

## CHAPTER 14

# Artillery and Surveillance

### *Artillery Operations—Surveillance and Reconnaissance Activities*

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#### *Artillery Operations*

As 1969 began, all Marine artillery units within I Corps Tactical Zone were either under the control of the 11th Marines, the artillery regiment of the 1st Marine Division, or the 12th Marines, the artillery regiment of the 3d Marine Division.

The 11th Marines, commanded by Colonel Harry E. Dickinson consisted of four organic battalions and the attached 1st Field Artillery Group (1st 155mm Gun Battery, Self-Propelled [SP], later redesignated 1st 175mm Gun Battery); 1st Battalion, 13th Marines; Battery K, 4th Battalion, 13th Marines; 3d 8-inch Howitzer Battery (SP); Battery G, 29th Artillery (USA); Battery B, 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery (USA); and the 1st Armored Amphibian Company. Attached specifically for Operation Taylor Common, which was to conclude on 17 February, were elements of the 1st Battalion, 12th Marines in direct support of the 3d Marines.

Colonel Peter J. Mulroney's 12th Marines was composed of its three organic battalions and the attached 1st 8-inch Howitzer Battery (SP), under the operational control of XXIV Corps and assigned to the Army's 108th Field Artillery Group; 1st Searchlight Battery; 5th Battalion, 4th Artillery (USA); and the 3d Provisional 155mm Howitzer Battery.\* Also operating within Quang Tri Province, but not under the direct control of the 12th Marines, was the 5th 155mm Gun Battery (SP).\*\* Headquartered at Dong Ha Combat Base, with its 155mm guns at Vandegrift and a reinforcing platoon of 8-inch self-propelled howitzers at Elliott Combat Base, the battery operated under the control of the 108th Field Artillery Group.

The two artillery regiments' 105mm howitzer batteries were deployed offensively in direct support of

Marine infantry units. The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, with its command post on Hill 55 and batteries at fire support bases scattered about the flatlands south of Da Nang, supported the 1st Marines. From positions at An Hoa Combat Base, Liberty Bridge, and mountainous fire bases to the west, the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines and three batteries of the 1st Battalion, 12th Marines supported the 5th and 3d Marines, while the 3d Battalion, deployed at bases centered on Dai Loc and Da Nang, fired missions for the 7th Marines. The 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, headquartered on Hill 34 and batteries at the Northern Artillery Cantonment, west of Red Beach, Hill 55, and Hill 65, fired in general support of the 1st Marine Division. The 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, which administratively controlled Battery K, 4th Battalion, 13th Marines, fired missions from the Northern Cantonment and the Hai Van Pass in support of the 26th Marines.\*\*\* Of the general support artillery units, most were temporarily under the control of the 1st Field Artillery Group at An Hoa Combat Base in support of forces engaged in Operation Taylor Common.\*\*\*\*

To the north, Colonel Mulroney's 12th Marines supported infantry units of the 3d Marine Division; 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), and to a lesser extent the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile); the Navy's Task Force Clearwater; and elements of the 1st ARVN Division. The 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, headquartered at Vandegrift, fired missions for the 9th Marines, while the 3d Battalion, with batteries at Fire Support Bases Neville, Russell, Fuller, and Elliott, supported the 4th Marines. The 4th Battalion, with its command post at Dong Ha and batteries stretching in an arc from Cua Viet west to Elliott Combat Base, fired in general support of the division, as did units of the

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\*In general support, the 108th Field Artillery Group included the 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery (SP); 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery (SP); Battery C, 6th Battalion, 33d Artillery; 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery (SP); and, Marine 1st 8-inch Howitzer and 5th 155mm Gun Batteries.

\*\*With the arrival of 175mm guns in March and April, the battery was redesignated the 5th 175mm Gun Battery (SP). The 1st 155mm Gun Battery likewise was redesignated following the re-tubing of its guns during the same period.

\*\*\*Throughout most of the year, two batteries of the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines were in direct support of Special Landing Forces Alpha and Bravo.

\*\*\*\*Following Operation Taylor Common, units attached to the 1st Field Artillery Group were released and the group reduced to cadre strength. On 14 July, administrative control of the group was passed from 11th Marines to Regimental Landing Team 9 and the unit departed Vietnam for Okinawa and eventual transfer to Twenty-nine Palms, California.

108th Field Artillery Group. Although under the control of the 12th Marines, the Army's 5th Battalion, 4th Artillery directly supported the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division from positions at Fire Support Bases Sharon, Hai Lang, and Nancy. Attached to each of the direct support battalions of the regiment was a provisional, four-howitzer, 155mm battery, which Colonel Mulroney noted, "we could not get along without."<sup>1</sup>

Combined, the 11th and 12th Marines possessed a total of 242 howitzers, guns, and mortars at the beginning of the year. Three firing batteries in each direct support battalion were armed with the M101 A1 105mm towed howitzer, which had a maximum range of 11,000 meters and could be transported by CH-46 helicopters to distant fire support bases throughout the corps tactical zone; the fourth firing battery had six 107mm (commonly termed 4.2-inch) mortars with a range of 5,600 meters. The 4th battalion of each artillery regiment was equipped with M109A self-propelled 155mm howitzers, capable of striking targets at ranges up to 14,600 meters. Twenty-four helicopter-transportable, towed 155mm howitzers remained in both regiments' inventories in order to reinforce fires of the smaller caliber howitzers. Allocated among the direct support battalions, these heavy weapons normally were attached to either the 105mm or mortar batteries. The 155mm gun batteries initially were equipped with the M53 self-propelled 155mm gun, maximum range of 14,600 meters, but later replaced by the M107 175mm self-propelled gun, with a maximum range of 32,700 meters. Using the same tracked, motorized carriage as the 175mm gun, the fourteen M110 8-inch howitzers attached to the Force Artillery batteries were capable of hitting targets at a range of 16,800 meters.\*<sup>2</sup>

Beginning in midyear, Keystone Eagle and then Keystone Cardinal spawned the redeployment of the 12th Marines and relocation of a number of artillery units. The 2d Battalion, 12th Marines left Vietnam with the 9th Marines, the infantry regiment it supported, in August, followed in October and November by the 1st, 3d, and 4th Battalions, which accompa-

nied the remaining elements of the 3d Marine Division. With the departure of the 12th Marines, control of the 1st 8-inch Howitzer Battery passed to the 11th Marines, and the battery relocated to Quang Nam Province and its gun platoons to An Hoa Combat Base, Landing Zone Baldy, and Landing Zone Ross. Of Marine artillery units in Quang Tri Province, only the 5th 175mm Gun Battery and the 1st Platoon, 5th 8-inch Howitzer Battery remained. Under the operational control of the 108th Artillery Group and the administrative control of the 11th Marines, the batteries continued to fire long-range missions in support of elements of the 101st Airborne Division, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), and the 1st ARVN Division.

Within the expanded area of operations controlled by the 1st Marine Division, the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines moved to Landing Zone Baldy and then westward to fire support bases dotting the Que Son Mountains and Valley, as the 7th Marines assumed responsibility for that portion of southern Quang Nam Province vacated by the Americal Division in August. On the northern extreme of the division's area of operations, two batteries of the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, which had supported the 1st and 2d Battalions, 26th Marines serving with the Seventh Fleet's Special Landing Force, moved ashore in October.\*\* Initially located at the division's Northern Artillery Cantonment, northwest of Da Nang, the batteries later moved to Fire Support Base Los Banos, a former Army fire base overlooking the Hai Van Pass, as the division assumed control of the area from the 101st Airborne Division. By December, the 11th Marines and attached general support batteries controlled 152 artillery pieces.

The basic mission assigned to both the 11th Marines and 12th Marines was to "provide fires in support of offensive operations within and beyond the TAOR's, AO, and RZ [Reconnaissance Zone]" for Marine, other American, South Vietnamese, and South Korean forces. In support of the mission, the artillery's primary task was to respond to calls for fire from engaged units, and to prepare landing zones and fire support bases for occupation, which often consumed a minimum of 1,000 rounds of artillery, in addition to air delivered ordnance. Among the collateral functions were base

\*In addition to the standard artillery weapons, the two regiments possessed a number of "howtars," a weapon which combined the tube of a 4.2-inch mortar and the carriage of the 75mm pack howitzer. Although a high trajectory, helicopter-transportable weapon which could "deliver a round with more punch than a 105mm howitzer," the howtar was phased out during 1969 due to its inflexibility. See "Howtar is Phased Out," *Marine Corps Gazette*, vol. 53 (Oct69), p. 1.

\*\*Although the 11th Marines had had operational control of 1st Battalion, 13th Marines and Battery K, 4th Battalion, 13th Marines since November 1968, administrative control of the units was passed from the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade to the regiment on 20 October with the redesignation of Regimental Landing Team 26.



Marine Corps Historical Collection

*Artillerymen of 3d Battalion, 11th Marines on Hill 63 prepare to fire a 105mm howitzer, the most common piece of artillery used in Vietnam, in support of the 7th Marines.*

defense and countermortar, rocket, and artillery missions. As part of this function, the 11th Marines controlled the Northern Sector Defense Command (NSDC), which consisted of various headquarters and support units, artillery and infantry, organized as an outer defensive shield for the Da Nang Vital Area.

In accomplishing the defensive mission, both regiments expended large amounts of ammunition on actual or suspected enemy rocket, artillery, and mortar sites, suspected Communist base camps, infiltration routes, assembly areas, sensor activations, and in efforts to neutralize concentrations of surprise firing devices.<sup>3</sup> These essentially unobserved fires, or harassing and interdiction fires as they were commonly termed, were carried out in response to either specific intelligence from informants, radar, strings of anti-infiltration devices, radio intercepts, or according to specific fire plans to thwart periodic enemy concentrations, and accounted for approximately 85 percent

of the total amount of artillery rounds fired by both regiments at the beginning of the year.\* As the tempo of ground combat operations slowly declined, the proportion of artillery fire devoted to unobserved missions increased, and by December these fires consumed over 95 percent of artillery ammunition fired by the 11th Marines.

Much of the unobserved fire was planned with information from the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions' Fire Support Information Systems (FSIS). Inaugurated in 1968, the system was located within the target information section of each division's fire support coordination center. Gathering input on enemy troop sightings, movement, cache sites, and rocket launching positions from a wide variety of sources, the section coded

\*To prevent enemy infiltration of the Demilitarized Zone, the 12th Marines and the Army's 108th Artillery Group maintained a number of ground and counterbattery radar sites south of the zone at Alpha-4, Charlie-2, and Gio Linh.

and stored the information on computer tape, and on request provided artillery commanders with reports, plotting recurrent patterns of enemy movement in a given area. Using these reports, the artillery regiments placed unobserved fire on the most heavily traveled enemy infiltration routes and concentrations of cache sites in order to block movement and preempt an enemy attack.

Sensor activations also provided a number of lucrative targets. The 3d Marine Division, for example, monitored approximately 125 seismic and accoustical sensor strings, emplaced by reconnaissance teams and helicopters throughout the division's area of responsibility. Strings were assigned to certain batteries and upon activation the battery would fire a concentration a short distance from the end of the string. Excellent results were achieved, according to Colonel Wallace W. Crompton, who relieved Colonel Mulroney as commanding officer of the 12th Marines: "I recall the OIC [Officer in Charge] of the sensor unit telling me that one string which had been very active suddenly ceased. A team went out to see what had happened to the devices. They were surprised to see a sign on the trail warning not to use that trail as it 'led to death.' A new trail by-passed it, so the team moved the devices to that trail."<sup>4</sup> The 1st Division used anti-infiltration devices more for gathering intelligence, than for delivering an immediate, preemptive response.

Despite the steady rise in unobserved fires, both regiments continued to conduct a large volume of direct support and observed fire support missions. As Marine infantry units found themselves operating in mountainous, jungle terrain, far from established cantonments and lines of communications, in areas accessible only by helicopter, a method of direct fire support was needed. Developed during late 1968 from Army techniques by the 3d Marine Division under Major General Raymond G. Davis, the mobile fire support base concept envisioned the rapid construction of temporary artillery positions in remote areas, defended by a minimum of infantry. Under a series of protective, overlapping artillery fans, infantry units could then rapidly search the designated terrain, always being assured of immediate artillery support.<sup>5</sup>

By 1969, this technique for landing reconnaissance and security elements, engineers, construction equipment, guns, crews, ammunition, and infantry on a remote peak in the midst of an enemy base area was perfected and used to such an extent that existent or abandoned fire support bases dotted the high ground



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*With each round weighing close to 150 pounds, loading a 175mm gun required two Marines. The gun was the largest weapon in the Marine artillery arsenal.*

throughout the corps tactical zone and batteries could be emplaced and firing within hours of the initial insertion. This welding of artillery and infantry into teams allowed for much more flexibility on the battlefield, as General Davis was later to observe:

It was soon discovered that the NVA could not cope with this kind of highly mobile warfare when artillery batteries were positioned on razorbacks and high pinnacles throughout an area, eight kilometers apart so as to provide mutually supporting fire plus 3,000 meter overshoot to hit mortars beyond the base, with infantry battalions operating under the artillery fan. In brief, an infantry battalion with its direct support artillery battery formed a team . . . . In addition, the companies themselves operate independently as far as mutual support is concerned. As long as they're within the 8,000 meter fan of the artillery, there is no requirement for the rifle companies to operate together; they can be several kilometers apart.<sup>6</sup>

The normal application of this flexible team approach was to assign each infantry company a two to three kilometer-square area within which an artillery fire support base would be established, where helicopters could resupply and lift out casualties, and from which patrols could thoroughly search the area. Once

cleared, the company would then be lifted by helicopter to another area within the artillery fan. Using this method, detailed searches were made, revealing, as General Davis noted, "major trail networks and cache areas that the NVA had been using for the better part of ten years," and accounting for the success of such operations as Dewey Canyon in Quang Tri, and Taylor Common and Oklahoma Hills in Quang Nam Province.<sup>7</sup>

During Operation Taylor Common, conducted by Task Force Yankee from 7 December 1968 to 8 March 1969, for example, artillery batteries of the 11th and 12th Marines occupied 13 fire support bases in enemy Base Area 112, Go Noi Island, and the Arizona. Several batteries occupied as many as four different temporary bases during the course of the operation when almost all artillery displacement and resupply were accomplished by helicopter. Throughout the remainder of the year, the 11th Marines fired from an additional 52 positions, and by year's end artillery units of the regi-

ment occupied 17 bases stretching from Alpha-2 near the DMZ, to FSB Ryder in the Que Son Mountains.<sup>8</sup>

In addition to direct support and combat missions, observed artillery fire was used to supplement, and to a limited extent, replace the search and blocking activities of infantry patrols. All of these observed fires were directed to a degree by the traditional eyes of the artillery, the forward observer teams assigned to each infantry company. Often blinded by double and triple canopied jungle, elephant grass, mountainous terrain, climatic conditions, and distance between units, the artillery was forced to use additional means to supplement the eyes of the forward observers. Among these was the establishment of permanent observation posts in towers and on commanding terrain.

Although observation posts had been in use by the 11th and 12th Marines for some time, it was Colonel Don D. Ezell who, shortly after taking command of the 11th Marines in September 1969, instituted greater reliance on the technique, as he stated:

*Typical of the numerous 11th Marines' mountaintop artillery positions was Fire Support Base Cutlass, constructed to support the 3d Marines' search of enemy Base Area 112.*

Marine Corps Historical Collection



It appeared to me that when we first went in, the [Viet Cong] infrastructure and the organized units were lying together in the coastal plains, and that the Marines, through offensive operations, had disengaged the organized units from the infrastructure, knocking them back into the west and to the hills where they formed base camps. Now the infrastructure had to remain . . . to control the population. But they also had a great deal of dealings with the organized units in their mission; they reconned for them, they stored caches for them, they got food and medicine . . . And it would appear if there was a disengagement that there must be . . . a lot of travel back and forth across the battlefield by both the infrastructure and the organized units to perform their missions. My artillery was not in position to control this. My [Forward] O[bservers] were with the rifle companies, and they were certainly forward, but they weren't observers in six feet of elephant grass.<sup>9</sup>

Taking "100 people out of my hide," as Colonel Ezell noted, he initiated a regimental observation post system in an effort "to destroy the enemy as far away as *In addition to forward observers with each infantry company and electronic sensors, Marine artillery battalions relied on observation towers such as this one at Landing Zone Ross to provide accurate fire.*

Marine Corps Historical Collection



possible, to diminish his capabilities across the battlefield to perform his mission."<sup>10</sup>

These observation posts, each manned by a team of artillerymen and protected by infantry or reconnaissance elements, commanded the main infiltration routes into the populated lowlands surrounding Da Nang. The post atop Hill 190 covered Elephant Valley, north of Da Nang, while Hill 270, to the west, commanded routes leading from Happy Valley, Mortar Valley, Sherwood Forest, and Charlie Ridge. Covering the Thuong Duc corridor and the northwestern portion of the Arizona Territory were Hills 250 and 65. Farther south, Hill 425 in the Que Son Mountains watched Phu Loc Valley and the An Hoa basin, while artillerymen atop Hill 119 observed Go Noi Island and Dodge City. A post on FSB Ryder covered Antenna Valley and the northern section of the Que Son Valley to the south. Artillery observers at each of these positions searched the countryside for enemy movement and called fire missions on promising targets.<sup>11</sup>

In mid-October, the regiment's ability to control the battlefield with observation and fire was further enhanced by the introduction of the Integrated Observation Device (IOD).<sup>\*</sup> This 400-pound instrument, valued at \$225,000, consisted of a high-powered Kollmorgan ships' binoculars, combined with an infrared night observation device and a laser range finder. Using the IOD, a trained observer could locate targets up to a maximum range of 30 kilometers in daylight and, employing the infrared observation device, 4,000 meters at night. Once the observer identified a target and determined its distance and direction from the observation post, firing batteries could fire for effect without the usual preliminary adjustment rounds and achieve accuracy of five meters in range and one mil in azimuth.<sup>12</sup> The IOD, with its ability to achieve first round hits, was, as Colonel Ezell observed, "just what we needed." "We were losing targets because during the adjustment phase while we were trying to bracket them they were jumping in

<sup>\*</sup>The Integrated Observation Device was a product of the Marine Corps' Special Procedures for Expediting Equipment Development (SPEED) program, administered by HQMC and coordinated by the Marine Corps Development and Educational Command (MCDEC). Initiated in late 1968, the program was designed to identify the operational hardware requirements of Marine forces in Vietnam, followed by quick procurement and delivery to the field. Production and delivery of the IOD, a combination of three existing devices, spanned approximately six months. Of the initial 10 devices constructed, four went to the Army and six to the 11th Marines. For details of other items developed and procured under the SPEED program see FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb71, pp. 37-39.


holes." It proved to be the "missing ingredient as far as good fire support was concerned."<sup>13</sup>

Initially two teams, consisting of an officer and five enlisted men, were selected from the 11th Marines' pool of forward observers, trained in the use and maintenance of the device by intelligence personnel of the division, and then assigned to observation posts commanding the Arizona and Que Son Mountains. Eventually expanded to six by December, the IOD-equipped teams were positioned at observation posts on Hills 270, 250, 65, 119, 425, and FSB Ryder. Scanning the same countryside constantly, the trained observers in the course of time became so proficient in anticipating enemy evasive action that they could call in artillery fire so as to "lead" a moving enemy formation.

With the initial deployment of two teams in late October, IOD-equipped observation posts reported achieving considerable success. During the first 10 days of operation, the teams were credited with 72 kills, amounting to 28 percent of the total number of NVA and VC casualties reported by the 1st Marine Division for the same period. With the placement of four additional devices in November, enemy casualties mounted. On 10 November, the IOD team on Ryder observed nine enemy troops carrying packs and rifles in the Que Son Valley; Battery H, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines responded and killed all nine. Four days later, Battery E, 2d Battalion claimed 11 enemy killed of 16 sighted by the IOD team on Hill 65. In November, sightings by the six teams resulted in the deaths of 463 troops, 72 percent of the enemy casualties credited to the artillery and 42 percent of all enemy casualties reported by the division. December results were equally impressive, but as Colonel Ezell was later to report, confirmed enemy casualties probably did not accurately reflect the actual number of enemy killed:

Colonel [Gildo S.] Codispoti, who had the 7th Marines, had a valley called Antenna Valley which he used to keep one entire infantry battalion operating in. We were able to release that battalion for other operations . . . with one FO team with an IOD [on FSB Ryder]. In the first month they were there they had 300 confirmed kills. The infantry went back . . . and found hundreds of skulls, bones and they told us the place was stinking down there. It was interesting to find out that we were probably killing more than we thought.<sup>14</sup>

Another vital link in the control and surveillance of the battlefield was the artillery aerial observer. Supported by Marine and Army light observation helicopters (LOH-6A), UH-1E gunships, Cessna O1-G "Bird Dog" and OV-10A aircraft, aerial observers attached to the 11th and 12th Marines flew numerous low-level



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*The Integrated Observation System was one of many new devices created during the war that enhanced Marine artillery's ability to control the battlefield.*

reconnaissance and artillery registration missions in support of ground operations throughout the year. During Operation Dewey Canyon, for example, it was an airborne artillery observer attached to the 12th Marines who spotted the enemy's long-range 122mm field guns and directed their destruction. Similarly, aerial observers of the 11th Marines, supported by light observation helicopters from the Americal Division's Company A, 123d Aviation Battalion and gunships from the 282d Aviation Battalion, made three daily flights over the Da Nang rocket belt, searching for potential launch sites. On numerous occasions sites were located and destroyed before rockets could be launched at Da Nang or surrounding military installations. "The deterrent effect of aerial observers," noted Colonel Mulroney, "has been apparent in all types of counterfire. The enemy does not fire when a AO is in the vicinity. Enemy artillery, rocket, and mortar attacks have all been obviously timed during gaps in AO coverage. Continued thorough coverage by aerial observers is an important part of the defensive program against enemy fire of all types."<sup>15</sup>

No less important was illumination provided Marines of the 1st Division by Battery G, 29th Artillery and to the 3d Marine Division by the 1st Searchlight Battery. Often transported to the remotest fire support bases, battery searchlights were used to illuminate suspected enemy infiltration routes and rocket sites, as well as camp and fire support base perimeters and bridges, to place small arms and artillery fire on enemy positions.<sup>16</sup>

For each of the varied tasks assigned Marine artillerymen, target clearance, both air and ground, continued

to be a complicated and often frustrating process. Except for specified or "free" fire zones, where artillery and other supporting arms could be used without restriction, a call for artillery fire had to be cleared at the province and district levels and through the division, regiment, and appropriate South Korean commands before the mission could be executed. Using well-established procedures, division fire support coordination centers (FSCCs) synchronized all artillery, air, and naval gunfire support within the division TAOR, as did each regiment and infantry battalion. The regiments and battalions were primarily responsible for maintaining contact with allied military and civil headquarters within their respective areas of operation and for obtaining the proper fire clearances from each. The division fire support coordination centers, in close coordination with the 1st Wing DASC, operated the Sav-a-plane system to prevent aircraft from flying into the artillery's line of fire. The safety system, however, became a point of contention between air and artillery as the commanding officer of the 12th Marines, Colonel Peter J. Mulroney, pointed out:

There is too much of a tendency to go to automatic check firing. The decision for check firing must be made by the regimental commander concerned, it can't be made by an AO, . . . it can't be made by the DASC, it can't be made by some pilot. We can have artillery and air at the same time . . . . The pilot must have, which they don't have now, faith in the artillery. The principle that XXIV Corps works on is that with troops in contact and taking casualties, artillery fire should not be held up while they take more casualties on the slim chance that an aircraft will be hit. None were hit in the 13 months that I served in the 3d Marine Division.<sup>17</sup>

A number of changes instituted during 1969 further simplified the clearance procedures and reduced delays in initiating fire missions. Among them were preclearing of areas void of allied patrol activities, instituting a permanent restrictive fire plan during daylight hours, codenamed "California," across division TAORs while still permitting fire support to be employed, and demanding careful fire planning and preclearance of likely target areas for planned reconnaissance team operations. These changes reduced clearance delays to a minimum, while maintaining appropriate safety requirements.

Throughout most of 1969, the volume of Marine artillery rose steadily. In January, the 11th and 12th Marines fired 329,500 rounds during 35,916 missions. By June, the amount of fire had risen to 358,816 rounds for 34,860 missions. The volume of fire remained about that level throughout August, but fell precipitously in September with the redeployment of the 12th

Marines. By December, the 11th Marines, in an expanded TAOR, fired 163,574 rounds during 14,421 missions.

Augmenting the fires of the artillery regiments were tanks of the 1st and 3d Tank Battalions, and the long-range guns of ships of the Seventh Fleet. The primary mission of the Marine tank battalion was combat support during amphibious assault and subsequent operations ashore. In Vietnam, Marine tanks were employed in direct support of the infantry. The usual assignment was one tank company per regiment, with further assignment of tank platoons to battalions as required. The Marine command, however, often assigned tank companies to the direct or general support of separate task forces.

The M48A3 tanks of the 1st Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Maurice C. Ashley, Jr., and 3d Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Sleger, Jr., attached to the 1st and 3d Division respectively, performed a variety of missions, the most important being direct support of infantry in the assault, perimeter defense, road, bridge, and strongpoint security, and convoy escort. They also supplemented artillery fires, providing unobserved missions when needed. In addition, when in support of infantry operations, they undertook the destruction of enemy fortifications by direct fire. As an added task, the 1st Tank Battalion coordinated and controlled all activities within the Southern Sector Defense Command, aimed at delaying or denying enemy penetration of the Da Nang Vital Area.

As elsewhere in Vietnam, the greatest concern of Marine tankers were mines or RPG ambushes. In addition to box mines, which were difficult to detect and thus detonated by the vehicle, the enemy employed command-detonated artillery rounds and aircraft ordnance. All were successful according to Lieutenant Colonel Sleger, who reported that between January and May 1969, the "3d Tank Battalion incurred a total of 38 mining incidents to organic tracked vehicles. Of the 50 M48A3 tanks on hand, 30 had been mined one time, 9 had been mined twice, and one had been mined three times."<sup>18</sup>

Reinforcing the two tank battalions were elements of the deactivated 1st and 3d Anti-Tank Battalions. Equipped with the Ontos, a lightly armored tracked vehicle mounting six 106mm recoilless rifles, four .50-caliber and one .30-caliber machine guns, the primary mission of the battalions was the destruction of enemy armor. But in Vietnam, as a result of the



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*Marine ground commanders, in addition to artillery and air support, relied on naval gunfire provided by ships of the Seventh Fleet, such as the battleship New Jersey (BB 62).*

lack of such a threat, the vehicle initially was employed in support of infantry operations and convoy escort, and then only in perimeter defense due to the vehicles' vulnerability to mines.

Led by the battleship *New Jersey* (BB 62), until recalled in March, and then individual cruisers and destroyers, ships of the Seventh Fleet continued to provide accurate and timely fires in support of ground operations. Whether firing in support of engaged units, softening targets for advancing infantry, suppressing active enemy firing positions, or interdicting enemy lines of communication, the combat record of the ships was impressive. Hundreds of enemy fortifications, storage facilities, and firing batteries were destroyed, roads cut, and numerous previously occupied positions seized without opposition and friendly casualties. In addition, the availability of naval gunfire support allowed III MAF on several occasions to redistribute artillery assets in order to support mobile operations in the western reaches of the I Corps Tactical Zone.

The *New Jersey's* contribution was noteworthy. Firing in support of III MAF Marines, her battery of nine 16-inch guns enabled her to attack targets at a range of 24 miles with a shell weighing 2,750 pounds. The weight of metal, range, and penetration of the 16-inch round far exceeded that of the heaviest Marine artillery weapon—the 175mm gun. In addition, the battleship's secondary battery of 20 5-inch guns provided a fire support capability roughly equal to that of four destroyers. During her six month tour in Vietnam, the *New Jersey* fired over 3,000 16-inch rounds and

nearly 11,000 5-inch rounds, the bulk in support of the 3d Marine Division.

#### *Surveillance and Reconnaissance Activities*

The key to all successful military operations lay in timely, accurate information about the enemy. In Vietnam, the guerrilla nature of the struggle made timely intelligence even more essential, and at the same time more difficult to collect and evaluate. By 1969, the Marines' intelligence effort had evolved from an initial reliance on conventional techniques into a multifaceted, highly sophisticated intelligence gathering system that combined traditional air and ground reconnaissance methods with a number of new technological advances.

The majority of intelligence obtained by III MAF and its subordinate units was derived from air and ground reconnaissance. Marine Observation Squadrons 2 and 6 served as the airborne eyes of the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions. Each month the squadrons' UH-1E helicopters, OV-10As, and Cessna O-1 and O-1G light aircraft flew hundreds of observation missions. In addition, wing helicopters provided a platform for the Airborne Personnel Detector, Detector Concealed Personnel, and the Side Looking Airborne Radar. The mixed complement of RF-4Bs, Phantom IIs, EA-6A Prowlers, and F-3D Skyknights attached to Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron 1 also flew numerous conventional and infrared photographic survey missions. When the 1st MAW was unable to fulfill requests for photographic missions, the Seventh Air Force and Army aviation companies provided sup-

port. Rapid, expert interpretation and dissemination of aerial photographs was accomplished by III MAF's G-2 Photo Imagery Interpretation Center (PIIC), which included an automatic data processing system and a direct teletype link between III MAF and XXIV Corps. In addition, photo interpretation teams were assigned to tactical units to assist in the planning and execution of combat operations.<sup>19</sup>

Although small-unit infantry patrols continually provided information, the division's organic reconnaissance battalions generated the bulk of ground intelligence. III MAF reconnaissance forces consisted of two reconnaissance battalions and two force reconnaissance companies in January 1969. The 1st Reconnaissance Battalion supported 1st Marine Division operations, while the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion supported the 3d Marine Division. Attached to each battalion was a force reconnaissance company. The original doctrinal purpose of force reconnaissance companies was to operate in an amphibious operation under the landing force commander (III MAF), providing preassault reconnaissance and long-range reconnaissance after landing. In Vietnam, the force reconnaissance companies were originally used for deep reconnaissance under III MAF control. But by 1969, the 3d Force Reconnaissance Company had become totally absorbed by the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion during its support of operations undertaken by Task Force Hotel. Although attached to the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company remained a separate entity.

Realizing the need for reconnaissance information beyond that provided division commanders by their respective reconnaissance battalions, Lieutenant General Herman Nickerson, Jr., shortly after assuming command of III MAF in March, directed that the force reconnaissance companies be returned to the control of III MAF. 1st Force Reconnaissance Company became the first, beginning deep patrol operations for the MAF in June, followed by the reconstituted 3d Force Reconnaissance Company in October.

Although deep reconnaissance missions were conducted by units of the Army's Special Operations Group within I Corps, the information provided did not meet the specific tactical needs of III MAF. As a result of III MAF's desire for more coordination as well as coverage of areas not targeted by other operations, III MAF reassumed control of the 1st and 3d Force Reconnaissance Companies, which then were placed under the direction of the newly created Surveillance

and Reconnaissance Center (SRC), established in October. Under the SRC, the following missions were assigned to the force reconnaissance companies: perform deep reconnaissance to determine location and current usage of enemy base camps, storage sites, and lines of communication; fix and identify enemy units tentatively located by sensor devices and agent reports; provide specific targeting and bomb damage assessment for B-52 Arc Light strikes; execute POW recovery missions and wiretap operations; and emplace sensors across enemy trails and in other critical areas.<sup>20</sup>

Based at An Hoa Combat Base initially and then at Da Nang, Major Roger E. Simmons' 1st Force Reconnaissance Company concentrated its efforts during the first half of the year in support of Task Force Yankee and 1st Marine Division operations. Conducting missions in areas surrounding Charlie Ridge and enemy Base Area 112 to the west, patrols, usually inserted and extracted by helicopter, attempted to locate enemy troops, base camps, and storage areas. In addition they spotted targets for artillery fire, assessed bomb damage, and occasionally engaged enemy forces. During January, for example, the company ran 116 patrols, sighting 1,339 enemy troops and killing 88, while sustaining 7 killed and 37 wounded. The company also directed 88 artillery fire missions and 25 air strikes. Following its transfer to III MAF, the company shifted operations to the far reaches of Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces, and as a result the number of patrols gradually declined, totaling only five during December.

The 3d Force Reconnaissance Company, based with and essentially absorbed by the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion at Quang Tri, supported 3d Marine Division operations, conducting 20 patrols and observing or engaging 62 enemy troops while suffering one Marine wounded during January. With the redeployment of the battalion and the division in October, the company was brought up to authorized strength, control passed to III MAF, and the company relocated to Phu Bai Combat Base. During the remaining two months of the year, 3d Force Reconnaissance Marines concentrated on patrolling the Demilitarized Zone and the newly created western reconnaissance zones of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces, focusing on the A Shau Valley and surrounding terrain.

At the beginning of 1969, Lieutenant Colonel Larry P. Charon's 1st Reconnaissance Battalion was overstrength, possessing five lettered companies, and the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, instead of the nor-

mal four.\* In support of Task Force Yankee and the 1st Marine Division, the battalion performed a variety of missions: furnishing teams to support regimental search operations; securing fire support bases and artillery observation posts; and training scuba divers to check bridges within the division TAOR for demolitions and searching waterways for obstructions and weapons caches. However, the principal function of the reconnaissance battalion was to patrol the western fringes of the TAOR. Operating in six-man teams, each composed of an officer or NCO patrol leader, a radioman, three riflemen, and a Navy corpsman, battalion Marines normally spent half their time in the field and the remainder preparing for the next operation or participating in refresher training.

Reconnaissance patrolling, by 1969, had become somewhat standardized. Each team member packed food, water, ammunition, and equipment to sustain him for up to six days in the field. The radioman carried the AN/PRC-25 and extra batteries, while the corpsman took charge of the medical supplies. After several hours of rehearsals and briefings, helicopters lifted the team to its assigned operating area. Upon insertion, a radio check was made with the aircraft, radio relay, and company command post, and then the team departed the landing zone, following a prearranged route. Carefully noting and then reporting details of terrain and enemy activity, or calling in artillery and air strikes, the patrol attempted in most cases to avoid contact. At the end of its assigned mission, or when discovered or attacked, helicopters extracted the team. On return, each member of the team was debriefed and all reports of the patrol were reviewed and then distributed to the appropriate regiment or battalion.

Patrolling during the year by 1st Reconnaissance Battalion Marines resulted in a steady stream of sightings and engagements. During April, for example, the battalion conducted 177 patrols, sighting 2,746 enemy troops, and directing 88 artillery fire missions and 31 air strikes. During the month, battalion Marines killed 177 at a cost of 7 dead and 39 wounded.

Like the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Aydlette H. Perry, Jr., was also overstrength as 1969 began.\*\* Instead of the usual four lettered

companies, five were present plus the attached 3d Force Reconnaissance Company under Major Robert W. Holm. Supporting Task Force Hotel and the 3d Marine Division, battalion Marines performed the same missions as those assigned to the 1st Battalion. Concentrating their efforts in the DMZ, in western Quang Tri, and in the piedmont west of Quang Tri City and Dong Ha, meant that "every indication of enemy activity," General Davis recalled, was "explored by the insertion of reconnaissance teams."<sup>21</sup>

Generally, two types of patrol missions were conducted by reconnaissance Marines within the 3d Marine Division TAOR. As General Davis explained:

Under the artillery fan as established at the time, we would use Sting Ray techniques with 8 to 10 men in a team, seeking the enemy, seeking opportunities to deliver fire upon

*A patrol from Company B, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion moves along a trail south of the Demilitarized Zone in the continuing search for evidence of North Vietnamese infiltration into Quang Tri Province.*

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A192449



\*Lieutenant Colonel Charon was succeeded in February by Lieutenant Colonel Richard D. Mickelson, who was in turn replaced in October by Lieutenant Colonel John J. Grace.

\*\*Lieutenant Colonel Perry was replaced in May by Lieutenant Colonel Richard R. Burritt.



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A192444

*Concealing himself in a grove of bamboo, a reconnaissance Marine surveys the terrain and then directs artillery and air strikes on enemy troops and base camps.*

them. Well-out, smaller teams—four or five men—going on the basis of secrecy: only to observe, stay out of sight. If the enemy is encountered, they attempt to escape. These are not normally reinforced unless we are able to insert artillery at the time. Under the artillery fan, normally they would be reinforced if the enemy presented an adequate target. On contact the team hangs in and fights it out or if it's a small contact and they start to take casualties, we might extract them. However, if it's a large contact and under the artillery fan and the opportunity presents itself, they are reinforced in order to attempt to destroy the enemy force in its entirety.<sup>22</sup>

Using Stingray and deep reconnaissance techniques, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion in May, for example, conducted 194 patrols during which 68 contacts with enemy troops were made, resulting in 80 enemy killed and the loss of 4 Marines killed and 31 wounded.\* During this same period, battalion Marines directed 60 artillery missions, 35 air strikes, and conducted 14 scuba missions.

\*For details of the Stingray concept of operations, see MajGen Raymond G. Davis and 1stLt J. L. Jones, Jr., "Employing the Recon Patrol," *Marine Corps Gazette*, May69, pp. 41-45.

Although the primary purpose of reconnaissance patrols was to gather information, direct artillery and air strikes, and not to fight, teams often found themselves involved in intense combat. Firefights erupted from ambushes, chance meetings with small enemy units, or from efforts to take prisoners. One such encounter took place in March in the southwestern corner of Quang Nam Province.

On the 23d, a team from 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, identified by its radio call sign "Report Card," consisting of two officers, seven enlisted Marines, and a corpsman, was inserted by helicopter, shortly after noon, near the Song Thu Bon, southwest of Antenna Valley. The following morning, the team moved up to a trail where they were to set an ambush in an effort to snatch a prisoner. Once in position it became apparent that the trail was one of the enemy's main routes for moving supplies from western base camps, through Antenna Valley, into the An Hoa basin. During the first half hour in position, a group of approximately 32 enemy troops passed two to three meters in front of the team's ambush. Waiting for an enemy officer or NCO, the team let most pass. The last, dressed in full utilities, a pith helmet, boots, and "strutting along holding his rifle at port arms," appeared to be a good target and was ambushed. As the Marines dragged the enemy soldier into their ambush, they heard movement down the trail, both north and south of their position. Pulling back five meters into deep elephant grass, the team engaged two enemy soldiers, killing both. Then six more appeared to the front. While taking these under fire, and endeavoring to move down to a streambed, the patrol was hit from all sides by approximately 80 to 100 troops.

For 30 minutes, the team fended off probes by the large enemy force until two Huey gunships arrived; the only time the Marines used small arms was when an enemy soldier was actually sighted, otherwise they employed their grenades and the M79 launcher. The fighting continued for another two-and-one-half hours while the gunships were on station and then suddenly stopped. Searching the area around their position before being extracted, the patrol counted 10 enemy killed by Huey machine gun fire. "I learned," the team leader, First Lieutenant Wayne E. Rollings, later reported, "that with a small unit, if you keep good security, 360, that you can hold off a very large force that outnumbers you considerably, and suffer very few casualties. We had no casualties."<sup>23</sup> Although the patrol did not get its prisoner, who had been killed

by an enemy grenade during the fight, they did leave behind 22 NVA dead.

Two-and-one-half weeks later, Lieutenant Rollings and seven men were again on patrol. "The name of our reconnaissance patrol was 'Lunchmeat,' and with 150 North Vietnamese soldiers surrounding us, that's just how I felt, like a piece of lunchmeat in a sandwich." The mission assigned Rollings' patrol was to reconnoiter a trail and ridgeline, four kilometers southwest of An Hoa.

Near noon on 10 April, Rollings and his team were inserted into the area and began checking the ridgelines for enemy activity. Shortly after dusk the following day, they spotted 35 to 40 lights moving in a northeasterly direction, approximately 800 meters from their position. Before the team could move, they heard movement to their front and rear. "We hurriedly set up a defensive perimeter in some dense undergrowth on the side of the trail," noted Rollings, "and called in Spooky [Air Force C-47 aircraft equipped with mini-guns]."

With the enemy moving ever closer, Rollings called an artillery mission on a base camp spotted earlier in the day with the hope of forcing the NVA to call off the search and then radioed for Spooky to make a pass. As Lieutenant Rollings continued:

His first burst landed about 400 yards from us and I began to direct him in. He warned me to tell him when he was hitting within 50 to 75 yards of our position and that he would then start working out toward the enemy from there. But the enemy would still be between us and his fire so I waited until the outer fringe of his fire, which had a 25 yard radius, was within five yards and then told him to start working away from us. I didn't tell him how close his fire was to us, because I knew he wouldn't have gotten that close if he couldn't mark our position.<sup>24</sup>

Patrol members counted more than 30 instances where they heard screams and groans as artillery and mini-guns scored hits. In one instance, related Rollings, "we saw 10 NVA get within 40 yards of our position before 'arty' caught them with a barrage that finished them all off."

At first light the patrol got word to move out, but within 100 meters of its position, it encountered 20 NVA troops. Spooky again called for, the Air Force's C-47 began working in from the rear while the team hit the enemy from the front. "We had them sandwiched between us, but after about a half-hour, the NVA . . . took off." The patrol continued to search the area, but without success, and was extracted on the 13th with one minor casualty.<sup>25</sup>

Other teams were not so lucky. On 4 June, a patrol from Company D, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, fought the battalion's most severe action of the year and lost. The team, identified as "Flight Time," consisted of six Marines. Helicopters inserted the patrol, which carried two strobe lights for illumination, at 0930 on the 2d near Hill 471, overlooking Khe Sanh and Lang Vei, in western Quang Tri Province. The team's arrival went unopposed and the Marines moved northward from the landing zone toward the high ground, finding evidence of recent enemy occupation in the area. The following day, after setting up its harbor site for the evening, the team observed five enemy troops in brown utilities and helmets, but did not take the troops under fire.

At 0250 the next morning, the team began receiving small arms fire and grenades from an unknown size enemy force. Reporting one killed and five wounded, the team leader requested an emergency extraction and all available "on call" air. When the aerial observer arrived on station 10 minutes later, he saw that the enemy was within 10 meters of, and surrounding, the team's position. He immediately requested that a reaction force be inserted to assist the team. At 0315, the observer expended his ordnance, heard a secondary explosion, and then lost all communications with the team.

The 12-man reaction force arrived in the area at 0620 and reported sighting three, and possibly five, members of the team in terrain which looked as though it had been "hit by a flame thrower." On the ground, the force found the bodies of five members of the team in an enemy trench and the sixth approximately 10 meters down the hill. An on-sight investigation indicated that the enemy had come up the northeast side of the hill, firing grenades, small arms, and throwing satchel charges and bangalore torpedoes. The reaction force leader surmised that the burn marks on the ground and bodies, and the way in which the equipment was scattered, indicated that the team must have been involved in hand-to-hand fighting before being overrun.<sup>26</sup>

Enemy troops were not the only hazard faced by reconnaissance Marines when patrolling deep in mountainous terrain. In May, a seven-man team, again from the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, codenamed "Centipede," while patrolling the steep, triple-canopied hills surrounding the Ba Long Valley, observed numerous tiger tracks. On two occasions during the four-day patrol, a tiger came within 10 meters of



Marine Corps Historical Collection

*Cpl Sandy R. Reid of the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion applies additional camouflage paint to his face and neck in order to blend in with the jungle and thereby avoid detection.*

the team's position and had to be driven off with CS grenades.<sup>27</sup> Among other nonhostile hazards were lightning, friendly fire, the rugged terrain itself, and equipment failure. Although reconnaissance Marines did suffer a number of noncombat casualties, losses in most cases were a direct result of clashes with enemy troops.

With four years of experience behind them, reconnaissance Marines had, by 1969, developed tested techniques and equipment in order to supply the division

they supported with accurate and timely intelligence. To assure prompt artillery support when needed and at the same time prevent accidental shelling, special reconnaissance zones were established for each deployed team in which only the patrol could call fire missions. The 11th and 12th Marines designated a battery or platoon of howitzers to support each team and assigned a liaison officer at the reconnaissance battalion's command post to assist in fire planning and coordination. To ensure the rapid extraction of a team

under fire or in a tenuous situation, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing designated helicopters as part of a quick-reaction package, that at times included division infantry forces to assist.

When not on patrol, reconnaissance Marines continually trained for their exacting task. In addition to the initial indoctrination program for newly arrived personnel, which included instruction in the use of the AN/PRC-25 radio, map reading, first aid, rappelling from helicopters, observer procedures, and intelligence reporting techniques, the battalions conducted periodic refresher courses with special emphasis on weapons training, scuba diving, physical conditioning, and the use of new equipment such as extraction ladders. Selected personnel also were sent to the Army's Recon-do School at Nha Trang for more specialized training.

With the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division, Marine reconnaissance strength was halved. What had been the reconnaissance zone of the 3d Battalion was passed to reconnaissance elements of the 101st Airborne and 1st ARVN Divisions. The 3d Force Reconnaissance Company, now a separate entity under III MAF, moved to Phu Bai and was given the task of patrolling the A Shau Valley. The 1st Force Reconnaissance Company and 1st Reconnaissance Battalion continued to concentrate on Quang Nam Province, although by December, fewer patrols were assigned to deep missions in the western reaches of the province.

While direct air observation and ground reconnaissance provided the bulk of intelligence, the artillery's system of observation and target acquisition also produced information. Scattered throughout the divisions' areas of responsibility were numerous observation towers which not only directed artillery fire, but permitted general surveillance of enemy movement. Supplementing the artillery's intelligence gathering capability were Integrated Observation Devices and the computerized Fire Support Information System.\*

Captured enemy documents and prisoners yielded additional information. To extract the intelligence, the divisions relied heavily upon specially trained Marines attached to interrogation-translation teams, interpreter teams, and counterintelligence teams. Working within the division G-2 sections, the interrogation and interpreter teams, as their names implied, interviewed NVA and VC prisoners and suspected civilian detainees, and reviewed all captured documents for in-

formation on enemy unit strength; designations; attack and withdrawal routes; staging, rally, and base areas; mines and surprise firing devices locations; and enemy combat effectiveness and morale. In September 1969, a typical month, teams attached to the 1st Marine Division interrogated 1,397 detainees, 18 of whom were classified prisoners of war, 45 as civilian defendants, 13 as returnees, and 1,321 as innocent civilians. During the same month, the teams screened 3,107 documents for translation.<sup>28</sup>

Counterintelligence teams, in addition to performing normal security and counter-espionage tasks at every Marine cantonment where South Vietnamese civilians were employed, accompanied Marine units to the field in search of their primary target, the Viet Cong Infrastructure. Working closely with ARVN intelligence agencies, National Police, National Police Field Forces, Provisional Reconnaissance Units, and Revolutionary Development Cadre in numerous cordon operations, they checked the identities of civilian detainees against lists of known infrastructure members and carried out immediate exploitative operations.<sup>29</sup>

The Marines also employed numerous South Vietnamese interpreters and informants, tasked with ferreting out the local infrastructure. Many in the intelligence community, however, thought Marines should not be involved in such activity because, as the 1st Division's G-2, Colonel Anthony J. Skotnicki, pointed out, "we didn't have the skill or language ability," and that others among the near dozen agencies involved in such activity were better qualified.<sup>30</sup>

Marines in the field also relied heavily on Kit Carson Scouts, due to their proven loyalty and knowledge of the people and terrain. In addition, some Marine units, especially those operating in the heavily populated lowlands, worked closely with South Vietnamese Armed Propaganda Teams. Although primarily involved in psychological warfare, the teams, through informal contacts with villagers, did collect information concerning local guerrilla and infrastructure activity, which was passed on to the appropriate Marine unit.

Under the Voluntary Informant Program (VIP), Marines enlisted the assistance of South Vietnamese civilians in the intelligence gathering effort. Administered by the division's G-2 staff, battalions were provided funds with which information could be purchased. A majority of the funds, however, went to rewarding Vietnamese who brought in or pointed out munitions, such as grenades, dud artillery rounds, and aircraft ordnance, which could be used by the enemy

\*For additional detail on artillery targeting and operations, see pp. 245-249.



Marine Corps Historical Collection

*Under the Voluntary Informant Program, South Vietnamese civilians turned in dud ammunition, mortar rounds in this instance, that might otherwise be used to make boobytraps.*

in constructing surprise firing devices. During May 1969, for example, 1st Marine Division units spent a total of 1,502,454 piasters (approximately 1,200 dollars) in 764 separate payments for the return of ordnance, while making two payments for "casual information."<sup>31</sup>

As an adjunct to the VIP program, the 3d Marine Division Psychological Operations Office established its own program, dubbed "Circuit Rider." Composed of a psyops officer and an explosive ordnance disposal team, Circuit Rider traveled Route 1 weekly purchasing ordnance local children had found. The program, continually advertised by audio-visual trucks, leaflet drops, and aerial broadcasts, was considered highly successful. The area of greatest activity during the year, proved to be along Route 1, between Dong Ha and Gio Linh, where it was thought children had found and ransacked a number of enemy caches.

Marines also relied on information generated by signal intercepts. During the year, Lieutenant Colonel Patrick J. Fennell, Jr.'s 1st Radio Battalion provided III MAF with this capability. Headquartered at Camp

Horn, with its Headquarters and Service Company at nearby Camp Hoa Long and Operations Company at Dong Ha, the battalion's six task-organized platoons, deployed at fire support bases and observation posts throughout Quang Tri and Quang Nam Provinces, provided immediate tactical support for both regimental and division operations. Using both ground installations and airborne platforms supplied by the Army and Air Force, Marine radiomen listened to enemy verbal and message communications in an effort to determine the location of transmitter sites. As a result of these efforts, the battalion passed on an average of 4,000 fixes each month to tactical commanders who in turn used artillery, air, or ground operations to destroy them. In addition to monitoring enemy communications, the battalion also monitored friendly transmissions to ensure against security violations or compromises. During March, for example, the battalion reported 194 violations in 118,920 messages monitored.<sup>32</sup>

Electronic sensors provided yet another source of intelligence information. Products of the aborted Demilitarized Zone barrier project initiated by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and abandoned

in October 1968, sensors, by 1969, were being employed tactically throughout South Vietnam under a new program, Duffle Bag.\* These "24-hour silent sentinels" not only contributed to economies in force, but provided early warning of attacks on base camps and cities, and contributed to the reduction of rocket attacks. "It appears," noted a MACV message, "that . . . sensor technology may be one of the more important developments to come out of the Vietnam war. At the present time, the only limitations on successful sensor-supported operations are the availability of sensors, and the degree of imagination, initiative, ingenuity, and resourcefulness of tactical commanders."<sup>33</sup>

The Marines first used sensors during the siege of Khe Sanh in early 1968. At that time, Air Force Igloo White aircraft—dedicated EC-121s in orbit over Laos—provided readouts from out-of-country sensors. The sensor information was relayed to Nakhon Phanom where it was assessed and targets passed to Khe Sanh and Dong Ha. Towards the end of the siege, some local readout and assessment capability was given the Khe Sanh Marines. As a result of the experience at Khe Sanh, coupled with the onset of the rainy season in the Laotian Panhandle, sensors became available for limited test and evaluation in support of ground combat operations. Upon completion of the evaluations, codenamed Duck Blind, in August 1968, it became apparent that sensors, originally designed to impede or substantially reduce infiltration from North to South Vietnam, could make significant contributions in surveillance and target acquisition operations in South Vietnam.

A majority of the sensors employed by III MAF were of the radio-type, which transmitted information electronically directly to monitoring stations. These small, camouflaged, battery-powered devices could be dropped from aircraft or implanted by hand. Once in position, the sensors reacted to minute physical changes in the surrounding environment. Seismic sensors, known as Seismic Intrusion Devices (SIDs), responded to ground vibrations, such as human footsteps. Magnetic sensors, or Magnetic Intrusion Devices (MAGIDs), detected moving metallic objects, and infrared sensors (PIRIDs) reacted to heat emanating

from bodies, vehicle engines, and campfires. Acoustic sensors picked up audible sounds. Once activated, the sensors sent a signal to a receiver from which the operator could determine the location and probable nature of the object. Acoustic sensors transmitted the sounds they detected directly to the monitoring stations.

Sensors were generally planted in groups, or "strings" as they were more commonly termed, along enemy infiltration routes from the mountains into the lowlands. A typical string, designed to detect movement, consisted of several seismic and a few magnetic and acoustical sensors. Once activated, the monitoring station operator could request an artillery fire mission, alert a nearby ground unit, or simply record the time and direction of movement for later analysis. Seismic, magnetic, and infrared line sensors also were employed around fixed installations such as fire support or combat bases. The Da Nang Barrier contained 106 such sensors and plans called for the future implantation of an additional 775. By mid-1969, each division had over 100 sensors, maintained and monitored by the divisions' G-2 staffs.

Whether obtained by sensors, air and ground reconnaissance, or from a paid agent, intelligence information had to be quickly evaluated, correlated, and transmitted to units in the field to be of any value. In order to facilitate this process, III MAF established the Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center at Da Nang in late 1969, under Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Colonel John S. Canton. The center, according to Colonel Canton, was to "physically and functionally integrate and coordinate all intelligence collection means in ICTZ, thus reducing the time lapse between the initial collection of intelligence information and the dissemination of processed intelligence to tactical commanders." In addition to directing deep surveillance missions of the force reconnaissance companies, the SRC "monitored all intelligence collection in ICTZ. This ensured round-the-clock, timely and reliable communication of perishable intelligence data to using units, thus producing a quantum increase in the immediate utilization of intelligence assets."<sup>34</sup>

"In this war, like no other war in the past generation" noted Colonel Anthony J. Skotnicki, "we never worked under a lack of information. We actually acquired so much intelligence information we couldn't handle it." Despite advances in processing and organization, there remained "a considerable amount of difficulty in manually recording it and manually extracting it in order to put it together into useful intelligence."<sup>35</sup>

\*The use of sensors within South Vietnam, nicknamed Duffle Bag, was one of four continuing sensor programs carried out by MACV in Southeast Asia. The remaining three were: Igloo White, which involved the out-of-country use of sensors; Duel Blade II, the sensor supported anti-infiltration system in and along the DMZ; and, Tight Jaw, the combined US/GVN border surveillance operation.

## CHAPTER 15

# Supplying III MAF

*Force Logistic Command—Naval Support Activity, Da Nang—Engineer Support  
Motor Transport—Medical Support—Communications—Logistics of Keystone Eagle and Keystone Cardinal*

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### *Force Logistic Command*

For supply, maintenance, and service support, III MAF relied on Force Logistic Command (FLC). At the beginning of 1969, Brigadier General James A. Feeley, Jr. commanded the logistical arm supporting Marine operations in Vietnam. A Massachusetts native, combat veteran of World War II and Korea, and trained as an aviator, General Feeley assumed command of the FLC in October 1968.\*

Composed of 430 Marine and 22 Navy officers and 9,164 Marine and 150 Navy enlisted men, Force Logistic Command was headquartered at Camp Jay A. Books, part of the expansive Red Beach support complex, northwest of Da Nang. Under the operational control of III MAF and command and administrative control of FMFPac, FLC was organized around the Headquarters and Service, Supply, and Maintenance Battalions of the 1st Force Service Regiment and included 1st Service Battalion/Force Logistic Support Group Bravo (FLSG-Bravo), 3d Service Battalion/Force Logistic Support Group Alpha (FLSG-Alpha), 1st and 3d Military Police Battalions, 5th Communication Battalion, and 7th Motor Transport Battalion.

The three battalions of the Force Service Regiment performed a majority of the logistical functions of Force Logistic Command. Headquarters and Service Battalion provided administrative, communication, and motor transport assistance for elements of the FLC and units of III MAF. In addition to operating graves registration and maintaining internal and perimeter security for Camp Books, it also managed the III MAF Transient Facility, through which passed all incoming and outgoing personnel, and the R&R Processing Center. The Supply Battalion received, stored, distributed, and accounted for all supplies, while operating ammunition supply points (ASPs), baking most of III MAF's breadstuffs, and providing personnel for the logistical support subunit at Chu Lai. Maintenance

Battalion repaired all types of Marine ordnance and equipment, with the exception of aviation items or equipment requiring extensive overhaul. The battalion transferred these items either to 3d Force Service Regiment facilities on Okinawa or Japan, or to maintenance depots in the United States.

Force Logistic Support Group Alpha, initially headquartered at Phu Bai but moved to Camp Books on 5 January, directly supported the 1st Marine Division. Composed of the Headquarters and Service, Maintenance, Supply, and Truck Companies of the 3d Service Battalion, the FLSG maintained logistic support units (LSUs) at Hill 55, An Hoa, and Phu Bai, which served the 1st, 5th, and 7th Marines. Each LSU drew rations, fuel, and ammunition from the FLC for issue to its supported regiment, repaired equipment and ordnance, and operated a laundry. On 15 July, FLSG-Alpha assumed control over the logistic support subunit at Chu Lai, which provided rations, ammunition, and maintenance support for Marine Aircraft Groups 12 and 13, 9th Engineer Battalion, and the 1st Combined Action Group.


During November 1969, Force Logistic Support Group Bravo, which in like manner had supported the 3d Marine Division, assumed the support of the 1st Marine Division and portions of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. On the 7th, FLSG-Bravo adopted FLSG-Alpha's mission and initiated standdown procedures at Quang Tri, Vandegrift, and Dong Ha Combat Bases prior to moving to Camp Books. At the same time, FLSG-Alpha's organizational colors moved to Okinawa with the remaining elements of the 3d Marine Division. FLSG-Bravo continued to provide support for the 1st Marine Division through the operation of three logistic support units located at Hill 55, An Hoa Combat Base, and LZ Baldy (established in August), and the subunit at Chu Lai (FLSG-Bravo Sub-Unit 1).<sup>1</sup>

Under the amphibious concept, each division and the wing possessed its own logistical support capability. But as the war intensified, the accretion of troops and equipment necessitated a change. A viable, semipermanent logistic support organization, Force Logistic

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\*Brigadier General Mauro J. Padalino replaced General Feeley in November 1969. As a colonel in 1965, he headed FLC's predecessor, the Force Logistic Support Group.

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Command, was thus created from the previously fragmented logistic command and control structures. As a result, the divisions gave up their organic service battalions and thus maintained no separate supply or accounting facilities. Many Marines continued to view this loss as detrimental to the divisions' capabilities to perform their missions. Among them was Colonel Frank R. DeNormandie, G-4, 3d Marine Division, who noted that with the creation of FLC and subordinate groups, division control over logistical support moved from direct management to one of cooperation and coordination. "As a result, supply support rapidly

changed from unit distribution to supply point distribution. In addition, changes in priority for either unit supply or equipment repair had to be effected at the highest level." The division commander now not only had no readily available source of supply, but no established third echelon maintenance and supply or materiel storage capability. "We make a division that is supposed to be self-sufficient," noted Colonel DeNormandie, "that is capable of taking care of itself, that is capable of supporting itself far removed from any other headquarters and yet we take away from that division commander the thing that makes

him tick, and the thing that makes any military organization really tick and really able to fight is its logistics support capability.”<sup>2</sup>

Despite the lack of direct division control and the imposition of additional management levels, the logistics of support, on the whole, remained rather simple. Individual battalions of the 1st Marines, for example, radioed their supply requests to their representatives on Hill 55 each day prior to 1500. Battalion support personnel then drew supplies from FLC, either directly or through a logistic support unit and staged the loads for next-day delivery. Trucks or helicopters then transported passengers and supplies to the battalion and on the return trip, removed retrograde equipment and troops.<sup>3</sup>

As helicopter resupply became more prominent, each division became more dependent upon the activities of its shore party battalions. Originally established to facilitate the movement of men and equipment across the beach, the battalions expand-

ed their mission to include support of heliborne assaults. Organic to each division, these battalions deployed a company with each infantry regiment. Shore party support teams located with each LSU assembled and prepared supplies for helicopter pickup, while control teams with the rifle companies marked the landing zones, briefed the incoming helicopter crews, and supervised unloading.

Supply and maintenance support for the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was more complex since the wing drew upon both Navy and Marine sources. Force Logistic Command provided non-aviation supplies and ammunition, while a variety of Navy agencies supplied replacement aircraft, spare parts, vehicles, and maintenance support. Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet, a subordinate of CinCPacFlt, was responsible for aviation logistic support of the wing. As a result, the wing requisitioned its Navy material from the Naval Supply Depot at Yokosuka, Japan, which also contracted for and oversaw major repair and

*BGen James A. Feeley, Jr., right, Commanding General, Force Logistic Command, guides LtGen Herman Nickerson through the command's data processing center at Camp Books.*

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A193236



rebuilding of Marine aircraft. Within the wing, each aircraft group stored and issued supplies and performed routine maintenance and limited repair of aircraft. Augmenting the groups' organic battle damage repair capabilities were civilian teams from naval aircraft repair facilities. Marine Wing Support Group 17 provided Marine Corps supply, postal, post exchange, and disbursing services for all wing elements, while maintaining group equipment, aircraft launch, and recovery systems, and overseeing the shipment of aircraft into and out of Vietnam.

The logistic supply and repair system supporting Marine units within I Corps ran smoothly during 1969. It responded quickly and effectively to III MAF's highly mobile, wide-ranging offensive maneuvers with the establishment of expedient positions in rugged, mountainous terrain in order to sustain extended combat operations. Temporary shortages of ordnance, spare parts, radio batteries, wet weather gear, and malaria and salt tablets did occur, but these shortages were quickly remedied by borrowing from the Army or by emergency shipments from Marine supply facilities on Okinawa or in the United States. Despite these occasional shortages, Marine units experienced few supply system problems. As Major General Wilbur F. Simlik, former commanding officer of the 3d Marines and later III MAF G-4, noted: "never have troops been supported in such abundance as in the Vietnamese war. The chow, the ammunition, the supplies, the transportation, were there when we needed it, in abundance; as a matter of fact, probably too much."<sup>4</sup>

As a direct result of abundance of support, the problem of supply discipline arose. It varied from the solitary Marine who abandoned his gas mask along a trail because it was too bulky or heavy to carry and was issued a replacement in preparation for an inspection, to the battalion commander who requested a dozen sets of utilities be issued per man when only three were authorized. "As a practical matter," noted 1st Marine Division Supply Officer and later division Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Colonel John L. Schwartz, supply discipline "is non-existent. It does not make any difference whether it is ammunition, fuel, chow, or what it is. There is gross extravagance . . . . There seems to be in the minds of many many commanders three questions: How much stuff have I got? How soon can I use it? and Where can I get some more?"<sup>5</sup> Although numerous attempts were made, the problem continued to defy solution.

On 27 April 1969, the III MAF logistic support sys-

tem was tested severely when a grass fire brought about the destruction of Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)-1, three kilometers southwest of the Da Nang Airbase. The fire first ignited unserviceable ammunition slated for disposal, and the resultant explosions spread in chain reaction to the two main ground and air ammunition storage areas and a nearby fuel storage area. Colonel William D. Bassett, Jr., FLSG-Alpha's commanding officer, described the effects:

On that Sunday afternoon, the Helicopter Utilization Review Board was in session at III MAF Headquarters. The smoke and fire could be seen across Da Nang at a distance that I would guess to be 10 to 12 kilometers. There were two significant explosions which were far greater than the rest. Both produced fire balls similar to small nuclear explosions, complete with shock waves which could be seen moving out in a circular pattern through the smoke and haze. The first of these two exceptional blasts hit III MAF Headquarters at approximately 1430. The meeting was in a converted single story warehouse with a solid wall toward ASP-1. The seaward side of the building had two large warehouse-type doors which closed together and had steel drop-bar closures into the concrete floor. The reverse, counter pressure actually pushed the doors in, breaking the concrete around the holes that the bars were in . . . . The second similar blast took place around 2200 and was not as strong as the first, but the shock wave did hit III MAF Headquarters.<sup>6</sup>

Major destruction occurred in the ammunition supply point, the fuel storage area, and a nearby Air Force bomb dump, while extensive damage caused by the blast and flying debris was done to FLC facilities between the ASP and the airfield. Continuous secondary explosions forced the temporary closing of the Da Nang Airbase to all but emergency traffic; normal airfield operations were resumed within 18 hours. Casualties were limited to one American and one Vietnamese killed and 65 wounded, while 1,500 Vietnamese were left homeless when the nearby village of Hoa Phat was destroyed by the fire and explosions.

Approximately 38,000 short tons of ground and air munitions, valued in excess of 75 million dollars, were destroyed; an amount equal to 40 percent of the total Marine munitions on hand at FLC facilities throughout I Corps.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, the destruction of the supply point caused no interruption in ordnance support for continuing combat operations. As the commanding officer of the 11th Marines, Colonel Samuel A. Hannah, noted:

When the ammo dump started going, we put a little restriction on our shooting to slow it down a little bit and keep it down because we weren't sure exactly the extent of it. But within a day or so, this cleared up and we got a general feeling about what the ammo supply was and we were able to go



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A422546

*The large mushroom cloud produced by exploding ordnance stored at Force Logistic Command Ammunition Supply Point 1 was visible for several miles. While close to half of III MAF's ammunition was destroyed, Marines experienced no interruption in support.*

back to what might be called a normal rate of fire . . . . From a shooting standpoint, no great problems with it. There may have been one or two cases where we ran a little short of a certain type of fuze, but it was of no great consequence to the actual support.<sup>8</sup>

Immediate action was taken on the 28th when FLC shifted munitions storage operations to nearby ASP-2 and ordered replenishment stocks from storage areas in the Western Pacific and the United States. Although ground stocks for four months remained below the 45-day level authorized, and the ASP was idle for six while repairs were made, there was no degradation in ordnance support for continuing III MAF operations.<sup>9</sup>

#### *Naval Support Activity, Da Nang*

The United States military logistic system in I Corps was composed of three elements, of which Force Logistic Command was one component. For most standard supply items and for a wide variety of support services, III MAF depended upon Naval Support Activity (NSA), Da Nang, headquartered at the "White Elephant" within the city until 15 August, and then

at the China Beach Public Works Compound ("Wooden Elephant") in East Da Nang.

Commanded by Rear Admiral Emmett P. Bonner, who was replaced in December by Rear Admiral Robert E. Adamson, Jr., Naval Support Activity, Da Nang consisted of close to 11,000 United States Navy officers and enlisted men and a civilian work force of over 6,700 South Vietnamese. An equal number of Americans, Vietnamese, and other Asians worked for the activity's private contractors. Established in late July 1965 to support the initial elements of III MAF, NSA Da Nang was under the immediate operational control of Commander, United States Naval Forces, Vietnam, while overall command was exercised by Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet through Commander, Service Force, Pacific Fleet.<sup>10</sup>

The Naval Support Activity operated the port of Da Nang as well as transshipment points at Cua Viet/Dong Ha and Hue/Tan My in northern I Corps and Sa Huynh and Chu Lai in the southern provinces. With a fleet of over 350 ships and other small craft, vast warehouses, storage lots, and tank farms, NSA

handled, stored, and issued all incoming and outgoing military cargo. NSA's public works department provided electricity, water, and ice to American cantonments, while its civilian contractors maintained over 700 miles of roads and the attending construction equipment. In addition, the activity managed Navy and Marine real estate holdings and operated the 720-bed naval hospital at Da Nang.<sup>11</sup>

Army units operating within I Corps Tactical Zone received logistical support from the U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang, an organization which performed functions similar to those of Force Logistic Command. Under the operational control of the Commander, 1st Logistical Command, the Da Nang Support Command, by 1969, had grown to a strength of about 7,500 supply and transportation troops. The command included a field depot at Da Nang and two general support groups, the 26th, located at Phu Bai, and the 80th at Da Nang, which supported Army units in northern and southern I Corps.<sup>12</sup>

At its peak in 1969, the Navy by way of the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, provided 98 percent of the commonly used supplies, construction materials, and service support for the 190,000 troops in I Corps. Marines and Army troops, through the Force Logistic Command and U.S. Army Support Command, distributed supplies drawn from the NSA to their own units, and procured, stored, and issued their own ammunition and those other supplies unique to the particular service. In addition to supporting the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FLC supported the 2d ROKMC Brigade, while Army Support Command maintained petroleum pipelines used by all Services, as well as providing mortuary assistance and property disposal. With the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division and the relocation of FLSG-Bravo to Da Nang in November, the Army Support Command assumed the function of furnishing supplies and services for the remaining Marine elements in northern I Corps.<sup>13</sup>

With the implementation of plans for the withdrawal of Marine units from I Corps, the Army would assume a greater role in supporting the remaining forces. As redeployment planning began, Vice Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, proposed that the Army, which already furnished support for all United States forces outside of I Corps, assume the missions of Naval Support Activity, Da Nang. With a proviso that the Navy would end its support only in conjunction with the redeploy-



Marine Corps Historical Collection  
*A Force Logistic Command forklift unloads artillery ammunition from a Navy LST. The Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, provided Marines most standard supply items and a wide variety of support services.*

ment of Marine units, Zumwalt secured approval for his proposal from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. Also endorsing his plan, General Abrams, in late May 1969, ordered U.S. Army, Republic of Vietnam to make a study of the cost and manpower requirements of an Army logistics takeover in I Corps.<sup>14</sup>

When informed of these preliminary steps in early June, Lieutenant General Nickerson, III MAF commander, protested the move. Expressing complete satisfaction with Navy support, he urged that the present logistical structure in I Corps not be dismantled at a time when major redeployments and realignment of allied forces were to take place and the threat of enemy action remained high.<sup>15</sup> General Marine reaction to the possible loss of Navy support was one of apprehension. As Major General Simlik later recalled: "We had great misgivings of losing Navy support. Naval Support Activity, Da Nang (NSA) had done such a marvelous job for a number of years and had given us such magnificent support. All of a sudden

with NSA leaving we had a sinking feeling—almost one of despair.”<sup>16</sup>

The Navy-Marine Corps team had worked well and few were willing to see the formal and informal relationship dissolved. According to General Simlik:

It wasn't as simple as writing a contract for janitorial services . . . NSA had been supporting the Marines in Vietnam for 5 years or so. Both NSA and the Marines knew the major areas of support. But there were so many areas that were covered by the Marine gunnery sergeant-Navy chief routine. For example, . . . a gunnery sergeant may have gotten a chief to take care of certain functions—to render certain support, small that it may be—by seeing that he got a couple bottles of booze or a case of beer at the right time. It was an informal, unwritten agreement of course, passed on from gunnery sergeant to gunnery sergeant, and chief to chief. Undoubtedly, there were a number of such agreements—difficult to discover, impossible to reduce to written form for a formal contract. And we were apprehensive, a psychotic apprehensiveness, that the Army would not respond if the written contract didn't include it.<sup>17</sup>

The greatest area of concern was the possible loss of the naval hospital. As Lieutenant General Leo J. Dulacki, then a brigadier general and III MAF G-3, later commented:

When the redeployment plans were first drawn up, it was envisioned that substantial Marine forces would be redeployed out of country in the very first phases. Consistent with those plans, the Navy developed a plan for the early redeployment of the Naval Support Activity (Da Nang) concurrent with the redeployment of the Marines. However, the original plan was modified, as a result of which, the Marines forces would be redeployed on a slower and more extended time schedule. Nevertheless, the Navy determined that it would continue with its original plans regardless of any changes in the timing of the Marine redeployment. Suddenly we were faced with the prospect of some 40,000 Marines continuing operations in ICTZ but without naval support which had been such an integral part of the overall campaign in ICTZ. Of particular concern was the closure of the Naval Hospital (Da Nang) since it was prudent to assume that the enemy might attempt to exploit reduction of forces in ICTZ by launching increased offensive operations; if the latter eventually occurred, the availability of the hospital was essential. Formal representations were made to Admiral Zumwalt, Commander of Naval Forces, Vietnam, and Admiral Adamson, the Commander Naval Support Activity (Da Nang) to no avail; the Navy intended to proceed with its original redeployment plans. The situation was also discussed with General Abrams, COMUSMACV; General Abrams, as he stated, “preferred not to get involved in a ‘Navy-Marine Corps controversy’ ”; he then gave his personal assurances that, if the enemy embarked on large-scale offensive operations, at the outset, a hospital ship would be made available off the coast of ICTZ, and if necessary, a MASH would be moved into ICTZ to render medical support to the Marines.

“It was my understanding,” General Dulacki continued, “that CG, FMFPac made a similar representation to CINCPacFlt in Hawaii for the continuation of hospital support in Da Nang, but also to no avail.”<sup>18</sup>

Despite Marine protests, planning for the Army takeover of the activity's support functions continued. In September 1969, MACV established a joint Army-Navy planning group, at Admiral Zumwalt's suggestion, to work out the practical details of the gradual transfer to the Army as the Marines pulled out. The group, chaired by the Army and located at Da Nang, included representatives of MACV, USARV, NavForV, III MAF, 1st Logistical Command, NSA Da Nang, Army Support Command Da Nang, and Force Logistic Command. Divided into functional subcommittees, MACV tasked the group with determining requirements for personnel and equipment, costs, and defining problems and proposing solutions.

With Marine redeployments and joint studies underway, General Abrams, in mid-November, instructed the Army and Navy to develop a support turnover schedule for formal presentation to MACV by 1 January 1970. Noting that particular functions not directly required for the support of III MAF could be transferred earlier, Abrams directed that the final assumption of common support by the Army would follow the complete removal of Marine combat units.

Discussions dragged on past the 1 January MACV deadline with Zumwalt pressing for early Army takeover of ports and activities not needed by Marines in northern I Corps, and indicating that once the Army assumed the common support mission, NSA Da Nang would be replaced by a smaller naval support facility, whose primary concern would be small-craft maintenance and assisting the South Vietnamese Navy. At the same time, III MAF stressed the need for the slow and deliberate transfer of functions to the Army, while reemphasizing that Navy support continue until all Marine combat forces were withdrawn from Vietnam. USARV sought the loan or outright transfer of Navy facilities and equipment to supplement Army logistical resources in I Corps, while all the Service components sought to minimize the cost of supporting the remaining forces.

On 21 January, General Abrams set 1 July 1970 as the date for final turnover of common service support to the Army. The changeover would take place even if Marine combat units remained. Preliminary turnovers of equipment and minor facilities in northern I Corps began in November 1969, following the

redployment of the 3d Marine Division, but not until February 1970 did the first of a series of major transfers occur. On the 15th, Naval Support Activity, Da Nang disbanded its detachments at Sa Huynh and Cua Viet and transferred the port facilities to the U.S. Army Support Command. Additional transfers were made during March, April, and May, and on 30 June 1970 NSA Da Nang was disestablished. The following day U.S. Naval Support Facility, Da Nang came into being.<sup>19</sup>

### *Engineer Support*

At the beginning of 1969, five Marine combat engineer battalions were deployed in I Corps. The 1st Engineer Battalion, organic engineer element of the 1st Marine Division, reinforced by a platoon of Company A, 3d Engineer Battalion, and a platoon of Company A, 5th Engineer Battalion, performed light construction throughout the division's area of responsibility, maintained water points, swept roads of mines, and conducted the division's Demolitions, Land Mine Warfare, and Viet Cong Boobytrap School. The 3d Engineer Battalion, organic to the 3d Marine Division, performed similar functions in Quang Tri Province. Assisting the 3d Engineer Battalion was the 11th Engineer Battalion, reinforced by the 3d Bridge Company. Of III MAF's two force engineer battalions, the 7th, with attached 1st Bridge Company, worked almost exclusively for the 1st Marine Division, performing heavy construction in the Da Nang area, maintaining and improving roads, and conducting sweeps in search of enemy mines. The 9th Engineer Battalion, with its command post and three companies at Chu Lai and part of the fourth at Tam Ky, concentrated its main effort on maintaining and upgrading Route 1 between Chu Lai and the Song Cau Lau. The battalion also provided secondary road maintenance and other tactical support to the Americal Division. The battalions, in addition to normal combat tasks, carried out an extensive civic action program, that included repair of local school and government buildings, irrigation canals, and plowing acres of rice paddies.

In addition to the five Marine engineer units, naval construction forces (Seabees) of the 3d Naval Construction Brigade and the four-battalion U.S. Army 45th Engineer Group operated in I Corps at the beginning of 1969.<sup>20</sup> The Seabees rotated battalions in and out of I Corps throughout the year and had 10 battalions at the beginning of 1969, 12 at midyear, and 5 at the end of the year. Like the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions, the Americal and 101st Airborne Divisions, and the

1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, had organic engineers. The Air Force relied on a heavy repair squadron, located at the Da Nang Airbase.<sup>21</sup>

With Marine, Army, Navy, and the public works division of NSA Da Nang involved in large and varied construction projects, the lines of responsibility among the engineer elements, specifically between Marine direct and general support battalions and the Seabees, became "blurred," noted Colonel Nicholas A. Canzona, G-4 of the 1st Marine Division. "I never saw so many engineers in all my life working in a given area," Canzona continued, "and I must admit that I don't think I've ever seen so much attendant confusion as to who is supposed to do what and why and who is in charge of this and that. And this can get somewhat exasperating at times."<sup>22</sup>

Redeployments during the last months of 1969 reduced the III MAF engineer force by two Marine battalions: the 3d Marine Division's 3d Engineer Battalion and the 11th Engineer Battalion, a force unit. Among the principal contributions of the battalions in northern I Corps was development and perfection of the fire support base concept. With the increased dependence on mobile operations to exert maximum pressure on enemy formations, there occurred a requirement to provide close artillery support for combat units deployed beyond the range of guns at existing support bases. The solution was to establish small fortified positions on defensible terrain, large enough to accommodate the required artillery and service units supporting the maneuver elements. The construction of these sites proved to be a major engineering task, requiring first a detailed reconnaissance and then the formation of a task-organized engineer unit. Engineer equipment and troop requirements varied according to the nature of the terrain and the amount of clearing necessary following the supporting arms preparations.

The general sequence of engineer buildup on the selected fire support base site began with a small reconnaissance team accompanying the security force and helicopter support team. The contingent grew quickly as engineers began initial work with hand and power tools, and demolitions, to carve out a landing zone capable of receiving heavy equipment, such as tractors and backhoes, for the construction of gun pits, ammunition storage facilities, a helicopter pad, a fire direction center, and other defensive positions.

The primary piece of engineer equipment used in the construction of a fire support base was the Case

450 bulldozer, a helicopter-transportable tractor procured specifically for this task. Delivered to the site in two lifts, the tractor proved invaluable in reducing both manual labor and the time required to complete the base. In addition, the tractor was used to rapidly unearth enemy supply caches.

A substantial portion of the efforts of all five Marine engineer battalions, and Army and Navy engineers as well, was expended in upgrading major lines of communication throughout I Corps. Their effort was part of the general MACV bridge and LOC restoration program which sought to create a passable road network throughout South Vietnam, both to facilitate tactical maneuver and promote economic development. The tactical advantages were evident. Not only could troops be moved more quickly, but the construction of wide, modern paved roads forced the enemy to place his mines on the shoulders or on unimproved roads. This practically eliminated mining incidents on primary roads, reducing the daily minesweeping burden of III MAF engineer units and freeing them for other tasks. Road improvements undertaken during the year cut travel time between Da Nang and Hue from six hours to two, and between Da Nang and Dong Ha to four and one-half hours. An ancillary effect was to decrease vehicle maintenance requirements. Concentrating on Routes 1, 4, and 9, Marine, Navy, and Army engineer forces had completed the upgrading of over 370 kilometers and were at work on the

remaining 100 kilometers by year's end. In addition, they continued the task of bridge construction and repair, which, during a typical month, involved work on 15 spans.

Among the major engineering accomplishments during the year was the opening of the new Liberty Bridge by naval construction forces to traffic on 30 March, thereby restoring a permanent overland route into the An Hoa basin. Replacing the original 2,000-foot bridge washed away by monsoon floods in late 1967, the new 825-foot, timber-pile-supported, concrete-decked bridge not only cut travel time between Da Nang and An Hoa by half, but increased the capacity of allied forces in support of tactical and pacification operations and assisted local Vietnamese in the economic development of the industrial area. In July, Marine engineers reopened the Song Tra Bong bridge on Route 1, following its partial destruction by enemy sappers, which again provided a vital link between Chu Lai and the southern extremes of the corps tactical zone. During the same month, elements of the 1st Engineer Battalion completed the upgrading of a portion of Route 4, permitting increased access to western Quang Nam Province.

In addition to road construction and maintenance, all Marine engineer battalions regularly swept assigned segments of highway for enemy mines. Sweep teams not only employed electric mine detectors, but also purchased large quantities of ordnance from Viet-

*Once cleared of trees and vegetation, a mountaintop becomes a fire support base as members of the 1st Engineer Battalion take preliminary steps to create artillery positions.*

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A371975





Marine Corps Historical Collection

*Marines of the 9th Engineer Battalion apply a fresh layer of asphalt to Route 1 as a part of the continuing country-wide effort to upgrade South Vietnam's primary road network.*

namese civilians under the Voluntary Informant Program. During May 1969, for example, teams from the 1st Engineer Battalion swept over 1,800 kilometers of road, detecting and destroying 91 mines and boobytraps. In the month they also purchased 2,717 ordnance items, ranging from small arms ammunition to 105mm artillery rounds.<sup>23</sup>

While construction efforts were directed, in the main, toward upgrading and maintaining lines of communication, engineers still faced endless requirements for cantonment and fire base construction, maintenance, and rehabilitation. Except for the six-month reconstruction project required to return ASP-1 and other nearby damaged facilities to full operation following the 27 April fire, Marine, Navy, and Army combat engineers each month built or improved bunkers, SEA huts, showers, watch towers, and mount-out boxes; provided potable water and electricity; and laid barbed wire entanglements around base perimeters. For the 1st Medical Battalion, they constructed a 200-bed hospital, dental clinic, and support facilities. For FLC, engineers completed a new maintenance complex, consisting of 25 Butler build-

ings with attendant support hardware. And for the 1st MAW, they constructed over 100 steel and concrete "Wonder Arch" shelters at Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Marble Mountain air facilities. Introduced during 1969 to provide maximum possible protection of aircraft from high-trajectory weapons, such as rockets and mortars, and to reduce the danger of a fire spreading from one aircraft to others, each 48-by-70 foot shelter was constructed of bolted steel sections covered with 12 inches of high-strength concrete.<sup>24</sup>

Engineers also constructed facilities where the Marine infantrymen could get away from the stress of combat, among them "Stack Arms," the 1st Marine Division's in-country rest center located in the 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion cantonment just south of the Marble Mountain Air Facility. While "this program did not win the war," as Lieutenant General Ormond R. Simpson, then commanding general of the division, later noted, "it was damn important to the 'man with the rifle.'" Infantry companies were brought to the center by helicopter. During their 48-hour stay, Marines could, as General Simpson noted, take "all the showers they wanted, were supplied with health and

comfort items free, got new clothing and 782 gear, if needed, swam in the sea, had beer and soft drinks, wrote letters, called home . . . got haircuts, watched movies, slept, ate the best hot food we could beg, borrow, or steal, literally, and had absolutely NO DUTY!"<sup>25</sup>

With the withdrawal of the 3d Marine Division from Vietnam, Marine engineers from the 3d and 11th Battalions ceased all construction projects and began demolition of a number of installations they earlier had built. Before redeploying on 29 November, elements of the 11th Engineer Battalion completed the destruction of Vandegrift and Elliott Combat Bases and assisted the 3d Engineer Battalion in policing up Cua Viet and Dong Ha Combat Bases, prior to their transfer to ARVN and other allied units remaining in Quang Tri Province.<sup>26</sup>

During the year, the enemy relied, as he had done throughout the earlier years of the war, on networks of caves, tunnels, and fortifications. To destroy these fighting positions, as well as remove foliage used as concealment, Marine engineers engaged in "land-clearing" operations—the systematic destruction of selected portions of the countryside. In addition to employing organic engineer elements, III MAF organized a number of provisional land-clearing units, consisting of men and equipment from Marine force engineer battalions and the Army's 45th Engineer Group, for specific purposes.

General land-clearing operations followed an established pattern. Vietnamese provincial authorities would designate the target area, and the military unit operating within the area would furnish a company-size security force for the engineer effort. Land-clearing bulldozers would then begin scraping the assigned area section by section, clearing trees and brush and simultaneously demolishing enemy trenchlines, bunkers, and tunnels, and detonating boobytraps. Ordnance not destroyed by the initial engineering effort, as well as impenetrable tunnels and bunkers, would be demolished separately.

During 1969, III MAF land-clearing efforts concentrated on two areas—Leatherneck Square in Quang Tri Province and Go Noi Island, southeast of Da Nang. Leatherneck Square, a 450,000 square meter corridor between Gio Linh and Con Thien, bounded by Route 9 on the south, was covered by scrub growth, crisscrossed by hedgerows, and dotted by numerous enemy harbor and fighting positions. By midyear, Marines of the 11th Engineer Battalion had reduced the area

to a dusty, hot piece of ground that would eventually be reclaimed by farming. To the south, in Quang Nam Province, portions of Dodge City and all of Go Noi Island, a long-time enemy stronghold, also were denuded. During 1st Marine Division Operation Pipestone Canyon, elements of the 1st, 7th, and 9th Engineer Battalions, in conjunction with Army land-clearing forces, leveled more than 8,000 acres, destroying an extensive enemy command post, 97 tunnels, 2,193 bunkers, 325 fighting holes, and 3,246 meters of trenchline.<sup>27</sup> As Lieutenant General Simpson noted: "We knew it was a staging point. We did clear it; there wasn't anything left." The engineers "went in there with . . . plows and actually plowed the whole damned thing up; every square foot of it."<sup>28</sup>

Despite restraints in manpower and materials, Marine combat engineers, working in conjunction with their Army and Navy teammates, continued to provide combat and combat service support to maneuver elements deployed throughout I Corps. Their accomplishments were many and varied, ranging from water supply to the time-consuming and hazardous task of mine sweeping. Throughout it all, Marine combat engineers found the time to assist a Vietnamese village in building a new school or repairing an antiquated water system.

#### *Motor Transport*

III MAF possessed six motor transport units at the A 3d Engineer Battalion sweep team checks a road for mines ahead of an advancing tank. Daily road sweeps consumed a portion of the Marine engineering effort.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A192390





Marine Corps Historical Collection

*The men of 2d Battalion, 5th Marines line up for the daily barbecue at the 1st Marine Division's in-country rest center, "Stack Arms," at China Beach south of Da Nang.*

beginning of 1969. The 1st Motor Transport Battalion, reinforced in October by Company A, 5th Motor Transport Battalion, 5th Marine Division, was under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division, as was the 11th Motor Transport Battalion, a force unit. Supporting the 3d Marine Division was the 3d Motor Transport Battalion, reinforced until 23 March by a platoon of Company A, 5th Motor Transport Battalion, and the 9th Motor Transport Battalion. Force Logistic Command had operational control of the large truck company of Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st Force Service Regiment, and the 7th Motor Transport Battalion, which supported FLSG-Bravo at Quang Tri. Both of these units supported Force Logistic Command, as well as other III MAF elements.

The motor transport battalions organic to each division consisted of a Headquarters and Service Company and three truck companies. Each truck company was equipped with thirty 2.5-ton trucks. The force transport units, 7th, 9th, and 11th, whose mission was to reinforce other elements of the MAF, each consisted of a H&S Company, three truck companies, and transportation company. The transportation compa-

ny was authorized 30 tractors and 47 trailers of various sizes, while each truck company had thirty-one 5-ton trucks. The Truck Company, Force Logistic Command possessed a variety of specialized vehicles as well as a large fleet of 2.5- and 5-ton trucks.

Throughout 1969, III MAF still relied heavily on trucks to move cargo and personnel despite the ever-increasing use of helicopters. Major combat bases and the two logistic support units received most of their supplies by "Rough Rider" truck convoys. During 1969, Marine transport battalions covered 6,801,188 miles, carrying 2,416,802 passengers and 970,092 tons of freight.

Although improved roads permitted trucks to reach most major Marine positions in both western Quang Tri and Quang Nam Provinces, Marine truckers still had to contend with ambushes and mines. "On several occasions," noted Lieutenant Colonel Laurier J. Tremblay, 9th Motor Transport Battalion's commanding officer, "these convoys had to fight their way through well-established ambushes and as a result sustained many casualties in troops and equipment. During the early months of 1969, Route 9 was considered a

'Gauntlet' that our convoys were required to run through almost daily in order to provide urgently needed supplies and munitions to our combat troops operating out of Vandegrift Combat Base." Although a number of protective modifications were made to trucks, the simplest being the lining of floor boards with filled sandbags, casualties continued to mount.<sup>29</sup>

The year witnessed the introduction of two new vehicles into III MAF's motor transport inventory, the M116E1 marginal terrain vehicle and the M733, its armored counterpart. Designed to replace the M76 Otter of World War II vintage, the M116E1 was placed into service in April by the 11th Motor Transport Battalion to support the 1st Marine Division in the low and often inundated areas south of Da Nang. Virtually unaffected by weather, this versatile vehicle had the effect of reducing reliance on helicopter support. The armored version of the vehicle was placed into service in August as a convoy escort.<sup>30</sup>

The 3d and 9th Motor Transport Battalions were among the last units to redeploy with the 3d Marine Division. Needed to move the redeploying combat units and their equipment to coastal ports for embarkation, both units left Vietnam in late November. The

7th Motor Transport Battalion remained behind to assist in the relocation of Marine personnel and equipment from northern I Corps to the Da Nang area, to which it moved on 2 December.

#### *Medical Support*

Medical service support available to III MAF at the beginning of 1969, included the 1st Medical Battalion, reinforced in October by Company A, 5th Medical Battalion, which maintained the 240-bed 1st Marine Division Hospital. A similar size hospital was maintained by the 3d Medical Battalion for the 3d Marine Division. In addition the 1st Hospital Company, a force unit, operated a 100-bed treatment facility at Da Nang. Approximately 250 Navy medical officers and 2,700 hospital corpsmen were attached to the divisions, wing, FLC, and other combat support units throughout I Corps. Two Navy hospital ships, the *Sanctuary* (AH 17) and the *Repose* (AH 16), each with a capacity of 560 beds, which could be increased to 750 during an emergency, were stationed off I Corps to treat the more seriously ill and wounded. At Da Nang, the 720-bed Naval Support Activity Hospital provided most services available at a general hospital in the United States. Also available were the facilities of the

*A 7th Motor Transport Battalion "Rough Rider" convoy, originating at Quang Tri, pauses at Phu Bai south of Hue before proceeding over Hai Van Pass and into Da Nang.*

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A800437





Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A800568  
*A wounded Marine is hoisted on board a hovering Marine CH-46 helicopter. Rapid evacuation and the use of innovative techniques saved valuable time, increasing the survival rate among the seriously wounded.*

95th U.S. Army Evacuation Hospital near Da Nang.

Although the medical evacuation chain and policy remained unchanged throughout 1969, improvements to shorten the time between injury and treatment continued. Hot pads specifically tailored to the dedicated two-transport, two-gunship helicopter medical evacuation package were established. This not only had the effect of reducing scramble time, but also promoted "dialogue among crews of the package, before, between, and after missions which is an important factor in teamwork." In addition, specific ultra-high-fre-

quency (UHF) channels were dedicated solely for medical evacuation communications. During the year a joint medical regulating center was established by placing a Navy and Marine regulating section with its Army counterpart at the 95th Evacuation Hospital. After helicopters picked up casualties, the flight corpsman, or a member of the helicopter crew in the absence of the corpsman, would contact the regulating center on the dedicated radio frequency and report the number of patients and the type and severity of the wounds. A center regulator would then check the status board indicating the facilities, specialties, and space available at each hospital, and direct the helicopter to the appropriate destination for treatment.<sup>31</sup> Specially designed litters and forest penetrators were also introduced to aid in helicopter rescue operations in jungle terrain or in combat areas too dangerous for a helicopter to land.

"The swift and orderly chain of evacuation is a many faceted thing," noted Colonel Eugene R. Brady, former commander of HMM-364, "many procedures have been adopted to shorten and strengthen the chain. The dedicated four plane package, the hot pad, the dedicated frequency . . . are but a few links in the chain. There are many other links, some small, some large. Non-essential links have been discarded." Although the process may have been evolutionary, "the dedication, motivation, and courage of those involved in tactical air medical evacuation will," Colonel Brady continued, "never change."<sup>32</sup>

Admissions to hospitals serving III MAF declined over the year, reflecting not only redeployments but also the slackening of combat. Of the 22,003 patients treated during 1969, 26 percent were admitted for wounds received as a direct result of combat. Illnesses, such as fevers of undetermined origin or malaria, like the year before, accounted for the majority of admissions (61 percent), while the remaining 13 percent were as a result of nonbattle injuries. Of the Marines admitted to III MAF medical facilities, 11,355 were evacuated to out-of-country installations through the Air Force's 22d Casualty Staging Facility at Da Nang for specialized treatment.

Like other support organizations, III MAF medical support facilities experienced a reduction during the latter half of 1969 as a result of redeployments. The 3d Medical Battalion, which supported the 3d Division, left Vietnam on 24 November. However, those Marine units remaining in Quang Tri Province were not without medical support. Casualties were either

transported to Company B, 75th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, or to Army or Marine facilities further south.

### *Communications*

The corps-wide communications system which allowed Commanding General, III MAF to administer, coordinate, and direct the various commands under his control was installed, maintained, and operated by the 5th and 7th Communication Battalions.\* In addition to the common functions associated with communications, installation of telephone poles, cable construction and splicing, maintenance of switching apparatus, and manning of radio relay sites, members of the battalions staffed the various Marine communications operations centers located throughout I Corps.

Centered at Da Nang, the corps-wide communications system provided III MAF with various capabilities: teletype and data, radio, and telephone operations. The III MAF teletype and data capability rested mainly with the administrative communications center at Camp Horn, although similar operations existed at the divisions, wing, and Force Logistics Command, and on down to the regimental and in some instances, battalion level. The center, staffed by officers and men of the Communications Company, 5th Communication Battalion, processed and distributed over 2,500 messages generated daily by dedicated point-to-point teletype circuits to all major subordinate units. In addition, the center maintained other dedicated circuits which provided entry into four world-wide teletype systems; to FMFPac in Hawaii, to the Navy's Naval Command Operational network in the Philippines, to CinCPac's Joint Pacific Teletype Network, and to the AUTODIN telephone network via teletype.

Instead of maintaining control over subordinate elements by voice radio communications, III MAF relied on the various teletype networks. The circuits to major units were all secure point-to-point utilizing encryption devices. In addition, the center maintained secure circuit links with the Korean Brigade at Hoi An, Army Special Forces operating in I Corps, ARVN I Corps Headquarters, and a special radio teletype net which connected major subordinate commands as well as the special landing forces and Navy ships providing gunfire support. Lastly, teletype circuits were main-



Marine Corps Historical Collection

*PFC Richard J. Wellnitz, left, of the 7th Communications Battalion, checks out the telephone line after LCpl Kenneth D. Ellis completes a wire patch.*

tained to MACV and the Air Force's Task Force Alpha in Thailand.

While secure communications by radio was kept to a minimum, it was maintained as a backup to the teletype systems. III MAF did possess an unsecure command radio net with the Da Nang harbor patrol, the Navy Hospital, and hospital ships in the vicinity, but this like other unsecure radio nets was used sparingly.

The initial telephone system within I Corps Tactical Zone was tactically oriented, but as III MAF grew, larger and more complex fixed equipment was added. The final result was a combination of the tactical system, utilizing automatic dial telephone switching equipment at the division and force level, and the Defense Communication System operating fixed dial central offices. In the spring of 1969, the Air Force, under the direction of the Defense Communications Agency, inaugurated the Da Nang tandem switching center which provided intra-corps switching between all five dial central offices, stretching from Phu Bai to Chu Lai, as well as providing access to other corps tactical zones and Thailand. The system terminated in the AUTOVON switching center in Saigon, providing all users with direct dial capability throughout the world.

\*On 15 April 1969, the 5th and 7th Communication Battalions were combined under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Brady. Both battalions maintained their separate identities, but were controlled by one commanding officer and his staff.

*Logistics of Keystone Eagle and Keystone Cardinal*

The redeployment of men and equipment of the 3d Marine Division posed one of the most complex logistic problems facing III MAF during the latter half of 1969. Units scheduled to be redeployed did not simply cease operations, pack up, and leave Vietnam; instead, with each withdrawal, the selected units would disengage from continuing operations. Once extricated, the departing units would exchange, if required, most of their personnel and equipment with other organizations still in combat before embarking for destinations in the Pacific or the United States. The movement was not all in one direction, for normal rotation of personnel and replacement of equipment had to continue. This flow had to be stringently regulated so as to leave III MAF at the prescribed personnel strength and Force Logistic Command with manageable materiel levels at the completion of each redeployment cycle.

In consultation with MACV, the White House and Department of Defense determined the number of troops to be withdrawn and timetable for each redeployment. MACV then apportioned the troops to be removed among the Services and requested from each component commander a list of specific units to be redeployed. CinCPac and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in turn reviewed and approved the list, determining the destination of each redeployed unit. Based on the transportation requirements provided by the separate Services, CinCPac would then prepare a schedule and timetable for the sea and air movements of men and equipment.<sup>33</sup>

Coordinating redeployment planning and execution for Marine Corps units was FMFPac, headquartered at Camp Smith, Hawaii. Under the command of Lieutenant General Henry W. Buse, Jr., a Naval Academy graduate and recipient of the Silver Star in World War II, FMFPac, in conjunction with III MAF, proposed specific Marine units to be redeployed. Following general guidelines established by Headquarters Marine Corps, FMFPac coordinated the movement of men and equipment from South Vietnam to other Marine Corps bases in the Pacific and the continental United States. "FMFPac was the prime coordinator," according to Major General Wilbur F. Simlik, then III MAF G-4. "FMFPac arranged the shipping—which was the controlling factor, of course. FMFPac told us which regiment, which element would be retrograded when and where."<sup>34</sup>

On redeployment matters, the relationship between

FMFPac and III MAF was, as General Simlik later remarked, "constant and close, and personal." Buse or members of his staff made frequent visits to Da Nang to observe, consult, and to provide guidance. At the same time, a constant and friendly dialogue was maintained with CinCPac, Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., and his staff. For its part, III MAF regularly sent representatives to FMFPac and CinCPac planning and movement conferences, in addition to coordinating with MACV, the other Services, and the South Vietnamese on such matters as area responsibility, base transfers, and equipment turnovers.<sup>35</sup>

Redeployment plans were drafted in terms of units to be withdrawn and the total number of troops to be deducted from the authorized strength of each Service within Vietnam. For the Marine Corps, FMFPac and III MAF determined which unit, and further, which individual Marine would be removed in order to bring III MAF down to the required strength. In deciding who should redeploy and who should remain, tour equity would overshadow all other considerations. Those Marines with the fewest months remaining in their current 12-month tour would normally be selected for redeployment.

As with all other combat and support units in Vietnam, Marine units were made up of personnel with varied end-of-tour dates, and thus no unit could simply be withdrawn with its complete complement of existing personnel. Instead, for each unit selected for redeployment to Okinawa or continental United States, a process nicknamed "mixmaster" was instituted. Mixmaster involved the transfer of noneligible Marines to units remaining in Vietnam and the filling of the redeploying unit's ranks with eligible men from other Marine commands. In Keystones Eagle and Cardinal, the only major unit to undergo extensive "mixmastering" was the 3d Marines. Those Marines of RLT-3 who had served a minimum of seven months were considered eligible for return to Camp Pendleton with the unit or to normal and accelerated rotation drafts, while the remainder were transferred to other units in Vietnam, Okinawa, and Japan. Units remaining in Vietnam in turn provided a number of Marines to fill the void. Commands bound for Okinawa and Japan underwent less "mixmastering," and these units embarked with a majority of existing personnel, including those otherwise ineligible, in order to maintain the unit's integrity and combat readiness.

In implementing this complex reshuffling of manpower, each redeployment was broken down into the

number of Marines of each rank, grade, and skill to be removed either by transfer to a withdrawing organization or by normal rotation. FMFPac, which held broad transfer and reassignment authority, issued strength reduction requirements and assisted, where necessary, in their implementation. Through its G-1 section, each major III MAF subordinate command then selected those Marines eligible for redeployment, arranged for the transfers, and prepared and issued the necessary orders. FMFPac, in addition, periodically adjusted the flow of replacements to III MAF to assure compliance with stated manpower ceilings, and directed special transfers of III MAF personnel to units on Okinawa or in Japan, not only to reduce numbers in Vietnam, but to rebuild other Western Pacific commands gutted during the war.

Redeploying units involved in Keystones Eagle and Cardinal began embarkation planning and preparation one to two months before their scheduled date of departure. While still conducting combat operations, equipment was inventoried and those supplies not immediately needed were disposed of or packed for shipment. Two to three weeks before embarkation, the units normally stood down and moved to secure cantonments, in the case of units of the 3d Marine Division, to Dong Ha Combat Base. There, battalions "mixmastered" their personnel, turned in supplies and excess equipment, and completed packing in preparation for shipment.

In the redeployments carried out during 1969, units leaving Vietnam carried with them their standard allowances of supplies and equipment. They, however, were to divest themselves of all rations, ammunition, fuel, and excess Southeast Asia equipment, and in the case of those units deploying to Okinawa and Japan, jungle fatigues.<sup>36</sup> The fatigues were one of the items that were not to be taken out of country. However, "the distribution of regular utilities had started," reported Colonel Raymond C. Damm, "but supplies were not sufficient to outfit the troops going to Japan and Okinawa. We requested authority to retain one set of jungle utilities for the movement . . . FMFPac approved the request with the proviso that we gather them up as soon as we could issue regular utilities on Okinawa. The troops, much to the satisfaction of the troop leaders, embarked in jungle utilities."<sup>37</sup>

Excess equipment and supplies were turned over to Marine organizations still committed to combat or used to replenish the mount-out and mount-out aug-

mentation (MO/MOA) stocks of the displacing forces.\* Force Logistic Command acted as the conduit for redistributing these excess supplies, ensuring that those units departing Vietnam were fully prepared for expeditionary service.

All equipment and supplies accompanying units being redeployed to the United States had to meet the strict standards of cleanliness established by the United States Department of Agriculture and the Public Health Service to prevent the introduction of Asian insects and contagious diseases into the United States. Meeting these standards proved a problem, as General Simlik later noted:

One of our most aggravating problems was that all of the gear, all of the equipment, all of the vehicles that we retrograded to the United States had to pass an agricultural inspection. So consequently they had to be spotless, absolutely spotless. And there were inspectors that were at the docks and aboard ships . . . With vehicles that had been in combat only a few days before, this was a very difficult task to accomplish. We [therefore had to] set up all sorts of washing and scrub down stations by the docks.<sup>38</sup>

Packing boxes had to be constructed of termite-free wood, and all containers, vehicle bodies, and shipborne aircraft had to be sealed and treated with insecticides and rodent poisons before being loaded.

Of the total number of Marines redeploying during 1969, more than 50 percent left Vietnam by ship. The remainder departed on commercial aircraft chartered by the Military Airlift Command. In contrast, over 90 percent of all Marine equipment and cargo went by sea. Most of this cargo, as well as those surface-transported Marines, traveled by amphibious vessels provided by CinCPacFlt. During each redeployment, one of the two Seventh Fleet Special Landing Forces stood down temporarily to permit the vessels of its amphibious ready group to join the sealift. During Keystones Eagle and Cardinal, FLC squeezed 604,884 square feet of vehicle and 3,952,911 cubic feet of freight onto eastbound amphibious shipping. This

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\*Marine Corps units, as forces required to be constantly ready to be committed, maintain stocks of reserve supplies in order to support themselves during their initial period of deployment should supplies not be readily available. These stocks are divided into two 30-day blocks, the mount-out and mount-out augmentation. The mount-out block is held by the unit itself and moves with it when the unit is deployed. The augmentation block is carried by the division or regiment service support unit and is intended to supplement the primary block of supplies. Following initial Marine deployments to Vietnam in 1965, mount-out blocks were consumed and by early 1969 had to be rebuilt.

reliance on Navy ships instead of contracted vessels of the Military Sealift Transportation System (MSTS) saved the Marine Corps approximately \$5,000,000 in commercial freight costs during the last half of 1969.

As the Marines left with their equipment and supplies, III MAF disposed of the vacated bases and camps. Although it possessed authority to demolish fire bases and combat positions, all major installations were first offered to the other United States Services and then to the South Vietnamese. If rejected then they were demolished. Real estate transfers, especially to South Vietnamese forces, was a complex, and often involved task. The secrecy of redeployment planning prevented III MAF and other commands from initiating discussions of base turnover with the South Vietnamese until late in each withdrawal cycle. Poorly organized and equipped to manage their own facilities, the Vietnamese made decisions slowly, and as General Simlik noted, demanded much paperwork:

III MAF and XXIV Corps, of course, did their best to influence how the ARVN would deploy and utilize the fire bases which we occupied. But the Vietnamese were indepen-

dent. There were certain fire bases which they wanted and others which they didn't, and they made up their mind with deliberate speed . . . . The fire bases and the camps which the ARVN and other units were to occupy had to be left in spotless condition—A-1; all the electrical wiring had to be exactly right, all the heads had to be functioning, all this sort of thing. And there was a formal agreement, a real estate agreement, which was to be signed by both parties and forwarded down to MACV affirming that all was in order. This almost required the services of a professional real estate negotiator. Each fire base posed its own problems, and negotiations were constant.<sup>39</sup>

The transfer of real estate, while at times frustrating, proved to be less of a problem than cleaning up the battlefield, as Lieutenant General William K. Jones, then Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, later noted:

These [fire support bases] were built with huge 12 by 12 timbers. It was necessary, of course, that we completely dismantle them so that they could not be used by the enemy. This was a major problem—a major engineer problem. The ARVN were very interested in acquiring this material and I was given authority to give it to them. So they would come

*The electronic equipment of the 1st Light Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion heads out of Da Nang Harbor by ship bound for Marine Corps Base, Twentynine Palms, California.*

Marine Corps Historical Collection



up and haul this bulk of material back to their camps. But, even so, why was this the big problem, was that we had to close up and police up an area that had been used by Marines for many, many years.

Everything had to be removed or buried:

We had to remove all mines. We didn't have to remove the barbed wire, but we had to take out all the mines or give the minefield maps to the ARVN if they wanted them left in; and there weren't very many that they wanted left in, actually. So, we had to clear all that. And then, just the debris, just the cans and boxes, . . . accumulated trash we

had to bury . . . We left it absolutely clean—everything. Everything was buried and there was no trash whatsoever.<sup>40</sup>

The logistical effort in moving a reinforced division, in addition to an appropriate share of supporting air units, from the war zone to Okinawa, Japan, and United States bases was accomplished successfully despite the problems which arose. The mistakes and the actions taken during the Keystones Eagle and Cardinal redeployments served as useful guidelines for units involved in the increasing number of redeployments the following year.

PART VI

UNIQUE CONTRIBUTIONS

## CHAPTER 16

# Pacification

### *The National Perspective—Pacification Planning In I Corps—Line Unit Pacification Civic Action—The Grass Roots Campaign—Results*

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#### *The National Perspective*

Long a major concern of Marines in South Vietnam, pacification, by 1969, had become the major goal of the allied country-wide strategy. Although definitions varied with time, pacification was a complex military, political, economic, and sociological process with the principal thrust of providing security for the population of South Vietnam as well as peace, prosperity, political stability, and social justice. Broad in concept, it combined a myriad of individual programs and efforts which had the following basic objectives: establishing or re-establishing local government which was responsive to the citizenry and that involved their participation; providing sustained security; destroying the enemy's infrastructure; asserting or reasserting South Vietnamese political control; involving the people in the central government; and initiating sustained economic and social growth.

In theory, a sound pacification program was inherent in successfully combating counterinsurgency. In practice, however, the program during the early years was marked by confused policies and goals, divided authority and fragmented administration, all of which permitted corruption and created little or no progress. Beginning in late 1966, major efforts were begun to create a meaningful program to deny the enemy his vital base of popular support and to coordinate security planning. Further refinements were made the following year with the combining of most American personnel engaged in pacification under one organization, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), and placing it within the MACV command structure. Paralleling CORDS, the South Vietnamese Government created the Central Recovery Committee (CRC), first chaired by the Vice President and then by the Prime Minister. The two organizations through deputies and councils at all governing levels, coordinated, planned, and directed the pacification effort.

Following the 1968 *Tet* Offensive, during which the enemy attempted not only to inflict a major military defeat, but also to coerce the South Vietnamese people

into an uprising, a comprehensive review of pacification policies and management was undertaken, resulting in the launching of a "special campaign" to seize the initiative from the enemy and expand governmental authority and control. Announced on 11 October by President Nguyen Van Thieu, the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) had as its major objectives the consolidation of past achievements and the extension of government control over necessary territory and a minimum of 80 percent of the population. The main effort was to be directed at maintaining security in those hamlets rated "under GVN influence" (A, B, or C) by the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), in order that local government and community life could flourish.\* In those areas rated "contested" (D and E hamlets) efforts were to be directed toward restoring security and limited community development. As for enemy-controlled hamlets, emphasis was

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\*Instituted in 1966, the Hamlet Evaluation System arranged and analyzed information on all aspects of pacification—security, political, and socio-economic—provided by province and district advisors. The computerized system then supplied information on demand, with the most important being the placing of areas in specific categories assigned the letter grade A, B, C, D, E, or V. These security categories were defined as:

A. Hamlet has adequate security forces; infrastructure has been eliminated; public projects are underway and the economic picture is improving.

B. A Viet Cong threat exists, but security is organized and partially effective; infrastructure has been partially neutralized; and self-help and economic programs are underway.

C. Hamlet is subject to infrequent VC harassment; infrastructure members have been identified; and the population participates in some self-help programs.

D. Viet Cong activities have been reduced, but an internal enemy threat in the form of taxation and terrorism still exists. The local populace participates in some hamlet government and economic programs. The hamlet is contested but leaning toward the central government.

E. The Viet Cong are effective although some government control exists. The enemy infrastructure is intact, and government programs are nonexistent or just beginning.

V. Hamlet under Viet Cong control. No government official or advisor may enter except on military operations, and the population willingly supports the enemy.



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A371861

*Navy Corpsman Donald W. Vogt, accompanying a Company L, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines patrol south of Da Nang, pauses to treat a South Vietnamese woman's injured leg.*

to be placed on conducting military operations designed to disrupt enemy troop movements and destroy enemy logistical storage areas.

The primary tasks of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign were to: improve the Regional and Popular Forces; promote the anti-Viet Cong Infrastructure plan (Phoenix); reform local government; organize the people into self-defense forces; enforce economic revival measures; improve information and propaganda; implement the Chieu Hoi or "Open Arms" program; and assist in the accelerated rehabilitation and resettlement of refugees. For each task, a specific target goal was assigned: drive the enemy from populated areas; upgrade 1,000 D and E hamlets to category C; neutralize 3,000 members of the infrastructure each month; rally at least 5,000 Hoi Chanh; expand the People's Self-Defense Force (PSDF) to one million, of which 200,000 would be armed; and expand the information and propaganda campaign to exploit enemy failures and demonstrate the government's seizure of the initiative to end the war in victory.

After the various organizations and units necessary to implement the tasks were set up, the target hamlets selected, and the supporting military operations arranged, the campaign was launched on 1 November. As with all undertakings of this magnitude, problems arose, but for the most part they were overcome. An early and potentially difficult problem was that of centralized management. As the campaign progressed, it soon became apparent that the loosely organized Central Recovery Committee was ill-equipped to manage effectively a program as all-inclusive and as urgent as the APC. As a result, the permanent Central Pacification and Development Council was established, under the Prime Minister, composed of representatives of the ministries most directly involved in pacification. This new arrangement not only fostered authoritative centralized control, but assured that the momentum achieved during the initial stages of the campaign would be maintained.

Expanding upon the special 1968 plan, which was to terminate on 31 January 1969, the South Vietnamese

issued the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan on 15 December. This authoritative document served not only as the foundation for the 1969 program, but was in itself a notable achievement in cooperation and coordination between the newly formed Central Pacification and Development Council, various government ministries, and MACV, therefore ensuring that the yearly pacification plan would receive widespread support throughout South Vietnam.

As a continuation and extension of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, the essential task to be accomplished during 1969 remained the liberation of the people from the coercion and control of the enemy and to prevent his return. Underlying all pacification efforts was to be the guiding principle of "Community Spirit." As the 1969 Pacification and Development plan stressed:

The Community Spirit Principle must originate with the people; every effort of the Government must be developed based on that principle, while carrying out any program or operation. The Community Spirit principle must work on a three-fold basis: cooperation among the people, cooperation between the people and the Government, and cooperation among Government organizations. Only then can the Government be more powerful and stable; then the people will realize that they are involved and will cooperate with the Government to defeat the common enemy.<sup>1</sup>

The practical goals for action were established in eight mutually supporting objectives: provide territorial security; establish local government in villages; organize People's Self-Defense Forces; increase the number of Hoi Chanh; reduce the Viet Cong Infrastructure; intensify information and propaganda efforts; stimulate the rural economy; and reduce the number of refugees.

Under territorial security, the Vietnamese Government committed itself to controlling and providing security for 90 percent of the population which lived in hamlets and villages with a Hamlet Evaluation System pacification rating of A, B, or C. Responsibility for this security involved both the Vietnamese Armed Forces (including RF and PF), Free World Military Assistance Forces, together with People's Self-Defense Force, and National Police. Each of these military and paramilitary forces would be used according to its capabilities.

As the South Vietnamese had no long tradition of nationhood, the government placed primary emphasis on unifying the village and hamlet governments with the central government, rather than attempting to win support of the state by individual loyalty. In contested hamlets and Viet Cong-controlled villages, elections

were to be held, competent officials trained, and administrative organizations established, ensuring a real and durable presence of the government in rural areas.

Originally organized to obtain the commitment of as many people as possible to the government and actively involved in its defense, and to strengthen security in both rural and urban areas, the People's Self-Defense Force, the civilian home guard, had by the end of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign grown to approximately 1 million, of which nearly 200,000 were armed.\* Ultimately to include all males not liable for military service and women, aged 16 and above, organized into local combat and support groups, the PSDF was potentially one of the government's most promising pacification devices. The objective of the 1969 Pacification and Development plan was to increase membership to a minimum of 2 million with 1.6 million of this number trained and 400,000 armed.

The Chieu Hoi or "Open Arms" program was considered vital to the 1969 pacification campaign. Deemed one of the most successful programs initiated, more than 90,000 Hoi Chanh, or ralliers, had returned to government control since the effort was begun in 1963, of which more than 10,000 came from enemy military units and over 4,000 from the enemy infrastructure. The 1968 Chieu Hoi program produced approximately 18,000 ralliers, with nearly 8,000 being returned during the last three months of the year. Based on these results and the desire to step up propaganda efforts, the government set a goal of receiving 20,000 Hoi Chanh during 1969.

The anti-Viet Cong Infrastructure program, code-named Phoenix by the Americans and Phung Hoang by the Vietnamese, had been in existence for some time. Again calling for the elimination, by death, capture, or desertion, of the enemy's entrenched infrastructure, the 1969 plan specified goals and targets. The main targets of the campaign were to be members of the National Liberation Councils and their subor-

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\*Four groups composed the People's Self-Defense Forces: the Female Support Group; the Youth Self-Defense Group; the Elders Self-Defense Group; and the Combat Group. Membership in the combat group included all males 16 and 17 years of age and able-bodied females, between the ages of 16 and 40, who joined voluntarily. Women between the ages of 16 and 50 composed the female group, while males over 51 were included in the elders group. Youth between 13 and 15 joined the youth group. Membership in the female, elder, and youth groups was voluntary, and tasks included social welfare, health activities, and morale support. (COMUSMACV msg to JCS, dtd 9Jun69 [MACV HistDocColl, Reel 56]).

dinate organizations on provincial, district, village, and hamlet levels, with particular emphasis given to areas considered contested or under temporary Communist control. For goals, the 1969 Pacification and Development plan called for the political elimination of 33,000 individuals.

Since "winning the hearts and minds of the people" was the ultimate aim of the pacification effort, a broad information and propaganda program was necessary to explain and encourage active participation and cooperation with the government in achieving the eight objectives of the 1969 campaign. In secure areas, the aim was to exploit the government's military and political successes, appeal for the people's active cooperation in destroying the enemy infrastructure, and warn against Communist attempts at terrorism, sabotage, and use of distorted propaganda calling for a coalition government. In contested areas, emphasis was to be placed on exposing Communist intentions and methods, while expounding upon the good intentions and programs of the government.

The 1969 Pacification and Development plan took careful notice of the refugee problem, stressing that the number of refugees be reduced to less than one million by resettling or returning 300,000 people to their native villages. In discussing efforts to revive the rural economy, rice production was to be encouraged, roads were to be repaired, low interest loans were to be made, farming equipment was to be available, and all unnecessary permits, taxes, and checkpoints were to be eliminated. Although committed to, but not mentioned, land reform would have to await the decision of the government as to the exact pattern a program should take.

Responsibility for achieving the eight goals was assigned to various government ministries and to military corps, provinces, and districts. Officials concerned were to draft pacification and development plans, based on the national plan, for their areas of responsibility, and to coordinate their activities with each other and with local corps and province officials.

With the 1969 pacification program well underway, the South Vietnamese Prime Minister unexpectedly announced to the 23 May meeting of the Central Pacification and Development Council that the program would be advanced to meet the 1969 goals by the end of October. This new program, termed the 1969 Accelerated Pacification Campaign, contained two objectives: the fulfillment or over-fulfillment of the original eight goals set for the 1969 campaign by

31 October, and the achievement of fully secure status (HES rating of A or B) for 50 percent of the hamlet population. Of the eight goals, only three were changed. On the subject of rendering the infrastructure ineffective, the Prime Minister proposed sentencing 5,000 VCI during the period in order to effectively remove them from the war. Acknowledging that the goal of resettling refugees could not be met, he suggested that every effort should be made to resettle as many as possible. The only goal prescribed under the objective of stimulating the rural economy related to land reform, whereby the government would dispose of excess land and initiate the purchase of additional land for distribution to farmers under the "Land to the Tiller" Act. As with the comprehensive plan, the Accelerated Pacification Campaign required the support and coordination of all appropriate agencies during the four-month program.

#### *Pacification Planning in I Corps*

In I Corps Tactical Zone, as elsewhere in South Vietnam, the 1968 Pacification and Accelerated Pacification Campaigns had achieved considerable success. Of the nearly 3 million civilians living in the five provinces, 2,200,000 people or 73.7 percent were considered to be residing in secure hamlets, with 85.7 percent under government sovereignty. The People's Self Defense Force had enrolled 225,000 members; however, the training program could indoctrinate but 98,000, with weapons available for only 30,000, far below the goal of training 128,000 and arming 48,000. Over 2,000 members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure had been arrested or killed, and almost 2,800 Hoi Chanh rallied to the government. With over 690,000 refugees comprising 25 percent of the population, I Corps had approximately 55 percent of the refugees in all of South Vietnam. Although strides were made to resettle or return as many as possible to their native villages, this area posed a grave challenge for the coming year.

Corps- and province-level pacification and development plans for the year included efforts to achieve the national goal of bringing security to 90 percent of the population, eliminating 2,600 infrastructure members, and rallying 2,500, later raised to 3,600, enemy troops. Plans also called for the substantial enlargement of the People's Self-Defense Force from 225,000 to 320,000, of which 256,000 would be trained and 64,000 would be armed, if training cadre and weapons were available in adequate numbers. Of the 509 villages in I Corps, 187 had elected councils during 1967, 194 had

nonelected committees, and 128 were to elect governing bodies during the year. Thus, by the end of 1969, all Corps villages were expected to have governing bodies, 62 percent of which would be popularly elected. Although planners did not include specific numerical goals for refugee resettlement and economic development, much activity was promised in both fields.

The pacification effort in I Corps was organized to conform with the standard CORDS structure. Control of the regional CORDS effort rested with III MAF, with overall guidance administered through the Joint Staff, later renamed the Program Coordination Staff, headed by a civilian deputy for CORDS. As deputy, Mr. Charles T. Cross, replaced in May by Mr. Alexander Firfer, held Foreign Service rank equivalent to that of a major general and directed the efforts of close to 1,000 military and civilian personnel drawn from the four Armed Services, Department of Defense, Agency for International Development (AID), U.S. Information Agency (USIA), the Central Intelligence Agency, and other federal agencies. The staff controlled divisions responsible for each element of the pacification program: Government Development, Economic Development, Agriculture, Phoenix/Phung Hoang, Public Health, Refugees, Revolutionary Development, Regional Forces and Popular Forces, and Chieu Hoi.<sup>2</sup>

Under the control of the Deputy for CORDS were the five U.S. Army province senior advisors, each with a staff similar to that at the corps-level. The senior advisors worked closely with the province chiefs, who directed all aspects of civil government as well as commanded the territorial forces within the province. Under the five province advisors were the district senior advisors who worked directly with the local district chiefs, who in turn were responsible to the province chiefs.

Marine Corps representation on the CORDS staff during 1969 was relatively small in comparison to the size of its forces in I Corps. The highest-ranking Marine with CORDS was Colonel George C. Knapp, replaced in April by Colonel Howard A. Westphall, who served as chief of staff to the Deputy for CORDS and a member of the joint staff. In addition to Colonel Knapp, four other Marine officers held corps-level staff billets. With the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division, five additional officers, who had time to serve in-country, were added as advisors to the Revolutionary Development Cadre. Below corps-level, Marines had very little representation at the important province and district senior advisory levels.<sup>3</sup>



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A371966  
*A Vietnamese woman has her teeth checked by Lt David W. Syrek, USN, a dentist with the 1st Dental Company, during a visit to her village as part of the 1st Marine Division Dental Civic Action Program.*

III MAF and its subordinate military units maintained contact with CORDS and the provincial and district governments primarily through the G-5 or S-5 (Civic Affairs/Civic Action) staff sections, added to the headquarters staff in 1965. Responsible for pacification, psychological operations, and civic affairs, the G-5 and S-5 officers at corps-, division-, wing-, regiment-, and battalion-level attempted to fit military civic action into overall pacification planning, in addition to coordinating Marine operations in populated areas with those of local security forces and settling disputes and damage claims by local citizens against Marines. Both III MAF and the 1st Marine Division had a number of civic affairs officers during the year. At III MAF, Colonel Westphall headed the G-5 office until assuming the position of chief of staff at CORDS in April; Colonel Gilbert R. Hershey served until July; Colonel Theodore E. Metzger until September; and Colonel Clifford J. Peabody until September 1970. The 1st Marine Division G-5, Colonel Harry F. Painter, held the post until August when he was replaced by Colonel William J. Zaro and then by Lieutenant Colonel Vincent A. Albers, Jr. Colonel William E. Kerri-gan headed the 3d Marine Division's G-5 section un-

til the division departed South Vietnam in November.<sup>4</sup>

In addition to III MAF, ARVN, and Korean combat forces, a wide range of military and civilian agencies were involved in the pacification effort throughout I Corps. Provincial and district governments were active and relatively successful. At the beginning of the year there were about 49,800 men of the Regional and Popular Forces, organized into companies and separate platoons. Although improving in military effectiveness, they tended to be tied to static defensive positions and commanded by relatively inexperienced leaders. The People's Self-Defense Force boasted over 98,000 trained and 30,000 armed members. The corps' 11,000-man National Police Field Force and National Police, previously concentrated in the larger villages and hamlets, were beginning to move into the countryside where they relieved territorial forces of the task of maintaining public order.

Besides the police, the People's Self-Defense Forces, and territorial troops, groups of Revolutionary Development Cadre assisted the pacification effort at the hamlet-level. Organized into teams of approximately 30, recruited and trained by the central government, cadre teams worked with the local populace in organizing themselves for defense and assisting in political, economic, and social self-help programs. In order to spread the government's message throughout the corps tactical zone, Armed Propaganda Companies were kept in the field to encourage enemy desertions.

Despite this variety of organizations, the population of I Corps at the beginning of 1969 was far from secure. Of its over 2.9 million people, about 2 million resided in areas considered secure, while another 45,000 lived in areas considered contested, and the rest under Viet Cong domination. Thus, about 74 percent of the population were considered under government control. Social and economic improvement efforts left much to be desired as did proposed solutions to the resettlement of the estimated 690,000 refugees. Nevertheless, Marines throughout 1969 continued to work to strengthen and expand upon past pacification achievements.

#### *Line Unit Pacification*

"Without security your whole 1969 Pacification Campaign is down the drain," noted Colonel George C. Knapp.<sup>5</sup> The primary mission of Marine rifle companies and battalions during 1969 was to attack enemy military units with the aim of improving population security. Whether searching jungle-covered mountain valleys or working with Vietnamese forces

in cordoning and searching villages, protecting rice harvests, or furnishing protection for government elections, the ultimate goal of Marine infantry operations was to ensure the security of the population so that normal social, economic, and political activity could be restored and allowed to flourish.

While multi-battalion attacks took place, cordon and search operations of varying sizes increased in frequency. From a single raid on a hamlet by a platoon in search of a Viet Cong Infrastructure member to a week-long search of a village complex, the tactic proved increasingly productive as the year progressed. In the larger cordons and searches, several Marine companies or battalions, working with ARVN troops, Regional and Popular Force units, the Vietnamese National Police, and allied intelligence and counterintelligence teams would move into an area, establish blocking positions, allowing no movement in or out. Vietnamese troops, aided by Marines, would then collect all the civilians at a Combined Holding and Interrogation Center (CHIC) where they would be questioned and their identities checked against lists of known or suspected Viet Cong. Searches, meanwhile, would be conducted for hidden Viet Cong and each house would be examined for concealed arms, food, and equipment.

While the searches took place, Vietnamese and Americans provided the assembled villagers with a place to sleep, food, and entertainment, which consisted of concerts, and government-oriented motion pictures, plays, and skits. Whenever possible, Marines sent in medical and dental teams to treat minor illnesses or injuries and provide instruction and advice on health. By means of these activities, the allies hoped not only to win the allegiance of the villagers, but also to increase their support of the war effort and government-sponsored pacification programs.

Although successful in weeding out the infrastructure, by the end of the year, cordon and search operations were doomed. By their very nature, these operations produced refugees. "Call them what you want," noted Major John J. Guenther, III MAF's counterintelligence officer, "people are taken out of their homes and put into a CHIC. As far as the CORDS organization is concerned, they are in the refugee category. And the word from Saigon, both U.S. and GVN, is don't generate any more refugees."<sup>6</sup>

During the year, Marines, aided by territorial forces, continued their effort, termed "Golden Fleece," aimed at protecting the twice-yearly rice harvest from being seized. Before the April-May and September-October

harvest periods, each Marine regiment launched attacks into known enemy base and cache areas and placed patrols along infiltration routes into the rice-growing areas. During the harvest, the number of patrols and ambushes around rice paddies was likewise increased. Following the harvest, Marines assisted in guarding and transporting the rice to central storage facilities.

In March, elections were held for 128 village council and 717 hamlet chief positions throughout I Corps. Held on the four consecutive Sundays of the month, Marines cooperated with provincial and district authorities in protecting the polling places and voters from Viet Cong terrorism. While not actually guarding the polls, the Marines were deployed in the countryside to block likely enemy avenues of approach and to deny the enemy access to known mortar and rocket launching sites. Rapid reaction forces were maintained to reinforce hamlets or villages under attack. Marines

were instructed to avoid populated areas unless they were under enemy attack and refrain from any activity that might be taken as an American attempt to influence the elections.

Behind the screen provided by Marine and territorial forces, the March elections were completed and were unmarred by major enemy interference. By the 23d, the last polling day, 126 village and 713 hamlet elections had been conducted, with more than 85 percent of the eligible voters participating. Fall elections for representatives to the National Assembly also experienced little enemy interference.

In addition to ferreting out the Viet Cong in cordon and search operations, securing the rice harvests, and protecting local elections, Marine combat units assisted in resettlement. Go Noi Island, a previously fertile agricultural area, inhabited by nearly 27,000 Vietnamese before the war, by 1969 was a tunneled, cave-infested Viet Cong haven. Driven out by the Viet

*MajGen Raymond G. Davis, center, and Dr. Tran Lu Y, left, South Vietnamese Minister for Health, Social Welfare, and Relief, lay the cornerstone for the 120-bed, 10-building 3d Marine Division Memorial Children's Hospital complex at Quang Tri on 9 April.*

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A800546



Cong, floods, and numerous allied sweeps, most of the island's residents had joined the growing refugee population of Quang Nam Province. During Operation Pipestone Canyon, conducted between May and November, the 1st Marine Division, assisted by elements of the 51st ARVN Regiment and 2d Korean Marine Brigade, swept the island again of its NVA and VC occupiers and cleared over 8,000 acres of underbrush and treelines, at the same time destroying the enemy's extensive network of tunnels and fortifications.<sup>7</sup>

During the operation, the division proposed a plan for resettling Go Noi Island once it had been cleared. The plan had obvious advantages. Not only would the repopulation of the area with pro-government civilians make future Communist infiltration more difficult, but the area could provide homes and livelihoods for thousands of refugees, ultimately contributing to the economic revival of Quang Nam Province. The appropriate corps and national agencies took interest, but it was not until the end of August 1970 that the first refugees were resettled in newly constructed villages. While this was the major effort during the latter half of the year, numerous other smaller resettlement projects were carried out with Marine assistance throughout both Quang Tri and Quang Nam Provinces.<sup>8</sup>

During 1969, III MAF continued to support and to benefit from the Kit Carson Scout Program. Initiated by Marines in 1966 with the hiring of six former Viet Cong guerrillas as combat scouts, the program proved to be such a success that MACV extended it to all U.S. commands in Vietnam. At the beginning of the year, III MAF employed 476 of the former enemy soldiers and by the end of the year the number had grown to 597, despite the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division.

Following extensive screening, training, and indoctrination, the scouts were placed with Marine units and given a number of tasks. Scouts guided Marine patrols, participated in propaganda broadcasts, led Marines to supply and equipment caches, pointed out mines and boobytraps, and assisted in the identification of members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure.<sup>9</sup> In addition, many conducted training for Marine infantrymen in the enemy's use of surprise firing devices and sapper tactics. During the year, Kit Carson Scouts attached to Marine units conducted over 13,700 patrols and were credited with killing 191 enemy, apprehending 539 prisoners, and capturing 195 weapons, in addition to detecting 518 explosive devices and 143 caves, tunnels, and caches.

### *Civic Action*

When Marines first landed in I Corps Tactical Zone in March 1965, they spontaneously undertook to assist the people among whom they were fighting by providing food, relief supplies, and medical care. Acting from a variety of motives, they not only hoped to win the friendship of the Vietnamese who in turn would provide information about the Viet Cong, but generate popular support for their own activities and those of the South Vietnamese Government. As pacification programs were developed, civic action activities contributed to them by promoting economic and social improvement, thus assisting "the government of the Republic of Vietnam in stabilizing the political situation and building respect and loyalty of the people for the legally constituted authority."<sup>10</sup>

The III MAF Civic Action Program by 1969 had grown from initial spontaneous acts of charity into a large-scale effort, coordinated by G-5 and S-5 staffs and integrated with the government's pacification and development plans. The program emphasized the requirement that the people, with Marine assistance, help themselves. Villagers were to identify the need, whether it be a new school, well, bridge, or dispensary. Marines would then furnish the materials, tools, and equipment, drawn from their own resources, CORDS, or from private charities; the technical know-how; and some labor. Villagers in turn would supply most of the labor and additional construction material if available. However, Marines often found themselves more heavily committed to projects than was necessary, often to the detriment of South Vietnamese efforts to assist.

In addition to community-sponsored projects, III MAF units provided individual assistance to I Corps' inhabitants with special emphasis on the large refugee population. During 1969, through the Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) and Dental Civic Action Program (DENTCAP), units, in coordination with province and district medical officials, furnished over one million medical and 35,000 dental treatments and administered 100,000 immunizations. Through Project Handclasp, they distributed large amounts of food, clothing, and other essential commodities. Also, monies made available through the Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action Fund were used to purchase school and medical kits, rice, soap, and clothing through the relief agency CARE, and to support the General Walt Scholarship Fund which helped to finance the secondary and college education of selected

Vietnamese youth. Additional funds made available through a variety of other relief agencies purchased fertilizers, seeds, farm machinery, and improved strains of vegetables and livestock, enriching the economy at the village and hamlet level.<sup>11</sup>

The most ambitious project begun in 1969 was the 3d Marine Division Memorial Children's Hospital, built in Quang Tri City and dedicated to the memory of Marines and sailors who had lost their lives in Vietnam. The cornerstone of the 120-bed, 10-building complex was laid on 9 April and by the end of the year over \$135,000 of the projected cost of \$471,000 in materials had been collected. Originally, construction was to be accomplished by the 3d Engineer Battalion and the 128th Naval Mobile Construction Battalion, with Vietnamese assistance. But with redeployment of the 3d Marine Division before the hospital could be completed, remaining U.S. Army forces in Quang Tri Province assumed responsibility.

At the time construction of the permanent hospital began, a temporary facility at Dong Ha Combat Base was in operation. The 3d Medical Battalion furnished the physical plant, and, along with 19 Vietnamese nurses and 22 other civilians, undertook the task of providing the temporary hospital's medical support. By December, the complex had treated a total of 20,600 outpatients, with referrals coming from as far north as the Demilitarized Zone and as far south as Hue. When the 3d Marine Division redeployed the facility was moved to Quang Tri Combat Base and the Army's 18th Surgical Hospital, 67th Medical Group assumed the task of providing medical support.<sup>12</sup>

Under the administrative and operational control of Force Logistic Command, the Hoa Khanh Children's Hospital near Da Nang had grown from a small roadside dispensary into a fully equipped 120-bed pediatric facility by 1969. Built with thousands of hours of donated Marine labor and sustained by over \$300,000 in annual contributions by servicemen and concerned groups and individuals in the United States, the hospital treated hundreds of children, who would have otherwise died or become permanently incapacitated from a wide variety of the simplest of childhood accidents and illnesses.<sup>13</sup>

While assisting in major civic action projects, individual Marines and their units continued to help Vietnamese who lived within their TAORs or near their camps and bases. Marines participated in numerous minor construction projects and provided supplies and money for local schools, religious institutions, and

refugee centers. Typical of the efforts were those of Force Logistic Support Group-Bravo at Dong Ha, which in January began collecting and hauling scrap lumber and cement declared unusable for the rebuilding of approximately 200 homes and temples destroyed the year before. By May, 175 homes and two temples had been completely repaired. Marines not only shared excess material, but also their time. Three times a week, for example, members of Headquarters Battery, 12th Marines conducted English classes at the Buddhist High School, Semi-Public High School, and District Headquarters High School at Dong Ha.<sup>14</sup>

The effectiveness of the Marine civic action program, however, was questionable. The immediate effects were obvious: medical treatment cured illness and healed wounds; a new well provided water where there was none before; and discarded lumber built houses and schools. But the question of whether the program won support for the South Vietnamese Government and greater acceptance for the Marines among the local populace remained unanswered.

#### *The Grass-Roots Campaign*

The primary pacification mission of Marine combat units was to provide security for the local population. Much of their activity was directly or indirectly involved in keeping enemy military units from cities, villages, and hamlets, and assisting the government in eradicating the Viet Cong Infrastructure. Those Marines involved in the Combined Action Program had security at the village- and hamlet-level and the suppression of local guerrillas as their exclusive mission.

The Combined Action Program originated with the Marines in 1965 when III MAF, in attempting to secure the heavily populated area around the Hue-Phu Bai Airfield, discovered a "ready-made ally" in the surrounding hamlets—the part-time soldiers of the Popular Forces, the lowest echelon of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. Minimally trained, armed, and paid, and commanded at the district-level, they could do little towards the basic mission of providing hamlet- and village-level security. From the beginning, Marines on patrol had taken members of the Popular Forces along as guides and interpreters, but with proper support and training, it was thought they could relieve regular Marines of the local defensive mission and assist in weeding out the enemy.<sup>15</sup> From this ad hoc effort in 1965, the Combined Action Program was to grow from seven platoons in January 1966, to 57 a year later, and to over 100 platoons deployed throughout I Corps in late 1968.



Abel Papers, Marine Corps Historical Center

*Col Edward F. Danowitz, left, head of the Combined Action Program, interviews a volunteer. All CAP members were volunteers, but not all were accepted into the program.*

To work with the Popular Forces, III MAF created the combined action platoon (CAP), consisting of a 15-man Marine rifle squad composed of a squad leader, M79 grenadier, Navy corpsman, and three fire teams of four men each. Together with a Popular Force platoon of approximately 35 men, the combined unit defended one village or group of hamlets. Each element of the team complemented the other. Marines provided advice, training, encouragement, and access to American medical evacuation and fire support. The Popular Forces, being local residents, provided knowledge of the area, rapport with the people, information about the enemy, and "the motivation that was inherent in the defense of one's home."<sup>16</sup>

Unlike conventional American and ARVN combat forces which swept through a village and then moved on, the Combined Action Platoons remained to protect the villagers from Viet Cong terrorism. As the Marines increasingly won the confidence of the people with whom they lived and worked, the platoons not only became a major source of allied intelligence, but a screen behind which the government could reestablish its authority and undertake social and economic

improvements. As the platoons' successes grew so did the number of platoons, and by 1969 the program had been extended to all five provinces within I Corps. To administer and coordinate the activities of the platoons, III MAF subsequently created combined action companies and then combined action groups (CAGs).

At the beginning of 1969, four combined action groups were in operation: the 1st, under Lieutenant Colonel Earl R. Hunter, headquartered at Chu Lai, controlled 4 companies and 26 platoons scattered throughout Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces; the 2d, the largest, was composed of 8 companies and 36 platoons under Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Lewis, Jr., and worked out of Hoi An in Quang Nam Province; the 3d, under Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Whitesell, controlled 5 companies and 31 platoons in Thua Thien Province; and the 4th, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John E. Greenwood, was composed of 3 companies and 18 platoons operating in Quang Tri Province. Attached to each group was a mobile training team which assisted in the training of the Popular Force Platoons. The teams' function was taken over during the year by the Army's Mobile Advisory

Teams.<sup>17</sup> Over 1,600 Marines and 128 Navy corpsmen composed the four Combined Action Groups; these Americans worked with about 3,100 Popular Force soldiers. By year's end, the program achieved its authorized strength of 20 companies and 114 platoons.

III MAF exercised control of the four groups through the Assistant Chief of Staff, Combined Action Program, Colonel Edward F. Danowitz and his successors, Colonel Charles R. Burroughs and Colonel Theodore E. Metzger. Lieutenant General Nickerson, in consultation with General Lam, the I Corps commander, passed on every change in deployment of a Marine squad assigned to the program. To improve coordination and administration of the growing program, Nickerson late in 1969 recommended the establishment of a Combined Action Force (CAF), with its own headquarters under III MAF, as the groups, General Nickerson noted, were essentially "battalions."<sup>18</sup> The proposal was approved and instituted in early January 1970.

In the field, the combined action platoons operated under a complex chain of command. The Marines assigned to squads were commanded by the assistant chief of staff for the program through the groups and companies, while the Popular Forces were responsible, in theory, to their village chief, but in practice took orders from their district chief and through him from the province chief and corps commander. Generally, each combined action group headquarters was collocated at the province headquarters and provided administrative support for the companies under it, in addition to training both Marines and Popular Forces and assigning areas of operation in consultation with province chiefs and regular unit commanders. Combined action company headquarters, located with district headquarters, maneuvered the platoons in consultation with the district chief and his U.S. Army advisor, arranged for artillery and air support, evacuation of casualties, and reinforcement for platoons under its control.

The area of operation assigned to each platoon, normally a single village or group of hamlets, was mutually agreed to by the province chief, the group commander, and the commander of the regular infantry battalion operating in the area. The village or hamlets, once assigned to the platoon, became the exclusive territory of that platoon and non-CAP units were prohibited from entering the area without the permission of the district chief and combined action company commander. Within each platoon's area, the Marine squad leader and the Popular Force sergeant,

neither of whom had command over the other, directed the daily operations of the platoon by consultation and agreement. The effectiveness of this system of dual command depended entirely upon the trust and respect which existed between the Marine and Popular Force leader.

Initially, Marines who joined the Combined Action Program were volunteers obtained from the two divisions. This proved to be a problem as Colonel Charles R. Burroughs noted: "we would get the man after maybe six months in-country. First thing would be R&R, then we would send him to school. We lost about a month, which left five months with the CAPs."<sup>19</sup> By 1969, a majority of combined action Marines were obtained directly from the United States, the remaining volunteers, those who requested transfer to the CAPs, came from other III MAF Marine units. Once personally screened to ensure adaptability to the program, the selected Marines attended the two-week Combined Action Program School at Da Nang where they received refresher training in basic infantry weapons, small unit tactics, first aid, map and compass reading, the basic techniques for requesting and controlling artillery, air strikes, and medical evacuation flights, and language. Upon graduation, the students were given a language examination and those who exhibited an aptitude for language returned to Da Nang after two to four months in the field with a platoon to receive intensive Vietnamese language instruction at the program's language school. Most training, however, was of the "on-the-job" variety: "the CAP Marine conceives of himself as a combat Marine, and therefore his classroom is the 'bush' where the VC provide the necessary training aids."<sup>20</sup>

Throughout 1969, the CAPs continued to perform the six basic missions assigned them: destroy the Viet Cong hamlet-village infrastructure; provide public security and help maintain law and order; protect the local governing structure; guard facilities and important lines of communications within the village and hamlet; organize local intelligence nets; and participate in civic action and psychological operations against the Viet Cong. The Marine element of the CAP had additional missions assigned: conduct training in general military subjects and leadership for Popular Forces assigned to the platoon; motivate, instill pride, patriotism, and aggressiveness in the Popular Force soldier; conduct combined day and night patrols and ambushes; conduct combined operations with other allied forces; and ensure that information

gathered was made available to nearby allied forces. Marines were to prepare the Popular Force element to assume effectively the platoon's mission upon the Marine squad's relocation to a new village where government authority was contested and where the local PF were ineffective in dealing with the enemy. "Thus, CAP Marines are engaged in a process of perpetually working themselves out of a job, a procedure which exemplifies the concept of Vietnamization."<sup>21</sup>

Combined action platoons accomplished their security mission by continually deploying day and night patrols and setting ambushes in and around their assigned villages. When not on patrol, the CAPs, initially, tended to be tied to fortified compounds, one of which Corporal Michael E. Gordy, platoon leader with the 4th CAG, described:

When we first moved out here, we cleared all the trees and started laying wire. The wire around here consists of a continuous belt, this belt consists of one row of triple-strength concertina, then one row of tangle-foot, then another row of triple-strength concertina, another row of tangle-foot, another row of triple-strength concertina, another row of tangle-foot, and then a double-apron fence, and that is all the way around this compound. Now interlaced in all this wire are about 150 tripflares and there are about 40 claymores around this position . . . We have an

81 mortar here. We have a 60 mortar. We have one M60 machine gun. In the compound at all times there is at least one M79, and of course the Marines and PFs are all equipped with M16s . . . We are not really sweating getting overrun that much because we feel that we have a pretty tight compound here and we think our defenses are such that we could hold off probably anything up to a company until we could get some tanks here.<sup>22</sup>

These compounds, Marines found, not only offered the enemy lucrative targets, but weakened the security screen around the village by tying many of the platoons down to defending a fixed position.

By mid-1969, a majority of the platoons had abandoned the defensive role of the past and adopted the "Mobile CAP" concept of operations. Establishing no position more permanent than a command post at a specific location during any 12-hour period, platoons were to patrol and ambush continually among their assigned villages and hamlets without using the same routes, trails, or setting a pattern of operations. All villages and hamlets were to be checked at least once every 24 hours.<sup>23</sup> By doing so, they would make it impossible for the Viet Cong to feel safe anywhere in or near the protected hamlets. This tactic not only allowed the platoons to screen a larger area more effec-

*Capt John D. Niotis, Commanding Officer of Combined Action Company 2-5, discusses the placement of platoons in Hoa Vang District with District Chief, Maj Mai Xuan Hau.*

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A192928



tively with the same number of men, but it kept the enemy uncertain as to the platoons' whereabouts and thus less likely to enter the protected hamlets.<sup>24</sup>

While security patrols and ambushes occupied a majority of their time, CAP units also participated in other types of operations and activities. They often worked with U.S., ARVN, and territorial forces in cordon and searches or helped in offensive sweeps of the villages and hamlets under their care. During Operation Bold Mariner, for example, platoons of the 1st CAG assisted Army and Marine units in sweeping the enemy-infested Batangan Peninsula. In addition to training Popular Forces so as to promote greater self-sufficiency, combined action units also provided allied forces with a substantial amount of local intelligence on such subjects as the location of heavily-used enemy trails, identity of Viet Cong Infrastructure members, and the sites of emplaced mines and boobytraps.

Away from combat and training, CAP Marines spent much of their time helping the villagers improve their daily lives. The attached Navy corpsmen held periodic sick calls where the people gathered for the treatment of minor injuries and illnesses. The corpsmen also taught personal hygiene and trained volunteers in basic first aid for service in the local dispensary. CAP riflemen distributed food, clothing, building materials, and school supplies, as well as assisted the villagers in self-help projects, as one Marine sergeant and CAP squad leader noted:

They already had the dispensary set up, we just supplied them with necessary items. We built them two new bridges. The old bridges were rotted. The two good ones they had, someone blew them up . . . So we built them new bridges so they could bring their buffalo carts across, bring their goods to the market for sale. We built, I don't know how many, buffalo pens. We got bags of cement for them, and everything, lumber, and for the church, we got them all new desks for the classrooms.<sup>25</sup>

Throughout 1969, the Combined Action Program continued to achieve success in its primary mission of improving local security, but the program did experience a number of problems. Disputes often arose between regular infantry units and the platoons over the requirement that line units obtain both CAP and district approval before entering the CAP area of operations. In an effort to ameliorate the situation, both formal and informal arrangements were made among the local commanders to ensure greater cooperation and coordination. At the platoon-level, difficulties remained. Of major concern was the reluctance on the

part of the Popular Forces to adopt the mobile concept, preferring instead to remain in compounds or other fixed installations. This lack of mobility was a direct consequence of village pressure to keep Popular Forces as close to the village as possible in order to afford maximum personal security for the village and its officials.

Although disagreements sometimes arose that brought Marines and Popular Forces close to blows, working and social relationships were for the most part harmonious, as one platoon leader reported:

Whatever we ate, we let them eat. Like if we got a chow supply, they'd eat right along with us. We never separated them like a lot of the CAPs I've seen. They'd tell the Fox-trots [PFs], time for chow and they'd take off for the ville . . . and eat. Well, we all ate together here, or if we wanted to go in the ville some place, one of the mama-sans, we had several of them, we had three of them we called mother, just like American mothers, and they cooked us chow and stuff . . . and we'd all eat together and play games . . . Just a close relationship, working with them and treating them like you're treated and it helped them understand, well he's treating us just like them, there's no difference.<sup>26</sup>

In spite of problems, Marines and others alike, remained convinced of the success of the Combined Action Program. Among the program's ardent supporters was Mr. Alexander Firfer, I Corps Deputy for CORDS, who noted:

Unless you had the Vietnamese governing themselves, feeling responsible for what is going on, and feeling they really had a share in decisions, instead of being told by the province chief or by the zone commander what they were going to do, it was obvious you could not get the support of the people and without the support of the people you could not beat the enemy. Within this kind of context, the CAPs played a very important role. For one thing, they were stationed out there with the people, near their villages or in their villages, helping defend those villages. Thus, in addition to the local Vietnamese military, in whom perhaps the villagers did not have great confidence, you had a group of U.S. soldiers, Marines, whom the villagers trusted and depended on. And the Marines were trained in such a way that they did more than just participate in village defense, they made friends with the people and sought ways to help them, in what I suppose you would call a "civic action way." This involved health, this involved just plain loving care, this involved small technical assistance, this involved the provision of certain commodities that the village didn't have, and this involved an organization which allowed them to call up the headquarters and say, "look my village needs so and so, please get it for me." Now with that kind of an interrelationship, the CAPs were a way of stimulating the Vietnamese hamlet residents to do something about their own defense.<sup>27</sup>

"You are" he continued, "fish in the sea and the sea is the population . . . If you want the people with



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A800440

*Cpl Walter Rebacz and his scout dog, King, lead a CAP patrol composed of Marines and local Popular Forces out from a protected village three kilometers south of Tam Ky.*

you, you had better be in touch with the people and find some way to reflect their needs, their concerns, and some how get their involvement . . . This was the approach taken by the Marines.”<sup>28</sup>

Operationally, 1969 was an active year for the program. Aided by the increase in size and a mobile posture, combined action platoons conducted in excess of 145,000 combat patrols and ambushes, 73 percent of which were conducted at night. Although these

operations were nearly double the number executed the previous year, the overall enemy toll, 1,938 killed, 425 taken prisoner, and 932 weapons captured, was lower, reflecting the enemy's inability to penetrate, or desire to avoid, platoon-protected villages and hamlets.

Capitalizing on the success and effectiveness of the Combined Action Program, General Nickerson, in October, initiated the Infantry Company Intensive Pacifi-

cation Program (ICIPP). Realizing that the Marines were about to be phased out, he felt that the concept of the combined action platoon should be continued, and thus he convinced the Army, which was to succeed the Marines in I Corps, to accept a similar program.<sup>29</sup> Employing the basic principles of the CAP, infantry companies, and eventually battalions, were to be assigned the primary mission of pacification; squads were to be combined with Regional or Popular Force platoons and deployed to target hamlets, selected by the province chief in close coordination with the local brigade or regimental commander. The ICIPP, however, differed from the Combined Action Program in two respects. Unlike CAP Marines, ICIPP Marines and Army infantrymen were not formally selected nor trained; they remained as members of a rifle company which had been given a special mission. In addition, the ICIPP companies remained under the operational control of its parent unit and were for the most part deployed within the regiment's or brigade's area of operations.

On 3 October, the Americal Division began ICIPP operations in Quang Ngai Province, deploying Company D, 5th Battalion, 46th Infantry in three contested Son Tinh District hamlets. Then, on 15 October, Company A, 1st Battalion, 52d Infantry was inserted into two Son Tinh hamlets, one contested and one under Viet Cong control. Initially, platoons rather than squads were deployed with encouraging results.

Participation by the 1st Marine Division began in late November with the deployment of squads from Company M, 1st Marines to three contested hamlets near Hill 55. Five additional hamlets were added in early December. Following its first complete month of ICIPP operations, the security efforts of Company M had raised the four VC-controlled and four contested hamlets to the status of five relatively secure and three contested. As the year ended, the 7th Marines selected nine hamlets for operations beginning in mid-January, and the 5th Marines started ICIPP training and initiated the selection of target hamlets in coordination with district and provincial officials.<sup>30</sup>

### *Results*

Throughout South Vietnam, progress in pacification during 1969 was dramatic. Unhindered by a massive *Tet* Offensive, as in 1968, which temporarily sidetracked pacification efforts, the government made substantial gains in the reestablishment of governmental and economic structures as well as in the return of stable living conditions for both urban and rural inhabitants.

Under the three separate, but interrelated, country-wide pacification and development programs, I Corps made steady progress during 1969 in achieving most of these programs' goals. This success was largely attributable to the efforts of the government working hand-in-hand with III MAF to produce a comprehensive effort involving even the most remote communities and the lowest military echelons.

Although the overall population security posture of I Corps increased during the year from 69.3 percent to 93.6, exceeding the assigned 90 percent level, each province achieved varying degrees of security. With the shift of enemy interest in late 1968 from northern I Corps to the three southernmost provinces, Quang Tri and Thua Thien reached the highest levels. Thua Thien, the first province to indicate 100 percent of its population free from Viet Cong and NVA domination, reached this plateau at the end of June, with Quang Tri following suit three months later; however, about 9,000 persons in Thua Thien returned to Viet Cong control during December. Despite being subjected to increased enemy efforts to disrupt the various pacification programs, the three southern provinces made dramatic increases in population security. Although Quang Tin exhibited the largest increase, 57.2 to 86.7 percent, its year-end security-level rating remained the lowest of the provinces within the tactical zone. Quang Nam advanced from 62 to 92 percent, and Quang Ngai moved from 63 to 91 percent. Of a total population of 2,998,200 in I Corps, 2,805,900 inhabitants were considered secure at year-end.

The concerted drive to neutralize the Viet Cong Infrastructure was also successful. By the end of December, 5,363 members of the infrastructure, 82 percent of whom came from the three southern provinces, had been killed, captured, or had rallied, exceeding the set goal of 4,800 by more than 500. As a result of the heavy losses, NVA troops began to assume a more prominent role at the local level in an effort to create a stronger, viable organization. "This was considered by many," noted Colonel Theodore E. Metzger, Commanding Officer of the Combined Action Force, "to be an act of desperation. At the local level, it was a development productive of much resentment by the old time VC who had survived, but who were now being told what to do by aggressive, overbearing NVA regulars who were neither familiar with local problems nor with the terrain, the people, and the opposing forces."<sup>31</sup> Although the network had been weakened by neutralizations, the Viet Cong and NVA had

replaced many of those lost during the year, leaving an estimated strength of some 19,000. The 1970 Pacification and Development Plan prescribed an even more ambitious campaign to ferret out and destroy this enemy faction.

The 1969 Chieu Hoi campaign was the highlight of the year, as an unprecedented 5,996 Hoi Chanh rallied to the government in I Corps, a dramatic increase over the 3,600 expected. Two distinct trends were reversed during the year. First, the two northernmost provinces yielded less than 10 percent of the year's total, whereas during the previous year, better than 50 percent had come from Quang Tri and Thua Thien. This reversal was caused primarily by the enemy's shift of emphasis from the northern to the southern provinces, where his soldiers and nonmilitary supporters, demoralized by personnel losses and lack of support, rallied in large numbers. The second reversal was seen in the type of defector, as more nonmilitary supporters than armed combatants switched sides, bringing with them fewer weapons when they surrendered.

Although the goal of completely reestablishing popularly elected governments at the local level was not met during the year, 91 percent of I Corps' vil-

lages and 99 percent of its hamlets could boast of having elected representatives; the remainder were government-appointed officials. While the specific goal was not met, two important things did occur. First, 85 percent of the population voted, indicating the elections "meant for them something about local control, something about their involvement and their rights." Secondly, younger, more dynamic individuals replaced approximately one third of the older politicians. Thus, the elections saw participation, real campaigning, new faces, and new blood.<sup>32</sup> The goal of resettling and restoring to self-sufficiency all but 55,000 refugees by the end of the year, was likewise not met, although the refugee population was reduced from 619,000 to 169,000.

The effort to develop a local self-defense system showed dynamic growth in the number of citizens organized, trained, and armed during 1969. The People's Self-Defense Forces at the end of the year encompassed 548,190 members, 287,000 of whom were trained and 81,000 armed, fulfilling the stated goal in each category. Advances were also made in rejuvenating the rural economy, such as on Go Noi Island and in Leatherneck Square, but there were setbacks. Among them was the attempt to reclaim land around Phu Loc,

*As part of the Infantry Company Intensive Pacification Program, a Marine instructs a member of the Popular Forces in the care and cleaning of the infantryman's M16 rifle.*

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A372497



south of Hue, and place it back into agricultural production. "There was a simple problem," the III MAF Deputy for CORDS noted, "there were land mines, there were bombs, and what was needed were some Rome Plows to just go over the field and try to explode or pull out any remaining explosives. Well, I never succeeded in convincing anyone to respond to what was proposed . . . . Putting the land back into production was giving the villagers a stake in the South Vietnamese Government."<sup>33</sup> In the area of psychological operations, III MAF, ARVN, and South Vietnamese Government agencies joined together in continuously providing the civilian population with

information concerning government plans and policies, while degrading enemy morale through exploitation of his losses and inevitable defeat.

After five years of American involvement, the allies had erected a strong defensive screen, behind which pacification and development had taken root. Security operations had reduced Communist control of the villages and hamlets and with it the enemy's ability to draw popular support and disrupt nation-building efforts. The South Vietnamese at all levels had begun to establish elected governments and stable economies. Yet for the Marines, Army, and South Vietnamese in I Corps, much remained to be accomplished.

## Special Landing Force Operations

*The Strategic Reserve—Organization and Operations—The Fleet's Contingency Force*

### *The Strategic Reserve*

The United States Seventh Fleet's amphibious arm, Amphibious Task Force 76, composed of the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and Special Landing Force (SLF), was established by the Commander in Chief, Pacific in July 1960 as a balanced mobile contingency force to meet strategic reserve requirements throughout the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. From the beginning of the major United States commitment in Vietnam, the fleet's Amphibious Ready Group and its embarked Special Landing Force either augmented forces already ashore or conducted amphibious raids along the entire coast of South Vietnam, fronting the South China Sea. Since 1967, when a second force was established, their deployments, as arranged through mutual coordination between the Commander, Seventh Fleet and Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and as made available by CinCPac through Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, provided for separate and alternating employments of the two forces. However, due to the heightened level of conflict in South Vietnam, notably in I Corps Tactical Zone beginning in the summer of 1967, III MAF often employed the two SLFs concurrently for operations within the zone.


By mid-1968, the Special Landing Forces were being committed ashore more often and stayed longer than originally envisioned, resulting not only in a deterioration of the fleet's strategic reserve capability, but in the Marine Corps' amphibious character in the region. Both Task Group 79 and the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, which directly controlled the two Marine landing forces, were "under constant and conflicting pressures concerning the employment of its combat assets," according to brigade Chief of Staff, Colonel John Lowman, Jr., "each completely justifiable from the viewpoint of the commander involved." The commonly-held view at III MAF was that "any combat Marine not ashore and fighting was not being properly utilized. Hence, the periods of OpCon ashore grew longer and longer." With the SLFs constantly ashore, the Seventh Fleet's amphibious reserve was thus unavailable to meet a sudden crisis elsewhere, and there-

fore "it was hard for the Navy to justify the expense of keeping under-utilized amphibious shipping hanging off the Vietnamese coast." Charged with the responsibility for operations throughout South Vietnam, constant demands were made on MACV for the use of the SLFs in areas other than I Corps, especially in the coastal region south of Saigon. "This viewpoint," noted Colonel Lowman, "had some measure of support from Seventh Fleet staff and none at all from III MAF. In fact, the easiest way to get thrown out of the III MAF compound was to even mention the subject."<sup>1</sup>

"The operations of the SLFs, for a long while, we were quite perturbed about," noted Colonel Clyde W. Hunter, G-3, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, "primarily because we thought they were being misused; that the divisions were using the SLFs improperly, actually ginning up operations just to get them ashore and then tie them down to a TAOR, or into some kind of operation, that had no connection to their mission as an SLF."<sup>2</sup> Although shore demands on the two landing forces diminished somewhat following *Tet* and the allied response, both forces by the beginning of 1969 had not yet fully resumed their role as forces afloat, ready to respond to any contingency throughout the Pacific Command's area of responsibility.

Some critics, both in and out of South Vietnam, continued to express the opinion that amphibious operations were a waste of time and that the Special Landing Forces should be left ashore permanently. Others saw it differently. "This is the name of the game," observed one special landing force commander, "there should be more of it. Let's face it, we are amphibious in nature, and there are only two little small units in the Marine Corps today that are active in a truly amphibious role."<sup>3</sup> Frustrations were evident as another remarked:

The tenor [of operations] seems to be to go through your amphibious assault phases and as soon as you get yourself established on the beach you are chopped OPCON to the unit commander ashore, which is a pretty frustrating business . . . . As an SLF commander, you are somewhat of a minister without portfolio; you spend most of your time in III MAF trying to get some targeting for yourself and trying to get your troops out on board ship for necessary training and rehab[ilitation]. You play the role, so-to-speak, to get



in the show yourself with your SLF, the entire SLF . . . . This SLF business is the last grasp we have on amphibious business . . . it has to be pushed. You have to target it properly and employ these BLTs in the amphibious role.<sup>4</sup>

The failure of some observers to realize that the United States had other commitments and responsibilities in the region, and that the two Marine landing forces could not be dedicated solely to the war in South Vietnam would be corrected in 1969.

#### *Organization and Operations*

A part of the Pacific Command reserve, the Special Landing Forces were "balanced, self-sustaining fighting units," each consisting of a Marine Battalion Landing Team and a Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM). The battalion landing team was task-

organized and thus had no standard composition or size; it could vary in the number of personnel from a minimum of 1,060 to a maximum of 1,937. Typically, the team was composed of an infantry battalion with attached combat support units, ranging from artillery to reconnaissance and shore party detachments. The helicopter component was a twenty-four CH-34D, or CH-46A-equipped squadron. Also included were separate billets for the force commander and staff.

The two landing forces, Alpha and Bravo (Navy designated Task Groups 79.4 and 79.5) were under the command of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, headquartered on Okinawa. While at sea, they were under the control of the Commander, Amphibious Task Force, Seventh Fleet. When in Vietnam they were

## STRENGTH, ARMS, AND EQUIPMENT OF A TYPICAL SPECIAL LANDING FORCE

| UNITS EMBARKED*                       | STRENGTH |       |     |     | EQUIPMENT                                                             |
|---------------------------------------|----------|-------|-----|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                       | USMC     |       | USN |     |                                                                       |
|                                       | OFF      | ENL   | OFF | ENL |                                                                       |
| SLF Headquarters Detachment           | 10       | 46    | 0   | 0   | 68 M60 Machine Gun<br>28 M20 3.5 Rocket Launcher<br>16 M2 Machine Gun |
| BLT 2/26                              |          |       |     |     | 12 M10 60mm Mortar                                                    |
| 2d Bn, 26th Mar                       | 37       | 1,160 | 3   | 61  | 8 M20 81mm Mortar                                                     |
| Mortar Battery, 1st Bn, 12th Mar      | 3        | 64    | 0   | 2   | 8 M40 106mm Recoilless Rifle                                          |
| Battery B, 1st Bn, 13th Mar           | 10       | 99    | 0   | 2   | 6 M30 107mm Mortar                                                    |
| Platoon, Co A, 5th Amtrac Bn          | 1        | 37    | 0   | 0   | 6 M101A 105 Howitzer                                                  |
| Platoon, Co A, 5th Antitank Bn        | 1        | 21    | 0   | 0   | 5 M48 90mm Tank                                                       |
| Platoon, Co A, 5th Tank Bn            | 1        | 28    | 0   | 0   | 5 M50 Ontos                                                           |
| Platoon, Co A, 5th Recon Bn           | 1        | 21    | 0   | 0   | 2 M2 Flame Thrower                                                    |
| Platoon, Co A, 5th Engineer Bn        | 1        | 38    | 0   | 1   |                                                                       |
| Platoon, Co C, 5th Motor Transport Bn | 1        | 31    | 0   | 0   |                                                                       |
| Platoon, Co A, 5th Shore Party Bn     | 1        | 45    | 0   | 1   | 36 M35 2½ Cargo Truck                                                 |
| Clear Platoon, Co D, 5th Medical Bn   | 0        | 5     | 3   | 20  | 10 LVTP-5                                                             |
| Det, Hq Bn, 5th MarDiv                | 1        | 8     | 0   | 0   | 1 LVTP-6                                                              |
| Det, Hq Co, 26th Mar                  | 0        | 6     | 0   | 0   | 9 M422 1/4T Mite                                                      |
| Det, Communication Supt Co, 9th MAB   | 0        | 0     | 0   | 0   | 8 M274 1/2T Mule                                                      |
| Det, 15th Dental Co                   | 0        | 0     | 1   | 1   | 5 M37 3/4T Cargo Truck<br>2 M49 Tank Truck                            |
| HMM-362                               | 55       | 205   | 1   | 3   | 2 M-54 Cargo Truck<br>1 M38 1/2T Utility Truck<br>1 M170 Ambulance    |
| (Aircraft: 24 UH-34D)                 |          |       |     |     |                                                                       |
| Totals                                | 123      | 1,814 | 8   | 92  |                                                                       |

\*SLF Alpha, January 1969

under the operational control of III Marine Amphibious Force or its subordinate units. Prior to 1969, any reinforced infantry battalion within III MAF was liable for assignment to the Special Landing Force for a six-month tour, but under the brigade leadership of Brigadier General John E. Williams in late 1968, and with the concurrence of FMFPac and III MAF, Regimental Landing Team 26 (26th Marines, with appropriate 5th Marine Division supporting units) was reconstituted, and from it the two forces drew their battalion landing teams throughout most of 1969. Like the infantry component, any medium helicopter squadron of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing could be assigned to the SLF, but as a result of General William's reorganization, two squadrons, HMM-164 and HMM-362,

replaced in May by HMM-265, were permanently tasked to the 9th MAB for duty with the Marine landing force.<sup>5</sup>

When not ashore, the two SLFs were embarked on board ships of the Seventh Fleet's Amphibious Ready Groups, Alpha (Task Group 76.4) and Bravo (Task Group 76.5). Each fleet amphibious ready group consisted of an amphibious assault ship (LPH), dock landing ship (LSD), and a tank landing ship (LST). Additional ships were employed with the ARG as the situation dictated: the AP, a high-speed transport used to carry underwater demolition teams and Marine reconnaissance units, and either the amphibious transport dock (LPD), the attack transport ship (APA), or the attack cargo ship (AKA)—all employed in trans-

porting additional supplies, troops, and landing craft.<sup>6</sup>

The year began with both Special Landing Forces, Alpha and Bravo, ashore. On 5 January, following the completion of Valiant Hunt, a search and clear operation begun in mid-December on Barrier Island, south of Hoi An, SLF Alpha (BLT 2/26 and HMM-362) under the command of Colonel John F. McMahon, Jr., was reembarked on board the *Okinawa* (LPH 3) and other ships of the ready group. Simultaneously, Colonel Robert R. Wilson's SLF Bravo, BLT 3/26 and HMM-164, which had replaced BLT 2/7 and HMM-165, boarded the *Tripoli* (LPH 10), *Ogden* (LPD 5), *Monticello* (LSD 35), and *Seminole* (AKA 104).

Within a week of terminating Valiant Hunt, both Special Landing Forces assembled off Quang Ngai Province in preparation for launching Operation Bold Mariner, slated to be the largest amphibious operation carried out since the Korean War. Under the command of Brigadier General Williams, in his dual role as Commanding General, 9th MAB and Commander,

Task Group 79, the brigade-size Marine landing force was to join with elements of the Americal Division in an assault on the Batangan Peninsula, 18 kilometers south of Chu Lai, in an effort to destroy the enemy stronghold and reestablish South Vietnamese control.\* Encompassing approximately 48 square kilometers of flat fertile lowlands and rolling hills, the peninsula harbored elements of the *38th Viet Cong Main Force Regiment*, *48th Viet Cong Local Force Battalion*, *P-31st Local Force Company*, and the *C-95th Sapper Company*. From their well-entrenched positions on the peninsula, the enemy units not only supported local village and hamlet infrastructures, but posed a continual threat to Quang Ngai City to the southwest.

The operation began on 12 January with an amphibious demonstration off Mo Duc, 40 kilometers

\*The Batangan Peninsula was the site of Operation Piranha conducted by the 7th Marines in 1965 before being included in the 2d Korean Marine Brigade's TAOR in 1966, and later the Americal Division's area of responsibility.

*VAdm William F. Bringle, right, Commander, Seventh Fleet, is introduced to Col Robert R. Wilson, commanding SLF Bravo on board the Tripoli. Observing the introduction is BGen John E. Williams, center, Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade.*

Courtesy of Col Robert R. Wilson (Ret.)





Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A192555

*The 26th Marines come ashore on the Batangan Peninsula in Quang Ngai Province, initiating Bold Mariner, a joint operation with troops of the Army's Americal Division.*

south of Chu Lai, in order to mask the intended operational area. At 0700 the following morning, Lieutenant Colonel William F. Sparks' BLT 2/26 and Lieutenant Colonel J.W.P. Robertson's BLT 3/26 assaulted the northern portion of the peninsula by air and landing craft, as the Americal Division's Task Force Cooksey, composed of elements of 46th Infantry and 1st Cavalry, began a companion operation, Russell Beach, to seal off the area's southern boundary. Once ashore, the battalion landing teams pushed south and east, linking up with elements of the Army task force moving to the northeast. Within seven hours, the combined force, supported by organic artillery and guns of the battleship *New Jersey* offshore, began sweeping eastward, forcing the enemy toward the sea where avenues of escape were blocked by Navy and Coast Guard patrol boats, supported by other ships of the fleet.

Resistance was negligible as Marine, Army, and 2d ARVN Division units tightened the cordon around the peninsula. There were clashes over the next several days, consisting of brief exchanges with furtive groups of enemy or individuals attempting to flee under cover of darkness. Among the obstacles encountered were extensive networks of mines and boobytraps scattered throughout the area and an equally extensive complex of enemy earthworks, each of which had to be searched and then destroyed. In the course of clearing the mazes of tunnels, connecting trenches, caves, and shelters, numerous supply caches and training facilities were uncovered. During one such search on 19

January, Company F, 2d Battalion, 26th Marines captured 102 Vietnamese, 56 of whom were males of military age. Later interrogation revealed that they were members of the *C-95th Sapper Company* and represented the largest single enemy unit captured virtually intact up to that time.

Moving steadily eastward, the combined force encountered an ever-increasing number of civilians who eventually were evacuated to the Combined Holding and Interrogation Center, north of Quang Ngai City, where they were given food, shelter, and medical treatment, as necessary. There, U.S. forces, assisted by a platoon of National Police Field Forces, a Regional Force platoon, and three Armed Propaganda Teams, screened the detainees to determine possible affiliation with the Viet Cong. In all, the center processed more than 11,900 civilians during the month-long operation.

On 24 January, the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines completed participation in the operation and returned to its amphibious shipping offshore for rehabilitation. Two days later, Lieutenant Colonel Sparks' landing team again moved ashore, joining the 7th Marines in Operation Linn River, north of Liberty Bridge. On 7 February, operational control of the landing team was passed to the 5th Marines and for the next five days Sparks' battalion participated in Operation Taylor Common within the same operational area until back-loaded on board ships of the ready group for another period of training and repair.

With the withdrawal of BLT 2/26 from the Batan-



Courtesy of Col Robert R. Wilson (Ret.)

*Infantrymen of the 26th Marines force a suspected Viet Cong guerrilla from his hiding place in one of the many tunnel networks that lay beneath the enemy-infested peninsula.*

gan Peninsula, operational control of Lieutenant Colonel Robertson's battalion shifted from Task Force 79 to III MAF. Working in close coordination with Army Task Force Cooksey, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines continued searching the peninsula. During the last days of the operation, the battalion observed large groups of enemy troops attempting to escape the ever-shrinking cordon. Employing air and artillery, the battalion engaged the enemy, who did not return fire although outnumbering Robertson's Marines on several occasions. On 7 February, the battalion began its withdrawal, leaving elements of the Americal Division to complete the task of searching the operational area.

Three days after completing Bold Mariner, Marines of BLT 3/26 entered Operation Taylor Common by way of a vertical envelopment, codenamed Defiant Measure. In order to allow the prepositioning of other Marine units prior to *Tet*, Robertson's battalion initially assumed responsibility for 100 kilometers of the Arizona Territory, but as the operation progressed, individual companies moved out of the operational area in search of enemy troops. On 20 March, the battalion landing team was replaced by the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines and helilifted to An Hoa Combat Base for the period of rehabilitation. Three days later, operational control of the battalion, now under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Edward W. Snelling, who had replaced Robertson on the 3d, was passed to the 7th Marines and on the 31st, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, along with units of Colonel Robert L. Nichols' regiment and the 51st ARVN Regiment, assaulted landing zones on Charlie Ridge and in Happy Valley, initiating operation Oklahoma Hills.\*

After a week of training with its amphibious ready group, the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines returned to Vietnamese waters as III MAF's mobile reserve force, liable to be committed during *Tet*. With the buildup of substantial enemy forces west of Da Nang, the battalion landing team, now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel George M. Edmondson, Jr., began Operation Eager Pursuit I on 1 March by way of an amphibious landing and helicopter assault into operational areas of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines and 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, northwest of Da Nang. The 10-day amphibious operation was followed by Eager Pursuit II, which continued until 27 March. Under the immediate control of the 5th Marines, Edmondson's battal-

ion, supported by elements of the 51st ARVN Regiment, swept east from Liberty Bridge, across Go Noi Island and then back west, encountering a large number of minefields and boobytraps, but only limited resistance. Following a day of rehabilitation on board ship, the battalion again moved ashore on the 28th, assuming responsibility for the combined and modified operational areas of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 7th Marines, west of Da Nang. Once firmly established in its new area, the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines was replaced on 1 April by Lieutenant Colonel George C. Kliefoth's 1st Battalion, 26th Marines as SLF Alpha's battalion landing team.


April activities of the two landing teams were routine as both were in support of operations ashore: BLT 3/26 engaged in Operation Oklahoma Hills in the mountains west of Da Nang and BLT 1/26, in search operations near the villages of Kim Lien and Quang Nam, straddling Route 1 north of Da Nang. Both helicopter squadrons, Lieutenant Colonel Richard T. Trundy's HMM-164 and Lieutenant Colonel Jack E. Schlarp's HMM-362, when not training on board ship, were rotated alternately ashore to Phu Bai Airfield, where they were placed under the control of Marine Aircraft Group 36 in support of the 3d Marine Division.

In May, the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines completed Oklahoma Hills and returned to Amphibious Ready Group Bravo for a period of rehabilitation and training on the 4th. Serving as amphibious reserve for III MAF, the BLT twice demonstrated its measure of readiness by being fully prepared to land all units within 24-hours notice and failing to do so only because of last moment cancellation of the operations. The first was to be directed against Hour Glass Island in Quang Ngai Province and the second in an area south of the Cua Viet River, west of Wunder Beach in Quang Tri. Despite preparations, both operations were cancelled within 15 hours of landing by III MAF.

Snelling's Marines remained on board ship until 10 June when they moved ashore in preparation for the relief in place of 2d Battalion, 26th Marines, which in turn began embarking on board ships of the ready group. On the 12th, Lieutenant Colonel Edmondson's Marines departed Vietnam, bound for Okinawa, marking the first time since April 1967 that a battalion landing team's rehabilitation and training cycle would take place on the island. The tempo of the war had until then precluded the movement of BLTs to Okinawa, the most desirable location for refurbishing due to the presence of the 3d Force Service Regiment.

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\*For a detailed account of BLT 3/26's participation in Operations Taylor Common and Oklahoma Hills, see Chapters 5 and 6.



See Reference Map, Sections 18-63

The June deployment of BLT 2/26 marked the first out-of-country rehabilitation since BLT 2/7 was refurbished at Subic Bay in June 1968. During the intervening period, three battalion landing teams were refurbished at Da Nang: 2/26 in August 1968; 3/26 in January 1969; and 1/26 in April 1969. While the Subic Bay and in-country rehabilitations were accomplished successfully, problems such as crowded port and maintenance facilities, lack of suitable training areas, and long supply lines combined to render the refurbishment less effective than under the original concept calling for deployment to Okinawa.

Following tested methods, a team from the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade on Okinawa conducted limited inspections of the battalion's organic equipment prior to embarkation, thereby allowing sufficient lead-time for the requisitioning of repair parts and other supplies. Upon arrival, the BLT had use of all 9th MAB repair facilities, in addition to higher echelon

maintenance support available from the 3d Force Service Regiment. A major contribution to the successful completion of the refurbishment was the "BLT Layette." Assembled and held by the regiment, the package contained a cross-section of supply items needed by Edmondson's Marines. Departing Okinawa on 26 June, the battalion landing team rejoined Amphibious Ready Group Bravo for movement to Subic Bay and a period of tactical training.

While the 3d Battalion and then the 2d underwent periods of training and refurbishment, Lieutenant Colonel Kliefoth's battalion participated in two major landings south of Da Nang. The first, Daring Rebel, was viewed as a complement to on-going 1st Marine Division operations designed to block the western and southwestern approaches to the Da Nang Vital Area. The amphibious objective area of the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines was to be the central portion of Barrier Island known to harbor elements of the 3d, 36th, and the battered 38th Viet Cong Regiments, 32 kilome-

*On the flight deck of the Tripoli, a Marine CH-53 helicopter prepares to load elements of the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines for an air assault into western Quang Nam Province.*

Courtesy of Col Robert R. Wilson (Ret.)





Marine Corps Historical Collection

*A group of suspected local Viet Cong are led to a combined interrogation point by elements of the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines during the battalion's search of Barrier Island.*

ters south of Da Nang, near the Quang Nam-Quang Tin provincial boundary. In conjunction with the battalion landing team, four companies of the 2d Korean Marine Brigade were to conduct search and clear operations to the northwest, while two battalions of the 51st and 54th ARVN Regiments supported the Marines with companion operation Vu Ninh 03 on the island near the Song Cau Dau, and the Americal Division conducted armored cavalry screening operations to the south and west. On Long Dong, a small island just northwest of Barrier Island, Regional and Popular forces were to provide security for a Combined Holding and Interrogation Center, operated by Vietnamese authorities, and to conduct local patrol operations. In addition, U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels were to conduct coastal, river, and estuary patrols, blocking enemy escape routes as well as providing coordinated naval gunfire support for the forces ashore.

Before dawn on 5 May, Amphibious Ready Group Alpha converged offshore and made preparations to land BLT 1/26, employing air strikes and naval gunfire to neutralize the landing beach and primary helicopter landing zones. At 1005, Company A, in the first wave of landing craft, moved unopposed across Red Beach to spearhead the amphibious assault. Further inland, Company C met sporadic sniper fire as

its helicopters from HMM-362 entered Landing Zone Lion. Touchdown of Company D at Landing Zone Tiger was delayed an hour while air strikes completed the destruction of numerous enemy fortifications uncovered during the initial preparation of the landing zone. Once ashore, a fire support base and beach support areas were established near Red Beach as Kliefoth's Marines began search and clear operations to the northeast.

During the initial stages of the operation, as in Bold Mariner, an extensive psychological campaign was directed at the civilian population, alerting them of their impending relocation to the combined center for further screening, interrogation, classification, and eventual resettlement on the island. Aerial broadcasts, continually beamed over the entire area, instructed the civilians to move south along the beach toward the support area for transfer out of the combat zone, while leaflets amplified the instructions. The immediate effect was the relocation of over 1,300 civilians during the first two days of the operation. Ground action during the 17-day operation was limited to dislodging enemy troops and Viet Cong sympathizers from their hiding places. Throughout the endeavor, the combined force found the enemy to be extremely adept in conducting harassing attacks, planting boobytraps

and concealing himself in extensive, well-prepared bunker and tunnel complexes. Despite the use of organic artillery, air strikes, and fire from the rocket-firing ship *White River* (LFR 536), and destroyers *Mulinnix* (DD 944), *Frank E. Evans* (DD 754), *Noa* (DD 841), and *Douglas H. Fox* (DD 779) on a rotating basis, these enemy fortifications only yielded their hidden caches and prisoners when thoroughly searched or probed by long metal rods.

The enemy was caught napping twice during the operation when Marine units, which had swept from the southwest to the central portion of the island, boarded helicopters and returned to their original landing zones. As Colonel William C. Doty, Jr., commander of Special Landing Force Alpha, recounted: "I felt that when the enemy saw us turn our backs and move north they would come across the river behind us. We jumped right back to the area and got them."<sup>7</sup>

As a result of such tactics, the combined operations netted 303 Viet Cong killed, a majority of which resulted from the actions of the two ARVN battalions; another 328 taken prisoner; and 37 tons of rice, 4 tons of salt, and 131 weapons seized. In addition, over 7,000 civilians were eventually processed through the combined center and resettled on the island under Vietnamese control. "It had taken the enemy years to set up a good infrastructure," noted Colonel Doty, "by rooting out the VCI, we've hurt the enemy's cause much more than just taking prisoners. He has to start rebuilding over again if he wants to reassert himself in this area again."<sup>8</sup>

The second landing came three days after completion of Daring Rebel, when Kliefoth's battalion was helilifted ashore during Gallant Leader, trucked from Hill 55 to an area just north of Liberty Bridge, and then began an easterly sweep toward Dodge City. With the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines established blocking positions along the western edge of the area while the 1st Marines and ARVN Rangers, in Operation Pipestone Canyon, attacked south towards Go Noi Island. The battalion maintained these positions until 8 June when a tactical withdrawal was conducted to ships of the ready group in preparation for yet another landing on Barrier Island.

On the morning of 27 June, Special Landing Force Alpha, employing helicopters of Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Gray, Jr.'s HMM-265, which had replaced HMM-362 in late May, as well as amphibian tractors and assault landing craft, put BLT 1/26 once again

ashore on wedge-shaped Barrier Island in Operation Bold Pursuit. Intelligence reports had indicated a rise in the number of enemy units in the Quang Tin portion of the island, apparently tasked with thwarting Vietnamese pacification efforts begun during Operation Daring Rebel in May. Enemy strength was estimated at 140 Viet Cong in main and local force units, 300 guerrillas, and elements of the *70th Main Force Battalion*, of unknown strength. The total number of enemy troops within supporting distance of the island was estimated at 1,200.

Landing at Blue Beach in the northern portion of the island, a kilometer south of the Quang Nam-Quang Tin provincial boundary, and at Landing Zones Cobra, Rattler, and Krait, Lieutenant Colonel Kliefoth's battalion began a southward purge of the island. Meanwhile, units of the Americal Division and Vietnamese Regional Forces established blocking positions on the western banks of the Song Truong Giang as a prelude to screening operations, and U.S. Navy Swift boats, augmented by Coast Guard and Vietnamese patrol craft, were stationed offshore to prevent an enemy escape by sea.

Encounters were sporadic as enemy troops again engaged in only occasional sniper fire and small-scale skirmishes, avoiding contact with the numerically superior forces of the landing team. As in Daring Rebel, Kliefoth's Marines uncovered numerous enemy fortifications and hiding places, which subsequently were destroyed by attached engineers. By the end of the 10-day operation on 6 July, 42 Viet Cong had been killed and 19 weapons seized. In addition, nine enemy troops were captured and 720 suspects detained for further interrogation and eventual classification by Vietnamese authorities.

Four days after reembarking on board shipping of the Amphibious Ready Group, BLT 1/26 assaulted into a small objective area within the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines operational area between the Song Vinh Diem and the South China Sea. Intelligence sources had placed elements of the *R-20th Local Force Battalion* and the *Q-92d Special Action Sapper Company*, in addition to scattered units of the *Q-82d* and *V-25th Local Force Battalion*, totaling more than 450 troops in the region. The presence of these major enemy units posed not only a direct threat to local allied installations guarding the southern approaches to the Da Nang Vital Area, but enhanced the possibility of rocket attacks against the Da Nang Airbase and Marble Mountain Air Facility.

Assisting Kliefoth's Marines were elements of the 2d Korean Marine Brigade positioned to the south and west; 1st Marines units to the north and northwest; and Company M, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, directly attached to the battalion landing team. As in previous operations, U.S. Navy and Coast Guard patrol vessels were to provide screening operations along coastal and inland waterways. Also, the Vietnamese National Police were tasked with screening and classifying all civilian detainees and infrastructure suspects apprehended during the operation.

The operation, codenamed Mighty Play, began on 10 July with a helicopter assault into three inland zones, secured by Company M, 1st Marines. Since an over-the-beach assault did not take place, all logistical needs of the landing team were met by helilifts directly to units in the field or unloaded at Da Nang and trucked to the fire support base of Battery A, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines and the logistical support area established near Route 538, south of Tra Khe (1). Once ashore, each of Kliefoth's companies operated in an area adjacent to its initial landing zone, providing thorough coverage of inhabited areas and suspected enemy routes in the region. The enemy made no stand, relying instead on heavy concentrations of mines and boobytraps to disrupt search and clear operations of the landing team. As a result, contact was extremely light as Marines moved through the heavily mined terrain, engaging only isolated groups of enemy soldiers. By the close of Operation Mighty Play on 20 July, 30 enemy troops had been killed, 10 weapons seized, and over 200 enemy structures destroyed.

As the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines assumed defensive responsibility for the operational area of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines on the termination of Mighty Play, Lieutenant Colonel Edmondson's Battalion, after undergoing a month of rehabilitation on Okinawa and training at Subic Bay in the Philippines, prepared to assault a coastal area southeast of Chu Lai in order to cordon and search a number of target hamlets for enemy forces believed to be operating within Binh Son District of Quang Ngai Province. Among the forces identified to be infesting the region were the *48th Local Force Battalion*, *T-20th*, *P-31st*, and *95th Local Force Companies*, and nearly 800 guerrillas and known members of the infrastructure. Within striking range of the objective area were elements of the *21st NVA Regiment*, *107th NVA Artillery Battalion*, and numerous local force companies, totaling more than 1,200 troops.

On 24 July, elements of the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines landed across the beach near the village complex of Le Thuy, 14 kilometers southeast of Chu Lai, while the remainder, on board helicopters of HMM-164, assaulted three inland landing zones, closing off the area. Accompanied by local Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces, the Marines then began a methodical search for enemy troops, supplies, and fortifications during daylight hours. After dark, more than two thirds of the battalion was deployed throughout the area in ambushes, listening posts, and killer teams. However, long distance night patrols were kept to a minimum because of the heavy saturation of the area with mines, boobytraps, and other surprise firing devices. Although numerous base areas and defensive positions were discovered and destroyed, the enemy, as in previous operations, harassed or fled rather than defend positions and risk his limited formations in close engagements with the Marines.

Operation Brave Armada was terminated on 7 August with negligible results, and Lieutenant Colonel Edmondson's Marines were withdrawn by helicopter to the *Valley Forge* (LPH 8) and *Vernon County* (LST 1161). Three days later, the battalion again moved ashore, relieving the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines of its operational area, west of Da Nang. Initially headquartered at the Rock Crusher near Dai La Pass, and then on Hill 10, BLT 2/26 was given the task of defending the Da Nang Anti-Infiltration Barrier, and for the next month Edmondson's Marines covered all avenues of approach, responding to intrusions with quick reaction forces and supporting arms.

Meanwhile, to the southeast, Battalion Landing Team 1/26, now under the command of Lieutenant Colonel James C. Goodin, backloaded on board ships of Amphibious Ready Group Alpha on 8 August, following two weeks securing vital military installations and patrolling within the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines area of operations. After a month of training and equipment repair, preparations were made for yet another strike at Barrier Island. The third operation in four months targeted at this traditional coastal enemy stronghold, Defiant Stand was fated to be the last special landing force combat assault into the South Vietnamese war zone. Although the two previous operations on the island had netted close to 400 enemy troops and eradicated much of the local Viet Cong Infrastructure, by July, the enemy had reinfiltrated the island, and again threatened the coastal areas of Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces.

The operation, the first to combine United States and Republic of Korea Marines in an amphibious assault during the war, was to involve two phases. The first called for the establishment of an angular block to isolate the northern end of the island, with 1st Battalion, 26th Marines holding the east-west leg and a Korean Marine battalion the other. During the second phase, maneuver elements were to attack within the cordoned area, searching out and destroying the trapped enemy.

On 7 September, the first phase of Defiant Stand began with Goodin's Marines assaulting into the central portion of Barrier Island. Despite rain and heavy cloud cover, which caused a 90-minute delay, Companies C and D, on board helicopters of HMM-265, were inserted into two landing zones along the east bank of the Song Truong Giang, while the remainder of the battalion moved ashore by landing craft. As A-4s of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and the guns of the destroyer *Taussig* (DD 746) covered the landing, airborne loudspeakers urged civilians to move southward to a number of predesignated safe areas. Concurrently,

units of the 1st Marine Division to the north and west, Americal Division to the south and southwest, and 2d Korean Marine Brigade to the north, began local screening operations to seal off the island. Closer in, U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and Vietnamese Navy patrol craft again covered the coastline and surrounding rivers against any enemy attempt to escape. The initial assaults of BLT 1/26 met little opposition and the Marines pushed northward, evoking scattered firefights with small bands of enemy attempting to reach river crossings and other escape routes. By the 12th, the Marine landing team had established a series of blocking positions across the north-central portion of the island, isolating the northern sector in preparation for the Korean assault.

After landing Goodin's Marines, troop and cargo ships of the Amphibious Ready Group moved up the coast and, on the 9th, embarked the 2d and 5th Battalions, 2d Korean Marine Brigade in preparation for the operation's second phase. For the next three days, the Korean Marines received amphibious assault refresher training, culminating in a landing rehearsal

*Barrier Island villagers are escorted to a collection point while the 26th Marines, with Army armored cavalymen, Korean Marines, and ARVN troops, again search the island.*

Marine Corps Historical Collection



on the 11th. The following morning, the 1,100-man Korean contingent landed by helicopter and amphibious assault craft on the northern tip of the island. The initial assault was unopposed, but as the Koreans attacked south toward U.S. Marine blocking positions, they encountered increased resistance from groups of enemy trapped in the ever-closing cordon. With the enemy's escape routes barred, Korean Marines searched the caves and tunnels which honeycombed the area, accounting for most of the 293 Viet Cong killed and 121 weapons seized until both Marine contingents merged on 18 September.

With the end of Operation Defiant Stand, Goodin's Marines assumed responsibility for the operational area held by Battalion Landing Team 2/26 and, on 20 October, command was passed from the 9th MAB to the 1st Marine Division and BLT 1/26 reverted to 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. As Goodin's Marines moved ashore, the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines, configured as a BLT, went on board ships of the Amphibious Ready Group for several weeks of training, but in mid-October it too was returned to shore and on the 27th reverted to 2d Battalion, 26th Marines.

#### *The Fleet's Contingency Force*

Upon the completion of the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division (Keystone Cardinal), and the redesignation, transfer from 9th MAB to III MAF, and consolidation of the battalions of the 26th Marines, elements composing the Seventh Fleet's Special Landing Forces were to be drawn from the units of I MEF,

headquartered on Okinawa. Since the Fleet's two landing forces now were to be formed from the redeployed units of the 3d Marine Division, they could no longer be introduced into Vietnam without specific authorization from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Prevailing opinion at CinCPac was that an "enemy offensive of major proportions would have to be launched before imminent reintroduction [of the SLFs into Vietnam] would even be considered." Notwithstanding, the Special Landing Force was to be fully prepared for such a recommitment should circumstances warrant, and in recognition of such a possibility, CinCPac directed that the landing forces and amphibious ready groups maintain a 120-hour reaction posture for possible deployment to Vietnam in addition to maintaining the normal seven-day readiness posture envisioned under existing Pacific Command contingency plans.<sup>9</sup>

In early November, newly designated BLT 1/9 and HMM-164 embarked on board Amphibious Ready Group Bravo, followed in December by BLT 2/9 and HMM-165, which boarded ships of ARG Alpha. The pattern of SLF operations during the remainder of the year consisted of periods of normal upkeep, maintenance, and training at Subic Bay in the Philippines and periods at sea. When at sea, each landing force operated along the littoral of South Vietnam, from the Cau May Peninsula to the DMZ, remaining well outside the 12-mile limit, but constantly ready for possible recommitment to Vietnam or to any other amphibious objective in the Western Pacific.<sup>10</sup>

## The Advisory Effort and Other Activities

*Marine Advisors and the Vietnamese Marine Corps—1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO)  
U.S. Marines on the MACV Staff—Embassy Guard Marines*

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### *Marine Advisors and the Vietnamese Marine Corps*

While III MAF combat and support units garnered most of the laurels during the year, over 700 Marines scattered from the Delta to the DMZ, worked behind the scenes in less noticed but equally challenging positions. These Marines provided support not only to MACV Headquarters; the American Embassy; Marine units, both Korean and American; and U.S. Army units in the field through a detachment of 1st ANGLICO, but also to elements of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. Marines attached to the 525-man United States Army Advisory Group in I Corps provided needed liaison between units of the 1st and 2d ARVN Divisions and adjacent American forces, and also coordinated the use of allied tactical and support assets. Those with the Marine Advisory Unit provided the same assistance to the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

At the beginning of 1969, the Marine Advisory Unit (MAU), commanded by Senior Marine Advisor Colonel Leroy V. Corbett and assisted by Lieutenant Colonel James T. Breckinridge, had a Marine strength of 47 officers and nine enlisted men. Attached was one Navy medical officer and one petty officer. Marines assigned to the MAU represented the full spectrum of the combat arms, and combat and service support. Advisory personnel assisted most of the Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) staff sections, and normally two advisors were assigned to each Marine infantry battalion—one advisor usually remained with the battalion command group while the other assisted the forward companies.


U.S. Marine advisors supported the Vietnamese Marine Corps from its creation in October 1954 out of various Vietnamese commando companies and river patrol forces that had fought in the north. Following the Geneva Accords that split Vietnam at the 17th Parallel, these units were reorganized in the south and formed into a Vietnamese Marine infantry force. The Marine Advisory Unit, initially a division within the Navy Section of the United States Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam, acted as the link between the Vietnamese Marine Corps and the American command.

Originally formed as a component of the Vietnamese Navy, the small Vietnamese Marine Corps consisted of a landing battalion, river patrol company, river group, ranger group, and a field support group. Its main task was to conduct amphibious and riverine operations. From 1954 to 1969, the Corps expanded from a strength of 1,137 officers and men to approximately 9,300. During the same period, it grew from a single battalion to a light division, composed of six 800-man infantry battalions and five combat and combat service support units, and also achieved separate service status. With the expansion in strength, the Corps was given responsibility for conducting independent and joint ground operations with ARVN and Free World Forces, and for the conduct of riverborne operations along the coastal lowlands and throughout the Mekong Delta. As an element of the country's General Reserve Forces, battalions could be deployed to any of the four corps areas and the Capital Military District. During the 1968 *Tet* Offensive, for example, Vietnamese Marines not only assisted in the defense of Saigon, but in retaking the Hue Citadel.

Relying on U.S. Marine advisors from the beginning, the Vietnamese Marine Corps, as a result, mirrored its sister service in organization, recruitment, and training. Recruited as volunteers, with appeals similar to those used by the U.S. Marine Corps, enlistees were sent to the VNMC Training Command, located northwest of Thu Duc in III Corps, near Saigon. Accommodating about 2,000 trainees, the command provided basic recruit and advanced individual training, as well as a number of specialized courses for both officers and NCOs. Officers were appointed from the National Military Academy, the two-year infantry school for reserve officers, or the 12-week officers' course for exemplary NCOs. In addition to normal training, a select number of officers and enlisted men attended courses at Marine Corps schools in the United States and on Okinawa.

A select group of closely screened and thoroughly trained Marines, advisors viewed their mission as one of improving the expertise of the Vietnamese Marine tactical unit commander in conducting amphibious, riverine, helicopter assault, and ground operations,

## MARINE ADVISORY UNIT, 1969





Marine Corps Historical Collection

*LtGen Le Nguyen Khang, Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, continually stressed the close relationship between U.S. Marine advisors and Vietnamese Marines both on and off the battlefield.*

and establishing a sound administrative and logistical organization within the VNMC.\*<sup>1</sup> In combined operations with American forces, the advisor directed close air support and helicopter medical evacuations, and served as liaison officer between the two units. Advisors also monitored the Military Assistance Service Fund (MASF) which supported Vietnamese Marines. Drawing upon the fund, American Marine advisors furnished the VNMC with materiel and equipment not commonly available to other South Vietnamese forces.

Off the battlefield, Marine advisors worked to improve the health and well-being of Vietnamese Marines and their families, resulting not only in enhanced morale, but in unit esprit de corps. Donating many hours to civic action projects, U.S. advisors participated in projects that focused on dependent housing, upgrading of camp installations, and the establishment of health care facilities. The relationship between ad-

sors and Vietnamese Marines was close. They were, noted Vietnamese Marine Commandant, Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang, "our friends":

U.S. Marine advisors never tried to command the Vietnamese Marine unit. They always stayed as a friend, they advise us, they help us, and they try to understand our problems—try to see the difficulty, and try to give us support, and try to fight things with many other agencies to give more support for the Vietnamese Marines—materially . . . . Many Marine advisors worked outside their military field, you see; they tried to go to many places, asking for many things to bring back and help the Marine dependents and Marine children . . . . But one thing, they never tried to dictate to us or to command us. Discussing—yes. Sometimes very hard discussion, but after that we remained very friendly . . . . The U.S. Marine advisors is the only one to share the food with the Vietnamese Marines in the field. They don't carry food for themselves; they don't carry the water for themselves. They shared the rice; they shared what we had in the field, together with my Marines. They do not make any distinction between the U.S. Marine Corps and the Vietnamese Marines.<sup>2</sup>

As units of the country's General Reserve, Vietnamese Marine battalions were liable to be committed anywhere throughout South Vietnam. Under the direct operational control of the Chairman of the Joint General Staff, General Cau Van Vien, and not General Khang, the Vietnamese Marine Corps, as a cohesive division, was used "piecemeal," according Colonel Corbett. "Every time there is a crisis," noted the Senior Marine Advisor, "every one hollers for one or two of these Marine battalions. If things get hot in the Rung Sat Special Zone, Admiral Zumwalt wants one or two of these Marine battalions, at the same time [Major] General [Julian J.] Ewell [Commanding General, 9th U.S. Infantry Division] wants them in the Delta, at the same time III Corps insists on having them around Tay Ninh or around Bien Hoa."<sup>3</sup>

Operating with its U.S. Marine advisors, the VNMC continued to conduct battalion-size operations during 1969 in its assigned areas of operations. The year began slowly with the six Marine battalions operating under ARVN and American forces in III and IV Corps. But with the approach of the *Tet* holidays, activity picked up. In early February, while under the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), the 3d Battalion, in searches near the Cambodian border, came upon one of the largest arms and ammunition caches of the war. Using over forty CH-47 lifts, the tons of 122mm rockets, rifles, grenades, and assorted ammunition were transferred from the elaborate enemy complex in the Parrot's Beak to the brigade support area near An Loc. Throughout the 40 days with the 2d

\*Once selected, advisors attended either the Marine Advisors Course at Quantico, or the U.S. Army's Unit Sector Advisor Training Course at the John F. Kennedy Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Brigade, the 3d Battalion conducted numerous searches, and on several occasions was called upon to reinforce heavily engaged ARVN and U.S. forces.<sup>4</sup>

In late February, while under the Long Bien Special Zone, near the Bien Hoa Military Complex, the 5th Battalion engaged elements of the *K.3 Battalion, 275th Regiment, 5th NVA Division* intent on attacking the town, III Corps Headquarters, and the airbase. At 0300 on the 26th, the Marines met the enemy battalion three and one half kilometers east of the airfield, near the village of Ho Nai. In fierce fighting that lasted the day, and was so close that artillery could not be used, the battalion killed over 130 enemy troops and captured 20, including the battalion commander and his executive officer. For this action, the battalion was awarded the U.S. Navy Unit Commendation.

On 1 April, the artillery element of the division was reorganized. The 1st Artillery Battalion was formed from Batteries A, B, and C; Batteries D, E, and F formed the nucleus around which a second battalion was created. A third artillery battalion would be autho-

rized and formed in November and a seventh infantry battalion would be authorized the following month.

While elements of Brigade A continued to operate in III Corps during April and May, Brigade B's three infantry battalions conducted a series of amphibious, riverine, and reconnaissance-in-force operations under the control of the 21st ARVN Division and then U.S. Navy River Assault Squadron 15 and the Vietnamese Navy's River Assault Group. From the Nam Can Forest area of the Cau Mau Peninsula, the brigade moved into the Twin Rivers area of Chuong Thien Province of IV Corps and then into the northern U Minh Forest with moderate results. The two brigades, at the end of May, exchanged areas of operation as Brigade A moved into IV Corps and Brigade B was placed under the operational control of the Long Bien Special Zone in Bien Hoa Province.

Throughout June, July, and August, Brigade A conducted a series of reconnaissance-in-force operations in the northeastern portion of enemy Base Area 483 in Chuong Thien Province, south of Can Tho. Work-

*Marine advisor 1stLt Fred H. McWaters calls for a medical evacuation helicopter. The advisors' task was not only to assist, but also to request and control allied air support.*

Courtesy of Capt Joseph W. Pratte (Ret.)





Courtesy of Capt Joseph W. Pratte (Ret.)

*Vietnamese Marines carry several enemy rockets captured during operations in III Corps. As a reserve force, the Marines could be committed anywhere within the country.*

ing closely with territorial forces, the brigade reopened Route 12 and conducted extensive pacification operations throughout its assigned area until the end of August when it was placed in general reserve status. During the same period, Brigade B continued search and clear operations in Bien Hoa Province until the beginning of September when it was placed under Task Force 211, controlled directly by the Joint General Staff, and tasked with continuing the search of Base Area 483 and the U Minh Forest in IV Corps.\*

Both brigades continued operations in their assigned areas until mid-November, when yet another exchange was made. On the 12th, Brigade A terminated its stand-by status and departed Saigon to relieve Brigade B in the U Minh Forest of IV Corps. During the relief, the command post of the brigade came under heavy enemy 82mm mortar fire. Twenty-six rounds landed with pinpoint accuracy on the CP, causing 18

casualties. Among the wounded was Captain Richard L. Porter, U.S. Marine advisor to the artillery battalion.

During the remainder of 1969, Vietnamese Marines and their advisors continued operations in both III and IV Corps, and the Rung Sat Special Zone. Unlike the rest of the year, contact was heavy as elements of both brigades encountered sizable enemy units in fortified positions, while dealing with increased sniper fire and incidents of boobytraps and mines, which took a heavy toll on Marines. Despite the losses, the division continued to meet its recruiting objective of 700 per month and by the end of the year exceeded its new authorized strength of 11,400.

Summing up his tour as Senior Marine Advisor, Colonel Corbett expressed the general feeling of all Marine advisors as to the effectiveness of the Vietnamese Marine Corps and the individual Marines who composed it:

Some battalions are exceptionally good, one is mediocre, but most of them are very good. Depends on the officers they have with them at the time. Based on casualties, leave, and so forth, if they have the leadership there, they do the job. There is no difference in a Vietnamese Marine and a

\*On 7 July, Colonel William M. Van Zuyen relieved Colonel Corbett and assumed command of the MAU. His assistant was now Lieutenant Colonel Tom D. Parsons, who had joined the MAU on 2 May and relieved Lieutenant Colonel James T. Breckinridge.



Marine Corps Historical Collection

*Surrounded by communications equipment in the brigade's command post, ANGLICO Marines coordinate American air and naval gunfire in support of the Korean Marines.*

U.S. Marine. When ably led and properly supported, he will do what he is told to do, when he is told to do it, and he will do it in a topnotch manner. I have no great concern about the Vietnamese Marine Corps' combat effectiveness. It is the support of them and the manner in which they are employed which concerns me. They are a most cost-effective unit. I would be most happy to serve with them anytime, and I have served with them. I have never felt insecure with them and I don't feel any of the advisors, other than myself, who have served with them, has ever felt for one moment that they were insecure.<sup>5</sup>

In essence, Colonel Corbett later noted, "if properly deployed and supported they could do the job. I believe that the events surrounding the VNMC deployment to I Corps before the downfall of everything supports my analysis of their capability in 1969."<sup>6</sup>

*1st Air and Naval Gunfire  
Liaison Company (ANGLICO)*

As American involvement in the Vietnam War grew and troop strength rose, a requirement for naval gunfire support developed. In response, Sub-Unit One, 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) was activated and ordered to South Vietnam in 1965. The primary mission of ANGLICO was to support the ground elements of an amphibious force by providing

the necessary control and liaison agencies that would request, direct, and control U.S. Navy support in the form of naval gunfire and Marine and naval air.

From the beginning most of the fighting in Vietnam centered on the populated coastal lowlands, and naval gunfire became a useful and flexible means of fire support. Unlike air support, naval gunfire support was available around the clock, being relatively unaffected by weather or visibility. In addition, it offered a wide variety of ordnance, from 16-inch shell fire to rockets which could rapidly saturate any point or area target.

In January 1969, ANGLICO detachments were spread throughout South Vietnam. Naval gunfire liaison and spot teams were assigned to U.S. Army, Marine, and Korean Marine units in each of the four corps tactical zones and to the U.S. Naval Advisory Group in the Rung Sat Special Zone and the 1st Australian Task Unit at Baria. ANGLICO aerial observer teams were also assigned surveillance missions of the Vung Tau Shipping Channel.<sup>7</sup> Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Frederick K. Purdum, replaced in August by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Simpson, Sub-Unit

One had a strength in January of 19 Marine and 13 Navy officers, and 176 Marine and two Navy enlisted men.

Within the cruiser-destroyer group of the Seventh Fleet, a designated task unit provided MACV with naval gunfire support. Composition of the unit varied as ships moved to or from differing operational commitments, but the command element remained relatively constant, either the destroyer squadron or division commander. Based on gunfire support priorities set by MACV for each of the corps tactical zones, the task unit commander published periodic ship availability reports. These reports reflected the ships assigned to each zone and period of assignment.

At least 48 hours prior to the arrival of the support ship or ships, the corps senior U.S. military commander, with the advice of the naval gunfire liaison officer, assigned the ships to specific target areas and furnished spotter team identification and necessary radio frequencies. As the ship reported on station the ANGLICO spotter supporting the designated ground combat unit briefed the ship on friendly positions, scheme of maneuver, general enemy situation, rules of engagement, navigational aids, anticipated gunfire employment, and the number and location of friendly aircraft. Throughout the operation, continual communication was maintained among the ship, the spotter, and the liaison team.

Naval gunfire support employed during 1969 varied from 40mm cannon fire of the Swift patrol boats (PCFs) and Coast Guard cutters to the 16-inch shells of the battleship *New Jersey* (BB 62). The mainstay of the fire support was the destroyer with its 5-inch guns. In shallow beach areas, particularly in I Corps, in-shore fire support ships (LFRs) equipped with 5-inch multiple rocket launchers were used to bombard close-in targets.

The highpoint of ANGLICO's employment during the year was its support of the Korean Marines during Special Landing Force Operation Defiant Stand in September. Participating in their first amphibious assault since the Korean War, the Korean Marine Brigade, with elements of the 1st Marines, assaulted Barrier Island, south of Hoi An. Planning and coordinating naval gunfire, air, and helicopter support for the Korean forces was carried out by the assigned ANGLICO support team.<sup>8</sup>

With the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division, ANGLICO teams took over the responsibility for naval gunfire control along the DMZ, assuming manage-

ment of the installations at Alpha-1 and Alpha-2. Using the TPS-25 radar in combination with naval gunfire, ANGLICO teams were able to locate and quickly interdict enemy personnel moving within the southern half of the zone. Eighty percent of the targets that were taken under fire during darkness were fired by naval gunfire instead of artillery. The reason for this, as Lieutenant Colonel Simpson explained, was due to the unique position ANGLICO had in obtaining clearances:

We set up a clearance station with the 1st ARVN Division Forward at Charlie-1. What I did was to put three enlisted personnel in there, and they were able to sit in there with the ARVN and as soon as the target would show up on the TPS-25 radar they would check with the ARVN to get it cleared. At the same time down at Quang Tri, we had a naval gunfire liaison officer who was clearing the target through U.S. channels. So at this time, we had the two simultaneous clearances going on. Where the artillery would go back to Quang Tri, get it cleared at Quang Tri, go back to Dong Ha, which was the CP for the 1st ARVN Division Forward, try to get it cleared, then go back down the channel, where we were getting simultaneous clearance and then we would go ahead and fire on the target.<sup>9</sup>

ANGLICO's strength by December had risen to 198 enlisted men and 32 officers. During the final month of the year the naval liaison teams directed 2,407 missions, firing 23,049 rounds. In addition, they controlled 107 fixed-wing and 1,716 helicopter sorties, 114 medical evacuations, and the delivery of 2,702,950 pounds of supplies.

#### *U.S. Marines on the MACV Staff*

The Marine Corps provided 77 officers and 53 enlisted men for the MACV staff in Saigon at the beginning of 1969. Another 15 officers and 12 enlisted Marines served with various MACV field components. The senior Marine officer on the staff was Brigadier General John N. McLaughlin, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff J-3, who had relieved Brigadier General John R. Chaisson in mid-1968, and who, in turn, would be replaced by Brigadier General Samuel Jaskilka. Other Marine billets on the staff covered a broad spectrum of assignments, ranging from comptroller, to membership on specialized study groups, to duty with the public information section.

Marine participation on the MACV staff and in the various field components had a dual function. It not only helped make Marine views on important questions readily available to the staff, but allowed MACV Marines to clarify Saigon's decisions for fellow Marines in I Corps. Moreover, as General McLaughlin later noted: "I had a close relationship with General Cushman

and later General Nickerson. I was not their representative at MACV, obviously, and for obvious reasons; but I think I was helpful and was as helpful as I could be. And of course I enjoyed a similar arrangement with I Field Force and II Field Force, and with the U.S. Army command down in the Delta."<sup>10</sup>

Participation by Marines on the MACV staff had yet another effect; it allowed them to gain a broader view of the war. "From Saigon," McLaughlin reported, "I saw that there was more to the war than I Corps or III MAF." Continuing, he noted:

As you will recall, most of the fighting prior to *Tet* was with the large-scale NVA units that had been up in I Corps, and III MAF had borne the brunt of a lot of this. And I think there was an unspoken attitude up there that this was the war, in I Corps. Well I found that this was not the case. And of course later on when the NVA gave up, to a certain extent, their large-scale attempts to infiltrate through the DMZ, and we saw the appearance of NVA divisions that had fought up in I Corps down in the highlands in II Corps and even over in western III Corps. As the war shifted, and it did necessarily when the NVA started bringing large formations down to II and III Corps, there was less pressure from main force NVA units up in I Corps . . . I'm not saying this as criticism of anybody. It's a natural reaction. Everybody is responsible for his own area, and naturally he's concerned with his own war.<sup>11</sup>

From his associations with other senior members of the staff and allied representatives, Brigadier General McLaughlin came away with the shared belief that Marines, like their Army, Navy, and Air Force counterparts, had done their job. "General Abrams . . . was appreciative of the fighting characteristics of the Marines in Vietnam," noted McLaughlin. "I would say that he treated the Marines and Marine units, Marine divisions, as well as he treated anybody in the country. I think that's about the most you can expect. I

think he admired the good things we did. I think perhaps he didn't admire some of the things that we didn't do."<sup>12</sup>

### *Embassy Guard Marines*

The Marines of Company E, Marine Security Guard Battalion (State Department) were assigned security guard duty at the American Embassy in Saigon throughout 1969. Led by Captain Roger M. Jaroch and then by Captain Robert P. Lacoursiere and Major Harry J. Shane, the five officers and 155 enlisted men were tasked with safeguarding classified material and protecting U.S. Embassy personnel and property, the mission performed by Marines attached to all embassies throughout the world.

Unlike 1968 when Marine guards fought off an enemy attack on the embassy during the *Tet* Offensive, 1969 was a quiet year. In July, the routine sentry duty was broken by the visit to the embassy of President and Mrs. Richard M. Nixon and Secretary of State William P. Rogers. Early the following month, General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, accompanied by the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, Joseph E. Daily, paid a visit to the Ambassador. While enroute, they were given a brief tour of the embassy, during which the Commandant took note of the number of trophies the company had won for athletic activities. For the most part, Marines at the embassy were free from terrorist activities during the year. However, embassy routine was violently interrupted on 5 March when an attempt was made on the life of Tran Van Huong, Premier of South Vietnam, 50 yards from the compound. No one on the embassy grounds was hurt in the assassination attempt. Four persons were captured and later charged in the incident.

## CHAPTER 19

# 1969: An Overview

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At the 15 January meeting of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, reported on the situation in Vietnam as he found it during a recent inspection visit. The situation, he said, was good. He likened it to a pioneer who settles in the wilderness and begins the arduous task of cultivating a crop. In the fall, after being ravaged by Indian raids, weather, and vermin, the crop was ready for harvest. Like the pioneer, who had to decide whether to remain or move on, the time had come for America to decide. Nineteen-sixty-nine, he concluded, "would be the year of decision," as indeed it was.<sup>1</sup>

Sandwiched between the massive *Tet* Offensive of 1968 and the deescalation of American involvement in the war that took place during the early 1970s, 1969 marked a major change and watershed in United States policy for the Vietnam War. Following a thorough review, the Nixon Administration adopted a policy of seeking to end United States involvement either through negotiations or, failing that, turning the combat role over to the South Vietnamese. It was this decision that began the Vietnamization of the war in the summer of 1969 and that would soon greatly reduce and then end the Marine Corps' combat role in South Vietnam.

The redeployment of the 9th Marines in July began this process of disengagement and replacement. Rooted in the Marine advisory effort of the 1950s, Marine air and ground forces increased rapidly with the deployment of the first helicopter squadrons in 1962. By the beginning of 1969, III Marine Amphibious Force, encompassing Marine, Army, and Navy components, had become the largest combat unit in Marine Corps history.

Throughout this build-up, Marines on the battlefield faced two different challenges: the first from guerrillas—an enemy almost impossible to identify, who rarely stood and fought, and who would rather fade away to return at a time and place of his own choosing—and the second from disciplined NVA soldiers who sought out Marines and maneuvered to meet them in more conventional engagements. In exchanges ranging from small encounters with a few Viet Cong

in a lowland hedgerow to a North Vietnamese Army battalion occupying a fortified position in triple-canopied jungle, Marine units time and again defeated the enemy—1969 was no different.

Working in close harmony with the South Vietnamese Army, III MAF and the Seventh Fleet Special Landing Forces took full advantage of the momentum achieved during 1968 to continue the unrelenting attack on the enemy's combat organization and guerrilla infrastructure. Prominent among III MAF's combat operations were those aimed at destroying the enemy's staging and assembly areas and lines of communications. In northern I Corps, the 9th Marines' Operation Dewey Canyon wreaked havoc on a major enemy command and logistic network in the Da Krong Valley, crippling the enemy's supply effort and future aggressive plans in I Corps for a year. Despite the reluctance of NVA units to engage in decisive combat within the northern two provinces, 3d Marine Division operations along the DMZ; 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division actions in the coastal lowlands; and 101st Airborne Division incursions into the A Shau Valley, did trigger occasional sharp exchanges, which cost the enemy heavily in both troops and equipment.

To the south, the 1st Marine and Americal Divisions conducted a series of major operations to rid Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai Provinces of a substantial enemy presence directed against populated areas of Da Nang and Quang Ngai. Driving into such long-time enemy strongholds as Base Area 112, Happy Valley, Charlie Ridge, Dodge City, Go Noi Island, and the Que Son Mountains, the year-long campaign by the 1st Marine Division laid waste to a large number of enemy base camps and storage areas, denying the enemy opportunity to marshal forces for any significant offensive in Quang Nam. In the heavily populated areas of the three provinces, the two divisions' unremitting counterguerrilla effort, although undramatic, achieved steady success over the local Viet Cong infrastructure. From the DMZ in the north to Duc Pho in the south, III MAF combat operations during the year cost the enemy over 30,000 killed or captured, a loss equivalent to nearly three divisions. Marines losses were 2,259 killed and 16,567 wounded.



Marine Corps Historical Collection

*Within the secure environment provided by III MAF, a Vietnamese farmer in the hamlet of An Ngai Tay checks his new vegetable crop with little fear that it might be confiscated.*

Prominently influencing I Corps combat operations, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, reinforced by helicopter squadrons from the Seventh Fleet's Special Landing Force, maintained the constant air support necessary to implement and sustain III MAF's battle plan. Measured statistically, the Marine in-country air campaign encompassed 64,900 fixed-wing and 548,000 helicopter sorties, delivering over 100,000 tons of ordnance and some 895,000 troops and 115,000 tons of supplies. However, a truer measure of success was the effectiveness of the air-ground team, which was exploited to the fullest extent during the high-mobility mountain operations carried out by the 3d Marine Division early in the year—campaigns which combined the intrinsic capabilities of infantry maneuver, helicopter mobility, and coordinated air and artillery fire support to neutralize the hostile enemy threat to northern I Corps.

Complementing the combat efforts and achievements of United States forces were those of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. As a result of the increased number of combined operations and training, and the

concomitant rise in its effectiveness, the 1st ARVN Division assumed an ever-increased role in the defense of the northern five provinces of Vietnam. Upon the departure of the 3d Marine Division, General Lam's troops took over the defense of the Republic's northern boundary. Exhibiting the apparent benefits of better weapons and stronger leadership, the combat skills of Regional and Popular Force units also seemingly increased during the year, evoking new confidence among the rural citizenry whom they were tasked to defend.

Substantial progress was the hallmark of population security and Revolutionary Development plans during 1969. Unhampered by an enemy offensive as in 1968, the III MAF-supported South Vietnamese effort made substantial progress toward the reestablishment of governmental and economic conditions necessary for the return of a stable environment for both urban and rural inhabitants of the corps tactical zone.

Three separate, but mutually supporting, corps-wide pacification and development programs made

headway during the year—a success largely attributable to the efforts of both South Vietnamese Government officials and III MAF working together to accomplish the programs' goals. The rise in population security, which climbed from 69 to 93 percent during the year, provided optimum conditions for civil and economic recovery. While the program to establish or reestablish popularly elected governments and officials at the hamlet- and village-level exhibited moderate gain, the campaign to reduce enemy forces through the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) and Phoenix-Phung Hoang programs greatly exceeded expectations.

Directly related to the effectiveness of the allied military screen provided the more populated areas of the coastal plains was revolutionary development. Ranging from multi-battalion military operations to the actions of the People's Self-Defense Forces, allied and South Vietnamese forces attempted to erect a secure barrier behind which nation building and economic development could root and flourish. An integral aspect of this effort since its inception in 1965, the Combined Action Program continued to expand in 1969, reaching an authorized strength of 114 platoons in August. Its successful history of working with

local forces led to the initiation in October of the Infantry Company Intensive Pacification Program, whereby infantry companies of the 1st Marine and Americal Divisions joined with territorial forces in direct support of population security.

Overall, 1969 was a year of achievement, featuring consolidation and exploitation of successes gained from combat and pacification activities alike. Despite the reduction of Marine troop strength in I Corps, the 55,000 remaining Marines would continue the full range of military and pacification tasks in the coming year. A further dwindling of the Marine presence in I Corps Tactical Zone and the transfer of most of III MAF's responsibilities to the Army's XXIV Corps would take place in 1970. Within Quang Nam Province, their primary area of responsibility, Marines would continue to develop and apply combat and counterinsurgency techniques to the fullest extent to protect Da Nang, root out enemy guerrillas and infrastructure from the countryside, and prevent enemy main forces from disrupting pacification, while encouraging Vietnamization and conducting a systematic and orderly withdrawal—a difficult task.



# Notes

## PART I The Continuing War

### CHAPTER 1 PLANNING THE CAMPAIGN

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, January through December 1969, hereafter cited as FMFPac, MarOpsV with month and year; III MAF Command Chronology (ComdC), Jan69; and ICTZ/III MAF Combined Campaign Plan, 1969, hereafter ICTZ CombCP, 69. All documentary material cited, unless otherwise noted, is located in the Marine Corps Historical Center (MCHC), Washington, D.C.

#### I Corps Order of Battle

1. First Quarter Written Summary, ICTZ CombCP, 69, dtd 20Apr69.
2. Gen Robert H. Barrow intvw, 30Jan87 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Barrow intvw, 30Jan87.
3. App. A (Order of Battle), III MAF Periodic Intelligence Report 1-69, 29Dec68-4Jan69.
4. CGIIIMAF ltr to COMUSMACV, dtd 27Jan69 (MACV Historical Document Collection, Reel 1, hereafter MACV HistDocColl, with reel number).

#### Strategy: A Reevaluation of Priorities

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: MilHistBr, Office of the Secretariat, General Staff, HQ, USMACV, Command History, 1968, hereafter MACV Comd Hist 1968; MilHistBr, Office of the Secretariat, General Staff, HQ, USMACV, Command History, 1969, hereafter MACV Comd Hist 1969; and JGS/USMACV Combined Campaign Plan, 1969, AB-144, 30Sep68.

5. CinCPac msg to MACV, dtd 9Jan69 (MACV HistDocColl, Reel 54).
6. Captured enemy document quoted in Gen Creighton W. Abrams msg to Adm John S. McCain, Jr., dtd 3May69 (Abrams Papers, Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.).
7. Gen William C. Westmoreland, Pentagon Military Briefing, 22Nov67.
8. Gen William C. Westmoreland, Speech before the Annual Meeting, Army Officers Association, Cleveland, Ohio, 18Nov68.
9. COMUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, *et al.*, dtd 13Oct68.
10. Memo, MACV Commander's Conference, dtd 11Jan69 (MACV HistDocColl, Reel 11).

#### I Corps Planning

11. Anx A (Intelligence), ICTZ CombCP, 69, pp. 1-2.
12. Ibid., p. 4.

13. ICTZ CombCP, 69, p. 9.
14. Anx I (Neutralization of VC/NVA Base Areas), ICTZ CombCP, 69, p. 1.
15. Ibid., p. 2.
16. Ibid., p. 1.
17. Anx B (Military Support for Pacification), ICTZ CombCP, 69, p. 2.
18. ICTZ CombCP, 69, p. 6.

### CHAPTER 2 MOUNTAIN WARFARE

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Feb69, and 3dMarDiv, ComdCs, Jan-Feb69.

#### Northern I Corps

1. MajGen Raymond G. Davis and 1stLt Harold W. Brazier, "Defeat of the 320th," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Mar69, pp. 23-30.

#### Off Balance

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 3d Mar ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; TF Bravo ComdCs, Feb69; 2/3 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 3dTankBn ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 1stAmtracBn ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 4th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 1/4 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 2/4 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 3/4 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 3/12 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 9th Mar ComdCs, Dec68-Feb69; 1/9 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 2/9 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 3/9 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; Captain R. B. MacKenzie, "Intelligence Starts at the Top," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jul73, pp. 40-44; and Colonel M. J. Sexton, "Sapper Attack," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Sep69, pp. 28-31.

2. Gen Raymond G. Davis intvw, 2Feb77, pp. 17-18 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Davis intvw.
3. Barrow intvw, 30Jan87.
4. Gen Raymond G. Davis, Comments on draft ms, Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Davis Comments.
5. Davis intvw, p. 20.
6. Ibid., p. 23.
7. MajGen Raymond G. Davis and Lt James L. Jones, Jr., "Employing the Recon Patrol," *Marine Corps Gazette*, May69, pp. 40-45.
8. Davis Comments.
9. Barrow intvw, 30Jan87.
10. Ibid.
11. LtCol Joseph E. Hopkins intvw, 16-18Feb69, No. 3915 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
12. Ibid.
13. 1stLt Larry L. Eastland intvw, 16-18Feb69, No. 3915 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
14. Capt James E. Knight, Jr. intvw, 10-12May69, No. 4091 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

15. GySgt John E. Timmermeyer intvw, 10-12May69, No. 4091 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
16. Capt Albert H. Hill intvw, 14-16May69, No. 4096 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
17. BGen Joseph E. Hopkins, Comments on draft ms, 31Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

#### From the Cua Viet, South

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Operational Report/Lessons Learned (ORLL), Feb and May69; 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) ORLL, Feb and May69; 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) AAR, Napoleon Saline II and Marshall Mountain, dtd 8Apr69.

18. Davis Comments.

### CHAPTER 3 THE SPRING OFFENSIVE PREEMPTED

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb69; 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 9th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 1/9 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 2/9 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 3/9 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 2/12 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 9th Mar AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon, dtd 8Apr69, hereafter 9th Mar AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon; MajGen Robert H. Barrow, "Operation Dewey Canyon," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Nov81, pp. 84-89; and 1stLt Gordon M. Davis, "Dewey Canyon: All Weather Classic," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jul69, pp. 32-40.

#### Strike into the Da Krong

1. III MAF Periodic Intelligence Report 1-69, dtd 7Jan69, pp. 1-3.
2. VMA(AW)-242 ComdC, Jan69.
3. Annex A (Order of Battle), III MAF Periodic Intelligence Report 1-69, dtd 7Jan69, pp. A5-A9.
4. 3dMarDiv msg to CG TF Hotel, dtd 14Jan69, in 3dMarDiv ComdC, Jan69.
5. CG TF Hotel msg to CO, 9th and 12th Mar, dtd 15Jan69, in *ibid*.
6. Barrow intvw, 30Jan87.

#### A Phased Operation

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 9th Mar ComdC, Jan69.

7. Col Robert H. Barrow intvw, 8Apr69, No. 4054 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Barrow intvw, 8Apr69.
8. Barrow intvw, 30Jan87.
9. "CO's Planning Guidance, Dawson River South-Upper Da Krong Valley," undtd, in 9th Mar ComdC, Jan69.
10. Barrow intvw, 30Jan87.
11. OpO 2-69, Operation Dawson River South, dtd 20Jan69, in *ibid*.; Frag Order 4-69, dtd 31Jan69, in *ibid*.
12. Anx H (Air) to OpO 2-69, Operation Dawson River South, dtd 20Jan69, in *ibid*.; Anx D (Fire Support) to OpO 2-69, Dawson River South, dtd 20Jan69, in *ibid*.
13. Davis Comments.
14. Anx E (Administration and Logistics) to OpO 2-69, Operation Dawson River South, dtd 20Jan69, in 9thMar ComdC, Jan69.

#### Phase I

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 9th Mar ComdC, Jan69; 9th Mar AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon; and 2/12 AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon, dtd 5May69.

15. LtCol Wesley L. Fox, Comments on draft ms, 15Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
16. Capt David F. Winecoff intvw, 5-9Mar69, No. 4028 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
17. Maj Charles G. Bryan intvw, 8Mar-8Apr69, No. 4028 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

#### Backyard Cleanup

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 9th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 9th Mar AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon; 2/9 ComdC, Feb69; 3/9 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 3/9 AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon, dtd 25Mar69; 2/12 AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon dtd 5May69.

18. LtCol Elliott R. Laine, Jr., intvw, 18Mar-14Apr69, No. 4063 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
19. 2dLt Walter J. Wood intvw, 5-9Mar69, No. 4028 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
20. Barrow intvw, 30Jan87.
21. Capt Daniel A. Hitzelberger intvw, 5-9Mar69, No. 4028 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
22. *Ibid*.
23. LtCol George C. Fox intvw, 5-9Mar69, No. 4028 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
24. Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS) 2 ComdC, Feb69.

### CHAPTER 4 THE RAID INTO LAOS

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: 9th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 9th Mar AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon; 1/9 AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon, dtd 17Apr69; 2/9 ComdC, Feb69; 3/9 AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon, dtd 25Mar69; 2/12 AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon, dtd 5May69; and, MajGen Robert H. Barrow, "Operation Dewey Canyon," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Nov81, pp. 84-89; LtCol Dave Winecoff, USMC (Ret), "Night Ambush!," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jan84, pp. 47-52..

#### Across the Da Krong

1. Barrow intvw, 30Jan87.

#### The NVA Retaliates

2. Maj Joseph B. Knotts intvw, 8Apr69, No. 4054 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
3. 2dLt Milton J. Teixeira intvw, 18Mar-14Apr69, No. 4063 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
4. 2/3 ComdC, Feb69.

#### Ambush Along 922

5. 1/9 AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon, dtd 17Apr69.
6. CGXXIV Corps msg to COMUSMACV, J-3, dtd 30Jan69, Dewey Canyon Border Incident File.

7. COSOG, msg to MACV, J-3, dtd 31Jan69, in *ibid*.
8. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 3Feb69, in *ibid*.
9. COMUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, *et al.*, dtd 12Feb69, in *ibid*.
10. Barrow intvw, 8Apr69.
11. Capt David F. Winecoff intvw, 5-9Mar69, No. 4028 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Winecoff intvw.
12. *Ibid*.
13. CGXXIV Corps msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 20Feb69, Dewey Canyon Border Incident File.
14. CGIIIMAF msg to COMUSMACV, dtd 20Feb69, in *ibid*.
15. Col George C. Fox, Comments on draft ms, 28Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
16. Barrow intvw, 8Apr69.
17. Winecoff intvw.
18. *Ibid*.
19. Barrow intvw, 8Apr69.
20. Winecoff intvw.
21. *Ibid*.
22. *Ibid*.
23. CGXXIV Corps msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 22Feb69, Dewey Canyon Border Incident File.
24. *Ibid*.
25. COMUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 22Feb69, in *ibid*.
26. CGIIIMAF msg to COMUSMACV, dtd 22Feb69, in *ibid*.
27. Barrow intvw, 8Apr69; 9th Mar AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon.
28. CGXXIV Corps msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 22Feb69, Dewey Canyon Border Incident File.
29. COMUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 24Feb69, in *ibid*.
30. Ambassador Sullivan msg to COMUSMACV, dtd 1Mar69, in *ibid*.

#### Heavy Fighting

31. Capt Wesley L. Fox intvw, 19-28Apr69, No. 4086 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); LtCol Wesley L. Fox, Comments on draft ms, Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
32. *Ibid*.
33. GySgt Russell A. Latona intvw, n.d., No 4912 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
34. Maj Joseph B. Knotts intvw, 8Apr69, No. 4054 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

#### Back Into Laos

35. Winecoff intvw.
36. Col George C. Fox, Comments on draft ms, 28Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
37. Winecoff intvw.

#### Persistent Problems

38. Maj Charles G. Bryan intvw, 18Mar-8Apr69, No. 4028 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
39. 9th Mar AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon, 8Apr69.

#### Phased Retraction

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 9th Mar AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon, 8Apr69; 1/9 AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon, 17Apr69; 2/9 ComdC, Mar69; 3/9 AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon, 25Mar69; and 2/12 AAR, Opn Dewey Canyon, 5May69.

40. CGXXIV Corps to COMUSMACV, dtd 6Mar69, Dewey Canyon Border Incident File.

#### Laos: Repercussions

41. COMUSMACV msg to Ambassador Sullivan, dtd 6Mar69, in *ibid*.
42. "Hilltops in Laos Seized by Marines," *New York Times*, 9Mar69.
43. "Laird Foresees a Troop Cut by U.S. in Vietnam," *New York Times*, 11Mar69.
44. *Ibid*.
45. "Laird's Statement on U.S. Incursion Disturbs Laotians," *New York Times*, 13Mar69.
46. "Secret 1969 Foray Into Laos Reported," *New York Times*, 12Aug73; see also "Officer Began Laos Forays, Marines Say," *Washington Post*, 13Aug73.

## CHAPTER 5 THE QUANG TRI BORDER AREAS

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Mar-Jun69, and 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Feb-Jun69.

#### No Change in Tactics

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2. LtGen William K. Jones, Comments on draft ms, 30Jul86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
3. MajGen Raymond G. Davis FMFPac debrief, 15Apr69, p. 332 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

#### The DMZ Front

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 4th Mar ComdCs, Mar-May69; 1/4 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 2/4 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 3/4 ComdCs, Mar-May69; and 4th Mar AAR Opn Purple Martin, dtd 4Jul69.

4. 1stLt John P. Kiley intvw, 16May-13Jun69, No. 4334 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
5. 2dLt Rick W. Prevost intvw, 16May-13Jun69, No. 4334 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
6. Maj Raymond D. Walters intvw, 16May-13Jun69, No. 4334 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
7. 1stLt John P. Kiley intvw, 16May-13Jun69, No. 4334 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
8. Maj Raymond D. Walters intvw, 16May-13Jun69, No. 4334 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
9. Maj George X. McKenna intvw, 16-18May69, No. 4094 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

#### Brigade Mauls 27th

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Mar-Apr69; 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) ORLL, dtd 30May69; and 3/9 ComdCs, Mar-Apr69.

#### The 9th Battles the 36th

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Mar-May69; 9th Mar ComdCs, Mar-Apr69; 1/9 ComdCs, Mar-Apr69; 2/9 ComdCs, Mar-Apr69; and 3/9 ComdCs, Mar-Apr69.

### The Vietnam Salient

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 3d Mar Div ComdCs, Mar-May69; 3d Mar ComdCs, Mar-May69; 3d Mar ARR, Opn Maine Crag, dtd 2Jun69; 1/3 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 2/3 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 3/3 ComdCs, Apr-May69; and 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) ARR, Opn Maine Crag, dtd 5May69.

10. Col Paul D. Lafond intvw, 25Jun69, No. 4335 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
11. LtCol James J. McMonagle intvw, 16May69, No. 4124 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Col Paul D. Lafond intvw, 11May69, No. 4095 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
15. Ibid.

### Apache Snow

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 9th Mar ComdCs, May-Jul69; 9th Mar AAR, Opn Apache Snow, dtd 20Jun69; 9th Mar AAR, Opn Cameron Falls, dtd 4Jul69; 1/9 ComdCs, May-Jul69; 2/9 ComdCs, May-Jul69; and 3/9 ComdCs, May-Jul69.

16. Col Edward F. Danowitz intvw, 9Jun69, No. 4336 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
17. 22d Military History Detachment, "Narrative: Operation Apache Snow," n.d.
18. Ibid.
19. Col Edward F. Danowitz intvw, 6Jun69, No. 4355 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
20. LtCol Oral R. Swigart, Jr., intvw, 11Jul69, No. 4392 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
21. Ibid.
22. 1stLt Patrick P. Oates intvw, 11Jul69, No. 4391 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
23. LtCol Robert L. Modjeski, Comments on draft ms, 15Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

### Central DMZ Battles

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 3d Mar ComdCs, May-Jul69; 3d Mar ARR, Opn Virginia Ridge, n.d.; 1/3 ComdCs, May-Jul69; 2/3 ComdCs, May-Jul69; 3/3 ComdCs, May-Jul69; 4th Mar ComdCs, May-Jul69; 4th Mar ARR, Opn Herkimer Mountain, dtd 21Aug69; 1/4 ComdCs, May-Jul69; 2/4 ComdCs, May-Jul69; and 3/4 ComdCs, May-Jul69.

24. Maj Donald J. Myers intvw, 15Aug69, No. 4468 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
25. Capt William J. Quigley intvw, 6Sep69, No. 4415 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
26. Maj Charles W. Cobb intvw, 5Aug69, No. 4466 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
27. Ibid.
28. Col William F. Goggin intvw, 4Aug69, No. 4464 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

### Eastern Quang Tri and Thua Thien

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 101st Abn Div (AM) ORLLs, May and Aug69, and 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) ORLL, May69.

## PART II

### Southern I Corps Battleground

#### CHAPTER 6

#### DESTRUCTION OF BASE AREA 112

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Mar69; III MAF ComdCs, Dec68-Mar69; and 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Mar69.

#### Defense of Da Nang

1. LtGen Ormond R. Simpson, Comments on draft ms, 18Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
2. 1stMarDiv OpO 301-YR, dtd 9Feb69 in 1stMarDiv ComdC, Feb69.
3. Barrow intvw, 30Jan87.

#### Attack into 112

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: III MAF Periodic Intelligence Reports, 5Jan69-2Feb69; TF Yankee ComdCs, Dec68-Feb69; TF Yankee AAR, Opn Taylor Common, dtd 20Mar69; 3d Mar ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 1/3 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 3/3 ComdCs, Jan-Feb69; 5th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; 1/5 ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; 2/5 ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; 3/5 ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; and 11th Mar ComdCs, Dec68-Mar69.

4. MACV Comd Hist, 1969.
5. LtCol John A. Dowd intvw, 17Mar69, No. 4042 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
6. Col James B. Ord, Jr., intvw, 3Nov69, No. 4 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
7. MajGen Ross T. Dwyer, Jr., intvw, 17Oct77, p. 35 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Dwyer intvw; MajGen Ross T. Dwyer, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 11Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Dwyer Comments.
8. Dwyer Comments.
9. Dwyer intvw, pp. 37-38.
10. Ibid., p. 40; Dwyer Comments.
11. Davis Comments.
12. Capt Roger K. Peterson intvw, Feb69, No. 4045 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
13. Ibid.
14. LCpl Rick L. Wacke intvw, 20Feb69, No. 4011 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
15. 1stLt Ronald E. Pruiett intvw, 19Feb69, No. 4010 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
16. Col Harry E. Atkinson, Comments on draft ms, 24Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
17. BGen Ross T. Dwyer, Jr. intvw, n.d., No. 3914 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
18. Ibid.
19. Col Edwin H. Finlayson, Comments on draft ms, 25Nov69 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

### "A Little Urban Renewal"

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1st Mar ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; 1/1 ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; 2/1 ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; 3/1 ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; 7th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; 2/7 ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; 3/7 ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; 2/26 ComdCs, Jan-Mar69; and 3/26 ComdCs, Jan-Mar69.

20. Capt Thomas M. Cooper intvw, 6Feb69, No. 4007 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
21. 2dLt Wyman E. Shuler III intvw, 6Feb69, No. 4007 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
22. LtCol Merrill L. Bartlett, Comments on draft ms, 1Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); Col Fred T. Fagan, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 9Jan87 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
23. Capt Paul K. Van Riper, "Riot Control Agents in Offensive Operations," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Apr72, pp. 18, 22.

### Americal's TAOI

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: Americal Division ORLL, dtd 10Feb69; Americal Division ORLL, dtd 10May69; and Senior Officer Debriefing Report, MajGen Charles M. Gettys, dtd 13Jun69.

## CHAPTER 7 THE BATTLE FOR QUANG NAM CONTINUES

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Mar-May69, and 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Mar-May69.

### Rockets Equal Operations

1. LtGen Ormond R. Simpson intvw, 25May73, p. 2 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Simpson intvw.
2. LtGen Ormond R. Simpson intvw, 2Feb84 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
3. Simpson intvw, pp. 3-7; LtGen Ormond R. Simpson, Comments on draft ms, 18Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Simpson Comments.

### Operation Oklahoma Hills

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 7th Mar ComdCs, Mar-May69; 7th Mar AAR, Opn Oklahoma Hills, n.d.; 1/7 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 1/7 AAR, Opn Oklahoma Hills, dtd 7Jun69; 2/7 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 3/7 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 3/1 ComdCs, Apr-May69; and 3/26 ComdCs, Mar-May69.

4. 1stMarDiv, Nui-Nang-Nui-Ba Na-Charlie Ridge Special Study, dtd 1Jan-5Mar69.
5. Col Robert L. Nichols intvw, 3-5Jun69, No. 4371 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Nichols intvw.
6. Col James B. Ord, Jr., intvw, 3Nov69, No. 4 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
7. Ibid.
8. Capt Paul K. Van Riper intvw, 2May69, No. 4109 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

9. Nichols intvw.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. LtGen Robert L. Nichols, Comments on draft ms, 23Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
13. Nichols intvw.
14. 7th Mar AAR, Opn Oklahoma Hills, n.d.

### 5th Marines and the Arizona

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1st Mar ComdCs, Mar-May69; 3/1 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 5th Mar ComdCs, Mar-May69; 5th Mar AAR, Opn Muskogee Meadow, dtd 5May69; 1/5 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 1/5 AAR, Opn Muskogee Meadow, dtd 26Apr69; 2/5 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 2/5 AAR, Opn Muskogee Meadow, dtd 27Apr69; 3/5 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 3/5 AAR, Opn Muskogee Meadow, dtd 23Apr69; Capt Wayne A. Babb, "The Bridge: A Study in Defense," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jun71, pp. 16-23, hereafter Babb, "The Bridge"; and LtCol Charles K. Breslauer, "Battle of the Northern Arizona: Combined Arms at Their Best," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jan77, pp. 47-55.

15. LtCol Richard F. Daley, Comments on draft ms, 8Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Daley Comments.
16. Babb, "The Bridge," p. 21.
17. Daley Comments.
18. Col Thomas E. Bulger, Comments on draft ms, 9Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Bulger Comments.
19. Col William J. Zaro, Comments on draft ms, 16Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Zaro Comments.
20. 5th Mar AAR, Opn Muskogee Meadow, dtd 5May69.
21. Zaro Comments.
22. 1stLt Victor V. Ashford intvw, 3-5Jun69, No. 4319 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
23. Ibid.
24. Zaro Comments.

### Securing the Southern and Northern Approaches

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1st Mar ComdCs, Mar-May69; 1/1 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 2/1 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 3/1 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 26th Mar ComdCs, Mar-May69; 1/26 ComdCs, Mar-May69; 2/26 ComdCs, Mar-May69; and 3/26 ComdCs, Mar-May69.

25. Simpson intvw, pp. 27-28.
26. BGen Charles S. Robertson, Comments on draft ms, 19Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Robertson Comments.
27. Simpson Comments.
28. Robertson Comments.
29. Bulger Comments.
30. Col Wendell P. C. Morgenthaler, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 2Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
31. Robertson Comments.

### Americal Battleground

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: Americal Di-

vision ORLL, dtd 10May69, and Americal Division ORLL, dtd 10Aug69.

32. Senior Officer Debriefing Report, MajGen Charles M. Gettys, dtd 13Jun69, p. 7.

## PART III The Third's Final Months

### CHAPTER 8 REDEPLOYMENT: THE FIRST PHASE

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: CinCPac, Comd Hist, 1969; MACV, Comd Hist, 1969; 3dMarDiv ComdC, Jul69; 9th Mar ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 1/9 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 2/9 ComdCs, Jul-Dec69; 3/9 ComdCs, Jul-Dec69; and HMM-165 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69.

#### Keystone Eagle

1. MACV Talking Paper, T-Day Planning, n.d. (MACV HistDoc-Coll, Reel 3).
2. III MAF/1st ARVN Corps, Combined Campaign Plan, 1969, AB-144, dtd 26Dec68.
3. *New York Times*, 1Jan69.
4. LtGen John N. McLaughlin, Comments on draft ms, 25Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
5. U.S. President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington: Office of the *Federal Register*, National Archives and Records Service), Richard M. Nixon, 1969, pp. 215, 300, hereafter *Public Papers, Nixon, 1969*.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 370.
7. COMUSMACV msg to CJCS, dtd 24Apr69 (Abrams Papers, Army Center of Military History).
8. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 5Apr69, in III MAF, "Force Reduction Planning" File, dtd 4Apr-25Jul69.
9. LtGen Henry W. Buse, Jr. intvw, Jul69, No. 5022 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
10. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 15Apr69, in FMFPac, "Force Reduction Planning" File.
11. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 2May69, in *ibid.*
12. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 7May69, in *ibid.*
13. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 5Jun69, in *ibid.*
14. Richard M. Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 392.
15. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 12Jun69; CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 13Jun69; CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 13Jun69, in III MAF, "Force Reduction Planning" File.

#### "A Turning Point"

16. LtGen William K. Jones intvw, 13Apr73, p. 57 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Jones intvw.
17. Col Edward F. Danowitz intvw, 11Sep69, No. 4481 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
18. III MAF Oplan 182-69, dtd 15Jun69.
19. LtGen Henry W. Buse, Jr., intvw, Jul69, No. 5022 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Sea Tiger*, 25Jul69.

22. Col Edward F. Danowitz, Comments on draft ms, 14Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

23. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 27Jun69; CGIIIMAF msg to CG 1st MAW, dtd 27Jun69; CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 5Jul69, in III MAF, "Force Reduction Planning" File.

### CHAPTER 9 "A STRANGE WAR INDEED"

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul-Nov69; 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Jul-Nov69; 3d Mar ComdCs, Jun-Sep69, 1/3 ComdCs, Jun-Sep69; 2/3 ComdCs, Jun-Sep69; and 3/3 ComdCs, Jun-Sep69.

#### Company Patrol Operations

1. 3dMarDiv, LOI 1-69, dtd 29Jul69, p. 4, in 3dMarDiv ComdC, Jul69.
2. Col Robert H. Barrow intvw, 28Jul69, No. 4411 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Barrow intvw, 28Jul69.

#### Idaho Canyon

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 3d Mar ComdCs, Jul-Sep69, and 3d Mar AAR, Opn Idaho Canyon, n.d.

3. 1stLt Terry L. Engle intvw, 22Sep69, No. 4645 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*
9. 1stLt Richmond D. O'Neill intvw, 22Sep69, No. 4645 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
10. 1stLt James P. Rigoulot intvw, 22Sep69, No. 4645 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Rigoulot intvw.
11. Capt David M. Jordon intvw, 10Oct69, No. 4645 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
12. *Ibid.*
13. Rigoulot intvw.

#### "A Significant Step"

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 3d Mar ComdC, Sep69; 1/3 ComdC, Sep69; 2/3 ComdC, Sep69; and 3/3 ComdC, Sep69.

14. Clark Clifford, "A Vietnam Reappraisal," *Foreign Affairs*, Jul69, pp. 601-622.
15. *Public Papers, Nixon, 1969*, p. 472.
16. *New York Times*, 31Jul69; *Public Papers, Nixon, 1969*, pp. 585-586.
17. *New York Times*, 13Sep69, 15Sep69.
18. *Public Papers, Nixon, 1969*, p. 718.
19. MGen Wilbur F. Simlik intvw, 14Oct77 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), pp. 4-5, hereafter Simlik intvw.
20. *Ibid.*

21. Ibid.
22. Jones intvw, pp. 57-58.
23. Simlik intvw, pp. 5-6.
24. Col Raymond C. Damm, Comments on draft ms, 14Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
25. Simlik intvw, p. 16.
26. Ibid., pp. 6-9.

#### Specter of Anarchy

27. Barrow intvw, 28Jul69.
28. 3dMarDiv memo to CGFMFPac, dtd 26May69 in CMC, WestPac Trip Report, 1969.
29. LtCol Gary D. Solis ltr to LtCol Elliott R. Laine, Jr., USMC (Ret), dtd 16Mar87.
30. Jones intvw, pp. 40, 83.
31. 3dMarDiv, Standing Operating Procedure for Apprehension of Individuals Involved in Acts of Violence Towards Members of this Command, dtd 4Jul69 in CMC, WestPac Trip Report, 1969.
32. 3dMarDiv Fact Sheet, Third Marine Division Program to Eliminate Actions of Violence, n.d., in *ibid.*
33. III MAF Fact Sheet, I Corps Tactical Zone Watch Committee, dtd 7Aug69, in *ibid.*
34. CMC to ALMAR, dtd 2Sep69 (Negro Marines, ALMAR 65 Subject File, Reference Section, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
35. Jones intvw, pp. 83-85; Majs A. S. Painter, G. S. Pierre, and H. C. Sweet, Jr., rept, subj: Race Relations in the United States Marine Corps, dtd Jun70 (Negro Marines—Race Relations, Subject File, Reference Section, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
36. Ibid.
37. MACV Policy Summary Sheet, Use of Marijuana by U.S. Servicemen in Vietnam, dtd 29Mar68 (MACV HistDocColl); CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 10Sep67.
38. Col Peter J. Mulroney intvw, 17Jul69, No. 4384 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Mulroney intvw.
39. Barrow intvw, 28Jul69.
40. Mulroney intvw.
41. Ibid.

### CHAPTER 10 “A DIFFICULT PHASE”

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul-Nov69; 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Jul-Nov69; 4th Mar ComdCs, Jul-Dec69; 1/4 ComdCs, Jul-Dec69; 2/4 ComdCs, Jul-Dec69; and 3/4 ComdCs, Jul-Dec69.

#### Maintaining a Protective Barrier

1. 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), FragO 1 to OpO 4-69 (William's Glade), dtd 14Jul69, in 1/4 ComdCs, Jul69.
2. Capt Henry W. Buse III intvw, 40Oct69, No. 4644 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
3. Ibid.
4. SSgt William Reese intvw, 15Sep-19Oct69, No. 4516 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
5. Maj James J. O'Meara intvw, 15Sep-19Oct69, No. 4516 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
6. Ibid.
7. Col Gilbert R. Hershey intvw, 11Feb70, No. 4815 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

8. 1stLt William H. Stubblefield intvw, 9Oct69, No. 4519 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
9. Ibid.

#### “You Shouldered Us”

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 4th Mar ComdCs, Sep-Dec69; 1/4 ComdCs, Sep-Dec69; 2/4 ComdCs, Sep-Dec69; 3/4 ComdCs, Sep-Dec69; and ProvMAG-39 ComdCs, Sep-Oct69.

10. 2dLt Danny G. Dennison intvw, 11Oct69, No. 4517 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
11. Ibid.
12. *Sea Tiger*, 14Nov69.
13. LtGen William K. Jones, Comments on draft ms, 30Jul86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
14. *Public Papers, Nixon*, 1969, pp. 906-907.
15. Ibid., pp. 1026-1027.

#### The Brigade Takes Over

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 101st Abn Div (AM) ORLL, Aug69; 101st Abn Div (AM) ORLL, Nov69; 101st Abn Div (AM) ORLL, Feb70; 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) ORLL, Nov69; and 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) ORLL, Feb70.

16. COMUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, *et al.*, dtd 15Jan69; CGIIIMAF msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 2Dec69 (MACV HistDocColl, Reel 56).

## PART IV Quang Nam: The Year's Final Battles

### CHAPTER 11 GO NOI AND THE ARIZONA

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jun-Dec69, and 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jun-Dec69.

#### Vital Area Security

##### Pipestone Canyon: The Destruction of Go Noi Island

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1st Mar ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 1/1 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 2/1 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 3/1 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 3/5 ComdCs, May-Jun69; BLT 1/26 ComdCs, May-Jun69; and 1st Mar AAR, Opn Pipestone Canyon, n.d.

1. Col James B. Ord, Jr. intvw, 3Nov69, No. 4 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
2. Col Charles S. Robertson intvw, 22Jul69, No. 4400 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
3. 1st Mar OpO 001-69 (Pipestone Canyon), dtd May69, in 1st Mar ComdC, May 69.
4. LtCol Wendell P. Morgenthaler, Jr., intvw, 8Jul69, No. 4398 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
5. 1stLt Robert L. Leonard intvw, 25Jul69, No. 4403 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); Maj James W. Dion, Comments on

- "Vietnam Anthology" ms, 12Apr78 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
6. 1stLt Robert M. Wallace intvw, 22Jul69, No. 4405 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
  7. Col Wendell P. Morgenthaler, Jr., Comments on draft ms, (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
  8. Capt Frank H. Adams intvw, 8Jul69, No. 4398 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
  9. Memo CO 2/1 to CO 5th Mar, dtd 6Aug69 in MajGen Harold G. Glasgow, Comments on draft ms, 3Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
  10. BGen Charles S. Robertson, Comments on draft ms, 19Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

#### 1st Marines: Protecting the Southern Flank

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1st Mar ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 1/1 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 2/1 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; and 3/1 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69.

11. Col Herbert L. Wilkerson intvw, 13Jul70, No. 4892 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
12. Col Godfrey S. Delcuze, Comments on draft ms, 28Jul86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

#### The Arizona

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 5thMar ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 1/5 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 2/5 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 3/5 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; and 5th Mar AAR, Opn Durham Peak, n.d.

13. Zaro Comments.
14. Col William E. Riley, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 3Oct86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
15. CO Comment, 5thMar ComdC, Jul69.
16. 2dLt Robert L. Lavery intvw, 9Aug69, No. 4498 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
17. Ibid.
18. Zaro Comments.
19. Maj Gaetano Marino intvw, 9Aug69, No. 4498 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
20. Col John M. Terry, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 2Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
21. Col Noble L. Beck, Comments on draft ms, 13Nov86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
22. 5th Mar OpO 62-69, in 5th Mar ComdC, Oct69.

## CHAPTER 12

### DA NANG AND THE QUE SON VALLEY

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jun-Dec69, and 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jun-Dec69.

#### The 7th Marines

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 7th Mar ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 1/7 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 2/7 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; and 3/7 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69.

1. MajGen Ormond R. Simpson memo to CGIII MAF, dtd 25Mar69 (1stMarDiv Admin File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); III MAF Fact Sheet, Da Nang Anti-Infiltration System, dtd 2Aug69, in CMC, WestPac Trip Report, 1969.
2. 1stLt Raymond A. Hord intvw, 14Aug69, No. 4507 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Maj Peter S. Beck intvw, n.d., No. 4495 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. LtCol Marvin H. Luger intvw, n.d., No. 4495 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. BGen Joseph E. Hopkins, Comments on draft ms, 31Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
13. LtCol Ray Kummerow, Comments on draft ms, "U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1970-71," 25Apr83 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Kummerow 70-71 Comments.
14. LCpl Jose F. Jimenez Biography (Biographical Files, Reference Section, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); 2dLt Richard L. Jaehne Award Citation (Biographical Files, Reference Section, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
15. PFC Dennis D. Davis Biography (Biographical Files, Reference Section, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
16. Kummerow 70-71 Comments.
17. Col Ray Kummerow, Comments on draft ms, 11Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
18. Kummerow 70-71 Comments.
19. PFC Ralph E. Dias Biography (Biographical Files, Reference Section, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
20. Kummerow 70-71 Comments.

#### 26th Marines:

#### Protecting the Northern Flank

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 26th Mar ComdCs, May-Dec69; 1/26 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; 2/26 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69; and 3/26 ComdCs, Jun-Dec69.

21. Col Ralph A. Heywood, Comments on draft ms, 11Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

#### Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Battleground

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: Americal Division ORLL, dtd 10May69; Americal Division ORLL, dtd 10Nov69; Americal Division ORLL, dtd 10Nov69; and Americal Division ORLL, dtd 10Feb70.

22. Senior Officer Debriefing Report, MajGen Charles M. Gettys, dtd 13Jun69, p. 9.
23. Ibid., pp. 7-8.

#### Results

24. These figures are compiled from the monthly summaries in 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jun-Dec69.
25. LtGen Ormond R. Simpson intvw, 8Sep81 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

## PART V Supporting the Troops

### CHAPTER 13 MARINE AIR OPERATIONS

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; MAG-11 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; MAG-12 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; MAG-13 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; MAG-15 ComdCs, Oct-Dec69; MAG-16 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; MAG-36 ComdCs, Jan-Oct69; and ProvMAG-39 ComdCs, Jan-Oct69.

#### 1st MAW Organization and Deployment

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69, and 1stMAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec69.

1. MACV, ComdHist, 1969, "Air Operations"; HQMC, Status of Forces, dtd 2Jan69.
2. HQMC, Status of Forces, "Distribution of Aircraft, FMFPac," dtd 9Jan69.
3. LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr., intvw, 10Jan73 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), p. 96.
4. MajGen George S. Bowman, Jr., ltr to MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, dtd 23Dec69 (McCutcheon Papers, 1969 Correspondence, Personal Papers Collection, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
5. 1st MAW (Rear) ComdC, 7Nov-31Dec69.

#### Single Management: Relations with the Seventh Air Force

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: "Single Management" File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.

6. COMUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 7Mar68, in "Single Management" File.
7. Ibid.
8. Gen Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., intvw, n.d. (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), pp. 70-71.
9. Ibid., pp. 71-72.
10. Ibid., p. 72.
11. MajGen Charles J. Quilter intvw, 12Jul69, No. 4362 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Quilter intvw; Col Virgil D. Olson intvw, 11Sep69, No. 4477 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), MajGen William G. Thrash intvw, 2Jul70, No. 4850 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
12. Quilter intvw.
13. BGen Homer S. Hill intvw, 15May69, No. 4122 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Hill intvw.
14. Quilter intvw.

#### Upgrading of Aviation Assets

15. LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962-1970," *Naval Review 1971* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1971), p. 134, hereafter McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation."

#### I Corps Fixed-Wing Support

16. 1stLt Earl C. Smith intvw, n.d., No. 4765 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Smith intvw.

17. Hill intvw.

#### The Interdiction Campaign

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: MACV Comd Hist, 1969, "Air Operations," pp. 200-223.

18. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation," p. 142.
19. Maj Patrick J. McCarthy intvw, n.d., No. 4780 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); Smith intvw.
20. Ibid.
21. Capt Lawrence J. Karch intvw, n.d., No. 4765 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Karch intvw.
22. 1stLt John D. Halleran intvw, n.d., No. 4782 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
23. Karch intvw.
24. Maj James E. Buckley intvw, n.d., No. 4146 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Buckley intvw; 1stLt Michael L. Richardson intvw, n.d., No. 4749 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
25. Buckley intvw.
26. Quilter intvw.
27. Hill intvw.

#### Air Control

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation," pp. 138-139.

28. Col Robert D. Slay intvw, 12Jun69, No. 4265 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
29. Ibid.
30. Hill intvw.
31. Capt Thomas L. Hall intvw, n.d., No. 4766 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
32. Col George C. Fox, Comments on draft ms, 28Aug69 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

#### Helicopter Operations

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation," pp. 143-154; FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; MAG-16 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; MAG-36 ComdCs, Jan-Oct69; and ProvMAG-39 ComdCs, Jan-Oct69.

33. Hill intvw.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.

#### Improving Helicopter Support

36. Col Leonard L. Orr, Comments on draft ms, 4Sep69 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
37. MajGen Carl A. Youngdale, HQMC Briefing, 8Aug69, No. 6010 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
38. III MAF, Board Report for Utilization, Command and Control of Marine Corps Helicopter Assets in III MAF, 17May69.
39. Ibid.
40. Quilter intvw.
41. MajGen Carl A. Youngdale intvw, 6Mar81 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), pp. 441-442.

42. CMC ltr to all general officers, Green Letter 17-69, dtd 4Nov69.

### Air Defense

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1st LAAM Bn ComdCs, Jan-Aug69.

### Accomplishments and Costs

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec69.

## CHAPTER 14 ARTILLERY AND SURVEILLANCE

Unless otherwise noted, material in this section is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Nov69; 11th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 1/11 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 2/11 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 3/11 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 4/11 ComdCs, Jan-Sep69; 1/13 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 12th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Nov69; 1/12 ComdCs, Jan-Sep69; 2/12 ComdCs, Jan-Aug69; 3/12 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 4/12 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 1st FAG ComdCs, Jan-Jul69, Nov-Dec69; and 11th Mar, Resume of Artillery Operations, 1 December 1968 to 30 November 1969, dtd 3Dec69, in 1stMarDiv Admin File, hereafter 11th Mar, Arty Ops.

### Artillery Operations

1. Col Peter J. Mulroney intvw, 17Jul69, No. 4384 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Mulroney intvw.
2. MCDEC, Artillery Reference Data, dtd Aug70, pp. 35-45.
3. 1stMarDiv OpO 301-YR, dtd 10Dec69.
4. Mulroney intvw; Col Wallace W. Crompton, Comments on draft ms, 11Sep86, (Vietnam 69 Comment Files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
5. Maj Robert V. Nicoli, "Fire Support Base Development," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Sep69, pp. 38-43; MajGen Raymond G. Davis intvw, 1Jan69, (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Davis intvw.
6. Davis intvw.
7. Ibid.
8. 11th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 11th Mar, Arty Ops.
9. Col Don D. Ezell intvw, 8Apr70, No. 4837 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Ezell intvw.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid; FMFPac MarOpsV, Apr70, pp. 37-39.
13. Ezell intvw.
14. Ibid.
15. Mulroney intvw.
16. 11th Mar, Arty Ops.
17. Mulroney intvw.
18. Col Joseph Sleger, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 2Oct86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

### Surveillance and Reconnaissance Activities

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1st Recon Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 3d Recon Bn ComdCs, Jan-Nov69; 1st Force

Recon Co ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and 3d Force Recon Co ComdCs, Aug, Nov-Dec69. Extensive use was made of LCdr Ray W. Stubbe, CHC, USN, "Aarugha!, Report to Director, Historical Division, Headquarters, Marine Corps, on the History of Specialized and Force Level Reconnaissance Activities and Units of the United States Marine Corps, 1900-1974" (unpublished ms, 1981).

19. Col John S. Canton, Comments on draft ms, 3Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Canton Comments.
20. FMFPac to CMC, dtd 8Dec69, III MAF Misc Msg File, Oct-Dec69.
21. Davis intvw, p. 285.
22. Ibid., pp. 285-286.
23. 1stLt Wayne E. Rollings intvw, Jun69, No. 4074 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); "Caught With His Pants On," *Sea Tiger*, 16May69.
24. Debrief Rpt, dtd 131900Apr69 in 1st For Rec Co ComdC, Apr69; "Recon Patrol Eludes 150 NVA," *Sea Tiger*, May69.
25. Ibid.
26. Debrief Rpt, dtd 050500Jun69 in 3d Recon Bn ComdC, Jun69.
27. Debrief Rpt, dtd 020533Jun69 in 3d Recon Bn ComdC, Jun69.
28. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Sep69.
29. Maj John J. Guenther intvw, 11Aug69, No. 4483 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
30. Col Anthony J. Skotnicki intvw, 18Sep69, No. 4562 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Skotnicki intvw.
31. 1stMarDiv ComdC, May69.
32. 1st Radio Bn ComdC, Mar69.
33. COMUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 14May69 (MACV Hist-DocColl, Reel 46).
34. Canton Comments.
35. Skotnicki intvw.

## CHAPTER 15 SUPPLYING III MAF

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69.

### Force Logistic Command

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: FLC ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; FLSG-Alpha ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; FLSG-Bravo ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and Col James B. Soper, "A View From FMFPac of Logistics in the Western Pacific, 1965-1971," *Naval Review* 1972, pp. 224-239.

1. FLSG-Bravo ComdC, Nov69.
2. Col Frank P. DeNormandie intvw, 10Nov69, No. 4684 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
3. 1stMarDiv ComdC, May69.
4. MajGen Wilbur F. Simlik intvw, 14Oct77 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), p. 26, hereafter Simlik intvw.
5. Col John L. Schwartz intvw, 22Oct69, No. 4564 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
6. Col William D. Bassett, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 11Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
7. FLC ComdC, Apr69.
8. Col Samuel A. Hannah intvw, 7Jul69, No. 4256 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

9. FLC ComdCs, Apr-May69; Col Darwin B. Pond, Jr., intvw, 22Jul69, No. 4253 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

### Naval Support Activity, Da Nang

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: III MAF/I Corps Tactical Zone Common Service Support Responsibilities File, 3Jan69-1Feb70, hereafter cited as III MAF CSS File; U.S. Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, Command History 1969, in Operational Archives Branch, NHD, hereafter USNSADN Comd Hist 1969; Cdr Frank C. Collins, Jr., USN, "Maritime Support of the Campaign in I Corps," *Naval Review* 1971, pp. 158-179, hereafter Collins, "Maritime Support"; U.S. Naval Support Activity/Facility, Da Nang, *Changes: A History*, 1970, hereafter *Changes, A History*.

10. Collins, "Maritime Support," pp. 158-159; USNSADN, Comd Hist 1969.
11. USNSADN, Comd Hist 1969.
12. LtGen Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., *Vietnam Studies: Logistic Support* (Washington: GPO, 1974), pp. 177-181.
13. Ibid., p. 184.
14. ComNavForV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 3Jun69, III MAF CSS File.
15. CGIIIMAF msg to ComNavForV, dtd 4Jun69, Ibid.
16. Simlik intvw, p. 17.
17. Ibid., p. 18.
18. LtGen Leo J. Dulacki intvw, 24Oct74 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), pp. 68-69; LtGen Leo J. Dulacki, Comments on draft ms, 1Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
19. III MAF CSS File; Collins, "Maritime Support," p. 178; and *Changes: A History*.

### Engineer Support

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 1st Engr Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 3d Engr Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 7th Engr Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 9th Engr Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and 11th Engr Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69.

20. HQMC, Status of Forces, Jan69; MajGen Robert R. Ploger, *Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Engineers, 1965-1970* (Washington: GPO, 1974), pp. 148-155.
21. LtCol Adrian G. Traas, USA, Comments on draft ms, 29Aug86 (Vietnam Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
22. Col Nicholas A. Canzona intvw, 4Mar70, No. 4796 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
23. 1st Engr Bn ComdC, May69.
24. FMFPac MarOpsV, Dec69.
25. LtGen Ormond R. Simpson, Comments on draft ms, 18Aug69 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
26. 11th Engr Bn ComdC, Sep-Nov69.
27. Land-Clearing Company (Provisional) AAR, Go Noi Island, in 7th Engr Bn ComdC, Jul69.
28. LtGen Ormond R. Simpson intvw, 25May73 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), p. 654.

### Motor Transport

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; 1st MT Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 3d MT Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 7th MT Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 9th MT Bn

ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 11th MT Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and Truck Company ComdCs, Jan-Dec69 in 1st FSR ComdCs, Jan-Dec69.

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30. 11th MT Bn ComdCs, Apr-Aug69.

### Medical Support

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; 1st Med Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 3d Med Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and 1st Hospital Co ComdCs, Jan-Dec69.

31. Col Eugene R. Brady, Comments on draft ms, 14Oct86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); Col Eugene R. Brady, "The Thread of a Concept," *Marine Corps Gazette*, May71, pp. 35-42.
32. Ibid., p. 40, 42.

### Communications

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 5th Com Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 7th Com Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and Maj Blaine D. King, "Force Comm in Vietnam," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Feb72, pp. 35-38.

### Logistics of Keystone Eagle and Keystone Cardinal

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 3dMarDiv OpO 25-69, dtd 23Sep69, and 3dMarDiv "Lessons Learned, 3d Marine Division Redeployment, June through December 1969," dtd 5Jan70.

33. LtGen Leo J. Dulacki intvw, 24Oct74 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), pp. 66-68.
34. Simlik intvw, pp. 22-23.
35. Ibid.
36. Jones intvw, p. 57.
37. Col Raymond C. Damm, Comments on draft ms, 14Aug69 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
38. Simlik intvw, p. 16.
39. Ibid., pp. 23-24.
40. Jones intvw, pp. 65-66.

## PART VI Unique Contributions

### CHAPTER 16 PACIFICATION

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Command History, 1969; FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec69.

#### The National Perspective

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: MACV Com-

mand History, 1969; FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; and MACV, Hamlet Evaluation System Handbook, Jun69.

1. Republic of Vietnam, Office of the Prime Minister, Central Pacification and Development Council, "Basic Directive on the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan," p. 3 (MACV HistDocColl, Reel 56).

#### Pacification Planning In I Corps

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: MACV Command History, 1969; FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; and I Corps/III MAF Combined Campaign Plan (CCP) 1969, dtd 26Dec68.

2. Col George C. Knapp intvw, 2May69, No. 4088 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Knapp intvw.
3. III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec69.
4. Ibid.; 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Nov69.

#### Line Unit Pacification

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Nov69.

5. Knapp intvw.
6. Maj John J. Guenther intvw, 11Aug69. No. 4483 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
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9. MACCORDS, Monthly Reports-Kit Carson Scout Program, Jan-Dec69 (MACV HistDocColl, Reel 56).

#### Civic Action

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Nov69.

10. I Corps/III MAF CCP, 1969, p. B-3-2.
11. Ibid., p. B-3-9.
12. 3dMarDiv G-5, History of Civic Action Projects in Quang Tri During 1969, n.d.
13. FLC ComdCs, Jan-Dec69.
14. 3dMarDiv, Civil Affairs & PsyOp Newsletter, Jan, Mar, May69.

#### The Grass Roots Campaign

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; 1stCAG ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 2dCAG ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 3dCAG ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and 4thCAG ComdCs, Jan-Dec69.

15. CAF Fact Sheet, dtd 31Mar70.
16. Ibid., p. 1.
17. 1stCAG ComdCs, Jan69; 2dCAG ComdCs, Jan69; 3dCAG ComdCs, Jan69; 4th CAG ComdCs, Jan69; and, Col Charles R. Burroughs CAP Briefing, Jun69, No. 6506 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Burroughs briefing.
18. LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr., intvw, 10Jan73 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), p. 103, hereafter Nickerson intvw.

19. Burroughs briefing.
20. CAF Fact Sheet, p. 2.
21. Ibid.; LtCol Earl R. Hunter, Comments on draft ms, 9Sep86, 14Oct86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); Burroughs briefing.
22. Cpl Michael E. Gordy intvw, 5Mar69, No. 3913 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
23. 4th CAG OpO, Mobilization of Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1, dtd 1Apr69 in 2d CAG ComdC, Apr69.
24. CAF Fact Sheet, Encl 7, "A Discussion of the Mobile CAP Concept."
25. Human Sciences Research, Inc., Interim Technical Report, "Marine Combined Action Capabilities: Training For Future Contingencies," Apx C, p. 61.
26. Ibid., p. 16.
27. Alexander Firfer intvw, 26Jul76, No. 6323 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Firfer intvw.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.; LtGen Leo J. Dulacki, Comments on draft ms, 1Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
30. 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Nov-Dec69; Nickerson intvw, pp. 101-102.

#### Results

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: MACV Command History, 1969; FMFPac MarOpsV, 1969, Oct-Dec69; and III MAF ComdCs, Nov-Dec69.

31. Col Theodore E. Metzger, Comments on draft ms, 25Aug86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
32. Firfer intvw.
33. Ibid.

## CHAPTER 17

### SPECIAL LANDING FORCE OPERATIONS

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69; 9th MAB ComdCs, Jan-Nov69; TF 79.4 (SLF Alpha) ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; TF 79.5 (SLF Bravo) ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; 1/26 ComdCs, Feb-Nov69; 2/26 ComdCs, Jan-Jun, Aug-Nov69; and 3/26 ComdCs, Jan-Nov69.

#### The Strategic Reserve

1. Col John Lowman, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 22Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
2. Col Clyde W. Hunter intvw, 10Jul69, No. 4363 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
3. Col William C. Doty, Jr., intvw, 23Sep69, No. 4482 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
4. Col Robert R. Wilson intvw, 12Jun69, No. 4263 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

#### Organization and Operations

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: TF 79.4 (SLF Alpha) ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; TF 79.4 AAR, Opn Eager Pursuit; TF 79.4 AAR, Opn Daring Rebel; TF 79.4 AAR, Opn Bold Pursuit; TF 79.4 AAR, Opn Mighty Play; TF 79.4 AAR, Opn Defiant Stand; TF 79.5 (SLF Bravo) ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; TF 79.5 AAR, Opn Defi-

ant Measure; 1/26 ComdCs, Feb-Nov69; 1/26 AAR, Opn Daring Rebel; 1/26 AAR, Opn Bold Pursuit; 1/26 AAR, Opn Mighty Play; 2/26 ComdCs, Jan-Jun, Aug-Nov69; 2/26 AAR, Opn Bold Mariner; 3/26 ComdCs, Jan-Nov69; 3/26 AAR, Opn Bold Mariner-Russell Beach; 3/26 AAR, Opn Defiant Measure-Taylor Common; HMM-164 ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; HMM-362 ComdCs, Jan-Jun69; and HMM-265 ComdCs, Jun-Nov69.

5. BGen John E. Williams intvw, 12Jun69, No. 4262 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
6. HQMC, Final Report of Study of Special Landing Force Operations, dtd 30Mar70.
7. *Sea Tiger*, 30May69.
8. Ibid.

#### **The Fleet's Contingency Force**

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: 9th MAB ComdCs, Oct-Nov69; TF 79.4 (SLF Alpha) ComdCs, Nov-Dec69; and TF 79.5 (SLF Bravo) ComdCs, Oct-Dec69.

9. CTF 76 msg to CTG 76.4, dtd 3Dec69 in COMSEVENTHFLT Amphib Opns File, Dec69, (Operational Archives Branch, NHC, Washington, D.C.); COMSEVENTHFLT msg to CTF 76 and CTF 79, dtd 5Dec69, in *ibid*.
10. BGen Robert B. Carney, Jr., intvw, 21Nov69, No. 4643 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

### **CHAPTER 18 THE ADVISORY EFFORT AND OTHER ACTIVITIES**

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Feb69.

#### **Marine Advisors and the Vietnamese Marine Corps**

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: Senior Marine Advisor, "Vietnamese Marine Corps/Marine Advisory Unit Historical Summary, 1954-1973," dtd 22Mar73; Senior Marine Advisor, Monthly Historical Summaries, Jan-Dec69; and Col James T. Breckinridge intvw, 2May69, No. 4060 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), and supporting documents (S908633).

1. Senior Marine Advisor, "Vietnamese Marine Corps/Marine Advisory Unit Historical Summary, 1954-1973," encl 2, pp. 1-2.
2. LtGen Le Nguyen Khang intvw, 30Sep75 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), pp. 72-73.

3. Col Leroy V. Corbett intvw, Aug69, No. 5031 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Corbett intvw.
4. LtCol David G. Henderson, Comments on draft ms, 9Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
5. Corbett intvw.
6. Col Leroy V. Corbett, Comments on draft ms, 12Sep86 (Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

#### **1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO)**

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: Sub-Unit One, 1st ANGLICO ComdCs, Jan-Dec69; and LtCol Thomas H. Simpson intvw, 24Sep70, No. 4960 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

7. LtCol Thomas H. Simpson intvw, 24Sep70, No. 4960 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.

#### **U.S. Marines on the MACV Staff**

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: LtGen John N. McLaughlin intvw, 18Oct78 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), pp. 16-38.

10. LtGen John N. McLaughlin intvw, 18Oct78 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), p. 25.
11. Ibid, p. 19.
12. Ibid, p. 38.

#### **Embassy Guard Marines**

Additional sources for this section are drawn from: Company E, Security Guard Battalion (Saigon) ComdCs, 1969.

### **CHAPTER 19 1969: AN OVERVIEW**

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac MarOpsV, Jan-Dec69, and III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec69.

1. Memo for the Record, JCS Meeting, 15Jan69, dtd 17Jan69, Chapman Papers, MCHC.

# Appendix A

## Marine Command and Staff List January-December 1969

|                                            |               |  |                                                        |               |
|--------------------------------------------|---------------|--|--------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| <b>III MAF Headquarters, 1Jan-31Dec69*</b> |               |  | Col Clifford J. Peabody                                | 21Sep-31Dec69 |
| CG LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr.            | 1Jan-26Mar69  |  | G-6 Col Bill E. Horner                                 | 1Jan-14Sep69  |
| LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr.                | 27Mar-31Dec69 |  | Col Sam A. Dressin                                     | 15Sep-27Nov69 |
| DepCG MajGen Carl A. Youngdale             | 1Jan-11Jul69  |  | LtCol Richard S. Barry                                 | 28Nov-31Dec69 |
| MajGen George S. Bowman, Jr.               | 12Jul-31Dec69 |  | <b>AC/S Combined Action Program</b>                    |               |
| DepCG Air MajGen Charles J. Quilter        | 1Jan-10Jul69  |  | Col Edward F. Danowitz                                 | 1Jan-31Mar69  |
| MajGen William G. Thrash                   | 11Jul-31Dec69 |  | Col Charles R. Burroughs                               | 1Apr-Oct69    |
| C/S BGen George E. Dooley                  | 1Jan-22Dec69  |  | Col Theodore E. Metzger                                | Oct-31Dec69   |
| BGen Leo J. Dulacki                        | 23Dec-31Dec69 |  | <b>1st Combined Action Group<br/>(1st CAG)</b>         |               |
| DepC/S Col Michael Mosteller               | 1Jan-18Feb69  |  | CO LtCol Earl R. Hunter                                | 1Jan-24Apr69  |
| Col Lewis E. Poggemeyer                    | 19Feb-27Nov69 |  | LtCol Joseph E. Hennegan                               | 25Apr-23Oct69 |
| Col Sam A. Dressin                         | 28Nov-31Dec69 |  | LtCol David F. Seiler                                  | 24Oct-31Dec69 |
| DepC/S Plans BGen Warren K. Bennett, USA   | 1Jan-29May69  |  | <b>2d Combined Action Group<br/>(2d CAG)</b>           |               |
| BGen William A. Burke, USA                 | 30May-27Nov69 |  | CO LtCol Edward L. Lewis, Jr.                          | 1Jan-19Oct69  |
| Col Milton M. Cook, Jr.                    | 28Nov-3Dec69  |  | LtCol Don R. Christensen                               | 20Oct-31Dec69 |
| Col James A. Sloan                         | 4Dec-31Dec69  |  | <b>3d Combined Action Group<br/>(3d CAG)</b>           |               |
| G-1 Col Maurice Rose                       | 1Jan-26Mar69  |  | CO LtCol Robert D. Whitesell                           | 1Jan-24Feb69  |
| Col William J. Howatt                      | 27Mar-20Jun69 |  | LtCol Roi E. Andrews                                   | 25Feb-24Jul69 |
| Col George W. Callen                       | 21Jun-21Sep69 |  | LtCol John B. Michaud                                  | 24Jul-31Dec69 |
| Col Robert L. Parnell, Jr.                 | 22Sep-31Dec69 |  | <b>4th Combined Action Group<br/>(4th CAG)</b>         |               |
| G-2 Col Ray N. Joens                       | 1Jan-4Feb69   |  | CO LtCol John E. Greenwood                             | 1Jan-27Feb69  |
| Col John S. Canton                         | 5Feb-19Dec69  |  | LtCol Daniel J. Ford                                   | 28Feb-14Aug69 |
| Col Edward W. Dzialo                       | 20Dec-31Dec69 |  | Maj Robert M. Cooper                                   | 15Aug-7Sep69  |
| G-3 BGen Carl W. Hoffman                   | 1Jan-17Feb69  |  | LtCol John J. Keenah                                   | 8Sep-31Dec69  |
| BGen Ross T. Dwyer, Jr.                    | 18Feb-25Jun69 |  | <b>5th/7th Communication Battalion, 15Apr-20Oct69*</b> |               |
| BGen Leo J. Dulacki                        | 26Jun-22Dec69 |  | CO LtCol Charles L. Brady                              | 15Apr-14Sep69 |
| BGen Thomas H. Miller, Jr.                 | 23Dec-31Dec69 |  | Maj Donald F. Selby                                    | 15Sep-30Sep69 |
| Dep G-3 Col Marion C. Dalby                | 1Jan-17Apr69  |  | LtCol Dale E. Shatzer                                  | 10Oct-12Oct69 |
| Col Robert H. Barrow                       | 18Apr-19Jul69 |  | Maj Richard G. Schwarz                                 | 13Oct-20Oct69 |
| Col Roy L. Reed                            | 20Jul-27Nov69 |  | <i>*7th Comm Bn departed RVN on 20Oct69.</i>           |               |
| Col Lewis E. Poggemeyer                    | 28Nov-31Dec69 |  | <b>1st Marine Division</b>                             |               |
| G-4 Col Lawrence C. Norton                 | 1Jan-19Jul69  |  | CG MajGen Ormond R. Simpson                            | 1Jan-14Dec69  |
| Col Oliver R. Davis                        | 20Jul-20Oct69 |  | MajGen Edwin B. Wheeler                                | 15Dec-31Dec69 |
| Col Robert J. Barbour                      | 3Oct-11Nov69  |  | ADC BGen Ross T. Dwyer, Jr.                            | 1Jan-14Feb69  |
| Col Wilbur F. Simlik                       | 12Nov-31Dec69 |  | BGen Samuel Jaskilka                                   | 15Feb-15Aug69 |
| G-5 Col Howard A. Westphall                | 1Jan-18Apr69  |  | BGen Charles S. Robertson                              | 16Aug-31Dec69 |
| Col Gilbert R. Hershey                     | 19Apr-27Jul69 |  | ADC (TAD III MAF) BGen Carl W. Hoffman                 | 1Jan-14Feb69  |
| Col Theodore E. Metzger                    | 28Jul-20Sep69 |  |                                                        |               |

*\*Unless otherwise indicated, dates refer to the period when a unit was in Vietnam. Only permanent Marine organizations of battalion/squadron-size or larger are listed; exceptions are Task Force Bravo, Task Force Hotel, Task Force Yankee, and Force Logistic Command and its components. The following listing reflects administrative rather than operational organization.*

|                                                                            |               |                                   |               |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------------------------|---------------|
| BGen Ross T. Dwyer, Jr.                                                    | 15Feb-24Jun69 | LtCol Harold G. Glasgow           | 5Feb-8Aug69   |
| BGen Leo J. Dulacki                                                        | 25Jun-25Dec69 | LtCol William V. H. White         | 9Aug-31Dec69  |
| C/S Col Samuel A. Hannah                                                   | 1Jan-7Feb69   |                                   |               |
| Col Harry E. Dickinson                                                     | 8Feb-8Aug69   | <b>3d Battalion, 1st Marines</b>  |               |
| Col Charles E. Walker                                                      | 9Aug-31Dec69  | LtCol Thomas E. Bulger            | 1Jan-6Jul69   |
| G-1 Col George E. Lawrence                                                 | 1Jan-6Sep69   | LtCol Thomas P. Ganey             | 7Jul-31Dec69  |
| LtCol James E. Harrell                                                     | 7Sep-11Dec69  |                                   |               |
| Col Robert E. Barde                                                        | 12Dec-31Dec69 | <b>5th Marines</b>                |               |
| G-2 Col Anthony J. Skotnicki                                               | 1Jan-14Sep69  | CO Col James B. Ord, Jr.          | 1Jan-22Mar69  |
| Col Edward A. Wilcox                                                       | 15Sep-31Dec69 | Col William J. Zaro               | 23Mar-16Aug69 |
| G-3 Col Adolph G. Schwenk                                                  | 1Jan-8Mar69   | Col Noble L. Beck                 | 17Aug-31Dec69 |
| Col Jo M. Van Meter                                                        | 9Mar-22Mar69  |                                   |               |
| Col James B. Ord, Jr.                                                      | 23Mar-31Oct69 | <b>1st Battalion, 5th Marines</b> |               |
| Col Floyd H. Waldrop                                                       | 1Nov-31Dec69  | CO LtCol Richard F. Daley         | 1Jan-26Apr69  |
| G-4 Col James E. Wilson, Jr.                                               | 1Jan-12Mar69  | LtCol William E. Riley, Jr.       | 27Apr-30Aug69 |
| Col John L. Schwartz                                                       | 13Mar-14Oct69 | Maj Patrick E. O'Toole            | 31Aug-22Sep69 |
| Col Nicholas A. Canzona                                                    | 15Oct-31Dec69 | LtCol Joseph K. Griffis, Jr.      | 23Sep-31Dec69 |
| G-5 Col Harry F. Painter                                                   | 1Jan-15Aug69  | <b>2d Battalion, 5th Marines</b>  |               |
| Col William J. Zaro                                                        | 16Aug-12Dec69 | CO LtCol James W. Stemple         | 1Jan-13Mar69  |
| LtCol Vincent A. Albers, Jr.                                               | 13Dec-31Dec69 | LtCol James H. Higgins            | 14Mar-18Aug69 |
|                                                                            |               | Maj Robert E. Loehe               | 19Aug-25Aug69 |
|                                                                            |               | LtCol James T. Bowen              | 26Aug-31Dec69 |
| <b>Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division</b>                         |               | <b>3d Battalion, 5th Marines</b>  |               |
| CO Col William S. Fagan                                                    | 1Jan-27Mar69  | CO LtCol Harry E. Atkinson        | 1Jan-29Jun69  |
| Col Nicholas A. Canzona                                                    | 28Mar-30Sep69 | LtCol John M. Terry, Jr.          | 30Jun-8Dec69  |
| Col William C. Patton                                                      | 1Oct-31Dec69  | LtCol Johan S. Gestson            | 9Dec-31Dec69  |
| <b>Task Force Yankee, 1Jan-8Mar69*</b>                                     |               |                                   |               |
| CO BGen Ross T. Dwyer, Jr.                                                 | 1Jan-14Feb69  | <b>7th Marines</b>                |               |
| BGen Samuel S. Jaskilka                                                    | 15Feb-8Mar69  | CO Col Herbert L. Beckington      | 1Jan-7Feb69   |
| C/S Col Robert L. Nichols                                                  | 1Jan-16Jan69  | Col Robert L. Nichols             | 8Feb-9Jul69   |
| Col William J. Zaro                                                        | 17Jan-8Mar69  | Col Gildo S. Codispoti            | 10Jul-31Dec69 |
| G-1 Capt Richard W. Schulz                                                 | 1Jan-8Mar69   |                                   |               |
| G-2 LtCol John A. Dowd                                                     | 1Jan-8Mar69   | <b>1st Battalion, 7th Marines</b> |               |
| G-3 LtCol Raymond P. Coffman, Jr.                                          | 1Jan-8Mar69   | CO LtCol William F. Bethel        | 1Jan-22Mar69  |
| G-4 Maj Kenneth P. Knueble                                                 | 1Jan-6Mar69   | LtCol John A. Dowd                | 23Mar-13Aug69 |
| Capt Nicola M. Pereira, Jr.                                                | 7Mar-8Mar69   | LtCol Frank A. Clark              | 14Aug-31Dec69 |
| <i>*Deactivated with termination of Operation Taylor Common on 8Mar69.</i> |               | <b>2d Battalion, 7th Marines</b>  |               |
| <b>1st Marines</b>                                                         |               | CO LtCol Neil A. Nelson           | 1Jan-21Feb69  |
| CO Col Robert G. Lauffer                                                   | 1Jan-24Feb69  | LtCol Jan P. Vandersluis          | 22Feb-27Feb69 |
| Col Charles S. Robertson                                                   | 25Feb-30May69 | LtCol Neil A. Nelson              | 28Feb-28Apr69 |
| Col Charles E. Walker                                                      | 31May-13Jun69 | LtCol Marvin H. Lugger            | 29Apr-28Aug69 |
| Col Charles S. Robertson                                                   | 14Jun-16Aug69 | LtCol Joseph E. Hopkins           | 29Aug-21Oct69 |
| Col Herbert L. Wilkerson                                                   | 17Aug-31Dec69 | LtCol Arthur E. Folsom            | 21Oct-31Dec69 |
| <b>1st Battalion, 1st Marines</b>                                          |               | <b>3d Battalion, 7th Marines</b>  |               |
| CO LtCol Alphonse A. Laporte, Jr.                                          | 1Jan-28Mar69  | CO LtCol Francis X. Quinn         | 1Jan-22Mar69  |
| LtCol Wendell P. Morgenthaler, Jr.                                         | 29Mar-8Oct69  | LtCol James O. Allison            | 23Mar-17Aug69 |
| LtCol Godfrey S. Delcuze                                                   | 9Oct-31Dec69  | LtCol Ray G. Kummerow             | 18Aug-31Dec69 |
| <b>2d Battalion, 1st Marines</b>                                           |               | <b>26th Marines, 7Nov-31Dec69</b> |               |
| CO LtCol John E. Poindexter                                                | 1Jan-4Feb69   | CO Col Ralph A. Heywood           | 7Nov-12Dec69  |
|                                                                            |               | LtCol James E. Harrell            | 13Dec-31Dec69 |

|                                                                                      |               |                                                                    |               |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| <b>1st Battalion, 26th Marines</b>                                                   |               |                                                                    |               |
| CO LtCol James C. Goodin                                                             | 7Nov-31Dec69  | LtCol Dale E. Young                                                | 11Mar-7Jul69  |
|                                                                                      |               | LtCol Robert B. March                                              | 8Jul-8Sep69   |
| <b>2d Battalion, 26th Marines</b>                                                    |               | LtCol Larry R. Butler                                              | 9Sep-12Nov69  |
| CO LtCol William C. Drumright                                                        | 7Nov-31Dec69  | Maj Joseph J. Louder                                               | 13Nov-31Dec69 |
| <b>3d Battalion, 26th Marines</b>                                                    |               |                                                                    |               |
| CO LtCol William A. Simpson                                                          | 7Nov-26Dec69  | <b>1st Motor Transport Battalion</b>                               |               |
| LtCol John J. Unterkofler                                                            | 27Dec-31Dec69 | CO Maj Robert G. Reilly                                            | 1Jan-3Jan69   |
|                                                                                      |               | LtCol Billy E. Wilson                                              | 4Jan-30Sep69  |
| <b>11th Marines</b>                                                                  |               | Maj Donald C. Pease                                                | 1Oct-1Dec69   |
| CO Col Harry E. Dickinson                                                            | 1Jan-7Feb69   | LtCol Morris S. Shimanoff                                          | 2Dec-31Dec69  |
| Col Samuel A. Hannah                                                                 | 8Feb-2Jul69   |                                                                    |               |
| Col Carl E. Walker                                                                   | 3Jul-8Aug69   | <b>1st Engineer Battalion</b>                                      |               |
| LtCol Corbin J. Johnson                                                              | 9Aug-31Aug69  | CO LtCol Donald H. Hildebrand                                      | 1Jan-25Mar69  |
| Col Don D. Ezell                                                                     | 1Sep-31Dec69  | LtCol John F. Mader                                                | 26Mar-31Jul69 |
|                                                                                      |               | LtCol Roland E. Smith                                              | 31Jul-16Nov69 |
|                                                                                      |               | LtCol Walter M. Winoski                                            | 17Nov-31Dec69 |
| <b>1st Battalion, 11th Marines</b>                                                   |               |                                                                    |               |
| CO LtCol John A. Hamilton                                                            | 1Jan-11Mar69  | <b>1st Shore Party Battalion</b>                                   |               |
| LtCol Francis Andriiunas                                                             | 12Mar-21Aug69 | CO LtCol Donald L. Anderson                                        | 1Jan-9Sep69   |
| LtCol John D. Shoup                                                                  | 22Aug-31Dec69 | Maj John E. Duck                                                   | 10Sep-4Oct69  |
|                                                                                      |               | LtCol Richard F. Armstrong                                         | 5Oct-31Dec69  |
| <b>2d Battalion, 11th Marines</b>                                                    |               |                                                                    |               |
| CO LtCol Robert D. Jameson                                                           | 1Jan-20Apr69  | <b>3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion</b>                              |               |
| LtCol Kenneth L. Smith                                                               | 21Apr-1Oct69  | CO LtCol Joseph E. Hennegan                                        | 1Jan-28Feb69  |
| LtCol Vonda Weaver                                                                   | 2Oct-31Dec69  | Maj James W. Rahill                                                | 1Mar-5Mar69   |
|                                                                                      |               | Maj King D. Thatenhurst, Sr.                                       | 6Mar-12Sep69  |
| <b>3d Battalion, 11th Marines</b>                                                    |               | Maj James W. Rahill                                                | 13Sep-31Oct69 |
| CO LtCol Richard P. Johnson                                                          | 1Jan-28Feb69  | LtCol David G. Mehargue                                            | 1Nov-31Dec69  |
| Maj Andrew F. Bauer                                                                  | 1Mar-14Mar69  |                                                                    |               |
| LtCol Raymond B. Ingrando                                                            | 15Mar-20Oct69 | <b>1st Medical Battalion</b>                                       |               |
| LtCol Karl N. Mueller                                                                | 21Oct-31Dec69 | CO Capt James V. Sharp, MC, USN                                    | 1Jan-20Feb69  |
|                                                                                      |               | Capt James W. Lea, MC, USN                                         | 21Feb-31Dec69 |
| <b>4th Battalion, 11th Marines</b>                                                   |               |                                                                    |               |
| CO Maj Bobby J. Ready                                                                | 1Jan-1Jun69   | <b>7th Communication Battalion, 1Jan-15Apr69*</b>                  |               |
| Maj Eric H. Wieler                                                                   | 2Jun-14Jun69  | CO LtCol Charles L. Brady                                          | 1Jan-15Apr69  |
| LtCol John H. Strandquist                                                            | 15Jun-16Oct69 | <i>*Unit transferred to III MAF and combined with 5th Comm Bn.</i> |               |
| LtCol James F. Burke, Jr.                                                            | 17Oct-31Dec69 |                                                                    |               |
| <b>1st Field Artillery Group*</b>                                                    |               |                                                                    |               |
| CO LtCol Raymond B. Ingrando                                                         | 1Jan-15Mar69  | <b>11th Motor Transport Battalion</b>                              |               |
| Maj Edward E. Johnson                                                                | 16Mar-27Mar69 | CO LtCol John A. Kinniburgh                                        | 1Jan-12Sep69  |
| 1stLt Joseph H. Molen                                                                | 28Mar-13Jul69 | Maj Michael J. Zachodni                                            | 13Sep-17Sep69 |
|                                                                                      |               | LtCol William R. Kephart                                           | 18Sep-31Dec69 |
| <i>*Reduced to cadre strength on 1Apr69 and departed RVN on 13Jul69 with RLTF-9.</i> |               |                                                                    |               |
| <b>1st Battalion, 13th Marines, 7Nov-31Dec69</b>                                     |               | <b>7th Engineer Battalion</b>                                      |               |
| CO LtCol Donald H. Strain                                                            | 7Nov-31Dec69  | CO LtCol Themistocles T. Annas                                     | 1Jan-18Aug69  |
|                                                                                      |               | LtCol William G. Bates                                             | 19Aug-31Dec69 |
| <b>1st Reconnaissance Battalion</b>                                                  |               |                                                                    |               |
| CO LtCol Larry P. Charon                                                             | 1Jan-8Feb69   | <b>9th Engineer Battalion</b>                                      |               |
| LtCol Richard D. Mickelson                                                           | 9Feb-7Oct69   | CO LtCol Darrell U. Davidson                                       | 1Jan-20Mar69  |
| LtCol John J. Grace                                                                  | 8Oct-31Dec69  | LtCol Billy F. Visage                                              | 21Mar-31Aug69 |
|                                                                                      |               | LtCol Edward K. Maxwell                                            | 1Sep-31Dec69  |
| <b>1st Tank Battalion</b>                                                            |               |                                                                    |               |
| CO LtCol Maurice C. Ashley, Jr.                                                      | 1Jan-10Mar69  | <b>3d Marine Division, 1Jan-7Nov69</b>                             |               |
|                                                                                      |               | CG MajGen Raymond G. Davis                                         | 1Jan-14Apr69  |
|                                                                                      |               | MajGen William K. Jones                                            | 15Apr-6Jul69  |

|                                                                                                                                                          |               |                                          |               |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|------------------------------------------|---------------|
| BGen Regan Fuller (Acting)                                                                                                                               | 6Jul-12Jul69  | 3d Marines*                              |               |
| MajGen William K. Jones                                                                                                                                  | 13Jul-7Nov69  | CO Col Michael M. Spark                  | 1Jan-15Jan69  |
| ADC BGen Frank E. Garretson                                                                                                                              | 1Jan-22Apr69  | Col Paul D. Lafond                       | 16Jan-27Jun69 |
| BGen Regan Fuller                                                                                                                                        | 23Apr-6Jul69  | Col Wilbur F. Simlik                     | 28Jun-6Oct69  |
| BGen Regan Fuller                                                                                                                                        | 13Jul-7Nov69  | *Unit departed RVN for CONUS, 6Oct69.    |               |
| ADC BGen Robert B. Carney, Jr.                                                                                                                           | 1Jan-9Jun69   | 1st Battalion, 3d Marines*               |               |
| C/S Col Martin J. Sexton                                                                                                                                 | 1Jan-29Aug69  | CO LtCol Richard B. Twohey               | 1Jan-2Feb69   |
| Col Robert P. Wray                                                                                                                                       | 30Aug-7Nov69  | LtCol John S. Kyle                       | 3Feb-10May69  |
| G-1 Col Louis R. Daze                                                                                                                                    | 1Jan-26Feb69  | LtCol David G. Herron                    | 11May-21Sep69 |
| LtCol Edward D. Gelzer, Jr.                                                                                                                              | 26Feb-29Apr69 | *Unit departed RVN for CONUS, 6Oct69.    |               |
| Col Marshall A. Webb, Jr.                                                                                                                                | 30Apr-3Oct69  | 2d Battalion, 3d Marines*                |               |
| LtCol William S. Daniels                                                                                                                                 | 4Oct-7Nov69   | CO LtCol James J. McMonagle              | 1Jan-2Aug69   |
| G-2 Col Thomas P. O'Callaghan                                                                                                                            | 1Jan-29Jun69  | LtCol William S. Daniels                 | 3Aug-21Sep69  |
| LtCol Charles R. Stephenson II                                                                                                                           | 30Jun-7Nov69  | *Unit departed RVN for CONUS, 6Oct69.    |               |
| G-3 Col Paul D. Lafond                                                                                                                                   | 1Jan-16Jan69  | 3d Battalion, 3d Marines*                |               |
| Col Francis R. Kraince                                                                                                                                   | 17Jan-17Jul69 | CO LtCol Richard C. Schulze              | 1Jan-19Aug69  |
| Col Clarence G. Moody, Jr.                                                                                                                               | 18Jul-28Aug69 | LtCol Ernest E. Evans, Jr.               | 20Aug-13Sep69 |
| Col William E. Barrineau                                                                                                                                 | 29Aug-7Nov69  | LtCol David F. Seiler                    | 14Sep-21Sep69 |
| G-4 Col Frank R. Denormandie                                                                                                                             | 1Jan-7Nov69   | *Unit departed RVN for CONUS, 7Oct69.    |               |
| G-5 Col William E. Kerrigan                                                                                                                              | 1Jan-7Nov69   | 4th Marines*                             |               |
| Headquarters Battalion                                                                                                                                   |               | CO Col William F. Goggin                 | 1Jan-9Aug69   |
| CO Marshall A. Webb, Jr.                                                                                                                                 | 1Jan-30Apr69  | Col Gilbert R. Hershey                   | 10Aug-20Nov69 |
| LtCol Stewart B. McCarty, Jr.                                                                                                                            | 1May-25Aug69  | *Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 20Nov69. |               |
| Maj Robert T. Carney                                                                                                                                     | 26Aug-5Sep69  | 1st Battalion, 4th Marines*              |               |
| Maj Keith L. Christensen                                                                                                                                 | 6Sep-9Sep69   | CO LtCol George T. Sargent, Jr.          | 1Jan-21Mar69  |
| LtCol Charles F. King, Jr.                                                                                                                               | 10Sep-7Nov69  | LtCol Clair E. Willcox                   | 22Mar-5Aug69  |
| Task Force Bravo, 1Jan-18Feb69*                                                                                                                          |               | LtCol Joseph A. MacInnis                 | 6Aug-22Oct69  |
| CO Col Truman W. Clark                                                                                                                                   | 1Jan-18Feb69  | *Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 22Oct69. |               |
| XO LtCol Byron T. Chen                                                                                                                                   | 1Jan-18Feb69  | 2d Battalion, 4th Marines*               |               |
| S-1 GySgt Robert D. Smith                                                                                                                                | 1Jan-18Feb69  | CO LtCol Joseph E. Hopkins               | 1Jan-6Sep69   |
| S-2 Maj George L. Shelley III                                                                                                                            | 1Jan-18Feb69  | LtCol William C. Britt                   | 7May-6Sep69   |
| S-3 Maj Harry L. Bauknight                                                                                                                               | 1Jan-18Feb69  | LtCol Donald J. Garrett                  | 7Sep-9Nov69   |
| S-4 1stLt Steven L. Cox                                                                                                                                  | 1Jan-18Feb69  | *Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 9Nov69.  |               |
| *Unit deactivated as operational control passed to 3d Marine Division on 18Feb69.                                                                        |               |                                          |               |
| Task Force Hotel, 1Jan-8Jul69*                                                                                                                           |               | 3d Battalion, 4th Marines*               |               |
| CO BGen Frank E. Garretson                                                                                                                               | 1Jan-31Mar69  | CO LtCol William A. Donald               | 1Jan-10May69  |
| BGen Robert B. Carney, Jr.                                                                                                                               | 1Apr-21May69  | Maj Raymond D. Walters                   | 6May-10May69  |
| MGen Clifford B. Drake                                                                                                                                   | 21May-22May69 | LtCol James W. Wood                      | 10May-20Nov69 |
| BGen Regan Fuller                                                                                                                                        | 22May-8Jul69  | *Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 20Nov69. |               |
| C/S Col Robert D. Slay                                                                                                                                   | 1May-6Jun69   | 9th Marines*                             |               |
| Col Warren L. MacQuarrie                                                                                                                                 | 7Jun-8Jul69   | CO Col Robert H. Barrow                  | 1Jan-8Apr69   |
| G-1 Capt William K. Hoyt, Jr.                                                                                                                            | 1May-15Jun69  | Col Edward F. Danowitz                   | 9Apr-13Aug69  |
| 2dLt Blaine E. Moyer                                                                                                                                     | 16Jun-8Jul69  | *Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 13Aug69. |               |
| G-2 Capt Robert B. Mackenzie                                                                                                                             | 1May-27Jun69  | 1st Battalion, 9th Marines*              |               |
| Maj Larry R. Ogle                                                                                                                                        | 28Jun-8Jul69  | CO LtCol George W. Smith                 | 1Jan-30Mar69  |
| G-3 LtCol George W. Smith                                                                                                                                | 1May-8Jul69   | LtCol Thomas J. Culkin                   | 31Mar-14Jul69 |
| G-4 Maj Donald C. Bickel                                                                                                                                 | 1May-8Jul69   | *Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 14Jul69. |               |
| *With the decision to withdraw the 9th Marines, TF Hotel was deactivated on 8Jul69. Names of personnel serving on staff through 30Apr69 are unavailable. |               |                                          |               |

**2d Battalion, 9th Marines\***

|                                 |               |
|---------------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol George C. Fox          | 1Jan-4Mar69   |
| Maj Patrick G. Collins (Acting) | 5Mar-18Mar69  |
| LtCol George C. Fox             | 19Mar-22Jun69 |
| Maj Robert L. Modjeski          | 23Jun-1Aug69  |

*\*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 1Aug69.*

**3d Battalion, 9th Marines\***

|                                |               |
|--------------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol Elliott R. Laine, Jr. | 1Jan-16Apr69  |
| LtCol Oral R. Swigart, Jr.     | 17Apr-22Jun   |
| LtCol Donald E. Wood           | 23Jun-13Aug69 |

*\*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 13Aug69.*

**12th Marines\***

|                          |              |
|--------------------------|--------------|
| CO Col Peter J. Mulroney | 1Jan-11Jul69 |
| Col Wallace W. Crompton  | 12Jul-9Nov69 |

*\*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 9Nov69.*

**1st Battalion, 12th Marines\***

|                           |              |
|---------------------------|--------------|
| CO LtCol Ermil L. Whisman | 1Jan-15Jan69 |
| LtCol Roddey B. Moss      | 16Jan-7Jun69 |
| LtCol Morgan W. West      | 8Jun-2Oct69  |

*\*Unit departed RVN for CONUS, 2Oct69.*

**2d Battalion, 12th Marines\***

|                                |               |
|--------------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol Joseph R. Scoppa, Jr. | 1Jan-30Mar69  |
| LtCol Calhoun J. Killeen       | 31Mar-31Jul69 |

*\*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 31Jul69.*

**3d Battalion, 12th Marines\***

|                                  |              |
|----------------------------------|--------------|
| CO LtCol Eugene D. Foxworth, Jr. | 1Jan-31Apr69 |
| Maj Robert E. Gibson             | 1May-2Jul69  |
| Maj Harry H. Bair                | 3Aug-18Aug69 |
| LtCol David R. McMillan, Jr.     | 19Aug-5Nov69 |

*\*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 5Nov69.*

**4th Battalion, 12th Marines\***

|                             |               |
|-----------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol Earl W. Bailey     | 1Jan-3May69   |
| LtCol Joseph R. Scoppa, Jr. | 4May-11Jul69  |
| Maj Thomas L. Edwards       | 12Jul-31Jul69 |
| LtCol Alfred J. Croft, Jr.  | 1Aug-29Sep69  |
| Maj Harry H. Bair           | 30Sep-19Nov69 |

*\*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 19Nov69.*

**3d Reconnaissance Battalion\***

|                                 |               |
|---------------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol Aydlette H. Perry, Jr. | 1Jan-29May69  |
| LtCol Richard R. Burritt        | 30May-24Nov69 |

*\*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 24Nov69.*

**3d Tank Battalion\***

|                             |               |
|-----------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol George E. Hayward  | 1Jan-31Jan69  |
| LtCol Joseph Sleger, Jr.    | 1Feb-15Jul69  |
| Maj Raymond G. Kennedy, Sr. | 16Jul-16Sep69 |
| LtCol William S. Rump       | 17Sep-23Oct69 |

*\*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 23Oct69.*

**3d Motor Transport Battalion\***

|                           |              |
|---------------------------|--------------|
| CO Maj George W. Ward     | 1Jan-16Feb69 |
| Maj Joseph F. Lavin       | 17Feb-8Jul69 |
| Maj Raymond S. Davis, Jr. | 9Jul-20Oct69 |

*\*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 20Oct69.*

**3d Engineer Battalion\***

|                           |              |
|---------------------------|--------------|
| CO LtCol Walter L. Persac | 1Jan-15Apr69 |
| LtCol John R. Lilley II   | 16Apr-3Aug69 |
| LtCol Raymond C. Damm     | 4Aug-6Sep69  |
| LtCol James W. Medis      | 7Sep-23Oct69 |

*\*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 23Oct69.*

**3d Shore Party Battalion\***

|                           |               |
|---------------------------|---------------|
| CO Maj Edwin J. Godfrey   | 1Jan-7Mar69   |
| Maj Joseph B. Knotts      | 8Mar-16Aug69  |
| LtCol Eugene E. Paro, Jr. | 17Aug-10Nov69 |

*\*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 10Nov69.*

**1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion\***

|                                   |              |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|
| CO LtCol Walter W. Darnewood, Jr. | 1Jan-30Mar69 |
| Maj David R. Stefansson           | 31Mar-5Jun69 |
| Maj William A. Grubbs III         | 6Jun-15Jun69 |

*\*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 15Jun69.*

**3d Medical Battalion\***

|                                    |               |
|------------------------------------|---------------|
| CO Cdr Barton K. Slemmons, MC, USN | 1Jan-24Jul69  |
| Capt Jacob V. Brown, MC, USN       | 25Jul-24Nov69 |

*\*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 24Nov69.*

**9th Motor Transport Battalion\***

|                              |              |
|------------------------------|--------------|
| CO LtCol Laurier J. Tremblay | 1Jan-22Oct69 |
| Maj Larry D. Derryberry      | 23Oct-4Nov69 |

*\*Unit departed for Okinawa, 4Nov69.*

**11th Engineer Battalion\***

|                          |              |
|--------------------------|--------------|
| CO LtCol Robert C. Evans | 1Jan-6Sep69  |
| Maj Dale R. Thibault     | 7Sep-21Nov69 |

*\*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 21Nov69.*

**Force Logistic Command**

|                              |               |
|------------------------------|---------------|
| CO BGen James A. Feeley, Jr. | 1Dec68-6Nov69 |
| BGen Mauro J. Padalino       | 7Nov-31Dec69  |

**Headquarters and Service Battalion,****1st Force Service Regiment**

|                       |              |
|-----------------------|--------------|
| CO LtCol Edward Lukas | 1Jan-19Aug69 |
| LtCol John H. Miller  | 20Aug-1Dec69 |
| LtCol Lewis R. Webb   | 2Dec-31Dec69 |

**Supply Battalion, 1st Force Service Regiment**

|                          |              |
|--------------------------|--------------|
| CO LtCol Edward G. Usher | 1Jan-31May69 |
| Col William W. Storm III | 1Jun-5Nov69  |
| Col Robert W. Calvert    | 6Nov-31Dec69 |

**Maintenance Battalion,****1st Force Service Regiment**

|                              |               |
|------------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol Edward W. Critchett | 1Jan-16Oct69  |
| LtCol Edward C. Morris       | 17Oct-31Dec69 |

**3d Service Battalion (Rein)****/Force Logistic Support Group Alpha\***

|                               |               |
|-------------------------------|---------------|
| CO Col Horton E. Roeder       | 1Jan-13May69  |
| LtCol William D. Bassett, Jr. | 14May-18Aug69 |
| LtCol Ward R. Reiss           | 19Aug-28Oct69 |
| LtCol William J. Beer         | 29Oct-7Nov69  |

*\*Unit redeployed to Okinawa and replaced by Sub-Unit 1, FLSG "B" (Rear).*

**1st Service Battalion (Rein)****/Force Logistic Support Group Bravo**

|                          |              |
|--------------------------|--------------|
| CO Col Harold L. Parsons | 1Jan-6Sep69  |
| Col Donald E. Morin      | 7Sep-31Dec69 |

**1st Military Police Battalion**

|                           |              |
|---------------------------|--------------|
| CO LtCol James D. Bailey  | 1Jan-8Nov69  |
| LtCol Speros D. Thomaidis | 9Nov-31Dec69 |

**3d Military Police Battalion**

|                              |               |
|------------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol Willard E. Cheatham | 1Jan-14Oct69  |
| LtCol Charles Fimian         | 15Oct-31Dec69 |

**5th Communication Battalion\***

|                        |              |
|------------------------|--------------|
| CO LtCol Jack D. Hines | 1Jan-15Apr69 |
|------------------------|--------------|

*\*Unit transferred to III MAF on 15Apr69 and merged with 7th Communication Battalion.*

**7th Motor Transport Battalion**

|                          |               |
|--------------------------|---------------|
| CO Maj Jerome W. Brown   | 1Jan-27Aug69  |
| Maj G. B. Tucker         | 28Aug-19Oct69 |
| LtCol Richard L. Prather | 20Oct-31Dec69 |

**1st Marine Aircraft Wing**

|                               |               |
|-------------------------------|---------------|
| CG MajGen Charles J. Quilter  | 1Jan-10Jul69  |
| MajGen William G. Thrash      | 11Jul-31Dec69 |
| AWC BGen Henry W. Hise        | 1Jan-28Feb69  |
| Vacant                        | 1Mar-10Jun69  |
| BGen William G. Johnson       | 11Jun-6Nov69  |
| AWC BGen Homer S. Hill        | 1Jan-15May69  |
| BGen Ralph H. Spanjer         | 16May-31Dec69 |
| C/S Col Virgil D. Olson       | 1Jan-6Sep69   |
| Col Robert W. Teller          | 7Sep-31Dec69  |
| G-1 Col Edward A. Parnell     | 1Jan-4Mar69   |
| Col Rex A. Deasy              | 5Mar-30Jun69  |
| Col Grover S. Stewart, Jr.    | 1Jul-31Dec69  |
| G-2 LtCol Hugh R. Bumpas, Jr. | 1Jan-23Feb69  |
| Col John J. Doherty           | 24Feb-11Jul69 |
| Col Leonard L. Orr            | 12Jul-19Sep69 |
| Col James R. Weaver           | 20Sep-31Dec69 |

|                             |               |
|-----------------------------|---------------|
| G-3 Col Edwin H. Finlayson  | 1Jan-10Jun69  |
| Col Robert L. Lamar         | 11Jun-31Dec69 |
| G-4 Col Steve Furimsky, Jr. | 1Jan-5Mar69   |
| Col Norman W. Gourley       | 6Mar-6Aug69   |
| LtCol Neil F. Defenbaugh    | 7Aug-11Aug69  |
| LtCol Edward E. Smith       | 12Aug-15Aug69 |
| Col William C. McGraw, Jr.  | 16Aug-31Dec69 |

**Marine Wing Headquarters Group 1****(MWHG-1)**

|                               |               |
|-------------------------------|---------------|
| CO Col Thomas H. Nichols, Jr. | 1Jan-26Feb69  |
| LtCol Dennis W. Wright        | 27Feb-18Mar69 |
| Col John R. Gill              | 19Mar-18Jul69 |
| LtCol William Shanks, Jr.     | 19Jul-10Nov69 |
| Col Laurence J. Stien         | 11Nov-31Dec69 |

**Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 18****(H&HS-18)**

|                               |              |
|-------------------------------|--------------|
| CO LtCol John R. Dopler       | 1Jan-11Jul69 |
| Capt George P. Turner, Jr.    | 12Jul-3Aug69 |
| LtCol Paul E. Shea            | 4Aug-5Oct69  |
| Maj Herbert E. Hoppmeyer, Jr. | 6Oct-31Dec69 |

**Marine Air Support Squadron 2****(MASS-2)**

|                           |               |
|---------------------------|---------------|
| CO Maj Edward J. Dahy III | 1Jan-10Jan69  |
| LtCol Robert A. Fuller    | 11Jan-5Aug69  |
| Maj Marvin L. Crowdis     | 6Aug-14Aug69  |
| Maj Ronald G. Richardson  | 15Aug-31Oct69 |
| Maj Jerry D. Oden         | 1Nov-23Nov69  |

**Marine Air Support Squadron 3****(MASS-3)**

|                               |               |
|-------------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol William J. Sullivan  | 1Jan-3Mar69   |
| LtCol William H. Jackson, Jr. | 4Mar-11Sep69  |
| LtCol John H. Dubois          | 12Sep-31Dec69 |

**Marine Air Control Squadron 4****(MACS-4)**

|                             |               |
|-----------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol Thomas M. Kauffman | 1Jan-9Mar69   |
| LtCol Edward S. John        | 10Mar-12Aug69 |
| LtCol Robert E. McCamey II  | 13Aug-30Dec69 |
| Maj Robert W. Molyneux, Jr. | 31Dec69       |

**Marine Wing Support Group 17****(MWSG-17)**

|                          |               |
|--------------------------|---------------|
| CO Col Richard S. Rash   | 1Jan-5Mar69   |
| LtCol Harry U. Carpenter | 6Mar-10Aug69  |
| Col Richard A. Savage    | 11Aug-31Dec69 |

**Marine Air Control Group 18****(MACG-18)**

|                                |               |
|--------------------------------|---------------|
| CO Col Edward S. Fris          | 1Jan-16Jul69  |
| Col Stanley G. Dunnwiddie, Jr. | 17Jul-31Dec69 |

**1st Light Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion  
(1st LAAM)\***

CO LtCol John W. Drury 1Jan-7Jul69  
Maj Edward L. House, Jr. 8Jul-16Aug69

*\*Unit departed RVN for CONUS, 16Aug69.*

**Marine Aircraft Group 11  
(MAG-11)**

CO Col Robert D. Slay 1Jan-13Mar69  
Col Steve Furminsky, Jr. 14Mar-12Aug69  
Col John B. Heffernan 13Aug-31Dec69

**Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 11  
(H&MS-11)**

CO LtCol Robert M. Stowers 14May-29Aug69  
LtCol Guy O. Badger 14May-29Aug69  
LtCol Richard F. Hebert 30Aug-31Dec69

**Marine Air Base Squadron 11  
(MABS-11)**

CO LtCol Preston P. Margues, Jr. 1Jan-15May69  
LtCol George W. Glauser 16May-21Oct69  
LtCol Paul A. Manning 22Oct-31Dec69

**Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron 1  
(VMCJ-1)**

CO LtCol Bobby R. Hall 1Jan-16May69  
LtCol Preston P. Marques, Jr. 17May-13Oct69  
LtCol Bob W. Farley 14Oct-31Dec69

**Marine All Weather Attack Squadron 225  
(VMA[AW]-225)\***

CO LtCol Ronald L. Townsend 5Feb-21Jun69  
LtCol Donald L. Harvey 22Jun-28Nov69  
Maj Peter M. Busch 29Nov-31Dec69

*\*From MAG-14, 5Feb69.*

**Marine All Weather Attack Squadron 242  
(VMA[AW]-242)**

CO LtCol Fred C. Rilling, Jr. 1Jan-14Jan69  
LtCol Adnah K. Frain 15Jan-1Jul69  
LtCol Thomas L. Griffin, Jr. 2Jul-31Dec69

**Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 334  
(VMFA-334)\***

CO LtCol James R. Sherman 1Jan-24Jan69

*\*To MAG-13, 24Jan69.*

**Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 542  
(VMFA-542)**

CO LtCol Henry R. Vitali 1Jan-24Feb69  
LtCol Ray N. Stewart 25Feb-10Aug69  
LtCol Keith A. Smith 11Aug-31Dec69

**Marine Aircraft Group 12**

CO Col Rex A. Deasy 1Jan-28Feb69

Col Thomas H. Nichols, Jr. 1Mar-28Sep69  
Col Paul B. Henley 29Sep-31Dec69

**Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 12  
(H&MS-12)**

CO LtCol Clifford D. Warfield 1Jan-9Apr69  
LtCol John J. McCarthy 10Apr-18Sep69  
LtCol Joseph J. Went 19Sep-31Dec69

**Marine Air Base Squadron 12  
(MABS-12)**

CO Maj Lawrence Furstenberg 1Jan-30Apr69  
LtCol John J. Cahill 1May-13Dec69  
LtCol George J. Ertlmeier 14Dec-31Dec69

**Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 121  
(VMFA-121)\***

CO Maj David A. Lerps 1Jan-14Feb69

*\*Redesignated VMA(AW)-121 on 14Feb69 and assigned to 2d Marine Aircraft Wing.*

**Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 211  
(VMFA-211)**

CO LtCol John R. Waterstreet 1Jan-15Mar69  
LtCol Edward T. Graham, Jr. 16Mar-5Sep69  
LtCol Louis Gasparine, Jr. 6Sep-31Dec69

**Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 223  
(VMFA-223)**

CO Maj Leonard T. Preston, Jr. 1Jan-10Apr69  
LtCol Merrill S. Newbill 11Apr-27Sep69  
LtCol James W. Lazzo 28Sep-31Dec69

**Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 311  
(VMFA-311)**

CO LtCol Charles O. Hiatt 1Jan-30Apr69  
LtCol David A. Kelly 1May-24Nov69  
Maj Arthur R. Hickle 25Nov-31Dec

**Marine All Weather Attack Squadron 533  
(VMA[AW]-533)\***

CO LtCol Paul K. German, Jr. 1Jan-28Feb69  
LtCol George H. Shutt, Jr. 1Mar-30Sep69  
LtCol Frank G. Castillo, Jr. 1Oct-7Oct69

*\*Unit departed RVN for Japan, 7Oct69.*

**Marine Aircraft Group 13**

CO Col Norman W. Gourley 1Jan-5Mar69  
Col Richard S. Rash 6Mar-14Sep69  
Col Thomas E. Murphree 15Sep-31Dec69

**Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 13  
(H&MS-13)**

CO Maj Edgar A. House 1Jan-14Jan69  
LtCol Billy M. Adrian 15Jan-13Jun69

|                          |               |
|--------------------------|---------------|
| LtCol Lawrence J. Willis | 14Jun-9Oct69  |
| Maj James D. Moody       | 10Oct-16Nov69 |
| LtCol Douglas L. Snead   | 17Nov-28Dec69 |
| Maj Frank J. Horak, Jr.  | 29Dec-31Dec69 |

**Marine Air Base Squadron 13**  
(MABS-13)

|                                  |               |
|----------------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol Charles V. Smillie, Jr. | 1Jan-23Apr69  |
| LtCol Ira L. Morgan, Jr.         | 24Apr-11Jun69 |
| LtCol Norbert F. Schnippel, Jr.  | 12Jun-4Jul69  |
| LtCol Alfred N. Drago            | 5Jul-5Oct69   |
| LtCol Richard D. Revie           | 6Oct-31Dec69  |

**Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115**  
(VMEA-115)

|                           |              |
|---------------------------|--------------|
| CO LtCol Robert R. Norton | 1Jan-1Jul69  |
| LtCol Edwin C. Paige, Jr. | 2Jul-31Dec69 |

**Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 122**  
(VMEA-122)\*

|                          |              |
|--------------------------|--------------|
| CO LtCol John K. Cochran | 5Sep-31Dec69 |
|--------------------------|--------------|

*\*From MAG-15, 5Sep69.*

**Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232**  
(VMEA-232)\*

|                             |               |
|-----------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol Walter P. Hutchins | 21Mar-11Aug69 |
| LtCol Ralph J. Sorensen     | 12Aug-7Sep69  |

*\*Unit arrived RVN from CONUS, 21Mar69; departed RVN for Japan, 7Sep69.*

**Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314**  
(VMEA-314)

|                                 |              |
|---------------------------------|--------------|
| CO LtCol Frank E. Petersen, Jr. | 1Jan-23Feb69 |
| LtCol Thomas R. Morgan          | 24Feb-8Mar69 |
| LtCol John W. Black             | 9Mar-25Jun69 |
| LtCol Charles G. Frederick      | 26Jun-1Dec69 |
| LtCol Thomas J. Kelly           | 2Dec-31Dec69 |

**Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323**  
(VMEA-323)\*

|                             |              |
|-----------------------------|--------------|
| CO LtCol Ira L. Morgan, Jr. | 1Jan-25Mar69 |
|-----------------------------|--------------|

*\*Unit departed RVN for CONUS, 25Mar69.*

**Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 334**  
(VMEA-334)\*

|                              |               |
|------------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol James R. Sherman    | 24Jan-12Feb69 |
| LtCol Samuel E. D'Angelo III | 13Feb-1Jul69  |
| LtCol John R. Braddon        | 2Jul-30Aug69  |

*\*Unit departed RVN for Japan, 30Aug69.*

**Marine Aircraft Group 16**

|                             |               |
|-----------------------------|---------------|
| CO Col Warren L. MacQuarrie | 1Jan-12Mar69  |
| LtCol Floyd K. Fulton, Jr.  | 13Mar-30Sep69 |
| Col James P. Bruce          | 1Oct-31Dec69  |

**Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 16**  
(H&MS-16)

|                             |               |
|-----------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol Charles W. Gobat   | 1Jan-25May69  |
| LtCol James W. Laseter      | 26May-19Aug69 |
| LtCol Richard A. Bancroft   | 20Aug-22Dec69 |
| Maj Malcolm T. Hornsby, Jr. | 23Dec-31Dec69 |

**Marine Air Base Squadron 16**  
(MABS-16)

|                             |               |
|-----------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol William Cunningham | 1Jan-9May69   |
| Maj John C. Archbold        | 10May-7Jun69  |
| LtCol Joseph R. Donaldson   | 8Jun-30Sep69  |
| LtCol John W. Coffman       | 1Oct-19Dec69  |
| Maj Peter C. Scaglione, Jr. | 20Dec-31Dec69 |

**Marine Observation Squadron 2**  
(VMO-2)

|                            |               |
|----------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol Thomas J. Dumont  | 1Jan-19Mar69  |
| LtCol Clark S. Morris      | 20Mar-16Jul69 |
| LtCol Stanley A. Challgren | 17Jul-31Dec69 |

**Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 167**  
(HML-167)

|                           |               |
|---------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol Thomas F. Miller | 1Jan-12Feb69  |
| LtCol Jack W. Conard      | 13Feb-19Aug69 |
| LtCol James W. Laseter    | 20Aug-7Nov69  |
| LtCol John E. Weber, Jr.  | 8Nov-31Dec69  |

**Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 364**  
(HMM-364)

|                            |               |
|----------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol Merlin V. Statzer | 1Jan-2Feb69   |
| LtCol Eugene R. Brady      | 3Feb-22Aug69  |
| LtCol Charles R. Dunbaugh  | 23Aug-31Dec69 |

**Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463**  
(HMH-463)

|                              |              |
|------------------------------|--------------|
| CO LtCol Roger W. Peard, Jr. | 1Jan-6Mar69  |
| LtCol Raymond M. Ryan        | 7Mar-31Dec69 |

**Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165**  
(HMM-165)\*

|                                 |               |
|---------------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol George L. Patrick, Jr. | 1Jan-24Feb69  |
| LtCol Thomas E. Raines          | 25Feb-13Aug69 |

*\*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 14Aug69.*

**Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263**  
(HMM-263)

|                                |               |
|--------------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol Robert E. Hofstetter  | 1Jan-13May69  |
| LtCol William Cunningham       | 14May-29Sep69 |
| LtCol Walter R. Ledbetter, Jr. | 30Sep-31Dec69 |

**Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361**  
(HMH-361)

|                           |               |
|---------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol Kermit W. Andrus | 26Sep-15Dec69 |
| LtCol Charles A. Block    | 16Dec-31Dec69 |

**Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 161**  
(HMM-161)

|                           |               |
|---------------------------|---------------|
| CO Maj Richard W. Carr    | 16Oct-14Dec69 |
| LtCol Bennie H. Mann, Jr. | 15Dec-31Dec69 |

**Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262**  
(HMM-262)

|                           |               |
|---------------------------|---------------|
| CO Maj Donald J. Meskan   | 16Oct-19Dec69 |
| LtCol Richard A. Bancroft | 20Dec-31Dec69 |

**Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 367**  
(HML-367)

|                            |               |
|----------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol Warren G. Cretney | 16Oct-31Dec69 |
|----------------------------|---------------|

**Marine Aircraft Group 36\***

|                          |               |
|--------------------------|---------------|
| CO Col Bruce J. Matheson | 1Jan-15May69  |
| LtCol Herbert J. Blaha   | 16May-9Jul69  |
| Col Noah C. New          | 10Jul-16Oct69 |
| Col Owen V. Gallentine   | 17Oct-7Nov69  |

*\*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 7Nov69.*

**Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 36**  
(H&MS-36)\*

|                          |               |
|--------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol James B. Bell   | 1Jan-12Sep69  |
| Maj Chester L. Whipple   | 13Sep-23Sep69 |
| Maj Charles A. Carey     | 24Sep-15Oct69 |
| LtCol Bobby R. Wilkinson | 16Oct-27Nov69 |
| Maj Joseph F. Golden     | 28Nov-7Nov69  |

*\*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 7Nov69.*

**Marine Air Base Squadron 36**  
(MABS-36)\*

|                           |               |
|---------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol Dennis W. Wright | 1Jan-9Feb69   |
| LtCol Rondell K. Wood     | 10Feb-15May69 |
| LtCol Ronald E. Nelson    | 16May-5Sep69  |
| Maj Edwin W. Lockard      | 6Sep-23Nov69  |

*\*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 23Nov69.*

**Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265**  
(HMM-265)\*

|                           |              |
|---------------------------|--------------|
| CO LtCol Ralph Thuesen    | 1Jan-15May69 |
| LtCol Robert L. Gray, Jr. | 16May-7Jun69 |

*\*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 7Jun69.*

**Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362**  
(HMM-362)\*

|                          |               |
|--------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol Jack E. Schlarp | 25May-21Aug69 |
|--------------------------|---------------|

*\*To FMFLant, 21Aug69.*

**Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363**  
(HMM-363)\*

|                                 |              |
|---------------------------------|--------------|
| CO LtCol Timothy J. Cronin, Jr. | 1Jan-21Jan69 |
|---------------------------------|--------------|

*\*Unit departed RVN for CONUS, 21Jan69.*

**Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 367**  
(HML-367)\*

|                              |               |
|------------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol Richard L. Robinson | 1Jan-19Feb69  |
| LtCol Bobby R. Wilkinson     | 20Feb-14Oct69 |
| LtCol Warren G. Cretney      | 15Oct-16Oct69 |

*\*To MAG-16, 16Oct69.*

**Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462**  
(HMH-462)\*

|                           |               |
|---------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol Ronald E. Nelson | 1Jan-15May69  |
| LtCol Rondell K. Wood     | 16May-13Oct69 |
| Maj Peter F. Lottsfeldt   | 14Oct-20Oct69 |

*\*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 20Oct69.*

**Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361**  
(HMH-361)\*

|                           |              |
|---------------------------|--------------|
| CO LtCol Kermit W. Andrus | 1Aug-26Sep69 |
|---------------------------|--------------|

*\*To MAG-16, 26Sep69.*

**Provisional Marine Aircraft Group 39**  
(PMAG-39)

|                         |              |
|-------------------------|--------------|
| CO Col Walter Sienko    | 1Jan-6Mar69  |
| Col Edward A. Parnell   | 7Mar-31Jul69 |
| Col Owen V. Gallentine* | 1Aug-15Oct69 |

*\*Assumed command of MAG-36 and staff merged with MAG-36.*

**Provisional Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 39 (PH&MS-39)\***

|                             |               |
|-----------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol Bobby R. Wilkinson | 1Jan-18Feb69  |
| Maj Joseph L. Felter        | 19Feb-11Apr69 |
| LtCol Warren G. Cretney     | 12Apr-10Oct69 |
| Maj Joseph F. Golden        | 11Oct-31Oct69 |

*\*Unit merged with MAG-36.*

**Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 161**  
(HMM-161)\*

|                        |               |
|------------------------|---------------|
| CO LtCol David L. Elam | 1Jan-19Jul69  |
| Maj Richard W. Carr    | 20Jul-15Oct69 |

*\*To MAG-16, 16Oct69.*

**Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262**  
(HMM-262)\*

|                           |              |
|---------------------------|--------------|
| CO LtCol Albert N. Allen  | 1Jan-23Mar69 |
| LtCol James A. Wells, Jr. | 24Mar-8Jul69 |
| Maj Donald J. Meskan      | 9Jul-15Oct69 |

*\*To MAG-16, 16Oct69.*

**Marine Observation Squadron 6**  
(VMO-6)\*

|                        |               |
|------------------------|---------------|
| CO Maj Hans A. Zander  | 1Jan-1Apr69   |
| LtCol Billy D. Bouldin | 2Apr-16Jun69  |
| Maj Albert K. Charlton | 17Jun-12Oct69 |

*\*Unit departed RVN for Okinawa, 12Oct69.*

## Marine Forces, Western Pacific

## 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade/Task Force 79, 1Jan-7Nov69\*

CO BGen John E. Williams 1Jan-12Jun69  
 BGen Robert B. Carney, Jr. 13Jun-7Nov69  
 C/S Col John Lowman, Jr. 1Jan-22Jul69  
 Col John F. McMahon, Jr. 23Jul-13Sep69  
 Col H. Speed Wilson 14Sep-7Nov69  
 G-1 Maj William H. Groesbeck 1Jan-20Feb69  
 Capt Raymond H. Ambrose 21Feb-4Mar69  
 LtCol Keith L. Lynn 5Mar-28Sep69  
 Maj Russell E. Dolan 29Sep-7Nov69  
 G-2 LtCol Aubrey L. Lumpkin 1Jan-26Jan69  
 LtCol Conrad A. Jorgenson 27Jan-19Apr69  
 1stLt Everett J. Boyser, Jr. 20Apr-13Jun69  
 Maj Jack D. Boline 14Jun-14Oct69  
 2dLt Ernest E. Johnson 15Oct-19Oct69  
 Maj Paul B. Tubach 20Oct-7Nov69  
 G-3 LtCol George C. Kliefoth 1Jan-16Feb69  
 Col Clyde W. Hunter 17Feb-9Jul69  
 LtCol William M. Kull 10Jul-6Aug69  
 Col Clarence W. Boyd, Jr. 7Aug-12Sep69  
 Col Ernest R. Reid, Jr. 13Sep-7Nov69  
 G-4 LtCol Stewart B. McCarty, Jr. 1Jan-15Apr69  
 LtCol Raymond McArthur 16Apr-19Aug69  
 Col John H. Keith, Jr. 20Aug-7Nov69

*\*Deactivated on 7 November 1969 and subordinate units transferred to 3d Marine Division, I Marine Expeditionary Force, and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Rear).*

## 26th Marines\*

CO Col Clyde W. Hunter 1Jan-13Feb69  
 Col Ray N. Joens 14Feb-13Jun69  
 Col Ralph A. Heywood 14Jun-7Nov69

*\*To 1st Mar Div, 7Nov69.*

## 1st Battalion, 26th Marines\*

CO LtCol Charles H. Knowles 1Jan-28Feb69  
 LtCol George C. Kliefoth 1Mar-27Jul69  
 LtCol James C. Goodin 28Jul-7Nov69

*\*To 1st Mar Div, 7Nov69.*

## 2d Battalion, 26th Marines\*

CO LtCol William F. Sparks 1Jan-27Feb69  
 LtCol George M. Edmondson, Jr. 28Feb-9Sep69  
 LtCol William C. Drumright 10Sep-7Nov69

*\*To 1st Mar Div, 7Nov69.*

## 3d Battalion, 26th Marines\*

CO LtCol J. W. P. Robertson 1Jan-3Mar69  
 LtCol Edward W. Snelling 4Mar-15Sep69  
 LtCol William A. Simpson 15Sep-7Nov69

*\*To 1st Mar Div, 7Nov69.*

## 1st Battalion, 13th Marines\*

CO LtCol John B. Cantieny 1Jan-27Jun69  
 LtCol David E. Gragan 28Jun-5Sep69  
 LtCol Donald H. Strain 6Sep-7Nov69

*\*To 1st Mar Div, 7Nov69.*

Special Landing Force Alpha  
(SLF Alpha)/CTG 79.4

CO Col John F. McMahon, Jr. 1Jan-5Apr69  
 Col William C. Doty, Jr. 6Apr-17Sep69  
 Col Clarence W. Boyd, Jr. 18Sep-7Nov69

Special Landing Force Bravo  
(SLF Bravo)/CTG 79.5

CO Col Robert R. Wilson 1Jan-28Feb69  
 Col Albert E. Coffeen 1Mar-25Jun69  
 LtCol Harold B. Wilson 26Jun-3Jul69  
 Col Albert E. Coffeen 4Jul-17Oct69  
 Col Clarence W. Boyd, Jr. 18Oct-7Nov69

## Provisional Service Battalion/TG 79.8

CO Col William C. Doty, Jr. 1Jan-29Mar69  
 Maj Raymond C. Kargol 29Mar-12Apr69  
 Col John F. McMahon, Jr. 12Apr-22Jun69  
 Col John M. Keeley 23Jun-7Nov69

## 9th Marines

CO Col Edward F. Danowitz 13Aug-7Sep69  
 Col Jo M. Van Meter 8Sep-7Nov69

## 1st Battalion, 9th Marines

CO LtCol Thomas J. Culkin 14Jul-14Aug69  
 Maj Joe L. Goodwin 15Aug-5Sep69  
 LtCol Donald J. McAdams 6Sep-7Nov69

## 2d Battalion, 9th Marines

CO LtCol Robert L. Modjeski 1Aug-18Oct69  
 Maj Charles G. Bryan 19Oct-27Oct69  
 LtCol James R. Van Den Elzen 28Oct-7Nov69

## 3d Battalion, 9th Marines

CO LtCol Donald E. Wood 13Aug-7Nov69

## 2d Battalion, 12th Marines

CO LtCol Calhoun J. Killen 1Aug-15Sep69  
 Maj Rodney H. Ledet 16Sep-19Oct69  
 LtCol Joe D. Prater 20Oct-7Nov69

## 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion

CO Maj William A. Grubbs III 15Jun-30Sep69  
 Maj Cliff E. Delano 1Oct-7Nov69

**Marine Aircraft Group 15****(MAG-15)/TG 79.3\***

CO Col Clement T. Corcoran 1Jan-6May69  
 Col Joseph A. Mitchell 7May-7Nov69

*\*Control passed from 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade to 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Rear) on 7 November 1969.*

**Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 15****(H&MS-15)**

CO LtCol Kenneth M. Scott 1Jan-21Apr69  
 LtCol Conrad A. Jorgenson 22Apr-3Oct69  
 Maj Lloyd K. Warn 4Oct-7Nov69

**Marine Air Base Squadron 15****(MABS-15)**

CO LtCol Dock H. Pegues 1Jan-4Sep69  
 LtCol Raymond McArthur 5Sep-7Nov69

**Marine Air Control Squadron 8****(MACS-8)**

CO Maj Dirk C. Bierhaalder 1Jan-31Mar69  
 LtCol Thomas M. Kauffman 1Apr-12Sep69  
 LtCol George G. Long 13Sep-7Nov69

**Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152****(VMGR-152)**

CO LtCol Frank R. Smoke 1Jan-31Aug69  
 LtCol Albert H. Manhard, Jr. 1Sep-7Nov69

**Marine All Weather Attack Squadron 533****(VMA[AW]-533)**

CO LtCol Frank P. Costello, Jr. 7Oct-7Nov69

**Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 122****(VMFA-122)\***

CO LtCol Lawrence J. Willis 1Jan-30Apr69  
 LtCol John K. Cochran 1May-5Sep69

*\*To MAG-13, 5Sep69.*

**Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232****(VMFA-232)**

CO LtCol Ralph J. Sorensen 7Sep-7Nov69

**Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 334****(VMFA-334)**

CO LtCol John R. Braddon 30Aug-7Nov69

**Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462****(HMH-462)**

CO Maj Peter F. Lottsfeldt 20Oct-7Nov69

**Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164****(HMM-164)**

CO LtCol Richard T. Trundy 1Jan-7Nov69

**Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165****(HMM-165)**

CO LtCol Thomas E. Raines 14Aug-7Nov69

**Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265****(HMM-265)**

CO LtCol Robert L. Gray, Jr. 7Jun-7Nov69

**Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362****(HMM-362)\***

CO LtCol Jack E. Schlarp 1Jan-25May69

*\*To MAG-36, 25May69.*

**Marine Observation Squadron 6****(VMO-6)**

CO Maj Albert K. Charlton 12Oct-7Nov69

**I Marine Expeditionary Force****Task Force 79 7Nov-31Dec69**

CO MGen William K. Jones 7Nov-31Dec69  
 C/S Col H. Speed Wilson 7Nov-16Nov69  
 Col Charles J. Bailey, Jr. 17Nov-31Dec69  
 G-1 Maj Russell E. Dolan 7Nov-31Dec69  
 G-2 Col Charles R. Stephenson II 7Nov-3Dec69  
 LtCol Joseph A. MacInnis 4Dec-31Dec69  
 G-3 Col Ernest R. Reid, Jr. 7Nov-15Nov69  
 Col H. Speed Wilson 16Nov-31Dec69  
 G-4 Col John H. Keith, Jr. 7Nov-31Dec69

**Special Landing Force Alpha****(SLF Alpha)/CTG 79.4**

CO Col Harold B. Wilson 7Nov-19Nov69  
 Col George G. Chambers, Jr. 20Nov-31Dec69

**Battalion Landing Team 2/9**

CO LtCol James R. Van Den Elzen 7Nov-31Dec69

**Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165****(HMM-165)**

CO LtCol Thomas E. Raines 7Nov-23Nov69  
 LtCol David H. Mitchell 24Nov-31Dec69

**Special Landing Force Bravo****(SLF Bravo)/CTG 79.5**

CO Col Clarence W. Boyd, Jr. 7Nov-31Dec69

**Battalion Landing Team 1/9**

CO LtCol Donald J. McAdams 7Nov-31Dec69

**Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164****(HMM-164)**

CO Maj Robert D. Fowner 7Nov-26Dec69  
 Maj Edward L. Kuykendall 27Dec-31Dec69

**3d Marine Division, 7Nov-31Dec69**

CG MajGen William K. Jones 7Nov-31Dec69

|                                    |               |                                                       |               |
|------------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| ADC BGen Regan Fuller              | 7Nov-16Nov69  | <b>3d Reconnaissance Battalion</b>                    |               |
| BGen Leonard E. Fribourg           | 17Nov-31Dec69 | CO LtCol Richard R. Burritt                           | 7Nov-14Dec69  |
| C/S Col Robert P. Wray             | 7Nov-31Dec69  | Maj Russell I. Kramer                                 | 15Dec-31Dec69 |
| G-1 LtCol William S. Daniels       | 7Nov-31Dec69  | <b>3d Tank Battalion</b>                              |               |
| G-2 Col Charles R. Stephenson II   | 7Nov-8Nov69   | CO LtCol William S. Rump                              | 7Nov-14Dec69  |
| Col Clarence G. Moody, Jr.         | 9Nov-31Dec69  | LtCol Robert W. Martin, Jr.                           | 15Dec-31Dec69 |
| G-3 Col William E. Barrineau       | 7Nov-3Dec69   | <b>3d Motor Transport Battalion</b>                   |               |
| Col Ernest R. Reid, Jr.            | 4Dec-31Dec69  | CO Maj Raymond S. Davis, Jr.                          | 7Nov-31Dec69  |
| G-4 Col Frank R. Denormandie       | 7Nov-8Nov69   | <b>3d Engineer Battalion</b>                          |               |
| <b>Headquarters Battalion</b>      |               | CO LtCol James W. Medis                               | 7Nov-31Dec69  |
| CO LtCol Charles F. King, Jr.      | 7Nov-31Dec69  | <b>3d Shore Party Battalion</b>                       |               |
| <b>4th Marines</b>                 |               | CO LtCol Eugene E. Paro, Jr.                          | 7Nov-31Dec69  |
| CO Col Gilbert R. Hershey          | 7Nov-3Dec69   | <b>3d Medical Battalion</b>                           |               |
| Col William E. Barrineau           | 4Dec-31Dec69  | CO Capt Jacob V. Brown, MC, USN                       | 7Nov-31Dec69  |
| <b>1st Battalion, 4th Marines</b>  |               | <b>9th Motor Transport Battalion</b>                  |               |
| CO LtCol Joseph A. MacInnis        | 7Nov-27Nov69  | CO Maj Larry D. Derryberry                            | 7Nov-31Dec69  |
| LtCol William C. Holmberg          | 28Nov-31Dec   | <b>7th Communication Battalion</b>                    |               |
| <b>2d Battalion, 4th Marines</b>   |               | CO Maj Richard G. Schwarz                             | 7Nov-4Dec69   |
| CO LtCol Donald J. Garrett         | 7Nov-31Dec69  | Maj Albert E. Harwood                                 | 5Dec-31Dec69  |
| <b>3d Battalion, 4th Marines</b>   |               | <b>1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion</b>                |               |
| CO LtCol James W. Wood             | 7Nov-5Dec69   | CO Maj Cliff E. Delano                                | 7Nov-14Nov69  |
| LtCol James P. Kehoe               | 6Dec-31Dec69  | Maj Joseph H. Alexander                               | 15Nov-11Dec69 |
| <b>9th Marines</b>                 |               | LtCol Allan W. Lamb                                   | 12Dec-31Dec69 |
| CO Col Jo M. Van Meter             | 7Nov-3Dec69   | <b>1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Rear), 7Nov-31Dec69*</b> |               |
| Col Robert J. Thomas               | 4Dec-31Dec69  | CO BGen William G. Johnson                            | 7Nov-31Dec69  |
| <b>1st Battalion, 9th Marines*</b> |               | C/S Col Eddie E. Percy                                | 7Nov-14Dec69  |
| CO LtCol Donald J. McAdams         | 7Nov-31Dec69  | Col Roy L. Reed                                       | 15Dec-31Dec69 |
| *OPCON To TF 79.5.                 |               | G-1 Maj Walter J. Klimek                              | 7Nov-31Dec69  |
| <b>2d Battalion, 9th Marines</b>   |               | G-2 Maj Fred G. Newcomb                               | 25Nov-31Dec69 |
| CO LtCol James R. Van Den Elzen    | 7Nov-31Dec69  | G-3 Col Robert L. Fulton                              | 7Nov-1Dec69   |
| <b>3d Battalion, 9th Marines</b>   |               | Maj James W. Pearson                                  | 2Dec-22Dec69  |
| CO LtCol Donald E. Wood            | 7Nov-9Dec69   | Col Albert R. Pytko                                   | 23Dec-31Dec69 |
| Maj Billy E. Pafford               | 10Dec-12Dec69 | G-4 LtCol Edward E. Smith                             | 7Nov-17Nov69  |
| LtCol Herbert M. Hart              | 13Dec-31Dec69 | Col Robert J. Barbour                                 | 18Nov-31Dec69 |
| <b>12th Marines</b>                |               | G-5 Col Leonard L. Orr                                | 7Nov-31Dec69  |
| CO Col Wallace W. Crompton         | 7Nov-31Dec69  | *Assumed MAG-36, 23Nov69.                             |               |
| <b>2d Battalion, 12th Marines</b>  |               | <b>Marine Aircraft Group 15</b>                       |               |
| CO LtCol Fred W. St. Clair         | 7Nov-31Dec69  | CO Col Joseph A. Mitchell                             | 7Nov-14Dec69  |
| <b>3d Battalion, 12th Marines</b>  |               | Col Eddie E. Percy                                    | 15Dec-31Dec69 |
| CO LtCol David R. McMillan, Jr.    | 7Nov-31Dec69  | <b>Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 15</b>       |               |
| <b>4th Battalion, 12th Marines</b> |               | (H&MS-15)                                             |               |
| CO Maj Harry H. Bair               | 7Nov-31Dec69  | CO Maj Lloyd K. Warn                                  | 7Nov-31Dec69  |
|                                    |               | <b>Marine Air Base Squadron 15</b>                    |               |
|                                    |               | (MABS-15)                                             |               |
|                                    |               | CO LtCol Raymond McArthur                             | 7Nov-12Dec69  |
|                                    |               | Maj Robert C. Baughman                                | 13Dec-31Dec69 |

**Marine Air Control Squadron 8\***  
(MACS-8)

CO LtCol George G. Long 7Nov-30Nov69  
\*Passed to MACG-18 (Rear), activated on 27Nov69.

**Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232**  
(VMFA-232)

CO LtCol Ralph J. Sorensen 7Nov-31Dec69

**Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 334**  
(VMFA-334)

CO LtCol John R. Braddon 7Nov-31Dec69

**Marine All Weather Attack Squadron 533**  
(VMA[AW]-533)

CO LtCol Frank P. Costello, Jr. 7Nov-5Dec69  
LtCol Donald L. Harvey 6Nov-31Dec69

**Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152**  
(VMGR-152)\*

CO LtCol Albert H. Manhard, Jr. 7Nov-18Nov69  
\*To MAG-36, 18Nov69.

**Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462**  
(HMH-462)\*

CO LtCol Peter F. Lottsfeldt 7Nov-18Nov69  
\*To MAG-36, 18Nov69.

**Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164**  
(HMM-164)\*

CO LtCol Richard T. Trundy 7Nov-18Nov69  
\*To MAG-36, 18Nov69.

**Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165**  
(HMM-165)\*

CO LtCol Thomas E. Raines 7Nov-18Nov69  
\*To MAG-36, 18Nov69.

**Marine Observation Squadron 6**  
(VMO-6)\*

CO LtCol Albert K. Charlton 7Nov-18Nov69  
\*To MAG-36, 18Nov69.

**Marine Aircraft Group 36**  
(MAG-36), 16Nov-31Dec69

CO Col Owen V. Gallentine 16Nov-31Dec69

**Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 36**  
(H&MS-36), 7Nov-31Dec69

CO LtCol Bobby R. Wilkinson 7Nov-27Dec69  
Maj Joseph F. Golden 28Dec-31Dec69

**Marine Air Base Squadron 36**  
(MABS-36), 30Nov-31Dec69

CO Maj Edwin W. Lockard 30Nov-31Dec69

**Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462**  
(HMH-462)

CO LtCol Peter F. Lottsfeldt 19Nov-31Dec69

**Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164**  
(HMM-164)\*

CO Maj Robert D. Fowner 19Nov-25Dec69  
Maj Edward L. Kuyendall 26Dec-31Dec69  
\*OPCON To TF 79.5.

**Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165**  
(HMM-165)\*

CO LtCol David H. Mitchell 19Nov-31Dec69  
\*OPCON To TF 79.4.

**Marine Observation Squadron 6**  
(VMO-6)

CO LtCol Albert K. Charlton 19Nov-30Nov69  
Maj Jack A. Brandon 1Dec-31Dec69

**Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152**  
(VMGR-152)

CO LtCol Albert H. Manhard, Jr. 19Nov-31Dec69

# Appendix B

## Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

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- A-1E—Douglas Skyraider, a propeller-driven, single-engine, attack aircraft.
- A-4—Douglas Skyhawk, a single-seat, jet attack aircraft in service on board carriers of the U.S. Navy and with land-based Marine attack squadrons.
- A-6A—Grumman Intruder, a twin-jet, twin-seat, attack aircraft specifically designed to deliver weapons on targets completely obscured by weather or darkness.
- AAR—After Action Report.
- ABCCC—Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center, a U.S. Air Force aircraft equipped with communications, data link, and display equipment; it may be employed as an airborne command post or a communications and intelligence relay facility.
- AC-47—Douglas C-47 Skytrain, twin-engine, fixed-wing transport modified with 7.62mm miniguns and used as a gunship.
- AC-119—Fairchild Hiller, C-119 military transport aircraft modified into a gunship with side-firing 7.62mm miniguns.
- ADC—Assistant Division Commander.
- AGC—Amphibious command ship. The current designation is ICC.
- AH-1G—Bell Huey Cobra helicopter specifically designed for close air support.
- AK47—Russian-designed Kalashnikov gas-operated 7.62mm automatic rifle, with an effective range of 400 meters. It was the standard rifle of the North Vietnamese Army.
- AKA—Attack cargo ship, a naval ship designed to transport combat-loaded cargo in an assault landing. LKA is the current designation.
- ALMAR—All Marines, a Commandant of the Marine Corps communication directed to all Marines.
- AIO—Air Liaison Officer, an officer (aviator/pilot) attached to a ground unit who functions as the primary advisor to the ground commander on air operation matters.
- ANGLICO—Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, an organization composed of Marine and Navy personnel specially qualified for control of naval gunfire and close air support. ANGLICO personnel normally provided this service while attached to U.S. Army, Korean, and ARVN units.
- AO—Air Observer, an individual whose primary mission is to observe or to take photographs from an aircraft in order to adjust artillery fire or obtain military information.
- AO—Area of Operations.
- AOA—Amphibious Objective Area, a defined geographical area within which is located the area or areas to be captured by the amphibious task force.
- APA—Attack transport ship, a naval ship, designed for combat loading elements of a battalion landing team. LPA is the current designation.
- APC—Armored Personnel Carrier.
- APD—Airborne Personnel Detector.
- APT—Armed Propaganda Team, a South Vietnamese pacification cadre who carried weapons in self-defense as they attempted to convince South Vietnamese villagers to remain loyal to the government.
- Arc Light—The codename for B-52 bombing missions in South Vietnam.
- ARG—Amphibious Ready Group.
- Arty—Artillery.
- ARVN—Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).
- ASP—Ammunition Supply Point.
- ASRT—Air Support Radar Team, a subordinate operational component of a tactical air control system which provides ground controlled precision flight path guidance and weapons release for attack aircraft.
- B40 rocket—Communist rocket-propelled grenade.
- B-52—Boeing Stratofortress, U.S. Air Force eight-engine, swept-wing, heavy jet bomber.
- BA—Base Area.
- Barrel Roll—Codename for air operations over Laos.
- Bde—Brigade.
- BGen—Brigadier General.
- BLT—Battalion Landing Team.
- Bn—Battalion.
- Btry—Battery.
- C-117D—Douglas Skytrain, a twin-engine transport aircraft. The C-117D was an improved version of the C-47, the military version of the DC-3.
- C-130—Lockheed Hercules, a four-engine turboprop transport aircraft.
- CACO—Combined Action Company.
- CAF—Combined Action Force.
- CAG—Combined Action Group.
- CAP—Combined Action Platoon, see Combined Action Program.
- Capt—Captain.
- CCP—Combined Campaign Plan.
- Cdr—Commander.
- CG—Commanding General.
- CH-46—Boeing Vertol Sea Knight, a twin-engine, tandem-rotor transport helicopter, designed to carry a four-man crew and 17 combat-loaded troops.
- CH-47—Boeing Vertol Chinook, the Army medium-transport helicopter.
- CH-53—Sikorsky Sea Stallion, a single-rotor, heavy transport helicopter powered by two shaft-turbine engines with an average payload of 12,800 pounds. Carries crew of three and 38 combat-loaded troops.
- Chieu Hoi*—The South Vietnamese amnesty program designed to attract Communist troops and cadre to defect to the government cause.
- CICV—Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam.
- CIDG—Civilian Irregular Defense Group, South Vietnamese paramilitary force, composed largely of Montagnards, the nomadic tribesmen who populate the South Vietnamese highlands, and advised by the U.S. Army Special Forces.
- CinCPac—Commander in Chief, Pacific.

- CinCPacFlt—Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.  
 CIT—Counter Intelligence Team.  
 Claymore—A U.S. directional antipersonnel mine.  
 CMC—Commandant of the Marine Corps.  
 CMH—Center of Military History, Department of the Army.  
 CO—Commanding Officer.  
 Co—Company.  
 COB—Combat Operations Base.  
 COC—Combat Operations Center.  
 Col—Colonel.  
 Combined Action Program—A Marine pacification program which integrated a Marine infantry squad with a South Vietnamese Popular Force platoon in a Vietnamese village.  
 ComdC—Command Chronology.  
 ComdHist—Command History.  
 ComNavForPac—Commander, Naval Forces, Pacific.  
 ComNavForV—Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam.  
 COMUSMACV—Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.  
 CORDS—Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, the agency organized under MACV in May 1967 and charged with coordinating U.S.-Vietnamese pacification efforts.  
 COSVN—*Central Office of South Vietnam*, the nominal Communist military and political headquarters in South Vietnam.
- CP—Command Post.  
 CPDC—Central Pacification and Development Council, the South Vietnamese government agency responsible for coordinating the pacification plan.  
 CRC—Control and Reporting Center, an element of the U.S. Air Force tactical air control system, subordinate to the Tactical Air Control Center, which conducted radar and warning operations.  
 C/S—Chief of Staff.  
 CTZ—Corps Tactical Zone.  
 CUPP—Combined Unit Pacification Program, a variation of the combined action concept and involving the integration of a Marine line company with a Popular Force or Regional Force unit.
- DAIS—Da Nang Anti-Infiltration System.  
 DASC—Direct Air Support Center, a subordinate operational component of the Marine air control system designed for control of close air support and other direct air support operations.  
 D-Day—Day scheduled for the beginning of an operation.  
 DD—Navy destroyer.  
 Det—Detachment.  
 Div—Division.  
 DMZ—Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam.  
 DOD—Department of Defense.  
 DSA—District Senior Advisor.  
 Dtd—Dated.
- EA-6A—The electronic-countermeasures version of the A-6A Intruder.  
 ECM—Electronic Countermeasures, a major subdivision of electronic warfare involving actions against enemy electronic equipment or to exploit the enemy's use of electromagnetic radiations from such equipment.  
 EF-10B—An ECM-modified version of the Navy F-3D Skyknight, a twin-engine jet night-fighter of Korean War vintage.  
 Engt—Engineer.
- F-4B—McDonnell Phantom II, a twin-engined, two-seat, long-range, all-weather jet interceptor and attack bomber.  
 F-4J—McDonnell Phantom II with air-to-air capabilities.  
 FAC(A)—Forward Air Controller (Airborne).  
 FDC—Fire Direction Center.  
 FFV—Field Force, Vietnam I and II, U.S. Army commands in II and III Corps areas of South Vietnam.  
 FLC—Force Logistic Command.  
 FLSG—Force Logistic Support Group.  
 FLSU—Force Logistic Support Unit.  
 FMFPac—Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.  
 FO—Forward Observer.  
*Front 4*—A Communist headquarters subordinate to *MR-5* and responsible for Quang Nam Province.  
 FSB—Fire Support Base.  
 FSCC—Fire Support Coordination Center, a single location involved in the coordination of all forms of fire support.  
 FSR—Force Service Regiment.  
 Fwd—Forward.  
 FWMF—Free World Military Force.
- G—Refers to staff positions on a general staff, e.g., G-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel; G-2, intelligence; G-3, operations; G-4, logistics; and G-5, civil affairs.  
 Gen—General.  
 Golden Fleece—Marine rice harvest protection operation.  
 Grenade Launcher, M79—U.S.-built, single-shot, breech-loaded shoulder weapon which fires 40mm projectiles and weighs approximately 6.5 pounds when loaded; it has a sustained rate of aimed fire of five-seven rounds per minute and an effective range of 375 meters.  
 Gun, 175mm, M107—U.S.-built, self-propelled gun which weighs 62,000 pounds and fires a 147-pound projectile to a maximum range of 32,800 meters. Maximum rate of fire is one round every two minutes.  
 GVN—Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam).
- H&I fires—Harassing and Interdiction fires.  
 H&MS—Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron.  
 H&S Co—Headquarters and Service Company.  
 HAWK—A mobile, surface-to-air guided missile, designed to defend against low-flying enemy aircraft and short-range missiles.  
 HE—High Explosive.  
 HES—Hamlet Evaluation System, the computerized statistical data system used to measure pacification in the hamlets and villages of South Vietnam.  
 H-Hour—The specific hour an operation begins.  
 HMH—Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron.  
 HMM—Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron.  
*Hoi Chanh*—A Viet Cong or North Vietnamese defector under the *Chieu Hoi* amnesty program.  
 Howitzer, 8-inch (M55)—U.S.-built, self-propelled, heavy-artillery piece with a maximum range of 16,900 meters and a rate of fire of one round every two minutes.  
 Howitzer, 105mm, M101A1—U.S.-built, towed, general purpose light artillery piece with a maximum range of 11,000 meters and maximum rate of fire of four rounds per minute.  
 Howitzer, 155mm, M114A towed and M109 self-propelled—U.S.-built medium artillery with a maximum range of 15,080 meters and a maximum rate of fire of three rounds per minute. Marines employed both models in Vietnam. The newer and heav-

- ier self-propelled M109 was largely road-bound, while the lighter, towed M114A could be moved either by truck or by helicopter.
- HQ or Hq—Headquarters.
- Howtar—A 4.2 (107mm) mortar tube mounted on a 75mm pack howitzer frame.
- "Huey"—Popular name for UH-1 series of helicopters.
- I Corps—The military and administrative subdivision which included the five northern provinces of South Vietnam.
- I MAF—I Marine Amphibious Force.
- I MEF—I Marine Expeditionary Force.
- Intel—Intelligence.
- Intvw—Interview.
- IOD—Integrated Observation Device.
- ITT—Interrogation/Translator Team.
- JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.).
- JGS—Joint General Staff (South Vietnamese).
- KC-130—The in-flight refueling tanker configuration of the C-130 Lockheed Hercules.
- KIA—Killed in Action.
- Kingfisher operations—Heliborne combat patrols for quick reaction operations.
- Kit Carson Scout—Viet Cong defectors recruited by Marines to serve as scouts, interpreters, and intelligence agents.
- L-Hour—In planned helicopter operations, it is the specific hour the helicopters land in the landing zone.
- LAAM Bn—Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion.
- LCM—Landing Craft Mechanized, designed to land tanks, trucks, and trailers directly onto the beach.
- LCVP—Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel, a small craft with a bow ramp used to transport assault troops and light vehicles to the beach.
- LKA—The current designation for an attack cargo ship. See AKA.
- LOC—Lines of Communication.
- LOI—Letter of Instruction.
- LPD—Amphibious transport, dock, a ship designed to transport and land troops, equipment, and supplies by means of embarked landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and helicopters. It had both a submersible well deck and a helicopter landing deck.
- LPH—Amphibious assault ship, a ship designed or modified to transport and land troops, equipment, and supplies by means of embarked helicopters.
- LSA—Logistic Support Area.
- LSD—Landing Ship, Dock, a landing ship designed to combat load, transport, and launch amphibious crafts or vehicles together with crews and embarked personnel, and to provide limited docking and repair services to small ships and crafts. It lacks the helicopter landing deck of the LPD.
- LST—Landing Ship, Tank, landing ship designed to transport heavy vehicles and to land them on a beach.
- Lt—Lieutenant.
- LtCol—Lieutenant Colonel.
- LtGen—Lieutenant General.
- Ltr—Letter.
- IVTP or IVP—Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Personnel, an amphibian vehicle used to land and/or transport personnel.
- LZ—Landing Zone.
- MAB—Marine Amphibious Brigade.
- MABS—Marine Air Base Squadron.
- Machine gun, .50-caliber—U.S.-built, belt-fed, recoil-operated, air-cooled automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 80 pounds without mount or ammunition; it has a sustained rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,450 meters.
- Machine gun, M60—U.S.-built, belt-fed, gas-operated, air-cooled, 7.62mm automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 20 pounds without mount or ammunition; it has a sustained rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,000 meters.
- MACS—Marine Air Control Squadron, provides and operates ground facilities for the detection and interception of hostile aircraft and for the navigational direction of friendly aircraft in the conduct of support operations.
- MACV—Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
- MAF—Marine Amphibious Force.
- MAG—Marine Aircraft Group.
- Main Force—Refers to organized Viet Cong battalions and regiments as opposed to local guerrilla groups.
- Maj—Major.
- MajGen—Major General.
- MarDiv—Marine Division.
- Marines—Designates a Marine regiment, e.g., 3d Marines.
- MASS—Marine Air Support Squadron, provides and operates facilities for the control of aircraft operating in direct support of ground forces.
- MAU—Marine Advisory Unit, the Marine advisory unit under the Naval Advisory Group which administered the advisory effort to the South Vietnamese Marine Corps; not to be confused with a Marine Amphibious Unit.
- MAW—Marine Aircraft Wing.
- MCAS—Marine Corps Air Station.
- MCO—Marine Corps Order.
- MedCap—Medical Civilian Assistance Program.
- MedEvac—Medical Evacuation.
- MIA—Missing'in Action.
- MilHistBr—Military History Branch.
- MO—Mount Out.
- MOA—Mount Out Augmentation.
- Mortar, 4.2-inch, M30—U.S.-built, rifled, muzzle-loaded, drop-fired weapon consisting of tube, base-plate and standard; weapon weighs 330 pounds and has maximum range of 4,020 meters. Rate of fire is 20 rounds per minute.
- Mortar, 60mm, M19—U.S.-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded weapon, which weighs 45.2 pounds when assembled; it has a maximum rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and sustained rate of fire of 18 rounds per minute; the effective range is 2,000 meters.
- Mortar, 81mm, M29—U.S.-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, which weighs approximately 115 pounds when assembled; it has a sustained rate of fire of two rounds per minute and an effective range of 2,300-3,650 meters, depending upon ammunition used.
- Mortar, 82mm—Soviet-built, smooth-bore, mortar, single-shot, high angle of fire weapon which weighs approximately 123 pounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 25 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 3,040 meters.
- Mortar, 120mm—Soviet- or Chinese Communist-built, smooth bore, drop or trigger fired, mortar which weighs approximately 600

pounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 15 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 5,700 meters.

*MR-5*—political and military sector in northern South Vietnam, including all of I Corps. NVA units in *MR-5* did not report to *COSVN*.

Ms—Manuscript.

Msg—Message.

NAC—Northern Artillery Cantonment.

NAG—Naval Advisory Group.

NAS—Naval Air Station.

NCO—Noncommissioned Officer.

NGLO—Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer.

NLF—National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Communist-led insurgency against the South Vietnamese Government.

NMCB—Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (Seabees).

NPFF—National Police Field Force.

NSA—Naval Support Activity.

NSC—National Security Council.

NSDC—Northern Sector Defense Command.

*Nui*—Vietnamese word for hill or mountain.

*Nung*—A Vietnamese tribesman, of a separate ethnic group, probably of Chinese origin.

NVA—North Vietnamese Army, often used colloquially to refer to a North Vietnamese soldier.

O-1B—Cessna, single-engine observation aircraft.

OAB, NHD—Operational Archives Branch, Naval History Division.

Ontos—U.S.-built, lightly armored, tracked antitank vehicle armed with six coaxially-mounted 106mm recoilless rifles.

OpCon—Operational Control, the authority granted to a commander to direct forces assigned for specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location.

OpO—Operation Order, a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the execution of an operation.

OP—Outpost or observation point.

OPlan—Operation Plan, a plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession; it is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders.

OpSum—Operational Summary.

ORLL—Operations Report/Lessons Learned.

OV-10A—North American Rockwell Bronco, twin-engine aircraft specifically designed for light armed reconnaissance missions.

*PAVN*—*Peoples Army of Vietnam* (North Vietnam). This acronym was dropped in favor of *NVA*.

PDC—Pacification and Development Councils.

PF—Popular Force, Vietnamese militia who were usually employed in the defense of their own communities.

Phoenix program—A covert U.S. and South Vietnamese program aimed at the eradication of the Viet Cong Infrastructure in South Vietnam.

PIIC—Photo Imagery Interpretation Center.

PRC-25—Standard radio used by Marine ground units in Vietnam that allowed for voice communication for distances up to 25 miles.

Project Delta—A special South Vietnamese reconnaissance group consisting of South Vietnamese Special Forces troops and U.S. Army Special Forces advisors.

PRU—Provincial Reconnaissance Unit.

PSA—Province Senior Advisor.

PSDF—Peoples Self-Defense Force, a local self-defense force organized by the South Vietnamese Government after the enemy's Tet offensive in 1968.

QDSZ—Quang Da Special Zone.

R&R—Rest and Recreation.

Recoilless rifle, 106mm, M401A1—U.S.-built, single-shot, recoilless, breech-loaded weapon which weighs 438 pounds when assembled and mounted for firing; it has a sustained rate of fire of six rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,365 meters.

Regt—Regiment.

Rein—Reinforced.

Revolutionary Development—The South Vietnamese pacification program started in 1966.

Revolutionary Development Teams—Specially trained Vietnamese political cadre who were assigned to individual hamlets and villages and conducted various pacification and civilian assistance tasks on a local level.

RF-4B—Photo-reconnaissance model of the F4B Phantom II.

RF—Regional Force, Vietnamese militia who were employed in a specific area.

Rifle, M14—Gas-operated, magazine-fed, air-cooled, semi-automatic, 7.62mm caliber shoulder weapon, which weighs 12 pounds with a full 20-round magazine; it has a sustained rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and an effective range of 460 meters.

Rifle, M16—Gas-operated, magazine-fed, air-cooled, automatic, 5.56mm caliber shoulder weapon, which weighs three pounds with a 20-round magazine; it has a sustained rate of fire of 12-15 rounds per minute and an effective range of 460 meters.

RLT—Regimental Landing Team.

ROK—Republic of Korea.

Rolling Thunder—Codename for U.S. air operations over North Vietnam.

Rough Rider—Organized vehicle convoys, often escorted by helicopters and armored vehicles, using Vietnam's roads to supply Marine bases.

ROE—Rules of Engagement.

RPG—Rocket Propelled Grenade.

RVN—Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).

RVNAF—Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.

RZ—Reconnaissance Zone.

S—Refers to staff positions on regimental and battalion levels. S-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel; S-2, intelligence; S-3, operations; S-4, logistics; and S-5, civil affairs.

SAM—Surface to Air Missile.

SecDef—Secretary of Defense.

SecState—Secretary of State.

Seventh AF—Seventh Air Force, the major U.S. Air Force command in Vietnam.

Seventh Fleet—The U.S. fleet assigned to the Pacific.

SFD—Surprise Firing Device, a euphemism for a boobytrap.

SID—Seismic Intrusion Device, sensor used to monitor movement through ground vibrations.

SLF—Special Landing Force.

SMA—Senior Marine Advisor.

- SOG—Studies and Operations Group, the cover name for the organization that carried out cross-border operations.
- Song*—Vietnamese for “river.”
- SOP—Standing Operating Procedure, set of instructions laying out standardized procedures.
- Sortie—An operational flight by one aircraft.
- Sparrow Hawk—A small rapid-reaction force on standby, ready for insertion by helicopter for reinforcement of units in contact with the enemy.
- SSDC—Southern Sector Defense Command.
- Steel Tiger—The codename for the air campaign over Laos.
- Stingray—Special Marine reconnaissance missions in which small Marine reconnaissance teams call artillery and air attacks on targets of opportunity.
- TAC(A)—Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne), an officer in an airplane, who coordinates close air support.
- TACC—Tactical Air Control Center, the principal air operations installation for controlling all aircraft and air-warning functions of tactical air operations.
- TACP—Tactical Air Control Party, a subordinate operational component of a tactical air control system designed to provide air liaison to land forces and for the control of aircraft.
- TADC—Tactical Air Direction Center, an air operations installation under the Tactical Air Control Center, which directs aircraft and aircraft warning functions of the tactical air center.
- TAFDS—Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System, the expeditionary storage and dispensing system of aviation fuel at tactical airfields. It uses 10,000-gallon fabric tanks to store the fuel.
- TAOC—Tactical Air Operations Center, a subordinate component of the air command and control system which controls all en-route air traffic and air defense operations.
- Tank, M48—U.S.-built 50.7-ton tank with a crew of four; primary armament is turret-mounted 90mm gun with one .30-caliber and one .50-caliber machine gun; has maximum road speed of 32 miles per hour and an average range of 195 miles.
- TAOC—Tactical Air Operations Center, a subordinate component of the air command and control system which controls all en-route air traffic and air defense operations.
- TAOI—Tactical Area of Interest.
- TAOR—Tactical Area of Responsibility, a defined area of land for which responsibility is specifically assigned to the commander of the area as a measure for control of assigned forces and coordination of support.
- TE—Table of Equipment.
- TF—Task Force.
- TG—Task Group.
- TO—Table of Organization.
- TO&E—Table of Organization and Equipment.
- Trung-si*—A South Vietnamese Popular Force sergeant.
- TU—Task Unit.
- UCMJ—Uniform Code of Military Justice.
- UH-1E Bell “Huey”—A single-engine, light attack/observation helicopter noted for its maneuverability and firepower; carries a crew of three; it can be armed with air-to-ground rocket packs and fuselage-mounted, electrically-fired machine guns.
- UH-34D—Sikorsky Sea Horse, a single-engine medium transport helicopter with a crew of three, carries eight to 12 combat soldiers, depending upon weather conditions.
- USA—U.S. Army.
- USAAG—U.S. Army Advisory Group.
- USAF—U.S. Air Force.
- USAID—U.S. Agency for International Development.
- USARV—U.S. Army, Vietnam.
- USASuppComDaNang—U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang.
- USIA—U.S. Information Agency.
- USMC—U.S. Marine Corps.
- USN—U.S. Navy.
- VC—Viet Cong, a term used to refer to the Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam; a contraction of the Vietnamese phrase meaning “Vietnamese Communists.”
- Viet Minh—The Vietnamese contraction for Viet Nam Doc Lap Nong Minh Hoi, a Communist-led coalition of nationalist groups, which actively opposed the Japanese in World War II and the French in the first Indochina War.
- VCI—Viet Cong Infrastructure.
- VCLF—Viet Cong Local Force.
- VMA—Marine attack squadron (in naval aviation, the “V” designates “heavier than air” as opposed to craft that are “lighter than air”).
- VMF(AW)—Marine Fighter Squadron (All-Weather).
- VMFA—Marine Fighter Attack Squadron.
- VMCJ—Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron.
- VMGR—Marine Refueller Transport Squadron.
- VMO—Marine Observation Squadron.
- VNAF—Vietnamese Air Force.
- VNMB—Vietnamese Marine Brigade.
- VNMC—Vietnamese Marine Corps.
- VNN—Vietnamese Navy.
- VT—Variable timed electronic fuze for an artillery shell which causes airburst over the target area.
- WestPac—Western Pacific.
- WIA—Wounded in Action.

# Appendix C

## Chronology of Significant Events January-December 1969

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- 1 January South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu suggested that the ARVN was "ready to replace part of the allied forces" in 1969.
- 5 January President-elect Richard M. Nixon named Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to succeed Ambassador W. Averell Harriman as chief U.S. negotiator at the Paris talks. He also appointed Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to continue at his post in Saigon.
- 20 January Richard M. Nixon inaugurated President of the United States.
- 22 January Operation Dewey Canyon began in the Da Krong Valley of Quang Tri Province with the lift of elements of Colonel Robert H. Barrow's 9th Marines and supporting artillery from Vandegrift Combat Base into the area.
- 31 January U.S. military strength in South Vietnam numbered 539,800, of which 81,000 were Marines.
- 16 February Allied forces observed a 24-hour ceasefire during *Tet*. Despite the ceasefire, VC/NVA forces committed 203 truce violations, which resulted in the loss of six killed and 94 wounded in I Corps.
- 23 February Communist forces launched a major offensive throughout South Vietnam, one day following the expiration of the seven-day Viet Cong proclaimed truce for *Tet*.
- 25 February Fire Support Bases Neville and Russell came under heavy enemy ground and mortar attacks, resulting in the loss of 30 and the wounding of 79 Marines.
- 27 February During Operation Dewey Canyon, men of the 9th Marines uncovered the largest single haul of enemy arms and ammunition in the war to date.
- 28 February The 3d Marine Division ended Operations Scotland II and Kentucky. During Scotland II, more than 3,300 enemy troops were killed, while friendly casualties were 463 killed. Operation Kentucky resulted in over 3,900 enemy and 520 U.S. casualties.
- 2 March Village and hamlet elections were held throughout South Vietnam. In I Corps, the percentage of the population voting ranged from 82 percent in Quang Nam Province to 92 percent in Quang Tri. The enemy made no attempt to disrupt the voting.
- 3 March The Marine Corps received its first CH-53D assault helicopter. The helicopter, intended to replace the CH-53A, introduced into Vietnam in late 1966, could transport four tons of cargo or 38 combat troops.
- 7 March Allied intelligence estimates of enemy strength place 40,000 NVA and between 60,000 and 70,000 VC in I Corps Tactical Zone, a majority of which were said to be in the northern provinces.
- 9 March 1st Marine Division Operation Taylor Common ended in Quang Nam Province. The operation, which began on 7 December 1968, accounted for close to 1,400 enemy killed and 610 captured.
- 16 March The U.S. battleship *New Jersey* departed the coast of Vietnam.

- 26 March Lieutenant General Herman Nickerson, Jr., replaced Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., as Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force.
- 30 March III MAF engineers completed the construction of Liberty Bridge, which spanned the Song Thu Bon, south of Da Nang.
- 3 April COMUSMACV confirmed that more Americans had been killed in Vietnam than in the Korean War. Vietnam had cost 33,641 lives since January 1961, compared to 33,629 lost in Korea.
- 7 April A Joint Coordinating Council was established by CG III MAF and CG ICTZ to monitor, coordinate, and support pacification and development programs within ICTZ.
- 10 April The first four AH-1G "Cobra" gunships arrived at Da Nang to begin air operations with Marine Observation Squadron 2.
- 15 April Major General William K. Jones replaced Major General Raymond G. Davis as Commanding General, 3d Marine Division.
- 17 April Marine firepower increased with the introduction of the first 175mm guns, scheduled to replace the 155mm guns of the 1st, 3d, and 5th 155mm Gun Batteries.
- 23 April More than 250 student leaders from colleges throughout the United States made a public statement that they would refuse induction into the armed forces so long as the war continued in Vietnam.
- 27 April A grass fire spread to the Navy/Marine Ammo Supply Point 1 at Da Nang, resulting in its complete destruction.
- 3 May Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird said the United States could begin troop withdrawals if any of the following three basic conditions were met: agreement of mutual withdrawals; sufficient improvement of South Vietnamese forces; and a substantial reduction of VC/NVA activity in South Vietnam.
- 6 May III Marine Amphibious Force, composed of the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Force Logistic Command, and the Army's XXIV Corps, Americal Division, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), and 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), began its fifth year in Vietnam.
- 8 May The Vietnamese Communists issued a 10-point proposal for peace, the most important new element of which was an attempt to limit United States participation in negotiations to the subject of a unilateral withdrawal from South Vietnam.
- 10 May Operation Apache Snow began in the southern Da Krong and northern A Shau Valleys and involved the 9th Marines and elements of the 101st Airborne Division. During the operation, which ended on 7 June, troops of the 101st assaulted and captured heavily fortified Dong Ap Bia, or as it later became known, "Hamburger Hill."
- 12 May The VC/NVA struck throughout South Vietnam with the largest number of attacks since *Tet* 1968.
- 29 May The 7th Marines multi-battalion Operation Oklahoma Hills ended. Enemy losses during the two-month operation were placed at 596, while friendly losses numbered 53 killed and 487 wounded.
- 8 June President Nixon announced that 25,000 troops would be withdrawn from South Vietnam by the end of August.

- 14 June Marine, Korean, and South Vietnamese troops began Operation Pipestone Canyon, south of Da Nang. Before ending in November, the enemy would lose close to 500 troops.
- 13 June Secretary of Defense Laird announced that the 9th Marines, in addition to Army and Navy units, would be withdrawn beginning in mid-July.
- 15 June The 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion began deployment from Vietnam to Okinawa.
- 11 July Major General Charles J. Quilter was relieved by Major General William G. Thrash as Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
- 14 July Battalion Landing Team 1/9 sailed from Da Nang for Okinawa on board ships of the Seventh Fleet, initiating Phase I of President Nixon's 25,000-troop withdrawal plan.
- 20 July Racial riots at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, resulted in the death of one Marine and serious injury to another.
- August The Combined Action Program reached its authorized strength of 114 platoons.
- 13 August Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 departed Vietnam for Okinawa under the announced 25,000-man troop reduction. The squadron was the first major unit of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing to depart Vietnam.
- 14 August The 9th Regimental Landing Team completed its redeployment from Vietnam with the departure of the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines.
- 18 August The last UH-34D "Sea Horse" Squadron, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362, departed Vietnam to be redesignated Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 362 after receiving CH-53 aircraft. The squadron was the first unit of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing to serve in Vietnam, arriving in April 1962.
- September Three disturbances took place over alleged mistreatment of prisoners at the Camp Pendleton brig. Three guards were disciplined for using excessive force in quelling disruptive prisoners.
- 3 September Marine Corps Commandant, General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., authorized "Afro" haircuts and the use of the upraised fist as a greeting among black Marines.
- 3 September North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh died.
- 16 September President Nixon announced another troop withdrawal. Of a total reduction of 40,500, more than 18,400 would be Marines, most of whom would come from the 3d Marine Division.
- 21 September Secretary of Defense Laird announced the deactivation of the 5th Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, California. The 26th Marines, still in Vietnam, would not be deactivated with the remainder of the division.
- 29 September The Marine Corps announced a cutback of 20,300 in total strength. It was felt that a reduction in recruiting would reduce the size of the Corps without any rollback of temporary officer promotions or any reversion of temporary officers to enlisted status before 1 July 1970.
- 15 October Throughout the United States, Vietnam Moratorium demonstrations were held.
- 7 November The 9th Marine Amphibious Force was deactivated; I Marine Ex-

- peditionary Force was created as an amphibious ready force in the Western Pacific; and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Rear) was activated in Japan. CG, I MEF was to exercise operational control of the 3d Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Rear).
- 13-15 November Critics of the war in Vietnam demonstrated in Washington with a march from Arlington Cemetery to the Capitol.
- 19 November The Nixon Administration's military draft lottery bill was passed by Congress.
- 20 November Marine Air Group 36 completed its move from Phu Bai to Futema, Okinawa, where it assumed control of the helicopter and observation squadrons which had been redeployed from Vietnam.
- 26 November The 5th Marine Division was deactivated and the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade came into existence.
- 1 December The first drawing of the draft lottery was conducted; those 19-year-olds whose birthdate was 14 September and whose last name began with "J" would be the first called.
- 15 December Major General Edwin B. Wheeler relieved Major General Ormond R. Simpson as Commanding General, 1st Marine Division.
- 15 December With the completion of Phase II redeployment, Marine authorized strength in the Republic of Vietnam stood at 55,300.
- 15 December President Nixon announced that the third round of American troop withdrawals from Vietnam was to be completed by 15 April 1970.
- 31 December Marine actual strength in South Vietnam stood at 54,559 at the end of 1969.

# Appendix D

## Medal of Honor Citations

### 1969

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The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL RICHARD A. ANDERSON  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

#### CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as an Assistant Team Leader with Company E, Third Reconnaissance Battalion, Third Marine Division, in connection with combat operations against an armed enemy in the Republic of Vietnam. While conducting a patrol during the early morning hours of 24 August 1969, Lance Corporal Anderson's reconnaissance team came under a heavy volume of automatic weapons and machine gun fire from a numerically superior and well-concealed enemy force. Although painfully wounded in both legs and knocked to the ground during the initial moments of the fierce fire fight, Lance Corporal Anderson assumed a prone position and continued to deliver intense suppressive fire in an attempt to repulse the attackers. Moments later he was wounded a second time by an enemy soldier who had approached to within eight feet of the team's position. Undaunted, he continued to pour a relentless stream of fire at the assaulting unit, even while a companion was treating his leg wounds. Observing an enemy grenade land between himself and the other Marine, Lance Corporal Anderson immediately rolled over and covered the lethal weapon with his body, absorbing the full effects of the detonation. By his indomitable courage, inspiring initiative, and selfless devotion to duty, Lance Corporal Anderson was instrumental in saving several Marines from serious injury or possible death. His actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life in the service of his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS OSCAR P. AUSTIN  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as an Assistant Machine Gunner with Company E, Second Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine Division in connection with operations against enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam. During the early morning hours of 23 February 1969, Private First Class Austin's observation post was subjected to a fierce ground attack by a large North Vietnamese Army force supported by a heavy volume of hand grenades, satchel charges and small arms fire. Observing that one of his wounded companions had fallen unconscious in a position dangerously exposed to the hostile fire, Private First Class Austin unhesitatingly left the relative security of his fighting hole and, with complete disregard for his own safety, raced across the fire-swept terrain to assist the Marine to a covered location. As he neared the casualty, he observed an enemy grenade land nearby and, reacting instantly, leaped between the injured Marine and the lethal object, absorbing the effects of its detonation. As he ignored his painful injuries and turned to examine the wounded man, he saw a North Vietnamese Army soldier aiming a weapon at his unconscious companion. With full knowledge of the probable consequences and thinking only to protect the Marine, Private First Class Austin resolutely threw himself between the casualty and the hostile soldier and, in so doing, was mortally wounded. Private First Class Austin's indomitable courage, inspiring initiative and selfless devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS DANIEL D. BRUCE  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

#### CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Mortar Man with Headquarters and Service Company, Third Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division, against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam. Early on the morning of 1 March 1969, Private First Class Bruce was on watch in his night defensive position at Fire Support Base Tomahawk in Quang Nam Province when he heard movements ahead of him. An enemy explosive charge was thrown toward his position and he reacted instantly, catching the device and shouting to alert his companions. Realizing the danger to the adjacent position with its two occupants, Private First Class Bruce held the device to his body and attempted to carry it from the vicinity of the entrenched Marines. As he moved away, the charge detonated and he absorbed the full force of the explosion. Private First Class Bruce's indomitable courage, inspiring valor and selfless devotion to duty saved the lives of three of his fellow Marines and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS BRUCE W. CARTER  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Grenadier with Company H, Second Battalion, Third Marines, Third Marine Division in connection with combat operations against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam. On 7 August 1969, Private First Class Carter's unit was maneuvering against the enemy during Operation Idaho Canyon and came under a heavy volume of fire from a numerically superior hostile force. The lead element soon became separated from the main body of the squad by a brush fire. Private First Class Carter and his fellow Marines were pinned down by vicious crossfire when, with complete disregard for his own safety, he stood in full view of the North Vietnamese Army soldiers to deliver a devastating volume of fire at their positions. The accuracy and aggressiveness of his attack caused several enemy casualties and forced the remainder of the soldiers to retreat from the immediate area. Shouting directions to the Marines around him, Private First Class Carter then commenced leading them from the path of the rapidly approaching brush fire when he observed a hostile grenade land between him and his companions. Fully aware of the probable consequences of his action but determined to protect the men following him, he unhesitatingly threw himself over the grenade, absorbing the full effects of its detonation with his own body. Private First Class Carter's indomitable courage, inspiring initiative, and selfless devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life in the service of his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS RONALD L. COKER  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

#### CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Rifleman with Company M, Third Battalion, Third Marines, Third Marine Division in action against enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam. On 24 March 1969, while serving as Point Man for the Second Platoon, Private First Class Coker was leading his patrol when he encountered five enemy soldiers on a narrow jungle trail. Private First Class Coker's squad aggressively pursued them to a cave. As the squad neared the cave, it came under intense hostile fire, seriously wounding one Marine and forcing the others to take cover. Observing the wounded man lying exposed to continuous enemy fire, Private First Class Coker disregarded his own safety and moved across the fire-swept terrain toward his companion. Although wounded by enemy small arms fire, he continued to crawl across the hazardous area and skillfully threw a hand grenade into the enemy positions, suppressing the hostile fire sufficiently to enable him to reach the wounded man. As he began to drag his injured comrade towards safety, a grenade landed on the wounded Marine. Unhesitatingly, Private First Class Coker grasped it with both hands and turned away from his wounded companion, but before he could dispose of the grenade it exploded. Severely wounded, but undaunted, he refused to abandon his comrade. As he moved toward friendly lines, two more enemy grenades exploded near him, inflicting still further injuries. Concerned only for the safety of his comrade, Private First Class Coker, with supreme effort, continued to crawl and pull the wounded Marine with him. His heroic deeds inspired his fellow Marines to such aggressive action that the enemy fire was suppressed sufficiently to enable others to reach him and carry him to a relatively safe area where he succumbed to his extensive wounds. Private First Class Coker's indomitable courage, inspiring initiative and selfless devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL THOMAS E. CREEK  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Rifleman with Company I, Third Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Marine Division in action against enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam. On 13 February 1969, Lance Corporal Creek's squad was providing security for a convoy moving to resupply the Vandegrift Combat Base when an enemy command-detonated mine destroyed one of the vehicles and halted the convoy near the Cam Lo Resettlement Village. Almost immediately, the Marines came under a heavy volume of hostile mortar fire followed by intense small arms fire from a well-concealed enemy force. As his squad deployed to engage the enemy, Lance Corporal Creek quickly moved to a fighting position and aggressively engaged in the fire fight. Observing a position from which he could more effectively deliver fire against the hostile force he completely disregarded his own safety as he fearlessly dashed across the fire-swept terrain and was seriously wounded by enemy fire. At the same time, an enemy grenade was thrown into the gully where he had fallen, landing between him and several companions. Fully realizing the inevitable results of his actions, Lance Corporal Creek rolled on the grenade and absorbed the full force of the explosion with his own body, thereby saving the lives of five of his fellow Marines. As a result of his heroic action, his men were inspired to such aggressive action that the enemy was defeated and the convoy was able to continue its vital mission. Lance Corporal Creek's indomitable courage, inspiring valor and selfless devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS RALPH E. DIAS  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty, while serving as a Rifleman with Company D, First Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine Division in the Republic of Vietnam on 12 November 1969. As a member of a reaction force which was pinned down by enemy fire while assisting a platoon in the same circumstance, Private First Class Dias, observing that both units were sustaining casualties, initiated an aggressive assault against an enemy machine gun bunker which was the principal source of hostile fire. Severely wounded by enemy snipers while charging across the open area, he pulled himself to the shelter of a nearby rock. Braving enemy fire for a second time, Private First Class Dias was again wounded. Unable to walk, he crawled fifteen meters to the protection of a rock located near his objective and, repeatedly exposing himself to intense hostile fire, unsuccessfully threw several hand grenades at the machine gun emplacement. Still determined to destroy the emplacement, Private First Class Dias again moved into the open and was wounded a third time by sniper fire. As he threw a last grenade which destroyed the enemy position, he was mortally wounded by another enemy round. Private First Class Dias' indomitable courage, dynamic initiative, and selfless devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pleasure in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

CAPTAIN WESLEY L. FOX  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Commanding Officer of Company A, First Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Marine Division, in action against the enemy in the northern A Shau Valley, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam, on 22 February 1969. Captain (then First Lieutenant) Fox's company came under intense fire from a large well-concealed enemy force. Captain Fox maneuvered to a position from which he could assess the situation and confer with his platoon leaders. As they departed to execute the plan he had devised, the enemy attacked and Captain Fox was wounded along with all of the other members of the command group, except the executive officer. Captain Fox continued to direct the activity of his company. Advancing through heavy enemy fire he personally neutralized one enemy position and calmly ordered an assault against the hostile emplacements. He then moved through the hazardous area coordinating aircraft support with the activities of his men. When his executive officer was mortally wounded, Captain Fox reorganized the company and directed the fire of his men as they hurled grenades against the enemy and drove the hostile forces into retreat. Wounded again in the final assault, Captain Fox refused medical attention, established a defensive posture, and supervised the preparation of casualties for medical evacuation. His indomitable courage, inspiring initiative, and unwavering devotion to duty in the face of grave personal danger inspired his Marines to such aggressive actions that they overcame all enemy resistance and destroyed a large bunker complex. Captain Fox's heroic actions reflect great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps, and uphold the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS ROBERT H. JENKINS, JR.  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

#### CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Machine Gunner with Company C, Third Reconnaissance Battalion, Third Marine Division in connection with operations against enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam. Early on the morning of 5 March 1969, Private First Class Jenkins' twelve-man reconnaissance team was occupying a defensive position at Fire Support Base Argonne south of the Demilitarized Zone. Suddenly, the Marines were assaulted by a North Vietnamese Army platoon employing mortars, automatic weapons, and hand grenades. Reacting instantly, Private First Class Jenkins and another Marine quickly moved into a two-man fighting emplacement, and as they boldly delivered accurate machine gun fire against the enemy, a North Vietnamese soldier threw a hand grenade into the friendly emplacement. Fully realizing the inevitable results of his actions, Private First Class Jenkins quickly seized his comrade, and pushing the man to the ground, he leaped on top of the Marine to shield him from the explosion. Absorbing the full impact of the detonation, Private First Class Jenkins was seriously injured and subsequently succumbed to his wounds. His courage, inspiring valor and selfless devotion to duty saved a fellow Marine from serious injury or possible death and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL JOSE F. JIMENEZ  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

#### CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Fire Team Leader with Company K, Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine Division in operations against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam on 28 August 1969. On that date Lance Corporal Jimenez's unit came under heavy attack by North Vietnamese Army soldiers concealed in well-camouflaged emplacements. Lance Corporal Jimenez reacted by seizing the initiative and plunging forward toward the enemy positions. He personally destroyed several enemy personnel and silenced an antiaircraft weapon. Shouting encouragement to his companions, Lance Corporal Jimenez continued his aggressive forward movement. He slowly maneuvered to within ten feet of hostile soldiers who were firing automatic weapons from a trench and, in the face of vicious enemy fire, destroyed the position. Although he was by now the target of concentrated fire from hostile gunners intent upon halting his assault, Lance Corporal Jimenez continued to press forward. As he moved to attack another enemy soldier, he was mortally wounded. Lance Corporal Jimenez's indomitable courage, aggressive fighting spirit and unfaltering devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

CORPORAL WILLIAM D. MORGAN  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

#### CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Squad Leader with Company H, Second Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Marine Division in operations against the enemy in the Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam. On 25 February 1969, while participating in Operation Dewey Canyon southeast of Vandegrift Combat Base, one of the squads of Corporal Morgan's platoon was temporarily pinned down and sustained several casualties while attacking a North Vietnamese Army force occupying a heavily-fortified bunker complex. Observing that two of the wounded Marines had fallen in a position dangerously exposed to the enemy fire and that all attempts to evacuate them were halted by a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire and rocket-propelled grenades, Corporal Morgan unhesitatingly maneuvered through the dense jungle undergrowth to a road that passed in front of a hostile emplacement which was the principal source of enemy fire. Fully aware of the possible consequences of his valiant action, but thinking only of the welfare of his injured companions, Corporal Morgan shouted words of encouragement to them as he initiated an aggressive assault against the hostile bunker. While charging across the open road, he was clearly visible to the hostile soldiers who turned their fire in his direction and mortally wounded him, but his diversionary tactic enabled the remainder of his squad to retrieve their casualties and overrun the North Vietnamese Army position. His heroic and determined actions saved the lives of two fellow Marines and were instrumental in the subsequent defeat of the enemy. Corporal Morgan's indomitable courage, inspiring initiative and selfless devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL THOMAS P. NOONAN, JR.  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

#### CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Fire Team Leader with Company G, Second Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Marine Division, in operations against the enemy in Quang Tri Province in the Republic of Vietnam. On 5 February 1969, Company G was directed to move from a position which they had been holding southeast of the Vandegrift Combat Base in A Shau Valley to an alternate location. As the Marines commenced a slow and difficult descent down the side of the hill made extremely slippery by the heavy rains, the leading element came under a heavy fire from a North Vietnamese Army unit occupying well-concealed positions in the rocky terrain. Four men were wounded, and repeated attempts to recover them failed because of the intense hostile fire. Lance Corporal Noonan moved from his position of relative security and maneuvering down the treacherous slope to a location near the injured men, took cover behind some rocks. Shouting words of encouragement to the wounded men to restore their confidence, he dashed across the hazardous terrain and commenced dragging the most seriously wounded man away from the fire-swept area. Although wounded and knocked to the ground by an enemy round, Lance Corporal Noonan recovered rapidly and resumed dragging the man toward the marginal security of a rock. He was, however, mortally wounded before he could reach his destination. His heroic actions inspired his fellow Marines to such aggressiveness that they initiated a spirited assault which forced the enemy soldiers to withdraw. Lance Corporal Noonan's indomitable courage, inspiring initiative and selfless devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS JIMMY W. PHIPPS  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Combat Engineer with Company B, First Engineer Battalion, First Marine Division in connection with combat operations against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam. On 27 May 1969, Private First Class Phipps, was a member of a two-man combat engineer demolition team assigned to locate and destroy enemy artillery ordnance and concealed firing devices. After he had expended all of his explosives and blasting caps, Private First Class Phipps discovered a 175mm high explosive artillery round in a rice paddy. Suspecting that the enemy had attached the artillery round to a secondary explosive device, he warned other Marines in the area to move to covered positions and prepared to destroy the round with a hand grenade. As he was attaching the hand grenade to a stake beside the artillery round, the fuse of the enemy's secondary explosive device ignited. Realizing that his assistant and the platoon commander were both within a few meters of him and that the imminent explosion could kill all three men, Private First Class Phipps grasped the hand grenade to his chest and dived forward to cover the enemy's explosive and the artillery round with his body, thereby shielding his companions from the detonation while absorbing the full and tremendous impact with his own body. Private First Class Phipps' indomitable courage, inspiring initiative and selfless devotion to duty saved the lives of two Marines and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL WILLIAM R. PROM  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

#### CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Machine Gun Squad Leader with Company I, Third Battalion, Third Marines, Third Marine Division in action against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam. While returning from a reconnaissance operation on 9 February 1969 during Operation Taylor Common, two platoons of Company I came under an intense automatic weapons fire and grenade attack from a well-concealed North Vietnamese Army force in fortified positions. The leading element of the platoon was isolated and several Marines were wounded. Lance Corporal Prom immediately assumed control of one of his machine guns and began to deliver return fire. Disregarding his own safety he advanced to a position from which he could more effectively deliver covering fire while first aid was administered to the wounded men. Realizing that the enemy would have to be destroyed before the injured Marines could be evacuated, Lance Corporal Prom again moved forward and delivered a heavy volume of fire with such accuracy that he was instrumental in routing the enemy, thus permitting his men to regroup and resume their march. Shortly thereafter, the platoon again came under heavy fire in which one man was critically wounded. Reacting instantly, Lance Corporal Prom moved forward to protect his injured comrade. Unable to continue his own fire because of severe wounds, he continued to advance to within a few yards of the enemy positions. There, standing in full view of the enemy, he accurately directed the fire of his support elements until he was mortally wounded. Inspired by his heroic actions, the Marines launched an assault that destroyed the enemy. Lance Corporal Prom's indomitable courage, inspiring initiative and selfless devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL LESTER W. WEBER  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Machine Gun Squad Leader with Company M, Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine Division, in action against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam. On 23 February 1969, the Second Platoon of Company M was dispatched to the Bo Ban area of Hieu Duc District in Quang Nam Province to assist a squad from another platoon which had become heavily engaged with a well-entrenched enemy battalion. While moving through a rice paddy covered with tall grass Lance Corporal Weber's platoon came under heavy attack from concealed hostile soldiers. He reacted by plunging into the tall grass, successfully attacking one enemy and forcing eleven others to break contact. Upon encountering a second North Vietnamese Army soldier he overwhelmed him in fierce hand-to-hand combat. Observing two other soldiers firing upon his comrades from behind a dike, Lance Corporal Weber ignored the frenzied firing of the enemy and racing across the hazardous area, dived into their position. He neutralized the position by wrestling weapons from the hands of the two soldiers and overcoming them. Although by now the target for concentrated fire from hostile riflemen, Lance Corporal Weber remained in a dangerously exposed position to shout words of encouragement to his emboldened companions. As he moved forward to attack a fifth enemy soldier, he was mortally wounded. Lance Corporal Weber's indomitable courage, aggressive fighting spirit and unwavering devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS ALFRED M. WILSON  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Rifleman with Company M, Third Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Marine Division in action against hostile forces in the Republic of Vietnam. On 3 March 1969, while returning from a reconnaissance in force mission in the vicinity of Fire Support Base Cunningham in Quang Tri Province, the First Platoon of Company M came under intense automatic weapons fire and a grenade attack from a well concealed enemy force. As the center of the column was pinned down, the leading squad moved to outflank the enemy. Private First Class Wilson, acting as Squad Leader of the rear squad, skillfully maneuvered his men to form a base of fire and act as a blocking force. In the ensuing fire fight, both his machine gunner and assistant machine gunner were seriously wounded and unable to operate their weapons. Realizing the urgent need to bring the weapon into operation again, Private First Class Wilson, followed by another Marine and with complete disregard for his own safety, fearlessly dashed across the fire-swept terrain to recover the weapon. As they reached the machine gun, an enemy soldier stepped from behind a tree and threw a grenade toward the two Marines. Observing the grenade fall between himself and the other Marine, Private First Class Wilson, fully realizing the inevitable result of his actions, shouted to his companion and unhesitatingly threw himself on the grenade, absorbing the full force of the explosion with his own body. His heroic actions inspired his platoon members to maximum effort as they aggressively attacked and defeated the enemy. Private First Class Wilson's indomitable courage, inspiring valor and selfless devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

# Appendix E

## List of Reviewers

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### Marines

Gen Robert H. Barrow, USMC (Ret)  
Gen Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., USMC (Ret)  
Gen Raymond G. Davis, USMC (Ret)

LtGen Leo J. Dulacki, USMC (Ret)  
LtGen William K. Jones, USMC (Ret)  
LtGen John N. McLaughlin, USMC (Ret)  
LtGen Thomas H. Miller, Jr., USMC (Ret)  
LtGen Robert L. Nichols, USMC (Ret)  
LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr., USMC (Ret)  
LtGen Adolph G. Schwenk, USMC (Ret)  
LtGen Ormond R. Simpson, USMC (Ret)  
LtGen Joseph J. Went, USMC

MajGen Clifford B. Drake, USMC (Ret)  
MajGen Ross T. Dwyer, Jr., USMC (Ret)  
MajGen Harold G. Glasgow, USMC  
MajGen Norman W. Gourley, USMC (Ret)  
MajGen Homer S. Hill, USMC (Ret)  
MajGen Carl W. Hoffman, USMC (Ret)  
MajGen Francis X. Quinn, USMC (Ret)  
MajGen Herbert L. Wilkerson, USMC (Ret)  
MajGen Carl A. Youngdale, USMC (Ret)

BGen Herbert J. Blaha, USMC (Ret)  
BGen George E. Dooley, USMC (Ret)  
BGen Frank E. Garretson, USMC (Ret)  
BGen Henry W. Hise, USMC (Ret)  
BGen Joseph E. Hopkins, USMC (Ret)  
BGen Charles S. Robertson, USMC (Ret)

Col Harry E. Atkinson, USMC (Ret)  
Col William D. Bassett, Jr., USMC (Ret)  
Col Noble L. Beck, USMC (Ret)  
Col Clarence W. Boyd, Jr., USMC (Ret)  
Col Eugene R. Brady, USMC (Ret)  
Col James T. Breckinridge, USMC (Ret)  
Col William C. Britt, USMC (Ret)  
Col Thomas E. Bulger, USMC (Ret)  
Col Charles R. Burroughs, USMC (Ret)  
Col John S. Canton, USMC (Ret)  
Col Frank A. Clark, USMC (Ret)

Col Leroy V. Corbett, USMC (Ret)  
Col Wallace W. Crompton, USMC (Ret)  
Col Raymond C. Damm, USMC (Ret)  
Col Edward F. Danowitz, USMC (Ret)  
Col Louis R. Daze, USMC (Ret)  
Col Frank R. DeNormandie, USMC (Ret)  
Col Fred T. Fagan, Jr., USMC  
Col Bob W. Farley, USMC (Ret)  
Col Edwin H. Finlayson, USMC (Ret)  
Col George C. Fox, USMC (Ret)  
Col Owen V. Gallentine, USMC (Ret)  
Col Samuel A. Hannah, USMC (Ret)  
Col Paul B. Henley, USMC (Ret)  
Col Gilbert R. Hershey, USMC (Ret)  
Col Ralph A. Heywood, USMC (Ret)  
Col William J. Howatt, USMC (Ret)  
Col Ray N. Joens, USMC (Ret)  
Col Ray Kummerow, USMC (Ret)  
Col Elliott R. Laine, Jr., USMC (Ret)  
Col Robert G. Lauffer, USMC (Ret)  
Col George E. Lawrence, USMC (Ret)  
Col John Lowman, Jr., USMC (Ret)  
Col John F. McMahon, Jr., USMC (Ret)  
Col Bruce J. Matheson, USMC (Ret)  
Col Theodore E. Metzger, USMC (Ret)  
Col Richard D. Mickelson, USMC (Ret)  
Col Wendell P. C. Morgenthaler, Jr., USMC (Ret)  
Col Donald E. Morin, USMC (Ret)  
Col Peter J. Mulroney, USMC (Ret)  
Col Leonard L. Orr, USMC (Ret)  
Col Harry F. Painter, USMC (Ret)  
Col Harold L. Parsons, USMC (Ret)  
Col Clifford J. Peabody, USMC (Ret)  
Col Lewis E. Poggemeyer, USMC (Ret)  
Col Roy L. Reed, USMC (Ret)  
Col William E. Riley, Jr., USMC (Ret)  
Col Horton E. Roeder, USMC (Ret)  
Col Richard A. Savage, USMC (Ret)  
Col John L. Schwartz, USMC (Ret)  
Col William Shanks, Jr., USMC (Ret)  
Col Walter Sienko, USMC (Ret)  
Col Anthony J. Skotnicki, USMC (Ret)  
Col Joseph Sleger, Jr., USMC (Ret)  
Col Edward W. Snelling, USMC (Ret)

Col Charles R. Stephenson II, USMC (Ret)  
 Col William W. Storm III, USMC (Ret)  
 Col John M. Terry, Jr., USMC (Ret)  
 Col Floyd H. Waldrop, USMC (Ret)  
 Col Howard A. Westphall, USMC (Ret)  
 Col H. Speed Wilson, USMC (Ret)  
 Col Robert R. Wilson, USMC (Ret)  
 Col William J. Zaro, USMC (Ret)

LtCol Roi E. Andrews, USMC (Ret)  
 LtCol Merrill M. Bartlett, USMC (Ret)  
 LtCol William F. Bethel, USMC (Ret)  
 LtCol Don R. Christensen, USMC (Ret)  
 LtCol Richard F. Daley, USMC (Ret)  
 LtCol Godfrey S. Delcuze, USMC (Ret)  
 LtCol Robert C. Evans, USMC (Ret)  
 LtCol Wesley L. Fox, USMC  
 LtCol Donald J. Garrett, USMC (Ret)  
 LtCol Edward D. Gelzer, Jr., USMC (Ret)  
 LtCol David G. Henderson, USMC (Ret)  
 LtCol David G. Harron, USMC (Ret)  
 LtCol Earl R. Hunter, USMC (Ret)  
 LtCol Raymond G. Kennedy, Sr., USMC (Ret)  
 LtCol Charles H. Knowles, USMC (Ret)  
 LtCol Marvin H. Lugger, USMC (Ret)  
 LtCol Robert B. March, USMC (Ret)  
 LtCol Robert L. Modjeski, USMC (Ret)  
 LtCol Aydlette H. Perry, Jr., USMC (Ret)

LtCol John E. Poindexter, USMC (Ret)  
 LtCol Thomas E. Raines, USMC (Ret)  
 LtCol Ward R. Reiss, USMC (Ret)  
 LtCol David F. Seiler, USMC (Ret)  
 LtCol William F. Sparks, USMC (Ret)  
 LtCol Laurier J. Tremblay, USMC (Ret)

Capt Cyril L. Kammeier, USMC (Ret)  
 Capt Joseph W. Pratte, USMC (Ret)

Sgt Gary S. Davis, USMC (Ret)

#### Army

Gen Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret)  
 MajGen William A. Burke, USA (Ret)  
 LtCol John W. Moser, USA (Ret)  
 LtCol Adrian G. Traas, USA

#### Others

Dr. Jeffrey J. Clarke  
 Mr. Edward J. Marolda  
 Mr. Bernard C. Nalty  
 Ms. Barbara A. Rhenish  
 Dr. Ronald H. Spector  
 Dr. Wayne W. Thompson  
 Mr. Willard J. Webb

# Appendix F

## Distribution of Personnel Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (Reproduction of Status of Forces, 31 January 1969)

| UNIT                 | NOTE | ASSIGNED STRENGTH |     | STR RPT DATE | DANANG |     | CHU LAI |     | PHU BAI |     | No I CTZ |     | OKINAWA |     | JAPAN |     | HAWAII |     | EASTPAC |      | OTHER |     |
|----------------------|------|-------------------|-----|--------------|--------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|----------|-----|---------|-----|-------|-----|--------|-----|---------|------|-------|-----|
| HEADQUARTERS         |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
|                      |      | USMC              | USN |              | USMC   | USN | USMC    | USN | USMC    | USN | USMC     | USN | USMC    | USN | USMC  | USN | USMC   | USN | USMC    | USN  | USMC  | USN |
| HQ, FMF, PAC         |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| FMF, PAC (FWD)       |      | 74                | 1   | 24JUL68      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     | 74      | 1   |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| H&S BN, FMF, PAC     | 4    | 1673              | 50  | 15JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     | 1507   | 50  |         |      | 166   |     |
| CAMP S. D. BUTLER    |      | 810               | 137 | 15JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     | 810     | 137 |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| CASUAL               |      | 611               |     | 15JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     | 611     |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| HOSPITALIZED         | 7    | 1139              |     | 15JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     | 568     |     | 571   |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| HQ, V MEF            |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 1ST CIVAFFGRP        |      | 63                | 7   | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 63      | 7    |       |     |
| HQ, 5TH MARDIV       |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| HQBN, 5TH MARDIV     | 4    | 1506              | 34  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 1461    | 34   | 45    |     |
| HQ, FORTRPS, FMF PAC |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| HQCO, FORTRPS        | 4    | 398               | 24  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 189     | 24   | 209   |     |
| HQ, 1ST MAR BRIG     |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| HQCO, 1ST MAR BRIG   |      | 230               | 8   | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     | 230    | 8   |         |      |       |     |
| HQ, 9TH MAB          |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| HQCO, 9TH MAB        |      | 482               | 20  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     | 482     | 20  |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| HQ, 111 MAF          |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| H&SCO, 111 MAF       | 4    | 993               | 31  | 28JAN69      | 975    | 31  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       | 19  |
| 1ST CAG              |      | 436               | 19  | 28JAN69      |        |     | 436     | 19  |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 2D CAG               | 2    | 608               | 42  | 28JAN69      | 588    | 42  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       | 20  |
| 3D CAG               |      | 540               | 28  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     | 540     | 28  |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 4TH CAG              |      | 302               | 13  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     | 302      | 13  |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| HQ, 1ST MAR DIV      |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| HQBN, 1ST MAR DIV    | 4    | 1930              | 42  | 28JAN69      | 1887   | 42  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      | 43    |     |
| HQ, 3D MAR DIV       |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| HQBN, 3D MAR DIV     | 4    | 2074              | 33  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     | 2053     | 33  |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       | 21  |
| INFANTRY             |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 1ST MARINES          |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| HQ CO                |      | 251               | 8   | 28JAN69      | 251    | 8   |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 1ST BATTALION        |      | 1054              | 59  | 28JAN69      | 1054   | 59  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 2D BATTALION         |      | 1046              | 60  | 28JAN69      | 1046   | 60  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 3D BATTALION         |      | 1105              | 59  | 28JAN69      | 1105   | 59  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 3D MARINES           |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| HQ CO                |      | 217               | 7   | 28JAN69      | 217    | 7   |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 1ST BATTALION        |      | 1156              | 56  | 28JAN69      | 1156   | 56  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 2D BATTALION         |      | 1123              | 61  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     | 1123     | 61  |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 3D BATTALION         |      | 1154              | 56  | 28JAN69      | 1154   | 56  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 4TH MARINES          |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| HQ CO                |      | 218               | 6   | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     | 218      | 6   |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 1ST BATTALION        |      | 1158              | 56  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     | 1158     | 56  |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 2D BATTALION         |      | 1113              | 61  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     | 1113     | 61  |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 3D BATTALION         |      | 1108              | 59  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     | 1108     | 59  |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 5TH MARINES          |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| HQ CO                |      | 243               | 7   | 28JAN69      | 243    | 7   |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 1ST BATTALION        |      | 1033              | 61  | 28JAN69      | 1033   | 61  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 2D BATTALION         |      | 981               | 54  | 28JAN69      | 981    | 54  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 3D BATTALION         |      | 1119              | 61  | 28JAN69      | 1119   | 61  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 7TH MARINES          |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| HQ CO                |      | 242               | 7   | 28JAN69      | 242    | 7   |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 1ST BATTALION        |      | 995               | 56  | 28JAN69      | 995    | 56  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 2D BATTALION         |      | 1059              | 59  | 28JAN69      | 1059   | 59  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 3D BATTALION         |      | 1018              | 57  | 28JAN69      | 1018   | 57  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 9TH MARINES          |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| HQ CO                |      | 214               | 6   | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     | 214      | 6   |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 1ST BATTALION        |      | 1106              | 56  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     | 1106     | 56  |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 2D BATTALION         |      | 1115              | 56  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     | 1115     | 56  |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 3D BATTALION         |      | 1118              | 56  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     | 1118     | 56  |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 26TH MARINES         |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| HQ CO                |      | 500               | 12  | 28JAN69      | 261    | 6   |         |     |         |     |          |     | 239     | 6   |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 1ST BATTALION        |      | 1571              | 56  | 28JAN69      | 1571   | 56  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| 2D BATTALION         | 1    | 1621              | 96  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      | 1621  | 96  |
| 3D BATTALION         | 1    | 1740              | 75  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      | 1740  | 75  |
| 27TH MARINES         |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| HQ CO                |      | 238               | 6   | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 238     | 6    |       |     |
| 1ST BATTALION        |      | 1095              | 86  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     | 1095   | 86  |         |      |       |     |
| 2D BATTALION         |      | 1129              | 32  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 1129    | 32   |       |     |
| 3D BATTALION         |      | 1144              | 32  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 1144    | 32   |       |     |
| 28TH MARINES         |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |      |       |     |
| HQ CO                |      | 244               |     | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         | 244  | 7     |     |
| 1ST BATTALION        |      | 1444              | 43  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         | 1444 | 43    |     |
| 2D BATTALION         |      | 1182              | 36  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         | 1182 | 36    |     |
| 3D BATTALION         |      | 1235              | 38  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         | 1235 | 38    |     |

| ARTILLERY     |     |    |         |     |    |  |  |  |  |
|---------------|-----|----|---------|-----|----|--|--|--|--|
| 11TH MARINES  |     |    |         |     |    |  |  |  |  |
| HQ BTRY       | 314 | 11 | 28JAN69 | 314 | 11 |  |  |  |  |
| 1ST BATTALION | 665 | 18 | 28JAN69 | 665 | 18 |  |  |  |  |
| 2D BATTALION  | 671 | 15 | 28JAN69 | 671 | 15 |  |  |  |  |
| 3D BATTALION  | 650 | 16 | 28JAN69 | 650 | 16 |  |  |  |  |
| 4TH BATTALION | 557 | 13 | 28JAN69 | 557 | 13 |  |  |  |  |
| 12TH MARINES  |     |    |         |     |    |  |  |  |  |
| HQ BTRY       | 296 | 16 | 28JAN69 | 296 | 16 |  |  |  |  |
| 1ST BATTALION | 698 | 21 | 28JAN69 | 698 | 21 |  |  |  |  |
| 2D BATTALION  | 658 | 19 | 28JAN69 | 658 | 19 |  |  |  |  |
| 3D BATTALION  | 767 | 18 | 28JAN69 | 767 | 18 |  |  |  |  |
| 4TH BATTALION | 514 | 14 | 28JAN69 | 514 | 14 |  |  |  |  |

| UNIT                   | NOTE | ASSIGNED STRENGTH | STR RPT DATE | DANANG   | CHU LAI  | PHU BAI  | No I CTZ | OKINAWA  | JAPAN    | HAWAII   | EASTPAC  | OTHER    |
|------------------------|------|-------------------|--------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
|                        |      | USMC USN          |              | USMC USN | USMC USN | USMC USN | USMC USN | USMC USN | USMC USN | USMC USN | USMC USN | USMC USN |
| <b>13TH MARINES</b>    |      |                   |              |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| HQ BTRY                |      | 310 6             | 28JAN69      |          |          |          |          |          |          |          | 310 6    |          |
| 1ST BATTALION          |      | 292 8             | 28JAN69      | 292 8    |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| 2D BATTALION           |      | 435 13            | 28JAN69      |          |          |          |          |          |          |          | 435 13   |          |
| 3D BATTALION           |      | 664 16            | 28JAN69      |          |          |          |          |          |          |          | 664 16   |          |
| 4TH BATTALION          |      | 423 11            | 28JAN69      |          |          |          |          |          |          |          | 423 11   |          |
| HQ BTRY, 1ST FAG       |      | 127 2             | 28JAN69      | 127 2    |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| HQ BTRY, 5TH FAG       |      | 122 4             | 28JAN69      |          |          |          |          |          |          |          | 122 4    |          |
| 1ST 155MM GUN BTRY     |      | 154 3             | 28JAN69      | 154 3    |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| 3D 155MM GUN BTRY      |      | 155 3             | 28JAN69      | 155 3    |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| 5TH 155MM GUN BTRY     |      | 180 8             | 28JAN69      |          |          |          | 180 8    |          |          |          |          |          |
| 7TH 155MM GUN BTRY     |      | 113 2             | 28JAN69      |          |          |          |          |          |          |          | 113 2    |          |
| 1ST 8" HOW BTRY        |      | 188 6             | 28JAN69      |          |          |          | 188 6    |          |          |          |          |          |
| 3D 8" HOW BTRY         |      | 220 4             | 28JAN69      | 220 4    |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| 5TH 8" HOW BTRY        |      | 145 2             | 28JAN69      |          |          |          |          |          |          |          | 145 2    |          |
| 12TH SEARCH LIGHT BTRY |      | 102               | 28JAN69      |          |          |          | 102      |          |          |          |          |          |
| <b>RECONNAISSANCE</b>  |      |                   |              |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| 1ST RECON BN           |      | 699 51            | 28JAN69      | 699 51   |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| 3D RECON BN            |      | 703 51            | 28JAN69      |          |          |          | 703 51   |          |          |          |          |          |
| 5TH RECON BN           |      | 408 13            | 28JAN69      |          |          |          |          |          |          |          | 408 13   |          |
| 1ST FORCE RECON CO     |      | 157 9             | 28JAN69      | 157 9    |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| 3D FORCE RECON CO      |      | 139               | 28JAN69      |          |          |          | 139      |          |          |          |          |          |
| 5TH FORCE RECON CO     |      | 147 2             | 28JAN69      |          |          |          |          |          |          |          | 147 2    |          |
| <b>ANTI-TANK</b>       |      |                   |              |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| 1ST AT BN              | 6    |                   |              |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| 3D AT BN               | 6    |                   |              |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| 5TH AT BN              |      | 341 10            | 28JAN69      |          |          |          |          | 54 1     |          |          | 287 9    |          |
| <b>TANK</b>            |      |                   |              |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| 1ST TANK BN            |      | 773 18            | 28JAN69      | 773 18   |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| 3D TANK BN             |      | 740 18            | 28JAN69      |          |          |          | 740 18   |          |          |          |          |          |
| 5TH TANK BN            |      | 665 13            | 28JAN69      |          |          |          |          |          |          |          | 665 13   |          |
| <b>AMTRAC</b>          |      |                   |              |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| 1ST AMTRAC BN          |      | 666 27            | 28JAN69      |          |          |          | 666 27   |          |          |          |          |          |
| 3D AMTRAC BN           |      | 631 17            | 28JAN69      | 631 17   |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| 5TH AMTRAC BN          |      | 672 15            | 28JAN69      |          |          |          |          | 125 5    |          |          | 547 10   |          |
| 1ST ARM AMPHIB CO      |      | 237 6             | 28JAN69      | 237 6    |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| <b>ENGINEER</b>        |      |                   |              |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| 1ST ENGR BN            |      | 702 12            | 28JAN69      | 702 12   |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| 3D ENGR BN             |      | 744 18            | 28JAN69      |          |          |          | 744 18   |          |          |          |          |          |
| 5TH ENGR BN            |      | 485 9             | 28JAN69      |          |          |          |          | 33 1     |          |          | 452 8    |          |
| 7TH ENGR BN            |      | 1120 24           | 28JAN69      | 1120 24  |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| 9TH ENGR BN            |      | 928 25            | 28JAN69      |          | 928 25   |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| 11TH ENGR BN           |      | 1152 28           | 28JAN69      |          |          |          | 1152 28  |          |          |          | 890 13   |          |
| 13TH ENGR BN           |      | 890 15            | 28JAN69      |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| 1ST BRIDGE CO          | 5    |                   |              |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| 3D BRIDGE CO           | 5    |                   |              |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| 5TH BRIDGE CO          |      | 150 2             | 28JAN69      |          |          |          |          |          |          |          | 150 2    |          |
| <b>MOTOR TRANSPORT</b> |      |                   |              |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |

|                          |      |    |         |      |        |
|--------------------------|------|----|---------|------|--------|
|                          |      |    |         |      |        |
| FLC, III MAF             |      |    |         |      |        |
| HQ, FLC/1ST FSR          |      |    |         |      |        |
| H&S BN                   | 1642 | 58 | 28JAN69 | 1642 | 58     |
| SUPPLY BN                | 1958 | 37 | 28JAN69 | 1958 | 37     |
| 7TH SEP HK FUEL CO       |      |    |         |      |        |
| MAINT BN                 | 1148 | 9  | 28JAN69 | 1148 | 9      |
| FLSG-A/3D SERV BN        | 1336 | 26 | 28JAN69 | 1336 | 26     |
| FLSG-B/1ST SERV BN       | 1612 | 19 | 28JAN69 | 1612 | 19     |
| 3D FSR                   |      |    |         |      |        |
| H&S BN                   | 1058 | 28 | 28JAN69 | 1058 | 28     |
| SUPPLY BN                | 1351 | 11 | 28JAN69 | 1351 | 11     |
| MAINT BN                 | 1033 |    | 28JAN69 | 1033 |        |
| 5TH FSR                  |      |    |         |      |        |
| H&S BN                   | 367  | 22 | 28JAN69 |      | 367 22 |
| SUPPLY BN                | 432  | 18 | 28JAN69 |      | 432 18 |
| MAINT BN                 | 555  |    | 28JAN69 |      | 555    |
| 5TH SERVICE BN           |      |    |         |      |        |
| PROV SERVICE BN, 9TH MAB | 805  | 15 | 28JAN69 | 805  | 15     |
| 9TH SEP BULK FUEL CO     | 764  | 16 | 28JAN69 | 764  | 16     |
|                          | 293  |    | 28JAN69 |      | 293    |

| UNIT           | NOTE | ASSIGNED STRENGTH |     | STR RPT DATE | DANANG |     | CHU LAI |     | PHU BAI |     | No I CTZ |     | OKINAWA |     | JAPAN |     | HAWAII |     | EASTPAC |     | OTHER |     |
|----------------|------|-------------------|-----|--------------|--------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|----------|-----|---------|-----|-------|-----|--------|-----|---------|-----|-------|-----|
| MEDICAL        |      | USMC              | USN |              | USMC   | USN | USMC    | USN | USMC    | USN | USMC     | USN | USMC    | USN | USMC  | USN | USMC   | USN | USMC    | USN | USMC  | USN |
| 1ST MED BN     |      | 150               | 312 | 28JAN69      | 150    | 312 |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| 3D MED BN      |      | 136               | 259 | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     | 136     | 259 |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| 5TH MED BN     |      | 96                | 157 | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 96      | 157 |       |     |
| 1ST HOSP CO    |      | 44                | 78  | 28JAN69      | 44     | 78  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| 5TH HOSP CO    |      | 30                | 48  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 30      | 48  |       |     |
| 1ST DENTAL CO  |      |                   | 83  | 28JAN69      |        | 83  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| 3D DENTAL CO   |      |                   | 85  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         | 85  |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| 5TH DENTAL CO  |      |                   | 27  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| 11TH DENTAL CO |      | 3                 | 74  | 28JAN69      | 3      | 74  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        | 12  |         | 15  |       |     |
| 13TH DENTAL CO |      |                   | 33  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     | 33    |     |
| 15TH DENTAL CO |      | 3                 | 39  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         | 3   | 39    |     |
| 17TH DENTAL CO |      | 4                 | 57  | 28JAN69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         | 4   | 57    |     |
| USMC           |      | 93,973            |     |              | 40,403 |     | 1,364   |     | 1,092   |     | 17,405   |     | 8,219   |     | 571   |     | 3,341  |     | 17,438  |     | 4,140 |     |
| USN            |      | 4,445             |     |              | 1,921  |     | 129     |     | 296     |     | 675      |     | 244     |     |       |     | 163    |     | 829     |     | 188   |     |
| GROUND TOTAL   |      | 98,418            |     |              | 42,324 |     | 1,493   |     | 1,388   |     | 18,080   |     | 8,463   |     | 571   |     | 3,504  |     | 18,267  |     | 4,328 |     |

| HQ SQDN FMFPAC |     | 61 | 28JAN69 |     | 61    |
|----------------|-----|----|---------|-----|-------|
| <b>1ST MAW</b> |     |    |         |     |       |
| MWHG-1         |     |    |         |     |       |
| H&HS-1         | 726 | 34 | 28JAN69 | 726 | 34    |
| MMFS-1         | 145 |    | 28JAN69 | 145 |       |
| MMCS-1         | 265 |    | 28JAN69 | 265 |       |
| MSG-17         |     |    |         |     |       |
| H&MS-17        | 713 | 18 | 28JAN69 | 713 | 18    |
| WERS-17        | 214 |    | 28JAN69 | 214 |       |
| MACG-18        |     |    |         |     |       |
| H&HS-18        | 234 | 4  | 28JAN69 | 234 | 4     |
| MASS-2         | 256 | 2  | 28JAN69 | 256 | 2     |
| MASS-3         | 223 | 2  | 28JAN69 |     | 223 2 |
| MACS-4         | 372 | 2  | 28JAN69 | 372 | 2     |
| 1ST LAAM BN    | 715 | 12 | 28JAN69 | 715 | 12    |
| MAG-11         |     |    |         |     |       |
| H&MS-11        | 613 |    | 28JAN69 | 613 |       |
| MBS-11         | 431 | 26 | 28JAN69 | 431 | 26    |
| VMCJ-1         | 354 | 1  | 28JAN69 | 354 | 1     |
| VMFA-542       | 289 | 1  | 28JAN69 | 289 | 1     |
| VMA(AW)-242    | 261 | 1  | 28JAN69 | 261 | 1     |
| VMA(AW)-225    | 328 | 2  | 28JAN69 | 328 | 2     |
| MAG-12         |     |    |         |     |       |
| H&MS-12        | 557 | 1  | 28JAN69 | 557 | 1     |
| MBS-12         | 538 | 26 | 28JAN69 | 538 | 26    |
| MATCU-67       | 97  |    | 28JAN69 | 97  |       |
| VMA-121        | 161 | 1  | 28JAN69 | 161 | 1     |
| VMA-211        | 191 | 1  | 28JAN69 | 191 | 1     |
| VMA-223        | 180 | 1  | 28JAN69 | 180 | 1     |
| VMA-311        | 179 | 1  | 28JAN69 | 179 | 1     |
| VMA(AW)-533    | 268 | 1  | 28JAN69 | 268 | 1     |
| MAG-13         |     |    |         |     |       |
| H&MS-13        | 490 |    | 28JAN69 | 490 |       |
| MBS-13         | 505 | 29 | 28JAN69 | 505 | 29    |
| VMFA-115       | 263 | 1  | 28JAN69 | 263 | 1     |
| VMFA-314       | 267 | 1  | 28JAN69 | 267 | 1     |
| VMFA-23        | 259 | 1  | 28JAN69 | 259 | 1     |
| VMFA-334       | 289 | 1  | 28JAN69 | 289 | 1     |
| MAG-16         |     |    |         |     |       |
| H&MS-16        | 570 |    | 28JAN69 | 570 |       |

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# Appendix G

## Distribution of Personnel Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (Reproduction of Status of Forces, 8 December 1969)

| UNIT                 | NOTE | ASSIGNED STRENGTH |     | STR RPT DATE | DANANG |     | CHU LAI |     | PHU BAI |     | TO I CTZ |     | OKINAWA |     | JAPAN |     | HAWAII |     | EAST PAC |     | OTHER |     |
|----------------------|------|-------------------|-----|--------------|--------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|----------|-----|---------|-----|-------|-----|--------|-----|----------|-----|-------|-----|
|                      |      |                   |     |              | USMC   | USN |         |     | USMC    | USN | USMC     | USN | USMC    | USN | USMC  | USN | USMC   | USN | USMC     | USN | USMC  | USN |
| <b>HEADQUARTERS</b>  |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| HQ, FMF, PAC         |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| FMF, PAC (FWD)       | 3    | 92                | 1   | 8MAY69       |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     | 92     | 1   |          |     |       |     |
| H&S BN, FMF, PAC     | 3    | 1864              | 50  | 14MAY69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     | 1864   | 50  |          |     |       |     |
| CAMP S. D. BUTLER    |      | 1456              | 124 | 25SEP69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     | 1456    | 124 |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| CASUAL               |      | 423               |     | 25SEP69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     | 423     |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| HOSPITALIZED         | 5    | 1168              |     | 25SEP69      |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     | 1       |     | 570   |     |        |     |          |     | 27    |     |
| HQ, V MEB            |      | 1943              | 83  | 2DEC69       |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 1943     | 83  |       |     |
| 1ST CIVAFFGRP        |      | 61                | 3   | 2DEC69       |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 61       | 3   |       |     |
|                      |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
|                      |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| HQ, FORTRPS, FMF PAC |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| HQCO, FORTRPS        |      | 190               | 18  | 2DEC69       |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 190      | 18  |       |     |
|                      |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| HQ, 1ST MAR BRIG     |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| HQCO, 1ST MAR BRIG   |      | 252               | 26  | 2DEC69       |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     | 252    | 26  |          |     |       |     |
|                      |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| HQ, I MEF            |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| HQ 3D MARDIV         |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| HQBN, 3D MARDIV      |      | 1830              | 79  | 2DEC69       |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     | 1830    | 79  |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| HQ, III MAF          |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| H&SCO, III MAF       |      | 1022              | 30  | 2DEC69       | 1022   | 30  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 1ST CAG              |      | 509               |     | 2DEC69       |        |     | 509     |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 2D CAG               |      | 604               |     | 2DEC69       | 604    |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 3D CAG               |      | 523               |     | 2DEC69       |        |     |         | 523 |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 4TH CAG              |      | 320               |     | 2DEC69       |        |     |         |     |         | 320 |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| HQ, 1ST MARDIV       |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| HQBN, 1ST MARDIV     | 3    | 2138              | 47  | 2DEC69       | 2089   | 47  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       | 49  |
| <b>INFANTRY</b>      |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| <b>1ST MARINES</b>   |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| HQ CO                |      | 273               | 10  | 2DEC69       |        |     | 273     | 10  |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 1ST BATTALION        |      | 1205              | 58  | 2DEC69       | 1205   | 58  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 2D BATTALION         |      | 1191              | 57  | 2DEC69       | 1191   | 57  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 3D BATTALION         |      | 1202              | 58  | 2DEC69       | 1202   | 58  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| <b>2D MARINES</b>    |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| HQ CO                |      | 288               | 9   | 2DEC69       |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 288      | 9   |       |     |
| 1ST BATTALION        |      | 1456              | 69  | 2DEC69       |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     | 1456   | 69  |          |     |       |     |
| 2D BATTALION         |      | 1356              | 74  | 2DEC69       |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 1356     | 74  |       |     |
| 3D BATTALION         |      | 1376              | 86  | 2DEC69       |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 1376     | 86  |       |     |
| <b>4TH MARINES</b>   |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| HQ CO                |      | 244               | 5   | 2DEC69       |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     | 244     | 5   |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 1ST BATTALION        |      | 915               | 56  | 2DEC69       |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     | 915     | 56  |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 2D BATTALION         |      | 927               | 55  | 2DEC69       |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     | 927     | 55  |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 3D BATTALION         |      | 1163              | 54  | 2DEC69       |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     | 1163    | 54  |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| <b>5TH MARINES</b>   |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| HQ CO                |      | 342               | 7   | 2DEC69       | 342    | 7   |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 1ST BATTALION        |      | 1203              | 57  | 2DEC69       | 1203   | 57  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 2D BATTALION         |      | 1218              | 51  | 2DEC69       | 1218   | 51  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 3D BATTALION         |      | 1202              | 59  | 2DEC69       | 1202   | 59  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| <b>7TH MARINES</b>   |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| HQ CO                |      | 283               | 7   | 2DEC69       | 283    | 7   |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 1ST BATTALION        |      | 1184              | 57  | 2DEC69       | 1184   | 57  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 2D BATTALION         |      | 1134              | 58  | 2DEC69       | 1134   | 58  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 3D BATTALION         |      | 1203              | 43  | 2DEC69       | 1203   | 43  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| <b>9TH MARINES</b>   |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| HQ CO                |      | 389               | 54  | 2DEC69       |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     | 389     | 54  |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 1ST BATTALION        | 1    | 1650              | 82  | 2DEC69       |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     | 1650  | 82  |
| 2D BATTALION         | 1    | 1552              | 57  | 2DEC69       |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     | 1552  | 57  |
| 3D BATTALION         |      | 1280              | 55  | 2DEC69       |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     | 1280    | 55  |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| <b>26TH MARINES</b>  |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| HQ CO                |      | 297               | 6   | 2DEC69       | 297    | 6   |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 1ST BATTALION        |      | 1317              | 60  | 2DEC69       | 1317   | 60  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 2D BATTALION         |      | 1302              | 57  | 2DEC69       | 1302   | 57  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 3D BATTALION         |      | 1318              | 56  | 2DEC69       | 1318   | 56  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| <b>ARTILLERY</b>     |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| <b>11TH MARINES</b>  |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| HQ BTRY              |      | 448               | 10  | 2DEC69       | 448    | 10  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 1ST BATTALION        |      | 647               | 16  | 2DEC69       | 647    | 16  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 2D BATTALION         |      | 638               | 18  | 2DEC69       | 638    | 18  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 3D BATTALION         |      | 621               | 16  | 2DEC69       | 621    | 16  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |
| 4TH BATTALION        |      | 588               | 13  | 2DEC69       | 588    | 13  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |          |     |       |     |



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| UNIT           | NOTE | ASSIGNED STRENGTH |     | STR RPT DATE | DANANG |     | CHU LAI |     | PHU BAI |     | No I CTZ |     | OKINAWA |     | JAPAN |     | HAWAII |     | EASTPAC |     | OTHER |     |
|----------------|------|-------------------|-----|--------------|--------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|----------|-----|---------|-----|-------|-----|--------|-----|---------|-----|-------|-----|
| MEDICAL        |      | USMC              | USN |              | USMC   | USN | USMC    | USN | USMC    | USN | USMC     | USN | USMC    | USN | USMC  | USN | USMC   | USN | USMC    | USN | USMC  | USN |
| 1ST MED BN     |      | 203               | 346 | 2DEC69       | 203    | 346 |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| 3D MED BN      |      | 163               | 276 | 2DEC69       |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     | 99      | 216 |       |     |        |     | 64      | 60  |       |     |
| 1ST HOSP CO    |      | 52                | 68  | 2DEC69       | 52     | 68  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| 1ST DENTAL CO  |      |                   | 68  | 2DEC69       |        | 68  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| 3D DENTAL CO   |      |                   | 83  | 2DEC69       |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     | 83      |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| 11TH DENTAL CO |      | 4                 | 62  | 2DEC69       | 4      | 62  |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| 13TH DENTAL CO |      | 30                | 30  | 2DEC69       |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         | 30  |       |     |
|                |      |                   |     |              |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
|                | USMC | 82,282            |     |              | 39,456 |     | 1,560   |     | 523     |     | 4,727    |     | 15,417  |     | 570   |     | 3,841  |     | 12,246  |     | 3,942 |     |
|                | USN  | 3,668             |     |              | 1,762  |     | 21      |     | 0       |     | 74       |     | 999     |     | 0     |     | 150    |     | 509     |     | 153   |     |
| GROUND TOTAL   |      | 85,950            |     |              | 41,218 |     | 1,581   |     | 523     |     | 4,801    |     | 16,416  |     | 570   |     | 3,991  |     | 12,755  |     | 4,095 |     |

## AVIATION UNITS

| HQ SQDN FMFPAC | 61  | 2DEC69    | 61     |
|----------------|-----|-----------|--------|
| <b>1ST MAW</b> |     |           |        |
| NWHG-1         |     |           |        |
| H&HS-1         | 835 | 36 2DEC69 | 835 36 |
| NWFS-1         | 153 | 2DEC69    | 153    |
| MWCS-1         | 304 | 2DEC69    | 304    |
| MWSG-17        |     |           |        |
| H&MS-17        | 710 | 19 2DEC69 | 710 19 |
| WERS-17        | 232 | 2DEC69    | 232    |
| MACG-18        |     |           |        |
| H&HS-18        | 251 | 11 2DEC69 | 251 11 |
| MASS-3         | 268 | 2 2DEC69  | 268 2  |
| MACS-4         | 343 | 4 2DEC69  | 343 4  |
| MAG-11         |     |           |        |
| H&MS-11        | 641 | 2DEC69    | 641    |
| MABS-11        | 473 | 23 2DEC69 | 473 23 |
| VMCJ-1         | 372 | 2DEC69    | 372    |
| VMA(AW)-225    | 258 | 1 2DEC69  | 258 1  |
| VMA(AW)-242    | 266 | 1 2DEC69  | 266 1  |
| VMFA-542       | 286 | 1 2DEC69  | 286 1  |
| MAG-12         |     |           |        |
| H&MS-12        | 447 | 2DEC69    | 447    |
| MABS-12        | 553 | 24 2DEC69 | 553 24 |
| MATCU-67       | 72  | 2DEC69    | 72     |
| VMA-211        | 171 | 1 2DEC69  | 171 1  |
| VMA-223        | 178 | 1 2DEC69  | 178 1  |
| VMA-311        | 181 | 1 2DEC69  | 181 1  |
| MAG-13         |     |           |        |
| H&MS-13        | 501 | 2DEC69    | 501    |
| MABS-13        | 552 | 32 2DEC69 | 552 32 |
| VMFA-115       | 278 | 1 2DEC69  | 278 1  |
| VMFA-314       | 276 | 1 2DEC69  | 276 1  |
| VMFA-122       | 358 | 1 2DEC69  | 358 1  |
| MATCU-62       | 38  | 2DEC69    | 38     |
| MAG-16         |     |           |        |
| H&MS-16        | 483 | 2DEC69    | 483    |
| MABS-16        | 666 | 27 2DEC69 | 666 27 |
| MATCU-68       | 52  | 2DEC69    | 52     |
| VMO-2          | 276 | 2DEC69    | 276    |
| HML-167        | 184 | 2DEC69    | 184    |
| HMA-364        | 222 | 1 2DEC69  | 222 1  |
| HMH-463        | 208 | 1 2DEC69  | 208 1  |
| HMM-263        | 227 | 1 2DEC69  | 227 1  |
| HMH-361        | 222 | 1 2DEC69  | 222 1  |

| UNIT        | NOTE | ASSIGNED STRENGTH |     | STRENGTH RPT DATE | DANANG |     | CHU LAI |     | PHU BAI |     | No I CTZ |     | OKINAWA |     | JAPAN |     | HAWAII |     | EASTPAC |     | OTHER |     |
|-------------|------|-------------------|-----|-------------------|--------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|----------|-----|---------|-----|-------|-----|--------|-----|---------|-----|-------|-----|
|             |      | USMC              | USN |                   | USMC   | USN | USMC    | USN | USMC    | USN | USMC     | USN | USMC    | USN | USMC  | USN | USMC   | USN | USMC    | USN | USMC  | USN |
| 1ST BRIG    |      |                   |     |                   |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| HAG-24      |      |                   |     |                   |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| HAMS-24     |      | 448               |     | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     | 448    |     |         |     |       |     |
| MABS-24     |      | 306               | 21  | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     | 306    | 12  |         |     |       |     |
| MACS-2      |      | 193               |     | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     | 193    |     |         |     |       |     |
| MATCU-70    |      | 43                |     | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     | 43     |     |         |     |       |     |
| VMFA-212    |      | 253               |     | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     | 253    |     |         |     |       |     |
| VMFA-235    |      | 255               |     | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     | 255    |     |         |     |       |     |
|             |      |                   |     |                   |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
|             |      |                   |     |                   |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| 3D MAW      |      |                   |     |                   |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| NHG-3       |      |                   |     |                   |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| HAMS-3      |      | 668               | 28  | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 668     | 28  |       |     |
| MWFS-3      |      | 153               |     | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 153     |     |       |     |
| MWCS-3      |      | 231               |     | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 231     |     |       |     |
|             |      |                   |     |                   |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| MCRTG-10    |      |                   |     |                   |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| HAMS-10     |      | 227               | 1   | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 227     | 1   |       |     |
| VMAT-102    |      | 189               |     | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 189     |     |       |     |
| VMT-103     |      | 199               |     | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 199     |     |       |     |
|             |      |                   |     |                   |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| NHG-30      |      |                   |     |                   |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| HAMS-30     |      | 366               | 1   | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 366     | 1   |       |     |
| HNBT-301    |      | 172               | 1   | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 172     | 1   |       |     |
| HNBT-302    |      | 220               | 1   | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 220     | 1   |       |     |
|             |      |                   |     |                   |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| HAG-33      |      |                   |     |                   |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| HAMS-33     |      | 923               | 2   | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 923     | 2   |       |     |
| MABS-33     |      | 419               | 3   | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 419     | 3   |       |     |
| MATCU-65    |      | 68                |     | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 68      |     |       |     |
| VMCJ-3      |      | 366               | 1   | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 366     | 1   |       |     |
| VMFA-214    |      | 208               |     | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 208     |     |       |     |
| VMFA-531    |      | 309               | 1   | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 309     | 1   |       |     |
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| WNR-352     |      | 358               | 1   | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 358     | 1   |       |     |
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| HAG-38      |      |                   |     |                   |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| HAMS-38     |      | 258               | 3   | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 258     | 3   |       |     |
| MACS-3      |      | 274               |     | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 274     |     |       |     |
| MACS-3      |      | 268               |     | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 268     |     |       |     |
| MACS-7      |      | 275               | 1   | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 275     | 1   |       |     |
| 1ST LAAM BN |      | 206               |     | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 206     |     |       |     |
| 2D LAAM BN  |      | 810               | 10  | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 810     | 10  |       |     |
|             |      |                   |     |                   |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| HAG-56      |      |                   |     |                   |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     |         |     |       |     |
| HAMS-56     |      | 449               |     | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 449     |     |       |     |
| MABS-56     |      | 329               | 1   | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 329     | 1   |       |     |
| MATCU-74    |      | 90                |     | 2DEC69            |        |     |         |     |         |     |          |     |         |     |       |     |        |     | 90      |     |       |     |

|                |        |          |       |       |  |  |       |       |       |        |     |   |  |
|----------------|--------|----------|-------|-------|--|--|-------|-------|-------|--------|-----|---|--|
| HMM-163        | 322    | 2DEC69   |       |       |  |  |       |       |       |        | 322 |   |  |
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| HMM-265        | 174    | 2DEC69   |       |       |  |  |       |       |       |        | 174 |   |  |
| HMM-363        | 312    | 2DEC69   |       |       |  |  |       |       |       |        | 312 |   |  |
| MATCU-75       | 59     | 2DEC69   |       |       |  |  |       |       |       |        | 59  |   |  |
|                |        |          |       |       |  |  |       |       |       |        |     |   |  |
|                |        |          |       |       |  |  |       |       |       |        |     |   |  |
| USMC           | 29,213 |          | 7,932 | 4,174 |  |  | 1,903 | 2,391 | 1,559 | 10,741 | 513 |   |  |
| USN            | 344    |          | 129   | 63    |  |  | 27    | 34    | 21    | 64     | 6   |   |  |
| AVIATION TOTAL | 29,557 |          | 8,061 | 4,237 |  |  | 1,930 | 2,425 | 1,580 | 10,805 | 519 |   |  |

## RECAPITULATION OF FMFPAC PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION

|                |      | ASSIGNED<br>STRENGTH | DAI NANG | CHU LAI | PHU BAI | No I CTZ | OKINAWA | JAPAN | HAWAII | EASTPAC | OTHER |
|----------------|------|----------------------|----------|---------|---------|----------|---------|-------|--------|---------|-------|
| GROUND TOTAL   | USMC | 82,282               | 39,456   | 1,560   | 523     | 4,727    | 15,417  | 570   | 3,841  | 12,246  | 3,942 |
|                | USN  | 3,668                | 1,762    | 21      | 0       | 74       | 999     | 0     | 150    | 509     | 153   |
| AVIATION TOTAL | USMC | 29,213               | 7,932    | 4,174   |         |          | 1,903   | 2,391 | 1,559  | 10,741  | 513   |
|                | USN  | 344                  | 129      | 63      |         |          | 27      | 34    | 21     | 64      | 6     |
| GRAND TOTAL    | USMC | 111,495              | 47,388   | 5,734   | 523     | 4,727    | 17,320  | 2,961 | 5,400  | 22,987  | 4,455 |
|                | USN  | 4,012                | 1,891    | 84      | 0       | 74       | 1,026   | 34    | 171    | 573     | 159   |

- NOTES:
- FIGURES IN "OTHER" ASSIGNED TO SLF'S.
  - FIGURES IN "OTHER" ASSIGNED TO VARIOUS LOCATIONS IN RVN.
  - PERSONNEL IN "OTHER" ARE ASSIGNED TO IT, ITT, SSC, CI TEAMS, RED EYE AND NUCLEAR ORDNANCE PLATOONS.
  - STRENGTH INCLUDED IN 1ST AND 3D TANK BATTALIONS.
  - THE 597 PERSONNEL LISTED IN "OTHER" ARE HOSPITALIZED AT LOCATIONS OTHER THAN OKINAWA, BUT ARE CARRIED ON THE ROLLS OF CASUAL COMPANY, MCB, CAMP BUTLER.

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*The device reproduced on the back cover is the oldest military insignia in continuous use in the United States. It first appeared, as shown here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804. With the stars changed to five points this device has continued on Marine Corps buttons to the present day.*



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