McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962–70,” pp. 134–36; McCutcheon intvw, 22Apr71, pp. 1–4, 6; Shulimson and Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965*, pp. 151–2; Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966*, 268–9.
17. Shulimson and Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965*, pp. 151–2; Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966*, pp. 268–9. For the Carey quote, see LtGen Richard E. Carey, Comments on draft, dtd 12Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).
18. CGFMFPac, “Pacific Operations,” p. 21.
19. This and the following paragraph are derived from: Shulimson and Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965*, pp. 151–2; Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966*, pp. 268–70; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967*, p. 200; McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962–70,” pp. 134–36.
20. Col David S. Twining, Comments on draft, dtd 15Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).
21. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967*, p. 200; MACG–18 ComdC, Oct67 and Jan68.
22. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967*, p. 200; McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962–70,” p. 138.
23. Ibid. and BGen Earl E. Anderson ltr to MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, dtd 14Mar68 (McCutcheon Papers PC464, 1968 Correspondence, File A).
24. McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962–70,” p. 138; 1st MAW ComdC, Jan68, pp. 2–3–2–4.
25. McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962–70,” p. 138; 1st MAW ComdC, Jan68, pp. 2–3–2–4; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967*, p. 200.
26. 1st MAW ComdC, Jan68, pp. 2–3–2–4.
27. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, pp. 66–7.
28. Twining Comments.
29. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, pp. 70–1.
30. CG 1stMAW ltr to CMC, dtd 24Apr68, Subj: Single Management, Encl 16, HQMC, DCS (Air) Single Manager Fldr, Jan68–15Aug70; MajGen Norman J. Anderson intvw, 17Mar81, pp. 189–90 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Anderson intvw, 3d Session, 17Mar81, and MajGen Norman J. Anderson ltr to BGen Edwin H. Simmons, dtd 8Sep1983 (Norman Anderson Papers, PC1263, MCHC).

Proposed Changes in Command and Control over Marine
Air-Operation Niagara, January 1968

31. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, pp. 423–4; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 344; Nalty, *Air Power and the Fight For Khe Sanh*, pp. 14–5; Bernard C. Nalty, "Operation Niagara, Air Power, and the Siege of Khe Sanh," *Command and Control of Air Operations in the Vietnam War*, pp. 39–46, hereafter Nalty, "Operation Niagara, Air Power, and the Siege of Khe Sanh."

32. McCutcheon intvw, Apr 1971, p. 6; Chaisson intvw, 19Mar69, pp. 235–6; Nalty, "Operation Niagara, Air Power, and the Siege of Khe Sanh," pp. 39–46; Gen William W. Momyer, *Air Power in Three Wars, (WWII, Korea, Vietnam)* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1978), pp. 285–7.

33. MajGen John R. Chaisson intvw, Mar69, pp. 229–30 and 236–7 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

34. Ibid.; Graham A. Cosmas, "General Westmoreland and Control of the Air War," in *Command and Control of Air Operations in the Vietnam War*, pp. 29–36.

35. Westmoreland msg to Sharp, dtd 18Jan68, Doc no. 2, HQMC, DCS Air Folder, Single Manager, Jan68–15Aug70; Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA, intvw, dtd 4Apr83, p. 47 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

36. Sharp msg to Westmoreland, dtd 18Jan68, Doc No. 3, HQMC, DCS Air Folder, Single Manager, Jan68–15Aug70.

37. Westmoreland msg to Sharp, dtd 21Jan68, Doc No. 4, HQMC, DCS Air Folder, Single Manager, Jan68–15Aug70; ComUSMACV msg to CG III MAF and CG Seventh Air Force, dtd 22Jan68 (Doc No. 58, III MAF Incoming Msgs, Dec67–1Feb68); MACV ComdHist, pp. 423–4.

38. Norman Anderson, Memo For the Record, dtd 29Jan68 (Norman Anderson Papers, PC 1263, MCHC).

39. John Schlight, *The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, The War in South Vietnam, the Years of the Offensive, 1965–68* (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1988), pp. 277–85, hereafter Schlight, *Years of the Offensive, 1965–68*; CGIIIMAF msg to Cdr, Seventh Air Force, dtd 24Jan68 (3d MarDiv, Messages, Jan68).

40. Anderson intvw, 3d Session, 17Mar81, pp. 199–201; Schlight, *Years of the Offensive, 1965–68*, pp. 277–78; Nalty, "Operation Niagara, Air Power, and the Siege of Khe Sanh," p. 44; Nalty, *Air Power and the Fight For Khe Sanh*, pp. 72–4.

41. McCutcheon ltr to Norman Anderson, dtd 23Jan68, Letter No. 45 and Anderson ltr to McCutcheon, dtd 7Feb68, Letter No. 50, File A, 1968 Correspondence, Box 20 (McCutcheon Papers, PC464), hereafter Anderson ltr to McCutcheon, 7Feb68.

Operation Niagara and Air Resupply in the Defense of Khe Sanh

42. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, pp. 423–24; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p. 3; Nalty "Operation Niagara, Air Power, and the Siege of Khe Sanh," pp. 39–46; Schlight, *Years of the Offensive, 1965–68*, pp. 277–85; Anderson ltr to McCutcheon, 7Feb68.

43. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, pp. 423–24; Nalty, *Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh*, pp. 83–6; Shore, *The Battle for Khe Sanh*, pp. 101–2.

44. Shore, *Battle for Khe Sanh*, pp. 102–3.

45. Nalty, *Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh*, pp. 82–3.

46. Ibid., pp. 86–8.

47. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, p. 423; Shore, *Battle for Khe Sanh*, p. 101; Col William H. Dabney intvw, 20May82, p. 65 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC), pp. 21–2. hereafter, Dabney intvw, 20May82.

48. Shore, *Battle for Khe Sanh*, pp. 103–4; Nalty, *Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh*, p. 66; 1st MAW ComdC, Mar68, p. 2–2; Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces*, pp. 71–2.

49. Shore, *Battle For Khe Sanh*, pp. 109–11

50. Quoted in Ibid., p. 97.

51. Nalty, *Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh*, pp. 43–50.

52. Ibid. p. 62; Shore, *The Battle for Khe Sanh*, 72–4.

53. Nalty, *Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh*, pp. 44–46; Shore, *The Battle for Khe Sanh*, 74–6.

54. LtGen John H. Hay, Jr., USA, *Vietnam Studies: Tactical and Materiel Innovations* (Washington, D.C.: Dept of the Army, 1974), pp. 22–23.

55. III MAF COC msg to MACV COC, 10Feb68 (III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File); 1/26 Journal for 10Feb68, Ser No 19 in 1/26 ComdC, Feb68, pt. IV; LtCol Johnny O. Gregerson, Comments on "The Battle for Khe Sanh," 3Jan69 (Comment File, MCHC); Nalty, *Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh*, p. 35; Shore, *Battle for Khe Sanh*, p. 76; CWO-4 Henry Wildfang, Comments on draft, dtd 26Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).

56. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb68, p. 30; Nalty, *Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh*, p. 45; III MAF Jnl & Msg File, 11–12Feb68, Ser. No. 100; 3d MarDiv COC msg to III MAF COC, 12Feb68 (III MAF Khe Sanh Ops File).

57. LtCol Robert Guay, "The Khe Sanh Airlift," 31Jan69 (1968 Background File, MCHC), p.4, hereafter, Guay, "The Khe Sanh Airlift;" Ray W. Stubbe, "Khe Sanh: Valley of Decision," ms, 1987 (Copy in Personal Papers Collection, MCHC), p. 895.

58. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p. 30; Shore, *Battle for Khe Sanh*, pp. 78–9.

59. This and the next paragraph are derived from the following sources: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, pp. 83–4; Nalty, *Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh*, pp. 51–52; Shore, *Battle for Khe Sanh*, pp. 78–9. The quote is from Shore, p. 78. The FMFPac account mentions only a crate of eggs being included with two of the eggs broken.

60. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p. 30.

61. Nalty, *Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh*, p. 58; Asst C/S G-3, 1st MAW memo to CG 1stMAW, dtd 12Aug68, Subj: Airlift Support of Khe Sanh in Meeting Notes Fldr (1968), MajGen Charles J. Quilter Papers MCHC, hereafter 1st MAW memo, 12Aug68, "Airlift Support of Khe Sanh" (Quilter Papers). Both Nalty and the author of the memo note the fragmentary nature of the statistics cited in the text. As the 1st MAW G-3 wrote, "we have sorted through our many reports—which contain some conflicting info and have arrived at the following as our best effort."

62. Dabney intvw, 20May82, p. 65; LtCol Harry L. Alderman, Comments on "The Battle for Khe Sanh," n.d. (Comment File, MCHC).

63. 3/26 ComdC, Feb68, p. 12.

64. This and the next two paragraphs are based on the following sources: MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, Comments on "The Battle for Khe Sanh," not dated (Comment File, MCHC), hereafter McCutcheon Comments, Khe Sanh; BGen Robert P. Keller, Comments on "The Battle for Khe Sanh," 17Dec68 (Comment File MCHC); Anderson intvw, 3d Session, 17Mar81, pp. 225–6; MajGen Norman J. Anderson to McCutcheon, dtd 25Feb68, ltr no. 60, 1968 cor, File A (McCutcheon Papers), hereafter Anderson to McCutcheon, 25Feb68.

65. Additional sources for this paragraph are: 1st MAW OPlan 3–68, dtd 23Feb68, Encl Anderson to McCutcheon, 25Feb68; 1st MAW ComdC, Feb68, p. 2–3.

66. An additional source for this paragraph is: BGen Henry W. Hise to BGen Alan J. Armstrong, dtd 13Mar68, File A, 1968 Cor (McCutcheon Papers, PC464, MCHC), hereafter Hise to Armstrong ltr, Mar68 (McCutcheon Papers).

67. McCutcheon Comments, Khe Sanh; Dabney intvw, 20May82, pp. 25–6, 69; Hise to Armstrong ltr, Mar68 (McCutcheon Papers); 1st MAW ComdC, Mar68, p. 2–2.

68. 1st MAW ComdC, Mar68, p. 2–2; 1st MAW memo, 12Aug68, "Airlift Support of Khe Sanh" (Quilter Papers); Guay, "The Khe Sanh Airlift," pp. 7–8. Again there is some difference between the 1st MAW ComdC and the memo in the Quilter papers over the figures on the tonnage and passengers lifted out by the helicopters. According to the memo, the helicopters lifted 10,677 passengers and 3,379 tons of cargo. On the other hand, according to the command chronology, the choppers lifted 14,562 passengers and 4,661 tons. The figures in the memo are used in the text, as the authors of the memo made some attempt to resolve conflicting information.

69. Nalty, "Operation Niagara, Air Power, and the Siege of Khe Sanh," pp 39–46.

CHAPTER 24

A MATTER OF DOCTRINE: MARINE AIR AND SINGLE MANAGER

Unless otherwise noted the sources in this chapter are derived from MACV ComdHist, 1968; HQMC Msg File; HQMC, Status of Forces, 1968; HQMC DCS (Air) Single Manager Fldr, Jan68–15Aug70; FMF-Pac, MarOpsV, 1967–1968; III MAF ComdCs, Jan–Dec 1968; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan–Dec68; Cushman intvw, Nov 82; MajGen Charles J. Quilter Papers, MCHC; Norman Anderson Papers; Anderson intvw, 3d Session, 17Mar81; McCutcheon Papers, MCHC; Westmoreland Papers, CMH; Westmoreland intvw, 1983; Chaisson Papers, Hoover Institute; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Bernard C. Nalty, *Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh* (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1969), hereafter Nalty, *Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh*; *Command and Control of Air Operations in the Vietnam War*; McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962–70."

The Establishment of Single Manager

1. Historical Summary, General Entry, 27Dec67–31Jan68, v.28, History File, Westmoreland Papers, CMH, hereafter Westmoreland, General Entry, 27Dec67–31Jan68; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 344; Graham A. Cosmas, "General Westmoreland and Control of the Air War," *Command and Control of Air Operations in the Vietnam War*, pp. 29–38.

2. Westmoreland intvw, dtd 4Apr83, p. 47. General Westmoreland did not recall the date of this meeting but he did meet with Cushman and General Norman Anderson about aviation arrangements on 19 January 1968. See Westmoreland entry for 19Jan68, Historical Summary, Westmoreland Papers, CMH.

3. Cushman Intvw, Nov82, pp. 33–4; Westmoreland intvw, 1983, p. 38; Anderson intvw, 3d Session, 17Mar81, pp. 192, 194–5; MajGen Norman J. Anderson ltr to BGen Edwin H. Simmons, dtd 8Sep83, Norman Anderson Papers, PC1263 (MCHC), hereafter N. Anderson ltr, 8Sep83.

4. Westmoreland intvw, 1983, pp. 38–50, quote is on p. 39.

5. Ibid. p. 42; N. Anderson ltr, 8Sep83; Anderson intvw, 3d Session, 17Mar81, pp. 192, 194–5.

6. BGen John R. Chaisson ltr to wife, dtd 28Jan68, Chaisson Papers,

Hoover Institute; Westmoreland, General Entry, 27Dec67–31Jan68; Anderson intvw, 3d Session, 17Mar81, pp. 194–5; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 342–3.

7. Gen William C. Westmoreland, Historical Summary, 1–29Feb68, pp. 4–5, Fldr 29, Westmoreland Papers (CMH); Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 342–3; N. Anderson ltrs to MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, dtd 7 and 13 Feb68, Letters Nos. 50 and 58, File A, 1968 Correspondence, Box 20 (McCutcheon Papers, PC464)

8. Sharp msg to Westmoreland, dtd 18Jan68, Doc No. 3, HQMC, DCS Air Folder, Single Manager, Jan68–15Aug70; Gen Westmoreland to LtGen Krulak, dtd 28Jan68, Doc 68, III MAF Incoming Msgs, Dec67–1Feb68; MajGen Norman Anderson, Memorandum for the Record, dtd 17Feb68, Subj: Control of Air in the Defense of Khe Sanh (Norman Anderson Papers, PC1263), hereafter Anderson memo, Control of Air, 17Feb68.

9. Anderson memo, Control of Air, 17Feb68.

10. Ibid.

11. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 18Feb68 (III MAF Provisional Corps, Vietnam Folder); BGen E. E. Anderson ltr to MajGen K. B. McCutcheon, dtd 19Feb68, Ltr No. 56, File A, 1968 Correspondence, Box 20 (McCutcheon Papers, PC464).

12. Westmoreland msg to Sharp, dtd 19Feb68, Doc 7, HQMC, DCS Air Folder, Single Manager, Jan68–15Aug70.

13. Transcript of III MAF Meeting with General Momyer, n.d. [20Feb68], Encl, Gen Earl E. Anderson, Comments on draft, 18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

14. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, p. 437; ComUSMACV ltr to CGIIIMAF, dtd 7Mar68, Subj: Single Management, Doc 14, HQMC, DCS Air Folder, Single Manager, Jan68–15Aug70; ComUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 22Feb68, Doc No. 13, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 20Feb68–1Mar68; BGen John R. Chaisson, entry 29Feb68, Diary, Jan–Jun68, Chaisson Papers, Hoover Institute.

15. CMC, Memo for the Chairman, JCS, Subj: Single Management, dtd, 21Feb68, Doc 9, and MACV, Memo for the Chairman, JCS, Subj: Single Management, dtd 24Feb68, Doc 11, HQMC, DCS Air Folder, Single Manager, Jan68–15Aug70.

16. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 344; "Chronology of Events and Briefing for new CinCPac at HQMC . . ." in Command Relations and Air Control in ICTZ, n.d. [May68] Doc 20, HQMC DCS (Air) Single Manager, Fldr, Jan68–15Aug70, hereafter Chronology of Events, Doc 20; CGFMFPac msg to CG III MAF, dtd 6Mar68, Doc 2, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 4–14Mar68, hereafter CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 6Mar68; intvw with Sharp quoted in Nalty, *Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh*, p. 77.

17. CG1stMAW msg to Krulak and Cushman, dtd 18Mar68, Doc No. 8, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 15–27Mar68; Schlight, *The Years of the Offensive, 1965–68*, p. 285.

18. Quoted in CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 5Mar68, and cover sheet, Doc No. 1, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 5–14Mar68. See also ComUSMACV ltr to CG III MAF, dtd 7Mar68, Subj: Single Management, Doc No. 14, HQMC DCS (Air) Single Manager Fldr, Jan68–15Aug70, hereafter ComUSMACV ltr, 7Mar68 Single Management; Schlight, *The Years of the Offensive, 1965–68*, p. 285.

19. ComUSMACV ltr, 7Mar68, Single Management.

20. Ibid.

21. CG1stMAW msg to CGIIIMAF and CGFMFPac, dtd 18Mar68, Doc No. 8, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 15–27Mar68, hereafter CG1stMAW msg to CGIIIMAF and CGFMFPac, 18Mar68.
 22. Ibid.
 23. Ibid.; see also CG7thAF to CGIIIMAF, dtd 14Mar68, Doc No. 38, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 5–14Mar68.
 24. CG1stMAW msg to CGIIIMAF and CGFMFPac, 18Mar68.
 25. MajGen Norman Anderson ltrs to McCutcheon, dtd 19Mar68, Ltr No. 67, and dtd 4Mar68, Ltr No. 61, File A, McCutcheon Papers, PC464.
 26. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 6Mar68.
 27. CMC memo to Joint Chiefs, Subj: Single Management, dtd 4Mar68, Doc No. 13, and Chronology of Events, Doc 20, HQMC DCS (Air) Single Manager Fldr, Jan68–15Aug70.
 28. Admirals Hyland and Mooror are quoted in CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 15Mar68, HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68.
 29. Westmoreland intvw, May 1983, p. 39; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 344–5. There is some contradiction between the interview and the book. In his book, he makes no mention of a telephone conversation with the President, but does mention discussing the subject with the President in April when on a visit to Washington.
 30. Newspaper article quoted in CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 9Mar68, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 5–14Mar68.
 31. Ibid. For Cushman and Anderson quotes see cover sheet to the FMFPac message. See also CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 11Mar68, Doc No. 27, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 5–14Mar68.
 32. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, p. 437.
 33. CG1stMAW to CGFMFPac and CGIIIMAF, dtd 23Mar68, Doc No. 23, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 15–27Mar68.
 34. Ibid.
 35. CMC msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 26Mar68, in Folder, Memos for the Record, 1966–68, hereafter CMC msg 26Mar68, and McCutcheon ltr to MajGen Norman and BGen E. E. Anderson, dtd 26Mar68, Ltr No. 64, File A, 1968 Correspondence, (McCutcheon Papers, PC464), hereafter McCutcheon ltr, 26Mar68.
- Point, Counterpoint**
36. CMC msg 26Mar68 and McCutcheon ltr 26Mar68.
 37. CG1stMAW msg to CG1stMarDiv and CG3dMarDiv, dtd 27Mar68, Doc. No. 33, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 15–27Mar68; Anderson draft of msg for Cushman to Westmoreland, n.d. [Apr68] [Info to CinCPac], MajGen Norman Anderson Papers, PC1263, hereafter Norman Anderson draft msg for Cushman [Apr68].
 38. Norman Anderson draft msg for Cushman [Apr68].
 39. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 10Apr68, HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, V, Mar68, pp. 66–7.
 40. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p. 68.
 41. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, p. 58.
 42. BGen H. W. Hise personal ltr to MajGen Charles Quilter, dtd 5Apr68, Miscellaneous Fldr, 1950–May68, Charles J. Quilter Papers, MCHC.
 43. CG1stMAW msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 5Apr68, Doc No. 36, and ComUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 5Apr68, Doc No. 24, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 29Mar–11Apr68.
 44. McCutcheon ltr to BGen E. E. and MajGen Norman Anderson, dtd 9Apr68, Ltr No. 68, File A, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers, PC464. See also Gen Leonard F. Chapman intvw, 28 Mar 1979, (Oral HistColl, MCHC), pp. 70–6.
 45. CMC Green Ltr, 4–68, to all general officers, dtd 9Apr68, Subj: Air Control in I Corps, Green Ltr Book, 1968.
 46. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 14Apr68, Doc No. 19, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 7Mar–13Aug68.
 47. Ibid.
 48. Ibid.
 49. CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 4 May68, HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68; CG1stMAW ltr to CMC, dtd 24Apr68, Subj: Single Management, dtd 24Apr68, Encl 16, H6, HQMC DCS (Air) Single Manager Fldr Jan68–15Aug70, hereafter CG1stMAW ltr to CMC, 24Apr68.
 50. CG1stMAW ltr to CMC, 24Apr68.
 51. Ibid.
 52. Ibid.
 53. CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 4May68, HQMC Msgs Mar–Jun68.
 54. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, pp. 437–9.
 55. BGen John R. Chaisson ltr to wife, dtd 2May68, Chaisson Papers, Hoover Institute; MajGen Norman Anderson, draft of Memo for the Record, n.d. [2 or 4May68], Subj: Single Management, Norman Anderson Papers, PC1263, hereafter Norman Anderson draft memo, Single Management; CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 4May68, HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68.
 56. Norman Anderson draft memo, Single Management.
 57. Ibid.
 58. Ibid. and CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 4May68, HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68.
 59. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 3May68, HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68.
 60. BGen Homer E. Hutchinson ltr to McCutcheon, n.d. [May68], Doc No. 21, HQMC DCS (Air) Single Manager Fldr Jan68–15Aug70.
 61. Ibid., and attached CinCPac Evaluation Team, draft rpt, n.d. [May 1968], Subject: Single Management of Air Support.
 62. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 7May1968, HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68.
 63. MarOpsV, May68, p. 68; CGIIIMAF and CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 10May68, HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68.
 64. CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 10May68, HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68.
 65. Ibid.
 66. Norman Anderson intvw, 3d Session, 17Mar81, pp. 202–04; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, p. 60, May68, p. 68.
 67. DepSecDef, Paul H. Nitze memo to Chairman, JCS, dtd 15May68, Subject: OpCon of III MAF Aviation, Assers, Doc No. 17, HQMC DCS (Air) Single Manager Fldr Jan68–15Aug70. Relative to HQMC presentations to DepSec Nitze, see HQMC, Briefing, Apr68, Doc No. 31, HQMC DCS (Air) Single Manager Fldr Jan68–15Aug70 and

McCutcheon ltr to MajGen Frank C. Tharin, dtd 24Apr68, Ltr No 37, File T, 1968 Correspondence, McCutcheon Papers, MCHC.

68. Chairman, JCS memo to DepSecDef, dtd 15May68, Subj: Single Management . . . , Doc No. 17, HQMC DCS (Air) Single Manager Fldr Jan68–15Aug70.

69. MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon memo to Gen Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., dtd 1May68, Subj: Air Control, in Fldr, Memos for the Record, 1966–68 and McCutcheon to MajGen Norman Anderson, dtd 17 May 68, Ltr No. 73, File A, McCutcheon Papers.

70. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 16May68, HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68; CMC Memorandum for the JCS, CMC 29–68, dtd 18May68, Subj: Op Con of III MAF Aviation Assets, Doc No. 18, HQMC DCS (Air) Single Manager Fldr Jan68–15Aug70.

71. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 25May68, HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68; BGen John R. Chaisson, diary entry, 20May68, Chaisson Papers, Hoover Institute; JCS msg to CinCPac and ComUSMACV, dtd 20May68, Doc No. 19, HQMC DCS (Air) Single Manager Fldr Jan68–15Aug70.

72. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 21 and 26 May68, and HQMC, ATA21 Point Paper, dtd 28May68, Subj: Change to the Single Management . . . , HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68 and MarOpsV, May68, pp. 68–9.

73. CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 26May68, HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68.

74. Ibid; LtGen Richard E. Carey, Comments on draft, dtd 12Dec94, (Vietnam Comment File); MajGen Norman J. Anderson, Comments on draft, n.d. [Jan95] (Vietnam Comment File); CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 30May68, HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68.

75. ATA21, Point Paper, dtd 28May68, Subj: Change to the Single Management . . . ; CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 26May68 and 30May68; CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 26May68 and 30May68. All in HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68.

76. CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 26 and 30 May 68 and CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 26May68, HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68.

77. HQMC AAM–7, Talking Paper, dtd 8Jul68, Subj: Air Control in Vietnam, in HQMC, General Officers Symposium Book, July 68, hereafter HQMC Talking Paper, Air Control in Vietnam; ATA21, Point Paper, dtd 28May68, Subj: Change to the Single Management . . . , HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68; McCutcheon to Norman Anderson, dtd 3Jun68, Ltr No. 76, File A, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers.

78. CMC msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 7 Jun 68, HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68.

79. HQMC Talking Paper, Air Control in Vietnam; CMC to CGFMFPac, dtd 19Jun68, HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68, hereafter CMC to CGFMFPac, 19Jun68.

80. CGFMFPac, 19Jun68.

The Continuing Debate

81. BGen John R. Chaisson, debriefing at FMFPac, May68, Chaisson Transcripts, pp. 147–73, p. 164.

82. Ibid. and Col Edward L. Fossum, debrief at FMFPac, 11Jul68, Tape No. 2911 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

83. CGFMFPac to CMC, dtd 16Jun68, HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68; Buse intvw, p. 191.

84. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 20Jun68, HQMC Msgs,

Mar–Jun68.

85. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 22Jun68, HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68.

86. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac and CMC, dtd 29Jun68, HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68.

87. Ibid.

88. CGFMFPac msg to III MAF, dtd 29Jun68 and CMC to CGFMFPac, dtd 29Jun68, HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68.

89. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 30Jun68, HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68.

90. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun68, p. 62; HQMC Talking Paper, Air Control in Vietnam; McCutcheon to MajGen C. J. Quilter, dtd 15Jul68, Ltr No. 35, File Q, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers, hereafter McCutcheon to Quilter, 15Jul68.

91. Chronology of Events, Doc 20, HQMC DCS (Air) Single Manager Fldr, Jan68–15Aug70; McCutcheon to Quilter, 15Jul68.

92. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 27Jul68, HQMC Msgs, Jul–15Oct68.

93. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: Hutch [BGen Homer G. Hutchinson] to McCutcheon, n.d. [Aug68], Ltr No. 48, File H, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers. See also Chapman intvw, p. 76.

94. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 10Sep68, HQMC Msgs, Jul–15Oct68.

95. For the wing's initial optimism see A/CS, G–3, 1st MAW memo to CG1stMAW, dtd 10Sep68 (Rpts and Letters, Jun–Dec68, Quilter Papers). For General Wheeler's support see CMC msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 26Sep68 (HQMC Msgs, Jul–15Oct68). General Abrams is quoted in CGIIIMAF msg to CMC and CGFMFPac and CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 8Nov66 (HQMC Msgs, Jul–Dec68).

96. McCutcheon ltr to MajGen Charles Quilter, dtd 19Nov68, Ltr No. 39, File Q, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers.

97. Charles R. Smith, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1969, High Mobility and Standdown* (Washington: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1988), pp. 225–6; Graham A. Cosmas and LtCol Terrence P. Murray, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1970–71* (Washington: Hist&Mus Div, HQMC, 1986), pp. 273–77; Bernard C. Nalty, "Operation Niagara, Air Power, and the Siege of Khe Sanh," in *Command and Control of Air Operations in the Vietnam War* (Washington: NHC, 1991), p. 46.

CHAPTER 25

A QUESTION OF HELICOPTERS

Unless otherwise noted the sources in this chapter are derived from MACV ComdHist, 1968; HQMC Msg File; HQMC, Status of Forces, 1968; FMFPac, MarOpsV, 1967–1968; III MAF ComdCs, Jan–Dec 1968; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan–Dec68; Cushman intvw, Nov 82; MajGen Charles J. Quilter Papers, MCHC; Norman Anderson Papers; Norman Anderson intvw, 3d Session, 17Mar81; McCutcheon Papers, MCHC; Westmoreland Papers, CMH; Gen Raymond G. Davis intvw, 2Feb77 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Davis intvw, 2Feb77; Westmoreland intvw, 1983; Chaisson Papers, Hoover Institute; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962–70;" LtCol William R. Fails, *Marines and Helicopters, 1962–1973* (Washington: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1978), hereafter Fails, *Marines and Helicopters*.

Another Debate

1. Davis intvw, 2Feb77, pp. 45–7; Norman Anderson intvw, 3d Session, 17Mar81, pp. 248–49, 259.
2. F. Clifton Berry, Jr., *Air Cav, The Illustrated History of the Vietnam War* (New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1988), p. 85; LtGen Willard Pearson, *The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966–68* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1975), pp. 78–92; Charles R. Smith, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, High Mobility and Standdown, 1969* (Washington, D.C.: Hist&Mus Div, HQMC, 1988), pp. 239–41, hereafter Smith, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1969*.
3. Norman Anderson intvw, 3d Session, 17 Mar 1981, pp. 250–51.
4. Norman Anderson ltr to McCutcheon, dtd 9Mar68, Ltr No. 62, File A, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers.
5. BGen E. E. Anderson ltr to MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, dtd 16Apr68, Ltr No. 70, McCutcheon Papers, File A, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers; Gen Robert E. Cushman, debriefing at FMFPac, Mar69, pp. 470–71 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
6. Westmoreland quoted in MajGen John R. Chaisson intvw, 19Mar69, pp. 223–25 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
7. MajGen Alan J. Armstrong intvw, 25Sep1973, pp. 15–21 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Armstrong intvw; Norman Anderson intvw, 3d Session, 17Mar81, pp. 198–99.

The Need for Lighter Aircraft

8. MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, Memorandum for the Record, dtd 18Jan68, Subj: Trip Report visit to West Pac with CMC, Jan68, Memos for the Record, 1966–8, McCutcheon Papers.
9. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 1Mar68, Doc no. 50, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 20Feb68–1Mar68; CMC msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 12 Mar 68, Doc No. 30, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 5–14 Mar68, and CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 30 Mar68, HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68.
10. Fails, *Marines and Helicopters*, pp. 112–13.
11. Marine Corps Bulletin 05400, dtd 8Mar68, Subj: Activation of Fleet Marine Force Aviation Units, Accession No. 127–74–63, Central Files Records, 1968, Box No. 13, File No. 5400 (1Jan–30Apr68).
12. HML–367 ComdCs, Mar–Dec68; HML–167 ComdCs, Apr–Dec68; VMO–2 ComdCs, Jan–Dec68; VMO–6 ComdCs, Jan–Dec68; VMO–3 ComdC, Mar68; HQMC, Status of Forces, "Distribution of Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific," p. 10–1, dtd 25Jan68 and 5Dec68; Smith, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1969*, p. 238.
13. LtGen John J. Tolson, *Airmobility, 1961–71* (Washington: Dept of the Army, 1973), passim.
14. BGen Henry Hise ltr to BGen A. J. Armstrong, dtd 13Mar68, Ltr No. 66, File A, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers.
15. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 20Jun68, HQMC Msgs, Mar–Jun68.
16. Davis intvw, 2Feb77, pp. 49–51.
17. McCutcheon ltr to MajGen Charles Quilter, dtd 19Nov68, Ltr No. 39, File Q, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers.

To Keep the Mediums and Heavies Flying

18. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967*, pp. 210–11 and Fails, *Marines and Helicopters*, pp. 101–02, 121–24; McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962–70," p. 145. See

also McCutcheon, Memorandum for the Record, dtd 9Feb68, Subj: Meeting with Mr. William Allen, President, The Boeing Company, Memos For the Record, 1966–68, McCutcheon Papers.

19. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962–70," p. 145; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul68, p. 71 and Dec68, p. 111.
 20. McCutcheon to Norman Anderson dtd 27Feb68, Ltr No. 57 and Norman Anderson to McCutcheon, dtd 4Mar68 Ltr No. 61, File A, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers.
 21. Norman Anderson ltr to McCutcheon, dtd 4Mar68, Ltr No. 61, File A, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers.
 22. McCutcheon to LtGen V. H. Krulak, dtd 30Apr68, Ltr No. 42, File K, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers, hereafter McCutcheon to Krulak, 30Apr68; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug68, p. 61.
 23. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68, p. 87; H. D. Hill draft ltr for MajGen Quilter to McCutcheon, n.d. [Nov–Dec68?], Reports and Letters, Jun–Dec68, Quilter Papers.
 24. McCutcheon to Krulak, 30Apr68; MajGen C. J. Quilter to McCutcheon, dtd 10Aug68, Ltr No. 31, File Q, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers; Helicopter Spare Parts Support, Tab A, Item 7, III MAF, Board Report for Utilization, Command and Control of III MAF Helicopter Assets (Youngdale Report), dtd 11 and 27Apr69 and 17May69, hereafter the entire report will be referred to as the Youngdale Report.
 25. Helicopter Spare Parts Support, Tab A, Item 7, Youngdale Report.
 26. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan–Dec68 and 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan–Dec68. See especially FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p. 4 and 56–7; Jul68, p. 66; Dec68, pp. 74 and 86–8; 1st MAW ComdC, Dec68, p. 10.
 27. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb68, p. 76; Dec68, pp. 86–7.
- Another Look at Helicopter Air-Ground Relations
28. CG1stMAW msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 6Mar68, Doc No. 3, III MAF Incoming Msgs, 5–14Mar68; 1st MAW ComdC, Apr68, pp. 1–4 and 2–4; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr68, p. 62; Cushman intvw, Nov82, pp. 48–9; Col John E. Hansen, Comments on draft, dtd 17Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).
 29. Davis intvw, 2Feb77, pp. 72, 75–6.
 30. Ibid., pp. 45–7.
 31. Col William H. Dabney intvw, 20May1982, pp. 43–4 (Oral HistColl, MCHC). See also Col William H. Dabney, Comments on draft, n.d. [Dec94] (Vietnam Comment File).
 32. MajGen Norman J. Anderson ltrs to McCutcheon, 12 and 19Jun68, Ltrs Nos. 79 and 83, File A, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers.
 33. MajGen Raymond G. Davis intvws, dtd 1Jan69 and 7Apr69, pp. 294–5, 307–8 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); BGen Homer Dan Hill to MajGen Norman Anderson, dtd 20Oct68, Ltr No. 51, File H, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers, hereafter Hill ltr, 20Oct68.
 34. MajGen Raymond G. Davis intvw, dtd 7Apr69, pp. 308–09 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
 35. E. E. Anderson to McCutcheon, dtd 30Nov68, Ltr No. 104, File A, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers; CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 19Dec68 and CGFMFPac msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 21Dec68 (HQMC Msgs, 16Oct–Dec68).
 36. McCutcheon to MajGen C. J. Quilter, dtd 27Aug68, Ltr No. 32, File Q, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers; Hill ltr, 20Oct68. Last quote

from Hill is from Smith, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1969, p. 238.

37. BGen E. E. Anderson to McCutcheon, dtd 17 Oct 68 [No number on ltr], File A, 1968 Cor, McCutcheon Papers and BGen E. E. Anderson, Comments on draft, dtd 18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

38. "Command Relationship," (Col Barrow's submission for broader consideration), n.d. [Oct-Dec68?] Undated Notes, Quilter Papers.

39. Ibid.

40. MajGen Raymond G. Davis, Letter to editor, clipping from *Marine Corps Gazette*, Feb 1969, Quilter Papers.

41. Ibid.

42. Youngdale Report. For detailed discussion of the Youngdale Report see Smith, *Marines in Vietnam*, 1969, pp. 239-40.

43. Youngdale Report.

44. Ibid.

45. Armstrong intvw, pp. 14-5; LtGen Thomas H. Miller, Jr., Comments on draft ms, Smith, *Marines in Vietnam*, 1969, dtd 5Sep88 (Vietnam Comment File).

CHAPTER 26

ARTILLERY AND RECONNAISSANCE

Unless otherwise noted the sources for this chapter are the FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Dec68; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec68; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec68; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec68; 11th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Dec68; 12th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Dec68; Charles R. Smith, *The History of the 12th Marines*, (MCHC, Washington, D.C., 1972), hereafter Smith, *12th Marines*.

Marine Artillery Reshuffles

1. 11th Mar ComdC, Jan68.

2. Ibid.

3. The sources for this and the following paragraph are: CG3dMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 7Jan68, Encl 13, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68; 12th Mar ComdC, Dec68, p. 1-II-2; Smith, *12th Marines*, p. 57.

4. Additional sources for this paragraph are: 12th Mar ComdC, Jan68; CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 11Jan68, Encl 12, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68.

5. LtCol Ralph Moody, "Artillery and Naval Gunfire," Chapter 21, in LtCol Ralph F. Moody, et al., "Marines in Vietnam, 1954-68," 8 pts (MS, MCHC, Washington, D.C., 1971), p. 34; 11th Mar, Opn Hue City Resume, 1-29 Feb68, App 2, Tab C, 11th Mar ComdC, Feb68; 11th Mar, Hue City Resume, 1Feb-2Mar68, App 2, Tab c, 11th Mar ComdC, Mar68.

The Guns in the North

6. Capt Moyers S. Shore, III, *The Battle for Khe Sanh* (Washington: Hist&Mus Div, HQMC, 1969), pp. 42-3; Maj Jerry E. Hudson, Comments on "The Battle for Khe Sanh," 2Jan69 (Khe Sanh Comment File, MCHC).

7. 26th Mar AAR for Opn Scotland, 31May68, p. 4, in 26th Mar ComdC, Mar68, pt. IV.

8. 12th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Mar68; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Mar68; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p. 3.

9. 12th Mar, ComdC, Pt III, Apr68, p. 1-III-1.

10. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar68, p. 23-4, Apr68, pp. 23-4; 12th Mar ComdC, May68, pp. 1-II-2-1-II-4.

11. Gen Robert E. Cushman intvw, 1Nov82, p. 74 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

12. LtGen Louis Metzger, unpublished manuscript, n.p., n.d., pp 99-100.

13. 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Mar-Apr68; 12th Mar ComdCs, Mar-May68.

14. 12th Mar ComdC, May68, pp. 1-III-6-1-III-8.

Mini-Ter and the Fall of Ngog Tavak and Kham Duc

15. 11th Mar ComdC, Feb-Mar68; 2/13 ComdC, Jan-Feb68, p. 6.

16. 11th Mar ComdC, Apr68, p. 2.

17. 11th Mar ComdCs, Apr-May68; 2/13 ComdCs, Apr-May68; Ronald H. Spector, *After Tet, The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam* (The Free Press, New York, New York, 1993), pp. 166-67, hereafter Spector, *After Tet*.

18. S-4Jnl, 10May68, Encl 1, and CO, 2/13 ltr to CMC, dtd 25May68, Subj: Meritorious Unit Commendation; recommendation for, and Encl, App 1, S-1 Jnl, 2/13 ComdC, May68, hereafter 2/13 ltr to CMC, 25May68; Spector, *After Tet*, p. 167.

19. Paul Drew Stevens, ed., *The Navy Cross, Vietnam, Citations of Awards to Men of the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps, 1964-1973* (Forest Ranch, CA: Sharp & Dunnigan Publications Inc., 1987), pp. 291-2.

20. Ibid., pp. 72-3.

21. 2/13 ltr to CMC, 25May68 with enclosures; Spector, *After Tet*, pp. 168-9.

22. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p. 72; Spector, *After Tet*, pp. 169-71.

23. Col Franklin L. Smith debriefing at FMFPac [May 1968], Tape 2904 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); BGen Jacob E. Glick, Comments on draft, n.d. [Dec94?] (Vietnam Comment File); Spector, *After Tet*, pp. 169-75. For Abrams quote, see Spector, *After Tet*, p. 175.

Operations Drumfire II and Thor—Guns Across the Border

24. 12th Mar AAR, Opn Drumfire II, dtd 3Jun68, Tab b, 12th Mar ComdC, Jun68.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid. and CO 12th Marines memo to CG3d MarDiv, dtd 4Jun68, Subj: Addendum to Opn Drumfire II AAR, Tab A, 12th Mar ComdC, Jun68.

27. 12th Mar ComdC, Jun68, p. 1-III-7.

28. CGProvCorpsV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 22Jun68, Encl 16, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68.

29. ProvCorpsV OpO 15-68, dtd 24Jun68, Encl 18, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun68.

30. XXIV Corps AAR, Opn Thor, dtd 16Aug68 in 3d MarDiv, USA After Action Reports, hereafter XXIV Corps AAR; PCV Preliminary AAR, Opn Thor, dtd 12Jul68 in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jul68; VMCJ-1 ComdC, Jul68.

31. XXIV Corps AAR.

32. 1st MAW ComdC, Jun68; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul68, pp. 7-10.

33. 12th Mar ComdC, Jun68.

34. 1st MAW ComdC, Jul68.

35. III MAF ComdC, Jul68.
36. XXIV Corps AAR.
37. 12th Mar ComdC, Jun68.
38. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jul68, p. 38.
39. XXIV Corps AAR.
40. MACV Comd Hist, 1968, p. 409.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 374.

Fire Base Tactics

42. 12th Mar ComdC, Dec68, 1–II–3.
43. LtCol Joseph Scoppa, III MAF intvw at Fire Base Dice, Dec 1968, Tape 3372 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Scoppa intvw; 12th Mar ComdC, Dec68.
44. Scoppa intvw.
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Ibid.*
48. *Ibid.* and 12th Mar ComdC, Dec68.
49. Scoppa intvw.
50. 11th Mar ComdCs, Jul–Dec68.

Marine Reconnaissance Operations

51. 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, pp. 31–33; 1st MarDiv to III MAF, resume of telecon, dtd 29Jan68 (III MAF Jnl&Msg File).
52. Patrol Report, Cayenne B–2–2, dtd 4Jun68, in 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Jun68, pt IV, Tab B–24.
53. 1st Recon Bn SitRep No. 156–68, p. 3, in 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Jun68, [SitReps] [pt 2 of 2 pts].
54. 1st Recon Bn PatRep, dtd 12Jun68, in 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Jun68, pt IV, Tab B–52.
55. 1st Recon Bn PatRep, dtd 16Jun68, in 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Jun68, pt IV, Tab B–80.
56. 1st Recon Bn SitRep No. 176–68, in 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Jun68, [SitReps] [2 of 2 pts] and 1st Recon Bn PatRep, dtd 1Jul68 in 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Jul68, pt IV, Tab B–6.
57. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68, pp. 49–50.
58. Col William D. Kent, intvw by Hist&Mus Div, dtd 27Aug91 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Kent Tape.
59. *Ibid.*; F. Clinton Berry, Jr., *The Illustrated History of the Vietnam War—Air Cav*, (New York and Toronto: Bantam Books, 1988), pp. 86–9.
60. Kent intvw.
61. *Ibid.*; Col Alexander L. Michaux, debriefing at FMFPac, 18Jul68, Tape No. 2915 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); LtCol Donald R. Berg, Comments on draft, dtd 9Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File); MajGen Raymond G. Davis, intvw by III MAF, Dec68–Jan69, pp. 284–6 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

CHAPTER 27

MANPOWER POLICIES AND REALITIES

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: HQMC Msg File; Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Rela-*

tions, 1956–1967, 12 bks (Washington: GPO, 1971), hereafter *Pentagon Papers* with appropriate section title and book, and section, volume or tab, and page number; Commandant's Reference Notebook, hereafter CMC Reference Notebook with appropriate year and tab; Col James W. Marsh, USMC (Ret) intvw with Capt David A. Dawson, 26Feb92, hereafter Marsh intvw; Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Subj: Strength Report—Vietnam, hereafter MACV Strength Report; III MAF ComdCs; Department of Defense, OASD (Comptroller), Directorate for Information Operation and Control, *Selected Manpower Statistics*, (Washington, D.C.) 1968–1975, hereafter *Selected Manpower Statistics* with appropriate years; Bureau of Naval Personnel, *Navy and Marine Corps Military Personnel Statistics*, hereafter *M.C. Personnel Statistics*; Marine Corps Personnel Data Bases held by the Center for Naval Analyses, hereafter CNA Database; Headquarters Marine Corps Central Files, hereafter CF with appropriate year.

The average strength of line battalions was derived by taking the "average monthly strength" as reported in the command chronology of every infantry battalion not configured as a BLT in Vietnam for which this information was available. Average rifle company strength was derived from the unit diary report closest to the date in question for the first letter company of every battalion in Vietnam, with the exception of battalions for which this information was not available. The average strength of infantry battalion headquarters and service companies was derived in the same manner, using all H&S companies for which information was available save those in BLTs. The average strength of regimental headquarters companies was derived from the unit diary reports of the headquarters company for every regiment in Vietnam for the date in question.

1. Marsh intvw. See also DAC/S G–1, Presentation, 14 July 1967, General Officers Symposium Book, 1967, sec G, p. 2.
2. Gen Leonard F. Chapman intvw, 17Jan79, 28Mar79, p. 66 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Chapman intvw.
3. MajGen Jonas M. Platt, Comments on draft, dtd 6Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File).

Personnel Turnover

4. Vietnam Manpower Statistics File, RefSec, MCHC.
5. *Selected Manpower Statistics*, 1975, p. 52.
6. CMC Reference Notebook 1966–67, Subj: Terms of enlistment.
7. CMC Reference Notebook 1968, tab I–F, Senate Armed Services Committee insert for the record.
8. AC/S G–1, Presentation, 14 July 1967, General Officers Symposium Book, 1967, sec G, pp. 6–8.
9. AC/S G–1 Memo to DirPers, Subj: CONUS Divisions Personnel and Readiness Status FY68–FY69, dtd 2Jan68, CF 68; AC/S G–1, Presentation, General Officers Symposium Book, 8–12 July 1968, sec I, pp. 9–10.
10. Dep Dir Personnel Memo to CMC, Subj: Status of Military Personnel Procurement Results for FY68 (as of 30 June 1968), dtd 17Jul68, Encl 1, CMC Reference Notebook 1968.
11. Insert for the Record, Senate Armed Services Committee, 20Feb68, tab I–F, CMC Reference Notebook 1968.
12. AC/S G–1 memo to DirPers, Subj: CONUS Divisions Personnel and Readiness Status FY68–FY69, 2Jan68, CF 68.
13. CMC Reference Notebook 1970, Personnel, Subj: Enlistment Standards and Periods of Enlistment, 17Nov70; *Selected Manpower Statistics*, 1975.

14. DepDirPers Presentation, General Officers Symposium 1968, tab J, p. 2.

The Quality Issue and Project 100,000

15. Homer Bigart, "McNamara Plans to 'Salvage' 40,000 Rejected in Draft," *The New York Times*, 24Aug66, pp. 1, 18.

16. Memo, Subj: Enlistment of Marginal Personnel, n.d., p. 2, File 1100, CF 67.

17. Janice H. Laurence and Peter F. Ramsberger, *Low-Aptitude Men in the Military: Who Profits, Who Pays?* (New York: Praeger, 1991), p. 23.

18. Telephone intvw between Thomas D. Morris and Capt David A. Dawson, 24May91.

19. CMC Reference Notebook 1969, Subj: Enlistment of Marginal Personnel—Project 100,000; AC/S G-1 Presentation, General Officers Symposium Book, 1969, sec E, p. 20.

20. Mark J. Eitelberg et al., *Screening for Service: Aptitude and Education Criteria for Military Entry* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Installations, and Logistics], 1984), pp. 138, 147.

21. CMC Reference Notebook 1966–67, 1970, 1974.

22. Office of the Adjutant General, U. S. Army, *Annual Report of the Qualitative Distribution of Military Manpower Program for 1951–1952* and FY 1953.

23. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), *Characteristics and Performance of New Standards Men: Final Report*, June 1971, Table A–3, A–6 (HumRRO Collection).

24. Lewis B. Puller, Jr., *Fortunate Son, The Autobiography of Lewis B. Puller, Jr.* (New York, New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), pp. 77–8.

25. LtCol Howard Lovingood intvw with Capt David A. Dawson, 17May91.

Training

26. CMC Reference Notebook, 1965–1968.

27. CMC Reference Notebook 1968, Subj: Basic Specialist Training, 8Jan68.

28. CMC Reference Notebook 1968, Subj: Recruit Training (Including Changes to Accommodate SEAAsia), 26Apr68.

The Search for Junior Leaders

29. See Bernard C. Nalty and LtCol Ralph F. Moody, *A Brief History of U. S. Marine Corps Officer Procurement* (Washington, D.C.: Hist Div, HQMC, 1970, rev ed), hereafter Nalty and Moody, *Officer Procurement*, for a description of the commissioning of senior NCO's as temporary officers during these conflicts.

30. Based on data from *M.C. Personnel Statistics*. On 31 December 1967, the Marine Corps had 6,326 first lieutenants on active duty. Of these, 3,800 were ground officers, and 3,493 had more than four years enlisted service. Since almost all of the 4,059 temporary officers should have been first lieutenants by this time, almost all of the first lieutenants with more than four years enlisted service must have been temporary officers. This is further supported by the fact that only 453 captains and 133 second lieutenants had more than four years enlisted service at this time, for a total of 4,079 company grade officers. Even allowing for casualties, other attrition, and the possibility of promotion from second lieutenant to major in less than three years, temporary officers accounted for some-

where on the order of 3,200–3,350 first lieutenants. Since all temporary officers were ground officers, the bulk of ground-assignable first lieutenants must have been temporary officers.

31. Nalty and Moody, *Officer Procurement*, pp. 23–24.

32. Gen Wallace M. Greene ltr to LtGen James M. Masters, Sr., dtd 31 Aug67, CF67 File 5000/5.

33. Nalty and Moody, *Officer Procurement*, p. 22.

34. DAC/S G-1 Presentation, General Officers Symposium Book, 1967, tab G, p. 3.

35. Director, Policy Analyses Division memo to Chief of Staff, Subj: Questions Asked by CMC in a Review of Second Draft of SecNav Posture Statement, dtd 22Jan68, CF 68.

36. AC/S G-1 Presentation, General Officers Symposium Book, 1969, tab E, p. 16.

37. MCBul 5430, Subj: Activation of Career Advisory Branch, 8Apr68 and HQBul 5400, Subj: Activation of Career Advisory Branch, 12Apr68, both in CF 68

Discipline

38. CG1stMarDiv msg to 1st MarDiv, dtd 8Apr68, Encl 4, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Apr68.

39. DivBul 5100, Subj: Accidental discharges, 24Aug68, Encl 15, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Aug68.

40. DivBul 5100, Subj: Careless Discharge of Weapons, 24Oct68, Encl 19, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Oct68.

41. 1st MarDivO 5101.2A, Subj: Weapons Safety, 4Mar69, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Mar69.

42. CMC Reference Notebook 1968, tab I–K, Subj: Marijuana involvement on the part of Marines, 21May68.

43. Talking Paper: Narcotics, Dangerous Drugs and Marijuana, p. 5, tab Y, General Officers Symposium Book, 1968.

44. Charles R. Anderson, *Vietnam: The Other War* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1982), p. 45, hereafter Anderson, *Vietnam: The Other War*.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 22

46. *Ibid.*, p. 21–22.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 23; LtCol Gary D. Solis, *Marines and Military Law in Vietnam: Trial By Fire*, (Washington, D.C.: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1989), p. 114; Maj Donald E. Milone, Comments on draft, n.d. [Dec94] (Vietnam Comment File).

48. The earliest racial incident recorded in HQMC files occurred in August 1968. Presumably there were racial incidents before this date, but this appears to be when HQMC began trying to keep track of racial incidents. CMC Reference Notebook 1972, Key Issue Paper, Subj: Equal Opportunity and Racial Unrest/Violence, n.d.

49. CMC msg to CGFMFPac, personal for LtGen Buse from Gen Chapman, dtd 17Oct68, HQMC Msg File.

50. CMC msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 22Oct68, HQMC Msg File.

51. Quoted in Otto J. Lehrack, *No Shining Armor* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1992), p. 326.

Morale

52. MajGen Carl W. Hoffman intvw, 14Nov84 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Hoffman intvw, p. 160.

53. See Anderson, *Vietnam: The Other War*, Chapter 3.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
55. R&R figures from III MAF ComdCs, 1968.
56. Most Vietnam autobiographies and novels mention the disdain held by front line men for those in the rear. Examples include James Webb's *Fields of Fire* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978), Gustav Hasford's *The Short Timers* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), and Philip Caputo's *A Rumor of War* (New York: Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston, 1977). Charles R. Anderson, in *Vietnam: The Other War*, discusses the guilt felt by rear area troops (pp. 20–21) and also the desire of men who have been in combat to find and keep these comfortable jobs (pp. 19–20).
57. Hoffman intvw, p. 138.
58. Col Robert D Heintz, USMC (Ret), *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1966), p. 22.
59. BGen R. R. Van Stockum, DepSrMbr, Navy Dept Board of Decorations and Medals Presentation, tab W, p. 2, General Officers Symposium Book, 1968.
60. *Ibid.*
61. For a discussion of the problems associated with men in combat without a realistic rotation plan, and the benefits of such a plan, see Samuel A. Stouffer et al., *The American Soldier* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1949), 2 vols, v. 2, Chapters 2 and 8.
62. For a discussion of how long men can stand sustained combat, see Anthony Kelleet, *Combat Motivation* (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, 1982), pp. 276–277. Lord Moran, in *The Anatomy of Courage* (London: Constable & Company, 1945) also argues that the effects of combat are cumulative, and that every man has a breaking point.
63. Lt Ted D. Kilpatrick, MSC, USNR, and Harry A. Grater, Jr., "Field Report on Marine Psychiatric Casualties in Vietnam," *Military Medicine*, October 1971, p. 809.

The Aviation Shortage

64. LtCol William R. Fails, USMC, *Marines and Helicopters 1962–1973* (Washington, D.C.: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1978), p. 61, hereafter Fails, *Marines and Helicopters*.
65. News Release No. 923–57, DoD Office of Public Information, "NavCads Will No Longer Be Commissioned Early; Must Complete 18-Month Flight Training Course," 17Sep57, in Aviation: Pilot Training file, RefSec, MCHC.
66. News Release No. 414–55, DoD Office of Public Information, "Marine Corps Announces New Aviation Officer Candidate Course," 1May55 and "Marine Aviation Flight Training," July 1957, in Aviation: Pilot Training file, RefSec, MCHC.
67. Fails, *Marines and Helicopters*, p. 65; News Release No. 786–59, DoD Office of Public Information, "Marine Aviation Cadets Begin Training at Pensacola," 11Jul59, in Aviation: Pilot Training file, RefSec, MCHC.
68. Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, Presentation, p. 6, tab VI.A, General Officers Symposium Book, 1965.
69. Fails, *Marines and Helicopters*, p. 138; note 9.
70. *Ibid.*, pp. 129–130.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
72. BGen E. E. Anderson, Memo for the Record, Subj: Telecon with LtGen V. Krulak, dtd 6Jan68, Norman J. Anderson Papers; CGFMFPac

- msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 10Jan68, III MAF Incoming Msgs; MajGen Norman J. Anderson intvw, 17Mar81, pp. 254–56 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
73. DepDir Pers, Presentation, tab J, pp. 3–4, General Officers Symposium Book, 1968.
74. MajGen Carl A. Youngdale ltr to Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, Subj: Board to Consider the Utilization, Command and Control of Marine Corps Helicopter Assets in III MAF, dtd 27Apr69, Encl (2), pp. 20–22, hereafter Youngdale Board.
75. Fails, *Marines and Helicopters*, p. 141.
76. MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon ltr to MajGen William G. Thrash et al., Subj: Graduation of Marine Officers from U.S. Air Force Flight Schools, dtd 14Feb68, and MajGen McCutcheon ltr to BGen E. E. Anderson, dtd 10Oct68, ltr No. 93, both in McCutcheon Papers, Box 20, PC464, MCHC; DCS Air Presentation, pp. 11–13, tab G, General Officers Symposium Book, 1968.
77. DCS Air Presentation, p. 24, tab I, General Officers Symposium Book, 1969.
78. Fails, *Marines and Helicopters*, p. 140.
79. DC/S Air memo to ACS, G–1, Subj: Manpower Overage for Occupational Field (OF) 63, dtd 12Apr68 (CF 68 file 5310).
80. Youngdale Board, p. 20.
81. *Ibid.*, pp. 20, 22.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

Filling the Ranks in Vietnam

83. Unless otherwise noted, the number of Marines in Vietnam is taken from page 14–1 of the HQMC Command Center, Status of Forces.
84. "U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments," Dept of Defense, *Pentagon Papers*, bk 5, sec IV–C–6, vol. 2, pp. 213–214.
85. *Ibid.*, pp. 148, 150.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 218.
87. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 27Oct67, and CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 9Mar68; in HQMC Msg Files. MCBul 1300, Subj: Tour Lengths for Personnel Attached to Fleet Marine Force Units in the Far East, dtd 24Oct68, CF 1968, File 1300.
88. CMC ltr to CG MCB Camp Pendleton and CG MCB Camp Lejeune, Subj: Retraining of Personnel into Occupational Field 03, dtd 5Jun67, CF 1967, file 1500.
89. Staging Battalion ComdC, Jul–Dec 1967, pp. 3–4, Jan–Jun 1968, p. 3, in Camp Pendleton ComdC, Jul–Dec67.
90. MACV Strength Report for 31 Dec 1967, dtd 24 Jan 68, pp. 1–3, 104–119.
91. KIA from Vietnam casualty reference file prepared by MGySgt H. G. Lock, drawn from the information kept at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. WIA from CMC Reference Notebook, 1968, tab II–A, Subj: USMC Casualties SEAsia, n.d.

The Deployment of Regimental Landing Team 27

92. The discussion on the high-level manpower policy in this section is drawn in part from Herbert Y. Schandler, *The Unmaking of a President: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 92–104.
93. JCS msg to CMC, dtd 13Feb68, tab F, G–3, HQMC, 27th Marines Deployment.

94. CMC msg to CG FMFPac, dtd 13Feb68, in G-3 HQMC, 27th Marines Deployment file.

95. CMC msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 13Feb68, in HQMC G-3 file, 27th Marines Deployment; 5th Mar Div, RLT 27 Deployment AAR, dtd 8May68, hereafter RLT 27 Deployment AAR.

96. Arrival date for Co B (rein), 5th Tank Battalion, embarked on the USS *Thomaston* (LSD 28), taken from HQMC, Status of Forces, 3Dec68, p. 18-8.

97. The section on the deployment of RLT 27 has been drawn from the 27th Mar ComdCs and 1/27 ComdCs; the HQMC, G-3, 27th Marines Deployment folder; RLT 27 Deployment AAR; the General Officers Symposium Book, 1968; and the unit diaries of the appropriate units.

98. LtGen Adolph G. Schwenk intvw 23Jun82, p. 19 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

99. General Officers Symposium Book, 1968, tab I, p. 4.

Reserve Callup?

100. "U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 5, sec IV-6-C, vol. 3, p. 11.

101. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

102. Chapman intvw, p. 26.

103. General Officers Symposium Book, 1968, tab H, p. 2-3; CMC Reference Notebook 1968 tab VI-B-3-a, Subj: Marine Corps Reserve Units to be Activated upon Mobilization, 24Jan68.

104. CMC Reference Notebook 1968, tab VI-B-3-c, Subj: Readiness of 4th Division/Wing Team, 24Jan68; General Officers Symposium Book, 1969, tab E, p. 26.

105. CMC Reference Notebook 1968, tab VI-B-3-a, Subj: Marine Corps Reserve Units to be Activated Upon Mobilization, 24Jan68; Hist Div, Joint Secretariat, JCS, "The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1960-1968," pt 3, 1Jul70, Chapter 49, p. 15; General Officers Symposium Book, 1968, tab D, pp. 14-15.

106. General Officers Symposium Book, 1968, tab D, p. 15; CMC Reference Notebook, tab VI-B-3-c, Subj: Readiness of 4th Division/Wing Team, 24Jan68.

107. "U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 5, sec IV-C-6, vol. 3, pp. 71-78.

The Bloodiest Month, The Bloodiest Year

108. CGIIIMAF msg to CG3d MarDiv, CG1stMarDiv, dtd 20May68, HQMC Msg File.

109. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 23May68, HQMC Msg File.

110. CMC msg to CGFMFPac, CGIIIMAF, dtd 4Jun68, HQMC Msg File.

111. AC/S G-3, Presentation, tab D, p. 8, General Officers Symposium Book, 1968.

112. Staging Battalion ComdC, Jul-Dec 68, p. 1-2.

113. CGFMFPac msg dtd 12Sep68, quoted in CMC Vietnam Chronology, p. 748.

114. LtGen Henry W. Buse, CGFMFPac, Presentation, tab M, pp. 14-15, General Officers Symposium Book, 1969.

115. Data on KIA/MIA from file by MGySgt Lock, and USMC Separation

Database at the Center for Naval Analyses; data on WIA from CMC Reference Notebook 1968, tab II-A, Subj: tab A, USMC Casualties SEAsia, 26Feb69, and L. A. Palinkas and P. Coben, *Combat Casualties Among U.S. Marine Corps Personnel in Vietnam 1964-1972*, report no. 85-11 (San Diego, California: Naval Health Research Center, 1985).

Foxhole Strength: Still Too Few Marines

116. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 5Mar68, HQMC Msg File.

117. Col C. J. Robichaud debrief by FMFPac, 3Jun68, Tape 2813 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); Col William L. Dick debrief FMFPac, 21Jul68, tape 3036, Oral HistColl, MCHC). Both officers had recently returned from tours with the 3d Marine Division; Col Robichaud served as Commanding Officer, Task Force Robbie, and Col Dick as DC/S, Plans.

118. LtGen John E. McLaughlin intvw, 18Oct78, p. 39 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter McLaughlin intvw.

119. Marsh intvw.

120. McLaughlin intvw, pp. 13-14.

121. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 22Jul68 in HQMC Msg File.

122. CGFMFPac msg to CGFMFPac (Fwd) (for General Chapman (CMC)), dtd 1Aug68, in HQMC Msg File.

123. Staging Battalion ComdC, Jul-Dec 68, p. 4.

The Return of RLT 27

124. Impact Assessment re: Marine Corps SEA Forces, p. 9, encl, CMC memo to DepSecDef, Subj: Marine Corps Strength and Structure, attached to CMC msg to CG FMFPac and CG III MAF, dtd 2Oct68, in MCEO File.

125. "U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 5, sec IV-C-6, vol. 3, p. 71.

126. HQ, 1st Bde, 5th InfDiv(M), Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 October 1968, pp. 1-2.

127. CMC Reference Notebook 1968, tab II-E, Key Issue Paper, Subj: Redeployment of RLT 27.

128. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 24Jun68, HQMC Msg File.

129. JCS msg to CinCPac, dtd 23Jul68, tab N, G-3, HQMC, RLT 27 Redeployment file, hereafter RLT 27 Redeployment File.

130. CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV dtd 26Jul68, tab N, RLT 27 Redeployment File.

131. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 28Jul68 and JCS msg to CMC and CinCPac, dtd 10Aug68, tab N, RLT 27 Redeployment File.

132. CMC msg to CGMarCRecruitDep San Diego, dtd 6Sep68, tab HH, RLT 27 Redeployment File.

133. See all public announcements, speeches, and press guidance included in G-3, HQMC, RLT 27 return to Conus File, hereafter RLT 27 return to Conus File.

134. The number of returnees is based on AAR, Chronological Sequence of Events of the Return and Recognition of Regimental Landing Team 27, n.d., p. 7, tab A; Memo for Record, Subj: RLT-27 Return, 20Sep68, tab JJ; Encl 2, p. 2, no cover document, tab EE; all in RLT 27 return to Conus File.

The End of the Year

135. Thomas C. Thayer, ed., *Forces and Manpower—A Systems Analysis*

View of the Vietnam War 1965–1972, vol. 2, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), 18Feb75, pp. 160–167.

136. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, 10Sep68; CGFMFPac msg to CMC n.d.; CMC to CGFMFPac dtd 2Oct68; CMC to CG FMFPac dtd 23Nov68; all in HQMC Msg File.

137. CMC msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 14Nov68, HQMC Msg File.

138. HQMC, Status of Forces, 2Jan69, p. 14–1.

The Marine Corps and the Draft

139. BGen Raymond G. Davis, AC/S G–1, Presentation, tab V.A.1, p. 4, General Officers Symposium Book, 1965.

140. Marsh intvw; LtCol Richard J. Alger, intvw with Capt David A. Dawson, 16Jan92.

141. General Officers Symposium Book, 1968, tab I, pp. 5–7; The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) figure given at this Symposium is 304,500, but MajGen J. M. Platt made it clear that this figure was still under discussion. CMC Reference Notebook 1968, tab II–F, SecNav Summary, 3Jun68, shows 306,408 as the budgeted strength for the Marine Corps.

CHAPTER 28

BACKING UP THE TROOPS

A Division of Responsibility

1. Col Rex O. Dillow, Comments on draft, dtd 10Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Dillow Comments; Draft of III MAF report on Logistics for General Officers Symposium, Jul68, n.d. [Jun68], Encl, Dillow Comments, hereafter III MAF Report on Logistics.

2. FLC ComdC, Feb68, tab J, Encl 2, p. 6.

3. Ibid., Jan68, Encl 1, p. 6.

4. Gen Westmoreland msg to Gen Wheeler and Adm Sharp, dtd 9Feb68, Encl, Joel D. Meyerson, Chief, Operational History Branch, CMH, Comments on draft, dtd 6Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Meyerson Comments.

5. Meyerson Comments.

6. ACS G–4, III MAF to Force Informational Services Officer, Subj: Northern I Corps Logistics, n.d. [Mar–Apr68], Encl, Dillow Comments, hereafter Northern I Corps Logistics; III MAF Report on Logistics.

7. LtCol Ralph F. Moody, Maj Thomas Donnelly and Capt Moyers S. Shore II, “Backing Up the Troops” in LtCol Ralph F. Moody, et al., “Marines in Vietnam, 1954–68,” 8 pts (ms, MCHC, Washington, D.C., 1971), pt VII, p. 22–16, hereafter Moody, Donnelly and Shore, “Backing Up the Troops”; BGen E. E. Anderson to MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, dtd 19Feb68, Letters No. 56, File A, 1968 Correspondence, Box 20 (McCutcheon Papers, PC464)

8. U.S. Army Support Command Da Nang (Prov), Operational Report for Period ending 30Apr68, dtd 18May68, Encl, Meyerson Comments, hereafter Army Support Comd, Da Nang, Opn Rpt, dtd 18May68, Meyerson Comments.

9. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb68, p. 75.

10. FLC ComdC, Jan68, tab E, Encl 2, pp. 6–8.

11. FLC ComdC, Feb68, Encl 1, pp. 5–7.

12. FLC ComdC, Mar68, tab D, Encl 2, p. 4.

13. FLC ComdC, Apr68, Encl 1, pp. 7–8.

14. Northern I Corps Logistics.

15. Moody, Donnelly and Shore, “Backing Up the Troops,” p. 22–15; III MAF Report on Logistics; Dillow Comments.

16. Moody, Donnelly and Shore, “Backing Up the Troops,” p. 22–16; CG III MAF Ltr to ComUSMACV, Subj: Performance of Duty by BGen George H. McBride . . . [USA], n.d. [Jul68], Encl, Dillow Comments; Meyerson Comments; Army Support Comd, Da Nang, Opn Rpt, dtd 18May68, Meyerson Comments.

17. Abrams msg to Westmoreland, dtd 24Mar68, Encl, Meyerson Comments.

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18. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in 1967*, pp. 231–32; Marolda, *By Sea, Air, and Land*, p. 251.

19. NSA, Da Nang, ComdHist 68; Marolda, *By Sea, Air, and Land*, p. 162.

20. NSA, Da Nang, ComdHist 68; Hooper, *Mobility, Support, Endurance*, p. 74.

21. NSA, Da Nang, ComdHist 68; Marolda, *By Sea, Air, and Land*, p. 251.

22. TF Clearwater, ComdHist, 68–70, pp. 1–2; Marolda, *By Sea, Air, and Land*, pp. 186–8.

23. TF Clearwater, ComdHist.

24. Marolda, *By Sea, Air, and Land*, p. 240.

25. “Typical Disposition of 100 Wounded,” HQMC, Status of Forces, dtd 30Dec68, p. 20–2.

26. Marolda, *By Sea, Air, and Land*, pp. 244–50.

Marine Engineers

27. 3d Engr Bn ComdC, Jan68.

28. 1st Engr Bn ComdC, Jan68.

29. Company A, 1st Engr Bn, CAAR, Opn Hue City, dtd 24Mar68, tab A, and Company B, 1st Engr Bn, CAAR, Opn Hue City, dtd 15Mar68, tab B, 1st Engr Bn, ComdC, Mar68; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68, pp. 105–6.

30. 11th Engr Bn ComdCs, Mar–Apr68.

31. 1st Engr Bn ComdC, Jul68.
32. 1st Engr Bn ComdCs, Apr–Dec68.
33. 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Jun–Dec68; 7th Engr Bn ComdCs, May–Dec68; C. A. Rocco memo to CO 7th Engr Bn, Subj: Completion of Barrier Project, dtd 23 Aug68, Encl, LtCol Themistocles T. Annas, Comments on draft chapter, dtd 6Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File); Charles R. Smith, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, High Mobility and Standdown, 1969* (Washington, D.C.: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1988), p. 201.

The FLC Continues to Cope

34. FLC ComdC, Mar68, tab E, Encl 2, p. 6.
35. FLC ComdCs, Apr68, tab E, Encl 2, pp. 6–7, and May68, tab E, Encl 2, p. 6.
36. FLC ComdC, Jun68, tab E, Encl 2, pp. 6–8.
37. FLC ComdCs, Aug68, tab E, pp. 6–7, and Oct68, p. 7.
38. FLC ComdC, Nov68, Encl 1, p. 8.
39. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68, p. 90.

PART VI

Other Perspectives: Pacification and Marines Outside of III MAF

CHAPTER 29 PACIFICATION

Unless otherwise noted, the sources for this chapter are: MACV ComdHist, 1967; MACV ComdHist, 1968; FMFPac, MarOpsV with specific month; III MAF ComdCs, Dec67–Jan68; A&S Files, Indochina Archives; Krulak, *First to Fight*; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; Shulimson and Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965*; Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966*; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967*.

Prelude

1. Robert J. Komer, *Bureaucracy at War, U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), p. 113, hereafter, Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*; for the figures on CAP strength see FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec67, p. 64.
2. For the Marine system, see Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966*, pp. 256–58; for the first quote see Richard Hunt, "Pacification and Counter-Insurgency," in *Vietnam Historians Workshop*, Plenary Session (Washington: Hist&Mus Div, HQMC, 9 May 1983), p. 4; for the second quote see Thomas C. Thayer, *War Without Fronts: The American Experience in Vietnam* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 4–5, hereafter Thayer, *War Without Fronts*.
3. For this and the following paragraph, see FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec67, p. 49; 3d MarDiv, Topic No. 6, Psychological Operations, 3d MarDiv Working Papers, Input to III MAF Campaign Plan Quarterly Review, n.d [Dec67], Encl 78, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67.
4. This and the following four paragraphs are drawn from Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966*, pp. 243–45.
5. Ibid., pp. 249–50; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967*, p. 184; MajGen Raymond L. Murray intvw, 1975, pp. 18–9 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Murray intvw.

6. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 165–6.
7. Ibid., 159–61; Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966*, pp. 44–5.
8. Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966*, pp. 44–5; Thomas C. Thayer, OASD (SA) RP Southeast Intelligence Division, editor, *A Systems Analysis View of the Vietnam War 1965–72*, v. 10, Pacification and Civil Affairs (Springfield, VA: National Technical Information Service, Dept of Commerce, 1975) ADA 039317, pp. 47 and 49, hereafter, Thayer, "Pacification and Civil Affairs," v. 10.
9. Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*, pp. 118–19; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 214–15.
10. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 215.
11. Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*, pp. 41 and 117–19.
12. Shulimson, *Marines in Vietnam, 1966*, p. 254; MACV ComdHist, 1967, pp. 318 and 320.
13. MACV ComdHist, 1967, p. 320; MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, pp. 561–2; Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*, pp. 33–5.
14. MACV ComdHist, 1967, p. 320; MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, pp. 13–7.
15. CMC msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 12Oct67, HQMC Msg File.
16. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 21Oct67, HQMC Msg File.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, p. 519; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec67, p. 53; Thayer, *War Without Fronts*, pp. 142–3.
22. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, p. 519.
23. For an official opinion that the "crossover point" had been reached, see MACV J–2 estimate cited in CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 24Aug67, HQMC Msg File. Relative to the removal of the two categories, see MACV Briefing on Enemy Order of Battle, 24Nov67, quoted in Thayer, *War Without Fronts*, p. 31 and the discussion in Chapter 1.
24. Thayer, *War Without Fronts*, pp. 30, 33, and 208–09; MACV ComdHist, I, p. 544.

The Tet Offensives and Operation Recovery

25. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb68, p. 52 and Dec68, p. 53; MACV ComdHist, I, pp. 520, 536, 539, 541; Patrick J. McGarvey, untitled ms, Hoover Institution on War, Peace and Revolution, Stanford University, Chapter 6, p. 41.
26. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, pp. 520, 536, 539, 542–44.
27. The source for this and the following paragraph is: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, pp. 30–2.
28. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, 539.
29. Ibid., pp. 554–55; Thayer, *War Without Fronts*, p. 169.
30. MACV, ComdHist, 1968, I, p. 520.
31. Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*, p. 30.
32. Ibid.
33. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, pp. 554–5; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68, pp. 59–60.

34. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, pp. 521, 525–6.
35. MarOpsV, Dec68, p. 54; Maj Edward F. Palm, Comments on draft, dtd 28May95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Palm Comments.
36. Thayer, "Pacification and Civil Affairs," v. 10, pp. 10–2.
37. Ibid; 1st MarDiv ltr to dist list, Subj: Restoration of Vietnam RR, dtd 1Aug68, and attachments, Encl 1, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Aug68; III MAF Fact Sheet, Subj: Da Nang-Hue Railroad, dtd 15Oct68, in III MAF Fact Sheets, Asst CMC Visit, 28 Oct–4Nov68, hereafter III MAF Da Nang-Hue Railroad Fact Sheet, 15Oct68.
38. III MAF Da Nang-Hue Railroad Fact Sheet, 15Oct68; III MAF ComdC, Nov68, p. 30; III MAF ComdC, Dec68, pp. 31–2; MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, p. 544.

III MAF and Pacification

39. Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*, p. 59.
40. Gen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., intvw, 1Nov82, 49–50 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Cushman intvw, 1982.
41. MajGen Norman J. Anderson, intvw, 3d Session, 17Mar1981, p. 231 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
42. Cushman intvw, 1982, p. 49.
43. III MAF Fact Sheet, Subj: New Concepts in Pacification Management, dtd 19Oct68, in III MAF Fact Sheets, Asst CMC Visit, 28 Oct–4Nov68. For some of the friction between the Combined Action Program and CORDS, see LtCol Byron F. Brady, Comments on draft, dtd 30Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Brady Comments. See also the discussion in the section on the Combined Action Program in this chapter.
44. III MAF ComdC, Mar68, p. 31; Col Ross R. Miner, Debriefing by FMFPac, 5Sep68, Tape 3068, (Oral HistColl, MCHC); FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68, pp. 71–2.
45. III MAF ComdC, Feb68, pp. 32–3.
46. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar68, p. 45 and III MAF ComdC, Dec68, pp. 39–40.
47. III MAF ComdC, Dec68, pp. 25–6 and 39–40; Chart of Chieu Hoi Returnees, Jan–Sep68, attached to III MAF Fact Sheet, Subj: Status of Pacification in I Corps, dtd 18 Oct68, in III MAF Fact Sheets, Asst CMC Visit, 28 Oct–4Nov68; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb68, p. 52, Dec68, p. 51.
48. III MAF ComdC, Feb68, p. 31; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68, p. 51; LtGen Donn J. Robertson intvw, 1973–76, p. 12 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
49. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68, p. 122.
50. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, p. 45.
51. 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan68, p. 23; 7th Engr Bn, Historical Study of CivicAction, Jan1968–June1969, dtd 1Aug69, Encl, LtCol Themistocles T. Annas, USMC, Comments on draft, dtd 6Dec1994, hereafter 7th Eng Bn, Hist Study Civic Action.
52. 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Nov68, pp. 25–6, and Dec68, pp. 44–5; 7th Eng Bn, Hist Study Civic Action.
53. 3d MarDiv ComdC, May68, pp. 40–1.
54. MajGen Raymond G. Davis, debrief at FMFPac, 15Apr69, pp. 337–42, (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
55. Col Donald R. Myers, Comments on draft, dtd 27Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File); 1stLt Justin M. Martin ltr to wife, dtd 24Nov68, Encl to LtCol Justin M. Martin, Comments on draft, n.d. [Jul96] (Vietnam Comment File)
56. III MAF ComdC, Aug68; III MAF Fact Sheet, Subj: 3d Marine Division Memorial Children's Hospital, dtd 12Oct68, in III MAF Fact Sheets, Asst CMC Visit, 28 Oct–4Nov68; Graham A. Comas and LtCol Terrence P. Murray, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, Vietnamization and Redeployment, 1970–71* (Washington, D.C.: Hist & Mus Div, HQMC, 1986), pp. 171–2, hereafter, Comas and Murray, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam 1970–71*. Colonel Peabody is quoted in Comas and Murray, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1970–71*, p. 172.
57. LtCol Merrill L. Bartlett, Comments on draft, dtd 8Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File); Charles R. Anderson, *Vietnam, The Other War* (Novato, Cal: Presidio Press, 1982), pp. 71 and 75.

Homicide in the Countryside

58. Cushman intvw, 1982, pp. 11–2; Cushman intvw, Mar 1969, 475–76 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); MajGen Rathvon McC Tompkins intvw, 1973, pp. 62–3 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
59. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 375–80; Cushman intvw, 1982, pp. 35–6.
60. Cushman intvw, 1982, p. 36.
61. LtCol Gary D. Solis, *Marines and Military Law in Vietnam: Trial by Fire* (Washington, D.C.: Hist & Mus Div, HQMC, 1989), pp. 111–4, hereafter Solis, *Trial by Fire*. The statistics of Marine court-martials are from Maj W. Hays Parks, "Crimes in Hostilities," pt I, *Marine Corps Gazette*, Aug76, v. 60, no. 8, pp. 16–22, p. 18.
62. Solis, *Trial by Fire*, p. 139.
63. LtCol Gary D. Solis, "Marine Corps War Crimes in Vietnam: Uncounted and Unpunished?" Precis of paper (Jan 1993) to be presented at Naval Academy Historical Symposium, Oct 1993; Maj W. Hays Parks, "Crimes in Hostilities," Conclusion, *Marine Corps Gazette*, Sept 1976, v. 60, No. 9, pp. 33–39, p. 38, hereafter Parks, "Crimes in Hostilities," Conclusion; Solis, *Trial by Fire*, pp. 138–39. The quotes in the text follow the order of presentation of the sources.
64. Quoted in Parks, "Crimes in Hostilities," Conclusion, p. 38.
65. Murray intvw, pp. 24–5.

Changing Attitudes

66. III MAF Fact Sheet, Subj: Personal Response, dtd 18Oct68, in III MAF Fact Sheets, Asst CMC Visit, 28 Oct–4Nov68, dtd 31Oct68, hereafter Personal Response Fact Sheet, Oct68; "III MAF Platoon Leader's Personal Response Notebook" [1967], given to author by LCdr Richard McGonigal (USN).
67. Personal Response Fact Sheet, Oct68; 3dMarDiv ComdC, Jan68, pp. 46–7.
68. Personal Response Fact Sheet, Oct68.
69. Ibid.; MajGen Rathvon McC Tompkins, debrief by FMFPac, 17Dec68, Tape 3627 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
70. Parks, "Crimes in Hostilities," Conclusion, p. 38.
71. Comas and Murray, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1970–71*, p. 350. See also Col Richard B. Smith, Comments on draft, dtd 14Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

The Boys Next Door: The Combined Action Program

72. Personal Response Project, FMFPac (Fwd), Interim Report on Combined Action Units, III Marine Amphibious Force, with Special Attention to Personal Relationships, dtd 8Feb67, hereafter Interim Report on Combined Action Units; LCdr Richard A. McGonigal intvw 12 Oct 1984 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter McGonigal intvw.
73. Michael E. Peterson, *The Combined Action Platoons, The U.S. Marines' Other War in Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1989), pp. 38–40, hereafter Peterson, *The Combined Action Platoons*; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967*, p. 270; III MAF ComdCs, Feb–Jun 67; LtCol William R. Corson, Biog File in Biog Files, Ref Sec, MCHC. See also LtGen Victor H. Krulak, Comments on draft, dtd 31Oct94 (Vietnam Comment File).
74. III MAF ComdCs, Jun–July67; LtGen Herman Nickerson intvw, 10Jan73, p. 76 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); Robert A. Klyman, "The Combined Action Program: An Alternative Not Taken," ms, Honors Thesis, Department of History, The University of Michigan, 1986, pp. 21–2, hereafter Klyman, "The Combined Action Program"; Peterson, *The Combined Action Platoons*, p. 39.
75. Peterson, *The Combined Action Platoons*, p. 50; III MAF ComdCs, Jul–Dec67; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec67, p. 64.
76. LtCol Bryon F. Brady, intvw, Oct, 1984 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Brady intvw.
77. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 19Aug67; CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 1Nov67; CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 2 Dec67 (Reel 4, HQMC Msg File);
78. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 166; CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 2Dec67 and CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 5Dec67 (Reel 4, HQMC Msg File).
79. Robert J. Komer, intvw with Martin Russ, 29 July 1976 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
80. "Discussions with Ambassador Komer, 7Jan68" in CMC, Trip Visit to Vietnam, Jan68.
81. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 216; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68, p. 656; Peterson, *The Combined Action Platoons*, pp. 62–3; MajGen E. E. Anderson intvw, Dec68, Tape 3578 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) as quoted in Klyman, "The Combined Action Program," p. 34; Telephone conversation with Ambassador Robert Komer, dtd 29Jul85 as quoted in Klyman, "The Combined Action Program" footnote 19, p. 82.
82. CGIIIMAF ltr to CMC, Subj: Change to T/O for Combined Action Group etc., dtd 30Jan68, attached to III MAF Fact Sheet, dtd 12 Oct68, Subj: Combined Action Program, in III MAF Fact Sheets, Asst CMC Visit, 28 Oct–4Nov68, dtd 31Oct68; Resume of telecon, III MAF to FMFPac, dtd 10Jan68 in III MAF Special Report to FMFPac Fldr.
83. Igor Bobrowsky intvw, 3Dec1982, Tape Three, pp. 2–3 (Oral HistColl, MCHC). See also Igor Bobrowsky, Comments on draft, dtd 26Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).
84. Thayer, "Pacification and Civil Affairs," v. 10, pp. 37–8.
85. Col Harold L. Oppenheimer, FMFPac debrief, n.d. [1968] (Oral HistColl, MCHC) and Col H. L. Oppenheimer, Deputy Special Projects, III MAF, memo, n.d. [May68?], Subj: Analysis Combined Action Program, Encl Brady Comments.
86. Brady intvw; LtCol Bryon F. Brady Presentation and Round Table Discussion, CAP Reunion, Oct84 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Brady Round Table; Brady Comments; Dir, CAP memo to DepCG, III MAF, Subj: Mobile CAPs, dtd 2Jun68, Encl, Brady Comments, hereafter Mobile CAP Memo, 2Jun68; Col Robert J. Keller, Comments on draft, dtd 2Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).
87. Mobile CAP Memo, 2Jun68 and Brady Round Table.
88. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb–May68.
89. McGonigal intvw; Brady intvw; III MAF Force Bulletin 1306, Subj: Combined Action Program Personnel Assignment, dtd 18Apr68, in III MAF Combined Action Program Personnel Assignment Folder, Apr–Jul68.
90. III MAF Force O 3121.4B, Subj: Standing Operating Procedure for the Combined Action Program, dtd 22Jun68, in III MAF Combined Action Program Personnel Assignment Folder, Apr–Jul68.
91. Ibid.
92. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p. 36; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul68, p. 33; III MAF ComdC, Jul68. There is some discrepancy in the number of Marines assigned to the program between FMFPac and III MAF. The FMFPac report for July reported only 1,773 Marines in the program.
93. Col Richard B. Smith, debrief at FMFPac, Jul68, Tape 3041 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); Col Alexander L. Michaux, debrief at FMFPac, 18Jul68 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); MajGen Raymond G. Davis, debrief at FMFPac, 15Apr69, p. 338 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
94. III MAF ComdC, Jul68; 4th CAG ComdC, Oct68; CO 4th CAG ltr to Director, Combined Action Program, Subj: 4th CAG proposed expansion plan . . . , dtd 9Aug68, tab 3, 4th CAG ComdC, Oct68.
95. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68, p. 67; 2d CAG ComdCs, Oct–Dec68. There is again a discrepancy in numbers relative to the strength of the CAPs between the FMFPac report and the III MAF command chronology. The chronology showed a Combined Action strength for December as 38 officers and 1,871 Marine enlisted men as compared to 32 officers and 1,275 Marine enlisted men for January 1968, an increase of about 600 men. III MAF ComdCs Jan and Dec68. One explanation for the difference between the FMFPac figures and that of III MAF is that the III MAF figures represent an average over the month. It is also possible that the FMFPac report is not including the administrative personnel assigned to the Combined Action Groups and companies.
96. III MAF Fact Sheet, Subj: Status of Pacification in I Corps, dtd 18 Oct68, in III MAF Fact Sheets, Asst CMC Visit, 28 Oct–4Nov68; BGen E.E. Anderson ltr to LtGen W. J. Van Ryzin, dtd 11 Sep68, and 16Oct68, Encls, Gen Earl E. Anderson, Comments on draft, dtd 18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File); Cushman intvw, 1982, pp. 52–3.
97. Brady intvw and Brady Round Table; III MAF, Force/Senior Advisor I Corps Order 5080.10, Subj: Pacification Coordination, n.d. [Jul68], and III MAF, Force/Senior Advisor I Corps Order 508010A, Subj: Pacification Coordination, n.d. [Jul68], in III MAF Combined Action Program Personnel Assignment Fldr, Apr–Jul68; Background File on Proposed III MAF Order on Pacification Coordination, Jun–Aug'68, Encl, Brady Comments.
98. Questionnaire for Personnel Nominated for the Combined Action Program, n.d.; Brady intvw; Brady Comments; Igor Bobrowsky intvw, 3Dec1982, Tape One, p. 21 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Bobrowsky Tape One; Igor Bobrowsky, Corrections and Clarifications (Tape One), dtd 7 Dec1983.
99. Bobrowsky Tape One, pp. 17–8.
100. Eugene H. Ferguson intvw, 13Oct1984 (Oral HistColl MCHC), hereafter Ferguson intvw.

101. Ibid. and Bobrowsky Tape One, p. 1; Andrew Lewandowski, "I Feel Like I'm Fixin to Die . . ." Letters and Transcriptions of Vietnam Marine Sergeant Andrew Lewandowski, Mar 1968–Jun 1969, compiled and edited by Dr. Eugene R. Slaski (ms, Andrew Lewandowski Papers, MCHC), pp. 451–2.

102. Maj Edward F. Palm, "Tiger Papa Three: A Memoir of the Combined Action Program," Special preview supplement, *Marine Corps Gazette*, February, 1988, pp. 1–3, hereafter Palm, "Tiger Papa Three."

103. Brady Round Table.

104. Palm, "Tiger Papa Three," Part Two, "The Fire Next Time," p. 20, and Palm Comments. James DuGuid intvw 14Oct1984 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter DuGuid intvw.

105. Igor Bobrowsky intvw, 3Dec1982, Tape Two, pp. 2–3, and 12 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Bobrowsky intvw, Tape Two.

106. Ibid., pp. 8–9; Thomas Harvey, Comments on draft, dtd 13Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File); Ferguson intvw, p. 14.

107. Lam Ha ltr to Robert Klyman, dtd 31Jan86, Robert Klyman Papers, Personal Papers Collection, MCHC.

108. Thayer, "Pacification and Civil Affairs," v. 10, pp. 28–38, quote is from p. 38.

109. Peterson, *The Combined Action Platoons*, pp. 60–3. Harvey is quoted by Peterson, p. 61. See also Ferguson and DuGuid intvws.

110. Thayer, "Pacification and Civil Affairs," v. 10, pp. 36–7.

111. Bobrowsky intvw, Tape Two, p. 21; Michael E. Peterson, Comments on draft, dtd 10Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File); Lawrence A. Yates, "A Feather in Their Cap? The Marines' Combined Action Program in Vietnam" in William R. Roberts and Jack Sweetman, *New Interpretations in Naval History, Selected Papers from the Ninth Naval History Symposium, Held at the United States Naval Academy, 18–20 October 1989* (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 309–22, p. 320.

112. Francis J. West, Comments on draft, dtd 2Dec1994 (Vietnam Comment File). West's best known work on Combined Action is *The Village* (New York, Harper & Row, 1972).

The Accelerated Pacification Plan

113. MACV ComdHist, 1968, I, pp. 521–2.

114. Ibid. 521–2 and 532–3; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec68, pp. 5, 9, 42, 47, 57–8, 60, 62–3, 71–2. For continued progress in the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, see Smith, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1969*, pp. 280–83.

CHAPTER 30 OUTSIDE OF III MAF: THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCES, MARINE ADVISORS, AND OTHERS

The 9th MAB and the SLFs

Additional sources for this section are 9th MAB ComdCs, Jan-Dec68; LtCol Ralph F. Moody and Benis M. Frank, "Special Landing Force," draft ms, 1972 (MCHC), hereafter Moody and Frank, "Special Landing Force," ms.

1. 9th MAB ComdC, Jan68.

2. Ibid.; MarOpsV, Jan68, p. 91.

3. TG 79.5 ComdC, Jan68.

4. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *Marines in Vietnam, 1967*, pp. 176–79. LtCol McQuown is quoted on p. 176.

5. BGen Jacob Glick intvw, 20 Jun and 11Jul89, p. 62 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Glick intvw; CG9thMAB msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 3 and 5Jan68, Encl 3 and 4, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan68.

6. CG9thMAB msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 15Jan68, HQMC Msg File, Reel No. 4; Glick intvw, pp. 62–5.

7. Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966*, pp. 299–305; CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 11Oct67 (HQMC Msg File, Reel 7).

8. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 16Oct67 (HQMC Msg File, Reel 7).

9. Moody and Frank, "Special Landing Force," ms, Chapter 8.

10. MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins intvw, 1973, pp. 60–1 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Tompkins intvw; Col Alexander L. Michaux debriefing at FMFPac, 18Jul68, Tape 2915 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

11. Tompkins intvw, pp. 60–1; LtGen Donn J. Robertson intvw, 1973–76, p. 14 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); Gen Robert E. Cushman intvw, 1 Nov 1982, p. 45 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Cushman intvw, 1982.

12. CGIIIMAF to CGs 1st and 3d MarDivs, dtd 19Dec67 (III MAF Outgoing Msgs, Oct–Dec67).

13. For discussion of the MACV contingency plan, see CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 12 and 13Jan68 and CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 6Jan68 and to CMC, dtd 18Jan68 (HQMC Msg File, Reels 4 and 6).

14. CinCPac msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 19Jan68 (Westmoreland Papers, MACV msgs, Jan68); CinCPacFlt msg to CinCPac, dtd 20Jan68 (HQMC Msg Files, Reel 6).

15. LtCol Peter L. Hilgartner, "Amphibious Doctrine in Vietnam," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 53, no. 1 (Jan 1969), pp. 28–31. Quote is from p. 31.

16. Col Franklin L. Smith debriefing at FMFPac [May 1968] Tape 2904 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

17. TG 79.5 ComdC, Jun68.

18. TG 79.5 ComdCs, Jul–Oct68.

19. BLT 2/26 ComdCs, Aug–Sep68. See also Com, Seventh Flt, Monthly Summary, Aug68 (OAB, NHD), pp. 36–7.

20. III MAF Fact Sheet, Subj: SLF Employment, dtd Oct 1968, Encl 24, to CGIIIMAF ltr to distribution list, dtd 31Oct68, Subj: III MAF Fact Sheets, Asst CMC Visit, 28 Oct–4Nov68, hereafter III MAF Fact Sheet, SLF Deployment; 9th MAB ComdC, Oct68.

21. III MAF Fact Sheet, SLF Deployment; BLT 2/26 ComdCs, Oct–Nov68.

22. CARG Bravo, Operation Daring Endeavor, Post Operation Rpt, dtd 13Dec68 in TG 76.5 Opn Rpts, 1967–69; TG 79.5 ComdC, Nov68.

23. BLT 2/26 ComdC, Dec68. Quotes are from entry dtd 8Dec68, p. 9 and BLT 2/26 CAAR, Opn Valiant Hunt, 15Dec68–5Jan69, dtd 1Jan69, tab A. Although Valiant Hunt AAR is dated 1 January 1968, it is obviously an error, as it contains entries through 5 January 1969, and is attached to the December 1968 ComdC.

24. TG 79.5 ComdC, Dec68; Col Clyde W. Hunter intvw, 10Jul69, Tape 4363 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), as quoted in Smith, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1969, p. 297.

25. Smith, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1969, pp. 300–310.

Sub-Unit 1, 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO)

26. Sub-Unit 1, 1st ANGLICO, FMF, ComdC, 1Jan–31Mar68, dtd 15Apr68, hereafter SU–1 ComdC, Jan–Mar68. While the number of ANGLICO personnel with the Koreans probably relates to the number at the end of March, it is assumed that this did not differ greatly from the number assigned in January.

27. Ibid. and MCCC, Status of Forces, dtd 29Feb68. Although the Status of Forces report is dated 29Feb68, the strength figure for ANGLICO Sub-Unit 1 is for 18Jan68. The Status of Forces report does not give the strength of the various detachments of the sub unit.

28. SU–1 ComdC, Jan–Mar68 and attached AAR, OpnHue City, 31Jan–20Feb68.

29. Ibid.

30. SU–1 ComdC, Jan–Mar68, p. 2–2 and Anx D, AAR, Battle of Phan Thiet.

31. SU–1 ComdC, Jan–Mar68; Sub-Unit 1, 1st ANGLICO FMF, ComdC, 1Apr–30Jun68, dtd 19Jul68, hereafter SU–1 ComdC, Apr–Jun68.

32. SU–1 ComdC, Jan–Mar68; SU–1 ComdC, Apr–Jun68; Com Seventh Fleet, Monthly Historical Summaries, Jan–Jun68 (OAB, NHD); CinCPac Flt, Pacific Area Opns, Jun68 (OAB, NHD), p. 2.

33. Sub-Unit 1, 1st ANGLICO, ComdC 1Jul68–30Sep68, dtd 25Oct68, p. 2–1, hereafter SU–1 ComdC, Jul–Sep68; Seventh Fleet, Monthly Historical Summary, Jul68, pp. 2 and 23 (OAB, NHD); CinCPacFlt, Pacific Area Naval Operations Review, Jul68, (OAB, NHD), pp. 36–7.

34. SU–1 ComdC, Jul–Sep68, p. 2–1; Com Seventh Flt, Monthly Summary, Oct 68 (OAB, NHD), p. 35.

Embassy Marines

35. MCCC, Status of Forces, p. 14–1, dtd 10Jan68 and 20Mar68; Marine Security Guard Bn (StateDept) ComdCs, 10Feb67–1969; Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1966, p. 318.

36. OIC, Marine Security Guard Detachment, American Embassy, Saigon, Incident Report, No. 1–68, Subj: Viet Cong Attack on American Embassy, 31Jan68, dtd 23Feb68 (Marine Security Guard Bn (StateDept) ComdCs, 10Feb67–69, hereafter Incident Report, Viet Cong Attack; Statement of Capt Robert J. O'Brien, n.d. [31Jan–Feb68], Encl, Incident Report, Viet Cong Attack, hereafter O'Brien Statement.

37. The following paragraphs are based upon Don Oberdorfer, *Tet!* (New York: Doubleday & Co, 1971), pp. 2–40; Jack Shulimson, *Tet–1968, The Illustrated History of the Vietnam War* (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), pp. 17–18; Incident Report, Viet Cong Attack.

38. An additional source for this and the following paragraph is Statement of Sgt Ronald W. Harper, n.d. [31Jan–Feb68] in Incident Report, Viet Cong Attack, hereafter Harper Statement.

39. Additional source for this and the following paragraphs is O'Brien Statement.

40. Additional source for this paragraph is Statement of Sgt Richard

G. Frattarelli, n.d. [31Jan–Feb68], in Incident Report, Viet Cong Attack, hereafter Frattarelli Statement.

41. Statement of GySgt Allen Morrison n.d. [31Jan–Feb68], in Incident Report, Viet Cong Attack.

42. Another source for this paragraph is Statement of SSgt Leroy J. Banks, n.d. [31Jan–Feb68], in Incident Report, Viet Cong Attack, hereafter Banks Statement.

43. Another source for this paragraph is Frattarelli Statement.

44. Additional source for this paragraph is Banks Statement.

45. Marine Security Guard Bn (State Dept) ComdC, 1Feb69–30Jun69 in Marine Security Guard Bn (State Dept) ComdCs, 10Feb67–1969.

Individual Marines in Saigon and Elsewhere in Vietnam

46. MCCC, Status of Forces, dtd 20Mar68, p. 14–1. For Chaisson's relationship to Westmoreland, see Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 343. For Chaisson's comments on 3Feb68, see Peter Braestrup, *Big Story, How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington*, abridged ed. (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1983), p. 124.

47. MCCC, Status of Forces, dtd 29Mar69, p. 14–1.

48. MCCC, Status of Forces, dtd 10Jan68 and 29Mar69, p. 14–1.

Advisors to the Vietnamese Marine Corps

Additional sources for this section are: SMA, Vietnamese Marine Corps/Marine Advisory Unit Historical Summary 1954–1973, hereafter SMA, MACV Hist Summary, 1954–73; SMA, MACV Monthly Historical Reports, Jan–Dec68, hereafter SMA Monthly Rpts and month; SMA After-Action Reports, 1968; Col James T. Breckinridge, After Tour Report, dtd 18Apr69 in SMA, MACV After Tour Rpts, 1965–69, hereafter Breckinridge Rpt; LtGen Le Nguyen Khang intvw, 30Sep75 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Khang intvw.

49. SMA Monthly Rpt, Jan68; Marine Advisory Unit Table of Organization Chart 1968, tab A, SMA, MACV Hist Summary, 1954–73, hereafter, Table of Organization Chart.

50. Table of Organization Chart; Breckinridge Rpt; LtCol Jerry I. Simpson, Comments on draft, dtd 10Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Simpson Comments.

51. SMA, MACV Hist Summary, 1954–73.

52. SMA, MACV Hist Summary, 1954–73.

53. Ibid. and Breckinridge Rpt.

54. SMA, MACV Hist Summary, 1954–73; Shulimson and Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1965, p. 204; Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1966, pp. 84–91.

55. Khang intvw., p. 23.

56. SMA, MACV Monthly Rpt, Jan68.

57. LtCol Pham Van Son et al., *The Viet Cong Tet Offensive (1968)* (Saigon: Republic of Vietnam, Joint General Staff, 1969), pp. 71–75, hereafter Pham Van Son, *The Viet Cong Tet Offensive*; Col Hoang Ngoc Lung, *The General Offensives of 1968–69*, Indochina Monographs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981), pp. 53–63, hereafter Lung, *The General Offensives*.

58. LtCol John J. Hainsworth, Comments on draft, dtd 12Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Hainsworth Comments.

59. SMA SitRep for period 28Jan–3Feb68, dtd 10Feb68 in SMA,

MACV SitReps, 1965–68, hereafter SMA SitRep, 10Feb68; Capt Harry J. Shane, MAU, NAG, CAAR, Tran Huong Dao, dtd 7Jun68, in SMA, MACV, AARs, 1968–69, hereafter SMA, CAAR, Tran Huong Dao.

60. SMA SitRep, 10Feb68; Hainsworth Comments; Newspaper Clippings, Encl, Hainsworth Comments.

61. SMA SitRep, 10Feb68; Simpson Comments.

62. SMA SitRep, 10Feb68; SMA, CAAR, Tran Huong Dao.

63. SMA SitRep, 10Feb68; SMA, CAAR, Tran Huong Dao; SMA, Monthly Rpt, Feb68.

64. SMA, CAAR, Tran Huong Dao; Lung, *The General Offensives*, p. 71.

65. SMA, CAAR, Tran Huong Dao.

66. SMA Monthly Rpts, Feb and Mar68; Maj Talman C. Budd II, MAU, NAG, CAAR, Hue City dtd 25Jul68, AAR in SMA, MACV, AARs, 1968–69; Tet Offensive statistical chart in Breckinridge Rpt.

67. Major Operations, Jan–Dec68 Statistical Chart and Col James T. Breckinridge, debriefing, dtd 2May69, hereafter Breckinridge debriefing, in Breckinridge Rpt.

68. Abrams msg to Westmoreland, dtd 23Feb68 (Abrams Papers, CMH); Jeffrey J. Clarke, *Advice and Support: The Final Years*, The U.S. Army in Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1988), p. 312; Khang intvw, pp. 45–48; Breckinridge debriefing.

69. Breckinridge Rpt.

70. Breckinridge Rpt.

CHAPTER 31

1968: AN OVERVIEW

1. LtGen John R. Chaisson presentation to the Commandant's Advisory Committee on Marine Corps History, 27Jul92 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), p. 412.

Appendix A

Marine Command and Staff List

1 January–31 December 1968

III MAF Headquarters 1Jan–31Dec68			G–2	Col Russell E. Corey	1Jan–14Jan68
CG	LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr.	1Jan–31Dec68		LtCol Jack H. Butler	15Jan–21Jan68
DepCG	MajGen Raymond L. Murray	1Jan–14Feb68		Col Herbert E. Ing, Jr.	22Jan–23May68
	MajGen William J. Van Ryzin	15Feb–25May68		LtCol Jack H. Butler	24May–26Oct68
	MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins	26May–20Dec68		Col Anthony J. Skotnicki	27Oct–31Dec68
	MajGen Carl A. Youngdale	21Dec–31Dec68	G–3	Col James C. Short	1Jan–30Jan68
DepCG Air	MajGen Norman J. Anderson	1Jan–21Jun68		Col Paul G. Graham	31Jan–25Apr68
	MajGen Charles J. Quilter	22Jun–31Dec68		Col Herbert Preston, Jr.	26Apr–1May68
DepCG Army	MajGen Richard G. Stilwell	12Apr–30Jun68		Col Robert D. Bohn	2May–13Jul68
C/S	BGen Earl E. Anderson	1Jan–31Dec68		Col Herbert Preston, Jr.	14Jul–6Aug68
G–1	Col Poul F. Pedersen	1Jan–11Jul68		Col Harry F. Painter	7Aug–30Sep68
	Col Maurice Rose	12Jul–31Dec68		Col Adolph G. Schwenk	1Oct–31Dec68
G–2	Col Kenneth J. Houghton	1Jan–28Feb68	G–4	Col Earl K. Vickers, Jr.	1Jan–4Jul68
	Col Herbert L. Beckington	29Feb–28Jul68		Col James E. Wilson, Jr.	5Jul–31Dec68
	Col Ray N. Joens	29Jul–31Dec68	G–5	Col Herbert L. Beckington	1Jan–18Feb68
G–3	Col Thomas L. Randall	1Jan–29Feb68		Col Ross R. Miner	21Feb–4Sep68
	BGen Carl W. Hoffman	1Mar–20May68		Maj Ronald L. Payne	5Sep–23Sep68
	BGen Jacob E. Glick	21May–14Aug68		Maj William T. Macy	24Sep–30Sep68
	BGen Carl W. Hoffman	15Aug–31Dec68		Col Harry F. Painter	1Oct–31Dec68
G–4	Col Rex O. Dillow	1Jan–3Jul68		Task Force X-Ray	
	Col Lawrence C. Norton	4Jul68–31Dec68		BGen Foster C. Lahue	5Jan–6Apr68
G–5	LtCol James L. Black, Jr.	1Jan–5Apr68		BGen John N. McLaughlin	7Apr–21May68
	LtCol Elmer J. Zorn	6Apr–31Oct68		BGen George D. Webster	22May–9Aug68*
	LtCol Howard A. Westphall	1Nov–31Dec68		<i>*TF X-Ray was deactivated on 9Aug68.</i>	
Attached Units, III MAF Headquarters				Headquarters Battalion	
	SubUnit–1, 1st Radio Battalion		CO	Col Joseph F. Donahoe, Jr.	1Jan–6Jan68
CO	LtCol Alfred M. Gray, Jr.	1Jan68–31May68		Col William R. Earney	7Jan–15May68
	LtCol James R. Quisenberry	1Jun–16Oct68		Col Robert G. Lauffer	16May–9Aug68
	LtCol Patrick J. Fennell, Jr.	17Oct–31Dec68		LtCol Charles F. Bunnell, Jr.	10Aug–17Sep68
	1st Marine Division Headquarters 1Jan–31Dec68			LtCol William S. Fagan	18Sep–31Dec68
CG	MajGen Donn J. Robertson	1Jan–26Jun68	CO	Col Herbert E. Ing, Jr.	1Jan–20Jan68
	MajGen Carl A. Youngdale	27Jun–20Dec68		Col Stanley S. Hughes	21Jan–16Jun68
	MajGen Ormond R. Simpson	21Dec–31Dec68		Col Ross T. Dwyer, Jr.	17Jun–14Aug68
ADC	BGen Foster C. Lahue	1Jan–14Apr68		Col Robert G. Lauffer	15Aug–31Dec68
	BGen John N. McLaughlin	19Feb–25May68*	CO 1/1	LtCol Marcus J. Gravel	1Jan–8Jun68
	BGen George D. Webster	15Apr–30Jun68		LtCol Archie Van Winkle	9Jun–7Sep68
	BGen John E. Williams	23May–9Aug68		LtCol Albert W. Keller	8Sep–14Oct68
	BGen George D. Webster	10Aug–18Aug68		LtCol Alphonse A. Laporte, Jr.	15Oct–31Dec68
	BGen Ross T. Dwyer, Jr.	15Aug–31Dec68	CO 2/1	LtCol Evan L. Parker, Jr.	1Jan–8Jan68
	BGen Carl W. Hoffman	18Aug–31Dec68		LtCol Billy R. Duncan	9Jan–9Aug68
C/S	Col Henry J. Woessner, II	1Jan–2Feb68		LtCol John E. Poindexter	10Aug–31Dec68
	Col James C. Short	3Feb–2Aug68	CO 3/1	LtCol Max McQuown	1Jan–31May68
	Col Samuel A. Hannah	3Aug–31Dec68		LtCol Daniel J. Quick	1Jun–25Oct68
G–1	Col William R. Earney	1Jan68		Maj Robert B. Ranck	26Oct–22Nov68
	Col Ernest W. Payne	2Jan–1Aug68		LtCol Thomas E. Bulger	23Nov–31Dec68
	LtCol Thomas L. Cobb	2Aug–31Aug68			
	Col George E. Lawrence	1Sep–31Dec68			
<i>*Beginning on 19Feb68 there were two ADCs for the 1st Marine Division.</i>			CO	Col Robert D. Bohn	1Jan–30Apr68

	Col Paul G. Graham	1May–13Oct68			1st Reconnaissance Battalion	
	Col James B. Ord, Jr.	14Oct–31Dec68	CO	LtCol Broman C. Stinemetz	1Jan–25Jul68	
CO 1/5	LtCol Oliver W. van den Berg, Jr.	1Jan–7Jan68		LtCol Larry P. Charon	26Jul–31Dec68	
	LtCol Robert P. Whalen	8Jan–1Feb68				
	LtCol Robert H. Thompson	2Feb–7Aug68				
	LtCol Richard F. Daley	8Aug–31Dec68	CO		1st Tank Battalion	
CO 2/5	LtCol George C. McNaughton	1Jan–2Jan68		LtCol Vincent J. Gentile	1Jan–8Apr68	
	LtCol Ernest C. Cheatham, Jr.	3Jan–24Jul68		LtCol Harry W. Hite	9April–27Aug68	
	Maj Orlo K. Steele	25Jul–31Jul68		LtCol Maurice C. Ashley, Jr.	28Aug–31Dec68	
	LtCol James W. Stemple	1Aug–31Dec68				
CO 3/5	LtCol William K. Rockey	1Jan–27Mar68	CO		1st Motor Transport Battalion	
	LtCol Donald N. Rexroad	28Mar–18Jul68		Maj Charles F. Cresswell	1Jan–12Jan68	
	LtCol Rufus A. Seymour	19Jul–15Oct68		LtCol Casimir C. Ksycowski	13Jan–19Sep68	
	LtCol Harry E. Atkinson	16Oct–31Dec68		Maj Robert G. Reilly	20Sep–31Dec68	
	7th Marines		CO		1st Engineer Battalion	
CO	Col Ross R. Miner	1Jan–20Feb68		LtCol Logan Cassidy	1Jan–30Apr68	
	Col Reverdy M. Hall	21Feb–15Aug68		Maj Sven A. Johnson	1May–30Jul68	
	Col Herbert L. Beckington	16Aug–31Dec68		LtCol Donald H. Hildebrand	31Jul–31Dec68	
					1st Medical Battalion	
CO 1/7	LtCol William J. Davis	1Jan–16Mar68	CO	Cdr Clinton H. Lowery, MC, USN	1Jan–27Feb68	
	LtCol William S. Fagan	17Mar–12Sep68		Cdr James V. Sharp, MC, USN	28Feb–31Dec68	
	Maj Denton Carter	13Sep–22Sep68				
	LtCol William F. Bethel	23Sep–31Dec68			1st Shore Party Battalion	
CO 2/7	LtCol John R. Love	1Jan–24Feb68		LtCol Nicholas Kavakich	1Jan–15Oct68	
	LtCol Charles E. Mueller	25Feb–29Jul68		LtCol Donald L. Anderson	16Oct–31Dec68	
	LtCol Leroy E. Watson	30Jul–19Sep68				
	LtCol Charles F. Bunnell, Jr.	20Sep–23Sep68	CO		3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion	
	LtCol Neil A. Nelson	24Sep–31Dec68		LtCol Robert L. Shuford	1Jan–5Jan68	
CO 3/7	LtCol Roger H. Barnard	1Jan–1Aug68		LtCol Robert E. Haebe	6Jan–30Jul68	
	LtCol Francis X. Quinn	2Aug–31Dec68		Maj Frank C. Chace, Jr.	31Jul–16Oct68	
				Maj John H. Keegan, Jr.	17Oct–4Nov68	
				LtCol Joseph E. Hennegan	5Nov–31Dec68	
	11th Marines				11th Motor Transport Battalion	
CO	LtCol Clayton V. Hendricks	1Jan–8Jul68	CO	LtCol Joseph B. Brown, Jr.	1Jan–14Jul68	
	LtCol John F. Barr, Jr.	9Jul–31Jul68		Maj Billy M. Floyd	15Jul–6Sep68	
	Col Harry E. Dickinson	1Aug–31Dec68		LtCol John A. Kinniburgh	7Sep–31Dec68	
	1st Field Artillery Group				7th Communication Battalion	
CO	LtCol Spencer F. Thomas	1Jan–15Jan68	CO	LtCol Harry O. Cowing, Jr.	1Jan–30Jun68	
	LtCol John F. Barr, Jr.	16Jan–4Jul68		Maj Theodore F. Benner, Jr.	1Jul–1Oct68	
	LtCol Reuel W. Stephens, Jr.	5Jul–29Aug68		LtCol Charles L. Brady	2Oct–31Dec68	
	LtCol Richard P. Johnson	30Aug–26Nov68				
	LtCol Raymond B. Ingrand	27Nov–31Dec68			7th Engineer Battalion	
CO 1/11	LtCol Robert C. V. Hughes	1Jan–30Jun68	CO	LtCol Ray Funderburk	1Jan–9Aug68	
	Maj John A. Hamilton	1Jul–9Jul68		LtCol Themistocles T. Annas	10Aug–31Dec68	
	LtCol Spencer F. Thomas	10Jul–6Oct68				
	Maj John A. Hamilton	7Oct–31Dec68			9th Engineer Battalion	
CO 2/11	LtCol David A. Clark	1Jan–9Feb68	CO	LtCol Horacio E. Perea	1Jan–14Sep68	
	LtCol Ben A. Moore, Jr.	10Feb–6Sep68		LtCol Darrell U. Davidson	15Sep–31Dec68	
	LtCol Robert D. Jameson	7Sep–31Dec68				
CO 3/11	LtCol George T. Balzer	1Jan–14Feb68			3d Marine Division Headquarters	
	LtCol Harlan C. Chase	15Feb–21Aug68	CG	MajGen Raymond G. Davis	21May–31Dec68	
	Maj Andrew F. Bauer	22Aug–26Oct68	ADC	MajGen Louis Metzger	1Jan–31Jan68	
	LtCol Frederick M. Woeller	27Oct–19Nov68		BGen Jacob E. Glick	1Feb–31May68	
	Maj Andrew F. Bauer	20Nov–26Nov68		BGen Carl W. Hoffman	22Jan–21Aug68*	
	LtCol Richard P. Johnson	27Nov–31Dec68		BGen William C. Chip	22Aug–31Aug68	
CO 4/11	LtCol John S. Hollingshead	1Jan–3Jan68		BGen Frank E. Garretson	26Aug–31Dec68	
	Maj Frank B. Wolcott III	4Jan–14Aug68		BGen George D. Webster	26Sep–7Nov68	
	LtCol John M. Cockey	15Aug–13Dec68		BGen Robert B. Carney, Jr.	8Nov–31Dec68	
	Maj Bobby J. Ready	14Dec–31Dec68				

* With the assignment of BGen Hoffman, the 3d Division was authorized two ADCs.

C/S	Col Walter H. Cuenin	1Jan-13Jul68	CO 2/4	LtCol William Weise	1Jan-2May68
	Col Joseph E. Lo Prete	14Jul-31Aug68		Maj Charles W. Knapp	3May-5May68
	Col Joseph R. Morelewski	1Sep-31Dec68		LtCol Louis A. Rann	6May-30Sep68
G-1	LtCol James W. Marsh	1Jan-31Jan68		Maj John E. O'Neill	1Oct-14Oct68
	Col George E. Jerue	1Feb-11Jun68		LtCol William L. Kent	15Oct-11Nov68
	Col Louis R. Daze	12Jun-31Dec68		Maj Joseph E. Hopkins	12Nov-31Dec68
G-2	Col Edward J. Miller	1Jan-24Feb68	CO 3/4	LtCol Lee R. Bendell	1Jan-26Apr68
	LtCol Frederic S. Knight	25Feb-13May68		LtCol Frank L. Bourne, Jr.	27Apr-24Oct68
	LtCol Michael M. Spark	14May-8Nov68		Maj James L. Fowler	25Oct-23Nov68
	LtCol Thomas P. O'Callaghan	9Nov-31Dec68		LtCol William A. Donald	24Nov-31Dec68
G-3	Col James R. Stockman	1Jan-10Jan68			
	Col Alexander L. Michaux, Jr.	11Jan-15Jul68		9th Marines	
	LtCol Paul D. LaFond	16Jul-31Dec68	CO	Col Richard B. Smith	1Jan-13Jul68
G-4	Col Francis I. Fenton, Jr.	1Jan-31Jan68		Col Robert H. Barrow	14Jul-31Dec68
	Col Edward E. Camporini	1Feb-31Aug68	CO 1/9	LtCol John F. Mitchell	1Jan-31Mar68
	Col William F. Goggin	1Sep-31Dec68		LtCol John J. H. Cahill	1Apr-12May68
G-5	Col Milton A. Hull	1Jan-17Feb68		LtCol James W. Quinn	13May-26May68
	Col Joseph E. Lo Prete	18Feb-31May68		LtCol Michael V. Palatas	27May-14Jul68
	LtCol Robert B. Thompson	1Jun-5Oct68		LtCol Francis X. Colleton	15Jul-28Sep68
	LtCol William E. Kerrigan	6Oct-31Dec68		Maj Wilbur W. Dinegar	29Sep-30Sep68
				LtCol Francis X. Colleton	1Oct-3Oct68
	Headquarters Battalion			LtCol George W. Smith	4Oct-31Dec68
CO	Col George E. Jerue	1Jan-17Jan68	CO 2/9	LtCol William M. Cryan	1Jan-13May68
	Maj Will D. Isbell	18Jan-20Jan68		LtCol Frederic S. Knight	14May-15Sep68
	Col Alfred I. Thomas	21Jan-3May68		Maj Frederick E. Sisley	16Sep-9Dec68
	Maj Edwin F. Vozella	4May-12May68		Maj Patrick G. Collins	10Dec-28Dec68
	LtCol Edwin A. Deptula	13May-14Aug68		LtCol George C. Fox	29Dec-31Dec68
	Maj Gerald F. Kurth	15Aug-18Sep68	CO 3/9	LtCol Gorton C. Cook	1Jan-22Feb68
	Maj Raymond D. Walters	19Sep-27Sep68		LtCol Edward J. Lamontagne	23Feb-24Oct68
	LtCol Marshall A. Webb, Jr.	28Sep-31Dec68		LtCol Elliott R. Laine, Jr.	25Oct-31Dec68
	Task Force Robbie			12th Marines	
CO	Col Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr.	16Feb-2Jun68	CO	Col Edwin S. Schick, Jr.	1Jan-21May68
				LtCol Wilson A. Kluckman	22May-4Jul68
	3d Marines			Col Peter J. Mulroney	5Jul-31Dec68
CO	Col Joseph E. Lo Prete	1Jan-17Feb68	CO 1/12	LtCol Charles H. Opfar, Jr.	1Jan68-6Apr68
	Col Milton A. Hull	18Feb-14Jul68		Maj Raymond R. Powell	7Apr-19Jul68
	LtCol Vaughn R. Stuart	15Jul-31Jul68		Maj Donald J. Capinas	20Jul-10Aug68
	Col Richard L. Michael, Jr.	1Aug-8Nov68		LtCol Ernil L. Whisman	11Aug-31Dec68
	LtCol Michael M. Spark	9Nov-31Dec68	CO 2/12	LtCol Ronald P. Dunwell	1Jan-5Aug68
CO 1/3	LtCol Richard W. Goodale	1Jan-15Apr68		LtCol Joseph Scoppa, Jr.	6Aug-31Dec68
	LtCol Charles V. Jarman	16Apr-16Jun68	CO 3/12	LtCol Roger W. Greer	1Jan-29Feb68
	Maj Edward J. Rochford, Jr.	17Jun-30Jun68		LtCol Joseph A. Como	1Mar-31Jul68
	LtCol Charles V. Jarman	1Jul-9Aug68		LtCol Eugene D. Foxworth, Jr.	1Aug-31Dec68
	LtCol Richard B. Twohey	10Aug-31Dec68	CO 4/12	Maj Rudolph W. Bolves	1Jan-12Mar68
CO 2/3	LtCol Henry English	1Jan-25Jan68		LtCol Thomas A. McPheeters	14Mar-19Mar68
	LtCol Jack W. Davis	26Jan-19Sep68		Maj Billy F. Stewart	20Mar-15Oct68
	LtCol Byron T. Chen	20Sep-7Dec68		LtCol Earl W. Bailey	16Oct-31Dec68
	LtCol James J. McMonagle	8Dec-31Dec68			
CO 3/3	LtCol Robert C. Needham	1Jan-20Jan68		3d Reconnaissance Battalion	
	LtCol James W. Marsh	21Jan-28Jul68	CO	LtCol William D. Kent	1Jan-11Jul68
	LtCol William H. Bates	29Jul-13Dec68		LtCol Donald R. Berg	12Jul-12Dec68
	LtCol Richard C. Schulze	14Dec-31Dec68		LtCol Aydlette H. Perry, Jr.	13Dec-31Dec68
	4th Marines			3d Tank Battalion	
CO	Col William L. Dick	1Jan-24Feb68	CO	LtCol Duncan D. Chapman III	1Jan-21Jan68
	Col Edward J. Miller	25Feb-14Sep68		LtCol Karl J. Fontenot	22Jan-26Jul68
	Col Martin J. Sexton	15Sep-31Dec68		Maj Conrad J. Samuelsen	27Jul-16Aug68
CO 1/4	LtCol Edwin A. Deptula	1Jan-27Apr68		LtCol George E. Hayward	17Aug-31Dec68
	LtCol James H. MacLean	28Apr-25Jun68			
	LtCol Thomas H. Galbraith	26Jun-15Nov68		3d Anti-Tank Battalion	
	LtCol George T. Sargent, Jr.	16Nov-31Dec68	CO	Maj Robert M. Jordan	1Jan-31Jan68

3d Motor Transport Battalion		
CO	Maj William H. Stewart, Jr.	1Jan-14Jul68
	Maj William O. Day	15Jul-25Jul68
	Maj Billy W. Adams	26Jul-18Oct68
	Capt James E. Quill	19Oct-31Oct68
	Maj Guy W. Ward	1Nov-31Dec68

3d Engineer Battalion		
CO	LtCol Jack W. Perrin	1Jan-6Mar68
	Maj Richard S. Krolak	7Mar-1Sep68
	LtCol Walter L. Persac	2Sep-31Dec68

3d Shore Party Battalion		
CO	LtCol James W. Quinn	1Jan-10May68
	LtCol Richard A. Sulik	11May-5Oct68
	Maj Edwin J. Godfrey	6Oct-31Dec68

1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion		
CO	LtCol Edward R. Toner	1Jan-17Mar68
	LtCol George F. Meyers	18Mar-12Nov68
	Maj Walter W. Damewood, Jr.	13Nov-31Dec68

3d Medical Battalion		
CO	Cdr Robert A. Brown, MC, USN	1Jan-31Jul68
	Cdr Barton K. Slemmons, MC, USN	1Aug-30Nov68
	LCdr Billy C. Roberts, MC, USN	1Dec-31Dec68

9th Motor Transport Battalion		
CO	Maj John R. Stanley	1Jan-27Jul68
	Maj Raymond Kulak	28Jul-1Oct68
	LtCol John R. Fox	2Oct-13Nov68
	Maj Laurier J. Tremblay	14Nov-31Dec68

11th Engineer Battalion		
CO	LtCol Victor A. Perry	1Jan-3Aug68
	LtCol Robert C. Evans	4Aug-31Dec68

5th Marine Division Units in Vietnam
26th Marines*

CO	Col David E. Lownds	1Jan-17Apr68
	Col Bruce F. Meyers	18Apr-11Aug68
	LtCol Clyde W. Hunter	12Aug-31Dec68
CO 1/26	LtCol James B. Wilkinson	1Jan-29Feb68
	LtCol Frederick J. McEwan	1Mar-26Jul68
	Maj Walter T. Cook	27Jul-17Oct68
	Maj Charles H. Knowles	18Oct-31Dec68
CO 2/26	LtCol Francis J. Heath, Jr.	1Jan-18Jul68
	LtCol Thurman Owens	19Jul-12Aug68
	LtCol William F. Sparks	13Aug-31Dec68
CO 3/26	LtCol Harry L. Alderman	1Jan-14Mar68
	LtCol John C. Studt	15Mar-15Jul68
	Maj Richard R. Blair	16Jul-2Aug68
	LtCol John W. P. Robertson	3Aug-31Dec68

* The 26th Marines transferred from the operational control of the 3d Marine Division to the 1st Marine Division on 18May68.

27th Marines*		
CO	Col Adolph G. Schwenk, Jr.	17Feb-10Sep68
CO 1/27	LtCol John E. Greenwood	17Feb-14Jul68
	Maj Kenneth J. Skipper	15Jul-12Sep68
CO 2/27	LtCol Louis J. Bacher	17Feb-19Jun68
	LtCol Albert W. Keller	20Jun-10Sep68

CO 3/27	LtCol Tullis J. Woodham, Jr.	17Feb-31Aug68
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**The 27th Marines arrived in Vietnam on 17Feb and departed 10Sep68. The regiment remained under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division during this entire period.*

Battalions of the 13th Marines*

**The 1st Battalion largely supported the 26th Marines and was under the operational control of the 12th Marines when that regiment was with the 3d Marine Division and under the operational control of the 11th Marines when the 26th Marines was attached to the 1st Marine Division. The 2d Battalion arrived and departed with the 27th Marines and was under the operational control of the 11th Marines during its entire tour in Vietnam.*

CO 1/13	LtCol John A. Hennelly	1Jan-23May68
	LtCol Anthony Novak	24May-14Nov68
	Maj John B. Cantieny	15Nov-31Dec68
CO 2/13	LtCol Rhys J. Phillips, Jr.	17Feb-6Aug68
	Maj Walter F. Dunn	7Aug-12Sep68

Headquarters, 1st Force Service
Regiment/Force Logistic Command (1st FSR/FLC)

CG	BGen Harry C. Olson	1Jan-25Oct68
	BGen James A. Feeley, Jr.	26Oct-31Dec68
C/S	Col Roy I. Wood, Jr.	1Jan-31Jul68
	Col Darwin B. Pond, Jr.	1Aug-31Dec68
G-1	LtCol Minard P. Newton, Jr.	1Jan-30Jul68
	Maj Donald A. Nilsen	31Jul-31Oct68
	LtCol Dennis K. Gray	1Nov-31Dec68
G-2	Maj Clarence E. Watson, Jr.	1Jan-30Jun68
	Maj Billy J. Fowler	1Jul-31Dec68
G-3	Col George K. Reid	1Jan-12Apr68
	Col James R. Jones	13Apr-4Sep68
	Col Francis W. Vaught	5Sep-31Dec68
G-4	LtCol Robert W. Howland	1Jan-2Jul68
	LtCol Stanley G. Tribe, Jr.	3Jul-24Jul68
	LtCol Alvin W. Bowen	25Jul-31Dec68
G-5	Maj Thomas J. Smyth	1Jan-2Aug68
	Maj John D. Crawford	3Aug-31Dec68

Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st Force Service Regiment

CO	LtCol William F. Koehnlein	1Jan-13Jul68
	LtCol James G. McCormick	14Jul-18Sep68
	Maj Edward Lukas	19Sep-31Dec68

Supply Battalion, 1st Force Service Regiment

CO	Col Julian G. Bass, Jr.	1Jan-20Mar68
	LtCol Richard G. Eykyn	21Mar-14Sep68
	LtCol Edward G. Usher	15Sep-31Dec68

Maintenance Battalion, 1st Force Service Regiment

CO	LtCol Jack M. Hermes	1Jan-3Aug68
	LtCol Stanley G. Tribe, Jr.	4Aug-2Nov68
	LtCol Edward W. Critchett	3Nov-31Dec68

3d Service Battalion, Force Logistic Support Group Alpha

CO	Col Nolan J. Bear	1Jan-18May68
	Col Francis W. Vaught	19May-4Sep68
	Col Horton E. Roeder	5Sep-31Dec68

1st Service Battalion, Force Logistic Support Group Bravo

CO	Col James R. Jones	1Jan-31Mar68
	Col Julian G. Bass, Jr.	1Apr-17Aug68
	LtCol Raymond J. Weber	18Aug-16Sep68
	Col Harold L. Parsons	17Sep-31Dec68

1st MP Battalion

CO	LtCol Twyman R. Hill	1Jan68–28Feb68
	LtCol Bruce G. Brown	29Feb–11Oct68
	Maj John E. Decoursey	12Oct–20Oct68
	LtCol James D. Bailey	21Oct–31Dec68

3d MP Battalion

CO	LtCol Joseph J. N. Gambardella	1Jan–28Sep68
	Maj Donald E. Milone	29Sep–21Oct68
	LtCol Willard E. Cheatham	22Oct–31Dec68

5th Communication Battalion

CO	LtCol Donald L. Lindemuth	1Jan–9Jul68
	Maj Lee R. Johnson	10Jul–31Aug68
	LtCol Jack D. Hines	1Sep–31Dec68

7th Motor Transport Battalion

CO	LtCol Lance D. Thomas	1Jan–29Aug68
	Maj Lee R. Johnson	30Aug–31Dec68

1st Marine Aircraft Wing

CG	MajGen Norman Anderson	1Jan–21Jun68
	MajGen Charles J. Quilter	22Jun–31Dec68
AWC	BGen Robert P. Keller	1Jan–22Apr68
	BGen Homer S. Hill	23Apr68–31Dec68
	BGen Henry W. Hise	11Feb68–31Dec68*
C/S	Col Frank C. Thomas	1Jan–7Sep68
	Col Virgil D. Olson	8Sep–31Dec68
G-1	Col Robert Baird	1Jan–12Sep68
	Col Edward A. Parnell	13Sep–31Dec68
G-2	Col Robert D. Limberg	1Jan–25Feb68
	LtCol Edward H. P. Lynk	26Feb–3Jul68
	Col John R. Gill	4Jul–26Sep68
	LtCol Hugh R. Bumpas, Jr.	27Sep–31Dec68
G-3	Col Joel E. Bonner, Jr.	1Jan–9Jun68
	Col Edwin H. Finlayson	10Jun–31Dec68
G-4	Col Charles B. Armstrong, Jr.	1Jan–9Mar68
	Col Eugene V. Goldston	10Mar–25Mar68
	Col Edward N. LeFaivre	26Mar–13Aug68
	Col Steve Furimsky, Jr.	14Aug–31Dec68

*With the assignment of BGen Hise, the 1st MAW was authorized two assistant wing commanders.

Marine Wing Headquarters Group 1 (MWHG-1)

CO	Col Tolbert T. Gentry	1Jan–8Oct68
	Col Thomas H. Nichols, Jr.	9Oct–31Dec68

Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 1 (H&HS-1)

CO	LtCol Albert W. Keller	1Jan–13Jun68
	Maj Lawrence Furstenberg	14Jun–7Oct68
	LtCol Prentice A. Lindsay	8Oct–31Dec68

Marine Wing Communication Squadron 1 (MWCS-1)

CO	Maj David H. Tinius	1Jan–10Apr68
	Maj Robin W. Cobble	11Apr–6Oct68
	Maj Don J. Ogden	7Oct–31Dec68

Marine Wing Facilities Squadron 1 (MWFS-1)

CO	LtCol Edward A. Laning	1Jan–23Apr68
	Maj Harry E. Taylor	24Apr–12Jun68
	Maj Richard C. Hoffman	13Jul–31Jul68
	Maj Winston O. Goller	1Aug–5Dec68
	Maj Esta D. Grissom	6–31Dec68

Marine Wing Support Group 17 (MWSG-17)

CO	Col John E. Hansen	1Jan–23Feb68
	Col Robert D. Limberg	24Feb–15Jul68
	Col William Farrell	16Jul–5Sep68
	Col Richard S. Rash	9Sep–31Dec68

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 17 (H&MS-17)

CO	LtCol Eugene V. Goldston	1Jan–18Jan68
	Maj Frank E. Graham	19Jan–14Feb68
	LtCol Grover C. Doster, Jr.	15Feb–2Aug68
	LtCol Edward S. John	3Aug–31Dec68

Wing Equipment and Repair Squadron 17 (WERS-17)

CO	LtCol John R. Hansford	1Jan–31Mar68
	Maj William T. Lunsford	1Apr–5Aug68
	Maj Duane R. Van Note	6Aug–8Sep68
	Maj Stanley M. Williams	9Sep–31Dec68

Marine Air Control Group 18 (MACG-18)

CO	Col Lyle V. Tope	1Jan–22May68
	LtCol James W. Dillon	23May–2Aug68
	Col Edward S. Fris	3Aug–31Dec68

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 18 (H&MS-18)

CO	LtCol Paul B. Montague	1Jan–13Jan68
	Maj Laurence A. Taylor	14Jan–17Jan68
	LtCol Thomas W. Riggs	18Jan–6Oct68
	LtCol John R. Dopler	7Oct–31Dec68

Marine Air Support Squadron 2 (MASS-2)

CO	LtCol John M. Johnson, Jr.	1Jan–3Jun68
	LtCol Gale Harlan	4Jun–29Jul68
	Maj Edward J. Dahy III	30Jul–31Dec68

Marine Air Support Squadron 3 (MASS-3)

CO	LtCol Hugh R. Bumpas, Jr.	1Jan–27Feb68
	LtCol Johnny O. Gregerson	28Feb–11Sep68
	Maj William J. Sullivan	12Sep–31Dec68

Marine Air Control Squadron 4 (MACS-4)

CO	LtCol William A. Cohn	1Jan–25Apr68
	LtCol David S. Twining	26Apr–14Sep68
	LtCol Thomas M. Kauffman	15Sep–31Dec68

1st Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion (1st LAAM Bn)

CO	LtCol Marshall J. Treado	1Jan–13Aug68
	Maj Norman P. Fitzgerald, Jr.	14Aug–11Oct68
	LtCol John W. Drury	12Oct–31Dec68

2d Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion (2d LAAM Bn)*

CO	LtCol Stanley A. Herman	1Jan68–7Feb68
	LtCol Donald E. Gunther	8Feb–12Oct68

*The 2d LAAM Bn departed Vietnam for CONUS, 12Oct68.

Marine Aircraft Group 11 (MAG-11)

CO	Col Leroy T. Frey	1Jan68–7Jun68
	Col Robert D. Slay	8Jun–31Dec68

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 11 (H&MS-11)

CO	LtCol Anthony L. Blair	1Jan–8May68
	LtCol Carl R. Lundquist	9May–14Oct68
	LtCol Robert M. Stowers	15Oct–31Dec68

Marine Air Base Squadron 11 (MABS-11)

CO	LtCol John W. Irion, Jr.	1Jan-16Jun68
	LtCol James W. Haskell	17Jun-30Nov68
	LtCol Preston P. Marques, Jr.	1Dec-31Dec68

Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron 1 (VMCJ-1)

CO	LtCol Robert W. Lewis	1Jan-15Mar68
	LtCol Eric B. Parker	16Mar-16Nov68
	LtCol Bobby R. Hall	17Nov-31Dec68

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 122 (VMFA-122)

CO	LtCol John M. Verdi	1Jan-28Jan68
	LtCol Paul B. Montague	29Jan-30Jun68
	LtCol Eugene R. Howard, Jr.	1Jul-25Aug68
	Maj Donald L. Waldvogel	26-30Aug68*

**The squadron was transferred to MAG-15 in Japan on 30Aug68.*

Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 242 (VMA [AW]-242)

CO	Maj Arthur W. D. Lavigne	1-22Jan68
	LtCol James R. Penny	23Jan-22Jul68
	LtCol Fred C. Rilling, Jr.	23Jul-31Dec68

Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 235 (VMA [AW]-235)

CO	LtCol Carl R. Lundquist	1Jan-8May68
	LtCol Anthony L. Blair	9May-10May68*

**The squadron was transferred to MAG-15 in Japan on 10May68.*

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 334 (VMFA-334)

CO	LtCol Hiel L. VanCampen	30Aug-30Sep68*
	LtCol James R. Sherman	1Oct-31Dec68

**The squadron arrived from CONUS on 30Aug68.*

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 542 (VMFA-542)

CO	LtCol Robert N. Hutchinson	10May-29Jul68*
	LtCol Henry R. Vitali	30Jul-31Dec68

**The squadron was transferred from MAG-15, in Japan on 10May68.*

Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12)

CO	Col Dean Wilker	1Jan-7Mar68
	Col Charles B. Armstrong, Jr.	8Mar-31Jul68
	Col Rex A. Deasy	1Aug-31Dec68

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 12 (H&MS-12)

CO	LtCol Dan C. Alexander	1Jan-28Oct68
	LtCol Clifford D. Warfield	29Oct-31Dec68

Marine Air Base Squadron 12 (MABS-12)

CO	LtCol Leo J. Leblanc, Jr.	1Jan-25Feb68
	LtCol John H. Miller	26Feb-8Oct68
	Maj Lawrence Furstenberg	9Oct-31Dec68

Marine Attack Squadron 121 (VMA-121)

CO	LtCol Richard J. Kern	1Jan-10Mar68
	LtCol William D. Shippen	11Mar-14Oct68
	Maj David A. Lerps	15Oct-31Dec68

Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMA-211)

CO	LtCol Francis H. Thurston	1Jan-28Feb68
	LtCol Leo J. Leblanc, Jr.	29Feb-26Aug68
	LtCol Frederic P. Salzman, Jr.	27Aug-30Nov68
	LtCol John R. Waterstreet	1Dec-31Dec68

Marine Attack Squadron (VMFA-223)

CO	LtCol Arthur W. Anthony, Jr.	23Apr-30Apr68*
	LtCol Erin D. Smith	1May-15Oct68
	Maj Leonard T. Preston, Jr.	16Oct-31Dec68

**The squadron was transferred from MAG-15 in Japan on 23Apr68.*

Marine Attack Squadron 311 (VMA-311)

CO	LtCol Richard B. Taber	1Jan-10Mar68
	LtCol Norman B. McCrary	11Mar-24Sep68
	LtCol Charles O. Hierr	25Sep-31Dec68

Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 533 (VMA [AW]-533)

CO	LtCol William E. H. Fitch III	1Jan-1Apr68
	LtCol Ronald L. Iverson	2Apr-31Jul68
	LtCol Edward A. Laning	1Aug-31Aug68
	LtCol Paul K. German, Jr.	1Sep-31Dec68

Marine Aircraft Group 13 (MAG-13)

CO	Col Edward N. Lefavre	1Jan-24Mar68
	Col James H. Berge, Jr.	25Mar-3Sep68
	Col Norman W. Gourley	4Sep-31Dec68

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 13 (H&MS-13)

CO	LtCol Paul L. Siegmund	1Jan-12Aug68
	Maj Edgar A. House	13Aug-31Dec68

Marine Air Base Squadron 13 (MABS-13)

CO	LtCol Leroy A. Madera	1Jan-21Apr68
	LtCol George L. Bruser	22Apr-12Jul68
	Maj Charles V. Smillie, Jr.	13Jul-31Dec68

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115 (VMFA-115)

CO	LtCol Richard E. Carey	1Jan-16Jan68
	LtCol Gerald W. Vaughan	17Jan-12Aug68
	Maj John I. Hudson	13Aug-27Nov68
	LtCol Robert R. Norton	28Nov-31Dec68

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314 (VMFA-314)

CO	LtCol Frank D. Topley	1Jan-13Jan68
	LtCol Herbert V. Lundin	14Jan-28Jul68
	LtCol Frank E. Petersen, Jr.	29Jul-31Dec68

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323 (VMFA-323)

CO	LtCol Harry T. Hagaman	1Jan-15May68
	LtCol Don J. Slee	16May-11Dec68
	LtCol Ira L. Morgan, Jr.	12Dec-31Dec68

Marine Aircraft Group 16 (MAG-16)

CO	Col Edwin O. Reed	1Jan-12Sep68
	Col Warren L. MacQuarrie	13Sep-31Dec68

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 16 (H&MS-16)

CO	LtCol Lawrence J. Flanagan	1Jan-6Jan68
	LtCol Horace A. Bruce	7Jan-30Apr68
	LtCol Morris G. Robbin	1May-11Jul68
	Maj William L. Whelan	12Jul-7Oct68
	LtCol Charles W. Gobat	8Oct-31Dec68

Marine Air Base Squadron 16 (MABS-16)

CO	LtCol Samuel J. Fulton	1Jan-30Apr68
	LtCol William E. Smilanich, Jr.	1May-29Jun68
	LtCol Robert F. Rick	30Jun-10Sep68
	LtCol Lowell W. Parish	11Sep-10Nov68
	LtCol William Cunningham	11Nov-31Dec68

Marine Observation Squadron 2 (VMO-2)

CO	LtCol Morris G. Robbins	1Jan-30Apr68
	LtCol Samuel J. Fulton	1May-4Nov68
	LtCol Thomas J. Dumont	5Nov-31Dec68

Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 167 (HML-167)

CO	Maj Robert C. Finn	15Mar-10May68*
	Maj George H. Dunn II	11May-17Aug68
	LtCol Thomas F. Miller	18Aug-31Dec68

**The squadron was activated on 15Mar68 at Marble Mountain Air Facility, Da Nang, Vietnam.*

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (HMM-163)

CO	LtCol Richard G. Courtney	19May-31Aug68*
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**The squadron was transferred from ProvMag-39 on 19May68 and was detached on 31Aug68 for return to CONUS.*

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 (HMM-164)

CO	LtCol Robert F. Rick	16-29Jun68*
	LtCol William E. Smilanich, Jr.	30Jun-17Nov68
	LtCol Richard T. Trundy	18Nov-29Nov68

**The squadron was detached from SLF Bravo on 16Jun68 and was reassigned on 29Nov68 to SLF Bravo*

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 (HMM-165)

CO	LtCol George L. Patrick, Jr.	4Oct-31Dec68*
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**The squadron was transferred from SLF Bravo on 4Oct68, then reverted to SLF Bravo control on 29Oct68, and then on 6Oct68 returned to MAG-16 control.*

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265 (HMM-265)

CO	LtCol William R. Beeler	1-12Jan68*
	Maj William L. Whelan	13Jan-4Jun68
	LtCol Roy J. Edwards	5Jun-15Jun68
	Maj Richard L. Yanke	16Jun-7Jul68
	LtCol Roy J. Edwards	19Aug-18Sep68
	LtCol Richard L. Yanke	19Sep-30Sep68

**On 15Jun68, the squadron command group of HMM-265 and a detachment was transferred to SLF Bravo, leaving Major Yanke in command of the squadron. On 7Jul68, the rest of the squadron was transferred to SLF Bravo. The squadron was detached from the SLF on 19Aug68 and returned to the control of MAG-16. On 30Sep68, the squadron was transferred to MAG-36.*

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 361 (HMM-361)

CO	LtCol Daniel M. Wilson	10Feb-25Mar68*
	Maj Forrest W. Crone	26Mar-18May68

**The squadron was attached from SLF Alpha on 10Feb68 and departed for CONUS on 18May68*

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM-362)

CO	Maj Walter H. Shauer, Jr.	5Sep-18Sep68*
	LtCol Jack E. Schlarp	19Sep-8Dec68

**The squadron was attached from SLF Alpha on 5Sep68 and reverted to SLF Alpha control on 8Dec68.*

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363 (HMM-363)

CO	LtCol Frankie E. Allgood	1Jan-9Feb68*
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**The squadron was transferred to SLF Alpha on 9Feb68*

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 364 (HMM-364)

CO	LtCol Merlin V. Statzer	10Dec-31Dec68*
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**The squadron was transferred from MAG-36 on 10Dec68.*

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 (HMH-463)

CO	LtCol Joseph L. Sadowski	1Jan-1Apr68
	LtCol Joe G. Walker, Jr.	2Apr-7Oct68
	LtCol Roger W. Peard, Jr.	8Oct-31Dec68

Marine Aircraft Group 36 (MAG-36)

CO	Col Frank E. Wilson	1Jan-30Apr68
	Col Bruce J. Matheson	1May-31Dec68

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 36 (H&MS-36)

CO	LtCol Richard G. Courtney	1Jan-30Apr68
	LtCol George L. Patrick, Jr.	1May-22Aug68
	LtCol Ralph Thuesen	23Aug-31Dec68

Marine Air Base Squadron 36 (MAB-36)

CO	Maj James C. Robinson	1Jan-5Mar68
	LtCol William D. Watson	6Mar-11Sep68
	LtCol Dennis W. Wright	12Sep-31Dec68

Marine Air Group 36, Detachment Alpha (MAG-36, Det Alpha)

OIC	Col Owen V. Gallentine	1Jan-27Feb68*
	Col John E. Hansen	28Feb-15Apr68

**Detachment Alpha was a command and control element of MAG-36 based at Quang Tri Air Base until replaced on 15Apr68 by Provisional Marine Aircraft Group 39 (ProvMAG-39).*

Marine Observation Squadron 3 (VMO-3)

CO	LtCol Glenn R. Hunter	1Jan-29Feb68*
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**VMO-3 was deactivated in March and reactivated as HML-367.*

Marine Observation Squadron 6 (VMO-6)

CO	LtCol William J. White	1Jan-24Mar68*
	LtCol Bertram A. Maas	25Mar-15Apr68

**The squadron was transferred to ProvMAG-39 on 16Apr68.*

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (HMM-163)

CO	LtCol Louis W. Schwindt	1Jan-15Apr68*
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**The squadron was transferred to ProvMAG-39 on 15Apr68.*

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 (HMM-164)

CO	LtCol Robert F. Rick	1Jan-3Mar68*
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**On 3Mar68, the squadron was transferred to SLF Bravo.*

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 (HMM-165)

CO	LtCol Richard E. Romine	1Jan-31Mar68*
	LtCol Elvyn E. Hagedorn	1Apr-22Aug68
	LtCol George L. Patrick, Jr.	23Aug-31Aug68

**From 9Jan-18Feb68, the squadron was detached to SLF Bravo. It then returned to MAG-36 and then once more reverted to SLF Bravo on 15Sep68.*

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262 (HMM-262)

CO	LtCol Melvin J. Steinberg	10Jan-15Apr68*
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**The squadron joined MAG-36 on 10Jan68 from SLF Bravo and then later transferred to ProvMAG-39 on 16Apr68.*

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265 (HMM-265)

CO	LtCol Richard L. Yanke	1Oct-31Dec68*
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**On 10Oct68, MAG-36 assumed command of the squadron from MAG-16.*

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM-362)

CO	Maj Walter H. Shauer, Jr.	1Jan-14Apr68*
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**On 15Apr68, the squadron joined SLF Alpha.*

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363 (HMM-363)

CO	Maj Duwayne W. Hoffert	15Apr68-22Aug68*
	Maj James L. Harrison	23Aug68-30Nov68
	Maj Timothy J. Cronin, Jr.	1Dec-31Dec68

**The squadron was transferred to MAG-36 on 15Apr68 from SLF Alpha. For the period 29Oct-7Dec68, the squadron was under the administrative control while under the operational control of MAG-36. On 8Dec68, it reverted once more to MAG-36 administrative control as well as operational control.*

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 364 (HMM-364)

CO	LtCol Louis A. Gulling	1Jan-16Apr68*
	LtCol Joseph R. Dobbratz, Jr.	17Apr-11Sep68
	LtCol Merlin V. Statzer	12Sep-9Dec68

*The squadron was transferred to MAG-16 on 10Dec68.

Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 367 (HML-367)

CO	LtCol Glenn R. Hunter	Mar-7Apr68*
	LtCol Robert King, Jr.	8Apr-22Aug68
	LtCol Richard L. Robinson	23Aug-31Dec68

*The Squadron was formed from the personnel and equipment of VMO-3 in March 1968.

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462 (HMH-462)

CO	LtCol Ronald E. Nelson	21Aug-31Dec68*
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*The squadron arrived from ConUS on 21Aug68.

Provisional Marine Aircraft Group 39 (ProvMAG-39)

CO	Col John E. Hansen	16Apr-30Jun68*
	LtCol Paul W. Niesen	1Jul-4Jul68
	Col Walter Sienko	5Jul-31Dec68

*ProvMAG-39 was formed at Quang Tri on 16Apr68 and replaced MAG-36, Detachment Alpha. LtCol Niesen remained commander of HMM 161 as well as ProvMAG-39 commander during the period 1-4 Jul68.

Provisional Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 39 (ProvH&MS-39)

CO	Maj Charles G. Gerard	16Apr-9Aug68
	Maj Herman R. Bolen	10Aug-29Nov68
	LtCol Bobby R. Wilkinson	30Nov-31Dec68

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 161 (HMM-161)

CO	LtCol Paul W. Niesen	17May-8Nov68*
	LtCol David L. Elam	9Nov-31Dec68

*The squadron joined ProvMAG-39 from CONUS on 17May68.

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (HMM-163)

CO	LtCol Richard G. Courtney	16Apr-18May68*
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*The squadron was transferred from MAG-36 to ProvMAG-39 on 16Apr68 and then transferred to MAG-16 on 19May68.

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262 (HMM-262)

CO	LtCol Melvin J. Steinberg	16Apr-20Sep68*
	LtCol Albert N. Allen	21Sep-31Dec68

*The squadron was transferred to ProvMAG-39 from MAG-36 on 16Apr68. It returned to MAG-36 on 21Sep68.

Marine Observation Squadron 6 (VMO-6)

CO	Maj Bertram A. Maas	16Apr-20Sep68*
	Maj Hans A. Zander	21Sep-31Dec68

*The squadron was transferred to ProvMAG-39 from MAG-36 on 16Apr68.

9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (9th MAB)/Task Force 79***9th MAB Headquarters**

CG	BGen Jacob E. Glick	1Jan-21Jan68
	BGen William C. Chip	22Jan-11Aug68
	BGen John E. Williams	12Aug-31Dec68
CS	Col James A. Etheridge	1Jan-30Sep68
	Col John Lowman, Jr.	1Oct-31Dec68
G-1	Col George H. Benskin, Jr.	1Jan-10Apr68
	LtCol Parks H. Simpson	11Apr-16Oct68
	Maj William H. Groesbeck	17Oct-31Dec68
G-2	Maj Hugh S. Jolley	1Jan-3Jan68

Maj James V. Knapp	1Feb-5Mar68
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Maj Hugh S. Jolley	6Mar-26Aug68
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Maj Aubrey L. Lumpkin	27Aug-31Dec68
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LtCol Anthony Novak	1Jan-30Apr68
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Col John A. Conway	1May-5Jun68
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Col Robert R. Wilson	6Jun-11Jul68
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LtCol Ronald A. Mason	12Jul-27Jul68
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LtCol George C. Kliefoth	28Jul-31Dec68
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Col Warren A. Butcher	1Jan-26Feb68
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LtCol Paul R. Fields	27Feb-29Feb68
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Col Maynard W. Schmidt	1Mar-11Oct68
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LtCol Stewart B. McCarty, Jr.	12Oct-31Dec68
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*The 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade was established on 1Mar66 and assumed responsibility for Task Force 79 (TF 79) duties on that date. On 15 April 1966, 9th MAB assumed responsibility for all tactical Marine aviation and ground units in the Western Pacific which were not in Vietnam.

Regimental Landing Team 26 (RLT-26)/Task Group 79.2*

CO	Col David E. Lownds	1Jan-11Apr68
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Col Bruce F. Meyers	12Apr-11Aug68
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Col Clyde W. Hunter	12Aug-31Dec68
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*RLT-26 remained administratively under 9th MAB, but, only RLT-26 (Rear) remained on Okinawa. The regimental command group and its three integral infantry battalions were in Vietnam.

Regimental Landing Team 26 (Rear) (RLT-26 [Rear])

CO	LtCol Richard D. Alexander	1Jan-16Feb68
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Maj John B. Bany, Jr.	17Feb-31Mar68
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LtCol Jack Erwin	1Apr-19Oct68
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Maj James E. Anderson	20Oct-27Oct68
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LtCol Rufino Delacruz	28Oct-31Dec68
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1st Battalion, 13th Marines

CO	LtCol John A. Hennelly	1Jan-23May68
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LtCol Anthony Novak	24May-15Nov68
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LtCol John B. Cantieny	16Nov-31Dec68
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Provisional Service Battalion/Task Group 79.8

CO	Col Thomas W. Burke	1Jan-17Jul68
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Col Robert R. Wilson	18Jul-21Aug68
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LtCol James F. Conlon	22Aug-8Sep68
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Col William C. Doty, Jr.	9Sep-31Dec68
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Marine Aircraft Group 15 (MAG-15)

CO	Col Wilbur C. Kellogg, Jr.	1Jan-12Oct68
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Col Clement T. Corcoran	13Oct-31Dec68
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Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 15 (H&MS-15)

CO	LtCol Herman L. Mixson	1Jan-18Jul68
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LtCol David P. Graf	9Jul-7Dec68
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LtCol Kenneth M. Scott	8Dec-31Dec68
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Marine Air Base Squadron 15 (MABS-15)

CO	LtCol Clement C. J. Chamberlain	1Jan-5Apr68
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Maj Raymond D. Fortmeyer	6Apr-21Aug68
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LtCol Dock H. Pegues	22Aug-31Dec68
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Marine Air Control Squadron 6 (MACS-6)

LtCol Rollin E. Hippler	1Jan-27Feb68*
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*MACS-6 returned to CONUS on 27Feb68 after being relieved by MACS-8.

Marine Air Control Squadron 8 (MACS-8)

LtCol Dirk C. Bierhaalter 27Feb-31Dec68*

MACS-8 joined MAG-15 from the 2dMAW at MCAS Cherry Point, North Carolina on 27Feb68.*Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 122 (VMFA-122)**

CO Maj Donald L. Waldvoege 131Aug-15Sep68*

Maj Don K. Hanna 16Sep-20Oct68

LtCol Lawrence J. Willis 30Oct-31Dec68

The squadron was transferred from MAG-11 in Vietnam to MAG-15 on 31Aug68.*Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 223 (VMFA-223)**

CO LtCol Arthur W. Anthony, Jr. 1Jan-23Apr68*

The squadron was transferred to MAG-12 on 23Apr68*Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 542 (VMFA-542)**

CO LtCol Richard C. Marsh 1Jan-26Jan68

LtCol Robert N. Hutchinson 27Jan-10May68*

The squadron was transferred to MAG-11 on 10May68.*Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 235 (VMA (AW)-235)**

CO LtCol Anthony L. Blair 11May-Sep68*

The squadron was transferred from MAG-11 on 11May68 and then transferred to the 1st Marine Brigade, MCAS Kaneohe, Hawaii on 6 Sep68.*Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152 (VMGR-152)**

CO LtCol Royce M. Williams 1Jan-31Mar68

LtCol Frank G. McLenon 1Apr-31Dec68

Special Landing Force Alpha (SLF Alpha)/**Task Group 79.4 (TG 79.4)**

CO Col John A. Conway 1Jan-14Jan68

Col Bruce F. Meyers 15Jan-10Apr68

LtCol Paul R. Fields 11Apr-2May68

Col Alfred I. Thomas 3May-1Aug68

LtCol Paul R. Fields 2Aug-6Aug68

Col Alfred I. Thomas 7Aug-24Aug68

Col John F. McMahon, Jr. 25Aug-31 Dec68

SLF Alpha Battalion Landing Teams (BLTs)***Battalion Landing Team 1/3 (BLT 1/3)**

CO LtCol Richard W. Goodale 1Jan-2Jan68

Battalion Landing Team 2/4 (BLT 2/4)

CO LtCol William Weise 3Jan-2May68

Maj Charles W. Knapp 3May-4May68

LtCol Louis A. Rann 5May-13Aug68

Battalion Landing Team 2/26 (2/26)

CO LtCol Thurman Owens 13Aug-17Aug68

LtCol William F. Sparks 18Aug-31Dec68

The assigned BLTs were drawn from III MAF on a rotating basis and returned to III MAF after their respective SLF deployment tours.*Special Landing Force Alpha Helicopter Squadrons****Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 361 (HMM-361)**

CO LtCol Daniel M. Wilson 1Jan-10Feb68*

The squadron was transferred to MAG-16 on 10Feb68.*Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363 (HMM-363)**

CO LtCol Frankie E. Allgood 10Feb-25Mar68*

Maj Duwayne W. Hoffert 26Mar-14Apr68

Maj James L. Harrison 6Sep-28Nov68

Maj Timothy J. Cronin, Jr. 29Nov-7Dec68

** The squadron was transferred to SLF Alpha from MAG-16 on 10Feb68 and detached to MAG-36 on 14Apr68. It was reassigned to SLF Alpha on 6Sep68 and then again returned to MAG-36 on 8Dec68.***Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM-362)**

CO Maj Walter H. Shauer, Jr. 14Apr-6Sep68*

LtCol Jack E. Schlarp 7Dec-31Dec68

The squadron was transferred to SLF Alpha from MAG-36 on 14Apr68 and on 6Sep68 it was then transferred to MAG-16. On 7Dec68, it reverted once more to SLF Alpha.*Special Landing Force Bravo (SLF Bravo)/****Task Group 79.5 (TG 79.5)**

CO Col Maynard W. Schmidt 1Jan-28Feb68

Col Warren A. Butcher 29Feb-5Sep68

Col Robert R. Wilson 6Sep-31Dec68

Special Landing Force Bravo Battalion Landing Teams***Battalion Landing Team 3/1 (BLT 3/1)**

CO LtCol Max McQuown 1Jan-4Jun68

LtCol Daniel J. Quick 5Jun-15Jun68

Battalion Landing Team 2/7 (BLT 2/7)

CO LtCol Charles E. Mueller 15Jun-30Jul68

LtCol Leroy E. Watson 31Jul-20Sep68

LtCol Neil A. Nelson 21Sep-31Dec68

The SLF Bravo BLTs like the BLTs in SLF Alpha rotated in and out to the SLF from III MAF.*Special Landing Force Bravo Helicopter Squadrons****Detachment Alpha,****Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262 (HMM-262)**

CO Maj David A. Althoff 1Jan-2Jan68*

Detachment Alpha, equipped with CH-46s, remained with the SLF while the remainder of the squadron was involved in a massive helicopter repair program. The remainder of the squadron rejoined Detachment Alpha on 3Jan68.*Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 (HMM-165)**

LtCol Richard E. Romine 10Jan-3Mar68*

LtCol George L. Patrick, Jr. 1Sep-28Dec68

** The squadron transferred to the SLF from MAG-36 on 10Jan68. It was relieved on 3Mar68 by HMM-164. It returned to the SLF on 1Sep68 and then relieved again by HMM-164 on 28Dec68.***Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 (HMM-164)**

CO LtCol Robert F. Rick 3Mar-16Jun68*

LtCol Richard T. Trundy 28Dec-31Dec68

The squadron relieved HMM-165 on 3Mar68 and was in turn relieved by HMM-265 on 16Jun68. On 28Dec68, it once more returned to the SLF.*Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265 (HMM-265)**

CO LtCol Robert J. Edwards 16Jun-1Sep68

**The squadron was assigned to SLF Bravo from MAG-16 on 16Jun68 and was in turn relieved on 1Sep68 by HMM-165.*

Appendix B

Chronology of Significant Events

January–December 1968

- 1 January Allied and Communist forces in Vietnam begin the new year with a cease-fire. The allies report 63 violations of the truce.
- 1 January The Marine Corps troop level in Vietnam reaches 81,249. The III Marine Amphibious Force, which is responsible for I CTZ, begins the year with a total strength of 114,158 troops, composed of 76,616 Marines divided among the 1st Marine Division, the 3d Marine Division, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and Force Logistic Command; 3,538 Navy personnel; and 36,816 Army personnel, including the Americal Division and one brigade of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, and 88 Air Force personnel.
- 3 January The 5th Marines concludes Operation Auburn south of Da Nang (28Dec67–3Jan68). The operation results in 37 reported enemy casualties with 24 Marines killed and 62 wounded.
- 11 January As part of Operation Checkers, in an effort to rotate units of the 1st Marine Division north to relieve the 3d Marine Division, Task Force X-Ray headquarters is activated at Phu Bai. Task Force X-Ray subsequently relieved the 3d Marine Division headquarters at Phu Bai, which moved to Dong Ha in Quang Tri Province.
- 16 January The 2d Battalion, 26th Marines reinforces the Marine base at Khe Sanh.
- 16 January A North Vietnamese representative states that North Vietnam will not begin peace talks until the United States halts bombing of the North.
- 20 January Operation Lancaster I (1Nov67–20Jan68), a 3d Marines operation to safeguard Route 9 between Cam Lo and Ca Lu, ends with a reported 46 enemy casualties and 27 Marines killed and 141 wounded.
- 20 January The 1st Marines concludes Operation Osceola I (20Oct67–20Jan68) in the Quang Tri City region. The operation resulted in a reported 76 enemy casualties with 17 Marines killed and 199 wounded.
- 20 January The 4th Marines concludes Operation Neosho I (1Nov67–20Jan68) northwest of Hue. The operation resulted in 77 reported enemy casualties with 12 Marines killed and 100 wounded.
- 20 January A Marine patrol participating in Operation Scotland makes contact with a heavy concentration of North Vietnamese troops around Hill 881 South near Khe Sanh. The ensuing battle signaled the beginning of the siege of Khe Sanh.
- 21 January The 1st Air Cavalry Division, USA, is placed under the operational control of III MAF commander, Marine Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr.
- 21 January The 4th Marines begin Operation Lancaster II in the same area as Operation Lancaster I.
- 21 January The 3d Marines begin Operation Osceola II in the same area as Osceola I.
- 21 January General Westmoreland, Commander USMACV, orders a temporary halt to work on the “McNamara Line,” the barrier and antiinfiltration system south of the DMZ.
- 21 January The NVA begins the bombardment of the base at Khe Sanh and the Marine outposts in the surrounding hills. This rocket, mortar, and artillery barrage will continue for the next 77 days.

- 22 January The 1st Battalion, 9th Marines reinforces the garrison at Khe Sanh.
- 22 January The 1st Air Cavalry Division begins Operation Jeb Stuart in the northern part of I CTZ.
- 23 January The USS *Pueblo* (AGER 2), an American intelligence ship, is seized off the coast of Korea by the North Koreans.
- 23 January Special Landing Force Bravo consisting of BLT 3/1 and HMM-165 begins Operation Badger Catch near the Cua Viet River.
- 26 January Operation Badger Catch is renamed Operation Saline. The Marines in Badger Catch continue to work in conjunction with Operation Napoleon, a similar effort by the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion to keep the Cua Viet River supply line open.
- 27 January The seven-day Communist ceasefire for the Tet holiday begins.
- 29 January The allied ceasefire for the Tet holiday begins in all of South Vietnam except I CTZ.
- 30 January Enemy troops launch the beginning of their Tet offensive in I Corps, attacking Da Nang and several cities south of the base.
- 31 January The NVA opens its Tet offensive throughout South Vietnam with attacks against 39 provincial capitals and major cities including Saigon and Hue.
- 31 January VC troops fail in an attempt to seize the U.S. Embassy in Saigon after breaching the compound.
- 31 January Gen Leonard F. Chapman becomes the 24th Commandant of the Marine Corps, upon the retirement of the former Commandant, Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr.
- 31 January 1st Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division launches a counter-offensive air assault into the city of Quang Tri.
- January Operation Kentucky in "Leatherneck Square," south of the DMZ, resulted in 353 reported enemy casualties.
- January The Americal Division continues Operation Wheeler/ Wallowa south of Da Nang.
- 1 February The 1st Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division together with ARVN forces successfully defend the city of Quang Tri. The enemy sustained 900 reported casualties and 100 captured.
- 1 February Richard M. Nixon announces his candidacy for president.
- 1 February Units of the 1st and 5th Marines begin Operation Hue City to drive the NVA out of the city.
- 5 February Marines from the 26th Marines at Khe Sanh repel a battalion-sized attack killing a reported 109 NVA soldiers with 7 Marines killed and 15 wounded.
- 7 February NVA units overrun the Special Forces base at Lang Vei, west of Khe Sanh.
- 7 February Elements of the 3d Marines, 5th Marines, and the Americal Division engage the *2d NVA Division* in fighting around Da Nang.
- 9 February III MAF units succeed in throwing back the *2d NVA Division* offensive at Da Nang.
- 9 February MACV Forward, under General Creighton B. Abrams, Deputy Commander USMACV, is established in I CTZ at Phu Bai.
- 13 February The headquarters and combat elements of the 101st Airborne Division arrive in I CTZ.
- 16 February Operation Osceola II ends. This operation resulted in 21 reported enemy casualties with 2 Marines killed and 74 wounded.
- 23 February NVA troops fire more than 1,300 shells into the Marine garrison at Khe Sanh. This barrage marks the heaviest shelling of the entire siege.

- 24 February American and South Vietnamese troops capture the Citadel in Hue.
- 25 February American forces declare the city of Hue secure.
- 29 February Operation Saline is combined with Operation Napoleon.
- February The 27th Marines arrives in Da Nang from the U.S. as part of the reinforcements approved by President Lyndon B. Johnson. The President made extensive reductions to original recommendations of MACV and the JCS.
- February Operation Kentucky results in 398 reported enemy casualties with 90 Marines killed and 277 wounded.
- 1 March Clark Clifford replaces Robert S. McNamara as Secretary of Defense.
- 2 March Operation Hue City ends successfully as the 1st and 5th Marines defeat the NVA assault in Hue. The operation resulted in 1,943 enemy casualties with 142 Marines killed and 1,005 wounded.
- 10 March MACV Forward is deactivated.
- 10 March Provisional Corps Vietnam is created. This command, led by Lieutenant General William B. Rosson, USA, controls the 3rd Marine Division, the 1st Air Cavalry Division, and the 101st Airborne Division and is subordinate to Lieutenant General Cushman, commander of III MAF.
- 12 March Senator Eugene McCarthy makes a substantial showing in the New Hampshire primary, winning 40 percent of the vote, with President Johnson winning 49 percent.
- 16 March Troops from the Americal Division massacre more than 100 civilians, mostly women and children, in the village of My Lai.
- 21 March As part of the Single Management System, the Seventh Air Force assumes responsibility for coordinating and controlling all fixed-wing aircraft missions, including those of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
- 31 March Operation Scotland (1Nov67–31Mar68) near Khe Sanh ends. The operation, which included the defense of the besieged garrison of Khe Sanh, resulted in a reported 1,631 enemy casualties with 204 Marines killed and 1,622 wounded in action.
- 31 March The 1st Cavalry Division concludes Operation Jeb Stuart. This operation resulted in a reported 3,268 enemy casualties with 284 Army personnel killed and 1,717 wounded.
- 31 March President Johnson announces a partial halt in the bombing of North Vietnam and that he will send an additional 13,500 troops to South Vietnam. In a surprise move, the President declares that he will not run for re-election due to the war in Vietnam and public unrest at home.
- March Operation Kentucky results in a reported 413 enemy casualties with 38 Marines killed and 217 wounded.
- 1 April The 1st Air Cavalry Division together with units from the 1st Marines and the ARVN, begins Operation Pegasus from the Marine base of Ca Lu to relieve the Marine garrison at Khe Sanh.
- 9 April U. S. troops retake the Special Forces Camp at Lang Vei, southwest of Khe Sanh.
- 15 April Operation Pegasus ends with the relief and resupply of Khe Sanh. The operation resulted in 1,044 reported enemy casualties, with 51 Marines killed and 459 wounded. The 1st Air Cavalry Division suffered 41 personnel killed and 208 wounded.
- 15 April With the relief of Khe Sanh and the end of Operation Pegasus, Operation Scotland II, a continuation of Marine Corps action around the base at Khe Sanh begins.

- 19 April Elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, the 101st Airborne Division, and several ARVN units begin Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216. This operation takes place in the A Shau Valley and is designed as a spoiling assault to disrupt enemy preparations for another attack on Hue.
- 30 April NVA units are engaged in the village of Dai Do by BLT 2/4. Heavy fighting in this area continues until 3 May.
- 4 May The 7th Marines begin Operation Allen Brook, an operation designed to disrupt the growing enemy presence South of Da Nang.
- 30 April–17 May Marine, Army, and ARVN units succeed in thwarting a possible enemy assault on Dong Ha. The NVA suffered a reported 1,547 casualties while the allies sustained casualties of nearly 300 dead and 1,000 wounded.
- 4 May The 7th Marines begin Operation Allen Brook, an operation designed to disrupt the growing enemy presence south of Da Nang.
- 5 May Signalling the second major offensive of the year, enemy troops launch 119 rocket and mortar attacks on towns and cities throughout South Vietnam.
- 13 May Peace talks among North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the United States begin in Paris.
- 17 May Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216 ends with a reported 735 enemy casualties with 142 Army personnel killed and 731 wounded.
- 17 May 1st Air Cavalry Division begins Operation Jeb Stuart III along the border of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.
- 18 May Battalions from the 1st Marine Division begin Operation Mameluke Thrust in the central regions of Quang Nam Province.
- 20 May Major General Raymond G. Davis replaces Major General Rathvon McC. Tompkins as Commanding General, 3d Marine Division.
- 22 May The Marine Corps makes its first use of the North American OV-10A Bronco as an observation and counter-insurgency aircraft.
- 26 May Major General Rathvon McC. Tompkins becomes Deputy Commander of III MAF, replacing Major General William J. Van Ryzin.
- 27 May Peace talks between the United States and North Vietnam break down in Paris.
- May Operation Kentucky results in a reported 817 enemy casualties with 134 Marines killed and 611 wounded.
- May Marine Corps force levels in Vietnam reach 89,000.
- 1 June Lieutenant General Henry W. Buse, Jr., replaces Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak as the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.
- 5 June Robert F. Kennedy is assassinated.
- 26 June Major General Carl A. Youngdale relieves Major General Donn J. Robertson as Commander of the 1st Marine Division.
- 27 June Marine troops begin to dismantle and withdraw from their static defense base at Khe Sanh.
- 1 July General Creighton Abrams relieves General William Westmoreland as Commander USMACV.
- 1 July Operation Thor begins in the eastern part of the DMZ. Planes from the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps, as well as artillery from Army and Marine artillery batteries in the DMZ sector and naval gunfire from cruisers and destroyers off the coast pound enemy artillery installations in the DMZ.
- 7 July Operation Thor ends.
- 25 July The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), USA, arrives in I CTZ and is placed under the operational control of III MAF.

- 15 August Provisional Corps Vietnam is deactivated and replaced by XXIV Corps.
- 23 August Operation Allen Brook ends. This operation resulted in 1,017 reported enemy casualties with 172 Marines killed and 1,124 wounded.
- 23 August Enemy troops mount their third major offensive by firing on 27 different allied installations and cities including Hue, Da Nang Air Base, and Quang Tri City. The major thrust of this effort is the city of Da Nang. The Communists fall far short of their objective due to resistance of U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and South Vietnamese troops.
- 24 August The Democratic Party Convention begins in Chicago. Vietnam War protesters clash violently with police for the next four days.
- 29 September The USS *New Jersey* (BB 62) arrives off the coast of the DMZ. The arrival of this battleship greatly increases the Navy's firepower and power projection in the eastern DMZ.
- September Engagements from Operation Kentucky result in 305 reported enemy casualties with 1 Marine killed and 8 wounded.
- 6 October 7th Marines begin Operation Maui Peak, an effort to relieve the Special Forces base at Thuong Duc in Quang Nam Province.
- 19 October Operation Maui Peak ends, resulting in 202 reported enemy casualties with 28 Marines killed and 143 wounded.
- 23 October Operation Mameluke Thrust ends, resulting in 2,728 reported enemy casualties with 269 Marines killed and 1,730 wounded.
- 23 October The 5th Marines begins Operation Henderson Hill in Quang Nam Province as a continuation of Operation Mameluke Thrust.
- 28 October The 1st Air Cavalry Division begins to move from I CTZ to III CTZ.
- 31 October President Johnson announces a complete halt in the bombing and naval bombardment of North Vietnam.
- 1 November North Vietnamese officials announce that they will meet in Paris with representatives from the United States, South Vietnam, and the National Liberation Front to begin peace talks.
- 1 November South Vietnamese units, aided by squads and platoons of American troops, begin the Accelerated Pacification (*Le Loi*) Campaign in order to regain the trust and control of South Vietnamese villages lost due to the major enemy offensives of the year.
- 2 November South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu states that his nation will not negotiate in Paris if the Communist National Liberation Front is given equal status with the other participants.
- 3 November Operation Jeb Stuart III ends. This operation resulted in 2,016 reported enemy casualties with 212 Army personnel killed and 1,512 wounded.
- 5 November Richard Nixon wins the presidential election by narrowly defeating Hubert Humphrey.
- 11 November The Americal Division ends Operation Wheeler/Wallowa after 14 months in the Nui Loc Son Valley. This operation resulted in a reported 10,020 enemy casualties with 683 Army personnel killed and 3,597 wounded.
- 20 November The 1st Marines begin Operation Meade River, nine miles south of Da Nang, in support of the South Vietnamese Accelerated Pacification Campaign.
- 23 November Operation Lancaster II ends. This operation resulted in a reported 1,800 enemy casualties with 359 Marines killed and 2,101 wounded.
- 26 November President Johnson states that the peace talks will include the United States, South Vietnam, and a Communist delegation which consists of representatives from North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front.

- 6 December Operation Henderson Hill ends. This action resulted in a reported 700 enemy casualties and 35 Marines killed and 273 wounded.
- 9 December Operation Napoleon/Saline ends, resulting in a reported 3,495 enemy casualties with 353 Marines killed and 1,959 wounded.
- 9 December Operation Meade River ends with 841 reported enemy casualties with 107 Marines killed and 522 wounded.
- 21 December Major General Carl A. Youngdale relieves Major General Rathvon McC. Tompkins as Deputy Commanding General, III MAF. Major General Ormond R. Simpson relieves Major General Youngdale as Commanding General, 1st Marine Division.
- 29 December Camp Carroll, the artillery base that supported the garrison at Khe Sanh, is deactivated.
- 29 December Allied troops in Vietnam announce that they will not honor any holiday truces.
- December III MAF ends the year with operational control of the 1st Marine Division, the 3d Marine Division, the 1st Marine Air Wing, the Marine Force Logistic Command, the 101st Airborne Division, the Americal Division, and the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized).
- December The year closes with 31,691 reported enemy casualties at the hands of Marine units in III MAF. The cost of the year's fighting to the Marine Corps was 4,618 Marines killed and 29,320 wounded.

Appendix C

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

- A-1—A-5—Designations for Strong Points which form the Dye-marker barrier.
- A-1E—Douglas Skyraider, a propeller-driven, single-engine, attack aircraft.
- A-4—Douglas Skyhawk, a single-seat, jet attack aircraft in service on board carriers of the U.S. Navy and with land-based Marine attack squadrons.
- A-6A—Grumman Intruder, a twin-jet, twin-seat, attack aircraft specifically designed to deliver weapons on targets completely obscured by weather or darkness.
- AAR—After Action Report.
- ABCCC—Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center, a U.S. Air Force aircraft equipped with communications, data link, and display equipment; it may be employed as an airborne command post or a communications and intelligence relay facility.
- AC-47—Douglas C-47 Skytrain, twin-engine, fixed-wing transport modified with 7.62mm miniguns and used as a gunship.
- AC-119—Fairchild Hiller C-119 military transport aircraft remodified into a gunship with side-firing 7.62mm miniguns.
- ADC—Assistant Division Commander.
- AdminO—Administrative Officer.
- Adv—Advanced.
- AFP—Armed Forces Police.
- AGC—Amphibious command ship. The current designation is LCC.
- AH-1G—Bell Huey Cobra helicopter specifically designed for close air support.
- AK-47—Russian-designed Kalashnikov gas-operated 7.62mm automatic rifle, with an effective range of 400 meters. It was the standard rifle of the North Vietnamese Army.
- AKA—Attack cargo ship, a naval ship designed to transport combat-loaded cargo in an assault landing. LKA is the current designation.
- ALMAR—All Marines, a Commandant of the Marine Corps communication directed to all Marines.
- ALO—Air Liaison Officer, an officer (aviator/pilot) attached to a ground unit who functions as the primary advisor to the ground commander on air operation matters.
- ALP—Air Liaison Party.
- AMERICAL—The U.S. Army's 23d Infantry Division.
- AmTrac—Amphibian Tractor.
- ANGLICO—Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, an organization composed of Marine and Navy personnel specially qualified for control of naval gunfire and close air support. ANGLICO personnel normally provided this service while attached to U.S. Army, Korean, and ARVN units.
- AO—Air Observer, an individual whose primary mission is to observe or to take photographs from an aircraft in order to adjust artillery fire or obtain military information.
- AOA—Amphibious Objective Area, a defined geographical area within which is located the area or areas to be captured by the amphibious task force.
- APA—Attack transport ship, a naval ship, designed for combat loading elements of a battalion landing team. LPA is the current designation.
- APC—Armored Personnel Carrier.
- APD—Airborne Personnel Detector.
- APT—Armed Propaganda Team, a South Vietnamese pacification cadre who carried weapons in self-defense as they attempted to convince South Vietnamese villagers to remain loyal to the government.
- ARA—Aerial Rocket Artillery.
- Arclight—The codename for B-52 bombing missions in South Vietnam.
- ARG—Amphibious Ready Group.
- Arty—Artillery.
- ARVN—Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).
- ASP—Ammunition Supply Point.
- ASRT—Air Support Radar Team, a subordinate operational component of a tactical air control system which provides ground-controlled precision flight path guidance and weapons release for attack aircraft.
- ATDS—Airborne Tactical Data System.
- B-40 rockets—Communist rocket-propelled grenade.
- B-52—Boeing Stratofortress, U.S. Air Force eight-engine, swept-wing, heavy jet bomber.
- BA—Base Area.
- BB—Navy Battleship.
- BDA—Battle Damage Assessment.
- BDC—Base Defense Commander.
- Bde—Brigade.
- BDR—Battle Damage Repair.
- BGen—Brigadier General.
- BLT—Battalion Landing Team.
- Bn—Battalion.
- Bru*—One of several non-Vietnamese ethnic groups living in the Vietnamese highlands; the inhabitants in the Khe Sanh area were primarily *Bru*.
- Btry—Battery.
- BUIC—Back-Up Intercept Computer.
- C-1—C-3—Designations for base areas which support the Dye-marker barrier.
- C-117D—Douglas Skytrain, a twin-engine transport aircraft. The C-117D was an improved version of the C-47, the military version of the DC-3.
- C-123—Fairchild Provider, two-engine, turboprop, transport aircraft with a maximum payload of 15,000 pounds.
- C-130—Lockheed Hercules, a four-engine turboprop transport aircraft.
- CAAR—Combat After Action Report.
- CACO—Combined Action Company.
- CAF—Combined Action Force.
- CAG—Combined Action Group.

- CAP—Combined Action Platoon.
- Capt—Captain.
- CAS—Close Air Support.
- CBU—Cluster Bomb Unit.
- CCP—Combined Campaign Plan.
- Cdr—Commander.
- CG—Commanding General.
- CH-46—Boeing Vertol Sea Knight, a twin-engine, tandem-rotor transport helicopter, designed to carry a four-man crew and 17 combat-loaded troops.
- CH-53—Sikorsky Sea Stallion, a single-rotor, heavy transport helicopter powered by two shaft-turbine engines with an average payload of 12,800 pounds. Carries crew of three and 38 combat-loaded troops.
- CH-54—Sikorsky Sky Crane, U.S. Army, two-engine, single-rotor, heavy transport helicopter with three-man crew and useful payload of 22,890 pounds.
- Chieu Hoi*—The South Vietnamese amnesty program designed to attract Communist troops and cadre to defect to the government cause.
- CICV—Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam.
- CID—Criminal Investigative Division.
- CIDG—Civilian Irregular Defense Group, South Vietnamese paramilitary force, composed largely of *Montagnards* and advised by the U.S. Army Special Forces.
- CinCPac—Commander in Chief, Pacific.
- CinCPacFlt—Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.
- CIT—Counter Intelligence Team.
- Class (I-V)—Categories of military supplies, e.g., Class I, rations; Class II, Uniforms and other individual items; Class III, POL; Class IV, Construction materials; Class V, Ammunition.
- Claymore—A U.S. directional antipersonnel mine.
- CMC—Commandant of the Marine Corps.
- CMH—Center of Military History, Department of the Army.
- CNO—Chief of Naval Operations.
- CO—Commanding Officer.
- Co—Company.
- COB—Combat Operations Base.
- COC—Combat Operations Center.
- CoFraM—Controlled Fragmentation Munitions.
- Col—Colonel.
- Combined Action Program—A Marine pacification program which integrated a Marine infantry squad with a South Vietnamese Popular Force platoon in a Vietnamese village.
- ComdC—Command Chronology.
- ComdHist—Command History.
- ComNavForPac—Commander, Naval Forces, Pacific.
- ComNavForV—Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam.
- ComUSMACV—Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
- CORDS—Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, the agency organized under MACV in May 1967 and charged with coordinating U.S.-Vietnamese pacification efforts.
- COSVN—Central Office of South Vietnam, the nominal Communist military and political headquarters in South Vietnam.
- County Fair—A sophisticated cordon and search operation in a particular hamlet or village by South Vietnamese troops, police, local officials, and U.S. Marines in an attempt to screen and register the local inhabitants.
- CP—Command Post.
- CPDC—Central Pacification and Development Council, the South Vietnamese government agency responsible for coordinating the pacification plan.
- Cpl—Corporal.
- CRC—Control and Reporting Center, an element of the U.S. Air Force tactical air control system, subordinate to the Tactical Air Control Center, which conducted radar and warning operations.
- CRIMP—Consolidated Republic of Vietnam Improvement and Modernization Plan.
- C/S—Chief of Staff.
- CS—A chemical irritant which affects the upper respiratory system, similar to tear gas.
- CSC—Communications Service Company.
- CTZ—Corps Tactical Zone.
- DAIS—Da Nang Antiinfiltration System.
- DASC—Direct Air Support Center, a subordinate operational component of the Marine air control system designed for control of close air support and other direct air support operations.
- D—Day—Day scheduled for the beginning of an operation.
- DD—Navy destroyer.
- Det—Detachment.
- DIOCC—District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center.
- Div—Division.
- DMZ—Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam.
- DOD—Department of Defense.
- DOIC—District Operations and Intelligence Center
- DPP—Data Processing Platoon.
- DPS—Data Processing Section.
- DRV—Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).
- DSA—District Senior Advisor.
- DSS—Da Nang Special Sector.
- Dtd—Dated.
- Duel Blade—The final codename for the DMZ barrier.
- Duster—The nickname for the U.S. Army's tracked vehicle, the M-42, which mounted dual 40mm automatic weapons.
- DVA—Da Nang Vital Area.
- Dyemarker—Codename for the Strong Point/Obstacle System (also known as the "McNamara Line" and "the barrier") which was constructed south of the DMZ and intended to limit infiltration from North Vietnam. See Practice Nine.
- EA-6A—The electronic-countermeasures version of the A-6A Intruder.
- ECM—Electronic Countermeasures, a major subdivision of electronic warfare involving actions against enemy electronic equipment or to exploit the enemy's use of electromagnetic radiations from such equipment.
- ELINT—Electronic Intelligence, the intelligence information gained by monitoring radiations from enemy electronic equipment.
- Engr—Engineer.
- EOD—Explosive Ordnance Device.
- F-4B—McDonnell Phantom II, a twin-engined, two-seat, long-range, all-weather jet interceptor and attack bomber.
- F-8—Chance-Vought Crusader, single-engine, single-seat carrier fighter aircraft.

- FAC(A)—Forward Air Controller (Airborne).
 FADAC—Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer.
 FAE—Fuel-Air Explosive.
 FAG—Field Artillery Group.
 FDC—Fire Direction Center.
 FFV—Field Force, Vietnam I and II, U.S. Army commands in II and III Corps areas of South Vietnam.
 FLC—Force Logistic Command.
 FLSG—Force Logistic Support Group.
 FLSU—Force Logistic Support Unit.
 FMFPac—Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.
 FO—Forward Observer.
 FOB—Forward Operating Base.
 FRC—Federal Records Center.
 Front 4—A Communist headquarters subordinate to MR-5 and responsible for Quang Nam Province.
 FSB—Fire Support Base.
 FSCC—Fire Support Coordination Center, a single location involved in the coordination of all forms of fire support.
 FSIc—Fire Support Information Center
 FSR—Force Service Regiment.
 Fwd—Forward.
 FWMF—Free World Military Force.
- G—Refers to staff positions on a general staff, e.g., G-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel; G-2, intelligence; G-3, operations; G-4, logistics, and G-5, civil affairs.
 GCA—Ground Control Approach.
 GCI—Ground Control Intercept.
 Gen—General.
 Golden Fleece—Marine rice harvest protection operation.
 GPES—Ground Proximity Extraction System.
 Grenade Launcher, M79—U.S.-built, single-shot, breech-loaded shoulder weapon which fires 40mm projectiles and weighs approximately 6.5 pounds when loaded; it has a sustained rate of aimed fire of five-seven rounds per minute and an effective range of 375 meters.
 GSW—Gunshot Wounds.
 Gun, 175mm, M107—U.S.-built, self-propelled gun which weighs 62,000 pounds and fires a 147-pound projectile to a maximum range of 32,800 meters. Maximum rate of fire is one round every two minutes.
 GVN—Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam).
 GySgt—Gunnery Sergeant
- H&I fires—Harassing and Interdiction fires.
 H&MS—Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron.
 H&S Co—Headquarters and Service Company.
 HAWK—A mobile, surface-to-air guided missile, designed to defend against low-flying enemy aircraft and short-range missiles.
 HDC—Helicopter Direction Center.
 HE—High Explosive.
 Hectare—A unit of land measure in the metric system and equal to 2.471 acres.
 HES—Hamlet Evaluation System, the computerized statistical data system used to measure pacification in the hamlets and villages of South Vietnam.
 H-Hour—The specific hour an operation begins.
- HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC—Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, the Vietnam-era predecessor of the History and Museums Division.
 HLZ—Helicopter Landing Zone.
 HMH—Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron.
 HML—Marine Light Helicopter Squadron.
 HMM—Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron.
Hoi Chanb—A Viet Cong or North Vietnamese defector under the *Chieu Hoi* amnesty program.
 Howitzer, 8-inch (M55)—U.S.-built, self-propelled, heavy-artillery piece with a maximum range of 16,900 meters and a rate of fire of one round every two minutes.
 Howitzer, 105mm, M101A1—U.S.-built, towed, general purpose light artillery piece with a maximum range of 11,000 meters and maximum rate of fire of four rounds per minute.
 Howitzer, 155mm, M114A towed and M109 self-propelled—U.S.-built medium artillery with a maximum range of 15,080 meters and a maximum rate of fire of three rounds per minute. Marines employed both models in Vietnam. The newer and heavier self-propelled M109 was largely road-bound, while the lighter, towed M114A could be moved either by truck or by helicopter.
 Howar—A 4.2 (107mm) mortar tube mounted on a 75mm pack howitzer frame.
 HQ or Hq—Headquarters.
 HST—Helicopter Support Team.
 "Huey"—Popular name for UH-1 series of helicopters.
- ICC—International Control Commission, established by the Geneva Accords of 1954 to supervise the truce ending the First Indochina War between the French and the Viet Minh and resulting in the partition of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel. The members of the Commission were from Canada, India, and Poland.
 ICJCC—I Corps Joint Coordinating Council, consisting of U.S. and Vietnamese officials in I Corps who coordinated the civilian assistance program.
 I Corps—The military and administrative subdivision which included the five northern provinces of South Vietnam.
 IDA—Institute for Defense Analysis.
 Intel—Intelligence.
 Intvw—Interview.
 IOD—Integrated Observation Device.
 ITT—Interrogation/Translator Team.
- J—The designation for members of a joint staff which includes members of several services comprising the command, e.g., J-1 would refer to the staff members responsible for personnel; J-2, intelligence; J-3, operations; J-4, logistics; and J-5, civil affairs.
 JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.).
 JGS—Joint General Staff (South Vietnamese).
 JTD—Joint Table of Distribution.
 JUSPAO—Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office.
- KC-130—The in-flight refueling tanker configuration of the C-130 Lockheed Hercules.
 KBA—Killed by Air.
 KIA—Killed in Action.
 Kit Carson Scout—Viet Cong defectors recruited by Marines to serve as scouts, interpreters, and intelligence agents.

L-Hour—In planned helicopter operations, it is the specific hour the helicopters land in the landing zone.

LAAM Bn—Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion.

LAAW—Light Anti-Armor Weapon

LAPES—Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System.

LCM—Landing Craft Mechanized, designed to land tanks, trucks, and trailers directly onto the beach.

LCpl—Lance Corporal.

LCU—Landing Craft Utility.

LCVP—Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel, a small craft with a bow ramp used to transport assault troops and light vehicles to the beach.

Le Loi—The Accelerated Pacification Campaign.

LKA—The current designation for an attack cargo ship. See AKA.

LOACH—Light Observation and Command Helicopter.

LOC—Lines of Communication.

LOH—Light Observation Helicopter.

LOI—Letter of Instruction.

LOTS—Logistics Over the Shore.

LP—Listening Post.

LPD—Amphibious transport, dock, a ship designed to transport and land troops, equipment, and supplies by means of embarked landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and helicopters. It had both a submersible well deck and a helicopter landing deck.

LPH—Amphibious assault ship, a ship designed or modified to transport and land troops, equipment, and supplies by means of embarked helicopters.

LSA—Logistic Support Area.

LSD—Landing Ship, Dock, a landing ship designed to combat load, transport, and launch amphibious crafts or vehicles together with crews and embarked personnel, and to provide limited docking and repair services to small ships and crafts. It lacks the helicopter landing deck of the LPD.

LST—Landing Ship, Tank, landing ship designed to transport heavy vehicles and to land them on a beach.

Lt—Lieutenant.

LtCol—Lieutenant Colonel.

LtGen—Lieutenant General.

Ltr—Letter.

LVTE—Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Engineer, a lightly armored amphibian vehicle designed for minefield and obstacle clearance.

LVTH—Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Howitzer, a lightly armored, self-propelled, amphibious 105mm howitzer. It resembles an LVTP with a turret for the howitzer.

LVTP—Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Personnel, an amphibian vehicle used to land and/or transport personnel.

LVTR—Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Retriever, an amphibian vehicle used for repair purposes.

LZ—Landing Zone.

MAB—Marine Amphibious Brigade.

MABS—Marine Air Base Squadron.

Machine gun, .50-caliber—U.S.-built, belt-fed, recoil-operated, air-cooled automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 80 pounds without mount or ammunition; it has a sustained rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,450 meters.

Machine gun, M60—U.S.-built, belt-fed, gas-operated, air-cooled, 7.62mm automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 20 pounds without mount or ammunition; it has a sustained rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,000 meters.

MACS—Marine Air Control Squadron, provides and operates ground facilities for the detection and interception of hostile aircraft and for the navigational direction of friendly aircraft in the conduct of support operations.

MACG—Marine Air Control Group.

MACV—Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

MAF—Marine Amphibious Force.

MAG—Marine Aircraft Group.

Main Force—Refers to organized Viet Cong battalions and regiments as opposed to local guerrilla groups.

Maj—Major.

MajGen—Major General.

MarCad—Marine Aviation Cadet.

MarDiv—Marine Division.

Marines—Designates a Marine regiment, e.g., 3d Marines.

MASS—Marine Air Support Squadron, provides and operates facilities for the control of support aircraft operating in direct support of ground forces.

MAU—Marine Advisory Unit, the Marine advisory unit under the Naval Advisory Group which administered the advisory effort to the South Vietnamese Marine Corps; not to be confused with a Marine Amphibious Unit.

MAW—Marine Aircraft Wing.

MCAF—Marine Corps Air Facility.

MCAS—Marine Corps Air Station.

MCCC—Marine Corps Command Center.

MCO—Marine Corps Order.

MCOAG—Marine Corps Operations Analysis Group.

MCSA—Marine Corps Supply Agency.

MEB—Marine Expeditionary Brigade.

MedCap—Medical Civilian Assistance Program.

MedEvac—Medical Evacuation.

MEF—Marine Expeditionary Force.

MGySgt—Master Gunnery Sergeant.

MIA—Missing in Action.

MilHistBr—Military History Branch.

Mortar, 4.2-inch, M30—U.S.-built, rifled, muzzle-loaded, drop-fired weapon consisting of tube, base-plate and standard; weapon weighs 330 pounds and has maximum range of 4,020 meters. Rate of fire is 20 rounds per minute.

Mortar, 60mm, M19—U.S.-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded weapon, which weighs 45.2 pounds when assembled; it has a maximum rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and sustained rate of fire of 18 rounds per minute; the effective range is 2,000 meters. Mortar, 81mm, M29—U.S.-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, which weighs approximately 115 pounds when assembled; it has a sustained rate of fire of two rounds per minute and an effective range of 2,300–3,650 meters, depending upon ammunition used.

Mortar, 82mm—Soviet-built, smooth-bore, mortar, single-shot, high angle of fire weapon which weighs approximately 123 pounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 25 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 3,040 meters.

Mortar, 120mm—Soviet- or Chinese Communist-built, smooth bore, drop or trigger fired, mortar which weighs approximately 600 pounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 15 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 5,700 meters.

MR-5—Military Region 5, a Communist political and military sector in northern South Vietnam, including all of I Corps. NVA units in MR-5 did not report to COSVN.

- Ms—Manuscript.
 Msg—Message.
 MSgt—Master Sergeant.
 MTDS—Marine Tactical Data System.
 MTT—Mobile Training Team.
Montagnard—From French for “mountaineer,” refers to the several tribes of non-ethnic-Vietnamese nomadic tribesmen who populate the South Vietnamese highlands.
 MWHG—Marine Wing Headquarters Group.
 MWSG—Marine Wing Support Group.
- NAC—Northern Artillery Cantonment.
 NAG—Naval Advisory Group.
 NAS—Naval Air Station.
 NavCad—Naval Aviation Cadet.
 NCC—Naval Component Commander.
 NCO—Noncommissioned Officer.
 NGLO—Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer.
 NLF—National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Communist-led insurgency against the South Vietnamese Government.
 NMCB—Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (Seabees).
 NMCC—National Military Command Center.
 NOD—Night Observation Device.
 NPFF—National Police Field Force.
 NSA—Naval Support Activity.
 NSD—Naval Supply Depot.
 NSDC—Northern Sector Defense Command.
Nui—Vietnamese word for hill or mountain.
Nung—A Vietnamese tribesman, of a separate ethnic group and probably of Chinese origin.
 NVA—North Vietnamese Army, often used colloquially to refer to a North Vietnamese soldier.
- O-1C/G—Cessna, single-engine observation aircraft.
 OAB, NHD—Operational Archives Branch, Naval History Division.
 OJT—On the Job Training.
 Ontos—U.S.-built, lightly armored, tracked antitank vehicle armed with six coaxially-mounted 106mm recoilless rifles.
 OpCon—Operational Control, the authority granted to a commander to direct forces assigned for specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location.
 OP—Outpost or observation point.
 OpO—Operation Order, a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the execution of an operation.
 OPlan—Operation Plan, a plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession; it is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders.
 OpSum—Operational Summary.
 ORLL—Operations Report/Lessons Learned.
 OSJS (MACV)—Office of the Secretariat, Joint Staff (Military Assistance Command Vietnam).
 OV-10—North American Rockwell Bronco, twin-engine aircraft specifically designed for light armed reconnaissance missions.
- PAR—Progressive Aircraft Rework.
 PAVN—Peoples Army of Vietnam (North Vietnam). This acronym was dropped in favor of NVA.
- PDC—Pacification and Development Councils.
 PF—Popular Force, Vietnamese militia who were usually employed in the defense of their own communities.
 PFC—Private First Class.
 Phoenix program—A covert U.S. and South Vietnamese program aimed at the eradication of the Viet Cong infrastructure in South Vietnam.
 PIIC—Photo Imagery Interpretation Center.
 POL—Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants.
 Practice Nine—The codename for the planning of the antiinfiltration barrier across the DMZ. See Dymarker.
 PRC-25—Standard radio used by Marine ground units in Vietnam that allowed for voice communication for distances up to 25 miles.
 Prov Corps—Provisional Corps Vietnam.
 PRU—Provincial Reconnaissance Unit.
 PSA—Province Senior Advisor.
 PSDF—People's Self-Defense Force, a local self-defense force organized by the South Vietnamese Government after the enemy's Tet offensive in 1968.
 Pvt—Private.
- QDSZ—Quang Da Special Zone.
 QRF—Quick Reaction Force.
- R&R—Rest and Recreation.
 Recoilless rifle, 106mm, M401A1—U.S.-built, single-shot, recoilless, breech-loaded weapon which weighs 438 pounds when assembled and mounted for firing; it has a sustained rate of fire of six rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,365 meters.
- Regt—Regiment.
 Rein—Reinforced.
 Revolutionary Development—The South Vietnamese pacification program started in 1966.
 Revolutionary Development Teams—Specially trained Vietnamese political cadre who were assigned to individual hamlets and villages and conducted various pacification and civilian assistance tasks on a local level.
- RF—Regional Force, Vietnamese militia who were employed in a specific area.
 Rifle, M14—Gas-operated, magazine-fed, air-cooled, semi-automatic, 7.62mm caliber shoulder weapon, which weighs 12 pounds with a full 20-round magazine; it has a sustained rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and an effective range of 460 meters.
 Rifle, M16—Gas-operated, magazine-fed, air-cooled, automatic, 5.56mm caliber shoulder weapon, which weighs 3.1 pounds with a 20-round magazine; it has a sustained rate of fire of 12–15 rounds per minute and an effective range of 460 meters.
- RLT—Regimental Landing Team.
 ROE—Rules of Engagement.
 ROK—Republic of Korea.
 Rolling Thunder—Codename for U.S. air operations over North Vietnam.
 Rough Rider—Organized vehicle convoys, often escorted by helicopters and armored vehicles, using Vietnam's roads to supply Marine bases.
 Route Package—Codename used with a number to designate areas of North Vietnam for the American bombing campaign. Route Package I was the area immediately north of the DMZ.
 RPG—Rocket-Propelled Grenade.

RRU—Radio Research Unit.

Rural Reconstruction—The predecessor campaign to Revolutionary Development.

RVN—Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).

RVNAF—Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.

RZ—Reconnaissance Zone.

S—Refers to staff positions on regimental and battalion levels. S-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel; S-2, intelligence; S-3, operations; S-4, logistics; and S-5, civil affairs.

SAM—Surface to Air Missile.

SAR—Search and Rescue.

SCAMP—Sensor Control and Maintenance Platoon.

SEATO—Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

SecDef—Secretary of Defense.

SecState—Secretary of State.

Seventh AF—Seventh Air Force, the major U.S. Air Force command in Vietnam.

Seventh Fleet—The U.S. fleet assigned to the Pacific.

SFD—Surprise Firing Device, a euphemism for a boobytrap.

SID—Seismic Intrusion Device, sensor used to monitor movement through ground vibrations.

SitRep—Situation Report.

Sgt—Sergeant.

SgtMaj—Sergeant Major.

SKS—Russian-designed Simonov gas-operated 7.62mm semiautomatic rifle.

SLAM—Seek, Locate, Annihilate and Monitor.

SLF—Special Landing Force.

SMA—Senior Marine Advisor.

SOG—Studies and Operations Group, the cover name for the organization that carried out cross-border operations.

Song—Vietnamese for "river."

SOP—Standing Operating Procedure, set of instructions laying out standardized procedures.

SPIE—Special Patrol Insertion/Extraction line.

Spt Rept—Spot Report.

Sortie—An operational flight by one aircraft.

Sparrow Hawk—A small rapid-reaction force on standby, ready for insertion by helicopter for reinforcement of units in contact with the enemy.

SSDC—Southern Sector Defense Command.

SSgt—Staff Sergeant.

Steel Tiger—The codename for the air campaign over Laos.

Stingray—Special Marine reconnaissance missions in which small Marine reconnaissance teams call artillery and air attacks on targets of opportunity.

Strike Company—An elite company in a South Vietnamese infantry division, directly under the control of the division commander.

TAC(A)—Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne), an officer in an airplane, who coordinates close air support.

TACC—Tactical Air Control Center, the principal air operations installation for controlling all aircraft and air-warning functions of tactical air operations.

TACP—Tactical Air Control Party, a subordinate operational component of a tactical air control system designed to provide air liaison to land forces and for the control of aircraft.

TADC—Tactical Air Direction Center, an air operations installation under the Tactical Air Control Center, which directs aircraft and aircraft warning functions of the tactical air center.

TAADS—Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System, the expeditionary storage and dispensing system of aviation fuel at tactical airfields. It uses 10,000-gallon fabric tanks to store the fuel.

Tank, M48—U.S.-built 50.7-ton tank with a crew of four; primary armament is turret-mounted 90mm gun with one .30-caliber and one .50-caliber machine gun; has maximum road speed of 32 miles per hour and an average range of 195 miles.

TAOC—Tactical Air Operations Center, a subordinate component of the air command and control system which controls all enroute air traffic and air defense operations.

TAOC—Tactical Area of Coordination.

TAOI—Tactical Area of Interest.

TAOR—Tactical Area of Responsibility, a defined area of land for which responsibility is specifically assigned to the commander of the area as a measure for control of assigned forces and coordination of support.

TASE—Tactical Air Support Element.

TDCC—Tactical Data Communications Central.

TE—Task Element.

T/E—Table of Equipment.

Tet—The Vietnamese Lunar New Year; Commonly associated with the NVA/VC offensive launched during the Tet Holiday of January 1968.

TF—Task Force.

TG—Task Group.

Tiger Hound—Airstrikes in Laos directed by U.S. Air Force small fixed-wing observation aircraft, flying up to 12 miles into southeastern Laos.

T/O—Table of Organization.

TO&E—Table of Organization and Equipment.

TOC—Tactical Operations Center.

Trung-si—A South Vietnamese Popular Force sergeant.

TPQ-10—Radar system used to control air strikes in poor and marginal weather.

TSF—Transitional Support Force.

TU—Task Unit.

UCMJ—Uniform Code of Military Justice

UH-1E—Bell Iroquois (commonly referred to as a "Huey"), a single-engine, light attack/observation helicopter noted for its maneuverability and firepower; carries a crew of three; it can be armed with air-to-ground rocket packs and fuselage-mounted, electrically-fired machine guns.

UH-34D—Sikorsky Sea Horse, a single-engine medium transport helicopter with a crew of three, carries eight to 12 combat soldiers, depending upon weather conditions.

USA—U.S. Army.

USAAG—U.S. Army Advisory Group.

USAF—U.S. Air Force.

USAID—U.S. Agency for International Development.

USARV—U.S. Army, Vietnam.

USASupComDaNang—U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang.

USIA—U.S. Information Agency.

USMC—U.S. Marine Corps.

U.S. Mission Council—Council, chaired by the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam and including ComUSMACV, which developed and coordinated U.S. policy within South Vietnam.

USN—U.S. Navy.

VC—Viet Cong, a term used to refer to the Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam; a contraction of the Vietnamese phrase meaning “Vietnamese Communists.”

VCI—Viet Cong Infrastructure.

VCLF—Viet Cong Local Force.

Viet Minh—The Vietnamese contraction for Viet Nam Doc Lap Nong Minh Hoi, a Communist-led coalition of nationalist groups, which actively opposed the Japanese in World War II and the French in the first Indochina War.

VIS—Vietnamese Information Service.

VMA—Marine Attack Squadron.

VMA(AW)—Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron.

VMCJ—Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron.

VMFA—Marine Fighter Attack Squadron.

VMF(AW)—Marine Fighter Squadron (All-Weather).

VMGR—Marine Refueller Transport Squadron.

VMO—Marine Observation Squadron.

VNAF—Vietnamese Air Force.

VNMB—Vietnamese Marine Brigade.

VNMC—Vietnamese Marine Corps.

VNN—Vietnamese Navy.

VNRS—Vietnamese National Rail System.

VT—Variable timed electronic fuse for an artillery shell which causes airburst over the target area.

WestPac—Western Pacific.

WIA—Wounded in Action.

WFRC—Washington Federal Records Center.

Appendix D

Medals of Honor Citations 1968

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS ROBERT C. BURKE
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty for service as a Machine Gunner with Company I, Third Battalion, Twenty-Seventh Marines, First Marine Division in the Republic of Vietnam on 17 May 1968. While on Operation Allen Brook, Company I was approaching a dry river bed with a heavily wooded treeline that bordered the hamlet of Le Nam (1), when they suddenly came under intense mortar, rocket propelled grenade, automatic weapons and small arms fire from a large, well concealed enemy force which halted the company's advance and wounded several Marines. Realizing that key points of resistance had to be eliminated to allow the units to advance and casualties to be evacuated, Private Burke, without hesitation, seized his machine gun and launched a series of one man assaults against the fortified emplacements. As he aggressively maneuvered to the edge of the steep river bank, he delivered accurate suppressive fire upon several enemy bunkers, which enabled his comrades to advance and move the wounded Marines to positions of relative safety. As he continued his combative actions, he located an opposing automatic weapons emplacement and poured intense fire into the position, killing three North Vietnamese soldiers as they attempted to flee. Private Burke then fearlessly moved from one position to another, quelling the hostile fire until his weapon malfunctioned. Obtaining a casualty's rifle and hand grenades, he advanced further into the midst of the enemy fire in an assault against another pocket of resistance, killing two more of the enemy. Observing that a fellow Marine had cleared his malfunctioning machine gun, he grasped his weapon and moved into a dangerously exposed area and saturated the hostile treeline until he fell mortally wounded. Private Burke's gallant actions upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

SERGEANT ALFREDO GONZALEZ
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Platoon Commander, Third Platoon, Company A, First Battalion, First Marines, First Marine Division, in the Republic of Vietnam. On 31 January 1968, during the initial phase of Operation Hue City Sergeant Gonzalez's unit was formed as a reaction force and deployed to Hue to relieve the pressure on the beleaguered city. While moving by truck convoy along Route #1, near the village of Lang Van Long, the Marines received a heavy volume of enemy fire. Sergeant Gonzalez aggressively maneuvered the Marines in his platoon, and directed their fire until the area was cleared of snipers. Immediately after crossing a river south of Hue, the column was again hit by intense enemy fire. One of the Marines on top of a tank was wounded and fell to the ground in an exposed position. With complete disregard for his own safety, Sergeant Gonzalez ran through the fire-swept area to the assistance of his injured comrade. He lifted him up and though receiving fragmentation wounds during the rescue, he carried the wounded Marine to a covered position for treatment. Due to the increased volume and accuracy of enemy fire from a fortified machine gun bunker on the side of the road, the company was temporarily halted. Realizing the gravity of the situation, Sergeant Gonzalez exposed himself to the enemy fire and moved his platoon along the east side of a bordering rice paddy to a dike directly across from the bunker. Though fully aware of the danger involved, he moved to the fire-swept road and destroyed the hostile position with hand grenades. Although seriously wounded again on 3 February, he steadfastly refused medical treatment and continued to supervise his men and lead the attack. On 4 February, the enemy had again pinned the company down, inflicting heavy casualties with automatic weapons and rocket fire. Sergeant Gonzalez, utilizing a number of light antitank assault weapons, fearlessly moved from position to position firing numerous rounds at the heavily fortified enemy emplacements. He successfully knocked out a rocket position and suppressed much of the enemy fire before falling mortally wounded. The heroism, courage, and dynamic leadership displayed by Sergeant Gonzalez reflected great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

SECOND LIEUTENANT TERRENCE COLLINSON GRAVES
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as a Platoon Commander with the Third Force Reconnaissance Company, Third Reconnaissance Battalion, Third Marine Division, in the Republic of Vietnam on 16 February 1968. While on a long-range reconnaissance mission Lieutenant Graves' eight-man patrol observed seven enemy soldiers: approaching their position. Reacting instantly, he deployed his men, and directed their fire on the approaching enemy. After the fire had ceased, he and two patrol members commenced a search of the area, and suddenly came under a heavy volume of hostile small arms and automatic weapons fire from a numerically superior enemy force. When one of his men was hit by the enemy fire, Lieutenant Graves moved through the fire-swept area to his radio and, while directing suppressive fire from his men, requested air support and adjusted a heavy volume of artillery and helicopter gunship fire upon the enemy. After attending the wounded, Lieutenant Graves, accompanied by another Marine, moved from his relatively safe position to confirm the results of the earlier engagement. Observing that several of the enemy were still alive, he launched a determined assault, eliminating the remaining enemy troops. He then began moving the patrol to a landing zone for extraction, when the unit again came under intense fire which wounded two more Marines and Lieutenant Graves. Refusing medical attention, he once more adjusted air strikes and artillery fire upon the enemy while directing the fire of his men. He led his men to a new landing site into which he skillfully guided the incoming aircraft and boarded his men while remaining exposed to the hostile fire. Realizing that one of the wounded had not embarked, he directed the aircraft to depart and, along with another Marine, moved to the side of the casualty. Confronted with a shortage of ammunition, Lieutenant Graves utilized supporting arms and directed fire until a second helicopter arrived. At this point, the volume of enemy fire intensified, hitting the helicopter and causing it to crash shortly after liftoff. All on board were killed. Lieutenant Graves' outstanding courage, superb leadership and indomitable fighting spirit throughout the day were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Services. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS RALPH H. JOHNSON
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a reconnaissance scout with Company A, First Reconnaissance Battalion, First Marine Division in action against the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong forces in the Republic of Vietnam. In the early morning hours of 5 March 1968, during Operation Rock, Private First Class Johnson was a member of a fifteen-man reconnaissance patrol manning an observation post on Hill 146 overlooking the Quan Duc Duc Valley deep in enemy controlled territory. They were attacked by a platoon-size hostile force employing automatic weapons, satchel charges and hand grenades. Suddenly, a hand grenade landed in the three-man fighting hole occupied by Private Johnson and two fellow Marines. Realizing the inherent danger to his two comrades, he shouted a warning and unhesitatingly hurled himself upon the explosive device. When the grenade exploded, Private Johnson absorbed the tremendous impact of the blast and was killed instantly. His prompt and heroic act saved the life of one Marine at the cost of his own and undoubtedly prevented the enemy from penetrating his sector of the patrol's perimeter. Private Johnson's courage, inspiring valor and selfless devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

CAPTAIN JAMES E. LIVINGSTON
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Commanding Officer, Company E, Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade in action against enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam. On 2 May 1968, Company E launched a determined assault on the heavily fortified village of Dai Do, which had been seized by the enemy on the preceding evening, isolating a Marine company from the remainder of the battalion. Skillfully employing screening agents, Captain Livingston maneuvered his men to assault positions across 500 meters of dangerous open rice paddy while under intense enemy fire. Ignoring hostile rounds impacting near him, he fearlessly led his men in a savage assault against enemy emplacements within the village. While adjusting supporting arms fire, Captain Livingston moved to the points of heaviest resistance, shouting words of encouragement to his Marines, directing their fire, and spurring the dwindling momentum of the attack on repeated occasions. Although twice painfully wounded by grenade fragments, he refused medical treatment and courageously led his men in the destruction of over 100 mutually supporting bunkers, driving the remaining enemy from their positions, and relieving the pressure on the stranded Marine company. As the two companies consolidated positions and evacuated casualties, a third company passed through friendly lines, launching an assault on the adjacent village of Dinh To, only to be halted by a furious counterattack of an enemy battalion. Swiftly assessing the situation and disregarding the heavy volume of enemy fire, Captain Livingston boldly maneuvered the remaining effective men of his company forward, joined forces with the heavily engaged Marines, and halted the enemy's counterattack. Wounded a third time and unable to walk, he steadfastly remained in the dangerously exposed area, deploying his men to more tenable positions and supervising the evacuation of casualties. Only when assured of the safety of his men did he allow himself to be evacuated. Captain Livingston's gallant actions uphold the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

CORPORAL LARRY LEONARD MAXAM
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a fire team leader with Company D, First Battalion, Fourth Marines, Third Marine Division in the Republic of Vietnam. On 2 February 1968, the Cam Lo District Headquarters came under extremely heavy rocket, artillery, mortar, and recoilless rifle fire from a numerically superior enemy force, destroying a portion of the defensive perimeter. Corporal Maxam, observing the enemy massing for an assault into the compound across the remaining defensive wire, instructed his Assistant Fire Team Leader to take charge of the fire team, and unhesitatingly proceeded to the weakened section of the perimeter. Completely exposed to the concentrated enemy fire, he sustained multiple fragmentation wounds from exploding grenades as he ran to an abandoned machine gun position. Reaching the emplacements, he grasped the machine gun and commenced to deliver effective fire on the advancing enemy. As the enemy directed maximum fire power against the determined Marine, Corporal Maxam's position received a direct hit from a rocket propelled grenade, knocking him backwards and inflicting severe fragmentation wounds to his face and right eye. Although momentarily stunned and in intense pain, Corporal Maxam courageously resumed his firing position and subsequently was struck again by small arms fire. With resolute determination, he gallantly continued to deliver intense machine gun fire, causing the enemy to retreat through the defensive wire to positions of cover. In a desperate attempt to silence his weapon, the North Vietnamese threw hand grenades and directed recoilless rifle fire against him, inflicting two additional wounds. Too weak to reload his machine gun, Corporal Maxam fell to a prone position and valiantly continued to deliver effective fire with his rifle. After one and a half hours, during which he was hit repeatedly by fragments from exploding grenades, and concentrated small arms fire, he succumbed to his wounds, having successfully defended nearly one-half of the perimeter single-handedly. Corporal Maxam's aggressive fighting spirit, inspiring valor and selfless devotion to duty reflected great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps and upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

STAFF SERGEANT KARL GORMAN TAYLOR, SR.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a company gunnery sergeant during Operation Meade River in the Republic of Vietnam on the night of 8 December 1968. Informed that the commander of the lead platoon had been mortally wounded when his unit was pinned down by a heavy volume of enemy fire, Staff Sergeant Taylor along with another Marine, crawled forward to the beleaguered unit through a hail of hostile fire, shouted encouragement and instructions to the men, and deployed them to covered positions. With his companion, he then repeatedly maneuvered across an open area to rescue those Marines who were too seriously wounded to move by themselves. Upon learning that there were still other seriously wounded men lying in another open area, in proximity to an enemy machine gun position, Staff Sergeant Taylor, accompanied by four comrades, led his men forward across the fire-swept terrain in an attempt to rescue the Marines. When his group was halted by devastating fire, he directed his companions to return to the company command post; whereupon he took his grenade launcher and, in full view of the enemy, charged across the open rice paddy toward the machine gun position, firing his weapon as he ran. Although wounded several times, he succeeded in reaching the machine gun bunker and silenced the fire from that sector, moments before he was mortally wounded. Directly instrumental in saving the lives of several of his fellow Marines, Staff Sergeant Taylor, by his indomitable courage, inspiring leadership, and selfless dedication, upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and of the United States Naval Service.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

MAJOR M. SANDO VARGAS, JR.*
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Commanding Officer, Company G, Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade in action against enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam from 30 April to 2 May 1968. On 1 May 1968, though suffering from wounds he had incurred while relocating his unit under heavy enemy fire the preceding day, Major (then Captain) Vargas combined Company G with two other companies and led his men in an attack on the fortified village of Dai Do. Exercising expert leadership, he maneuvered his Marines across 700 meters of open rice paddy while under intense enemy mortar, rocket and artillery fire and obtained a foothold in two hedgerows on the enemy perimeter, only to have elements of his company become pinned down by the intense enemy fire. Leading his reserve platoon to the aid of his beleaguered men, Major Vargas inspired his men to renew their relentless advance, while destroying a number of enemy bunkers. Again wounded by grenade fragments, he refused aid as he moved about the hazardous area reorganizing his unit into a strong defense perimeter at the edge of the village. Shortly after the objective was secured, the enemy commenced a series of counterattacks and probes which lasted throughout the night but were unsuccessful as the gallant defenders of Company G stood firm in their hard-won enclave. Reinforced the following morning, the Marines launched a renewed assault through Dai Do on the village of Dinh To, to which the enemy retaliated with a massive counterattack resulting in hand-to-hand combat. Major Vargas remained in the open, encouraging and rendering assistance to his Marines when he was hit for the third time in the three-day battle. Observing his battalion commander sustain a serious wound, he disregarded his excruciating pain, crossed the fire-swept area and carried his commander to a covered position, then resumed supervising and encouraging his men while simultaneously assisting in organizing the battalion's perimeter defense. His gallant actions upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

* On 26 December 1973, Major Vargas legally changed his name from Manuel Sando Vargas to Jay R. Vargas.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS DEWAYNE T. WILLIAMS
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a rifleman with the First Platoon, Company H, Second Battalion, First Marines, First Marine Division in action against communist insurgent forces in the Quang Nam Province, Republic of Vietnam. Private First Class Williams was a member of a combat patrol sent out from the platoon with the mission of establishing positions in the company's area of operations, from which it could intercept and destroy enemy sniper teams operating in the area. On the night of 18 September 1968, as the patrol was preparing to move from its daylight positions to a preselected night position, it was attacked from ambush by a squad of enemy using small arms and hand grenades. Although severely wounded in the back by the close intense fire, Private First Class Williams, recognizing the danger to the patrol, immediately began to crawl forward toward a good firing position. While he was moving under the continuing intense fire, he heard one of the members of the patrol sound the alert that an enemy grenade had landed in their position. Reacting instantly to the alert, he saw that the grenade had landed close to where he was lying and without hesitation, in a valiant act of heroism, he rolled on top of the grenade as it exploded, absorbing the full and tremendous impact of the explosion with his own body. Through his extraordinary initiative and inspiring valor in the face of certain death, he saved the other members of his patrol from serious injury and possible loss of life, and enabled them to successfully defeat the attackers and hold their position until assistance arrived. His personal heroism and devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL KENNETH L. WORLEY
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a machine gunner with Company L, Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine Division in action against enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam. After establishing a night ambush position in a house in the Bo Ban Hamlet of Quang Nam Province, security was set up and the remainder of the patrol members retired until their respective watches. During the early morning hours of 12 August 1968, the Marines were abruptly awakened by the platoon leader's warning that "Grenades" had landed in the house. Fully realizing the inevitable result of his actions, Lance Corporal Worley, in a valiant act of heroism, instantly threw himself upon the grenade nearest him and his comrades, absorbing with his own body, the full and tremendous force of the explosion. Through his extraordinary initiative and inspiring valor in the face of almost certain death, he saved his comrades from serious injury and possible loss of life although five of his fellow Marines incurred minor wounds as the other grenades exploded. Lance Corporal Worley's gallant actions upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

Appendix E

Distribution of Personnel

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL*

FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

27 JANUARY 1968

UNIT	NOTE	ASSIGNED STRENGTH	STR RPT DATE	DANANG	CHU LAI	PHU BAI	DONG HA	OKINAWA	JAPAN	HAWAII	EASTPAC	OTHER
		USMC USN		USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN
HEADQUARTERS												
HQ, FMF, PAC		74	1 24AUG67					74	1			
FMF, PAC (FWD)		1228	31 18JAN68							1228	31	
HAS BN, FMF, PAC		1075	118 23JAN68					1075	118			
CAMP S. M. BUTLER		1404	23JAN68					1404				
CASUAL/TRANSIENT		89	2 18JAN68							89	2	
HQ, V MEF		78	5 18JAN68							78	5	
1ST CIV AFF GRP												
HQ, 5TH MAR DIV		1491	49 18JAN68							1491	49	
HQBN, 5TH MAR DIV												
HQ, FORTRPS, FMF, PAC		302	17 18JAN68								102	17
HQ CO, FORTRPS												
HQ, 1ST MAR BRIG		202	17 18JAN68							202	17	
HQ CO, 1ST MAR BRIG												
HQ, 9TH MAB		508	12 18JAN68					508	12			
HQ CO, 9TH MAB												
HQ, III MAF		726	29 13DEC67	726	29							
HAS CO, III MAF		777	55 13DEC67	777	55							
1ST & 2D CAS	4											
HQ, 1ST MAR DIV		1718	34 10JAN68	1718	34							
HQBN, 1ST MAR DIV												
HQ, 3D MAR DIV		1949	34 27DEC67			1949	34					
HQBN, 3D MAR DIV												
INFANTRY												
1ST MARINES												
HQ CO		259	7 10JAN68			259	7					
1ST BATTALION		1220	34 10JAN68					1220	34			
2D BATTALION		1159	56 10JAN68					1159	56			
3D BATTALION	1	1718	95 27DEC67								1718	95
3D MARINES												
HQ CO		219	5 27DEC67					219	5			
1ST BATTALION		1267	93 27DEC67					1267	93			
2D BATTALION		1154	55 10JAN68	1154	56							
3D BATTALION		1230	65 27DEC67					1230	65			
4TH MARINES												
HQ CO		237	5 27DEC67					237	5			
1ST BATTALION		1168	66 27DEC67					1168	66			
2D BATTALION	1	1799	96 27DEC67								1799	96
3D BATTALION		1178	64 27DEC67					1178	64			
5TH MARINES												
HQ CO		233	5 10JAN68			233	5					
1ST BATTALION		1011	43 10JAN68					1011	43			
2D BATTALION		1092	53 10JAN68					1092	53			
3D BATTALION		1132	55 10JAN68	1132	55							
7TH MARINES												
HQ CO		250	7 10JAN68	250	7							
1ST BATTALION		1075	54 10JAN68	1075	54							
2D BATTALION		903	52 10JAN68	903	52							
3D BATTALION		1341	54 10JAN68	1341	54							
9TH MARINES												
HQ CO		216	5 27DEC67					216	5			
1ST BATTALION		1133	59 27DEC67					1133	59			
2D BATTALION		1227	65 27DEC67					1227	65			
3D BATTALION		1170	57 27DEC67					1170	57			
26TH MARINES												
HQ CO		450	16 10JAN68					450	16			
1ST BATTALION		1236	65 10JAN68					1236	65			
2D BATTALION		1186	68 10JAN68					1186	68			
3D BATTALION		1212	64 10JAN68					1212	64			
27TH MARINES												
HQ CO		217	4 18JAN68							217	4	
1ST BATTALION	3	1509	66 18JAN68							1509	66	
2D BATTALION		1044	33 18JAN68							1044	33	
3D BATTALION		1044	32 18JAN68							1044	32	
28TH MARINES												
HQ CO		299	5 18JAN68							299	5	
1ST BATTALION		999	32 18JAN68							999	32	
2D BATTALION		1000	30 18JAN68							1000	30	
3D BATTALION		999	32 18JAN68							999	32	
ARTILLERY												
11TH MARINES												
HQ BTRY		295	7 10JAN68	295	7							
1ST BATTALION		460	12 10JAN68					460	12			
2D BATTALION		515	13 10JAN68	515	13							
3D BATTALION		595	14 10JAN68	595	14							
4TH BATTALION		491	13 10JAN68	491	13							
12TH MARINES												
HQ BTRY		320	11 27DEC67					320	11			
1ST BATTALION		753	15 27DEC67					753	15			
2D BATTALION		489	6 27DEC67					489	6			
3D BATTALION		582	10 27DEC67			582	10					
4TH BATTALION		528	12 27DEC67			528	12					

* UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, STRENGTHS AND LOCATION ARE THOSE REPORTED BY UNIT PERSONNEL STATUS REPORTS AND DO NOT REFLECT DAY-TO-DAY ADJUSTMENTS BETWEEN REPORTING PERIODS.

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL

FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

27 JANUARY 1968

UNIT	NOTE	ASSIGNED STRENGTH		STR RPT DATE	DANANG		CHU LAI		PHU RAI		DONG HA		OKINAWA		JAPAN		HAWAII		EASTPAC		OTHER	
		USMC	USN		USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN
13TH MARINES																						
HQ BTRY		259	6	18JAN68															259	6		
1ST BATTALION		388	8	16JAN67							389	8										
2D BATTALION		409	10	18JAN68															409	10		
3D BATTALION		614	15	18JAN68															614	15		
4TH BATTALION		364	8	18JAN68															364	8		
HQ BTRY, 1ST MAG		111	2	27DEC67					111	2												
HQ BTRY, 5TH MAG		153	5	30NOV67															153	5		
1ST 155MM GUN BTRY		126	3	27DEC67					126	3												
3D 155MM GUN BTRY		148	3	10JAN68	148	3																
5TH 155MM GUN BTRY		150	3	27DEC67	150	3																
7TH 155MM GUN BTRY		162	3	23NOV67															162	3		
1ST B" HOW BTRY		84	2	30NOV67					84	2												
3D B" HOW BTRY		201	3	10JAN68	201	3																
5TH B" HOW BTRY		213	2	30NOV67															213	2		
1ST SEARCH LIGHT BTRY		97	2	27DEC67							97	2										
RECONNAISSANCE																						
1ST RECON BN		689	30	10JAN68	689	30																
3D RECON BN		772	55	27DEC67					772	55												
5TH RECON BN		223	14	18JAN68									36	1					287	13		
1ST FORCE RECON CO		160	7	10JAN68	160	7																
3D FORCE RECON CO		162	2	27DEC67							162											
5TH FORCE RECON CO		107	2	18JAN68															107	2		
ANTI-TANK																						
1ST AT BN		221	5	31DEC67	221	5																
3D AT BN		122	4	27DEC67					122	4												
5TH AT BN		273	7	18JAN68									49	1					224	6		
TANK																						
1ST TANK BN		686	15	10JAN68	686	15																
3D TANK BN		569	15	27DEC67					569	15												
5TH TANK BN		604	11	18JAN68									71	1					533	10		
AMTRAC																						
1ST AMTRAC BN		720	24	27DEC67							720	24										
3D AMTRAC BN		578	12	10JAN68	578	12																
5TH AMTRAC BN		685	17	18JAN68									110	3					575	16		
1ST ARM AMPHIB CO		266	3	10JAN68	266	3																
ENGINEER																						
1ST ENGR BN		678	16	10JAN68	678	16																
3D ENGR BN		621	14	27DEC67					621	14												
5TH ENGR BN		524	11	18JAN68									31	1					493	10		
7TH ENGR BN		933	22	10JAN68	933	22																
9TH ENGR BN		975	17	10JAN68			975	17														
11TH ENGR BN		1017	26	27DEC67							1017	26										
13TH ENGR BN		983	16	18JAN68															983	16		
1ST BRIDGE CO		148		10JAN68	148																	
3D BRIDGE CO		144		10JAN68	144																	
5TH BRIDGE CO		154	2	18JAN68															154	2		
MOTOR TRANSPORT																						
1ST MT BN		253	6	10JAN68	253	6																
3D MT BN		386	8	27DEC67					386	8												
5TH MT BN		208	7	18JAN68									11	1					197	6		
7TH MT BN		401	3	10JAN68	401	3																
9TH MT BN		386	9	27DEC67							386	9										
11TH MT BN		354	7	10JAN68	354	7																
13TH MT BN		381	7	18JAN68															381	7		
COMMUNICATION																						
1ST RADIO BN		462	2	13DEC67	242																	
5TH COMM BN		744	8	10JAN68	744	8																
7TH COMM BN		654	13	10JAN68	654	13																
9TH COMM BN		624	3	18JAN68									197	2								
1ST ANGLICO	2	340	13	18JAN68															427	1	225	10
SHORE PARTY																						
1ST SP BN		424	15	10JAN68	424	15																
3D SP BN		395	27	27DEC67					395	27												
5TH SP BN		317	20	18JAN68									20	5					297	15		
MILITARY POLICE																						
1ST MP BN		710	8	10JAN68	710	8																
3D MP BN		752	14	10JAN68	752	14																
5TH MP BN		363	6	18JAN68															363	6		
SERVICE/SUPPORT																						
PLC, III MAF																						
H&S BN		1523	59	10JAN68	1523	59																
SUPPLY BN		1448	17	10JAN68	1448	17																
7TH SEP BK FUEL CO		128	9	10JAN68	128	9																
MAINT BN		1068	1	10JAN68	1068	1																
PLSG-A/3D SERV BN		1181	25	10JAN68					1181	25												
PLSG-B/1ST SERV BN		1529	28	10JAN68							1529	28										
3D FSR																						
H&S BN		941	33	18JAN68									941	33								
SUPPLY BN		1197	15	18JAN68									1197	15								
MAINT BN		1018		18JAN68									1018									
5TH FSR																						
H&S BN		518	34	19JAN68															518	34		
SUPPLY BN		575	23	19JAN68															575	23		
MAINT BN		643		18JAN68															643			
5TH SERVICE BN		258	18	18JAN68																		
PROV SERVICE BN, 9TH MAB		547	10	18JAN68									547	10								
9TH SEP BULK FUEL CO		293		18JAN68															293			

27 JANUARY 1958

AVIATION UNITS

[illegible]

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL

FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

27 JANUARY 1968

UNIT	NOTE	ASSIGNED STRENGTH		STR RPT DATE	DANANG		CHU LAI		PHU BAI		DONG HA		OKINAWA		JAPAN		HAWAII		EASTPAC		OTHER	
		USMC	USN		USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN
1ST BRIG																						
H&MS 1ST BRIGADE		92		18JAN68													92					
MMCS-7		210		18JAN68													210					
VNF (AM)-212		227	1	18JAN68													227	1				
3D MAW																						
MMHC-3																						
H&MS-3		651	7	18JAN68															651	7		
MMFS-3		195		18JAN68															195			
MMCS-3		152		18JAN68															152			
MMTC-30																						
H&MS-30		412	1	18JAN68															412	1		
MMTC-301		262	1	18JAN68															262	1		
MMTC-302		247	1	18JAN68															247	1		
MAG-33																						
H&MS-33		805		18JAN68															805			
M&BS-33		588	2	18JAN68															588	2		
MATCU-65		85		18JAN68															85			
VMC-3		425	1	18JAN68															425	1		
VMA-214		246	1	11JAN68															246	1		
VMA-232		225	1	11JAN68															225	1		
VMA-334		361	2	11JAN68															361	2		
MMSC-37																						
H&MS-37		689	3	18JAN68															689	3		
MMSC-37		292	103	18JAN68															292	103		
VNCR-352		453	1	18JAN68															453	1		
MACG-38																						
H&MS-38		241		11JAN68															241			
MACS-5		205		18JAN68															205			
MACS-1		316		18JAN68															316			
MACS-3		246		18JAN68															246			
MACS-7		265	4	18JAN68															265	4		
5TH LAAM BN		518	9	18JAN68															518	9		
MAG-56																						
H&MS-56		384	1	18JAN68															384	1		
M&BS-56																						
VMO-5		438	3	18JAN68															438	3		
MMH-462		255		11JAN68															255			
MMH-263		180	3	11JAN68															180	3		
MMTCU-74		29		18JAN68															29			
USMC		28,047			7,590	4,380	2,171		710	1,011	1,886		623	9,235	441							
USN		815			152	80	36		5	69	323		1	144	5							
AVIATION TOTAL		28,862			7,742	4,460	2,207		715	1,080	2,209		624	9,379	446							

RECAPITULATION OF FMFPAC PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION

		ASSIGNED STRENGTH	DANANG	CHU LAI	PHU BAI	DONG HA	OKINAWA	JAPAN	HAWAII	EASTPAC	OTHER
GROUND TOTAL	USMC	89,305	24,876	1,011	10,028	21,657	7,549		3,279	17,163	3,742
	USN	4,341	1,208	110	709	934	271		129	789	191
AVIATION TOTAL	USMC	28,047	7,590	4,380	2,171	710	1,011	1,886	623	9,235	441
	USN	815	152	80	36	5	69	323	1	144	5
GRAND TOTAL	USMC	117,352	32,466	5,391	12,199	22,367	8,560	1,886	3,902	26,398	4,183
	USN	5,156	1,360	190	745	939	340	323	130	933	196

- NOTES:**
- FIGURES IN "OTHER" ASSIGNED TO SLF'S AND ARE BLT STRENGTHS
 - FIGURES IN "OTHER" ASSIGNED VARIOUS RVN LOCATIONS.
 - STRENGTHS INDICATED IS FOR BLT 1/27
 - AT VARIOUS I CTZ LOCATIONS,

FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

DOD DIR 5200.10

30 DECEMBER 1968

UNIT	NOTE	ASSIGNED STRENGTH	STR RPT DATE	DANANG	CHU LAI	PHU BAI	No I CTZ	OKINAWA	JAPAN	HAWAII	EASTPAC	OTHER
HEADQUARTERS												
HQ, FMF, PAC												
FMF, PAC (FWD)		74	1	24JUL68				74	1			
HAS BN, FMF, PAC	4	1624	50	18DEC68						1507	50	120
CAMP S. D. BUTLER		866	137	28DEC68				866	137			
CASUAL		580		28DEC68				580				
HOSPITALIZED	7	955		28DEC68				472	483			
HQ, V NEP												
1ST CIVAFFORD		66	7	78DEC68							66	7
HQ, 5TH MAR DIV												
HQBN, 5TH MAR DIV	4	1408	37	18DEC68							1363	37
											194	22
HQ, FORTRPS, FMF, PAC												
HQ CO, FORTRPS	4	438	22	18DEC68								
HQ, 1ST MAR BRIG												
HQ CO, 1ST MAR BRIG		223	8	18DEC68						223	8	
HQ, 9TH MAB												
HQ CO, 9TH MAB		508	19	18DEC68				508	19			
HQ, III MAF												
HAS CO, III MAF	4	989	11	18DEC68	977	11						12
2D CAG	2	781	42	18DEC68	761	42	367	31				
1D CAG		252	32	18DEC68			252	32				20
4TH CAG		267	21	18DEC68			267	21				
HQ, 1ST MAR DIV												
HQ BN, 1ST MAR DIV	4	1948	37	18DEC68	1902	37						46
HQ, 3D MAR DIV												
HQBN, 3D MAR DIV	4	1946	37	18DEC68			1930	37				16
INFANTRY												
1ST MARINES												
HQ CO		245	8	18DEC68	245	8						
1ST BATTALION		1071	59	18DEC68	1071	59						
2D BATTALION		1088	53	18DEC68	1088	53						
3D BATTALION		1068	61	18DEC68	1068	61						
3D MARINES												
HQ CO		230	6	18DEC68	230	6						
1ST BATTALION		1187	50	18DEC68	1187	50						
2D BATTALION		1168	58	18DEC68			1168	58				
3D BATTALION		1169	59	18DEC68	1169	59						
4TH MARINES												
HQ CO		218	5	18DEC68			218	5				
1ST BATTALION		1118	49	18DEC68			1118	49				
2D BATTALION		1150	56	18DEC68			1150	56				
3D BATTALION		1170	52	18DEC68			1170	52				
5TH MARINES												
HQ CO		245	7	18DEC68	245	7						
1ST BATTALION		1092	53	18DEC68	1092	53						
2D BATTALION		1121	53	18DEC68	1121	53						
3D BATTALION		1086	46	18DEC68	1086	46						
7TH MARINES												
HQ CO		242	6	18DEC68	242	6						
1ST BATTALION		1057	56	18DEC68	1057	56						
2D BATTALION		1045	113	18DEC68	1045	113						
3D BATTALION		1084	56	18DEC68	1084	56						
9TH MARINES												
HQ CO		233	6	18DEC68			233	6				
1ST BATTALION		1157	50	18DEC68			1157	50				
2D BATTALION		1150	52	18DEC68			1150	52				
3D BATTALION		1157	47	18DEC68			1157	47				
26TH MARINES												
HQ CO		477	12	18DEC68	238	6		239	6			
1ST BATTALION		1097	57	18DEC68	1097	57						
2D BATTALION		1479	97	18DEC68							1479	97
3D BATTALION		1229	66	18DEC68	1229	66						
27TH MARINES												
HQ CO		235	7	18DEC68							235	7
1ST BATTALION		756	88	18DEC68					756	88		
2D BATTALION		1097	12	18DEC68							1097	12
3D BATTALION		1181	32	18DEC68							1181	32
28TH MARINES												
HQ CO		267	6	18DEC68							267	6
1ST BATTALION		1176	46	18DEC68							1176	46
2D BATTALION		1167	41	18DEC68							1167	41
3D BATTALION		1334	41	18DEC68							1334	41
ARTILLERY												
11TH MARINES												
HQ BTRY		309	9	18DEC68	309	9						
1ST BATTALION		632	18	18DEC68	632	18						
2D BATTALION		658	18	18DEC68	658	18						
3D BATTALION		413	12	18DEC68	413	12						
4TH BATTALION		518	12	18DEC68	518	12						
12TH MARINES												
HQ BTRY		285	12	18DEC68	285	12						
1ST BATTALION		571	17	18DEC68	571	17						
2D BATTALION		1161	51	18DEC68	1161	51						
3D BATTALION		852	21	18DEC68	852	21						
4TH BATTALION		533	12	18DEC68	533	12						

* UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, STRENGTHS AND LOCATION ARE THOSE REPORTED BY UNIT PERSONNEL STATUS REPORTS AND DO NOT REFLECT DAY-TO-DAY ADJUSTMENTS BETWEEN REPORTING PERIODS.

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL

FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

20 DECEMBER 1968

UNIT	NOTE	ASSIGNED STRENGTH		STR RPT DATE	DARANG		CHU LAI		PHU BAI		No I CTZ		OKINAWA		JAPAN		HAWAII		EASTPAC		OTHER	
		USMC	USN		USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN
13TH MARINES																						
HQ BTRY		280	6	18DEC68															280	6		
1ST BATTALION		511	12	18DEC68	511	12																
2D BATTALION		407	8	18DEC68															407	8		
3D BATTALION		556	16	18DEC68															556	16		
4TH BATTALION		400	11	18DEC68															400	11		
HQ BTRY, 1ST FAG		124	2	18DEC68	124	2																
HQ BTRY, 5TH FAG		115	4	18DEC68																		
1ST 155MM GUN BTRY		130	3	18DEC68	130	3																
3D 155MM GUN BTRY		145	3	18DEC68	145	3																
5TH 155MM GUN BTRY		186	8	18DEC68							186	8										
7TH 155MM GUN BTRY		104	2	18DEC68															104	2		
1ST 8" HOW BTRY		195	6	18DEC68							195	6										
3D 8" HOW BTRY		211	4	18DEC68	211	4																
5TH 8" HOW BTRY		126	2	18DEC68																	126	2
1ST SEARCH LIGHT BTRY		97	2	18DEC68							97	2										
RECONNAISSANCE																						
1ST RECON BN		773	48	18DEC68	773	48																
3D RECON BN		751	52	18DEC68							751	52										
5TH RECON BN		254	15	18DEC68	70								5						276	15		
1ST FORCE RECON CO		164	8	18DEC68	164	8																
3D FORCE RECON CO		142		18DEC68							142											
5TH FORCE RECON CO		134	2	18DEC68															134	2		
ANTI-TANK																						
1ST AT BN	6																					
3D AT BN	6																					
5TH AT BN		267	8	18DEC68									54	1					213	7		
TANK																						
1ST TANK BN		762	18	18DEC68	762	18																
3D TANK BN		763	19	18DEC68							763	19										
5TH TANK BN		625	13	18DEC68															625	13		
AMTRAC																						
1ST AMTRAC BN		715	30	18DEC68							715	30										
3D AMTRAC BN		633	15	18DEC68	633	15																
5TH AMTRAC BN		628	15	18DEC68									125	5					573	10		
1ST ARM AMPHIB CO		228	5	18DEC68	228	5																
ENGINEER																						
1ST ENGR BN		782	11	18DEC68	782	11																
3D ENGR BN		774	15	18DEC68							773	15										
5TH ENGR BN		548	12	18DEC68									13	1					515	11		
7TH ENGR BN		1009	25	18DEC68	1009	25																
9TH ENGR BN		948	23	18DEC68			948	23														
11TH ENGR BN		1184	30	18DEC68							1184	30										
13TH ENGR BN		844	15																844	15		
1ST BRIDGE CO	5																					
3D BRIDGE CO	5																					
5TH BRIDGE CO		149	2	18DEC68															149	2		
MOTOR TRANSPORT																						
1ST MT BN		322	7	18DEC68	322	7																
3D MT BN		334	9	18DEC68							334	9										
5TH MT BN		371	5	18DEC68															371	5		
7TH MT BN		398	3	18DEC68	398	3																
9TH MT BN		384	10	18DEC68							384	10										
11TH MT BN		451	11	18DEC68	451	11																
13TH MT BN		415	7	18DEC68																	415	7
COMMUNICATION																						
1ST RADIO BN		495	2	18DEC68	408	2											87					
5TH COMM BN		665	5	18DEC68	665	5																
7TH COMM BN		663	12	18DEC68	663	12																
9TH COMM BN		397	9	18DEC68																	397	9
1ST ANGLICO	3	277	11	18DEC68													143	5			134	6
SHORE PARTY																						
1ST SP BN		430	25	18DEC68	430	25																
3D SP BN		494	23	18DEC68							494	23										
5TH SP BN		282	24	18DEC68	90								5	6					187	18		
MILITARY POLICE																						
1ST MP BN		693	14	18DEC68	693	14																
3D MP BN		747	13	18DEC68	747	13																
5TH MP BN		469	5	18DEC68															469	5		
SERVICE/SUPPORT																						
FLC, III MAP																						
HQ, FLC/1ST FSR		1693	45	18DEC68	1693	45																
HAS BN		1621	25	18DEC68	1621	25																
SUPPLY BN																						
7TH SEP BK FUEL CO		1030	11	18DEC68	1030	11																
MAINT BN																						
FLSC-A/3D SERV BN		1234	20	18DEC68							1234	20										
FLSC-B/1ST SERV BN		1359	17	18DEC68	1359	17																
3D FSR																						
HAS BN		1102	34	18DEC68									1102	34								
SUPPLY BN		467	20	18DEC68									467	20								
MAINT BN		1093		18DEC68									1093									
5TH FSR																						
HAS BN		400	23	18DEC68															400	23		
SUPPLY BN		399	18	18DEC68															399	18		
MAINT BN		520		18DEC68															520			
5TH SERVICE BN		715	15	18DEC68															715	15		
PROV SERVICE BN, 9TH MAB		947	18	18DEC68									947	18								
9TH SEP BULK FUEL CO		321		18DEC68															321			

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL

FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

30 DECEMBER 1968

UNIT	NOTE	ASSIGNED STRENGTH	STR RPT DATE	DANANG	CHU LAI	PHU BAI	No I CTZ	OKINAWA	JAPAN	HAWAII	EASTPAC	OTHER
		USMC USN		USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN
MEDICAL												
1ST MED BN		148 264	18DEC68	148 264								
3D MED BN		133 349	18DEC68			133 349						
5TH MED BN		101 158	18DEC68								101 158	
1ST HOSP CO		43 72	18DEC68	43 72								
5TH HOSP CO		30 48	18DEC68								30 48	
1ST DENTAL CO		84	18DEC68	84								
3D DENTAL CO		88	18DEC68		88							
5TH DENTAL CO		14	18DEC68								14	
11TH DENTAL CO		3 71	18DEC68	3 71								
13TH DENTAL CO		36	18DEC68								36	
15TH DENTAL CO		3 42	18DEC68								3 42	
17TH DENTAL CO		3 61	18DEC68								3 61	
	USMC	91,065		41,982	1,315	769	17,586	6,570	483	2,716	17,528	2,116
	USN	4,458		1,922	142	391	647	248		151	854	103
GROUND TOTAL		95,523		43,904	1,457	1,160	18,233	6,818	483	2,867	18,382	2,219

AVIATION UNITS

HQ SQDN FMFPAC	61	18DEC68								61		
1ST MAW												
MAWG-1												
MAWS-1	719 34	18DEC68	719 34									
MAWS-1	133	18DEC68	133									
MAWS-1	289	18DEC68	289									
MAWG-17												
MAWS-17	664 22	18DEC68	664 22									
MAWS-17	209	18DEC68	209									
MACG-18												
MAWS-18	246	18DEC68	246									
MAWS-2	254 3	18DEC68	254 3									
MAWS-3	223 2	18DEC68		223 2								
MAWS-4	347 3	18DEC68	347 3									
1ST LAAM BN	719 14	18DEC68	719 14									
MAG-11												
MAWS-11	414	18DEC68	414									
MAWS-11	349 26	18DEC68	349 26									
VMCJ-1	394 1	18DEC68	394 1									
VMA-542	312 1	18DEC68	312 1									
VMA(AW)-242	333	18DEC68	333									
VMA-334	355 1	18DEC68	355 1									
MAG-12												
MAWS-12	579 1	18DEC68	579 1									
MAWS-12	508 32	18DEC68	508 32									
MATCU-67	86	18DEC68	86									
VMA-121	192 1	18DEC68	192 1									
VMA-111	197 1	18DEC68	197 1									
VMA-223	190 1	18DEC68	190 1									
VMA-311	189 1	18DEC68	189 1									
VMA(AW)-533	307 1	18DEC68	307 1									
MAG-13												
MAWS-13	521	18DEC68	521									
MAWS-13	480 26	18DEC68	480 26									
VMA-115	280 2	18DEC68	280 2									
VMA-314	277 1	18DEC68	277 1									
VMA-323	280 1	18DEC68	280 1									
MAG-16												
MAWS-16	570	18DEC68	570									
MAWS-16	725 27	18DEC68	725 27									
MATCU-62	82	18DEC68					82					
MATCU-68	79	18DEC68				79						
VMD-2	261 1	18DEC68	261 1									
MM-167	243	18DEC68	243									
MM-164	243	18DEC68	243									
MM-463	326 1	18DEC68	326 1									
MM-165	208 4	18DEC68	208 4									
MM-264	222 1	18DEC68	222 1									
MAG-36												
MM-265	235 1	18DEC68			235 1							
MAWS-36	490	18DEC68			310	180						
MAWS-36	539 23	18DEC68			331 23	208						
MATCU-62 DET "A"	82	18DEC68				82						
MM-462	203 1	18DEC68			203 1							
MM-363	254 4	18DEC68			254 4							
MM-367	202 1	18DEC68			202 1							
PROVMAG-39/PROV MAWS-39	441 20	18DEC68				441 20						
VMD-6	250 1	18DEC68				250 1						
MM-161	250 1	18DEC68				250 1						
MM-262	238	18DEC68				238						
9TH MAB												
MAWS-15	442	18DEC68					64		378			
MAWS-15	284 25	18DEC68						294 25				
MM-5-B	240 1	18DEC68					240 1					
VMA-122	350 17	18DEC68						350 17				
MM-362	255 1	18DEC68									255 1	
MATCU-60	66	18DEC68						66				
MATCU-66	61	18DEC68					61					
VMA-152	457 4	18DEC68					457 4					

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL

FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

30 DECEMBER 1968

UNIT	NOTE	ASSIGNED STRENGTH		STR RPT DATE	DANANG		CHU LAI		PHU BAI		No I CTZ		OKINAWA		JAPAN		HAWAII		EASTPAC		OTHER	
		USMC	USN		USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN
1ST BRIG																						
MAG-24																						
H&MS-24		454		18DEC68													454					
H&MS-24		435	22	18DEC68													435	22				
MACS-2		223		18DEC68													223					
MATCU-10		67		18DEC68													67					
VMFA-212		254		18DEC68													254					
VMFA-235		248		18DEC68													248					
3D MAW																						
MHMG-3																						
H&MS-3	4	621	7	18DEC68															602	7	19	
MWFS-3		147		18DEC68															147			
MWCS-3		220		18DEC68															220			
MHT-101		345		18DEC68															345			
MHTG-10																						
H&MS-30		284		18DEC68															284			
HMT-301		159	1	18DEC68															159	1		
HMT-302		226		18DEC68															226			
MAG-33																						
H&MS-33		642		18DEC68															642			
H&MS-33		529	2	18DEC68															529	2		
MATCU-65		87		18DEC68															87			
VMFA-214		321		18DEC68															321			
VMFA-214		201	1	18DEC68															201	1		
VMFA-232		279	1	18DEC68															279	1		
VMFA-531		258	1	18DEC68															258	1		
MWGS-37																						
H&MS-37		597	3	18DEC68															597	3		
MWFS-37		230	80	18DEC68															230	80		
VMGR-352		362	1	18DEC68															362	1		
MAG-38																						
H&MS-38		241	3	18DEC68															241	3		
M&MS-5		198		18DEC68															198			
MACS-1		272		18DEC68															272			
MACS-3		251		18DEC68															251			
MACS-7		242	2	18DEC68															242	2		
5TH LAAM BN		512	10	18DEC68															512	10		
2D LAAM BN		235		18DEC68															235			
MAG-56																						
H&MS-56		352		18DEC68															352			
M&MS-56		334	2	18DEC68															334	2		
MATCU-74		66		18DEC68															66			
H&MS-163		240		18DEC68															240			
H&MS-163		256		18DEC68															256			
H&MS-167		412	5	18DEC68															412	5		
H&MS-167		259		18DEC68															259			
AVIATION TOTAL																						
USMC		29,474			8,535	4,309	1,614	1,731	822	1,088	1,742	9,359	274									
USN		450			139	70	30	22	5	42	22	119	1									
AVIATION TOTAL		29,924			8,674	4,379	1,644	1,753	827	1,130	1,764	9,478	275									

RECAPITULATION OF FMFPAC PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION

		ASSIGNED STRENGTH	DANANG	CHU LAI	PHU BAI	No I CTZ	OKINAWA	JAPAN	HAWAII	EASTPAC	OTHER
GROUND TOTAL	USMC	91,065	41,982	1,315	769	17,586	6,570	483	2,716	17,528	2,116
	USN	4,458	1,922	142	391	647	248		151	854	103
AVIATION TOTAL	USMC	29,474	8,535	4,309	1,614	1,731	822	1,088	1,742	9,359	274
	USN	450	139	70	30	22	5	42	22	119	1
GRAND TOTAL	USMC	120,539	50,517	5,624	2,383	19,317	7,392	1,571	4,458	26,887	2,390
	USN	4,908	2,061	212	421	669	253	42	173	973	104

NOTES:

- FIGURES IN "OTHER" ASSIGNED TO SLF's AND ARE BLT STRENGTHS.
- FIGURES IN "OTHER" ASSIGNED TO VARIOUS RVN LOCATIONS.
- AT VARIOUS I CTZ LOCATIONS.
- PERSONNEL LISTED IN "OTHER" ARE ASSIGNED TO IT, ITT, SSC, CI TEAMS, RED EYE AND NUCLEAR ORDNANCE PLATOONS.
- STRENGTHS INCLUDED IN 7TH AND 11TH ENGINEER BATTALIONS.
- 1ST AND 3D ANTI-TANK PERSONNEL ARE INCLUDED IN 1ST AND 3D TANK BATTALIONS STRENGTHS.
- HOSPITALIZED AT LOCATIONS OTHER THAN OKINAWA BUT CARRIED ON THE ROLLS OF CASUAL COMPANY, CAMP BUTLER.

Appendix F

Combined Action Program Expansion—1968

1ST CAG		
UNITS	1967	1968
GROUP HQ	1	1
COMPANY HQ	3	3
PLATOONS	15	21
MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS	-	2
STRENGTHS		
USMC	213	364
USN	19	34
RVN	334	664

2D CAG		
UNITS	1967	1968
GROUP HQ	1	1
COMPANY HQ	7	8
PLATOONS	40	38
MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS	-	1
STRENGTHS		
USMC	633	571
USN	42	41
RVN	1,070	1,043

3D CAG		
UNITS	1967	1968
GROUP HQ	1	1
COMPANY HQ	2	5
PLATOONS	15	31
MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS	-	2
STRENGTHS		
USMC	296	546
USN	18	28
RVN	378	809

4TH CAG		
UNITS	1967	1968
GROUP HQ	-	1
COMPANY HQ	2*	3
PLATOONS	9*	12
MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS	-	2
STRENGTHS		
USMC	123	282
USN	9	19
RVN	229	540

*Includes three CAP's and one CO Hq deactivated at Khe Sahn

Legend and Recapitulation

STATUS AS OF 31DEC68		ACTIVATED DURING 1968		STATUS AS OF 31DEC1968	
GROUP HQ	3	GROUP HQ	1	GROUP HQ	4
COMPANY HQ	14	COMPANY HQ	*6	COMPANY HQ	19
PLATOONS	79	PLATOONS	*28	PLATOONS	102
MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS	-	MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS	7	MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS	7
STRENGTHS		STRENGTHS		STRENGTHS	
USMC	1,265	USMC	498	USMC	1,763
USN	88	USN	34	USN	122
RVN	2,011	RVN	1,025	RVN	3,036

¹Five CAP's (two in 2d CAG; three in 4th CAG) and one Company Hq were deactivated during 1968

Appendix G

Casualties

NVA/VC Casualties Reported by III MAF Units

1968 Month	USMC		Americal Division		1st Air Cav Div ¹		101st Airborne ²	
	KIA	POW	KIA	POW	KIA	POW	KIA	POW
JAN	2126	55	2350	70	314	9		
FEB	5040	92	1691	62	1879	39		
MAR	3118	83	1621	41	1066	78	677	27
APR	1769	30	795	50	1259	10	859	29
MAY	6200	140	1393	21	473	35	1683	172
JUN	2154	65	688	15	661	85	450	121
JUL	2124	57	781	12	490	44	305	82
AUG	1894	57	1384	11	485	51	583	45
SEP	2392	105	1294	17	207	15	268	148
OCT	1707	24	685	11	202	28	397	207
NOV ³	1042							
DEC ⁴	1612							
TOTAL	31178	708	12682	310	7036	394	5212	831

¹U.S. Army 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) left I Corps Tactical Zone on 10 November 1968

²U.S. Army 101st Airborne Division (Air Mobile) came under the operational control of III MAF on 13 February 1968.

³Statistics for Army units are not recorded in III MAF Command Chronologies. Total casualties inflicted by III MAF units in November 1968 are: KIA: 2355; POWs: 131.

⁴Statistics for Army units are not recorded in III MAF Command Chronologies. Total III MAF casualties inflicted in December 1968 are: KIA: 2848; POWs: 165.

Casualties Sustained by III MAF Units

1968 Month	USMC				USA				USN			
	KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW	KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW	KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW
JAN	225	1122	30	41	177	552	22	13	15	45	3	0
FEB	554	2368	18	58	215	754	35	21	27	99	1	4
MAR	364	1915	65	19	199	843	6	14	15	73	0	1
APR	368	1596	9	33	257	887	43	13	21	71	0	3
MAY	723	2670	5	37	333	1499	73	36	37	83	0	1
JUN	495	2092	8	41	146	667	32	20	20	89	0	2
JUL	259	2131	15	25	92	591	31	18	9	96	0	3
AUG	250	1947	1	35	133	1301	31	25	10	104	0	0
SEP	207	1706	14	25	80	815	34	7	6	73	0	1
OCT	117	1052	10	20	73	734	26	8	3	28	0	0
NOV	157	843	0	15	94	479	70	19	7	53	0	2
DEC	165	1099	0	12	42	350	54	15	12	48	0	1
TOTAL	3884	20541	175	361	1841	9472	457	209	182	862	4	18

3d Marine Division

Enemy Casualties Reported and Friendly Casualties Sustained

(Includes 1st Marines through 31 August)

Month	Enemy KIA	POWs Captured	US KIA	US WIA
JAN	1290	34	154	935
FEB	1344	61	185	1279
MAR	2237	52	179	1239
APR	598	23	184	1203
MAY	5145	114	233	1398
JUN	1099	3	244	1409
JUL	1003	22	75	744
AUG	694	6	76	571
SEP	1399	18	92	703
OCT	679	7	23	199
NOV	64	12	37	320
DEC	217	11	35	231
TOTAL	15469	363	1517	10231

1st Marine Divison
 Enemy Casualties Reported and Friendly Casualties Sustained
 (Includes 1st Marines after 1 September)

Month	Enemy KIA	POW's Captured	US KIA	US WIA
JAN	900	79	73	826
FEB	3228	19	336	2425
MAR	942	23	130	1167
APR	1096	15	163	1182
MAY	1777	32	350	2002
JUN	887	32	128	1217
JUL	598	27	110	991
AUG	1120	26	117	1222
SEP	945	41	133	1111
OCT	920	17	74	827
NOV	976	91	110	857
DEC	1287	116	126	780
Total	15676	518	1850	14607

All units in I Corps Tactical Zone
Enemy Casualties Reported and Friendly Casualties Sustained

Month	Enemy KIA	NVA POW	VC POW	Total POW	US KIA	US WIA	US MIA	US DOW	Total US ¹
JAN ²	8037	37	525	562	417	1719	55	54	2245
FEB ²	14344	111	386	497	796	3221	54	83	4154
MAR ³	9203	117	406	523	578	2831	71	34	3514
APR ³	7030	47	224	271	646	2554	52	49	3301
MAY ³	12820	254	278	532	1093	4252	78	74	5497
JUN ³	5563	130	497	627	661	2848	40	63	3612
JUL ³	5050	81	393	474	360	2818	46	46	3270
AUG ³	6954	80	584	664	393	3352	32	60	3837
SEP ³	6733	51	768	819	293	2594	48	33	2968
OCT ³	4280	36	602	638	193	1823	36	28	2080
NOV ⁴	4141	32	516	548	258	1393	70	36	1757
DEC ⁵	5047	51	1016	1067	219	1497	54	28	1798
Total	89202	1027	6195	7222	5907	30902	636	588	38033

¹Includes casualties suffered by: USMC, USA, and USN

²Includes casualties inflicted by: USMC, Americal Division, 1st Air Cavalry, CIDG, ARVN, and ROKMC

³Includes casualties inflicted by: USMC, Americal Division, 1st Air Cavalry Division, 101st Airborne Division, CIDG, ARVN, and ROKMC


⁴Includes casualties inflicted by: units OpCon III MAF, ARVN, ROKMC, and USSF

⁵Includes casualties inflicted by: units OpCon III MAF, ARVN, ROKMC, and CIDG

Appendix H


Marine Fixed-Wing Support

IN-COUNTRY FIXED-WING SORTIES BY MARINE AIRCRAFT JANUARY-DECEMBER 1968



From Operations of Marine Forces Vietnam 1968.

ORDNANCE DELIVERED BY MARINE AIRCRAFT IN ICTZ JANUARY-DECEMBER 1968



From Operations of Marine Forces Vietnam 1968.

Appendix I

List of Reviewers

MARINES

Gen Earl E. Anderson, USMC (Ret)
Gen Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., USMC (Ret)
Gen Raymond G. Davis, USMC (Ret)
Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., USMC (Ret)

LtGen Richard E. Carey, USMC (Ret)
LtGen Ernest C. Cheatham, USMC (Ret)
LtGen George R. Christmas, USMC
LtGen Edward S. Fris, USMC (Ret)
LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret)
LtGen Louis Metzger, USMC (Ret)
LtGen Adolph G. Schwenk, USMC (Ret)
LtGen William J. Van Ryzin, USMC (Ret)
LtGen William J. White, USMC (Ret)

Maj Gen Norman J. Anderson, USMC (Ret)
Maj Gen Robert D. Bohn, USMC (Ret)
MajGen John P. Condon, USMC (Ret)
MajGen Carl W. Hoffman, USMC (Ret)
MajGen Kenneth J. Houghton, USMC (Ret)
MajGen James R. Jones, USMC (Ret)
MajGen James E. Livingston, USMC
MajGen James J. McMonagle, USMC
MajGen Raymond L. Murray, USMC (Ret)
MajGen Jonas M. Platt, USMC (Ret)
MajGen Arthur J. Poillon, USMC (Ret)
MajGen Francis X. Quinn, USMC (Ret)
MajGen Donn J. Robertson, USMC (Ret)

BGen James H. Berge, Jr., USMC (Ret)
BGen Michael P. Downs, USMC (Ret)
BGen Jacob E. Glick, USMC (Ret)
BGen Paul G. Graham, USMC (Ret)
BGen Harry T. Hagaman, USMC (Ret)
BGen Henry W. Hise, USMC (Ret)
BGen Joseph E. Hopkins, USMC (Ret)
BGen Frederick E. Sisley, USMC (Ret)
BGen William Weise, USMC (Ret)

Col George T. Blazer, USMC (Ret)
Col Roger H. Barnard, USMC (Ret)
Col John F. Barr, USMC (Ret)
Col Julian G. Bass, Jr., USMC (Ret)
Col Gordon D. Barcheller, USMC (Ret)
Col Lee R. Bendell, USMC (Ret)
Col James L. Black, Jr., USMC (Ret)
Col Joel E. Bonner, USMC (Ret)

Col Frank L. Bourne, Jr., USMC (Ret)
Col James T. Breckinridge, USMC (Ret)
Col Talman C. Budd II, USMC (Ret)
Col Charles F. Bunnell, Jr., USMC (Ret)
Col Warren A. Butcher, USMC (Ret)
Col Edward E. Camporini, USMC (Ret)
Col John D. Carr, USMC (Ret)
Col Kenneth L. Christy, Jr. USMC
Col Thomas W. Clarke, USMC (Ret)
Col John A. Conway, USMC (Ret)
Col Gorton C. Cook, USMC (Ret)
Col William M. Cryan, USMC (Ret)
Col William H. Dabney, USMC (Ret)
Col Edward F. Danowitz, USMC (Ret)
Col William J. Davis, USMC (Ret)
Col William J. Davis, USMC (Ret)
Col William L. Dick, USMC (Ret)
Col Harry E. Dickinson, USMC (Ret)
Col James W. Dillon, USMC (Ret)
Col Rex O. Dillow, USMC (Ret)
Col Billy R. Duncan, USMC (Ret)
Col Roy J. Edwards, USMC (Ret)
Col William S. Fagan, USMC (Ret)
Col Francis I. Fenton, Jr., USMC (Ret)
Col Paul R. Fields, USMC (Ret)
Col Edward L. Fossum, USMC (Ret)
Col Samuel J. Fulton, USMC (Ret)
Col Thomas H. Galbraith, USMC (Ret)
Col Joseph J. N. Gambardella, USMC (Ret)
Col Samuel A. Hannah, USMC (Ret)
Col John E. Hansen, USMC (Ret)
Col Twyman R. Hill, USMC (Ret)
Col Robert C. V. Hughes, USMC (Ret)
Col Stanley S. Hughes, USMC (Ret)
Col Charles V. Jarman, USMC (Ret)
Col Ray N. Joens, USMC (Ret)
Col Thomas M. Kauffman, USMC (Ret)
Col Robert J. Keller, USMC (Ret)
Col William E. Kerrigan, USMC (Ret)
Col John A. Kinniburgh, USMC (Ret)
Col Frederic S. Knight, USMC (Ret)
Col Robert G. Lauffer, USMC (Ret)
Col James Leon, USMC (Ret)
Col Robert W. Lewis, USMC (Ret)
Col Robert D. Limberg, USMC (Ret)
Col Joseph E. Lo Prete, USMC (Ret)

Col John R. Love, USMC (Ret)
 Col Edward H. P. Lynk, USMC (Ret)
 Col Max McQuown, USMC (Ret)
 Col Charles L. Meadows, USMC (Ret)
 Col Bruce F. Meyers, USMC (Ret)
 Col Alexander L. Michaux, USMC (Ret)
 Col John F. Mitchell, USMC (Ret)
 Col Peter J. Mulroney, USMC (Ret)
 Col Donald J. Myers, USMC (Ret)
 Col Robert C. Needham, USMC (Ret)
 Col Neil A. Nelson, USMC (Ret)
 Col Thomas P. O'Callaghan, USMC (Ret)
 Col Virgil D. Olson, USMC (Ret)
 Col Harry F. Painter, USMC (Ret)
 Col Eric B. Parker, USMC (Ret)
 Col W. Hays Parks, USMCR
 Col Harold L. Parsons, USMC (Ret)
 Col Ernest W. Payne, USMC (Ret)
 Col Clifford J. Peabody, USMC (Ret)
 Col Roger W. Peard, Jr., USMC (Ret)
 Col Poul F. Pedersen, USMC (Ret)
 Col Rhys J. Phillips, Jr., USMC (Ret)
 Col John W. P. Robertson, USMC (Ret)
 Col William K. Rockey, USMC (Ret)
 Col Maurice Rose, USMC (Ret)
 Col Joseph L. Sadowski, USMC (Ret)
 Col Edwin S. Schick, Jr., USMC (Ret)
 Col Maynard W. Schmidt, USMC (Ret)
 Col Walter Sienko, USMC (Ret)
 Col Anthony J. Skotnicki, USMC (Ret)
 Col Robert D. Slay, USMC (Ret)
 Col Richard B. Smith, USMC (Ret)
 Col Kent O. W. Steen, USMC (Ret)
 Col James W. Stemple, USMC (Ret)
 Col Broman C. Stinemetz, USMC (Ret)
 Col James R. Stockman, USMC (Ret)
 Col Vaughn R. Stuart, USMC (Ret)
 Col John C. Studt, USMC (Ret)
 Col Robert H. Thompson, USMC (Ret)
 Col David S. Twining, USMC (Ret)
 Col Earl K. Vickers, Jr., USMC (Ret)
 Col Raymond J. Weber, USMC (Ret)
 Col Howard A. Westphall, USMC (Ret)
 Col Dean Wilker, USMC (Ret)
 Col Tullis J. Woodham, Jr., USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Themistocles T. Annas, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Louis J. Bacher, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Merrill L. Bartlett, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Donald R. Berg, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Harper L. Bohr, Jr., USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Gene W. Bowers, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Byron F. Brady, USMC (Ret)

LtCol Justice M. Chambers, Jr., USMC (Ret)
 LtCol William A. Cohn, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Francis X. Colleton, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol William R. Corson, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Walter W. Damewood, Jr., USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Edwin A. Deptula, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Robert J. Edwards, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Karl J. Fontenot, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol James F. Foster, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Vincent J. Gentile, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol John J. Hainsworth, USMC (Ret)
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 LtCol Oliver W. van den Berg, Jr., USMC (Ret)
 LtCol George F. Warren, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol LeRoy E. Watson, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Ronald R. Welpott, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol James B. Wilkinson, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Daniel M. Wilson, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Frank B. Wolcott, III, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Roger Zensen, USMC (Ret)
 Maj John S. Leffen, USMC (Ret)
 Maj Donald E. Milone, USMC (Ret)
 Maj Edward Palm, USMC (Ret)
 Maj Gary E. Todd, USMC (Ret)
 Capt Matthew G. McTiernan, USMC (Ret)
 Capt George B. Meegan, USMC (Ret)
 Capt Alexander W. Wells, Jr., USMCR
 1stLt Tyrus F. Rudd, USMC (Ret)
 CWO 4 Henry Wildfang, USMC (Ret)
 MGySgt James W. Rogers, USMC (Ret)

ARMY

Gen William B. Rosson, USA (Ret)
 Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA (Ret)
 LtGen Philip B. Davidson, Jr., USA (Ret)
 Col Bruce B. G. Clarke, USA
 Col Lewis Sorley, USA (Ret)
 LtCol George L. MacGarrigle, USA (Ret)

NAVY

Capt Bernard D. Cole, USN
 Cdr Richard McGonigal, USN (Ret)
 LCdr Ray W. Stubbe, USN (Ret)

OTHERS

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 Dale Andrade
 Ron Asher
 John J. Balanco
 William R. Black, Jr.
 Harold R. Blunk
 Igor Bobrowsky
 Peter Braestrup
 C. C. Busick
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Harry F. Fromme
 John L. Gundersen
 Thomas Harvey
 George W. Jayne
 Andy Lewandowski
 Michael G. McDonell
 Charles McMahon
 Edward J. Marolda
 Joel D. Meyerson
 Bert Mullins
 William J. O'Connor
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Appendix J

Tables of Organization

Tables of Organization


None of the major units in Vietnam followed standard Marine Corps tables of organization (T/O), and many smaller units were also task-organized to adapt to the circumstances of the Vietnam war. This appendix contains tables of organization for selected types of units.

It is worth recalling that almost no unit in Vietnam was ever staffed exactly according to its T/O. The demands of sustained combat forced the Marine Corps to man some units, particularly headquarters units, considerably above their T/O. Almost every unit found that it had to detail some men to perform tasks for which the T/O had not provided. In general, most units were consistently manned well below their T/O strength.

The Marine Division


The standard T/O for a Marine Division called for a headquarters battalion, three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, a reconnaissance battalion, an antitank battalion, an engineer battalion, a service battalion, a motor transport battalion, a shore party battalion, and a medical battalion.

Standard Marine Division



The organization of Marine divisions in Vietnam differed markedly from this standard organization, and also varied from time to time. By 1968, the service battalions had been transferred to the Force Logistic Command and the antitank battalions cadred. Units normally subordinate to the Fleet Marine Force commander, including tank battalions, amphibian tractor battalions, and force reconnaissance companies, had been attached. For most of 1968, both divisions included four infantry regiments, a reinforced artillery regiment, and additional motor transport and engineer battalions. The following diagram shows what a "typical division looked like in Vietnam." The exact units in a given division at any given time is in Appendix A, Marine Command and Staff List, January-December 1968.

Marine Division, Vietnam 1968




Marine Aircraft Wing

There was no standard organization for any Marine Corps aviation unit above the squadron level. Selected squadron tables of organization are included in this appendix. The exact units making up the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing can be found in Appendix A, Marine Command and Staff List, January-December 1968.

Combat Service Support Units


Standard Marine Corps practice placed combat service support units into a force service regiment, consisting of a headquarters and service battalion, a maintenance battalion, and a supply battalion. In Vietnam combat service support units were consolidated into the Force Logistic Command, which also included the service battalions from both divisions, two military police battalions, a communications battalion, and a motor transport battalion. Since the organizations for the battalions in the Force Logistic command were heavily modified to enable them to support sustained ground operations, no T/O's for these units are included. The exact units making up the Force Logistic Command can be found in Appendix A, Marine Command and Staff List, January-December 1968.

Infantry Regiment
T/O M-1099, Revision 2
6 June 1967



* The company headquarters included a command post security platoon of 19 Marines, with a staff sergeant as platoon commander, and two squads of nine Marines each, consisting of a squad leader and two four-man fireteams.

Artillery Regiment
T/O M-1199, Revision 2
17 April 1964



Direct support battalions contained 18 M101A1 towed 105mm howitzers (six per battery) and six M98 107mm towed mortars.

General support battalions contained 18 M109 self propelled 155mm Howitzers (six per battery).


Amphibian Tractor Battalion

T/O M-4658, Revision 1

6 March 1967

The amphibian tractor battalion normally fell under force troops, but in Vietnam each division had an amphibian tractor battalion attached. The battalion's primary mission was to transport troops and equipment under combat conditions, and it had only enough Marines and sailors to operate and maintain its vehicles. For combat operations in Vietnam the battalion either had infantry units attached to ride in its vehicles or parcelled out its companies and platoons to support other units. Generally one amphibian tractor company could support an infantry battalion, and one amphibian tractor platoon could support a rifle company.

The headquarters and service company rated 12 LVTP5A1 personnel carrier landing vehicles, tracked, three LVTP5A1 CMD command variants, one LVTR1A1 recovery vehicle, and eight LVTE1 engineer vehicles. These vehicles supported the operations of the amphibian tractor battalion. Each amphibian tractor company contained 44 LVTP5A1s, three LVTP5A1 CMDs, and one LVTR1A1. Since LVTs suffered frequent mine damage in Vietnam, both amphibian tractor battalions received an increased allowance of LVTR1A1 recovery vehicles.




* A third amphibian tractor company could be activated by order of the Commandant. During 1968 both amphibian tractor battalions in Vietnam contained two amphibian tractor companies.

Tank Battalion
Vietnam 1968

Normally part of force troops, in Vietnam the two tank battalions were assigned to the divisions. The standard table of organization (T/O M-4238, Revision 1, 25 September 1967) for tank battalions called for a headquarters and service company, a heavy tank company, and three medium tank companies, with the proviso that only three tank companies would be activated except by order of the commandant. Both the 1st Tank Battalion and 3d Tank Battalion omitted the heavy tank company in this period (which would have been equipped with 17 M103A2 120mm gun tanks).

The headquarters and service company contained nine M67A2 flamethrower tanks (organized into a platoon with three sections of three tanks each), two M48A3 90mm gun tanks for the command section, and one M51 tank recovery vehicle. Each medium tank company rated 17 M48A3 90mm gun tanks and one M51 tank recovery vehicle, with two gun tanks and the recovery vehicle in the company headquarters and three platoons of five gun tanks each.

In December 1967 the 1st and 3d Antitank battalions were cadred, both being reduced to one reinforced anti-tank company. These companies were then attached to the like-numbered tank battalion, adding approximately 100 Marines, one corpsmen, and 20 M50A1 Ontos, a small tracked vehicle mounting six 106mm recoilless rifles.



* Does not include attached antitank company.

** One of these tanks was fitted with an M8 bulldozer blade.

Does not include additional personnel to support attached antitank company.

@ The standard T/O for an antitank company called for five officers and 76 enlisted Marines (T/O M-1248, Revision 2, 1 June 1967). Normally a company was divided into three platoons and equipped with 15 M50A1 Ontos. The reinforced companies attached to the tank battalions in December 1967 contained approximately six officers, 90-95 enlisted Marines, and one corpsman, and contained four platoons and a total of 20 M50A1 Ontos. Roughly one officer and six enlisted Marines were attached to the headquarters and service company to provide administrative support.

The Marine Aircraft Wing

There was no standard organization for any Marine Corps aviation unit above the squadron level. This section contains the official tables of organization for some of the more common Marine aviation squadrons present in Vietnam in 1968. It must be remembered that the actual number of Marines and aircraft assigned to a given squadron almost certainly varied from these tables. Squadrons of the same type, but flying different types of aircraft, had different T/Os. Also, the Marine Corps had multiple T/Os for certain types of squadrons flying the same aircraft. For example, some Marine Observation Squadron (VMO) were organized to fly 24 UH-1E Iroquois helicopters, some 30 UH-1E helicopters, while others flew a mix of helicopters and O-1B Bird Dog Cessna fixed wing light observation aircraft. In 1968 the Marine Corps introduced the OV-10A Bronco fixed wing observation aircraft to Vietnam, further complicating the picture.

Most squadron T/Os included an intermediate maintenance section. The Marines in these sections were not actually assigned to the squadron, but were instead an integral part of the parent group's headquarters and maintenance squadron. Still, these sections represented a manpower requirement associated with a specific squadron, and therefore these sections are included here.

The tables shown here are for squadrons at wartime strength. During the war, however, Marine aviation units remained on the reduced peacetime manning level, making their actual strength considerably less than shown in this appendix.

The exact units making up the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing can be found in Appendix A, Marine Command and Staff List, January-December 1968. *Note: Numbers in parentheses show billets filled by pilots, and are not included in the totals.*

Tables of Organization for Selected Squadrons

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 15 F-4J Phantom Jet Interceptor/Attack Aircraft T/O M-8848, 23 July 1968

	USMC				USN	
	Pilots	NFOs	Grd Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Squadron Headquarters	(3)		2	19		
Operations	26	26	1	6		
Aircraft Maintenance	(5)		3	240		
Motor Transport	(1)			9		
Medical					1	4
Squadron Total	26	26	6	274	1	4
Intermediate Maintenance				61		
Total	26	26	6	335	1	4

Marine Attack Squadron (VMA)
20 A-4C/E SkyHawk Jet Attack Aircraft
T/O M-8955, 7 November 1967*

	Pilots	<i>USMC</i>		<i>USN</i>	
		Grd Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Squadron Headquarters	(3)	2	19		
Operations	35	1	6		
Aircraft Maintenance	(5)	3	151		
Motor Transport	(1)		9		
Medical				1	4
Squadron Total	35	6	185	1	4
Intermediate Maintenance		33			
Total	35	6	218	1	4

* On 23 July 1968 an additional Marine was added to the intermediate maintenance section, bringing the enlisted total to 219.

Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron (VMA(AW))
12 A-6A Intruder Jet Attack Aircraft
T/O 8857, 25 May 1967*

	Pilots	<i>USMC</i>			<i>USN</i>	
		NFOs	Grd Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Squadron Headquarters	(3)		2	17		
Operations	21	21	1	7		
Aircraft Maintenance	(5)		3	222		
Motor Transport	(1)			9		
Medical					1	4
Squadron Total	21	21	6	255	1	4
Intermediate Maintenance				68		
Total	21	21	6	323	1	4

* On 20 August the total number of enlisted Marines was increased to 324, with one Marine added to both the squadron headquarters and intermediate maintenance section, and one dropped from the aircraft maintenance section.

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH)
24 CH-53A Sea Stallion Heavy Transport Helicopters
T/O M-8942, 28 December 1967*

	Pilots	<i>USMC</i>		<i>USN</i>	
		Grd Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Squadron Headquarters	(3)	2	19		
Operations	60	1	6		
Aircraft Maintenance	(5)	2	158		
Motor Transport	(1)		17		
Medical				1	4
Squadron Total	60	5	201	1	4
Intermediate Maintenance			43		
Total	60	5	244	1	4

* On 23 July 1968 a Marine was shifted from the aircraft maintenance section to the intermediate maintenance section.

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM)
24 CH-46 Sea Knight Medium Transport Helicopters
T/O M-8935, 25 May 1967*

	Pilots	<i>USMC</i>		<i>USN</i>	
		Grd Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Squadron Headquarters	(3)	2	19		
Operations	60	1	6		
Aircraft Maintenance	(5)	2	145		
Motor Transport	(1)		14		
Medical				1	3
Squadron Total	60	5	184	1	3
Intermediate Maintenance			31		
Total	60	5	215	1	3

* On 23 July 1968 one Marine moved from the aircraft maintenance section to the intermediate maintenance section.

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM)
24 UH-34D/E Sea Horse Medium Transport Helicopters
 T/O M-8932, 22 November 1967*

	Pilots	<i>USMC</i>		<i>USN</i>	
		Grd Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Squadron Headquarters	(3)	2	18		
Operations	60	1	6		
Aircraft Maintenance	(5)	2	146		
Motor Transport	(1)	14			
Medical				1	3
Squadron Total	60	5	184	1	3
Intermediate Maintenance			41		
Total	60	5	225	1	3

* On 23 July 1968 an additional Marine was added to the intermediate maintenance section, bringing the total number of enlisted Marines to 226.

Marine Observation Squadron (VMO)
24 UH-1E Iroquois Light Attack/Observation Helicopters
 T/O M-8963, 24 May 1967*

This T/O is for a squadron with 24 UH1E helicopters

	Pilots	<i>USMC</i>		<i>USN</i>	
		Grd Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Squadron Headquarters	(3)	2	13		
Operations	48	1	6		
Aircraft Maintenance	(4)	2	144		
Services	(2)	3	6		
Medical				1	3
Squadron Total	48	5	199	1	3

* On 20 August 1968 one Marine was added to the squadron headquarters, bringing the total number of enlisted Marines to 200.

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Key: p = photograph; n = informational note

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